The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...

INTRODUCTION. SECT. IV.

THese absurdities following too evidently from the upper Way, Others of the same side wil∣ing to decline them as rocks and precipices, doe leave that Way, and present man to God in his decree of reprobation, lying in the fault and under the guilt of Originall sinne; and say, That God looking upon miserable mankind lying in Adams sinne, did decree the greatest part of them to eternall torments in hell without remedy, for the manifestation of his severe Justice.

But notwithstanding this difference among themselves, they agree well enough together. For this little jarre is not (in their judgements) enough to make a breach between them, as we may see in the Conference at the Hague, and in the Synod at Dort. In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Re∣monstrants have these words. Quoad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus hominem re∣spexit * 1.1 in hoc decreto nondum creätum, vel creätum & lapsum, quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non per∣tinet libentèr alii alios aequitate Christiana toleramus. After this in the Synod of Dort, they permitted Gomarus to goe the Supralapsarian way; and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took. For these are their words, An Deus in eligendo consideravit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos, existimant (viz. the Delegates aforesaid) non esse necessarium ut definiatur, modo sta∣tuatur * 1.2 Deum in eligendo considerasse omnes homines in pari statu. And to say the truth there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both say.

1. That the moving cause of reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man ori∣ginall, or actuall.

2. That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates, are necessary and unavoidable by Gods absolute decree.

These two things are the maxima gravamina that the other side stick at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way. But because this last is chosen by the most, and latest maintainers of the absolute decree, as the more moderate of the two, and the easyer to be defended, I will set down the conclusion which I dislike in their way and words.

God hath absolutely purposed from eternity, of his meer will and pleasure without any considera∣tion of actuall continuance in sinne and unbeliefe, utterly to cast off from grace and glory, Millions of men considered in the fall (even those whom he calls to repentance and solvation by the Preaching of the Gospell) for the manifestation of his severity and Justice.

That all mankind is involved in the first sinne and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of na∣ture, and the guilt of eternall death, I confidently believe. But that God did absolutely intend to leave men in that woefull state for ever, and upon this only sinne, to build a peremptory decree of the una∣voidable damnation of the farre greater part of mankind, I cannot yet be perswaded.

Having thus plainly laid down the position, which I deem to be false, I come now in the next place to deliver my reasons against it, which are of two sorts:

• 1. Such as first made me to question the truth of it.
• 2. Such as doe for the present convince me that it cannot be a truth.

TWISSE Consideration.

HEre breaks out the main reason, that moved this Author to represent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predestination, that so a way might be opened unto him at pleasure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the proofe of his criminations, he might the better ease himselfe of the burthen thereof, by shewing the dissent of other Devines of the same profession from the former in this particular, making choyce rather to shape the object of Predestination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, ly∣ing in the masse corrupt by the fall of Adam. For surely it is to be presupposed, that they did not dissent from their former friends without some reason, and this Author makes bold to insinuate, that these absurdities mentioned by him were the reasons: As when he saith, These absurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the same side willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices doe leave that way. But that these were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor so much as adventureth upon the proofe thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to supply that by his forwardnesse, to take it upon trust; as if this discourser by his morall carriage, might winne the opinion of so much worthinesse, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the darke, quicum in tenebris mices. And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a mid∣dle opinion between these; namely, of those who make the object of predestination the masse of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon Junius, and appeals to his Theses, as giving evident testimony thereunto. Now there is no shew or colour of reason, why, to avoyd the absurdities premised by this Author, any man should decline the first way, and embrace the second, which is the way of Junius. And this I conceive to be the main reason, why this second way is altogether dissembled by this Author, or by the spirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every sorry consideration to serve his turne in the way of motive, learning to represent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongst our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the justification of his ab∣surdities charged upon the first way, from the mouthes or practice of our Divines, at least in appearance: and some colour hereof he findes by declining the first way and falling upon the third; but no colour at all by declining the first way and falling upon the second. Therefore he thought it a part of his wisdome altogether to dissem∣ble the second, and to represent the opinion of those Divines who decline the first (yea and second too) and fall upon the third. But suppose Iunius had preferred the third way and not the second, Had he done it out of a desire to decline the absurdi∣ties here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet he set not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintaines all these considerations to have their place in Predestination, and therefore makes Hominem communiter consideratum the object of predestination, which as it is a notion abstract from all the three speciall notions of nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or deni{que} corruptum, so it is indifferently applyable unto them all. And indeed Piscator re∣solves the question about the object of Predestination, namely, that as Predestination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, so the object must necessarily be mankind not yet created; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, so the object (as he thinkes) must be mankind created, but not yet corrupted; and lastly as it includes the decree of chusing some out of that corrupt masse, and refusing others or leaving them in it. so the object of his judgement must be mankind both created and corrupted. And Arminius himselfe professeth, that the twenty reasons wherewith he disputeth against the first way, may also be accommodated against the other waies. And albeit the followers of the second and third way doe think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the

absurdities wherewith the other waies are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did justify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of Iunius, as before I mentioned. Moulin indeed disputes against the first, but doth he, to decline that, subsist in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Masse the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes Gods decree of damnation, he premiseth thereunto, the foresight of finall impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin sound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concurre with him, we should no∣thing trouble our selves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that par∣ticular of reprobation. And wee of the first way are willing to professe, that God neither damnes nor decrees to damne any man, but for sinne and finall perseverance therein; nor so only, but in plain termes to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of damnation precede the consideration of sinne, and final im∣penitency; though we doe not make the consideration of sinne to precede the intenti∣on of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my understanding, other reasons there are, which cast Divines upon the third way, then the declining of these absurdities men∣tioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of justice, doe presup∣pose sinne. And whereas Arminius in his conference with Iunius, produceth five rea∣sons against the first way, no lesse then foure of them proceed on this manner; The first thus, Praedestinatio est voluntas Dei de illustrandâ suâ gloriâ per misericordiā & justitiā: At illa vo∣luntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedestinatio est pars provi∣dentiae administrantis & gubernātis humanū genus; ergò posterior naturâ actu creationis vel proposito creandi. Si posterior actu creationis vel propositio creandi hominē, jam homo praedestinationis objectum non est consideratus, ut nondū conditus. His 4^th argument is this, Predestinatio est praeparatio super∣naturalium bonorū; ergo praecedit communicatio naturaliū, & proptereà creatio in naturâ sive actu, sive in decreto Dei. His last reason is of the same nature thus, Illustratio sapientiae Dei per creationē prior est illustratione sapientiae Dei quae est administratio praedestinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo crea∣tio prior est praedestinatione. To all which reasons of his, I have answered in my Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Praedestin. digress. 5. in severall chapters. Only the second argument of Arminius insisteth upon Gods ordination of mans fall. And to be freed from the trouble of answering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the first and second way, and embarking our selves in the third. But how freed? surely only so farre, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, suppo∣sing Adams fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning A∣dams fall. But neverthelesse it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted A∣dam to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the first way, acknowledge no o∣ther Providence divine concerning the ingresse of sinne, as sinne, into the world, but in the way of permission. Sinne as sinne admitting no cause efficient, but deficient on∣ly. And it is utterly impossible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in for∣bearing to doe what he doth not, should in any culpable, or justly blameable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon Gods permission it follow∣eth, * 1.3 that sinne shall be committed by the creature; We readily professe it doth. This Vorstius acknowledgeth a favorite of the Arminians. Nay doth not Arminius himself deliver it expresly, where he saith, That when God permitteth the willing of ought, Necesse est ut nullo argumentorum genere persuadeatur ad nolendum? This he delivers without all qualification of the necessity mentioned, which we doe not. And this also Nava∣rettus a Papist professeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jesuite that opposeth him in this. And if any man inferre herehence, that then God determining to permit sinne, did determine that sinne should enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did so ordaine namely, that sinne should come to passe by his permis∣sion. Non aliquid fit (saith Austin) nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse * 1.4 faciendo. And Bellarmine professeth, that, Bonum est mala fieri Deo permittente: so that here∣in God doth not will evill, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of Bel∣larmine; and that in the heat of his opposition against our Divines in this particular. And Arminius is expresse in saying, Voluit Deus Achabum mensuram scelerum implere. And what is this but, Peccata peccatis cumulare? And though the Jesuits and Arminians doe * 1.5 with all their force resist, yet it evidently followes from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of sinne, dictated by Arminius himselfe. For efficacious grace with the Jesuites, consists in the

congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof consists in this, that God foreseeth that upon the confession thereof sinne will be avoided. Now what is the reason why God grants such a grace, whereupon he seeth sin will not be avoided; and denies such a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knowes full well that sinne would be avoided; but because his pleasure is, that sinne shall be committed by his permission, and not be avoyded, although he hath given them grace sufficient to avoid it, as they say, and it was most true of Adam in the state of innocency. In like sort doth Arminius distin∣guish of, Peceati impedimentum sufficiens & efficax, Efficacious hinderance of sinne, is that whereby God seeth sinne will be avoided; sufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withall he confesseth, that God in the Promptuary of his wisdome, hath not only such impediments as are sufficient to the avoiding of any sinne, but such also, as whereby any sinne would indeed be avoided, were he pleased * 1.6 to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit sinne, he doth not grant such impediments. And is not this a manifest evidence, that it is Gods will, that sinne shall come to passe (to wit, as often as it doth come to passe) by his permission? But suppose all our Divines that embrace the third way, doe imagine the absurdities here spoken of, to be justly chargeable upon the first way. Yet as he thinks them in an er∣rour, while they conceive they can with ease avoid these absurdities by their third way, let him be pleased to conceive, they may as well be in an errour, in thinking them justly chargeable upon the first way; and consequently their opinion is nothing suffi∣cient to justify, that they are unremoveable by them that embrace the first way.

It is true there is no cause of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I shewed in my digressions De Praedestinatione Digress. 1. seeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of Gods grace, or of his sove∣raignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and consequently, to make whom he will vessels of mercy, and whom he will vessells of wrath; but equally they stand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of Gods decrees of creation, permission of the fall of Adam, giving grace of faith and repentance unto some, and denying it to others, and finally saving some and damning others, whereupon only arise the different opinions, as touching the object of predestination and reprobation, it is meerly Apex Logicus, a poynt of Lo∣gick. And were it not a meer madnesse, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, meerely upon a poynt of Logick? Thus have I justified the improba∣bility and utter unlikelihood, that ever any schisme will be made in the Church of God, upon these nice and meer Logicall differences, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a passage that hereafter he representeth therehence, and that farther into the Book then these my digressions are upon the point of predestination, but is content to take no notice thereof, least it might hinder the course of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he should be serviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are said unanimously to agree, and which he calls maxima gravamina. It is true they doe agree herein, but it may be in a farre other sense, then he is willing should be taken notice of. For as for the first,

1. That the moving cause of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man ori∣ginall or actuall.

1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cause of election, but only the will of God; so no sinne or evill work of man is the cause of reprobation, but only the will of God.

1. That so it is of election, the Apostle both

1. Saith, Election is not of Workes but of him that calleth.

2. And proveth thus, Before Esau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said, The Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Workes (that is of good workes) but of him that calleth.

2. That so it is of reprobation, I prove by the same argument of the Apostle, thus, Before Esau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was said the Elder shall serve the Younger; therefore reprobation stands not of workes (that is of evill workes) but of the meer pleasure of God.

1. And like as this is farther evident by Gods course of calling in the point of Election, as the Apostle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in bestowing faith and repentance upon

them. For as the Apostle afterwards professeth, He hath mercy on whom he will.

2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuseth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the same Apostle professeth, saying, that God hardneth whom he will.

2. And this doctrine we doe explicate by distinguishing that which our Adversa∣ries desire to confound, least their cheating carriage should be discovered, as former∣ly I have shewed.

For Predestination and Reprobation, may be considered either quoad Praedestinantis & Reprobantis actum; or quoad Praedestinationis & Reprobationis terminum, as much as to say, quoad res praedestinatione & reprobatione praeparatas, that is, either as touching the act of Predestination and Reprobation, or as touching the things decreed by Predestination or Reprobation. Now as touching the act of Predestination never any man (saith Aquinas) was so mad as to say that the merits of man are the cause of predestination. And why so? Because the act of predestination is the act of Gods will, and formerly (saith he) I have shew∣ed, that there can be no cause of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God. Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobati∣on as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act also of Gods will? This can∣not be denied: and herehence it followes, that like as there can be no cause of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, so there can be no cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgement to say, that merits were the cause of predestination, as touching the act of God predestinating; so it is no lesse madnesse in his judgement, to maintain that either sinne originall or actuall, can be the meritorious cause of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating.

And what are the reasons hereof in School-divinity? Why surely these. 1. Prede∣stination and Reprobation are eternall, but good workes and evill workes of the creature are temporall; but impossible it is, that a thing temporall, can be the cause of that which is eternall. 2. The act of Predestination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will, and the act of Gods will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very es∣sence of God even God himselfe; and therefore to introduce a cause of Gods will, is to bring in a cause of God himselfe. 3. If works or faith foreseen be any moving cause of Divine election, then either they are so of their own nature, or by the meer constitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the constitution of God: but this cannot stand neither. For if by the constitution of God, then it would follow, that God did constitute, that upon foresight of mans faith he would elect him, that is, ordaine him to salvation. And what I pray is to constitute? Is it any other then to ordaine? And herehence it followeth, God did ordaine that upon foresight of mans faith, he would ordaine him unto salvation: Whereby the e∣ternall ordination of God, is made the object of his eternall ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporall, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternall. In like sort I dispute of repro∣bation: if sinne be the cause thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cause there∣of, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confesse: if you say by the ordinance of God, then it follows God did ordaine, that upon the foresight of mans sinne, he would ordaine him unto damnation. For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to consider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto considered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and shewed that thus they can have no cause.

But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cause as Aquinas pro∣fesseth and we professe with him. As for example to begin with election.

The things decreed or destinated to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both these may have a cause: For both Grace is the cause of glory; and Christs merits are the cause both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly understood. For in the confuse notion of grace many are apt to lurke, thereby to shut their eyes a∣gainst the evidence of truth. For no marvail if men be in love with their own er∣rours; and in proportion to the love of errour, such is their hatred of Divine truth op∣posite thereunto. Now by grace, we understand the grace of regeneration, whereby

that naturall corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindnesse of mind and hardnesse of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through originall sin, is in part cured. More distinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we say God bestowes on whom he will, finding all equall in infidelity and impenitency. For so the Apostle tells us, that, God hath mercy on whom he will. And as God bestowes it on * 1.7 whom he will, not finding any cause in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine constitution, moving him to bestow this grace on any. So the Apostle 2 Timoth. 1. 9. God hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our workes, but according to his own purpose and grace. And indeed we being all found dead in sinne, what could be found in one to move God to bestow the life of faith and re∣pentance upon him, more then upon another? And if any such thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then should grace be bestowed according unto works, that is in the Fathers phraise (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years agoe, in the Synod of Palestine: and Pelagius him∣selfe was driven to subscribe unto it, otherwise they had condemned him also.

But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not bestow this on whom he will, finding men equall without any moving cause thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cause hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cause in man by constitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to bestow solvation on some, and not on others. For God hath made a graci∣ous promise, that whosoever beleeveth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and re∣pentance unto death shall be saved, and whosoever beleeveth not and repenteth not shall be damned. So then though men are equall in originall sinne, and in naturall corruption, and God bestowes faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when, he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equall in morall condition; and accordingly God cannot be said on like manner, to bestow glory & solvation on whō he will; For he hath tyed himselfe by his own constitution to bestow solvation on none, but such as dye in thestate of grace. Yet, I confes, some say that God bestows solvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & bestows these graces on whō he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the use of this phraise of bestowing this or that on whom he will. For when God bestowes faith and repentance, he findes them on whom he will bestow it, no better then others: But when he comes to the be∣stowing of glory he findes them, on whom he bestowes that, farre better them others.

Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and these are two.

1. The denyall of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and re∣pentance, whereby mans naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured.

2. The denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The first of these, to wit, the denyall of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it must needs be so, in ease God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apostle professeth, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, so he hardneth whom he will. And as God denies this grace to whom he will, so did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a diffe∣rence considerable: For albeit God hardneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithstanding, like as it is just with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that sinne whether originall or actuall, wherein he findes them, when the ministry of the word is afforded them: so like∣wise it cannot be denied to be iust with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured. But yet because God hath not made any such consti∣tution, namely, that whosoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, shall be so left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly said, as to cure it in whom he will, so to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equall in originall sinne, and consequently lying equally in this their naturall infidelity and impenitencv. So wee may iustly say, there is no cause at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the meer pleasure of God that is the cause of this difference. And if any list to contend hereabouts, we shall be willing to entertaine him, and conferre our strength of argumentation on this point.

2. But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the second thing decreed in reprobation, there is alwaies found a cause motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denyall of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the meer pleasure of his will, & that

by reason of his own constitution, having ordained that whosoever continueth final∣ly in infidelity, in profane courses, and impenitency shall be damned. And albeit on the other side it may be said in some sence (as formerly I have shewed) that God saves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he bestowes on whom he will; yet in no congruous sence can he be said to damne whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of sinne, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he workes, but sinne and the evill thereof he only permits, not causeth it. And lastly, as God doth not damne whom he will, but those only whom he finds fi∣nally to have persevered in sinne without repentance: so neither did he decree to damne, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only those who should be found finally to persevere in sinne without repentance.

Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; The moving cause of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the sinne of man originall or actuall: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We say that reprobation doth signify, either a purpose of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpose of inflicting damnation. And each may be considered, either as touch∣ing the act of Gods decree, or as touching the things decreed. We shew how the Ar∣ticle holds or holds not, being differently accommodated.

1. As touching the things decreed,

1. As touching the deniall of grace, We say, That God decreed of his meere good pleasure to deny unto some the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any mo∣tive cause hereunto found in one more then in another.

2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We say, That God decreed to in∣flict damnation on some, not of his meer pleasure, but meerly for their finall perse∣verance in sinne without repentance.

2. As touching the very act of Gods decree, We say, Nothing in man could be the cause hereof, but the meer pleasure of God, as Aquinas professeth it a mad thing to devise in man a cause of divine predestination, as touching the act of God prede∣stinating, & as I have shewed, because both are eternall and the act of Gods will, which is God himselfe: and withall to devise a cause hereof, is to cast our selves upon an unavoydable absurdity, as namely to say, That God did ordaine that upon the fore∣sight of this or that in men, he would ordaine some of them to solvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harshnesse of the Tenent, consists chiefly in con∣founding these different considerations, whereby a colour is cast, as if we main∣tained that God did decree to damne men of his meere pleasure and not for sin.

2. As touching the second which is this, That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates are necessary, and unavoydable by Gods absolute decree. Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapt together, as unavoydable by Gods ab∣solute decree; whereas it is without all question, that supposing impenitency to be fi∣nall, damnation is unavoydable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whosoever dies in impenitency shall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that originall corruption wherein all are borne? I perswade my selfe they doe not. Corvinus professeth of all, That by the sinne of Adam, they are, conjecti in necessitatem peccandi. Then againe doth he main∣taine * 1.8 that any is able to cure this but God. It seems he doth not by that which fol∣loweth, where he signifieth that God (in his opinion) did not absolutely intend to leave men to that woefull estate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If so, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impossible God should not doe that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of justice. But nothing more manifest, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certain∣ly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is mans fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to say, if man would doe somewhat which he may doe, then God would give him repen∣tance. Here is good stuffe towards; and undoubtedly, this is the criticall point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how carefull the greatest Rabbies amongst the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifestly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given secundum merita, according to some good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synode of Palestine above 1200 years agoe; Nay what will you say, if their doctrine hereabouts

in the issue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere; modo Velit, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle resipiscere, modò Velit, as I can shew it under the hand of one? and I have cause to suspect that it comes also from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deale with. And in this case it shall not be true that God shews mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he shall shew mer∣cy on whom man will. And like as when a question is made, why such a man is re∣warded by the Magistrate, no wise man will answer because it is the pleasure of the Magistrate so to reward him, but rather represent the cause on mans part, why he was reward: so if God shews mercy in giving repentance according to some preparation found in one man, rather then in another, it shall not be said, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reason on mans part is to be represented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet these Petitions he calls maxima gravamina on the part of Reprobation.

And will he not give us leave to propose in proportion hereunto, our maxima grava∣mina, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the meer pleasure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreseen, that is the mo∣ving cause of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and re∣pent, and no man hath more cause to be thankfull unto God; for giving him any more grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) then he gives to reprobates. I speak of reprobate men, but for ought I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angells. And as touching that which they call grace subsequent, which is only Gods concurrence, seeing God affords that to a∣ny sinfull act, they may thank themselves, rather then God for that, like as for Gods concurrence unto any act of sinne. These doctrines are no gravamina to the tender consciences of our Adversaries.

The doctrine opposite to this which here he dislikes must needs be this, God hath not absolutely purposed from eternity of his meer will and pleasure, but upon consideration of actuall con∣tinuance in sinne and unbeliefe, to cast off men from grace and glory. Now this actuall conti∣nuance in unbeliefe I presume must be finall; and upon the consideration hereof, God casts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? surely from the grace of faith; otherwise it stands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the issue comes to this, Whom God foresees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they shall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foresees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they shall not repent unto death. This is the sober and savoury doctrine of these impugners of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a spirit of giddinesse possesseth them in this.

It is without question (I think) that God leaves many in that woefull estate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any specification wherein it consists) the guilt whereof is eternall death; and seeing that if he so leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended so to leave them. All the question is, Whe∣ther God did absolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he professeth his dislike of Gods absolue intention hereof, so dealt clearly, and shewed how he did intend so to leave some, as namely upon what condition, or upon foresight whereof, and withall given some proofe of his assertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we say, that God did not at all intend to leave men in this state. For the terme, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he speaks of some or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woefull state, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expressely called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Repro∣bates, I doe not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And Austin lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. speaking of the Non praedestinati: Illorum neminem (saith he) adducit Deus ad salubrem spiritualem{que} paenitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Christo, sive il∣lis ampliorem patientiam, sive non imparem praebeat: and if not unto repentance, then cer∣tainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then againe, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turkes and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woefull estate. If none are left but all are saved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternall death, for which not any suffers? And you may guesse by this whether this Authors Pretence of ac∣knowledgement of naturall corruption be not only from the teeth outward:

If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this wofull estate, and suf∣fer eternall death for that naturall corruption, let this Author answer, whether God intended to leave them in this woefull estate absolutely or no. For I professe wil∣lingly, I cannot imagine how God should intend this concerning such Infants and not absolutely, seeing before they come to the use of reason, there is no place for Di∣vine foresight of any thing in them, to put a difference between some and others.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Collat. Hag. Brand. p. 37.
• * 1.2

  Act. Synodal. pag. 3. & 48.
• * 1.3

  August. de Ci∣vit. Dei. l. 12. c. 7.
• * 1.4

  Lib. 2. de A∣miss. grat. & statis peccati. c. 14.
• * 1.5

  Exam. p. 162.
• * 1.6

  Armin. Ex∣am. p. 157.
• * 1.7

  Rom. 9. 18.
• * 1.8

  Defens. Ar∣min. pag. 394.