The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...

Sect. 2. Containing the first Objection with the answer thereunto devised, and my reply thereupon and an answer thereunto.

* 1.1

But God say some is soveraigne Lord of all creatures, they are truly and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth and doe with his own what he will? * 1.2

The question is not what an almighty soveraigne power can doe to poore vassalls, but what a power that is just and good may doe. By the power of a Lord his absolute and naked power he can cast away the whole * 1.3 masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to Omnipotencie or soveraingty, but by the power of a Judge, to wit, that actuall power of his, which is alwaies cloathed with goodnesse and justice, he cannot. For it is not compatible with these properties in God to appoint men to hell of his mere will and pleasure; no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall mind.

It is not compatible with justice which is a constant will of rendring to every one his due; and that is ven∣geance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. God is good, saith Saint Au∣stine, and God is just, he may without any desert free men from punishment, because he is good; But he cannot with∣out evill deserving condemne any man, because he is just. In an other place also he saith, If God be beleived to con∣demne any man that by sinne deserves it not, he is not to be believed to be free from injustice. 2. Nor is it com∣patible with goodnesse which is an inclination in God of communicating that good which is in himselfe un∣to his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his justice. And therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of himselfe without any motive in the reasonable cre∣ature, provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it or bestowing any good upon it.

As touching the Objection I hope this Authour will say so too. As touching the first, * 1.4 namely, that he is the soveraigne Lord of all creatures; and our Saviour Christ will say it for him, if he will not; as touching the last, namely, that it is lawfull for him to doe what he will with his owne. But I find noe need at all of this consideration, to make answer to his for∣mer vaine discourse: for he may see plainly that I have made noe use of these principles: but they have their place to justifie God in other courses; namely, 1. In punishing chil∣dren for the sinne of their fathers in great variety of judgments temporall; as in the con∣flagration of Sodome, and in drowning of the old world. 2. In damning many Infant chil∣dren of heathen men dying in originall sinne unremitted; as M. Mason in his lectures at Magdalen Hall maintained, that, the punishment of originall sinne unremitted was eternall damnation. And M. Hord confesseth as much in his preface, Sect: 4. 3. Yea and in making the Soule of Christ the holy Sonne of God an offering for the sinnes of others. But con∣sider we his answer.

To appoint to hell, what is it but to appoint to the sufferings of the torments of hell? Now doth any of our Divines maintaine that God appoints any man to the suffering of hell torments of his mere pleasure, and not for sinne? They doe not, and therefore this Authours discourse depends upon a mere fiction devised in his own brain. 2. The di∣stinction which here he makes is the distinction of Arminius, who maintained that God can doe that per potentiam, by power, which he cannot doe per justitiam, by justice, which I have disproved at large in a peculiar digression on this argument in my Vindiciae; and not one of my reasons there brought doth this Authour once offer to answer. And * 1.5 this opinion of his doth manifestly imply that God hath a power to doe that which is un∣just. 3. He supposeth very judiciously to his own advantage, that there is a justice in God towards his creature secluding the ordinance of his will; whereas both Suarez and Vas∣quez opposite in other particulars concerning God's justice, doe yet agree in this, that there is no justice in God towards his creature, but upon supposition of his will and * 1.6 ordinance as I have shewed. 4. He may as well say that it is not compatible with the ju∣stice of God to punish (as it signifies to inflict paineon) him who is holy. For justice is as well opposite to the punishing of an Inocent, as to the punishing of him in such a degree. And consequently God cannot in justice put an holy man to death, much lesse annihilate him; which if he saith, he shall contradict Arminius. 5. If it be not compatible with God's justice to inflict hell paines on any man, no fault of his preexisting in the eternall mind, then either Christ suffered not the paines of hell, or was not without fault; or lastly God was unjust in inflicting those paines upon him. 6. In the last place observe, for all this he gives us nothing but his bare word. So that if we give him leave he is like enough to dictate unto us Articles of beleife at his pleasure.

1 By what right is vengeance due to the obstinate and impenitent? Is it due by any other

right then by the ordinance of God? Cannot God pardon it if it please him, yea and cure it too? And if he be pleased to punish it, cannot he punish it as well by annihilation of the obstinate (so to set an end unto his sin as to himselfe) as by condemnation of him? That of Austine is spoken in reference to God's law, whereby he hath ordained that without evill deservings he shall not be condēned (yet Christ suffered hell paines without any evill deservings) In respect of the like law, he shall be unjust, if he he should not re∣ward them, who dye in faith and repentance, with everlasting life. This is only in respect of potentia ordinata, such a power as is ordained by his will. But as for potentia ahsoluta, pow∣er absolute, all confesse that God can annihilate the holy Angels.

2 How doth God communicate grace unto his creatures? is it not by necessity of na∣ture, or freedome of will? Philosophers were wont to argue the eternity of the world by this, that Bonum est sui communicativum, That which is good is apt to communicate it selfe, yea naturally and necessarily: And therefore God being optimus the best, as well as maximus the greatest, was most communicative, and that naturally and necessarily. If the same be this Authours opinion, he is as Atheisticall as they: But if by freedome of will he communicates his goodnesse, then he communicates his goodnesse, as when he will, so likewise how he will, and to whom he will. As Saint Paul expreslely professeth saying, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth, of such places as these this Au∣thour * 1.7 takes no notice, but so much the more Atheologically. Yet I am willing to take notice of what he brings, namely, that God is good to all; And so he is in doeing them good, many and sundry waies; in maintaining their being, But he is not in such sort good to all as he is said to be good to Israel. For he hath not dealt so with any nation, as with them. 2. 'Tis untrue that God communicates unto his creatures that good which is in himselfe: for the * 1.8 good which is in himselfe is of a more transcendent nature, then to be communicable un∣to creatures; such conceits are Manichaicall. God is essentally whatsoever he is: But the * 1.9 goodnesse this Authour speakes of, is of an accidentall nature unto us; And is it decent and not rather abominable to transforme the essence of God into an accident, that so it might be communicated to the creature.

3. If Gods goodnesse incline him to communicate goodnesse unto the creature, as farre as he can without wronging justice, then it inclines him to communicate holinesse un∣to all to preserve all from sinne, to bring all to faith and to repentance, and so to save all. For how could his justice be wronged in this?

4. When he saith, tha God of himselfe cannot without any motive in the reasonable creature provide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries; observe what an hun∣gry proposition this is; for will he say tht God can provide for any creature the greatest misery save one, though not the greatest of all without any motive in the creature? But if he can so provide the greatest save one, why not the greatest of all? What colour of rea∣son to put any difference in this! And if the greatest save two, why not the greatest save one? And so we may goe on till we come to the least misery, thereby to convince the un∣reasonablenesse of this assertion. For in cleare evidence of truth, reason cannot discover where to make a stand.

5. And what is the motive he meanes, but the motive of sinne? And what sinne did God the Father see in Christ the Sonne, that moved him to ordaine his deare Sonne to the suffering of hell paines?

6. And as he alledgeth Austine to little purpose, so to the contrary what he writes de predestinatione & gratia is well known. Si humanum genus quod creatum primitùs constat ex nihilo; sine debito mortis nasceretur, & tamen ex iis Creator Omnipotens in aeternum nonnul∣los damnare vellet interitum, quis Omnipotenti Creatori diceret, quare fecisti sic. If mankind which is well known, at first to be made of nothing, were born without the debt of death and sinne; Yet if the Almighty Creatour, would damne some of them to eternall destruction, who would say to the Almighty Creatour, why hast thou done so? And observe his reason, Qui enim cum non essent, esse donaverat, quo fine essent habuit potestatem For he that gave them being when for∣merly they had no being had power to dispose to what end they should be. There is nothing more evident by the light of nature then this. I willingly confesse that that this book though it goe under Austin's name, yet it is thought to be none of Austin's, and that amongst other * 1.10 considerations, by reason of this very sentence in particular, which seemes unto me very harsh, and contrary to Austin's doctrine in other places. But Raynaudus hath discovered at large the vanity of this reason, and shewes by variety of testimonies the concurrence of Antiquitie in bearing witnesse to the same truth. And albeit he confesseth the book not to be Austin's, yet he proves that Fulgentius was the Authour of it, alwaies accoun∣ted to be an Orthodox Father and well known to be a follower of Austin's.

Notes

• * 1.1

  M. Mason's Additons p. 16. 17.
• * 1.2

  Object.
• * 1.3

  Answer.
• * 1.4

  Reply.
• * 1.5

  Lib. 1 p. 2. digres. 4.
• * 1.6

  Vindic. l. 1. p: 3. digres. 1.
• * 1.7

  Rom: 9. 18.
• * 1.8

  Ps: 73. 1
• * 1.9

  Ps: 147. 20.
• * 1.10

  Raynaud: in adit. ad lib. Intitul. Vale∣rianus Inte∣ger doctrinae labis{que} purus.