The riches of Gods love unto the vessells of mercy, consistent with his absolute hatred or reprobation of the vessells of wrath, or, An answer unto a book entituled, Gods love unto mankind ... in two bookes, the first being a refutation of the said booke, as it was presented in manuscript by Mr Hord unto Sir Nath. Rich., the second being an examination of certain passages inserted into M. Hords discourse (formerly answered) by an author that conceales his name, but was supposed to be Mr Mason ... / by ... William Twisse ... ; whereunto are annexed two tractates of the same author in answer unto D.H. ... ; together with a vindication of D. Twisse from the exceptions of Mr John Goodwin in his Redemption redeemed, by Henry Jeanes ...

TWISSE Consideration.

THis Author seems to swell, in the conceit of his rationall performances, as if never any fly sitting upon a cart-wheele in a Sommers day had made such a dust as he had made. And fashioning to himselfe a victorious conquest, as if all his adversaries were but Pigmies to this Anakim, glad to runne into corners, or in∣to Acorn-cups to hide themselves there. For his reasons like some hobgoblins, doe so fright them, more then all the spirits that stand by the naked man in the book of Moones: And therefore all the help they have, if we believe this Pyrgopolinices is to charme them, by saying, that many things are delivered in Scripture, which are above the reach of humane capacity, among which this is one, &c. And I take this to be sound. For other∣wise, * 1.1 why should the Doctrine of Godlinesse, be called a mystery of Godlinesse. And the Schooles teach, that Fides est assensus inevidens: and Cajetan who was no gras-hopper,

as great an Anakim as this Author, or his familiar spirit takes himselfe to be, spares not to professe, that about the reconciling of Gods predestination with the liberty of mans will (a poynt that comes so neere to this in hand as a poynt can doe) there are many distinctions devised by the learned, but yet he saith of them, that they did not qutetare intellectum, and therefore that he did captivare suum in obsequium fidei: and Alva∣rez, no dwarfe neither in Scholasticall, that is, rationall Divinity, addeth that here∣in Cajetan piissimè & doctissimè loquitur. But who they are, that have taken notice, of those arguments here specified, and at the sight of them were so ston'd, as at the sight of some Medusas head, and thereupon came to this course of incantation or pacifi∣cation, he doth very wisely conceale, and like a man of authority, puts it upon us to take it upon his word. Yet I doe not remember that I have rested my selfe upon any such course, though the holy Apostle thinks it sufficient to cleare any course of God from injustice, by proving that Scripture doth attribute such a course unto God, as I have shewed out of Rom. 9. 14. It is true, the spirit which this Author breaths, is the right Pelagian spirit, according to the Pelagians in Bradwardines daies: for their vaunt was, that they could not be refuted by any reason Philosophicall, but only by certain naked authorities Theologicall, (as I have heard of a Schollar, some∣times challenged by a friend and kinsman of his, for being given (as he heard) to the Arminian Tenet, made a ready answer with protestation, that that opinion was very plausible, but that S^t Paul was against it.) And therefore Bradwardine undertakes to confute them by reason Philosophicall; so farre off was he from being cowed with their vain boasts and braggs. His words are these; Sicut antiqui Pelagiani ventoso nomi∣ne secularium scientiarum inflati consistorium Theologicum contemnentes Philosophicum flagitabant; ita & moderni. Audivi nam{que} quosdam advocatos Pelagii, licet multum provectos in sacris apicibus; affirmantes Pelagium nusquam potuisse convinci per naturalem & Philosophicam rationem; sed vix arguebatur utcun{que}, per quasdam authoritates Theologicas, maxime autem per authoritatem Eccle∣siae, quae Satrapis non placebat: Quapr opter per rationes & authoritates Philosophicas ipsos dispo∣sui reformare. And for my part, though I affect not in those poynts, to goe beyond Scripture and Christian reason, yet I am content to be led whethersoever my adver∣sary thinks good to lead me: And as a Schollar of my acquaintance being left han∣ded, and accordingly casting his cloake over the right shoulder, was answered by a Cittizen observing it, when he enquired his way, saying, when you shall come to such a place, you must turne on your right hand, meaning indeed, on the left; so likewise I am nothing afraid of this mans Philosophy, nor his Abettors neither, no∣thing doubting, but as many as I find opposing this divine truth, which we maintain, their best dexterity, in Philosophicall and rationall discourse, will prove but a left handed Philosophy: and in this very field of argumentation, I purpose to lay upon him ere we part. But let us first consider the things that he replies.

1. He saith, There is nothing in Scripture abhorring from sound and right reason, he addes, Odious too: as if his Philosophy had taught him, that it is the part of reason to hate, and not rather of affections. This rule when we were initiates in the University, we were soon acquainted with: Yet this Author to vent his fulnesse, casts himselfe upon an unnecessary proofe thereof, and the mischiefe is, that his proofe maketh his cause worse then it was before. For having formerly made the comparison between the word of God, and sound and right reason; in his reason he states the comparison be∣tween faith and reason, nature and Scripture, not distinguishing between nature cor∣rupt, and uncorrupt, reason corrupt and uncorrupt. Our service of God is reasona∣ble, in as much as it is performed by reasonable creatures, and the rule thereof is not * 1.2 naturall reason, but meerely the word of God. In whom was naturall reason more eminent, then in Philosophers? Yet were they wont to be called Haereticorum Patriar∣chae: and the Apostle hath professe of all such, that the things of God seem foolish∣nesse unto them, 1 Cor. 2. 14. Now I pray consider soberly, how reasonable such courses are judged to be, which are accounted foolishnesse, and what a sweet harmony there is between things revealed, and mens understandings; and whether reasonable, and foolish, be not a plain contradiction; as well as wise, and foolish. If we enjoy a more pure and refined reason then they, let us give illumination Divine the glory of it: and say with him in Job, verily there is a spirit in man, but the illumination of the Almighty giveth under∣standing. And seeing the word of God, is the only means of Divine illumination, let * 1.3 us thank Gods word for all. I come to the second Materiall of his reply.

2. And that is this, that all those Doctrine which are ad••erse and repugnant to understan∣dings

purged from prejudice and false principles, are not to be taken for Doctrines of Scripture, but devices of men, corrupting Scripture by false glosses and interpretations. No marvaile that when men oppose the misteries of Godlinesse, they fall upon the mysteries of iniquity. Here we have a rule given to try whether a Doctrine proposed, be to be taken for a Do∣ctrine of Scripture yea or no? And mark it well, I beseech you, and I desire that eve∣ry sober man will mark it well, and judge whether it deserve not to be numbred a∣mongst the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the depths of Satan: And withall judge whether the preten∣ded Author of this discourse, can in any probability be the Author of this, and whe∣ther it becomes not rather some old beaten Souldier in Arminianisme, that takes up∣on him to be the Master and Dictator of Sentences. About Regula fidei, the rule of Faith, there is much question between us and Papists; the meaning whereof is, what that is whereinto must be made the last resolution of our Faith? We say it is the word of God contained in the Books of the Old Testament and the New; Papists say, it is the voyce of the Church. This Author deviseth a new way, which I think was never heard off before, except among the Socinians, namely, that it is the judgement of under∣standings purged from prejudice and false Principles. For albeit the Doctrine of Faith, we judge to be contained no where, but in Gods word, yet notwithstanding as touching the meaning of it, nothing must be taken to be the true meaning of Scripture, how fairely soever grounded thereupon in shew, unlesse withall it seem nothing repug∣nant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles. Into this therefore must be made the last resolution of our faith.

Again, where shall we meet with these judges as they are here described, to wit, as having their understandings purged from prejudice and false principles: undoubtedly, like as the Church of Rome, when they have once brought the matter hitherto, that the last resolution of faith, must be made into the voyce of the Church, are confident enough, that when the question is made of the voyce of the Church, where that is to be found, they shall undoubtedly be able to carry it for the Church of Rome: So these Armi∣nians, or Socinians rather, when they have once brought the matter to this passe, that the last resolution of our faith must be made into the judgement of mens understan∣dings purged from prejudice and false principles; and that the question beginneth to be made of understandings thus purified, where they are to be found, they will be so favou∣rable to themselves, as to conceive, that such understandings are to be found no where, but amongst the nation of the Arminians; or at least among such, whose judgements are naturally inclined towards their Tenets. But is this a decent course to rest in the judgement of any mans understanding, whereas the soundnes of his un∣derstanding is not, nor cannot be discerned, but by the strength of his argument: and again, considering the judgement of man is miserably corrupted in such sort, as that the things of God seem foolishnesse unto them, Is it not much fitter that we should judge of e∣very mans understanding by Gods word, which cannot erre, rather then judge of the meaning of the word by the understanding of man? Let any man use his understan∣ding in opening and interpreting the word of God unto us, and clearing the mean∣ing thereof unto us as much as he can, by reason, by argument, by demonstration, but still let it be indifferent for any to judge, in what congruity his interpretation stands with the Text it selfe, and no mans judgement to be a rule of Faith unto o∣thers.

Before he goes off from this, he gives another description of those, whose judge∣ments must be the rule of the right interpretation of Scripture; to wit, such as stand in∣different to the entertainment of any truths. Now this seems to me to be as poore as the for∣mer, or rather much poorer. For this indifferency as I take it, is in respect of affecti∣ons; now albeit a man may be thus disposed, in respect of his affections, yet he may be of a very weak judgement; as for example, I have heard of a good man, that was sometimes wavering about the poynt of Ceremonies, yet very willing to receive in∣formation; and therefore conferres with both sides, as well such as held them law∣full in the use, as with those that held them unlawfull, and still was carried every way with the force of their reasons, who conferred with him for the present. Then again, suppose the indifferent were most fit to judge, where shall we find those indifferent persons, or who shall give rules, and what rules, according whereto to proceed in this our inquisition? Again, who are to be presupposed in likelihood, to be the more indifferent, then such as have not hitherto been versed in these controversies, and is it fit, that they who have been many years versed in them, should stand to the judge∣ment

of those who are little or nothing exercised therein? Lastly is the creature fit to judge of the Soveraignty of his creator, or being conceived of the freedome of his own will, to judge how farre it is reasonable, God should have power over his will and no farther? When the Apostle calls upon the Corinthians, to judge whether that which he wrote unto them, were the commandements of God or no, whom doth he call unto this office? Doth he call any other but such as are spirituall? If there be any amongst you that is a Prophet, or spirituall, let him know that these things are the com∣mandements of God. 1 Cor. 14. He doth not say, if there be any amongst you, that hath his understanding purged from prejudice, and false principles, let him know that these things which I write unto you, are the commandements of God. And the same Apostle tells us, that the things of God are spiritually to be discerned. 1 Cor. 2. 14.

Yet it is remarkable, that he appeals to the judgement not of the best only, but the worst also in this: but something qualified I confesse, to wit, provided that they stand indifferent to the entertainment of any truths. Marke it well, of any truths: and who are these? Not possessed with the entertainment of any Truths, but indifferent to the entertain∣ment of them, I say who are these? The regenerate or unregenerate? Here I am at a stand, not knowing which way to take. But it may be this is spoken only in reference to our Doctrine of absolute Reprobation. But of whatsoever it be spoken, let him give instance in either or in both; it seems he is indifferent to have it take place either way, for he proposed it of best and worst. But why should he presuppose an unrege∣nerate man to be indifferent, to the entertainment of any truth? Whereas the Apo∣stle professeth of a naturall man, that he cannot know the things of God, and he gives the reason of it, because they are spiritually discerned; and formerly said that they were foolishnesse unto him. Yet I willingly confesse, the Doctrine of absolute Reprobati∣on, is very harsh to the judgement and affections of carnall men; and such as we had never embraced, had it not been for the word of God, which plainly professeth, that election is not of (good) works; and that by such an argument, as whereby it is mani∣fest, * 1.4 1. That election is as well proved not to be of faith, as not of works. 2. That reprobation is not of evill works; yet the harshnesse hereof, is nothing like so much appearing in its proper colours, as upon their deciphering and blazing of it, who are as zealous for making election to be upon foresight of faith and works (though this latter member, they are loath to have the World take notice of) as they are opposite to the absolutenesse of reprobation. Now whereas before I have shewed, that there is a great deale of difference between absolute election unto salvation, and election unto salvation absolute: And that not one of our Divines doth maintain, that God doth elect men unto salvation absolute, but to obtain salvation upon their faith and repentance, and finall perseverance therein: In like sort there is as great difference between absolute reprobation unto damnation, and reprobation unto damnation ab∣solute. And if none of our Divines doe maintain, that God ordains any man of ripe years to obtain salvation, otherwise then upon their faith and repentance, and finall perseverance: how much lesse doe they maintain, that God ordains any man unto damnation, otherwise then for his sinne and finall perseverance therein without re∣pentance? Whereas these enemies of the grace of God, as Saint Austin sometimes called the Pelagians, to make their cause more plausible to the affections or carnall men carry the matter so, as if we maintained that God ordained them to be damned absolutely, and for the meer pleasure of God, concealing the only cause for which God ordained, that they should be damned, namely, for the wilfull transgression of Gods holy Commandements. Only the giving and denying of the grace of regenera∣tion, the giving of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency that is found in all; and the leaving it uncured by denying faith and re∣pentance: this indeed we maintain to be absolute, according to that of Saint Paul, he hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. Rom. 9. 18. Now, dare any of them deny faith and repentance to be the gift of God? They doe not, they dare not; only of late they have come thus farre, as to deny that Christ merited faith and regeneration for any. Secondly, inquire whether God gives faith and repentance to some, and denyes it to others of his meere will and pleasure, or because he finds some good works in the one, which he finds not in the other. Here is the criticall poynt, we defend no other absolutenesse of election and reprobation, but such as de∣pends wholly on this, namely, that God finding men equall in corruption, hath compassion on some, giving them faith and repentance, which he denies unto others:

All other absolutenesse of Election and Reprobation, besides that which we undertake by cleare demonstration to deduce herehence, we utterly renounce. Neither can our adversaries be so grossely ignorant, as not to perceive that this is the criticall poynt of these controversies, the resolution of the truths wherein, will set an end to all conten∣tion about Election and Reprobation. Why then doe they not deale plainly, and try their strength in this, whereby they should carry themselves fairely and ingenuously, and deale above board. For here alone is that absolutenesse of God in execution, which we maintaine; but here they are not so prone to shew their hornes: this argu∣ment is not so fit for the raising of clamours and Tragedies. And hating the truth of God as touching his soveraignty over his creatures, to have compassion on whom he will, and to harden whom he will; as also the prerogatives of his grace, to work us effectually to that which is pleasing in his fight, and that in whom he will also: yet not daring plainly to deliver their mind in this, as wherein they are found most ab∣surd, and encumbred with shamefull contradictions; therefore by the back dore as it were, they hope to discredit it, and by opposing the absolutenesse of Reprobation, to supplant and undermine the Doctrine of Gods free grace. And not content with this, they miserably corrupt our doctrine also, in the poynt of absolute Reprobation, drawing it to this; as if not reprobation only, but damnation also were made absolute by us: and that God damned men not so much in the way of justice for their sinne, as of his own meere pleasure. At length to come to the third particular of his reply.

3. And that is this, that howbeit some things in Scripture, which are peculiar to the Gospell, are above our understandings, and must without hesitation be believed: yet many things there, have their foundation in nature, and may be apprehended by the light of nature; and amongst these, the justice of Gods waies is one, as hath been shewed. Isai 5. 3. and Ezek. 18. To this I answer, That the waies of God mentioned Isai. 5. 3. is only in his expecting fruits after so great pains that he had taken, in husbanding his vineyard. And Ezek. 18. consists on∣ly in rendring unto men according to their waies. Neither doth it follow, that be∣cause the justice of God doth plainly appeare in these particulars, therefore it doth appeare as cleerely, or comprehensively in all others. Is there no difference between the waies of God there mentioned, and the waies of Gods justice mentioned in other place; as namely, in causing the Sonnes of Achan to be stoned to death with Achan him∣selfe, for his Sacriledge: in drowning the old World, not sparing the very Infants and sucklings: and for their conspiracy against Moses and Aaron, causing the earth to swallow up not Dathan and Abiram only, but their Wives and Children, and all that they had? So in consuming Sodom and Gomorrah with fire. And as for the punishing of of sinne, this is no peculiar truth of the Gospell. I had thought the Gospell, in the proper nature thereof, had been above reason altogether, and no way capable of de∣monstration. And as for the justice of God, must not this suppose him to be a free a∣gent? Or was this known to Aristotle by all the light of nature whereunto he attai∣ned? We that believe him to be a free agent, and withall the creator of all, are ready to demonstrate, that it is in his power to doe what he will with his creature, and that not only to annihilate him, though never so holy, but to inflict what paine soever up∣on him, yea even the torment of hell fire; which Medina acknowledgeth to have been Communem omnium Theologorum sententiam, viz. that this he can doe, ut Dominus vitae & mortis; as I have shewed in my Vindiciae graciae Dei, and by variety of arguments pro∣ved it, more then once in two severall digressions, which this Author pretends to have seen, yet answereth not one of them. And as for justice divine toward the crea∣ture (whereupon this Author doth with such confidence discourse,) both Vasquez and Suarez Jesuits, in other poynts concerning Gods justice, are miserably at odds, yet joyntly concurre in this, that all iustice Divine, doth presuppose the free determina∣tion of Gods will: Now, because I find this Gentleman, so conceited of the purity of his rationall faculty, and the power thereof, as to require that all interpretation of Scripture, should veyle bonnet to the soveraignty thereof; I purpose to try his ability this way, for the expediting of certain arguments about the absolutenesse of Gods decrees in generall, and particularly of the decree of Reprobation. Therefore to com∣bate with him on his own ground, and in his own element, I dispute thus.

1. No temporall thing can be the cause of that which is eternall, but the sinnes of men are all temporall, whereas Reprobation is eternall, therefore the sinnes of men cannot be the cause of Reprobation.

If it be said, that sinne is not made the cause of reprobation, but as it exsists in Gods foresight, and so not so much sinne as the prescience of sinne is the cause of reprobati∣on. I reply, that this device cannot stand, viz. that the prescience of sinne should be the cause of reprobation, and that for this reason; The cause of reprobation where∣of we enquire, is of the nature of a meritorious cause, But the prescience of God can no way be said to be a meritorious cause thereof. Science and prescience are causes of Gods works in the kind of an efficient Physicall, not in the kind of an efficient morall, such as are all causes meritorious.

If it be farther said, that not so much the foresight of sin, as (to speak more proper∣ly) sinne foreseen is the cause of reprobation: I reply against it in this manner; sinne foreseen doth suppose Gods decree to permit sinne, and consequently if sinne foreseene be before reprobation, then also the decree of permitting sinne is before the decree of reprobation, that is, the decree of damning for sinne. But this cannot be, as I endea∣vour to prove by two reasons. The first is this; There is no order in intentions, but between the intention of the end and the intention of the means, and the order is this, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. Therefore if the decree of permitting sinne be before the decree of damning for sinne, the decree of permitting sinne must be the intention of the end, and the decree of damning for sinne must be the intention of the meanes. But this is notoriously untrue: For it is ap∣parent that damnation tends not to the permission of sinne, as the end thereof; for if it did then men were damned to this end, that they might be permitted to sinne. But far more likely it is, that sinne should be permitted to this end, that a man might be damned, which yet by no means doe I a vouch; other reasons I have, to shew the vanity of this argumentation. I rather professe, that permssion of sinne and damnation are not subordinate as end & means, but coordinate, both being means tending joyntly to a farther end, which, under correction from understandings purged from prejudice and false principles, I take to be the manifestation of Gods glory in the way of ju∣stice vindicative.

2. My second reason is, if permission of sinne be first in intention and then dam∣nation, it followes that permission of sinne should be last in execution; but this is most absurd, namely, that a man should be first damned, and then suffered to sinne.

2. My second principall argument is this; Reprobation, as it signifies Gods de∣cree, is the act of Gods will; now the act of Gods will is the very will of God, and the will of God is Gods essence, and like as there can be no cause of Gods essence, so there can be no cause of Gods will, or of the act thereof. Upon some such arguments as these, Aquinas disputes, that the predestination of Christ, cannot be the cause of our Predestination; adding that they are one act in God. And when he comes to the re∣solution of the question, he grants all as touching actum volentis, that the one cannot be the cause of the other; But only quoad praedestinationis terminum, which is grace and glory, or the things predestinated. Christ is the cause of them, but not of our prede∣stination, as touching the act of God predestinating. And I think I may be bold to presume, that Christs merits are of as great force to be the cause, why God should e∣lect man unto salvation; as mans sinnes are of force, to be the cause why God should reprobate him unto damnation. The same Aquinas (a tall fellow as touching Scolasti∣call argumentation) hath professed that no man hath been so mad as to say that merits are the cause of predestination, quoad actum praedestinantis; and why, but because there can be no cause on mans part of the will of God quoad actum volentis. Now reprobation is well knowne to be the will of God as well as election; and therefore no cause can there be on mans part thereof quoad actum reprobantis. And it is well knowne, there is a predestination unto death, as well as unto life, and consequently tis as mad a thing in his judgement to maintaine, that merits are the cause there of quoad actum praedestinantis

God by efficacious grace could breake off any mans infidelity if it pleased him, that is, by affording him such a motion unto faith, as he foresaw would be yeelded unto: this is easily proved by the evident confession of Arminius formerly specified. Now, Why doth God so order it, as to move some in such a manner, as he foresees they will believe; others in such a māner as he foresees they will not believe? but because his purpose is to manifest the glory of his grace in the salvation of the one, and the glory of his justice in the damnation of the other. Herein I appeale to the judgement and

conscience of every reasonable creature that understands it, in spight of all prejudice and false principles to corrupt him.

4. In saying sinne foreseen is the cause of Gods decree of damnation, they pre∣suppose a prescience of sinne, as of a thing future, without all ground. For no∣thing can be foreknown as future, unlesse it be future: now these disputers pre∣suppose a futurition of sinne, and that from eternity, without all ground. For consider, no sinne is future in its own nature, for in its own nature it is meerely possible and indifferent, as well not to be future, as to become future; and there∣fore it cannot passe out of the condition of a thing meerely possible, into the con∣dition of a thing future without a cause. Now what cause doe these men devise of the futurition of sinne? Extra Deum, nothing can be the cause thereof: For this passage of things out of the condition of things possible, into the condition of things future, was from everlasting, for from everlasting they were future; o∣therwise, God could not have known them from everlasting, And consequently the cause of this passage, must be acknowledged to have been from everlasting, and consequently nothing without God could be the cause of it, seeing nothing without God was from everlasting. Therefore the cause hereof must be found in∣tra Deum, within God; then either the will of God, which these men doe utter∣ly disclaime, or the knowledge of God; but that is confessed to presuppose things future, rather then to make them so; or the essence of God; now that may be con∣sidered either as working necessarily, (and if in that manner it were the cause of things future, then all such things should become future by necessity of nature, which to say is Atheisticall) or as working freely; and this is to grant, that the will of God is the cause why every thing meerely possible in its own na∣ture doth passe from everlasting into the condition of a thing future, if so be it were future at all. And indeed seeing no other cause can be pitched upon, this free will of God must be acknowledged to be the cause of it: And consequent∣ly the reason why every thing becomes future is, because God hath determi∣ned it shall come to passe; but with this difference, All good things God hath determined shall come to passe by his effection, All evill things God hath determi∣ned shall come to passe by his permission. And the Scripture naturally affords plenti∣full testimony to confirme this, without forcing it to interpretations congruous here∣unto, upon presumptuous grounds that these arguments proceed from understan∣dings purged from prejudice and false principles.

5. My fifth argument is this. If sinne be the cause of Reprobation, that is, of the decree of damnation, then either by necessity of nature, or by the constitu∣tion of God; not by necessity of nature, as all, that hitherto I have known confesse. But I say neither can it be by the free constitution of God; for mark what a notorious absurdity followeth hence, and that unavoidably, namely, that God did ordaine, that upon foresight of sinne, he would ordaine them to damna∣tion; marke it well, God did ordaine that he would ordaine, or God did decree that he would decree. In which words Gods eternall decree is made the object of Gods decree. Whereas it is well known that the objects of Gods decrees are meerely things tem∣porall, and cannot be things eternall: we truly say God did decree to create the World, to preserve the World, to redeeme us, call us, justify us, sanctify and save us, but it cannot be truly said, that God did decree to decree, or ordaine to or∣daine: for to decree is the act of Gods will, and therefore it cannot be the object of the act of Gods will. Yet these arguments I am not so enamoured with, as to force the interpretations of Scripture to such a sense, as is sutable hereunto, pre∣suming of the purity of my understanding, as purged from prejudice and false principles. I could willingly content my selfe with observation of the Apostles dis∣course, in arguing to this effect; Before the Children were borne, or had done good or e∣vill, it was said the elder shall serve the younger: therefore the purpose of God according to electi∣on * 1.5 stands not of works. In like manner may I discourse: Before the Children were borne or had done good or evill, it was said the elder shall serve the younger: therefore the purpose of God concerning Reprobation stands not of works. And like as hence it is inferred, that therefore election stands not of good works; so therehence may I inferre, that therefore repro∣bation stands not of evill works.

6. If sinne foreseen be the cause meritorious of reprobation, then faith and re∣pentance and good workes are the disposing causes unto election. For there∣fore

evill works foreseen are made the meritorious cause of reprobation, be∣cause evill works exsistent, are the meritorious cause of damnation. And if this be true, then also because Faith and Repentance and good workes, are the disposing causes unto salvation, then by the same force of reason, faith, repen∣tance, and good workes foreseen, must be the disposing cause unto election; But faith, repentance, and good workes foreseen, are not the disposing causes unto election; as I prove thus.

1. If they were then the purpose of God according to election, should be of faith, repentance, and good works, which is expressely denyed by the Apostle, as touching the last part; and may as evidently be proved to be denied by him in effect of the other parts also, by the same force of argumentation which he useth: as for example, from this anticedent of the Apostles, before the Children were borne, or had done good or evill, it no more evidently followeth that therefore the purpose of God according to election is not of workes, than it followeth that the same purpose of God according to election is not of faith, nor of repentance: For before they were borne they were no more capable of faith, or of repentance, than of any o∣ther good works. And undoubtedly faith and repentance are as good works, as any other.

2. If God doth absolutely work faith in some, and not in others according to the meer pleasure of his will, then it cannot be said, that faith foreseen, is the cause of any mans election. For in this case faith is rather the means of salvation, then salvation a means of faith; and consequently, the intention of salvation ra∣ther precedes the intention of faith, than the intention of faith can be said to precede the intention of salvation. And to this the Scripture accords, Acts 1348. As many believed as were ordained to everlasting life, making ordination to everlasting life the cause why men believed; answerable hereunto is that Acts 2. last. God added daily to the Church such as should be saved: and that of Paul to Titus, according to the faith of Gods elect: So that according to Pauls phrase fides est electorum, but according to the Arminians Doctrine the inverse hereof is a more proper and naturall predication, as to say, electio est fidelium.

But God doth absolutely work faith in some men, according to the meer plea∣sure of his will, denying the same grace to others: which I prove;

1. By Scripture. Rom. 9. 18. God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth, compared with Rom. 11. 30. Yee in times past have not believed, but now have obtained mercy; where it appears by the Antithesis, that to find mercy is to believe, that is, to obtain the grace of faith at the hands of God, in Saint Pauls phrase.

2. By cleare reason: for if it be not the meer pleasure of Gods will, that is the cause hereof, then the cause hereof must be some good workes, which he finds in some, and not in others; whence it manifestly followeth, that God giveth grace ac∣cording unto works, which in the phrase of the ancients is according to merits: and for 1200 years together, this hath been reputed in the Church of God meere Pelagianisme.

2. I further demand, what that good worke is, whereupon God workes it in one, when he refuseth to worke it in another? Here the answer I find given is this, that God doth work in man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 velle credere modo velit. Now of the absurdity hereof, I appeale to the very light of nature, and let all the books that ever were written on this argument be searched, and let it be enquired, whether ever any did expresse themselves in the manner of so palpable and grosse absurdity: as wherein the act of willing is made the condition of it selfe: whence it followeth evidently, that it must be both before it selfe, and after it selfe; for the condition must all∣waies exsist before the thing conditionated. Yet they are driven upon these rocks of absurdities in spight of their teeth: so shamefull is the issue of their discourses, who, in hatred of Gods truth revealed in Gods word, and in a proud conceit of their own performances in the way of argumentation, dare prescribe rules to all o∣thers, how to carry themselves in the interpretation of Scriptures; as namely, to be so warie, as that they doe not deliver any thing, repugnant to understandings purged from prejudice and false principles: as if the word of God supposed them that are admit∣ted to the studying thereof, to have their understandings already purged from pre∣judice and false principles: not that it is given by God for this very end, namely, to

purge our understandings: for what is the illumination or opening of the eyes of the mind, other than the purging of the understanding from prejudice and false princi∣ples: and how miserable these aeriall disputers doe betray themselves, and manifest how they are transported with prejudice, and corrupted not with false only, but grosse principles, by this it may appeare in part.

I come to the consideration of his reply to the second answer, which here he re∣presents.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1 Tim. 3. 16;
• * 1.2

  Rom. 12. 1.
• * 1.3

  Iob. 32. 8.
• * 1.4

  Rom. 9. 11.
• * 1.5

  Rom. 9. 11.