Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

II. Question.

The second Question also does very nearly relate to Conscience and it's conduct.* 1.1 viz. Since the Scripture is the perfect Rule of Conscience, and contains in it all the will of God, whether or no, and how far is a negative argu∣ment from Scripture to prevail?

The resolution of this depends upon the premisses.* 1.2 For if Scripture be the intire Rule of Faith, and of Manners, that is, of the whole service and worship of God, then nothing is an article of Faith, nothing can com∣mand a moral action, that is not it's whole kind set down in Scripture. This I proved by direct testimonies of Tertullian, S. Basil, S. Austin, S. Cyril, Theophilus Alexandrinus and S. Hierome, in the* 1.3 foregoing numbers. To which I adde these excellent words of S. Cyril of Jerusalem, speaking of the Jerusalem Creed, which he had recited and explicated and promis'd to prove from Scripture; he gives this reason, Nam Divino∣rum sanctorumque fidei mysteriorum nihil, ne minimum quidem, absque Di∣vinis Scripturis tradi debet, neque simplici probabilitate neque verborum ornatu traduci. Not the least part of the Divine and Holy mysteries of Faith must be delivered without the Divine Scriptures. Believe not me telling thee, unless I demonstrate what I say from the Divine Scripture. For the safety and conservation of our Faith relics upon the proof of the Divine Scriptures. But because there are some particulars and some variety in the practise of this rule, I am to consider it now to other purposes.

1. Nothing is necessary either to be believ'd or done unless it be in Scrip∣ture.* 1.4 Thus S. Gregory Nyssen argues,* 1.5 Ubinam dixit Deus in Evangeliis oportere credere in unum & solum verum Deum? Non possent ostendere nisi habeant ipsi novum aliquod Evangelium. Quae n. ab antiquis per tradi∣tionem ad haec usque tempora in Ecclesiis leguntur, hanc vocem non continent quae dicat, oportere credere vel baptizare in unum solum verum Deum, quem∣admodum

isti autumant, sed in nomen Patris & Filii & Spiritus Sancti. I have I confess something wondred at the matter of this discourse. For ei∣ther the Arrians have infinitely imposed upon us, and interpolated Scri∣pture in a very material article; or else S. Gregory forgot the 17. of S. John and the 3. verse; or else he insisted onely upon the words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for the same sense is in the place now cited. For if this be life eternal to know him the onely true God, and whom he hath sent Jesus Christ, then also to believe in them onely is life eternal, and then we are tied to believe in none else; for we cannot believe in that we doe not know. Indeed the words are not there or any where else, that we ought to believe in [God the Father] him, the one, onely true God, &c. But certainly, if we are to know him onely, then onely to believe in him seems to be a very good con∣sequent. But S. Basil therefore onely insisted upon the very words, and thought himself safe (as indeed he was) upon the reverse of another argu∣ment. For since the words oportere credere in unum solum verum Deum were not in S. John or any where else, he concluded the contrary sense from a very good argument: we are commanded to be baptized into the faith of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, therefore we are to believe in three: and be∣cause the word [believe] was not set down expresly, where knowledge is confin'd to one or two, therefore it cannot be said that we are tied to be∣lieve onely in one or two: but because to believe in three can be inferr'd as a duty from another place, therefore it cannot be denied as a consequent from this; and therefore he had reason to insist upon his negative argu∣ment.* 1.6 Thus S. Austin also argued, Pater enim solus nusquam legitur mis∣sus, The Father is never in Scripture said to be sent; therefore no man must say it. So Epiphanius, Ipsa dictio non omnino cogit me de Filio Dei dicere: non enim indicavit Scriptura, neque quisquam Apostolorum meminit, neque Evangelium. The manner of speaking compels me not to understand it of the Son of God: For the Scripture hath not declared it; neither the Gospel nor any of the Apostles hath made any mention of it.

2. A negative argument from the letter of Scripture is not good,* 1.7 if the con∣trary affirmative can be drawn by consequent from any part of it. Thus our Blessed Saviour confuting the Sadducees in the article of the Resurrection hath given us a warranty for this proceeding; God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. These were the words of Scripture. But these directly would not doe the work. But therefore he argues from hence, God is not the God of the dead, but of the living: therefore these men are alive. That the Holy Ghost is God is no where said in Scripture; that the Holy Ghost is to be invocated is no where commanded, nor any example of its being done recorded. It follows not therefore that he is not God, or that he is not to be invocated: and the reason is, because that he is God is a cer∣tain consequent from something that is expresly affirmed; and therefore the negative argument is imperfect, and consequently, not concluding. Quae neque à Christianis dicuntur neque creduntur,* 1.8 neque ex consequente per ea quae apud nos certa sunt & concessa intelliguntur, &c. If Christians did never speak, nor believe any such thing, nor can they be drawn from the consequence of those things which are certain and granted amongst us, then indeed it is to be rejected from our Creed. Now amongst Christi∣ans this is believed as certain, that we may pray to him in whom we be∣lieve; that we believe in him into the faith of whom we are baptized; that we are commanded to be baptized into the belief and profession of the

Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: from hence Christians doe know that they are to invocate the Holy Ghost. For S. Pauls argument is good, How shall we call on him on whom we have not believed? therefore we may call on him if we believe on him: according to that Rule of reason, Negatio unius diversum affirmat, The denying of one is the affirmation of its contrary in the like matter.* 1.9 And something of this was used by Paschasius the Dea∣con: and the effect of it prevail'd upon the account of a negative from Scripture; In nullis autem Canonicis libris, de quibus Symboli textus pen∣det, accepimus, quia in Ecclesiam credere sicut in Spiritum Sanctum Fili∣úmque debemus, We are taught in no Scripture (from whence the Creed is de∣riv'd) to believe in the Church, as we believe in the Son and in the Holy Ghost: and therefore we ought not to doe it; but it being plain in the Creed, and consequently in the Scripture, that we must believe in the Holy Ghost, therefore also we may pray to him, and confess him to be God. To the same purpose S. Basil argues concerning the Holy Spirit; Dignitate namque ipsâ secundum esse à Filio pietatis sermo fortassis tradit: naturâ verò tertiâ uti nec à Divinis Scripturis edocti sumus, nec ex antecedentibus possi∣bile est consequenter colligi, That the Holy Spirit is of a nature distinct from the Father and the Son we neither are taught in Scripture, neither can it be drawn into consequence from any antecedent pretences.* 1.10

3. A negative argument of a word or an expression cannot be conse∣quently deduc'd to the negation of the mystery signified by that word.* 1.11 The Arrians therefore argued weakly, Shew us in all the Scripture that the Son is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Consubstantial to the Father; if you cannot, you ought not to affirm it. For we know God is one; if therefore we finde in Scri∣pture that the Son is true God, we know he must needs be of the same sub∣stance with his Father; for two substances cannot make one God. So though the Blessed Virgin Mary be not in Scripture called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Mother of God, yet that she was the Mother of Jesus, and that Jesus Christ is God, and yet but one person, that we can prove from Scripture, and that is sufficient for the appellative: and if the Church of Rome could prove the mystery of Transubstantiation from Scripture, we would indulge to them the use of that word, or any other aptly to express the same thing.

4. A negative argument from Scripture is sufficient to prove an article not to be of necessary belief,* 1.12 but is not sufficient to prove it not to be true: because although the Scripture is the measure of Faith and of Manners, yet it is an adequate measure of all truth. The meaning of which rule takes in all truths of art, experience, of prudence, of tradition and common report. Thus although it be no where said in Scripture that our Blessed Saviour said, Nunquam laeti sitis nisi cum Fratrem vestrum in charitate vide∣ritis, Be never very merry but when you see your Brother in charity; yet S. Hie∣rome reports it of him, and it is a worthy saying, and therefore may very well be entertain'd, not onely as true and useful, but as from Christ. The

Scripture no where says that the blessed Virgin was a Virgin perpetually to the day of her death: but as therefore it cannot be obtruded as an ar∣ticle of faith, yet there are a great many decencies and probabilities of the thing, besides the great consent of almost all the Church of God, which make it very fit to be entertain'd. There are some things which are piè credibilia, there is piety in the believing them: and in such cases it is not enough that there is nothing in Scripture to affirm it; if there be any thing in any other topick, it is to be entertain'd according to the merit of the thing.

5. A negative argument from Scripture does not conclude in questions of fact:* 1.13* 1.14 and therefore S. Hierome did not argue rightly, Quanquam excepto Apostolo non sit manifestè relatum de aliis Apostolis quod Uxores habuerint, & cum de uno scriptum sit ac de caeteris tacitum, intelligere debemiis, sine uxori∣bus eos fuisse, de quibus nihil tale Scriptura significat; The Scripture names onely Peters wife, and does not say that any of the other Apostles were marri∣ed, therefore we are to conclude that they were not. For besides that the al∣legation is not true, and S. Paul intimates that the other Apostles as well as Peter did lead about a Sister, a Wife; and that from thence the Fathers did believe them all to have been married except S. John, and some also except S. Paul; yet the argument is not good: for it may as well be con∣cluded that S. Peter never had a child, or that Christ did never write but once when he wrote upon the ground, because the Scripture makes no mention of either.

6. When a negative argument may be had from Scripture for both the parts of the contradiction,* 1.15 nothing at all can be concluded thence, but it must be wholly argued from other topicks. The Scripture neither says that Christ did ever laugh, nor it does not say that he did never laugh; there∣fore either of the contradicting parts may be equally inferr'd, that is truly neither. And indeed this is of it self a demonstration that in matters of fact and matters not necessary a negative argument from Scripture is of no use at all.

7. But when the question is of lawful or unlawful,* 1.16 then it is valid. If it be not in Scripture forbidden directly or by consequent then it is lawful; it is not by God forbidden at all. And on the other side, if it be not there commanded it is not necessary. Lucentius thus argued in the Council of Chalcedon, Dioscorus Synodum ansus est facere sine authoritate sedis Aposto∣licae, quod nunquam licuit, nunquam factum est. That it was never done, proves not but it may be done; but if it was never lawful to be done, then it was forbidden; for whatsoever is not forbidden is not unlawful: but if it was not in Scripture forbidden, then aliquando licuit, it once was law∣ful, and therefore is always so, if we speak of the Divine Law; and if Lu∣centius speaks of that, he ought to have considered it in the instance: but I suppose he means it of custome, or the Ecclesiastical Law; and therefore I meddle not with the thing, onely I observe the method of his arguing.

8. An argument from the discourse of one single person omitting to af∣firm or deny a thing relating to that of which he did discourse,* 1.17 is no competent argument to prove that the thing it self omitted was not true:* 1.18 and therefore Ruffinus had but a weak argument against the traduction of the soul when

he argued thus, Si anima quoque esset ex anima secundum illorum vanas opi∣niones, nunquam profecto hoc Adam praeterisset. Nam sicut os ex ossibus meis, & caro de carne mea dicebat, sic etiam anima ex anima mea dicere potuis∣set. Sed tantum hoc dixit quod sibi videlicet sciebat ablatum. Adam seeing his wife, said, this is bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh, for he knew what was taken from him; but he could have said, soul of my soul, if the soul had been deriv'd from him. This I say is no good argument, unless every one must be supposed when he says any thing to say all that is true, and all that he knows: so that Ruffinus in this particular defended a good cause with a broken sword.

9. But if that which is omitted in the discourse be pertinent and mate∣rial to the inquiry,* 1.19 then it is a very good probability that that is not true that is not affirmed. When the Jews asked our Blessed Saviour, Why doe the disciples of John and of the Pharisees fast often, but thy disciples fast not? he gave an answer that related to the present state of things and circum∣stances at that time, and said nothing of their not fasting in the time of the Gospel: from which silence we may well conclude that there is nothing in the Religion disobliging Christs disciples from fasting; if it had, it is very likely it would have been then expressed when there was so apt an occa∣sion, and the answer had been imperfect without it.* 1.20 S. Hieromes was also very good, but not so certain as the other, against the tale of Leo baptized after his death, and the periods of Paul and Tecla; Igitur periodos Pauli & Teclae & totam baptizati Leonis fabulam inter apocryphas Scripturas compu∣tamus. Quale enim est ut individuus comes Apostoli inter caeteras ejus res hoc solùm ignor ••verit? It is not likely that S. Luke, who continually at∣tended on S. Paul, observed all his actions, remark'd his miracles, de∣scrib'd his story, should omit things so strange, so considerable, if they had been true.

The reason of these things is,* 1.21 Every thing is to be suspected false that does not derive from that fountain whence men justly expect it, and from whence it ought to flow. If you speak of any things that relates to God, you must look for it there where God hath manifested himself; that is, in the Scriptures. If you speak of any humane act or ordinance, or story and matter of fact, you must look for it in its own spring and original, or goe the nearest to it you can. And thus the Bishops at the conference had with the Acephali, Hereticks who had Churches without Bishops,* 1.22 refused their allegations of the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite, upon this account, Illa testimonia quae vos Dionysii Areopagitae dicitis, unde potestis ostendere vera esse sicut suspicamini? Si enim ejus essent, non potuissent latere Beatum Cyrillum. Quid autem de B. Cyrillo dico, quando & B. Athanasius, si pro certo scisset ejus fuisse, ante omnia in Niceno Concilio de Consubstantiali Trinitate eadem testimonia protulisset adversus Arii diversae substantiae blasphemias? Si autem nullus ex Antiquis recordatus est ea, unde nunc potestis ostendere quia illius sunt, nescio. If neither S. Cyril, nor S. Athanasius, who were so diligent to inquire, so skilful in knowing, so concern'd that these Books should be the works of S. Dionys, did yet know nothing of them, and if amongst the Ancients they were not known, for you Moderns now to tell of Antiquity, what by them who then liv'd was not told, is a folly that can never gain credit amongst reasonable persons. Let every fruit proceed from its own root. We cannot say, because a thing is not in Scripture,

therefore it is not at all; but therefore it is nothing of Divine Religion. So it is also in things relating to the Ancient Church; from thence onely can we derive any notice of their doctrine and of their practices. For if an article prevail'd in S. Austins time, it was no argument that therefore it was believ'd in S. Cyprians time: but a negative argument from any Age ought to prevail in reference to that Age; and if there be in it nothing of Antiquity, no argument of the Moderns can prove it to be Ancient: and Baronius said well, Quod à recentiori Authore de rebus antiquis sine alicujus vetustioris authoritate profertur, contemnitur, What the Moderns say of the Ancients without warranty from themselves is to be despised. One thing one∣ly I am to adde to this out of Vincentius Lirinensis,* 1.23 Quicquid vero ab Anti∣quo deinceps Uno praeter omnes, vel contra omnes Sanctos novum & inaudi∣tum subinduci senserit, id non ad religionem sed ad tentationem potiùs intelli∣gat pertinere, If one of the Fathers say a thing, and the others say it not, but speak diversly or contrarily, that pertains not to Religion, but to tem∣ptation. I doubt not but he intended it against S. Austin, who spake things in the matter of Predestination, and the damnation of infants, and other appendant questions against the sense of all the Fathers that were before him;* 1.24 one (it may be) or scarce one being excepted. And to the same purpose Tertullian argued against Marcion concerning a pretended Gospel of S. Paul, Etsi sub ipsius Pauli nomine Evangelium Marcion intu∣lisset, non sufficeret ad fidem singularitas instrumenti destituta patrocinio An∣tecessorum. If you cannot bring testimony from the Fathers and Ancient Records, you must not receive it; one alone is not to be trusted. He that affirms must prove; to him that denies, a negative argument is sufficient. For to a mans belief a positive cause is required, but for his not belie∣ving, it is sufficient that he hath no cause.* 1.25 Thus S. Hierome argues well against the rebaptizing of converted Hereticks, Ad eos venio haereticos qui Evangelia laniaverunt….quorum plurimi vivente adhuc Johanne Apo∣stolo eruperunt, & tamen nullum eroum legimus rebaptizatum. Of all the He∣reticks which appeared in S. Johns time, we never read of any that was rebaptiz'd: and therefore it is to be presumed they were not; for a thing so considerable and so notorious, in all reason would have given some signs, and left some indications of it. But then it is to be observed,

10. A negative argument must not be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a partial or a broken piece of a medium.* 1.26 You cannot argue rightly thus, S. John in his Gospel speaks nothing of the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, therefore that Sacrament is no part of the doctrine of salvation. For three Evangelists had done it before him, and therefore he did not; and a negative argu∣ment onely from one Gospel cannot conclude rightly concerning any ar∣ticle of the Religion. And this is very evident in matters of fact also. For if it be argued thus, We doe not finde in Scripture nor in the days of the Apostles any infant baptized; therefore we conclude there was none. This is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is true, if there were no way else to finde it but the practice of the Apostles, the negative argument had been very good; but we derive it from the force of Christs words of institution, and of his discourse with Nicodemus, and the analogy of Circumcision, and the practice of the Jews in baptizing their children, and many proprieties of Scripture, and the effect of the Sacrament, and the necessities of regenera∣tion. S. Irenaeus his negative argument was good;* 1.27 Quod neque Prophetae praedicaverunt, neque Dominus docuit, neque Apostoli tradiderunt, &c. If

neither Moses nor the Prophets, Christ nor his Apostles have taught it, it is not to be received as any part of Christian doctrine. For this negative is integral & perfect. But S. Cyril of Alexandria disputed also well with his ne∣gative argument from Antiquity,* 1.28 Etenim nomen hoc 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 nullus unquam Ecclesiasticorum Doctorum repudiavit: qui autem illo subinde usi sunt, & multi reperiuntur, & maximè celebres. Many famous Doctors used this word, calling the Virgin Mary the Parent of God; and none ever refused it; therefore it may safely be used. If the negative argument from Scri∣pture or Antiquity respectively can run thus, It was not condemn'd in Scri∣pture or Antiquity, but it was used, therefore it is good; the argument concludes rightly in relation to Scripture, and probably in relation to An∣tiquity. But if it be said onely, the Scripture condemnes it not, but neither does it approve it, then it cannot be concluded to be laudable, but onely not criminal. But if it be said of Antiquity, it was neither condemn'd nor us'd, it cannot be inferr'd from thence that it is either laudable or inno∣cent. The reason is, because Scripture is the measure of lawful and unlaw∣ful, but the writings of the Doctors are not; and these may be deficient, though that be full.

11. In the mysteries of Religion,* 1.29 and in things concerning God, a nega∣tive argument from Scripture ought to prevail both upon our faith and upon our inquiries, upon our belief and upon our modesty. For as S. Austin said well, De Deo etiam vera loqui periculosissimum, It is hard to talk many things of God: we had need have good warranty for what we say; and therefore it is very fit we speak Scripture in the discourses of God. And thus S. Au∣stin argued,* 1.30 Ideo nusquam scriptum est quod Deus Pater major sit Spiritu Sancto, vel Spiritus Sanctus sit minor Deo Patre: quia non sic assumpta est Creatura, in qua appareret Spiritus Sanctus, sicut assumptus est Filius homi∣nis. Since it is no where written that the Father is greater then the Spirit, we ought not to say he is. But if it be objected that neither does the Scri∣pture say, that he is not greater, it does not say that they are equal; and therefore it will be hard to use a negative argument in such cases; and how shall we know which part of the negative to follow? I answer, it is very true according to the sixth proposition num. 52. but then in this case we must inquire for other words of Scripture by which we may be directed, and proceed accordingly, or inquire into the analogy of faith, or the mea∣sures of piety: but if there be nothing to determine to any side of the negative, we must say nothing; and if there be, yet we must say but little, because the notice is not great.

12. Lastly,* 1.31 In matters of envy and burden, a Negative argument even in matter of fact ought to prevail, unless the contrary be proved by some other competent Topick. That the Clergy ought not to marry is no where affir∣med in Scripture, and therefore it is permitted; and because it is agree∣able to Nature, and the Lawes of all republicks▪ their marriage is also holy and pleasing to God. A burden must be directly imposed; a man must not be frighted or scar'd into it. When our Blessed Saviour reproved the Pharisees for imposing heavy burdens, such which God impos'd not, he taught us the value of this argument; ubi scriptum est? shew us where it is written that this is displeasing to God: if it be no where forbidden, praesumitur pro libertate; all men are as free as they were born. How this can be altered by the lawes of man will be afterwards consider'd. In the

mean time God hath left us under no more restraints then are describ'd in Scripture. This argument S. Chrysostome urges against the necessitie of corporal afflictions to a contrite weeping penitent. Lacrymas Petri lego, Satisfactionem non lego. I read that S. Peter wept, I doe not read that he impos'd penances on himself. The argument were good from this place, if the case be not special, or if it be not altered by some other considera∣tion. This is also to be extended to such negative arguments as are taken from matter of fact in accusations, and criminal proceedings: not that it can of it self be great enough to prevail, but that the case is so favourable, that every little thing ought to be strong enough.* 1.32 Thus S. Athanasius de∣fended his Decessor Dionysius: Et prius eorum Authorem Dionysium per hoc voluit esse purgatum, atque ab Arianorum crimine alienum, quod ipse non sicut Arius cum viveret de impietate fuerat accusatus, aut de Episcopatu de∣jectus, neque velut haeresim defendens de Ecclesia, sicut ille, decesserit, sed in ejus permanserit unitate. Dionysius was not accused while he was alive, he was not thrown from his Bishoprick, he did not depart from the Church, but remain'd in her Communion; and therefore he was no Arian. But argu∣ments of this nature, when the medium is so limited, and the instance so particular, have their force onely by accident. For this and the like Negatives are good arguments when they are the best light in the que∣stion, that is, when nothing greater can be said against them, or when men are easy and willing to be perswaded; as in the questions of burden and trouble all men ought.

Notes

• * 1.1

  45.
• * 1.2

  46.
• * 1.3

  Vide 〈◊〉〈◊〉 9.
• * 1.4

  47.
• * 1.5

  O••••. 2 co•••••• Eunomiu••.
• * 1.6

  Lib. 2. de Tri∣nit. cap. 5. & cap. 6. contr. haer. l. 2. tom. 2.
• * 1.7

  48.
• * 1.8

  S. Greg. Nys∣••••n. ibid.
• * 1.9

  Lib. de Spi•••• c. 1.
• * 1.10

  Nónne per∣spicuum est, ista, tametsi non dicantur, tamen ex illis colligi quae haec necessariò efficiant ac probent? Quae tandem? Ego sum primus, & post haec, & ante me non est alius Deus, & post me non crit. Totum enim quicquid est, mecum est, nec principium habens, nec finem habiturum. His à Scriptura acceptis, illud quidem, quod ante eum nihil sit, nec anti quiorem causam habeat, Anarchum & Ingenitum appellasti: quod autem nunquam defiturum sit, Immortale, exiti••que expers. Nazianz. lib. 5. Theol. interprete Jacobo Billio. Et infra, Cum ergo in nominibus & rebus tantum discrimen reperiatur, quid causae est cur literae tantopere s••rvias, Judaicaeque sapientiae teipsum adjungas, relictisque rebus syllabas consecteris? Quod si te bis quinque aut bis septem dicente, decem aut quatuor decim ex verbis tuis colligerem, aut ex eo quod animal ratione praeditum. & mortale diceres, homi∣nem esse concluderem, an tibi viderer delirare? Neque enim verba magis sunt ejus qui loquitur quam illius qui loquendi necessitatem simul affert.
• * 1.11

  49.
• * 1.12

  50.
• * 1.13

  51.
• * 1.14

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.15

  52.
• * 1.16

  53.
• * 1.17

  54.
• * 1.18

  Lib. de fide, •• 28.
• * 1.19

  55.
• * 1.20

  Lib. de Script: Eccles. in Luca
• * 1.21

  56.
• * 1.22

  C. Pli. A••. Dom. 532.
• * 1.23

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.24

  Lib. 4 cap. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ma ••cion.
• * 1.25

  Dial. adv. Lu∣ciferianos.
• * 1.26

  57.
• * 1.27

  Lib. 1. c. 1.
• * 1.28

  Frima parte Concil. Ephes. cap. 25
• * 1.29

  58.
• * 1.30

  Lib. 2. de Tri∣nit. cap. 6.
• * 1.31

  59.
• * 1.32

  Apud Facun∣dum lib. 10. cap. 5