Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 13. Some things may be used in the service of God which are not commanded in any Law, nor explicitely commended in any doctrine of Jesus Christ.

THIS Rule is intended to regulate the Conscience in all those questi∣ons* 1.1 which scrupulous and superstitious people make in their inquiries for warranties from Scripture in every action they doe; and in the use of such actions in the service of God, for which particulars because they have no word, they think they have no warrant, and that the actions are superstitious. The in∣quiry then hath two parts;

1. Whether we are to require from Scripture a warrant for every action we doe, in common life?

2. Whether we may not doe or use any thing in religion, concerning which we have no express word in Scripture, and no Commandement at all?

1. Concerning the first the inquiry is but short, because there is no difficulty it but what is made by ignorance and jealousie; and it can be answer'd and made evident by common sense and the perpetual experience and the Natural necessity of things. For the laws of Jesus Christ were intended to regulate humane actions in the great lines of Religion, justice and sobriety, in which as there are infinite particulars which are to be conducted by reason and by analo∣gy to the laws and Rules given by Jesus Christ; so it is certain that as the ge∣neral lines and rules are to be understood by reason how far they doe oblige, so by the same we can know where they doe not. But we shall quickly come to issue in this affair. For if for every thing there is a law or an advice; let them that think so find it out and follow it. If there be not for everything such provision, their own needs will yet become their lawgiver and force them to do it without a law. Whether a man shall speak French or English? whe∣ther baptised persons are to be dipt all over the body, or will it suffice that the head be plunged? whether thrice or once? whether in water of the spring, or the water of the pool? whether a man shall marry, or abstain? whether

eat flesh or herbs; choose Titius, or Caius for my friend; be a Scholar or a Merchant; a Physician or a Lawyer; drink wine or ale; take Physick for prevention, or let it alone; give to his Servant a great pension, or a compe∣tent; what can the Holy Scriptures have to doe with any thing of these, or any thing of like Nature and indifferency?

For by nature all things are indulged to our use and liberty;* 1.2 and they so remain till God by a supervening law hath made restraints in some instances to become matter of obedience to him, and of order and usefulness to the world; but therefore where the law does not restrain, we are still free as the Elements, and may move as freely and indifferently as the atomes in the eye of the Sun. * And there is infinite difference between law and lawful, indeed there is nothing that is a law to our Consciences but what is bound upon us by God, and consign'd in holy Scripture (as I shall in the next Rule demon∣strate) but therefore every thing else is permitted, or lawful, that is, not by law restrain'd: liberty is before restraint; and till the fetters are put upon us we are under no law and no necessity, but what is natural. * But if there can be any natural necessities, we cannot choose but obey them, and for these there needs no law or warrant from Scripture. No Master needs to tell us or to give us signs to know when we are hungry or athirst; and there can be as little need that a lawgiver should give us a comand to eat when we are in great necessity so to doe. * Every thing is to be permitted to its own cause and pro∣per principle; Nature and her needs are sufficient to cause us to do that which is for her preservation; right reason and experience are competent warrant and in∣struction to conduct our affairs of liberty and common life; but the matter and design of laws is Honestè vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cui{que} tribuere; or as it is more perfectly describ'd by the Apostle, that we should live a godly, a righte∣ous, a sober life; and beyond these there needs no law: when nature is suffici∣ent Jesus Christ does not interpose, and unlesse it be where reason is defective or violently abus'd, we cannot need laws of self-preservation, for that is the sanction and great band and indearment of all laws: and therefore there is no express law against self-murder in all the new Testament; onely it is there and every where else by supposition; and the laws take care to forbid that, as they take care of fools and madmen, men that have no use or benefit of their reason or of their natural necessities and inclinations must be taken under the protection of others; but else when a man is in his wits, or in his reason, he is defended in many things, and instructed in more without the help or need of laws: nay it was need and reason that first introduced laws; for no law, but necessity and right reason taught the first ages,* 1.3

Dispersos trahere in populum, migrare vetusto De nemore, & proavis habitare, & linquere sylvas, Aedificare domos, laribus conjungere nostris Tectum aliud, tutos vicino limine somnos Ut collata daret fiducia. Protegere armis Lapsum, aut ingenti nutantem vulnere civem. Communi dare signa tuba, defendier iisdem Turribus, atque una portarum clave teneri.

to meet and dwell in communities, to make covenants and laws, to establish equal measures, to doe benefit interchangeably, to drive away publick injuries by common armes, to join houses that they may sleep more safe: and since laws were not the first inducers of these great transactions, it is certain they need not now to inforce them, or become our warrant to do that without which we cannot be what we cannot chuse but desire to be.

But if nothing were to be done but what we have Scripture for,* 1.4 either commanding or commending, it were certain that with a less hyperbole then S. John us'd, the world could not contain the book, which should be written; and yet in such infinite numbers of laws and sentences no man could be directed com∣petently because his Rule and guide would be too big, and every man in the in∣quiry after lawful and unlawful would bejust so enlightned as he that must for ever remain blind unless he take the Sun in his hand to search into all the cor∣ners of darkness, no candlestick would hold him, and no eye could use him. But supposing that in all things we are to be guided by Scripture, then from thence also let us inquire for a conduct or determination even in this inquiry; whether we may not doe any thing without a warrant from Scripture? and the result will be that if we must not doe any thing without the warrant of Scripture; then we must not for every thing look in Scripture for a warrant; because we have from Scripture sufficient instruction that we should not be so fool∣ish and importune as to require from thence a warrant for such things in which we are by other instruments competently instructed, or left at perfect liberty.

Thus S. Paul affirmes,* 1.5 All things are lawful for me; he speaks of meats and drinks, and things left in liberty concerning which because there is no law, and if there had been one under Moses, it was taken away by Christ, it is cer∣tain that every thing was lawful, because there was no law forbidding it: and when S. Paul said, This speak I, not the Lord; he that did according to that speaking, did according to his own liberty, not according to the word of the Lord; and S. Pauls saying in that manner is so far from being a warranty to us from Christ; that because he said true, therefore we are certain he had no warranty from Christ, nothing but his own reasonable conjecture. * But when our Blessed Saviour said and why of your selves doe ye not judge what is right? he plainly enough said that to our own reason and judgement many things are permitted, which are not conducted by laws or express declara∣tions of God.

Adde to this that because it is certain in all Theology, that whatsoever is not of faith is sin, that is, whatsoever is done against our actual persuasion be∣comes to us a sin, though of it self it were not; and that we can become a law unto our selves, by vows and promises, and voluntary engagements and opinions, it follows that those things which of themselves inferre no duty, and have in them nothing but a collateral and accidental necessity, are permitted to us to doe as we please, and are in their own nature indifferent, and may be so also in use and exercise: and if we take that which is the less perfect part in a Counsel Evangelical, it must needs be such a thing as is neither commanded nor commended, for nothing of it is commanded at all; and that which is commended is the more not the less perfect part; and yet that we may doe that less perfect part, of which there is neither a Commandement, nor a com∣mendation but a permission only appears at large in S. Pauls discourse concern∣ing Virginity and Marriage 1 Corinth. 7. 6, 37. But a permission is nothing but a not prohibiting, and that is lawful which is not unlawful, and eve∣ry thing may be done that is not forbidden: and there are very many things which are not forbidden, nor commanded; and therefore they are onely lawful and no more.

But the case in short is this;* 1.6 In Scripture there are many laws and pre∣cepts of holiness, there are many prohibitions and severe cautions against im∣piety: and there are many excellent measures of good and evil, of perfect

and imperfect: * whatsoever is good, we are oblig'd to pursue; * what∣soever is forbidden must be declin'd; * whatsoever is laudable must be lov'd, and followed after. Now if all that we are to doe can come under one of these measures, when we see it, there is nothing more for us to doe but to conform our actions accordingly. But if there be many things which cannot be fitted by these measures, and yet cannot be let alone; it will be a kind of madnesse to stand still, and to be useless to our selves and to all the world, because we have not a command or a warrant to legi∣timate an action which no Lawgiver ever made unlawful.

But this folly is not gone far abroad into the world;* 1.7 for the number of mad-men is not many, though possibly the number of the very wise is less: but that which is of difficulty is this,

Quest. Whether in matters of religion we have that liberty as in mat∣ters of common life? or whether is not every thing of religion determined by the Lawes of Jesus Christ, or may we choose something to worship God withall, concerning which he hath neither given us Commandement or intimation of his pleasure?

Of Will-Worship.

To this I answer by several Propositions.

1. All favour is so wholly arbitrary,* 1.8 that whatsoever is an act of favour, is also an effect of choice and perfectly voluntary. Since therefore that God accepts any thing from us is not at all depending upon the merit of the work, or the natural proportion of it to God, or that it can adde any moments of felicity to him, it must be so wholly depending upon the will of God that it must have its being and abiding onely from thence.* 1.9 He that shall appoint with what God shall be worshipped, must appoint what that is by which he shall be pleased; which because it is unreasonable to suppose, it must follow that all the integral, constituent parts of religion, all the funda∣mentals and essentials of the Divine worship cannot be warranted to us by nature, but are primarily communicated to us by revelation. Deum sic colere oportet quomodo ipse se colendum praecepit, said S. Austin. Who can tell what can please God, but God himself? for to be pleased, is to have something that is agreeable to our wills and our desires: now of Gods will there can be no signification but Gods word or declaration; and therefore by no∣thing can he be worship'd, but by what himself hath declar'd that he is well pleas'd with: and therefore when he sent his Eternal Son into the world, and he was to be the great Mediator between God and Man, the great instrument of reconciling us to God, the Great Angel that was to present all our prayers, the onely beloved by whom all that we were to doe would be accepted, God was pleased with voices from Heaven and mighty de∣monstrations of the Spirit to tell all the world that by him he would be reconcil'd, in him he would be worship'd, through him he would be invo∣cated, for his sake he would accept us, under him he would be obeyed, in his instances and Commandments he would be lov'd and serv'd; saying, This is my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased.

2. Now it matters not by what means God does convey the notices of his pleasure;* 1.10 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in sundry wayes and in sundry manners God manifests his will unto the world: so we know it to be his will, it matters not whether by nature or by revelation, by intuitive and direct notices, or by argument or consequent deduction, by Scripture, or by tradition, we come to know what he requires and what is good in his eyes; onely we must not doe it of our own head. To worship God is an act of obedience and of duty, and therefore must suppose a Commande∣ment; and is not of our choice, save onely that we must chuse to obey. Of this God forewarn'd his people: He gave them a Law, and comman∣ded them to obey that intirely, without addition or diminution; neither more nor less then it, [whatsoever I command you, observe to doe it; thou shalt not adde thereto nor diminish from it] and again,* 1.11 [ye shall not doe after all the things that we doe here this day, every man whatsoever is right in his own eyes] that is, This is your Law that is given by God; make no lawes to your selves or to one another, beyond the measures and limits of what I have given you: nothing but this is to be the measure of your obedience and of the Divine pleasure. So that in the Old Testament there is an express prohibition of any worship of their own chusing; all is unlawful, but what God hath chosen and declar'd.

3. In the New Testament we are still under the same charge;* 1.12 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Will-worship is a word of an ill sound amongst Christi∣ans most generally, meaning thereby the same thing which God forbad in Deuteronomy, viz. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Lxx. expresses it, when every man does that (not which God commands, or loves) but which men upon their own fancies and inventions think good, that which seems good in their own eyes,* 1.13 or as our Blessed Saviour more fully, teaching for doctrines the traditions, the injunctions or Commandements, of Men: the instance declares the meaning. The Pharisees did use to wash their hands before meat, cleanse the outside of cups and dishes, they wash'd when they came from the judgment hall; and these they commanded men to doe, saying that by such things God was worshipped and well pleas'd. So that these two together, and indeed each of them severally, is will-worship in the culpable sense. He that sayes an action which God hath not commanded is of it self necessary, and he that sayes God is rightly worshipped by an act or ceremony concerning which himself hath no way express'd his pleasure, is super∣stitious, or a will-worshipper. The first sins against charity; the second against religion: The first sins directly against his neighbour; the second against God: The first layes a snare for his neighbours foot; the second cuts off a Dogs neck and presents it to God: The first is a violation of Christian liberty; the other accuses Christs law of imperfection. So that thus far we are certain, 1. That nothing is necessary but what is com∣manded by God. 2. Nothing is pleasing to God in religion that is meerly of humane invention. 3. That the commandements of men cannot be∣come doctrines of God, that is, no direct parts of the religion, no rule or measures of conscience.

But because there are many actions which are not under command,* 1.14 by which God in all ages hath been served and delighted, and yet may as truly be called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or will-worship as any thing else, and the name is general and indefinite, and may signifie a new religion, or a free will-offering, an uncommanded general or an uncommanded particular,

that is, in a good sense, or in a bad, we must make a more particular sepa∣ration of one from the other, and not call every thing superstitious that is in any sense a will-worship, but onely that which is really and distinctly forbidden, not that which can be signified by such a word which some∣times means that which is laudable, sometimes that which is culpable •• Therefore,

What Voluntary or Uncommanded actions are Lawful or Commendable.

1.* 1.15 Those things which men doe, or teach to be done by a probable inter∣pretation of what is doubtful or ambiguous, are not will-worship in the culpable sense. God said to the Jewes that they should rest or keep a Sabbath upon the seventh day. How far this rest was to be extended, was to be taught and impressed not by the law, but by the interpretation of it; and therefore when the Doctors of the Jewes had rationally and authorita∣tively determin'd how far a Sabbath-daies journey was to extend, they who strictly would observe that measure which God describ'd not, but the Doctors did interpret, all that while were not to be blam'd, or put off with a quis requisivit? who hath requir'd these things at your hands?] for they were all that while in the pursuance and in the understanding of a Commandement. But when the Jew in Synesius who was the pilot of a ship, let go the helm in the even of his Sabbath, and did lye still till the next even, and refus'd to guide the ship though in danger of shipwrack, he was a superstitious foole, and did not expound but prevaricate the Com∣mandement. * This is to be extended to all probable interpretations so far, that if the determination happen to be on the side of error, yet the consequent action is not superstitious if the error it self be not Criminal. Thus when the Fathers of the primitive Church did expound the sixth chapter of S. Johns Gospel of sacramental manducation; though they erred in the exposition, yet they thought they serv'd God in giving the Holy Communion to Infants: and though that was not a worship which God had appointed, yet it was not superstition, because it was (or for ought we know was) an innocent interpretation of the doubtful words of a Commandement. From good nothing but good can proceed, and from an innocent principle nothing but what is innocent in the effect. In fine, Whatsoever is an interpretation of a Commandement is but the way of understanding Gods wil, not an obtruding of our owne; alwayes provi∣ded the interpretation be probable, and that the glosse doe not corrupt the text.

2.* 1.16 Whatsoever is an equal and reasonable definition or determination of what God hath left in our powers, is not an act of a culpable will-worship or Superstition. Thus it is permitted to us to chuse the office of a Bishop, or to let it alone; to be a Minister of the Gospel, or not to be a Minister. If a man shall suppose that by his own abilities, his inclination, the request of his friends, the desires of the people; and the approbation of the Church, he is called by God to this Ministery, that he should please God in so doing, and glorify his Name, although he hath no command or law for so doing, but is still at his liberty, yet if he will determine himself to this service, he is not superstitious or a will-worshipper in this his volun∣tary

and chosen service, because he determines by his power and the liberty that God gives him, to a service which in the general is pleasing to God; so that it is but voluntary in his person, the thing it self is of Divine institution.

3.* 1.17 Whatsoever is done by prudent Counsel about those things which be∣long to piety and charity, is not will-worship or superstition. Thus when there is a Commandement to worship God with our body; if we bow the head, if we prostrate our selves on the ground, or fall flat on our face, if we travail up and down for the service of God, even to weariness and diminution of our strengths, if we give our bodies to be burned, though in these things there is no Commandement, yet neither is there supersti∣tion, though we designe them to the service of God, because that which we doe voluntarily is but the appendage, or the circumstance, or the in∣stance of that which is not voluntary but imposed by God.

4.* 1.18 Every instance that is Uncommanded if it be the act or exercise of what is commanded, is both of Gods choosing and of mans, it is voluntary and it is imposed; this in the general, that in the particular. Upon this account, the voluntary institution of the Rechabites in drinking no wine and building no houses, but dwelling in Tents, was pleasing to God; be∣cause although he no where requir'd that instance at their hands, yet be∣cause it was an act or state of that obedience to their Father Jonadab which was injoyn'd in the fifth Commandement, God lov'd the thing, and rewarded the men. So David powr'd upon the ground the waters of Bethlehem which were the price of the young mens lives; he powred them forth unto the Lord: and though it was an Uncommanded instance, yet it was an excellent act, because it was a self denial and an act of mortifi∣cation. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the abundant expressions of the duty con∣tained in the Law, though they be greater then the instances of the Law, are but the zeale of God, and of religion; the advantages of lawes, and the enlargements of a loving and obedient heart. Charity is a duty, and a great part of our Religion. He then that builds almes-houses, or erects hospi∣tals, or mends high wayes, or repairs bridges, or makes rivers navigable, or serves the poor, or dresses children, or makes meat for the poor, cannot (though he intends these for Religion) be accused for will-worship; be∣cause the lawes doe not descend often to particulars, but leave them to the conduct of reason and choice, custome and necessity, the usages of society and the needs of the world. That we should be thankful to God, is a precept of natural and essential religion; that we should serve God with portions of our time, is so too: But that this day, or to morrow, that one day in a week, or two, that we should keep the anniversary of a blessing, or the same day of the week, or the return of the moneth, is an act of our will and choice; it is the worship of the will, but yet of reason too and right religion. Thus the Jewes kept the feast of Purim, the feast of the fourth, the fifth, the seventh, the tenth moneth, the feast of the dedica∣tion of the Altar; and Christ observ'd what the Maccabees did institute: and as it was an act of piety and duty in the Jewes to keep these feasts, so it was not a will-worship or superstition in the Maccabees to appoint it, because it was a pursuance of a general Commandement by symbolical but uncommanded instances. Thus it is commanded to all men to pray: but when Abraham first instituted morning prayer; and Isaac appointed in his

family the Evening prayer, and Daniel prayed three times a-day, and David seven times, and the Church kept her Canonical houres, Nocturnal and Diurnal Offices, and some Churches instituted an Office of forty houres, and a continual course of prayer, and Solomon the perpetual ministery of the Levites, these all doe and did respectively actions which were not nam'd in the Commandement; but yet they willingly and choosingly offer'd a willing but an acceptable sacrifice, because the instance was a daughter of the law, incouraged by the same reward, serving to the same end, warranted by the same reason, adorn'd with the same piety, eligible for the same usefulness, amiable for the same excellency, and though not commanded in the same tables, yet certainly pleasing to him who as he gave us lawes for our rule, so he gives us his Spirit for our Guide, and our Reason as his Minister.

5.* 1.19 Whatsoever is aptly and truly instrumental to any act of vertue or grace, though it be no where signified in the law of God, or in our religion, is not will-worship in the culpable sense. I remember to have read that S. Benedict was invited to break his fast in a Vineyard: he intending to accept the invitation betook himself presently to prayer; adding these words, Cursed is he who first eates before he prayes. This religion also the Jewes observ'd in their solemn dayes; and therefore wondred and were offen∣ded at the Disciples of Christ because that early in the morning of the Sabbath they eate the ears of corn. This and any other of the like nature may be superadded to the words of the law, but are no criminal will-worship, because they are within the verge and limits of it; they serve to the mini∣steries of the chief house. Thus we doe not finde that David had receiv'd a Commandement to build a Temple; but yet the prophet Nathan told him from God,* 1.20 that he did well because it was in his heart to build it: It was therefore acceptable to God because it ministred to that duty and re∣ligion in which God had signified his pleasure. Thus the Jewes serv'd God in building Synagogues or places of prayer besides their Temple; because they were to pray besides their solemn times, and therefore it was well if they had less solemn places. So Abraham pleased God in sepa∣rating the tenth of his possessions for the service and honour of God; and Jacob pleased the Lord of Heaven and Earth by introducing the religion of Vowes; which indeed was no new religion, but two or three excel∣lencies of vertue and religion dress'd up with order and solemne advan∣tages, and made to minister to the glorification of God. Thus fasting serves religion; and to appoint fasting daies is an act of religion and of the worship of God, not directly, but by way of instrument and ministery. To double our care, to intend our zeale, to enlarge our expence in the adorning and beautifying of Churches is also an act of religion or of the worship of God; because it does naturally signify or express one vertue, and does prudently minister to another; it serves religion, and signifies my love.

6.* 1.21 To abstain from the use of privileges and liberties though it be no where commanded, yet it is alwaies in it self lawful, and may be an act of vertue or religion if it be designed to the purposes of religion or charity. Thus S. Paul said he would never eat flesh while he did live rather then cause his brother to offend: and he did this with a purpose to serve God in so doing, and yet it was lawful to have eaten, and he was no where directly com∣manded

to have abstained; and though in some cases it became a duty, yet when he extended it or was ready to have extended it to uncommanded instances or degrees, he went not back in his religion by going forwards in his will. Thus not to be too free in using or requiring dispensations, is a good handmaid to piety or charity, and is let into the kingdome of heaven, by being of the family and retinue of the Kings daughters, the glorious graces of the Spirit of God. Thus also to deny to our selves the use of things lawful in meat and drink and pleasure, with a design of being exemplar to others and drawing them to sober counsels, the doing more then we are commanded, that we be not tempted at any time to doe lesse, the standing a great way off from sin, the changing our course and circum∣stances of life that we may not lose or lessen our state of the Divine grace and favour, these are by adoption and the right of cognation accepted as pursuances of our duty and obedience to the Divine Commandement.

7.* 1.22 Whatsoever is proportionable to the reason of any Commandement and is a moral representation of any duty, the observation of that cannot of it self be superstitious. For this we have a competent warranty from those words of God by the prophet Nathan to David.* 1.23 Thou shalt not build a house to the honour of my Name, because thou art a man of blood. In prose∣cution of this word of God, and of the reasonableness of it, it is very warrantable that the Church of God forbids Bishops and Priests to give sentence in a cause of blood; because in one case God did declare it unfit that he who was a man of blood should be imployed in the building of a house to God. Upon this account all Undecencies, all unfitting usages and disproportionate states or accidents are thrust out of religion. A Priest may not be a fidler, a Bishop must not be a shoomaker, a Judge must re∣ligiously abstain from such things as disgrace his authority, or make his per∣son and his ministery contemptible; and such observances are very far from being superstitious, though they be under no expresse Commandement.

8.* 1.24 All voluntary services, when they are observed in the sense and to the purposes of perfection, are so farre from being displeasing to God, that the more uncommanded instances and degrees of external duty and signification we use,* 1.25 the more we please God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Spiritual men doe their actions with much passion and holy zeale, and give testimony of it by expressing it in the uncommanded instances. And Socrates speaking of cer∣tain Church offices and rituals of religion, sayes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Since no man hath concerning this thing any written Com∣mandement, it is clear that the Apostles permitted it to the choice of every one, that every one may doe good not by necessity and feare] but by love and choice. Such were the free will-offerings among the Jewes, which alwaies might expect a speciall reward, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Those things which are in the tables of the Commandement shall be rewarded, but those which are more then these shall have a greater; the reason is, because they proceed from a greater intension of the inward grace: and although the measures of the Commandement were therefore less because they were to fit all capacities; yet they who goe farther, shew that they are nearer to the perfections of

grace then the first and lowest measures of the Commandement, and therefore are dispos'd to receive a reward greater then they shall have who are the least in the Kingdome of Heaven. But of this I have already given accounts in the foregoing rule, and* 1.26 otherwhere.

9.* 1.27 The circumstance of a religious action may be undertaken or impos'd civilly without being superstitious. As to worship God is a duty which can never be a superstitious will-worship, so to worship God by bowing the head or knee towards the East or West is a circumstance of this reli∣gious worship; and of this there may be lawes made, and the circumstance be determin'd, and the whole action so clothed and vested, that even the very circumstance is in some sense religious, but in no sense superstitious; for some way or other it must be done, and every mans act is determin'd when it is vested with circumstances, and if a private will may determine it, so may a publick law, and that without fault: but of this in the sequel.

10. The summe is this: Though the instance, the act or state be uncommanded, yet it is not a culpable will-worship, if either it be a pro∣bable interpretation of a Divine Commandement, or the use of what is permitted, or the circumstance or appendage to a vertue, or the particular specification of a general law, or is in order to a grace instrumental & mini∣string to it, or be the defalcation or the not using of our own rights, or be a thing that is good in the nature of the thing, and a more perfect pro∣secution of a law or grace, that is, if it be a part or a relative of a law: if a law be the foundation, whatsoever is built upon it, growes up towards Heaven, and shall have no part in the evil rewards of superstition.

But that what of it self is innocent or laudable may not be spoil'd by evil appendages, it is necessary that we observe the following cautions.

1. Whatsoever any man does in an uncommanded instance,* 1.28 it must be done with liberty and freedome of conscience; that is, it must not be pressed to other men as a law which to our selves is onely an act of love, or an instrument of a vertue, or the appendage and relative of a grace. It must, I say, be done with liberty of conscience, that is, without imposing it as of it self necessary, or a part of the service of God:* 1.29 and so it was anciently in the matter of worship towards the East: for though generally the Christians did worship toward the East, yet in Antioch they worshipped toward the West. But when they begin to have opinions concerning the circumstance, and think that abstracting from the order or the accidental advantage, there is some religion in the thing it self, then it passes fromwhat it ought to what it ought not, and by degrees proves folly and dreames. For then it comes to be a Doctrine and injunction of men. when that is taught to be necessary which God hath left at liberty, and taken from it all proper necessity; it then changes into superstition and injustice; for it is an invading the rights of God and the rights of man; it gives a law to him that is as free as our selves, and usurps a power of making lawes of conscience, which is onely Gods subject and Gods peculiar. Dogmatizing and Censoriousnesse makes a will-worship to be indeed superstition.

In prosecution of this it is to be added, It is as great a sin to teach for doctrines the prohibitions of Men, as the injunctions and commandements; to say that we may not doe what is lawful, as that it is necessary to doe

that which is onely permitted, or is commended. He that imposes on mens conscience an affirmative or a negative that God hath not imposed, is equally injurious, and equally superstitious; and we can no more serve or please God in abstaining from what is innocent, then we can by doing what he hath not commanded. He that thinks he serves God by looking to the East when he prayes, and believes all men and at all times to be oblig'd to doe so, is a superstitious man: but he who believes this to be superstition, and therefore turns from the East, and believes it also to be necessary that he do not look that way, is equally guilty of the same folly; and is like a traveller that so long goes from the East, that he comes to it by his long progression in the circle. If by the law of God it be not sinful, or if by the law of God it be not necessary, no doctrines of men can make it so: to call good evil, or evil good, is equally hateful to God: and as every man is bound to preserve his liberty that a yoke be not imposed up∣on his conscience, and he be tied to do what God hath left free; so he is oblig'd to take care that he be not hindred, but still that he may doe it if he will. That this no way relates to humane laws I shall afterwards dis∣course: I now onely speak of imposition upon mens understandings, not upon their wills or outward act. He that sayes that without a surplice we cannot pray to God acceptably, and he that sayes we cannot well pray with it, are both to blame; but if a positive law of our superiour inter∣venes, that's another consideration: for, quaedam quae licent, tempore & loco mutato non licent, said Seneca; and so on the contrary, that may be lawful or unlawful, necessary or unnecessary, accidentally, which is not so in its own nature and the intentions of God.

2. Whatsoever pretends to lawfulness or praise by being an instrument of a vertue and the minister of a law,* 1.30 must be an apt instrument, naturally, rationally, prudently, or by institution such as may doe what is pretended. Thus although in order to prayer I may very well fast, to alleviate the bo∣dy & make the spirit more active & untroubl'd; yet against a day of prayer I will not throw all the goods out of my house, that my dining-room may look more like a Chappel, or the sight of worldly goods may not be in my eye at the instant of my devotion: because as this is an uncommanded instance, so it is a foolish and an unreasonable instrument. The instrument must be such as is commonly used by wise and good men in the like cases, or something that hath a natural proportion and efficacy to the effect.

3. Whatsoever pretends to be a service of God in an uncommanded instance,* 1.31 by being the specification of a general command, or the instance of a grace, must be naturally and univocally such, not equivocally and by pretension onely: of which the best sign is this, If it be against any one commandement directly or by consequent, it cannot acceptably pursue or be the instance of any other. Thus when the Gnosticks abused their Di∣sciples by a pretense of humility, telling them that they ought by the me∣diation of Angels to present their prayers to God the Father, and not by the Son of God, it being too great a presumption to use his name and an immediate address to him (as S. Chrysostome, Theophylact, and O Ecumenius report of them) this was a culpable will-worship, because the relation it pretended to humility was equivocal and spurious, it was expresly against an article of faith* 1.32 and a Divine Commandement. So did the Pythagore∣ans in their pretensions to mortification; they commanded to abstain from

marriages, from flesh, from fish, as unclean, and ministeries of sin, and pro∣ductions of the Devil. Both these the Apostle reproves in his epistle to the Colossians; and therefore condemns all things of the same unreason ableness.

4. All uncommanded instances of piety must be represented by their own proper qualities,* 1.33 effect and worthiness; that is, if all their worth be relative, they must not be taught as things of an absolute excellency, or if it be a matter of abstinence from any thing that is permitted, and that abstinence be by reason of danger or temptation, error or scandal, it must not be pressed as abstinence from a thing that is simply unlawful, or the duty simply necessary. Thus the Encratites and Manichees were su∣perstitious persons, besides their heresie; because although they might lawfully have abstain'd from all ordinary use of wine, in order to tempe∣rance and severe sobriety, yet when they began to say, that such absti∣nence was necessary, and all wine was an abomination, they pass'd into a direct superstition, and a criminal wil-worship. While the Novatians de∣nied to reconcile some sort of lapsed criminals, they did it for discipline and for the interests of a holy life, they did no more then divers parts of the Church of God did; but when that discipline, which once was useful, became now to be intolerable, and that which was onely matter of Go∣vernment became also matter of doctrine, then they did that which our blessed Saviour reproved in the Pharisees, they taught for doctrines the in∣junctions of men, and made their wil-worship to be superstition.

5. When any uncommanded instance relative to a Commandement is to be performed,* 1.34 it ought to be done temperately and according to its own proportion and usefulness: for if a greater zeal invites us to the action, we must not give the reins and liberty to that zeal, and suffer it to pass on as far as it naturally can; but as far as piously and prudently it ought. He that gives alms to the poor, may upon the stock of the same vertue spare all vain or less necessary expence and be a good husband to the poor, and highly please God with these uncommanded instances of duty: but then he must not prosecute them beyond the reason of his own affairs, to the ruine of his relations, to the danger of temptation. To pray is good; to keep the continual sacrifice of morning and evening devotions is an excellent specification of the duty of [pray continually:] now he that prayes more frequently does still better, but there is a period beyond which the multiplication and intension of the duty is not to extend. For although to pray nine times is more then is describ'd in any diurnal or nocturnal office; yet if a man shall pray nine and twenty times, and prose∣cute the excess to all degrees which he naturally can, and morally cannot, that is, ought not, his will-worship degenerates into superstition; because it goes beyond the natural and rational measures, which though they may be enlarged by the passions of Religion, yet must not pass beyond the pe∣riods of reason, and usurp the places of other duties civil and religious.

If these measures be observ'd,* 1.35 the voluntary and uncommanded acti∣ons of religion, either by their cognation to the laws, or adoption into obedience, become acceptable to God, and by being a voluntary worship, or an act of religion proceeding from the will of man, that is, from his love and from his desires to please God, are highly rewardable: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

said S. Paul, If I doe this thing with a voluntary act or free choice, then I have a reward. And that no man may be affrighted with those words of God to the Jews,* 1.36 who hath requir'd these things at your hands? as if every thing were to be condemned concerning which God could say, Quis requisivit? meaning, that he never had given a comman∣dement to have it done; it is considerable, that God speaks not of volun∣tary, but of commanded services; he instances in such things which him∣self had requir'd at their hands, their sacrifices of bulls and goats, their new moons and solemn assemblies, their sabbaths and oblations: but because they were not done with that piety & holiness as God intended, God takes no delight in the outward services: so that this condemns the unholy keep∣ing of a law, that is, observing the body, not the spirit of religion; but at no hand does God reject voluntary significations of a commanded duty, which proceed from a well-instructed and more loving spirit, as appears in the case of vows and free-will-offerings in the Law; which although they were will-worshippings, or voluntary services, and therefore the matter of them was not commanded, yet the religion was approved. And if it be objected that these were not will-worshippings because they were recommended by God in general; I reply, Though they were recommen∣ded, yet they were left to the liberty and choice of our will, and if that re∣commendation of them be sufficient to sanctifie such voluntary religion, then we are safe in this whole question; for so did our blessed Saviour in the Gospel, as his Father did in the Law, Qui potest capere capiat; and he that hath ears to hear,* 1.37 let him hear; and so saith S. Paul, He that standeth fast in his heart, that is, hath perfectly resolved and is of a constant tem∣per, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath judged in his heart that he will keep his virgin, doth well. But the ground of all is this; all voluntary acts of worship or religion are therefore acceptable quia fundamentum habent in lege Divina, Gods law is the ground of them; that's the Canon, and these will-worshippings are but the Descant upon the plain-song: some way or other they have their authority and ground from the law of God; For

VVhatsoever hath its whole foundation in a persuasion that is meerly hu∣mane,* 1.38 and no waies relies upon the Law or the expressed will of God, that is will-worship in the criminal sense, that is, it is superstition. So the vulgar Latine and Erasmus render the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or will-worship; and they both signifie the same thing, when will-worship is so defin'd: but if it be defin'd by [a religious passion or excess in uncommanded instances re∣lating to, or being founded in the Law and will of God,] then will-worship signifies nothing but what is good, and what is better; it is a free-will-offering 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, like the institution under which S. Paul was educated, the strictest and exactest sect of the religion, and they that live accordingly, are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the voluntary and most wil∣ling subjects of the law. So that although concerning some instances it can be said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this is directly a commandement; and con∣cerning others, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this is a vertuous or a right action of my choice; yet these are no otherwise oppos'd then as in and super, for the one are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the order and constitution of the commandement, the other 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as S. Chrysostome expresses it) are above the commandement, yet all are in the same form or category: it is within the same limits & of the same nature, and to the same ends,

and by the same rule, and of the same holinesse, and by a greater love; that's all the difference: and thus it was from the beginning of the world, in all institutions and in all religions, which God ever lov'd.

I onely instance in the first ages and generations of mankinde,* 1.39 because in them there is pretended some difficulty to the question. Abel offer'd sacrifice to God, and so did Cain; and in the dayes of Enoch men began to call upon the name of the Lord;* 1.40 and a priesthood was instituted in every family, and the Major-domo was the Priest, and God was worshipped by consumptive oblati∣ons: and to this they were prompted by natural reason, and for it there was no command of God.a 1.41 So S. Chry∣sostome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Abel was not taught of any one, neither had he receiv'd a law con∣cerning the oblation of first-fruits; but of himself and moved by his Conscience he offer'd that sacrifice: andb 1.42 the Author of the answers ad Orthodoxos in the workes of Justin Martyr affirmes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, They who offer'd to God before the law the sacrifice of beasts did not dee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 by a Divine Commandement, though God by accep∣〈◊〉〈◊〉 gave testimony that the person who offered it was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to him. What these instances doe effect or per∣〈◊〉〈◊〉 we shall see in the sequal; in the mean time I ob∣〈◊〉〈◊〉 that they are by men of differing perswasions us'd to contrary pur∣〈◊〉〈◊〉 Some there are that suppose it to be in the power of men to ap∣〈◊〉〈◊〉 new instances and manners of religion, and to invent distinct matters ••••ormes of Divine worship; and they suppose that by these instances they are warranted to say, that we may in religion doe whatsoever by Natural reason we are prompted to; for Abel and Cain and Enoch did their services upon no other account. Others that suspect every thing to be superstitious that is uncommanded, and believe all sorts of will-worship to be criminal, say, that if Abel did this wholy by his natural reason and religion, then this religion being by the law of Nature was also a command of God; so that still it was done by the force of a law, for a law of Nature being a law of God, whatsoever is done by that is necessary, not will-worship, or an act of choice and a voluntary religion.

Now these men divide the truth between them.* 1.43 For it is not true that whatsoever is taught us by Natural reason, is bound upon us by a Natural law: which proposition although I have already prov'd competently, yet I shall not omit to adde some things here to the illustration of it, as be∣ing very material to the present question and rule of Conscience. Socinus the lawyer affirm'd Reason to be the Natural law, by which men are inclin'd first, and then determin'd to that which is agreeable to reason. But this cannot be true, least we should be constrain'd to affirme that God hath left the government of the world to an uncertain and imperfect guide; for nothing so differs as the reasonings of men, and a man may doe according

to his reason, and yet doe very ill. Sicut omnis citharoedi opus est citharam pulsare,* 1.44 periti verò ac probè docti rectè pulsare: sic hominis cujuscun{que} est agere cum ratione, probi verò hominis est rectè cum ratione operari. So Aristotle. It is the work of every Musician to play upon his instrument; but to play well requires art and skil: so every man does according to reason; but to doe righteous things, and according to right reason, must suppose a wise and a good man. The consequent of this is, that reason is not the natu∣ral law, but reason when it is rightly taught, well ordered, truly instructed, perfectly commanded; the law is it that binds us to operate according to right reason, and commands us we should not decline from it. He that does according to the natural law, or the law of God, does not, cannot doe amisse: but when reason alone is his warrant and his guide, he shall not alwaies find out what is pleasing to God. And it will be to no purpose to say, that not every mans reason, but right reason shall be the law. For every man thinks his own reason right, and whole nations differ in the assignation and opinions of right reason; and who shall be Judge of all, but God, and he that is the Judge must also be the law-giver, else it will a be sad story for us to come under his Judgement, by whose lawes and measures we were not wholly directed. If God had commanded the Priests pectoral to be set with rubies, and had given no instrument of discerning his mean∣ing but our eyes, a red crystal or stained glasse would have pass'd in stead of rubies: But by other measures then by seeing we are to distinguish the precious stone from a bright counterfeit. As our eyes are to the distinction of visible objects, so is our reason to spiritual, the instrument of judging, but not alone; but as reason helps our eyes, so does revelation informe our reason; and we have no law till by revelation or some specifick com∣munication of his pleasure God hath declar'd and made a law.* 1.45 Now all the law of God which we call natural is reason, that is, so agreeable to natural and congenit reason, that the law is in the matter of it written in our hearts before it is made to be a law. Lex est Naturae vis, & ratio prudentis, juris atque injuriae regula. So Cicero lib. 1. de leg. But though all the law of Nature be rea∣son; yet whatsoever is reason is not presently a law of Nature. And therefore that I may return to the instan∣ces we are discoursing of, it followes not that although Abel and Cain and Enoch did doe some actions of religion by the dictate of natural reason, that therefore they did it by the law of nature: for every good act that any man can doe is agreeable to right reason; but every act we doe is not by a law, as appears in all the instances I have given in the explication and commentaries on these two last rules. Secondly, On the other side it is not true, that we may doe it in religion whatsoever we are prompted to by natural reason. For although natural reason teaches us that God is to be lov'd, and God is to be worshipped, that is, it tells us he is our supreme, we his creatures and his servants; we had our being from him, and we still depend upon him, and he is the end of all who is the beginning of all, and therefore whatsoever came from him must also tend to him; and who∣soever made every thing, must needs make every thing for himself, for he being the fountain of perfection, nothing could be good but what

is from, and for, and by, and to that fountain, and therefore that every thing must in it's way honour and serve and glorify him: now I say, although all this is taught us by natural reason, by this reason we are taught that God must be worshipped; yet that cannot tell us how God will be wor∣shipped. Natural reason can tell us what is our obligation, because it can discourse of our nature and production, our relation and minority; but Natural reason cannot tell us by what instances God will be pleas'd with us, or prevail'd with to doe us new benefits; because no natural reason can informe us of the will of God, till himself hath declar'd that will. Natural reason tels us we are to obey God; but Natural reason cannot tell us in what positive commandements God will be obeyed, till he declares what he will command us to doe and observe. So though by Nature we are taught that we must worship God; yet by what significations of duty, and by what actions of religion this is to be done, depends upon such a cause as nothing but it self can manifest and publish.

And this is apparent in the religion of the old world,* 1.46 the religion of sacrifices and consumptive oblations; which it is certain themselves did not choose by natural reason, but they were taught and injoyn'd by God: for that it is no part of a natural religion to kill beasts, and offer to God Wine and Fat, is evident by the nature of the things themselves, the cause of their institution, and the matter of fact, that is the evidence that they came in by positive constitution. For blood was anciently the sancti∣on of lawes and Covenants, Sanctio à Sanguine say the Grammarians; because the sanction or establishment of lawes was it which bound the life of man to the law, and therefore when the law was broken, the life or the blood was forfeited: bt then as in Covenants, in which sometimes the wilder people did drink blood, the gentler and more civil did drink wine, the blood of the grape; so in the forfeiture of lawes they also gave the blood of beasts in exchange for their own. Now that this was lesse then what was due is certain, and therefore it must suppose remission and grace, a favourable and a gracious acceptation; which because it is voluntary and arbitrary in God, less then his due, and more then our merit, no natural reason can teach us to appease God with sacrifices. It is indeed agreeable to reason that blood should be pour'd forth, when the life is to be paied, because the blood is the life; but that one life should redeem another, that the blood of a beast should be taken in exchange for the life of a man, that no reason naturally can teach us. Ego verò destinavi ••um vobis in altari ad expiationem faciendam pro animis vestris: nam sangui•• est qui pro anima expiationem facit, said God by Moses.* 1.47 The life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you upon the Altar to make an atonement for your Souls: for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the Soule: accor∣ding to which are those words of S. Paul, without shedding of blood there is no remission; meaning that in the Law, all expiation of sins was by sacrifices, to which Christ by the sacrifice of himself put a period. But all this Reli∣gion of sacrifices, was (I say) by Gods appointment; Ego verò destinavi, so said God, I have design'd or decreed it: but that this was no part of a law of nature, or of prime, essential reason appears in this, * 1. Because God confin'd it among the Jewes to the family of Aaron, and that onely in the land of their own inheritance, the land of promise; which could no more be done in a natural religion then the Sun can be confin'd to a village-Chappel. * 2. Because God did express oftentimes that he took no de∣light in Sacrifices of Beasts; as appears in Psalm 40. and Psal. 50. and

Psal. 51. Isai. 1. Jerem. 7. Hosea 6. Micah 6. * 3. Because he tells us in opposition to sacrifices and external rites, what that is which is the natural and essential religion in which he does delight; the sacrifice of prayer and thanksgiving, a broken and a contrite heart; that we should walk in the way he hath appointed; that we should doe justice and judgment, and walk humbly with our God: He desires mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more then burnt-offerings. 4. Because Gabriel the Arch∣angel foretold that the Messias should make the daily sacrifice to cease. 5. Because for above 1600. years God hath suffered that nation to whom* 1.48 he gave the law of sacrifices to be without Temple, or Priest, or Altar, and therefore without Sacrifice.

But then if we inquire why God gave the law of sacrifices,* 1.49 and was so long pleas'd with it; the reasons are evident and confess'd. 1. Sacrifices were types of that great oblation which was made upon the altar of the Crosse. 2. It was an expiation which was next in kind to the real for∣feiture of our own lives: it was blood for blood, a life for a life, a lesse for a greater; it was that which might make us confesse Gods severity against sin, though not feel it; it was enough to make us hate the sin, but not to sink under it; it was sufficient for a fine, but so as to preserve the stake; it was a manuduction to the great sacrifice, but suppletory of the great losse and forfeiture; it was enough to glorify God, and by it to save our selves; it was insufficient in it self, but accepted in the great sacrifice; it was enough in shadow, when the substance was so certainly to succeed. 3. It was given the Jewes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.50 as the Author of the Apostolical constitutions affirmes, that being loaden with the expence of sacrifices to one God, they might not be greedy upon the same terms to run after many: and therefore the same Author affirmes, before their golden calfe and other idolatries, Sacrifices were not commanded to the Jewes, but perswaded onely; recommended, and left unto their liberty. By which we are at last brought to this truth, That it was taught by God to Adam, and by him taught to his posterity, that they should in their several manners worship God by giving to him something of all that he had given us; and therefore something of our time, and something of our goods: and as that was to be spent in praises and celebration of his name, so these were to be given in consumptive offerings; but the manner and the measure was left to choice,* 1.51 and taught by superadded reasons and posi∣tive lawes: and in this sense are those words to be understood which above I cited out of Justin Martyr and S. Chrysostom. To this purpose Aquinas cites the glosse upon the second of the Colossians, saying, Ante tempus legis justos per interiorem instinctum instructos fuisse de modo colendi Deum, quos alii sequebantur; postmodum verò exterioribus praeceptis circa hoc homines fuisse instructos, quae praeterire pestiferum est. Before the Law the righteous had a certain instinct by which they were taught how to worship God, to wit in the actions of internal religion; but afterwards they were instructed by out∣ward precepts. That is, the natural religion consisting in praiers & praises, in submitting our understandings and subjecting our wills, in these things the wise Patriarchs were instructed by right reason and the natural duty of Men to God: but as for all external religions, in these things they had a Teacher and a guide; of these things they were to doe nothing of their own heads. In whatsoever is from within there can be no Will-worship, for all that the Soul can doe is Gods right; and no act of faith or hope in

God, no charity, no degree of charity, or confidence, or desire to please him can be superstitious. But because in outward actions there may be undecent expressions or unapt ministeries, or instances not relative to a law of God or a Councel Evangelical, there may be irregularity and obliquity, or direct excesse, or imprudent expressions, therefore they needed Masters and Teachers, but their great teacher was God. Deum docuisse Adam cultum divinum quo ejus benevolentiam recuperaret quam per peccatum transgressionis amiserat; ipsumque docuisse filios suos dare Deo decimas & primitias, said Hugo de S. Victore. God taught Adam how to worship him, and by what means to recover his favour, from which he by trans∣gression fell (the same also is affirmed by S. Athanasius* 1.52:) but that which he addes, that Adam taught his children to give first-fruits and tenths, I know not upon what authority he affirmes it. Indeed Josephus seemes to say something against it: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, God is not pleas'd so much in oblation of such things which the greediness and violence of man forces from the Earth, such as are corne and fruits; but is more pleas'd with that which comes of it self naturally and easily, such as are cattel and sheep. And therefore he supposes God rejected Cain and accepted Abel, because Cain brought fruits which were procur'd by labour and tillage; but Abel offered sheep, which came by the easy methods and pleasing ministeries of Nature. It is certain Josephus said not true, and had no warrant for his affirmative: but that which his discourse does morally intimate is very right, that the things of mans invention please not God; but that which comes from him we must give him again, and serve him by what he hath given us, and our religion must be of such things as come to us from God: it must be obedience or compliance; it must be something of meer love, or something of love mingled with obedience: it is certain it was so in the instance of Abel.

And this appears in those words of S. Paul,* 1.53 By faith Abel offer'd sa∣crifice:* 1.54 it was not therefore done by choice of his own head; but by the obedience of faith, which supposes revelation and the command or declaration of the will of God. And concerning this, in the traditions and writings of the Easterlings, we find this story.

In the beginning of mankind, when Eve for the peopling of the world was by God so bless'd in the production of Children that she alwaies had twins before the birth of Seth, and the twins were ever male and female, that they might inter∣changeably marry, ne gens sit unius aetatis populus virorum, lest mankinde should expire in one generation; Adam being taught by God did not allow the twins to marry, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whom nature her self by their divided birth had separated and divided; but appointed that Cain should marry the twin-sister of Abel, and Abel should marry Azron the twin-sister of Cain: But Cain thought his own twin-sister the more beautifull, and resolved to marry her. Adam there∣fore wished them to inquire of God by sacrifice; which they did: and because Cains sacrifice was rejected, and his hopes made void, and his desire not consented to, he kill'd his Brother Abel; whose twin-sister afterwards fell to the portion of Seth, who had none of his owne. Upon this occasion sacrifices were first offered.

Now whether God taught the religion of it first to Adam, or immediately to Cain and Abel, yet it is

certain from the Apostle (upon whom we may relie, though upon the tradition of the Easterlings we may not) that Abel did his religion from the principle of faith; and therefore that manner of worshipping God did not consist onely in manners, but in supernatural mystery; that is, all Ex∣ternal formes of worshipping are no parts of moral duty, but depend upon divine institution and divine acceptance: and although any external rite that is founded upon a natural rule of vertue may be accepted into religion, when that vertue is a law; yet nothing must be presented to God but what himself hath chosen some way or other. Superstitio est quando tradi∣tioni humanae Religionis nomen applicatur, said the Glosse [in Coloss. 2.] when any tradition or invention of man is called Religion, the proper name of it is superstition; that is, when any thing is brought into Religion and is it self made to be a worship of God, it is a will-worship in the Cri∣minal sense. Hanc video sapientissimorum fuisse sententiam, legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam,* 1.55 neque scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed aeternum quiddam, quod universum mundum regeret, imperandi prohiben∣dique sapientia. Ita principem legem illam, & ultimam mentem esse dice∣bant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut vetantis Dei, said Cicero. Neither the wit of man, nor the consent of the people is a competent warranty for any prime law; for law is an eternal thing, fit to governe the world, it is the wisdome of God commanding or forbidding. Reason indeed is the aptness, the disposition, the capacity and matter of the eternal law; but the life and forme of it is the command of God. Every plant which my Heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up. Some plants arise from seed, some from slips and suckers, some are grafted, and some inoculated; and all these will grow, and bring forth pleasing fruit; but if it growes wild, that is, of its own accord, the fruit is fit for nothing, and the tree is fit for burning.

Notes

• * 1.1

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• * 1.2

  2.
• * 1.3

  Juvenal. l. 5. Satyr. 15.
• * 1.4

  3.
• * 1.5

  4.
• * 1.6

  5.
• * 1.7

  6.
• * 1.8

  7.
• * 1.9

  S. August. de vera relig. c. 55. Non sit nobisre∣ligio in phanta∣smatibus nostris. Melius est enim qualecūque ve∣rum quam omne quicquid arbi∣trio cogi potest. Lib. 1. de con∣sens. Fvan••. cap. 18.
• * 1.10

  8.
• * 1.11

  De•••••• 12. 32. Vers. 8.
• * 1.12

  9.
• * 1.13

  Matt. 15. 8, 9. Mark 7. 7.
• * 1.14

  10.
• * 1.15

  11.
• * 1.16

  12.
• * 1.17

  13.
• * 1.18

  14.
• * 1.19

  15.
• * 1.20

  1 King. 8. 18.
• * 1.21

  16.
• * 1.22

  17.
• * 1.23

  2 Sam. 7. 5. 1 Ch••on. 22. 8. & 28. 3.
• * 1.24

  18.
• * 1.25

  S. Chrysost. in Rom. 8.
• * 1.26

  Doctrine & pract. of Repen cap. 1.
• * 1.27

  19.
• * 1.28

  20.
• * 1.29

  Socrat. lib. ••. c. 22.
• * 1.30

  21.
• * 1.31

  22.
• * 1.32

  Joh. 16. 23.
• * 1.33

  23.
• * 1.34

  24.
• * 1.35

  25.
• * 1.36

  Isa. 1. 11, 12, 13.
• * 1.37

  1 Cor. 7. 37.
• * 1.38

  26.
• * 1.39

  27.
• * 1.40

  Multi commentariorum & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 versiarum scriptores ex his verbis 〈◊〉〈◊〉, homines illius seculi novos rius, no••••s ceremoni as & religionis formas instit••∣isse; quia scil. certum est, ab exor••••o hu∣mani generis homines Deum colu••se, at∣que adeò invocasse nomen Domini. Hoc ergo quod quasi de novo factum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, est institutio novorum rituum, quibus quasi de proprio Deum ••olere volucru•••• At notandum est in horum verborum sen∣su nihil esse certii quod ad hanc rem possit pertinere. Nam passim in Hebraeorum cōmentariis seculum Enoch tanquam im∣pium memoratur: Et Hebrai expon••re solebant hunc locum quasi sensus esset, tunc cum Enoch natus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 homines pr••∣fanasse nomen Domini invocando nomea ejus super Creatur••s, sic ••••••rbum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, derivatum scil. à voce Colin, i. e. pr••sana, profanasse interpret•••• sunt: homines sc•••• tunc coepisse appellare ••••lios hominum, & animalia, & herb 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nomine Dei sancti benedicti. Abenez•••• a. & Abrabaneel simpliciorem horum ••erborii sensum re••i∣nuerunt: caeperu•••• scil. commemorate creatorem suum, & ad nomen ejus opera & orationes dirigere.
• a 1.41

  a 12 de Statuis.
• b 1.42

  ad Quest. 83.
• * 1.43

  28.
• * 1.44

  Ethic l. 1. c. 7.
• * 1.45

  Lex Dei mentem nostram incendens, eam ad se pertrahit, conscientiámque no∣stram vellicat quae & ipsa mentis nostrae lex dicitur. Damascen. lib. 4. cap. 23. de fide. ••ibi Clichtovaeus sic exponit, lex men∣tis nostrae est ipsa naturalis ratio Dei legem habens sibi inditam, impressám{que} & insi∣tam qu bonum à malo interno luminc di••adicam ••••. S. Hieronymus episi. 151. ad Algasi. q. 8. hanc legè appellat legem in∣telligentiae, quam ignorat pueritia, ne∣scii infantia, tunc a venit & praecipit, quando incipit intelligentia. B. Maximus tom. 5. Biblioth. centur. 5. c. 13. Lex naturae est ratio naturalis, quae captivum tenet sensum ad delendam vim irrationa∣lem. Hoc dixit imperfectè, quia ratio na∣turali•• ta••••m est maieria legis naturalis. Rectiusa. S. Augustinus, l. 2. de sermone Domini in monto, Nullam animam esse quae ratiocinar•• possit, in cujus conscien∣tia non loquatur Deus: quis n. legem naturalem in cordibus hominum scribit nisi Deus? hoc scil. innuens non rationē solam, sed Deum loquentem ex principiis nostra rationis sanxisse legem. Idem dix∣it explicatius, l. 22. contr. Faustum c. 27. legem aeternam esse Divinam rationem vel voluntatem ordinem naturalem cōservari jubentem perturbari vetantem.
• * 1.46

  29.
• * 1.47

  Levit. 17. 11.
• * 1.48

  D. ••
• * 1.49

  30.
• * 1.50

  Lib. 6. c. 18.
• * 1.51

  Num. 7.
• * 1.52

  In Epi••••. de perfidia Euic•••••• & libro super illud, Omnia mihi: radia sunt. Antiq. Jud. l. 1. c. 3.
• * 1.53

  31.
• * 1.54

  Hebr. 11.
• * 1.55

  Lib 1. & lib. 2. de legibus. Videl•••• dial. to de legibus.