Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 1. The Law of Nature is the Universal Law of the world, or the Law of mankinde, concerning com∣mon necessities to which we are inclined by Na∣ture, invited by consent, prompted by reason, but is bound upon us onely by the commands of God.

ΕΣτω 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1 said the Apostolical constitution;* 1.2 Be careful to understand what is the Law natural, and what is super∣induc'd upon it. The counsel, abating the authority and reverence of them that said it, is of great reasonableness. For all men talk of the law of Nature, and all agree that there is such a material law which some way or other is of the highest obligation; but because there are no Digests or Tables of this law, men have not onely differ'd about the number of them, and the instances themselves, but about the manner of drawing them forth, and making the ob∣servation: whereas if the law of Nature were such a thing as it is supposed generally, these differences would be as strange and impossible, as that men should disagree about what is black, or what is yellow, or that they should dispute concerning rules to signify when they desire, or when they hope, or when they love. The purpose of the present intendment will not suffer me to make large disputes about it, but to observe all that is to be drawn from it in order to Conscience and its obligation.

The Law of Nature]

Jus naturae,* 1.3 and Lex naturae are usually confounded by Divines and Law∣yers, but to very ill purposes, and to the confusion and indistinction of all the notices of them.* 1.4 The right of nature, or Jus naturae is no Law, and the law of na∣ture is no natural right. The right of nature is a perfect and universal liberty to doe whatsoever can secure me or please me. For the appetites that are prime, original, and natural, doe design us towards their satisfaction, and were a con∣tinual torment, and in vain, if they were not in order to their rest, contented∣ness and perfection. Whatsoever we naturally desire, naturally we are permit∣ted to. For natures are equal, and the capacities are the same, and the desires alike; and it were a contradiction to say that naturally we are restrained from any thing to which we naturally tend. Therefore to save my own life, I can kill another, or twenty, or a hundred, or take from his hands to please my self, if it happens in my circumstances and power; and so for eating, and drink∣ing, and pleasures. If I can desire, I may possess or enjoy it: this is, The right of nature. Jus naturae, by jus or right, understanding not a collated or legal right, positive or determined, but a negative right, that is, such a right as every man hath without a Law, and such as that by which the stones in the streets are mine or yours; by a right that is negative, because they are nullius in bonis, they are appropriate to no man, and may be mine; that is, I may take them up and carry them to my bed of turf, where the natural, wild, or untutored man does sit. But this is not the Law of nature, nor passes any obligation at all.

And indeed nature her self makes not a Law:* 1.5

Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum,

and this opinion Carneades did express, but rudely, and was for it noted by Lactantius. He said there was no law of nature. But the Christians who for many ages have followed the School of Aristotle, have been tender in suffering such expressions, and have been great promoters of Aristotles doctrine con∣cerning the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the natural Law. But indeed Aristotle himself in this was various and indetermined.* 1.6 For in his Ethicks he affirms that some think the natural law to be [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉] unalterable, and of the same force every where, as fire burns here and in Persia: and yet he himself makes it no∣table, and that it is not the same among all Nations;* 1.7 for so he in his Rheto∣ricks says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that some doe Divine [not demon∣strate] that some things are just or unjust by nature, without any Covenant or So∣ciety; intimating, that without a covenant or contract tacite or explicite, there can be no Law: and if it depends upon contract, it must be variable as neces∣sity, and contingency together; and so he affirms,* 1.8 That there is nothing so na∣turally just but it is variable; and although the right hand is in most men the strongest, yet in some the left hand is. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Distributive justice is by proportion, and therefore it is variable; and in general he affirms of all justice, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ju∣stice is in proportion and relation.

For justice is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.9 that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a relative excellency, and therefore must suppose society, and a paction or covenant. For a man cannot be unjust to himself or to his own goods which are absolutely in his

power.* 1.10 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and therefore Justice, I mean that univer∣sal virtue that contains all else within it,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

is a virtue that hath its being from something superinduc'd upon nature. Justice is natural, as all virtues are, that is, reasonable and perfective of our nature, and introductive of well-being: But nature alone hath not injoyn'd it originally, any more then matrimonial chastity was a natural law, which could not be at all be∣fore Eve was created, and yet our nature was perfect before. Justum nihil est non constitutâ lege, nothing is just or unjust of it self, until some Law of God or man does supervene; and the Scepticks generally, and amongst the Dogma∣ticks Aristippus said, that nothing is just by nature, but onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by law and custome; which in what sense it is to be admitted, I shall explicate in the following periods.

—is the universal law of the World.]

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.11 so Aristotle calls it [The law of mankinde] Commune omnium ho∣minum us; so Justinian; which is not to be understood of all men in all things absolutely,* 1.12 but especially of all wise or civil Nations that communicate with each other. Lucretius restrains it to neighbours,

Tunc & amicitiam coeperunt jungere habentes Finitima inter se nec laedere, nec violare.

But many Nations have thought, and some think so still, that they may hurt stranger people, the possessors of farre distant Countries, barbarous and savage people: The Romans who were the wisest of all Nations did so.

—si quis sinus abditus ultra,* 1.13 Siqua foret tellus quae fulvum mitteret aurum Hostis erat—

All people whom they call'd barbarous, or whom they found rich were their enemies.

But there are some laws of Nature which belong to all absolutely,* 1.14 to whom any notice of the true God and of good manners is arrived; particu∣larly those which belong to common religion: But in the laws of justice, the law of nature is more restrained, because it does not onely, like the laws of religion, suppose some communications of command from God, but some entercourse with man; and therefore are obligatory, or extended in proportion to the proximity and communication. But the law taken in its integrity, or according to its formal reason, is the law of all mankinde; for all men in all things are bound to it.

Concerning some common necessities]

This describes the matter and body of natural Laws. For there is nothing by which the laws are denominated natural more then by this, that they are pro∣visions made for the natural necessities of mankinde; such are, To doe as we would be done to: To perform covenants: To secure messengers of peace and Arbitrators: To be thankful to our Benefactors, and the like: without these a man cannot receive any good, nor be safe from evil.

By this relation,* 1.15 and interchanging reason, it is therefore necessary that these laws should be distinguished from all others, because these and their like proceed from the same principle, are restrained by the same penalties, written in the same tables, have the same necessity, and doe suppose something super added

to our nature; and therefore that these and their like are natural, and the others are not, must be by relation to the subject matter.

For in these cases and the like,* 1.16 when that which is profitable is made just, then that which is natural is made a law; that is, when the law tends to the same end whither nature tends, when the faculty or appetite is provided for by obedience to a law, then the law is called natural. For since all good and just laws are profitable, they are laws Civil or Religions, or Natural according as they serve the end of the Commonwealth, or of the Religion, or of Nature. This is evident in the Code of the Mosaick law, where all laws being established by God under the same Prince, could have no difference but by their subject matter; and when they did lie in one body, to separate one from the other by proper appellatives was not easy, but by their manner of doing benefit, and their material relations.

To which we are inclined by nature]* 1.17 That which is usually called the law of Nature is of it self nothing else but convenientia cum naturâ rationali, a consonancy to natural reason and being. Some in drawing the Tables of the natural law, estimate those onely to be na∣tural laws which are concerning appetites and actions common to man and beast. Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit, said Ulpian. That is the law of nature which is by nature taught not onely to men,* 1.18 but even to beasts, for they also are under her power,

—Magnis agitant sub legibus aevum.

The same definition is also given by Aquinas, and many Lawyers after Justinian,* 1.19 and almost all Divines after Aquinas; but Laurentius Valla will at no hand endure it, Nam jus naturale dicere quod natura omnia animalia docuit, ridiculum; it is ridiculous to affirm that to be the law of nature, which nature teaches to all living creatures; such as are, conjunction of sexes for conservation of the kinde, nursing and educating children, abstinence from some certain mixtures and copulations, abhorring the conjunction of some very near persons. Concerning which it is therefore certain, that though the matter of these laws is hugely agreeable to nature, and some of them are afterwards made into laws, and for their matter sake and early sanction are justly called natural (as I have other∣where discoursed) yet they are made laws in nature onely dispositivè,* 1.20 that is, by nature they are made Candidates of laws, they are prepar'd by nature, but compleated by God in other ways then by our nature and creation.

The reason is,* 1.21 because that which is natural is one, but these laws admit variety; and amongst wise Nations in several cases have and have not obliga∣tion. The Religious, and the Priests, and wise men among the Persians did not account themselves bound by all these, as I shall discourse in the follow∣ing numbers; and yet they were then to be reckoned amongst the wisest men in the world, because of their great Empire and Government, which, by rea∣son of their great necessities and communications with mankinde, cannot be done without its proportion of wisdome. But if nature did make these into a law, that is, if it comes by creation, and from thence also the penalty and coer∣cion is derived (for without these there is no law) then it were impossible the wise Persians should think it commendable to doe that which others called abominable, since in all those things in which they doe a thing which they call unlawful, they as other men felt an equal sharpness and pungency of consci∣ence.

But that I may speak closer to the particular,* 1.22 That a thing is common to men and beasts is no indication of a law of nature, but onely of a common ne∣cessity, instinct, or inclination respectively. For they doe it without a law, and therefore so may we, unless something else besides nature makes it a law to us; for nature or natural desire in them and in us is the same, but this desire is in them where a law cannot be, and therefore in us also it may be without a law. Beasts doe all that they can doe, and can love, and are no more capable of law then of reason; and if they have instincts and inclinations, it is no otherwise then their appetites to meat, concerning which nature hath determined all, but without proper obligation: and all those discourses concerning the absti∣nence of beasts, their gratitude, their hospitality, their fidelity, their chastity and marriages, are just like the discourses of those that would make them rea∣sonable. More certain and true is that which was said of old,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

Fishes and birds and beasts eat one another, because they have no justice or laws amongst them, said Hesiod; and the like is in Homer,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.23

and therefore although it is a good popular argument which is used against un∣natural conjunctions which is in the Greek Epigram,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.24 &c.

Abstain from such impurities, for the very beasts preserve their natural customs and conjunctions inviolate; yet this is an infinitely uncertain and fallacious way of estimating any particular laws of nature, because it may as well be said to be against the law of nature to be drunk, as to be incestuous, upon this ac∣count, because Cows will drink no more then to quench their thirst: and although in the law of Moses, beasts were put to death if they were instrumental in bestiality or murder, yet this was in poenam Domini, or a matter of dominion over beasts; and the word poena or punishment was improper and no other∣wise to be understood then that of Suidas in his story of Nicon; whose statue when an envious person had whipp'd, to disgrace his memory, because in the Greek games he had won 1400. crowns, the statue fell upon his head and crushed him to death. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. His sons accused the statue as guilty of murder, and the Thasians threw it into the Sea; for so was the law of Draco the Athenian, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to banish every thing that kill'd a man, though it were wood, stones, or hatchets as you may see in Demosthenes.* 1.25 These things were tragical detestations and emblema∣tical prosecutions of the crime; but the men were wiser then to beleeve it really a punishment to inanimate things. The same is true of beasts in their proportion, whose cruelty, savageness, or violent revenges is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.26 as Origen calls it, it is like pravity or wickedness.

This thing is so much the more considerable,* 1.27 because it is of use against the pretences and scruples of some persons in things where they ought to be confident. S. Hierom says that beasts when they are impregnated abstain from coition till the production of their young, and that this they doe by the law of nature; now upon this account to impose a law upon mankinde to doe so too, is weak and dangerous. But yet not onely hea 1.28, but Origenb 1.29, S. Ambrosec 1.30, and Seduliusd 1.31, doe argue to the same purpose upon that very ground; most weakly and dangerously exposing married persons to the greater dangers of

fornication, and depriving them of all the endearments of society, not consi∣dering that those creatures, and those men whose custome was otherwise, or laws different, had vagam libidinem, or the evil remedy of Polygamy. Beasts indeed are so ordered by nature, but without a law; as there is no law for Li∣ons to eat flesh, or Oxengrass, but yet naturally they doe it. A beast may be cruel or lustful, or monstrous and prodigious in the satisfaction of his appe∣tites; but not injurious, or the breaker of any sanction, or laws of justice. There may be damnum sine injuria facientis datum, says the law, and it is in∣stanc'd in beasts. Neque enim potest animal injuriam fecisse dici, quod sensu caret.* 1.32 A beast that hath no sense (that is, no reason) no sense or perception of lawful or unlawful cannot be said to doe an injury, and therefore is not capable of pu∣nishment, because he is incapable of a law. So Justin Martyr, or who ever is the author of the Questions and answers plac'd in his works; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is unreason∣able to exact of beasts the obliquity of their actions, because they have no rea∣son; it is therefore as unreasonable to make the law of nature to be some∣thing common to them and us.

If it be replied,* 1.33 that the Lawyers and Philosophers mean onely that these material instances which are common to them and us are the particulars of the law of Nature, and though they be not a law to them, yet the same things which they doe naturally, are natural to us, and a law besides, that is, the natu∣ral law: Besides that this is not usually said by them, we are then never the nearer to know what is the law of Nature by this description of it, for all things which they and we doe are not pretended to be laws; as eating and sleeping; and therefore by what measure any other thing should be a law to us because they and we doe it, is not signified by this definition, or any expli∣cation of it. Let us then try the other measures which are usual.

Invited by consent]

The consent of Nations,* 1.34 that is, publick fame amongst all or the wisest Nati∣ons is a great signification of decency or undecency, and a probable indica∣tion of the law of nature.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—

It is not a vain noise when many Nations joyn their voices in the attestation or detestation of an action; and it looks as if it were deriv'd from some com∣mon principle, which seems either to be Nature, or Contract; and then as in the first case they are reasonable, so in the second they are directly obligatory. Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est erratum sed traditum, said Tertullian:* 1.35 like that of Heraclitus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, if it seems so to the communities of mankinde, it is genuine, and natural, and without illusion.

Now this is true up to many degrees of probability;* 1.36 and yet it is rather an index of a permission of nature, then of a natural obligation; it tels us ra∣ther what we may doe, then what we must, it being more probable that all nati∣ons will not consent to an unnatural thing, that is, will not doe violence to nature, then that whatsoever they commonly act should be a necessary law, and the measures of nature, or the indication of her sanctions; and yet it is still more probable that the consent of Nations is more fit to be used as a corroberative to a perswasion or a kinde of actions, then as the prime motive or introduction. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

said Aristotle; and ar∣gumentum est veritatis aliquid omnibus videri, said Seneca; it is a great streng∣thening and a powerful prevailing argument to have all men consent to our opinions and propositions. But it is in many moral instances as it is in the uni∣versal opinion which all mankinde hath concerning jewels, where they consent no man knows how, or why: And no man can give a rational account why so great value should be set upon a Diamond, but because it looks prettily and is lasting: and so there are in nature decencies and lasting proportions in moral instances between the conscience and the action; but yet as there is no proper and effective usefulness in Diamonds towards the life of man, so neither is there in many instances in which the consent of mankinde is very general. And therefore this is very farre short of a law, and is no certain token of a permissive right of nature, much less of a law or obligation. For,

1. Whole Empires have been established and United by violence,* 1.37 and have laws given to them, and they receiv'd them in pursuance of the Conque∣rors interest, and their educations have been form'd accordingly. Ninus form'd the Assyrian Monarchy, and his son was flattered into the reputation of a God, and all the Nations under that Scepter consented to the worship of Belus; and all the Nations with whom these men conversed, imitated the manners of the Princeps populus, and in their banquets, the most modest of their women used to strip themselves stark naked, and it was counted no undecency, but she was rude and uncivil that did not.

2. There are some Nations so wholly barbarous and bruitish in their manners,* 1.38 that from their consent we can gather nothing but thorns and wild briers: They are the words of Porphyry, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from whom we must not learn to bely and abuse the fair inclinations and sentences of humane nature. And therefore if we goe to account by the consent of Nations, we must thrust out all wild, sa∣vage, barbarous, and untaught people, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Michael Psellus.* 1.39 We must into the account of the law of Nations take them onely who are subject to Laws, the well manner'd people onely, but then this also will be an infinite uncertainty. For,

3. All Nations to the Greeks were barbarous;* 1.40 to the Romans also all Nations but the Greeks and themselves: and to the Jews all were Heathens, which to them signified the same thing or worse.

4. And then which are those Nations whom we shall call Moratiores,* 1.41 wise and well manner'd people, for this will depend upon our own customes; if they be like our customes, our laws, and manners of living then we approve them, else we condemne them.

5. But then let us remember also that civility and fair customs were but in a narrow circle,* 1.42 till the Greeks and Romans beat the world into better manners.* 1.43 Aristotle says, that in his time in the Kingdomes of Pontus, which were very near to Greece, divers Nations were eaters of mans flesh, such as were the Achaeans and Heniochans, and divers amongst the Mediterraneans were worse then they.

6. The greatest part of the world were undiscovered till this last age,* 1.44 and amongst them the Jus Gen tium was to sacrifice one another to Daemons; for all the old Navigations were by Maritime Towns, and the inlands either were left alone in their own wilder manners, or it is not known what civilities they had. So that the Jus Gentium must needs have been an uncertain thing, vari∣able and by chance, growing by accidents, and introduc'd by violence, and therefore could not be the measure of the law of Nature.

7. Adde to these that the several Nations of the world had customes of their own,* 1.45 which commencing upon uncertain principles, have been derived to their posterity, and retained with a religious fancy; becoming natural and proportionable to their fancies and their fears, and they would rather die then doe an act of violence to them, and beleev'd it to be the greatest impiety in the world to break them.* 1.46 Herodotus tells a full instance of this in a triall made by Darius to the Indians and Greeks. He ask'd the Greeks what they would take to doe as the Indians did who eat their dead Parents and friends and accounted it the most honourable burial; they answered, They would not doe at it any price. And when he as'kd the Indians upon what conditions they would be induc'd to burn the bodies of their Fathers, and not to eat them, they desired him not to speak to them of any such horrid impiety as to burn their Fathers careasses, and to deny to them the honour of a natural burial in the bowels of their dear children. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Custome is the Genius or spirit of a mans actions, and introduces a nature, a facility, a delight, and religion it self. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.47 Custome is as nature, and that to which we are accustomed is like that which we were born. For that which is often is next to that which is always. It is nature which is always, that is custome which is frequent: It is possible that nature in many things should be altered, and it is very difficult that custome should in any thing; we have seen and heard it in a great instance in a few ages last past. For when some of the reformed Doctors by their private authority did twice at∣tempt it, and the Church of Rome did twelve times publickly endevour it, to get the Greeks to forsake the customes of their Churches, and to reform them∣selves by their copy, they were all repulsed; and if the Greek Prelates should take the people off from their old customes, besides that the great Turk would doe them a mischief for complying with the Western Christians his Enemies, the people themselves would indanger all their Religion and turn Turks, if they once did learn that their old customes were not necessary Religion: and therefore they chose to stick secure in their Religion though allayed with some errors, then for the purchase of a less necessary truth endanger the whole Re∣ligion by taking the people off from their Jura Gentis, the customs of their Na∣tion.

8. Some Nations doe refuse to admit of some of those Laws which others call the laws of Nature,* 1.48 and such which ineed were given to all the Na∣tions of the world.

—Non foedera legum Ulla colunt, placidas aut jura tenentia mentes.* 1.49

and excepting the care of children, to which by natural likeness and endear∣ments we love to be oblig'd, and so less stand in need to be tied to it by a law, excepting this I say, to which beasts also doe as well as we, some wise persons have observ'd that in all things else we are at liberty, that is, naturally tied to no law.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.50 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

But the instances will make greater indication of this any mans affirmative. The Idumaeans are Theeves and Murderers, and will not beleeve that they doe amiss: The manner of their Nation is to live very much upon robbery, and plundring Merchants: and in Homers time there was a Nation of Pirates: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said the Scholiast upon Homers Odysses 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. They thought it no disparagement to steal, but an honou∣rable and a glorious thing; and it is worse now, and hath been growing so ever since Nimrods time. Men account it lawful to kill and steal, if they doe it by Nations, by Companies, and Armies, and Navies: and Cato had reason to complain, Fures privatorum furtorum in nervo atque in compedibus aetatem agunt,* 1.51 fures publici in auro atque in purpurâ; and particularly A. Gellius tells of the Egyptians that they allow of thefts; and the wiser Lacedemonians, a sober and a severe people, taught their young men to steal without covetousness; so they pretended, not to enrich themselves, but to incourage them to fight the bet••er by plundring well.* 1.52 Pomponius Mela tells of the Augitae, a Nation in Afri∣ca whose custome it was that every bride should be prostitute to all commers the first night, and she who had entertain'd most, was most honoured: and Solinus tells of the Garamantici that they know no marriages,* 1.53 and therefore chil∣dren onely own their Mothers, for they can hardly guess at their Fathers; and indeed the old world did doe fuch vile things, contracted such base customes, so delighted in wickedness, that as they highly provoked God to anger, so they left it impossible to judge of the laws of nature by the consent of Nations. Pro∣pertius complains severely of this popular impiety.

Sed postquam tellus scelere est imbuta nefando,* 1.54 Justitiamque omnes cupidâ de mente fugarunt, Perfudêre manus fraterno sanguine fratres, Destitit extinctos natus lugere Parentes, Optavit genitor primaevi funera nati, Liber ut innuptae potiretur flore Novercae: Ignaro mater substernens se impia nato, Impia non verita est Divos scelerare penates, Omnia fanda, nefanda malo permista furore Justificam nobis mentem avertêre Deorum.

The whole earth grew so impure and degenerous, that they drave justice from them as their Enemy; brothers wash'd their hands in their brothers bloud; the sons mourn'd not at their Fathers funeral; and the Father wish'd the death of his eldest son, that he might lie with his sons wife; the Mothers would steal secretly into the embraces of their sons; and they feared not to break the laws of Hospitality, or Custome, or Nature, or of Societies. Now from hence it will be impossible to derive our customes, and so to suppose them to be laws of Nature, which are openly destructive of justice.

And upon this last instance it appears that the saying of Polybius will be of no use to us in this que∣stion; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That for the laws of Nature we must seek amongst them that live accor∣ding to nature, not amongst them whose natures are deprav'd by custome; since as Andronicus of Rhodes was wont to say, He lies not that says honey is sweet, though a sick man refuses it as bitter and unpleasant; so is the law of Nature per••ect and immutable in those Nations who are endued with a sound minde and a sober

judgement. This indeed is true, but how this can be reduc'd to practice, will be found inexplicable, and the thing it self impossible: since the Lacedaemoni∣ans the wisest and severest amongst all Commonwealths permitted such natu∣ral injustices, and would breed children upon their own wives by strangers that they might have a good and a handsome breed.

9. Some Tyrants have made Laws to serve their lusts,* 1.55 or their necessi∣ties, and these things have come into Customes, and Laws of Nations, and sometimes have been suppressed, or spent in desuetude. It was the case of So∣leucus, who in the necessity of his son Antiochus gave him his own wise,* 1.56 and made it a Law for the future, which thing either was instantly disgrac'd and re∣jected, or else S. Paul had not heard, or had not taken notice of; for he thought it such a fornication as was not so much as named amongst the Gentiles that one should have his Fathers wife: indeed it was not named inter cordatiores, or those with whom he had conversed; but in Syria and in the Pontick Kingdome before his time, it had been named and practiced and pass'd into a Law; and yet that Kingdome consisted of two and twenty Nations of distinct languages. There was another instance like it spoken of by Cicero,* 1.57 that a woman married her daughters husband, which exactly was the same undecency and incestuous approach. Nubit genero Socrus, auspicibus nullis, nullis authoribus, funestis omini∣nibus. O mulieris scelus incredible & praeter hanc unam in omni vita inauditum. Something like S. Pauls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but yet sometimes it was done, and not onely before his time, but long after this monition also, as it was in the case of Antonius Caracalla: Matrem duxit Uxorem; od parricidium junxit ince∣stum: So Spartianus. Now concerning these things, how can any man from hence take an estimate of the law of Nature; for this cannot be of the law of Nature which hath in it so unreasonable and unnatural complications; and yet by what rule shall we judge of natures Law, since the wisest persons, even So∣crates and Cato did such things which they thought fit, and we call unreason∣able, for they gave their wives to their friends, as a man lends his beast for his neighbours use.

10. There are some Nations so used to a rude unmannerly pride and fierceness,* 1.58 that all civility seems softness and effeminacy. To this purpose is that which Tacitus reports of the son of Phraates the Parthian, who being bred up with Tiberius and efform'd into the Romane civilities was by the Prince 〈◊〉〈◊〉 friend sent to the Kingdome of Parthia; but in the young Gentleman 〈◊〉〈◊〉 there were presently observed easiness of access, a fair civil deportment and affability; obvia comitas: But these virtues being unknown to the Parthians were nova vitia; and because they were unknown to their Ancestors, perinde odium pravis & honestis, the good and the bad amongst them did equally detest them.

11. Some Nations have left their good Customes and taken up bad,* 1.59 and have chang'd their natural reason into unnatural follies, and the basest sins have been very general; and when God warned the Jews to take heed of the manners of their neighbour Nations, he enumerates vile lusts which were the national customs for which God affirms that he ejected them from their habi∣tations.

12. Lastly,* 1.60 there is no consent among nations in their Customs, nor ever was until a higher principle made a law and tied it on with penalties; such as were conquest, necessity, contract, reputation, decrees of Princes, or the laws of God, or of a Religion.* 1.61 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

and neither Nation with Nation, nor Man with Man, nor a Man with himself does long agree.

Indeed there are some propositions which all the world agrees upon,* 1.62 such as are, the immortality of the soul, and that there is a God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Greek and the Barbarian, the Epirot and the Maritime, the wise and the unwise agree in the beleef and profession of a God: but when these things come to manners and customes, they differ infinitely; and as they anciently chose se∣veral gods, so they did not agree in the manner of worshipping their gods; some they worshipped by praises, and some by railing, some by giving sacri∣fice, some by throwing stones; and so it was in other things. Some were ob∣servant of their Parents, and some knock'd them on the head with clubs when they came to a certain age, as is to be seen in Aelian; and even in the taking care and educating their children, in which nature seems most to have made a law, and signified it with the consent of Nations, yet even in this also there was variety, and no universal law naturally established. For some nursed their children, and some did not; sometimes they were left to their Mothers with∣out any provision made by their Fathers; sometimes the Fathers took them from their Mothers, but however, yet this cannot be properly derived from a Jus Gentium, for if it be a right or a law at all, it is a lex singulorum, it belongs to single persons and to families, and is common to man and beast, and hath a necessity in nature, as it is necessary to eat or sleep, and is as necessary to fa∣milies as the other are to single persons, but where there is a necessity, there needs no law, and cannot properly be any.

From all which I conclude that the Jus Gentium,* 1.63 the law of Nations is no indication of the law of Nature;* 1.64 neither indeed is there any Jus Gentium collectively at all, but onely the distinct laws of several Nations; and therefore it is to be taken distributively; for they are united onely by contract, or imita∣tion, by fear, or neighbourhood, or necessity, or any other accident which I have mentioned. And in those things in which they have agreed tacitely, or expresly, they have no obligation but what they bring upon themselves, as pe∣nalties, forfeitures, obloquies, and the like; which they as easily shake off when they have power, and when it is for their profit; and we see it in those who have killed Heralds or Ministers of peace and of Religion; which we say commonly is against the law of Nations; that is, it is against the custome of them, be∣cause to doe so is to no purpose, a spleenish ineffective malice; and therefore although of no usefulness, and consequently seldome done; yet it hath been sometimes, and no punishment follows, and therefore it is no law.

Now that this opinion may not wholly seem new,* 1.65 I finde something of it affirmed by Constantinus Harmenopulus,* 1.66 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The law of Nations is that which one or more Nations use; and he instances in not marrying their nearest kinred, amongst the Greeks and Saurae [Sarmatae (I suppose)] or else to marry them as the Persians use. But this onely, where it happens that Nations doe consent in great proportions, it confirms our assent to the law, and publishes its being natural, in case that of it self it be so.

Prompted by reason.]

Cicero defines the law of Nature to be,* 1.67 Vera ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes,* 1.68 constans, sempiterna: That right reason which is consonant to nature,

which is in every one always and the same, that is the law of Nature: So he, and from him Lactantius; but that is not exactly true. Right reason is the instrument of using the law of Nature, and is that by which together with the Conscience (which is also reason) we are determined to a choice and pro∣secution of it our selves, or to a willingness of obeying the obliging power. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Reason en∣tertains the Divine laws (of nature) and so is made a most vigilant Judge, said Hierocles. This is that which distinguishes us from beasts, and makes us capable of Laws.

—Separat haec nos A grege mutorum,* 1.69 atque ideò venerabile soli Sortiti ingenium, divinorúmque capaces, Atque exercendis, capiendísque artibus apti, Sensum à coelesti demissum traximus arce.

* But reason is not the law, or its measure; neither can any man be sure, that any thing is a law of Nature, because it seems to him hugely reasonable, nei∣ther if it be so indeed, is it therefore a law. For it is very reasonable that every man should choose his own wife, because his interest is the greatest: * That every man should suffer as much evil as he does; * That a man be not pu∣nished for evils that he cannot help; * That every man should suffer for his own fault, and no man for the fault of another; and yet these are not laws in all places where they are reasonable. Pythagoras in Laertius said that which was very reasonable. Plantae mansuetae non nocendum, veluti neque animali quod non noceat hominibus. A man may not hurt a gentle and a sweet plant, much less, a harmless and a profitable beast. Truly, it is unreasonable a man should, but if he does, he breaks no law by the meer doing such an action. For rea∣son can demonstrate, and it can perswade and invite, but not compel any thing but assent, not obedience, and therefore it is no law.

But besides this,* 1.70 Reason is such a boxe of Quicksilver that it abides no where; it dwells in no setled mansion; it is like a doves neck, or a change∣able Taffata; it looks to me otherwise then to you who doe not stand in the same light that I doe: and if we inquire after the law of Nature by the rules of our reason, we shall be uncertain as the discourses of the people, or the dreams of disturbed fancies. For some having (as Lucian calls it) weighed reasons in a pair of scales thought them so even, that they conclu∣ded no truth to be in the reasonings of men; or if there be, they knew not on which side it stood, and then it is, as if it were not at all; these were the Scepticks: and when Varro reckoned two hundred eighty eight opinions concerning the cheefest good or end of mankinde, that were entertained by the wisest and most learned part of mankinde, it is not likely that these wise men should any more agree about the intricate ways and turnings that lead thither, when they so little could agree about the journeys end, which all agreed could have in it no variety, but must be one, and ought to stand fair in the eyes of all men, and to invite the industry of all mankinde to the pursuit of it.

And it is certain,* 1.71 that the basest of things have been by some men thought so reasonable, that they really chose it, and propounded it to others. And this is the less wonder, when we consider that in defiance of all the consen∣ting reasons, and faith of all the Nations of the world, some few single persons,

wittier then folly, but not so wise as Reason or religion should say that there is no God: such were Diagoras Milesius, Theodorus Cyrenaicus, Protagoras; and it is thought, Lucian also: But they that think so, must also con∣sequently beleeve that nothing is dishonest that they can doe in private, or with impunity. * Some have beleeved that there is nothing in it selfe just, but what is profitable: So did Carneades (whom I before noted out of Lactantius) and so did Aristippus.

Now here it is not sufficient to say,* 1.72 that in this inquest after the law of nature by the proportions of reason, we must exclude all unreasonable, bruitish, and monstrous persons. For first the question will returne, who those are which are unreasonable, and we are not to reject the opinion upon pretence it is unreasonable, unless we first know some certain measures of reason: Now we cannot take our measures of reason from Nature; or if we doe we cannot take the measures of Nature from reason, that is, if we call men unreasonable because they speak Unnatural things, then it must be cer∣tain that what is natural or unnatural is known some other way then by the proportions of reason; for the reason being misliked for its disproportion to Nature, the laws of nature must be foreknown, and therefore are not to be proved by that which comes after: besides this (I say) the wisest of Men in their profession, and such as were no fools in their persons, so far as can ap∣pear by all their other discourses, have beleeved the worst of crimes to be in∣nocent, and to have in them no natural dishonesty. Theodorus allowed of Sacrilege, and so do thousands who at this day call themselves Christians: Plato allowed adultery, and community of wives; so did Socrates and Cato. Zeno and Chrysippus approved of incest, and so did the Persians: So that we may well say as Socrates to Phaedon; when we hear the name of Silver or Iron all men that speak the same language understand the same thing: but when we speak of good and evil, we are distracted into various apprehen∣sions and differ from each other and from our selves: we say as Pilate said of truth, What is truth? we cannot tell what is true and what is good and what is evil; and every man makes his own opinions to be laws of nature,* 1.73 if his persuasion be strong and violent. Tertullian complain'd that the old Philo∣sophers did so: leges naturae opiniones suas facit [Philosophia.] And yet it is without all peradventure that all lawes which are commonly called Natural are most reasonable, they are perfective of Nature, unitive of Societies, ne∣cessary to common life, and therefore most agreeable to reason. But if you make an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of these, and reckon backward, you cannot wisely and de∣monstratively reckon from reason, or consent or natural inclinations up to natural laws.

But the last clause of the Rule finishes this whole question,

[Bound upon us by the Command of God]

For when God made man a free agent, he by nature gave him power to do all that he could desire:* 1.74 and all that is Jus naturale, a natural right or power: and it needs no instances; for it is every thing he could desire in eating and drinking and pleasures and rule and possession: but the law was super∣induc'd upon this. Right is liberty, but law is a fetter; Nature is free to every thing which it naturally desires 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 said Dio Chrysostomus: That's the right of nature, to be free, to be subject to no law, to do absolutely whatsoever

Pleases us. This is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as the law calls it) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A natural liberty permitting us to do what we list, Libertati pro∣prium est sic vivere ut velis, said Cicero de Offic. lib. 1. It is not liberty un∣less you live as you please: but servitude is not by nature, therefore liberty is. l. 5. D. de statu hominum. Instit. de jure personarum §. & libertas. For where na∣nature hath an appetite, and proper tendency, it cannot deny to it self satis∣faction; whatsoever therefore is a law and a restraint to it, must needs be su∣perinduc'd upon it: which nature her self cannot be supposed to be wil∣ling to doe; and nothing had power to doe but God onely who is the Lord of Nature.

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

It was God that gave justice to Mankinde: he made justice by his sanction: This was expressely the sentence of Cicero speaking of the law of nature: Est recta ratio à Numine Deorum tracta, imperans honesta & prohibens contraria: and again, Lex vera at{que} princeps apta ad jubendum & ad vitandum ratio est recta summi Jovis. The law of nature is a transcript of the wisdome and will of God written in the tables of our minds, not an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a product of experience, but written with the finger of God, first in the tables of our hearts. But those tables we like Moses brake with letting them fall out of our hands, upon occasion of the evil manners of the world: but God wrought them again for us, as he did for Moses by his spirit, in all the ages of the world, more or less, by arts of instruction and secret insinuation, by all the waies proportioned to a reasonable nature; till from an inclination it came to a firme persuasion and so to a law: God, in this, ruling in our hearts somthing after the manner by which he reigns in heaven, even by significations of what is fit, by inspirations and congenite notices, by na∣tural necessities: but this thing was yet no law till God also had signifi'd it to Men, after the manner of men, that is, by discourse and humane Communications, by something that taught them, and obliged them.

The sense of this is,* 1.75 that religion is the first and greatest bond of laws, and necessity is the next: For though many times it prevails more then reli∣gion, yet it is not alwaies incumbent, and that which is necessary to society, is inconvenient in some cases, and when power comes in, and need goes out, there is nothing which can make or continue the law: and it were impossible that all the world should acknowledge any lawgiver but God; for nothing else could be greater then all mankind, nor be trusted in all cases, nor fear'd but he alone. And therefore the heathen Princes when they gave their lawes, gave them in the Name of a Deity. So Numa, Lycurgus, and others; which was not a designe to scare fools and credulous people, but in some instances (excepting onely that they nam'd a false God) was a real truth; that is, in all those things which commanded natural justice, honesty and decencies: for these were really the lawes of the true God.

For the law of Nature is nothing but the law of God given to Mankinde for the conservation of his Nature and the promotion of his perfective end.* 1.76 A law of which a man sees a reason and feels a neces∣sity: God is the lawgiver. Practical reason or conscience is the record, but revelation and expresse declaring it, was the first publication and emission of it, and till then it had not all the solemnities of law, though it was pass'd in the Court, and decreed and recorded.

And this is the perfect meaning of those words of S. Paul [but for the law I had not known sin] that is,* 1.77 although by natural reason and the customes of the world I had or might have reasons to dislike many actions; yet till the law declar'd it I could not call any thing a sin, and if S. Paul could not, neither could the Gentiles: their Nature was alike, and S. Paul had advan∣tage in education, and yet his nature could not instruct him in the Names and differences of good and evil; therefore neither could the Gentiles know it meer∣ly by Nature. But yet a man may become a law unto himself: So S. Paul observes of the Gentiles who not having a law doe by Nature the things contain'd in the law, and so become a law unto themselves. So does every man who be∣leeves any thing to be necessary, though it be not so; yet he becomes a law to himself, because by his conscience and persuasion he makes to himself a law or obligation: much more might the Gentiles do so; in whose Nature the aptnes∣ses to justice and disposition to laws were concreated with their understandings. Well might they become a law unto themselves in these natural instances; for if opinion can make a law to our selves in an unlawful matter, much more may it doe so in a matter that is so agreeable to our Nature, so sitting, so useful, so prepared to become a law, that it wants onely the life of authority, sancti∣on and publication: but though the Gentiles became a law unto themselves, by this means: yet their Natural reason was not yet fram'd into a law, till Gods authority, either by his express declaration, or by the conscience of the man, that is, directly or indirectly did intervene: testimonium reddente consci∣entiâ, so S. Paul, their conscience bearing witness: for either God published these lawes by express declaration and voices, or else by imprinting upon the Conscience such fears and opinions that pass'd upon the man the reverence and obligation of Lawes. In both these there was variety: though in the latter there was amongst the better sort of men a more regular and universal influence and effect: and although it is very probable that all the measures of justice and natural lawes of honesty were expressly published to the Patriarchs of the great families of the world, yet when some of the posterity lost their tradition, these laws were maintain'd by more imperfect relations, and kept up by fears and secret opinions which the spirit of God who is never wanting to men in things necessary, was pleas'd in his love to Mankinde to put into the hearts of men, that men might be governed by instruments which would not fail.

Thus S.* 1.78 Hieromea 1.79 affirmes that Pharaoh knew his sins by the law of Na∣ture: and of this it was that Tertullianb 1.80 affirmed; ante legem Moysi scriptam in tabulis lapideis, legem fuisse contendo non scriptam, quae naturaliter intelligebatur & à patribus custodiebatur: Nam unde Noë justus inventus est si non illum naturalis legis justitia praecedebat? Unde Abraam amicus Dei deputatus, si non de aequitate & justitia legis hujus Naturalis? by this the Fathers liv'd, by this Noah was found just, and Abraham the friend of God: for this though not written in Tables of stone, yet it was written in the tables of their hearts; that is, it was by God so imprinted in their Consciences that they were by it sufficiently instructed how to walk and please God; and this is that which was said by Antigonus in Sophocles, and which Apollonius did use against the edict of Nero.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

This is a thing which neither heaven nor hell hath taught by any new or ex∣press sanction: For God hath given us other laws. But never did I think that thy commands could ever prevail so, that it could be possible that thou being a mortal man should prevaricate the unwritten and potent laws of God. For these laws are not of to day or yesterday, but they are eternal, and their principle is secret, and from within.

And therefore Philo saies,* 1.81 the law of nature is a law 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 engraven in an immortal Understanding by an immortal nature. In this whole affair, God is as the Sun, and the Con∣science as the Eye: or else God or some Angel from him being the intellectus agens did informe our reason, supplying the place of Natural faculties and being a continuall Monitor (as the Jews generally beleeve, and some Christians, especially about three or four ages since:) which Adam de Marisco was wont to call Helias his Crow: something slying from heaven with provisions for our needs. And the Gloss. and Gulielmus Parisiensis, and before them Maimo∣nides, from whom I suppose they had it, affirme this to be the meaning of David in the fourth Psalme, Offer the sacrifice of righteousness; it follows, Quis monstrabit? Who will shew us any good? who will tell us what is justice, and declare the measures of good and evil? He answers, Signatum est super nos lu∣men vultûs tui Domine, thou hast consign'd the light of thy Countenance up∣on us, ut scilicet (as it is in another Psalme) in lumine tuo videamus lumen, that in thy light we may see light.

The effect of all which is this onely,* 1.82 That God is our lawgiver, and hath made our hearts to be the Tables of the laws of nature, that they might al∣waies be there under our eye, legible and clear. It is not a law for being plac'd there; but God first made or decreed it to be a law, and then plac'd it there for use, and promulgation: and although very many men, and nations had no entercourse with God as a lawgiver but what they have by the means of their conscience, that is, they never heard God speak, had no prophets, no reve∣lation, and have forgot the tradition of their fathers; yet when God by ways undiscernible hath written a proposition there, and that the Man does beleeve any thing to be good or evil: it is true that God is his lawgiver, because he onely is Lord of his Conscience: but it is also true: that he becomes a law unto himselfe: that is, he becomes oblig'd to God by the act of his own con∣science; and however it be that his conscience be wrought upon, though by a fancy or a fear, a sad sight, or a casuall discourse, if it works the consci∣ence into the notice and obedience of a natural law, the meaner the instru∣ment is, the greater is the efficacy of the principal agent. The putting it in∣to the conscience is a sufficient promulgation of the law, however that be done; but nature alone never does it: The express voice of God, tradition, prophets, contract, providence, education and all sorts of influence from God, and enter∣course with man have their portion in this effect. And when wise men say, this is naturally understood; it must mean thus, naturally men find it reasonable, but not naturally to be a law: naturally they consent to it, but not naturally find it out, or naturally we may be instructed but not naturally bound: but when God changes science into conscience, then he makes that which is reasonable to become a law.

But first or last,* 1.83 this way or another, it became a law onely by the autho∣rity and proper sanction of God; God is the author of our Nature and made a law fit for it, and sent the principles of that law together with it, not that whatsoever is in nature or reason is therefore a law because it is reasonable or because it is natural: but that God took so much of prime reason as would make us good and happy, and established it into a law; which became and was called the law of Nature both because 1. These laws are in Materta Naturali: that is, concerning the good which refers to the prime necessities of Nature; and also because 2. being Divine in respect of the authour, the principles of this law are natural in respect of the time of their institution being together with our nature: though they were drawn out by God severally in several pe∣riods of the world, who made them laws actually by his command, which in nature are so onely by disposition.

This latter reason is given by Alphonsus à Castro and by Wesenbech:* 1.84 the former is insinuated by Mynsinger defining the law of Nature to be quod natu∣ra, adeoque Deus ipse omnes homines in Creatione, prima quaedam praecepta & for∣mulas honestatis docuit. But the latter of them I say is true onely of such as are the prime laws or rather rules of nature, and the general measures of vertue and vice. But as for the particular laws of Nature (which onely are properly to be call'd laws) we are to look for no other systeme or collective body of them, but the expresse declared laws of God which concerne morality, that is, all that are given to all Mankinde without relation to any one period, such is the moral law of the Jewes: and such is the religion of the Christians; that less perfect, this more perfect and intire: for these in their several proportions are such which are generally for all mankind; and upon this account it is affirm'd by Gratian,* 1.85 Jus naturale esse, quod in lege & Evangelio continetur, The law of Nature is that which is contain'd in the Law, and the Gospel: which say∣ing he had from Isidore.

It is necessary that this be rightly understood,* 1.86 because it establishes many certainties in the matter of Conscience, and eases us of the trouble of finding out a particular systeme of Natural laws, the inquiry after which hath caused many disputes in the world, and produc'd no certainty, It is all 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the Platonists call it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the word of God is the law, a right rule or sentence, and divine law, a law that is the distribution of the mind of God; and under this come all the precepts of Christianity: which was well summ'd up by him who gave this account of the religion, and the religi∣ous that are of it, saying they are homines conspirantes in communem utilitatem; and that they mutually make and give 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Symbols and Sacraments to each other, that none shall doe or receive injury: men conspiring for the good of others: or as the Romane souldier was told, They are men whose profession is to doe hurt to no man, and to do good to every man: and this is the integral designe of the law of Nature so far as it can relate to humane entercourse.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.87 So Christ is called by S. Peter and the Greek Fathers, he is the word of the Father and the law; and it is remarkable, this word or law of the Father was the instrument of teaching mankind in all periods of the world. He taught the law of Nature to all men, and renew'd it, and made several manifestations and manners, and at last appear'd in the forme of

a man, and made a perfect body of it to last as long as our nature last, and as long as this world, and his kingdome abides. When God spake to Adam, to the Patriarchs, to the Prophets, still he spake by Christ, who was the An∣gel of the old Testament, and the Mediator of the New. He is therefore Verbum Patris; by him he signified his laws and righteous commandements, and the law was given 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in the hands, that is, by the ministery, of the Mediator,* 1.88 who is one: that is Jesus Christ; and this Tertullian affirmes. Christus semper egit in Dei Patris Nomine. Ipse ab initio conversatus est, & congressus cum Patriarchis & Prophetis: and again, Christus ad colloquia sem∣per descendit, ab Adam usque ad Patriarchas & Prophetas, in visione, in som∣no, in speculo, in aenigmate, ordinem suum praestruens ab initio semper: & Deus internis cum hominibus conversatus est; non alius quàm semo qui caro erat futurus. Christ in all ages spake to Men in the person of his Father, being from the beginning the word of the Father, which was to be incarnate. The same also is to be read in Justin Martyr against Tryphon the Jew.

Christ therefore was the preacher of this righte∣ousness, and at last revealed all his Fathers will, which should ne∣ver receive any further addition, diminution or alteration.

The Novellae constitutiones, the inlargements and explications made by our Blessed Lord, together with the repetition of the old, that is, the Christian law, is the perfect Code and Digest of the Natural law. For they all rely upon the fundamental relations between God and us, and the natural entercourse betwen Man and Man, and the Original necessities and perfective appe∣tites of our own Nature.

But here it will be necessary to clear that great objection which will be pretended against this doctrine.* 1.89 For since Christian religion is new in respect of Nature, and superinduc'd some things upon Nature, and rescinded some of her rights, and restrain'd her liberty; it will seem impossible that Christian religion should be a collected body of the laws of Nature; because the law of Nature is prime and eternal; which Christian religion seems not to be: Now to this I answer

1. That it is evident that all that which any men call the laws of Na••ure is actually conteined in the books of the new Testament.* 1.90 S. Austin, H••••o de S. Victore, and Alexander say the law of Nature hath but these two precepts, 1 Doe as you will be done to; and 2 Doe not that which you would not have done to your self: Isidore reckons into the laws of Nature, 1 Conjunction of male and female, 2 Education and 3 Succession of children; 4 Common possessions and 5 Common liberty, and 6 Acquisition of things in air, earth, and sea: 7 Restoring the thing that is intrusted, 8 Repelling force by force. These are rights of Nature, and natural states or actions, but not laws. There are some laws concerning these things, but they also are in the New Testament. Cicero reckon'd, 1 Religion, 2 Piety, 3 Thankfulness, 4 Vindication of injuries, 5 Observance of Superiors, 6 To speak truth. The lawyers reckon otherwise. The laws of Nature are these, 1 To worship God, 2 To live honestly, 3 To obey superiors; Kings, Parents, &c. 4 To hurt no man, 5 To give every one their own, 6 Common use of things as far as it may be; and where it may not, then 7 Dominion and 8 Propriety enter, 9 To take away evil doers from among men. And if we observe but the precepts of Nature (for they had no other light which we know of) which are reckoned by Hesiod, Pythagoras, Theognis, Phocylides, Epictetus, Cato, Publianus, and Seneca, we shall finde that they reckon many minute

counsels which are deriv'd from naturall Principles, but yet stand far off of from the fountain: and some which they derive from the rights of Nature, not from her laws, but indeed are directly contrary.

—Semper tibi proximus esto.

So Cato, and

Qui simulat verbis, nec corde est fidus amicus; Tu quoque fac simules, sic ars deluditur arte.

And that of Cicero, vindicationem esse honestam, revenge is justice. By their own reason men took their aim at the precepts and laws of Nature, but their reason being imperfect and abused it was not likely they could be exact: none but the wisedome of the Father could doe it perfectly. Thus they can never agree in their enumeration of the Natural laws: But it is certain that so ma∣ny of these as are laws, and bound upon us by God, are set down in the Scrip∣tures of the New Testament. For it is not a law of Nature unless God have commanded it to us in or by or with Nature and natural reason. Now it is certain that Christ told us all his fathers will: and the Apostles taught all that to the Church which Christ taught to them: and therefore what is not in their doctrine is not in natures law, that is, it is no part of the law of God: and if it be certain that he that lives according to the law of Christ does please God and doe all his duty; then it follows that either there is no such thing as that which we call the law of Nature, and no obligation from thence, and no measures of good and evil there; or if there be, it is also part of the Christian mans duty, and express'd and taught by the Master and Lord of the Christians. All that is essentially good, is there; all that by which the World can be made happy, is there: all that which concernes every mans duty, is there; all the instruments of felicity, and the conveyance of our great hopes is there, and what other potentiality there can be in the law of Nature, then what I have reckon'd now, I neither have been taught by any man else, neither can I my self imagine, or understand. Here are the general propositions which are the forme, and make the honesty and the justice of all the particular laws of Nature; and what is not there pro∣vided for by special provision, or by general reason and analogy, is wholly per∣mitted to humanelaws and contracts, or to liberty and indifferency, that is, where the laws of nature cease, there the rights of nature returne.

2. But secondly,* 1.91 to the objection I answer, that it will be but weakness, to thinke that all the instances of the law of Nature, must be as prime as Na∣ture herself: for they neither are so prime, nor so lasting, but are alterable by God and by Men, and may be made more, or fewer, or other.

This may seem new,* 1.92 and indeed is unusual in the manner of speaking: but the case is evident and Empirically certain. For when God commanded Abraham to kill his son; the Israelites to rob the Egyptians and to run away with their goods; he gave them a commandement to break an instance of the natural Law; and he made it necessary that Cain should marry with his Sister: and all those laws of Nature which did suppose liberty and indistinction of possessions are wholly altered when Dominion, and Servitude, and propriety, came into the world: and the laws of nature which are in peace are not obligatory to other persons in the time of war.

For the laws of nature are in many instances relative to certain states:* 1.93 and therefore in their instances and particulars are as alterable as the states themselves, but the reasons indeed on which they doe relie (supposing the

same or equal circumstances and the matter unchang'd) are eternal and unal∣terable as the Constitution of Nature. But therefore it was unwarily said of the learn'd Hugo Grotius, and of divers others before him, that God can∣not change the law of Nature. For as S. Paul said of the priesthood; that it being chang'd, there must of necessity be a change also of the law, so it is in the law of Nature; the matter of it being chang'd, there must of necessity also be a change in the law: for although the essential reason may be the same in chang'd instances yet that hinders not but the law may justly by affirm'd to be alterable; just as the law was under the several priesthoods, in both which the obligation is the same, and so is the relation to God, and the Natural reli∣gion. * Thus when rivers are common it is lawful for any man to fish, and unlawful for my neighbor to forbid me, but when rivers are inclosed and made proper, it is unlawful for me to fish, and lawful for the proprietary to forbid me; before the inclosure it was just to doe that thing, which afterward is un∣just; and this is as much a change of a particular law as can be imagined. * If it be meant, that while the propriety remains, or the state, the law introduc'd upon that state is unalterable: then there is no more said of the law of Na∣ture then of any positive law of God, or the wise law of any Prince; which are not to be altered as long as the same case and the same necessity remains; and it would be to no purpose to affirme so of the law of Nature; for the sence of it would be, that while things remain as God established them, they are unalterable. But if God can disannull the obligation by taking a∣way the matter of the law, or the necessity or the reasonableness, or the obligation (and all this he can doe one way or other) it is not safe nor true to say, God can∣not alter the law of Nature. * He chang'd the matter in suffering liberty to pass into servitude, * he made necessity in one instance, I mean, in the matter of incest in the case of Cain, and afterwards took it away: * he took away the reasonableness of the sanction by changing the case in the subduction or mutati∣on of the matter, * and he took off the obligation in the case of Abraham and of the Israelites robbing their Neighbors.

And therefore the Christian laws superinducing some excellencies and perfections upon humane Nature,* 1.94 and laying restraint upon the first Natu∣ral laws, that is, upon such which before this last period of the world were laws of Nature, is no hard thing to be understood. God in it used but his own right. And I suppose it will be found to be unreasonable to expound the precepts of the Religion by the former measures of Nature while she was less perfect, less instructed: but this rather; the former instances of the Natural law are pass'd into the Christian precepts, and the Natural instance is chang'd, and the law alterd in it's material part; the formality of it remain∣ing upon the supposition of a greater reason. Thus to repell force by force is a right of Nature; and afterwards it was passed into a law that Men might doe it; that is, God expressly gave them leave; and although it be not properly a law which neither forbids nor commands but onely gives a leave, yet when God had forbidden men to doe violence, and to establish this law the rather, gave leave, to any man that could, to punish his unjust Enemy that attempted to doe him mischiefe, it may be call'd a law, in the lesser sence, that is, a decree of the Court of Heaven by which this became lawful. * Though this was pass'd into a law in the manner now explicated, yet it was with some restraints; which yet were not so great but they left a great liberty which was sufficient security against violence. The restraint which God superinduc'd upon this Right or Nature was but moderamen incul∣patae

tutelae, it left men defended sufficiently against injuries though it permit∣ted us to be tried in some lesser instances and unavoidable accidents. But now although Christianity hath proceeded in the first method of God, and restrain'd it yet more, and forbids us to strike him that strikes us, we are not to force this precept into a sense consisting with the former liberty which we call the law of Nature; but was at first onely a right of Nature or a permissive law, but not obligatory; and afterwards suffer'd some restraints: for that which suffer'd some, may suffer more: and as the right of nature was for its being re∣straind recompenc'd in the provisions of laws, and by the hands of justice, taking it from the private into the publike hand: so may this right of nature when it is wholly taken from us be recompenc'd by Gods taking the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or the power of avenging our quarrels into his hands.

This right of nature being now almost wholly taken from us,* 1.95 part of it is taken up to God, and part of it is deposited in the hands of the civil power, but we have none of it; onely by Christ's laws and graces our nature is more perfect, and morality is set forward, and justice and all our rights are secured; but yet the law is changed. * The like may be said in divers other instances, as I shall discourse in their several places: here it is sufficient to have given the first hint of it, and demonstrated the certainty and reasonableness of it, which (as ap∣pears by the instances) although it be especially and frequently true in the Jus naturae or the permissive law of nature, and in those not onely God but men also may make an alteration; yet even in those laws which are directly obligatory, the power of God who made them cannot be denyed to be equal in the alteration: And indeed he that can annull nature, can also at least alter her laws, which are consequent to Nature and intended onely for her preservation.

The case seems to be the same with eating and drinking which God hath made necessary for our life,* 1.96 as justice is to societies: but as he can take away the necessity from this person at this time to eat and can supply it otherwise: so he can also conserve humane society in the mutation of cases and extraor∣dinary contingencies as well as in the ordinary effects of justice. Indeed God cannot doe an unjust thing; because whatsoever he wills or does is therefore just because he will and does it; but his will being the measure of justice, and his providence the disposer of all those events and states of things to which the instances of Justice can relate: when he wills an extraordinary case and hath chang'd the terme of the relation, then he hath made that instance which be∣fore was unjust, now to become just; and so hath not chang'd justice into unjustice, but the denomination of the whole action concerning which the law was made, is alterd from unjust to just, or on the contrary.

It is not to be suppos'd that the whole law of Nature can be alter'd as long as our Nature is the same;* 1.97 any more then the fashion of our garments can be generally alter'd as long as our body is of this shape: and therefore it is not to be thought that he that makes a doublet shall ever make three sleeves unless a man have three armes, or a glove with six fingers for him that hath but five, but many particular laws of Nature suffer variety and alteration, according to the changes that are in our Nature and in our Necessities, or by any Measure of Man or Men which God shall superinduce.

Duo cùm idem faciunt saepe, ut possis dicere Hoc licet impunè facere huic, illi non licet; Non quod dissimilis res est, sed is qui facit.

The rule of Nature is always the same; yet one may doe what another may not, and sometimes that is lawful which at another is criminal; not because the measure is changeable, but the thing measured suffers variety. So that in effect the sence and extent of truth in this question is this; That although as long as this world lasts and men in it, the law of Nature cannot be abrogated, because it is that law which is fram'd proportionable to Mans Nature; yet it may be derogated, that is, lessen'd, or inlarg'd in instances, chang'd in the integrity of many of it's particulars made, relative to several states and new necessities; and this is that which in true speaking does affirme that the laws of Nature may be chang'd. For although there are some propositions and de∣crees so General that they are in their Nature applicable to all variety of things, and therefore cannot be chang'd: yet they are rather the foundation of laws then laws themselves: because a law must be mixt with a Material part, it must be a direction of actions, and a bond upon persons which does suppose many things that can be changed: And therefore although the propo∣sitions upon which the reasonableness and justice of the law does depend, serves to the contrary instances by analogy, and common influence, yet the law being material does not, and therefore is alterable. But of this I shall give a fuller account in the ninth and tenth rules of this Chapter. For the present, I observe,

The want of considering this,* 1.98 hath made difficulty in this question and errors in many. Every natural proposition is not a law: but those ante∣cedent propositions, by the proportions of which laws stand or fall, are the measures of laws. They are rules, not laws: and indeed the rules of Nature are Eternal and Unalterable: that is, all those Natural and reasona∣ble propositions which are dictates of prime reason, and abstract from all persons and all states and all relations: such as are God is to be honour'd: Ju∣stice is to be done: Contracts are to be affirm'd: Reason is to be obeyed: Good is to be followed: Evil to be eschewed. These are the common measures of all laws, and all actions: but these are made laws when they are prescrib'd to persons, and applied to matter: and when they are, because that matter can have variety, the law also can, though the rule cannot.

That we are to restore all that was intrusted to us,* 1.99 is a Natural law de∣riv'd from the rule of doing justice: but this may be derogated and prejudic'd without sin. For prescription transfers the possession and disobliges the fidu∣ciary from restitution.

By the law of Nature relying upon the rule of performing contracts,* 1.100 clandestine marriages are valid and firme: but yet some Churches, particu∣larly the Church of Rome in the Councell of Trent hath pronounc'd some marriages void which by the Rule of Nature, and afterwards by a law were rate and legal; particularly, clandestine marriages, and marriages not clandestine by the ingress of one of the parties into Religion, as is to be seen in the eighth Session.

By the law of Nature a testimony under two or three witnesses may stand,* 1.101 but in the case of the accusation of a Cardinal Deacon in Rome they require the concurrence of seven and twenty, of a Cardinal Priest sixty four, of a Cardinal Bishop seventy and two, and in England one shall serve the turne, if it be for the King. In Codicils the civil law requires five witnesses. In te∣staments there must be seven: when a controversy is concerning the emi∣nency and prelation of excellent persons, fifteen are demanded. But if these

things may be prejudic'd by men, much more may they be alter'd by God. But this extends it self a little further. For in some of these instances, that which is a law of Nature becomes so inconvenient as to doe much evil, and then it is to be estimated by a new Rule; and therefore the whole law is chang'd when it comes to have a new measure, and the analogy of a New reason.

Upon the account of these premises it follows,* 1.102 that it is but a weak di∣stinction to affirme some things to be forbidden by God because they are Unlaw∣ful: and some to be unlawful because they are forbidden. For this last part of the distinction takes in all that is unlawful in the world, and therefore the other is a dead member and may be lopp'd off.* 1.103 So Ocham affirmes against the more common sentence of the Schooles (as his manner is) nullus est actus malus nisi quatenus à Deo prohibitus est, & qui non possit fieri bonus si à Deo praecipi∣atur & è converso: Every thing is good or bad according as it is commanded or forbidden by God, and no otherwise. For nothing is Unlawful antece∣dently to Gods commandement. Sin is a transgression of some law, and this law must be made by a Superior, and there is no Superior but who de∣pends on God, and therefore his law is its measure. There are some things good which God hath not commanded; but then they are such which he hath commended by counsels, or analogies and proportions. But whatso∣ever is a sin, is so therefore because it is forbidden, and without such a prohi∣bition, although it might be Unreasonable, yet it cannot be criminal or unjust. Since therefore all measures of good and evil in the entercourses of Men wholly rely upon the law of God, and are consequent to his will, although it can never be that we can have leave to be Unjust, or Unchast, that is, to doe against a law in being with all its circumstances, yet the law may be so chan∣ged that the whole action which was forbidden may become permitted, and innocent, and that which was permitted may become Criminal. I instance in the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or the conjunction of the neerest kindred, which once was lawful and ever since is become Criminal.

The purpose of this discourse is this,* 1.104 that we look no further for tables of the law of Nature, but take in onely those precepts which bind us Christi∣ans under Christ our lawgiver who hath revealed to us all his Fathers will. All the laws of Christ concerning moral actions are the laws of Nature: and all the laws of Nature which any wise Nation ever reckoned either are taken away by God, or else are commanded by Christ. So that Christianity is a perfect Systeme of all the laws of Nature, and of all the will of God, that is, of all the obligatory will; of all the Commandements. In those things where Christia∣nity hath not interpos'd, we are left to our Natural liberty, or a Jus permissi∣vum, a permission, except where we have restrain'd our selves by contract or dedition.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  Constit. Apost. l. 1. c 6.
• * 1.3

  2.
• * 1.4

  Valla Elegant. l. 4. c. 48.
• * 1.5

  3.
• * 1.6

  L. 5. c. 10.
• * 1.7

  Lib. 1. c. 13. & 15.
• * 1.8

  Lib. 5. c. 7•• Ethic.
• * 1.9

  4.
• * 1.10

  E••hic. l. 5. c. 10.
• * 1.11

  Rhetor. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.12

  L. 9. ff. de jure & justitia.
• * 1.13

  Arbiter.
• * 1.14

  5.
• * 1.15

  6.
• * 1.16

  7.
• * 1.17

  8.
• * 1.18

  L. 1. ff. de justi∣tia & jure.
• * 1.19

  1. 2 q. 1••4. art. 2. Elegant. l. 4. c. 43.
• * 1.20

  See Great E•••• emplat.
• * 1.21

  9.
• * 1.22

  10.
• * 1.23

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.24

  L. 1. c. 78.
• * 1.25

  Orat. contr. A∣ristocratem.
• * 1.26

  Contr. Celsum.
• * 1.27

  11.
• a 1.28

  L. 1. contr. Jo∣vin.
• b 1.29

  Hom. 5. sup. 19 Genes.
• c 1.30

  L. 1. Comm. sup. Luc. 1.
• d 1.31

  In cap. 5. Eph.
• * 1.32

  L. 1. ss. si Qu••∣drupes. §. 3.
• * 1.33

  12.
• * 1.34

  13.
• * 1.35

  De praescrip••.
• * 1.36

  14.
• * 1.37

  15.
• * 1.38

  16.
• * 1.39

  In Synopsi LI.
• * 1.40

  17.
• * 1.41

  18.
• * 1.42

  19.
• * 1.43

  Lib 8. Polit. c. 4.
• * 1.44

  20.
• * 1.45

  21.
• * 1.46

  In Thalia.
• * 1.47

  Arist. Rheot••••. l. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.48

  22.
• * 1.49

  V••. F••c••.
• * 1.50

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.51

  L. 11. cap. 18.
• * 1.52

  Lib. 1. c. 8.
• * 1.53

  C••p. 43.
• * 1.54

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.55

  23.
• * 1.56

  App••an. d•• B••l. Sy••••
• * 1.57

  Orat. pro C••a.
• * 1.58

  24.
• * 1.59

  25.
• * 1.60

  26.
• * 1.61

  Maxim. Ty•• Dissert. ••.
• * 1.62

  27.
• * 1.63

  28.
• * 1.64

  See the preface to the Great Exempl••r. n. 23.
• * 1.65

  29.
• * 1.66

  Lib. 1. tit. 1. Prochir.
• * 1.67

  30.
• * 1.68

  Lib. de Repub.
• * 1.69

  Juven. Sat. 1••.
• * 1.70

  31.
• * 1.71

  32.
• * 1.72

  33.
• * 1.73

  Lib. de anima cap. 2.
• * 1.74

  34.
• * 1.75

  35.
• * 1.76

  36.
• * 1.77

  37.
• * 1.78

  38.
• a 1.79

  Epist. 151. ad Algas. q. 8.
• b 1.80

  Adrv Judxos c. 2.
• * 1.81

  39.
• * 1.82

  40.
• * 1.83

  41.
• * 1.84

  42.
• * 1.85

  Dist. 1. in princ.
• * 1.86

  43.
• * 1.87

  44.
• * 1.88

  Adv. Marcion. lib. 2. Adv. Praxeam.
• * 1.89

  45.
• * 1.90

  46.
• * 1.91

  47.
• * 1.92

  48.
• * 1.93

  49.
• * 1.94

  50.
• * 1.95

  51.
• * 1.96

  52.
• * 1.97

  53.
• * 1.98

  54.
• * 1.99

  55.
• * 1.100

  56.
• * 1.101

  57.
• * 1.102

  58.
• * 1.103

  2. q. 19. ad 3, & 4.
• * 1.104

  59.