Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 7. Every dictate and judgement of the Conscience, though it be little and less material, is sufficient and may be made use of for the deposition of a doubt.

EVery little reason is not sufficient to guide the will,* 1.1 or to make an honest or a probable Conscience, as I have proved in the foregoing Chapter* 1.2; but in a doubting conscience, that is, where there are seemingly great reasons of either side, and the conscience not able to determine between them, but hangs like a needle between two load-stones, and can goe to neither, because it equally inclines to both; there it is, that any little dictate that can come on one side and turn the scale is to be admitted to counsel and to action; for a doubt is a disease in conscience, like an irresolution in action, and is therefore to be remo∣ved at any just rate, and any excuse taken rather then have it permitted. For even to wash in Jordan may cure a leprosy, and a glass of wine may ease the infirmities of the stomack and he is too ceremonious in the matter of life and death, that stands upon puntilio's with nature, and will not be cured but by rich medicines. For in a doubting conscience the immediate cure is not to choose right, that is the remedy in an erring conscience; but when the disease or evil, is doubting, or suspension, the remedy is determination; and to effect this, whatso∣ever is sufficient may be chosen and used.

Every conscience that proceeds probably,* 1.3 proceeds honestly, unless by a greater probability it be engaged against the less; now to make a conscience that is probable, yet even more probable, a little advantage is sufficient; which is to be understood with these cautions:

1. When the doubt is equal and the danger alike on either side,* 1.4 then a smal∣ler supersaetation of argument will doe the work, that is, cure the doubting; for though a little argument is not alone a ground for the action of a wise man, yet a little overplus of reason will take off this calamity of irresolution and tre∣pidation;

it is not enough to out weigh any danger, but it can with the por∣tion of the equal measures which stand on its own side, by its little weight cast the ballance.

2. This is not so easily to be admitted when the judgement of the man is discernably and perceivably little and not to be trusted,* 1.5 for then the super∣addition that is made by him to any part of the doubt may be as wholly incon∣siderable as the doubt it self is troublesome; and though this may make the doubt to be laid aside, as it will also determine such a man in the whole tra∣verse of the question, yet it is the worst remedy of the doubt, and an insufficient introduction of the probability. In this case the doubt is to be laid aside by the advice and authority of some person fit to lead him, rather then by the con∣fidence of his own little superadded impertinency. For indeed it is not good to have the sacredness of a conscience governed by weakness and contin∣gency.

3. When the doubting person is inconstant,* 1.6 let him not speedily act what he lightly determines by the sudden intervening humor; for he that chan∣ges quickly, judges lightly, but fancies strongly, and acts passionately, and repents speedily and often; therefore let such a man when he perceives his own infirmity stop at the gates of action, lest the laying down one doubt, multiply many, and he become more miserable in his remedy then in his sickness.

In pursuance of this Rule it is to be taken care of that fear be not mis∣taken for doubt; for there is oftentimes a doubt no where but in the Will, and the more slender and weak the judgement is, oftentimes the fear is greater; and sometimes they fear because they fear, and not because they have reason; when therefore the doubt does not rely upon such a reason as can be formed into an argument and discourse, but is an unreasonable trouble, and an infinite nothing; the doubt ought directly to be laid aside, for it is no way considerable, but onely that it is a considerable trouble.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  Rule 7.
• * 1.3

  2.
• * 1.4

  3.
• * 1.5

  4.
• * 1.6

  5.