Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 6. It is lawful for the Conscience to proceed to action against a doubt that is meerly speculative.

IN a sure Conscience the speculative and the practical are the same in certain consequence,* 1.1 as I have already proved in its own place; but in a doubting Conscience the case is differing. For though it be ordinarily true here also that he that doubts speculatively does also doubt practically; as if he doubts concerning all usurarious contracts, whether it be lawful or no to use any, he doubts also concerning this which himself uses, if it be usurarious. But be∣cause there may intervene a special case, and that which is true in general may be altered in the particular, it may happen that he may be certain and determined in the particular when he is not so in the general; that is, when the case is special, by privilege, or exemption, or the ceasing of the reason, or by any other special case he may think himself acquitted, when yet the action is culpable in its whole kinde.

But by a speculative doubt sometimes is meant not the general,* 1.2 but the question abstracted from circumstances; and in this it sometimes hap∣pens that though the conscience doubt concerning the question, yet it does not doubt concerning the practice. Titius is possessed of a field on which he entred by inheritance, and wholly without fraud and violence; but yet upon some supervening notices he afterwards doubts whether the field be his own by a just title; but because he is informed by his Confessor and others on whom he does and may rely, that possession is a collateral title, and that what he so possesses h•••• may still dwell upon till it be certain that it is not his own; he rests at quiet in his minde, because possession is stronger then his doubt, though it cannot prevail against demonstration.

Mary of Rhemes the wife of a Souldier is told by his Captain that her hus∣band was kill'd at the battel of Pavy;* 1.3 after her year of mourning was expi∣red she marries again to a Citizen of Rhemes, and cohabites with him two year; after which she is told that her first husband escaped to Tarentum, and there lives in obscurity. Upon this she doubts whether the Citizen be really her husband or no; yet living with him he demands her to pay her conjugal duty, she inquires whether during this doubt she may or no; and is answered affirmatively upon the same grounds: The Citizen is in possession of the mar∣riage, and this is not to be disturbed by a doubt, but by a certainty, especially since the doubt is but a speculative doubt, not a practical. For it is no good argu∣ment to say, I doubt whether this man be my husband or no, therefore if I consent to him I commit adultery; for the presumption lying upon the possessor, though his title be dubious, yet his possession is not, and either of them both are to have a portion in the effect, and therefore the certain possession in a dubious title is to be preferred before a dubious title without possession, and therefore this kinde of doubt ought not to hinder the effect of the present duty. For in this case it is not true; The antecedent is doubtful, therefore so is the consequent. Fo•• as out of falshood truth may come, so out of doubts may come certainty. I see a great way off Father Grimaldi moving his lips; I suppose he is disputing, whom yet I was told not to be alive. I argue thus: He disputes, therefore he is not dead. The consequent is certain, but the antecedent doubtful; so it is in the present case. I doubt whether this woman be and ought to be my wife, but because she is legally so and so reputed and in possession, I doe inferre that therefore I must pay my duty to her, till it be certain that she is not my wife. For though I doubt of the person whether or no she be my wife, yet I am certain, or I may be certain of this, that he that approaches to her who is in possession of marriage may doe it lawfully; he onely does fornicate who approaches to her of whom I am certain that she is not my wife. But if of this proposition also I doubt, the doubt is practical, and I may not doe it, till by some means the doubt be re∣solved or laid aside. But so long as it is a question speculative, the action may be determinate and lawful, and introduced upon many accounts.

For the fuller manifestation of which secret,* 1.4 because it is of great con∣cernment, and hath influence upon the conscience in many great actions and entercourse of humane society, it is remarkable that we cannot argue thus; This man is not bonae fidei possessor, a possessor by a just faith, therefore he pos∣sesses it malâ fide, by an unjust: So neither does this follow, This man pos∣sesses it not with an evil faith, therefore he possesses it with a good faith. It does neither way follow negatively. But this consequence is good; He is a possessor by a good faith, therefore he does not possess it by an evil. Or, he is a possessor by an evil faith, therefore he does not possess it by a good; it fol∣lows either way affirmatively. The reason of the difference is this; If it be good it cannot be bad, and if it be bad it cannot be good; if it be one, it can∣not be the other, but it may happen that it may be neither good nor bad, for there is a medium or a third between good and bad faith or honesty of posses∣sion; and this consists in a speculative doubt, by which the possessor doubts whether that which is in his hands be in his right, or belongs to him or to ano∣ther; and that he who so doubts hath neither good nor bad faith is expressed by the gloss in l. 1. C. de acq. poss. gl. in l. 2. ff. pro solut. & gl. in l. 3. §. gene∣ralitèr ff. de acq. poss.

The consequent of which is this,* 1.5 That because that he who so doubts is not bonae fidei possessor, therefore he cannot from thence begin to prescribe or to ac∣quire

a just title, because of the rule of the Law, Quod ab initio non valuit, pro∣gressu temporis valere non debet, and it cannot by time get strength to walk which enters into the world without feet; now the doubting conscience is but a lame supporter. But yet because such a conscience which onely hath this speculative doubt is not malae fidei possessor, therefore he may lawfully still retain the posses∣sion till the contrary be evicted.

There is this onely to be added, that although prescription or other ways of just title cannot begin with a doubting conscience, yet if it entred with a throughly perswaded conscience, it may goe on though it be disquieted by a supervening doubt. The reason is, because it having lawful Parents of its birth and first production, cannot be kill'd and destroyed by a suit at Law, it began well, and therefore had just principles of its progression; and whatsoever hath the first advantage of just and reasonable, is always to be so presum'd till the contrary be proved; a doubt therefore may make the man unquiet, and tie him to inquire, but cannot interrupt the possession or the beginning and grow∣ing title. Besides the reason, this sentence is confirm'd by the concurring te∣stimonies of Bartolus, Imola, Sylvester, Felinus, Balbus, and Johannes Hanni∣bal, under their titles de praescriptionibus & usucapionibus.

There are some accidental hardnesses to the conscience which are inno∣cent,* 1.6 and because besides the even measures of good and evil by lawful▪ and unlawful, there are some paths chalked out to us by necessities, by conveniences, by presumptions, by securities, and other indefinite aims at things which can sometimes weigh down the best of our imperfect conjectures in some obsure cases, we may as well walk by the light of the starres, and better too, then to walk qui••e in the dark; and not onely the Sun is appointed to rule the day, but there are the Moon and the Stars to govern the night: plain and easy Rules make a sure conscience, but the doubtful and the dark must be content with a less light.

For,* 1.7 unlearned men are oftentimes beset with the arguments of a talking man, which they cannot answer, but create a speculative doubt, and such as destroys all the certainty of evidence which they had; but if they should not stick to their own conclusion in despight of all the objections, by a certainty of adhesion, they might be disturbed in every thing, and confident in nothing, and might if they met with a Heretick be fool'd out of their Religion, and quit the most material parts of their beleef. And even the learned have in many ar∣ticles a presumptive assent to their propositions; and if they be made to doubt in their understanding by the opposition of an adversary, they are not instantly to change their practice, but to inquire further. For if after every such doubting their practice must be insecure or criminal, they might be forc'd to a lightness greater then that of the Egyptian Priests: and some men can beleeve well, and dispute ill, but yet their faith must not change at the argument of every Sophister. In these cases the practice is made secure by a collateral light, and he is defended from change by reputation, and custome, by fear of scandal, and the tie of Laws, and by many other indirect instruments of determination, which although they cannot out-wit the crntrary arguments, yet they ought to outweigh the doubt, and guide the will, and rule the conscience in such cases.

There is nothing but a weak man may doubt of,* 1.8 but if he be well, he must not change his foot, till it be made certain to him that he is deceived; let him con∣sider what he please, and determine at leisure; let him be swift to hear, but slow to speak, and slower yet in declaring by his action and changed course,

that his doubt hath prevailed upon him. I knew a Scholler once who was a man of a quick apprehension, and easy to receive an objection, who when he read the Romane Doctors was very much of their opinion, and as much against them when he read their adversaries, but kept himself to the Religion of his Country, concerning which at all times he remembred that there were rare arguments and answers respectively, though he could not then think upon them. * There are temptations of faith and opinion, and they are to be resi∣sted sometimes by indirect ways of proceeding, and artifices of the spirit; and sometimes men in sickness are afflicted with doubting and trembling con∣sciences, but yet are supported onely with general remembrances, they consi∣der that there are comforts, and excellent promises, and instruments of hope, and wise and holy sayings by which they were nursed up to that height of strength, that they are now able to fight in the dark: If the speculative doubting conscience should always prevail in practice, the ignorant might be abused and miserable in all things, and the learned in most.

Notes

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  1. Ci••p. 2. Rule 3.
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