Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 5. In doubts the safer part is to be chosen.

WHen the Conscience is doubtful,* 1.1 neither part can be chosen till the doubt be laid down; but to choose the safer part is an extrinsecal means instrumental to the deposition of the doubt, and changing the consci∣ence from doubtful to probable. This Rule therefore does properly belong to the probable conscience: for that the conscience is positively doubtful is but ac∣cidental to the question and appendant to the person. For the reasons on ei∣ther side make the conscience probable, unless fear, or some other accident make the man not able to rest on either side. For in matters of conscience it is as hard to finde a case so equally probable that a man shall finde nothing without, or within to determine him, as it is to finde that which the Philoso∣phers call, Temperamentum ad pondus, a constitution so equal that no part shall excel the other. For if there were nothing in the things to distinguish them, yet in the man there is a natural propensity which will make him love one sort of arguments more then another. What can be more indifferent then to see two dogges fight? and yet no man sees their cruelty, but he wishes better to one then to another: and although no opinions are so very even, yet if they were, the man hath an acquisite, or else a natural biass, or something of con∣tingency that will determine him: and if the conscience remains undetermi∣ned, so that he may not, or dare not venture upon either part, it is certainly a disease, or a direct infirmity. And because such persons can doe nothing at all till their doubtful is changed into a probable conscience, this discourse must re∣late to that conscience that is probable, though in compliance with the usual ways of speaking, I have placed it here.

1. The Rule therefore is to be understood to be good advice,* 1.2 but not ne∣cessary in all cases. For when the contrary opinion is the more probable, and this

the more safe, to doe this is a prudent compliance, either with a timorous or with an ignorant conscience; it is always an effect of piety, and a strong will to good, but very often an effect of a weak understanding,; that is, such an one which is inclined to scruple, and dares not trust the truth of his proposition, or God with his soul in the pursuance of it. And indeed sometimes there is in this some little suspicion of the event of things which must needs reflect upon the goodness of God, under whom we fancy we cannot be so safe by pursuing that rule and guide that he hath given us, that is, the best reason, and the fairest inducement, as we may be by relying upon the sureness of the matter. Indeed we our selves are so wholly immerged in matter that we are conducted by it, and its relations in very many things: But we may as well rely upon formalities and spiritual securities (if we understood them) as upon the material; and it is as safe to rely upon the surer side of reason as upon the surer side of the thing. Now that which is the more probable hath the same advantage in constituting a conscience formally safe, as the other less probable but surer side hath for the making the conscience safe materially.

2. If the conscience be probable,* 1.3 and so evenly weighed that the determina∣nation on either side is difficult, then the safer side is ordinarily to be chosen, because that helps to outweigh and determine the scale; that is, when reason and the proper motives of the question are not sufficient to determine it, let auxiliaries be taken from without, and if the conscience be not made securer by its rule, let it be made safe by the material. It is just as the building of an house If the Architect be not wise and knowing how to secure the fabrick by rule of art, and advantages of complication, and the contexture of parts, let him support it with pillars great and massy; for if the other be wanting, these will sustain the roof sure enough, but with some rudeness in the thing, and imperfection in the whole.

3. If to that which is the surer side there be a great inconvenience con∣sequent,* 1.4 the avoiding of that inconvenience being laid on the opposite even part, will outweigh the consideration of the safety. Quintus Milo commands his servant Anfidius whom he had taken for the teaching Grammar and Rhe∣torick to his children, that he would learn the Trade of a Shoo-maker. An∣fidius doubts whether his Master Q. Milo hath power to command him to doe that which was no part of the imployment for which he was entertained, and yet because the thing is of it self lawful and honest, he considers it is the safest course for him to obey, for certainly in so doing he sins not; and thus farre he is bound, and was in the right. But if to learn that mean Trade will dishonour and disable him, make him a fool and contemptible, and ruine his hopes and his interests when he leaves the service of Milo, the servant is not tied to follow that which is more safe, but that which is more charitable and pru∣dent; In dubiis juris tutior pars sequenda est, & obedire teneor, si commodè possim, was the rule: because the reason abstractedly considered makes the question safe on either side, as the determination happens; and the avoiding an intole∣rable inconvenience is as considerable as the accidental security, and in many cases more complying with charity, because in a question in which the conscience is probable there is a great safety without taking in the advantage of a safe mat∣ter, by the proper efficacy and influence of the reason making a probable and an honest conscience; but then when the safety is provided for fairly otherways, and for the most part sufficiently, and the inconvenience on the other side is not provided for; in all such cases we must leave that which is materially sure,

for the choice of that which in its formality is equally sure, and in its matter more charitable. A little child came to my door for alms, of whom I was told he was run from his Mothers house and his own honest imployment; but in his wandring he was almost starv'd: I found that if I releeved him, he would not return to his Mother, if I did not releeve him, he would not be able. I considered that indeed his souls interests were more to be regarded and secured then his body, and his sin rather to be prevented then his sickness, and therefore not to releeve him seem'd at first the greater charity. But when I weighed against these considerations, that his sin is uncertain, and future, and arbitrary, but his need is certain, and present, and natural; that he may choose whether he will sin or no, but cannot in the present case choose whether he will perish or no; that if he be not releeved he dies in his sin, but many things may intervene to reform his vicious inclination; that the natural necessity is ex∣treme, but that he will sin is no way necessary, and hath in it no degrees of un∣avoidable necessity; and above all, that if he abuses my releef to evil purpo∣ses which I intended not, it is his fault, not mine, but the question being con∣cerding my duty not his, and that to releeve him is my duty and not his, and that therefore if I doe not releeve him, the sin is also mine and not his; and that by bidding of him to doe his duty I acquit my self on one side, but by bidding him to be warm and fed, I cannot be acquitted on the other, I took that side which was at least equally sure and certainly more charitable.

This also happens in the matter of justice very often. It is the surer side in many cases to restore,* 1.5 and is a testimony of an honest minde, that to secure its eternal interest, will quit the temporal. But if to restore will undoe a man, and the case is indifferent, or at least probable that he is not bound, then it is not necessary to restore, though to restore be the surer side; and if the inte∣rest of a third person, as of wife, or children, be also involved in the question, then the inquiring person is bound not to restore. Because in the present case there is a certain uncharitableness, and but an uncertain justice, that is, a duty certainly omitted, for the securing of another that is not certain.

4. When the more probable is also the more safe,* 1.6 there is no question but the safer is to be chosen. For so, the conscience is made the more sure both ma∣terially and formally; that is, by the better reason, and the more advantageous matter, and he that does otherwise, exposes himself to an evident danger of sinning, having nothing to out ballance either the direct reason, or the acciden∣tal safety.

5. Sometimes it happens that what is safe in one regard,* 1.7 is dangerous in another, and on each side of the probability there is a danger and a safety. Vittoria Columbina a Venetian Lady was married to five Magnifico's succes∣sively; and they all being dead, and she left very rich, young, and tempted to a sixth marriage, advises with her Confessor whether or no she may lawfully doe it? he tels her that it is not onely probable, but certain that she may; but it were better if she kept her Widdowhood, and after so much sense of mortality retire to Religion. But that he may determine her case with more certainty she tels him, she had once resolved with her self to live a Widow, but finds she shall not be free from temptation in that state, and desires him to tell her if she may lawfully marry, notwithstanding that resolution, which now to be something altered, he perceives by her question. * He answers, that it is the surest course to determine for chastity and abstinence, her state of Widowhood being more certainly pleasing then the other. But then she

hints her temptation, and asks if some sure course is not to be taken for her being secured in that point too? * This arrests his thoughts upon a new consideration, but the result is this:

1. When there are two securities to be provided for,* 1.8 one of the thing, and the other of the person; that of the person is first to be provided for. It is the safer part of the question to determine on the side of chastity, or virginity, or widdowhood, but this may be the unsafer side to the person, who if he suffers temptation is to be provided for by that answer which gives him remedy and ease.

2. But if it happens that there is danger on either side to the person,* 1.9 that is the surer side which provides against that temptation which is strongest and most imminent, and which if it prevails is of the worst consequence.

3. This is also to be understood in those cases when temporal life is of∣fered in question against the danger of a sin.* 1.10 Michael Verinus a yong Gentleman of Spain, by reason of his living a single life was press'd with so great inconve∣nience that he fell into a lingring and dangerous sickness. The Physicians ad∣vise him to use his remedy, though he be not married, and being it was in or∣der to his health, which was not else to be recovered, they presumed it law∣ful, or did not care whether it were or no, but however they advise him to it. He doubts of it, and dares not be uncharitable and die for want of remedy, if he might have it, and yet dares not commit an act of uncleanness; but finding on either hand a sin threatning him, and if he flies from a Lion he meets a Bear, or is told that a Bear is in the way: he at last flies from the evil beast that stood before him, and chooses that way which was evidently the safest, not to his health, but to his salvation; not to his body, but his soul, and chose rather to die, then to doe that which he was certainly perswaded to be a sin, and of the other he was not so sure.

Sola Venus potuit lento succurrere morbo, Nè se pollueret, malùit ille mori,

In other things, the prudence of a guide must be his onely Rule.

The summe is this:

1. If the doubt be equal and the danger equal,* 1.11 the doubt must be laid aside, or there can be no action consequent: and for the danger, if you choose one, you may choose either, for there is no difference; a dagger or a sword is all one to him that must die by one.

2. If the doubt be unequal and the danger equal,* 1.12 the resolution must be on that side where there is the most confidence, that is, where the less cause of doubting is apprehended; as if I have but enough to give one alms, and I see two ready to perish, and I can releeve but one; the danger is equal, for pasce fame morientem, si non pavisti, occidisti, said S. Ambrose, but one is my friend, and the other is a stranger; in this case the doubt is unequal, and I ought to preferre my friend.

3. If the danger be unequal,* 1.13 and the doubt equal, the resolution must be made in compliance with our safety. For there is nothing to weigh down in the doubt, yet there is something to weigh down in th•• ••••nger, and that is suf∣ficient.

4. If the doubt be unequal,* 1.14 and the danger unequal, there we must take the least danger▪ though on the least side of the probability, because there can no

degree of sin be consented to; and therefore when by our own fault or infeli∣city we must be forced to fall upon one, we must take the less, by the same reason for which we are to refuse all that we can. Maevius Caligarius a Ro∣man Gentleman and newly converted to Christianity, observes that his friend Agricola was pursued by his enemies unto death, and was by them asked con∣cerning him whether he were in his house or no. He knew he was, but knows also that if he confesses it he shall die. He doubts whether it be lawful to lie to save his friends life or no, and cannot resolve whether it be or no, but in∣clines rather to think it is not lawful. But he considers if it be lawful, then he is guilty of his friends death, who refused to save him at an innocent charge. But if it be not lawful, he does but tell an officious lie, so long as the doubt remains, he must rather venture upon an uncertain sin in the officious lie, then the uncertain but greater sin of homicide. These are the cases in which the danger is on both sides.

5. But if there be danger on one side onely,* 1.15 and a doubt on both sides, there is no question but that side is to be chosen where there is no danger; unless the doubt on one side be contemptible and inconsiderable, and the other not so.

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