Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 9. Multitude of Authors is not ever the most probable inducement, nor doth it in all cases make a safe and probable Conscience.

FOllowing a multitude is sometimes like the grazing or running of an heard,* 1.1 Non quo cundum est, sed quo itur, not where men ought but where they use to goe: and therefore Justinian in compiling of the body of the Romane Laws, took that which was most reasonable,* 1.2 not that which was most followed; Sed neque ex multitudine Authorum quod melius & aequius est judicabile: cùm possit unius forsan, & deterioris sententia multos & majores aliqua in parte superare. The sentence of one, and of a meaner man may sometimes outweigh the say∣ings of a multitude of greater persons. Nam testibus se, non testimoniis creditu∣rum rescripsit Imperator. Sometimes one witness is better then twenty testimo∣nies; that is, one man, good and pious, prudent and disinteress'd, can give a surer sentence then many men more crafty,* 1.3 and less honest. And in the Nicene Council when the Bishops were purposing to dissolve the Priests marriages, Paphnutius did not follow the common vote, but gave them good reason for his single opinion, and they all followed him. This Rule is true, and to be practised in the following cases:

1. When against the common opinion there is a strong,* 1.4 or a very probable reason, then the common opinion is not the more probable. Because a reason is an intrinsecal, proper and apportioned motive to the conscience, but humane authority, or citation of consenting Authors is but an extrinsecal, accidental and presumptive inducement, and a meere suppletory in the destitution of rea∣son: and therefore Socrates said,* 1.5 Veritatem in disputando, non ex teste aliquo, sed

ex argumento esse ponderandam; Truth is to be weighed by argument not by testimony, and it is never otherwise but when men are ruled by prejudice, or want reason to rule them in that particular. Tantum opinio praejudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret authoritas,* 1.6 said Cicero. And this is to be extended to all sorts of Authors that are not Canonical, or Divine. Meum propositum est antiquos legere, probare singula, retinere quae bona sunt, & à fide Ecclesiae Catholicae non recedere, said S. Hierom. My purpose is to read the Fathers, to try all things, to retain that onely which is good, and never to depart from the faith of the Catholick Church, that is, from the Creeds, which all Christendome profes∣ses. And at another time when himself ask'd leave, in discourse with S. Austin, Patiaris me cum talibus errare,* 1.7 Suffer me to goe along with such great men, though to an error, it would not be permitted, but reason was chosen and the authority neglected. And this course all men have followed when they pleased, and knew they might and ought.

2. When the multitude of Doctors are reducible to a single,* 1.8 or an incon∣siderable principle and beginning. Thus an opinion entertained by a whole fa∣mily and order of Clerks, while they either generally doe follow, or think them∣selves bound to follow the leading man in their own order, is to be reckoned but as a single opinion. The Millenary opinion was driven to a head in Papias; the condemning unbaptized infants, in S. Austin, or S. Ambrose; and therefore their numerous followers are not to be reckoned into the account. For if they that follow consider it not, the case is evident; if they doe, then their reaso•••• are to be weighed, not their authority.

3. When it is notorious that there is,* 1.9 or may be a deception in that num∣ber, by reason of some evil ingredient in the production of the opinion; as if it be certain that the opinion was taken up because it serves an interest, the same men having been on the other side when their interest was there. That it is lawful to put hereticks, or disagreeing persons to death, is generally taught by the followers of Calvin and Beza where they doe prevail: and yet no man that lives under them hath warrant to rely upon their authority in this questi∣on, because it is onely where and when they have power, themselves having spoken against it in the days of their minority and under persecution. Under the same consideration it is, if there be any other reason against the men, not relating to their manners, but to their manner of entring or continuing in the perswasion.

4. But when these cautions are provided for,* 1.10 the multitude of Authors hath a presumptive authority, that is, when there is no reason against the thing, nor against the men, we may presume upon the multitude of learned men in their proper faculty, that what they teach is good and innocent, and we may proceed to action accordingly. It can never make a Conscience sure, but it may be innocent, because it is probable; but he that relies upon authority alone is governed by chance. Because, if the more be against him, he is prejudic'd by multitude; if the fewer be against him, yet they may be the wisest: and whe∣ther they be or not, yet a tooth-drawer may sometimes speak a better reason; and one may carry it against multitudes, and neither one nor the other can justly induce a beleef unless they have considered all things; and if I can tell who hath done so, I am my self as well able to answer as they: for he that can judge who speaks best reason, or who is most fit to be trusted in the particular, must be able in himself to consider the particulars by which that judgement is to be made; if he can and does, he hath reason within him, and needs not fol∣low

low authority alone; if he cannot, then he is governed by chance, and must be in the right, or in the wrong according as it happens. For in many cases both sides have many advocates and abettors, and no man can tell who hath most, and each side says that their opinion is the most commonly received. In Venice there is a Law that any man may kill his Father if he be banished; some affirm this also to be lawful where such a Law is in force, and they affirm this to be the common opinion. Julius Clarius says that it is the common opinion, that though there be such a Law, yet that it is unlawful to doe it. It is com∣monly affirmed that it is lawful for such a banished person to defend himself, and if he can in his own defence to kill the invader. It is also a common opi∣nion that this is as unlawful as for a condemn'd man to kill his Executioner, because no Warre can be just on both sides. It is very commonly taught, that it is lawful by fraud, by surprise, by treason, to slay the Banditi. It is also very commonly taught that this is absolutely unlawful. * Sometimes that which was the common opinion an age agoe, is now rarely maintained but by a few persons. It was a common opinion in Tertullians time, that the souls departed are in outer Courts expecting the revelation of the day of the Lord; in the time of P. Leo, and Venerable Bede, and after, it was a common opinion that they were taken into the inner Courts of heaven. * Sometimes the place diversifies the opinion. In Germany and France, the Romanists worship the Cross with a religious worship of the lowest kinde of their own distinction; but in Spain they worship it with that which they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or the highest kinde; and this is commonly done in the several Countries respectively. When this, or any thing like this shall happen, unless by reason men be determined, they may draw lots for their opinion. But since the better part is not always the greater, it is left to me to choose which I will; and it is ten to one but I call the men of my own communion or my own acquaintance, The best; and it is certain I can∣not judge of those with whom I doe not converse.

For these and many other concurrent causes,* 1.11 the proceeding is inartificial and casual, and fit to lead the ignorant, but not the learned: and concerning the ignorant he can so little skill to choose his authority, that he must lie un∣der that where he dwels, and where his fortune hath placed him. If he goes any whither else he hath no excuse, because he hath no sufficient inducement; and where a man cannot goe alone, it is best for him to sit still where Gods providence hath placed him, and follow the Guides provided by the Laws of his Country where he was born, or where he lives:

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Conform your self to the Laws of the People with whom you must abide.

This is the most proper way to conduct the ignorant in their cases of con∣science in which themselves have no skill.* 1.13 They must beleeve one, and if they have a better way to proceed, let them pursue it: if they have not, this is cer∣tainly safe, because it is their best; and no man is tied to make use of better then he hath. And if they could fall into error, yet it could not be imputed to them with justice, while bonâ fide they fall into heresy, and are honestly be∣trayed. This onely is to be added:

They must make it as good as they can by inquiry (according to their cir∣cumstances, opportunities, and possibilities) and by prayers,* 1.14 and by innocent and honest purposes, for these onely will secure our way, by means of Gods

providing. In this case there is no irregularity, because it is the best obedience which can be expressed by subordinate and weak understandings, and there is in it no danger, because the piety, and the prayers of the man will obtain Gods blessing upon his innocent well meaning soul. It was well said of Hesiod,

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He is the best and wisest man who in himself knows what he ought to doe, dis∣cerning what is best, and seeing unto the end of things. He also is good, who obeys the sayings of wise men, that counsel well; but he is a fool who not be∣ing able to advise or determine himself, refuses to be conducted by others. Here onely are the evils to be complained of.

In some places there are a great many articles put into their publick con∣fessions, and a great many teachers of unnecessary propositions, and a great many idle and impertinent guides, who multiply questions lest themselves should seem useless; and amongst men, there are many orders, and families, and societies, all which are desirous to advance themselves, and to get disciples and reputation; and on the other side, there are very many that are idle, and rather willing to trust others, then to be troubled themselves; and many choose Teachers for interest, and some have mens persons in admiration because of ad∣vantage; and Princes have designs of State, and they would have Religion minister to them, and there are a great many Ecclesiastical Laws made, and some of these pass into dogmaticall propositions, and they teach for doctrines the Commandements of men; and there are very many sects of men, and confi∣dent fools, who use to overvalue their trifles, and teach them for necessary truths, and in all this incertainty of things, men are in the dark, and Religion is become an art of wrangling; and the writers of Controversies are oftentimes abused themselves, and oftner doe abuse others; and therefore men are taught certain little rules to grope by, and walk in Seas and upon Rocks. But the things themselves are oftentimes so indifferent, and the reasons of either side so none at all, or so inconsiderable, that it comes to pass that the testimony of Do∣ctors is the guide that men choose (as they list) to follow•• who because they teach contrary things, cannot be followed by their authority, and for reason, sometimes themselves have none, sometimes their disciples have not leisure to examine them, or judgement to discern them.

Quest.

HEre therefore is to be inquired,* 1.15 How shall the ignorant and vulgar people proceed in such cases where their Teachers are divided?

1. I answer, that in most cases it is best for them to let them alone, and let them be divided still, and to follow them in those things where they doe agree; but if it be in such cases where they must declare or act on one side, let them take that which they think to be the safest, or the most pious, the most chari∣table, and the most useful; that so by collateral considerations they may deter∣mine that which by the authority seems equal and indeterminable.

The collateral considerations are commonly these:

1. That which is more agreeable to the letter of Scripture.

2. That which does most agree with the purpose and design of it.

3. That which Saints have practised.

4. That which whole Nations have approved.

5. That which is agreeable to common life.

6. That which is best for the publick.

7. That which is most for the glory of God, for the reputation of his Name, and agreeing with his attributes.

8. That which is more holy.

9. That which gives least confidence to sin and sinners.

10. That which is most charitable to others.

11. That which will give least offence.

12. And (in destitution of all things else) that which is most useful to our selves. All these are good considerations, and some of them intervene in most cases, and can be considered by most men. But where nothing of these can be interwoven in the sentence, but that the authority of the Teacher is the onely thing that can be considered, the following measures are to be added.

2. The authority of one man wise and good,* 1.16 that is, who is generally so reputed, is a probable argument, and a sufficient guide to ignorant persons in doubtful matters, where there is no clear or known revelation to the con∣trary. When it is his best, there is no disputing whether it be good or no; onely in this case, he is so farre to suspend his consent, till his guide hath con∣sidered, or answered deliberately; for if his guide vomit out answers, it is bet∣ter to refuse it, till it be digested better. This hath been highly abused in some places, and permissions have been given or taken to doe acts of vile im∣piety, or horrible danger, where by interest they were perswaded, and being desirous for some pretence to legitimate the act, or to invite their conscience to it, they have been content with the opinion of one probable Doctor. Such was he whose testimony being required in a matter of right concerning his College, swore to a thing as of his certain knowlege, of which he had no cer∣tain knowledge, but a probable conjecture; onely because he had read or been told that one Doctor said it was lawful so to doe. This is to suborn a sentence and to betray a conscience, for the sentence of one Doctor is onely a good or a tolerable guide, when there is no better guide for us, and no reason against us; that is, it is to be used onely when it is the best, but not when it is the worst.

3. But if divers men equally wise and good speak variously in the que∣stion,* 1.17 and that the inquirer cannot be indifferent to both, but must resolve upon one, he is first to follow his Parish Priest, rather then a stranger in the article, who is equal in all things else; his own Confessor, his own Bishop, or the Laws and Customs of his own Country: because next to reason, comes in place that which in order of things is next to it; that is, the proper ad∣vantages of the man, that is, learning and piety; and next to them succeed the accidental advantages of the man, that is, his authority and legal prehe∣minence. There is no other reason for these things, but that which is in the proper and natural order of things: This is the natural method of perswa∣sion direct and indirect.

4. Where it can certainly be told that it is the more common,* 1.18 there the community of the opinion hath the advantage, and is in the same circumstan∣ces still to be preferred, because where reason is not clear and manifest, there we are to goe after it, where it is more justly to be presumed. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Euripides, it is good when good things are attested

by many witnesses. O 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Aristotle,* 1.19 that which seems so to all men, this we say, is as it seems; and so it is in proportion from some to many, from many to all. The summe of all these things is this: 1. God is to be preferred before man. 2. Our own reason before the sayings of others. 3. Many before few. 4. A few before one. 5. Our superiours, or persons in just authority over us, before private persons, caeteris paribus. 6. Our own be∣fore strangers. 7. Wise men before the ignorant. 8. The godly and well mea∣ning, and well reputed, before men of indifferent or worse lives. That is, they must doe as well and wisely as they can, and no man is obliged to doe better. Onely this is to be observed;

That in this case it is not necessary that truth should be found,* 1.20 but it is highly necessary it should be searched for. It may be it cannot be hit, but it must be aymed at. And therefore they (who are concerned) are not to be troubled and amazed at the variety of opinions that are in the world; There must be heresies, that is, sects are differing opinions, that they who are faithful may be approved. Now they can be approved in nothing but what is in their power, that is, diligence to inquire, and honesty in consenting; both which may very well be, and yet the man be mistaken in his particular sentence, in a matter not simply necessary, not plainly revealed.

There is but one thing more that concerns his duty, and that is,* 1.21 that in all his choices he preferre the interest of peace and of obedience; for it ought to be a very great cause that shall warrant his dissent from the authority which is appointed over him. Such causes may be, but the unskill'd multitude (of whom we now treat) seldome finde those causes, and seldome are able to judge of them, and therefore this Rule is certain.

Whoever blows a trumpet,* 1.22 and makes a separation from the publick, they who follow his authority, and know not, or understand not a sufficient reason for the doing it, they are highly inexcusable upon this account, because they following the less probable authority, have no excuse for the matter of their sin; and therefore if it happen to be schisme or rebellion, or disobedience, or heresy in the subject matter, it is in the very form of it, so imputed to the consenting person. For though great reason may be stronger then authority, yet no private authority is greater then the publick. But of this I shall have further occasion to discourse in its proper place.

Although this is the best, and therefore a sufficient advice for the ignorant,* 1.23 yet for the learned and the wise, there are other considerations to be added.

1. They who are to teach others may not rely upon single testimonies, or the slight probability of one Doctors opinion. This is true ordinarily and regularly, because such persons are supposed more at leisure, more instructed, better able to inquire, and to rely finally upon such single and weak supports, is to doe the work of the Lord negligently.

2. If the opinion be probable upon the account of a more general rece∣ption,* 1.24 and be the more common, and allowed by wise and good men, they who are learned, and are to teach others, may lawfully follow the opinion without examining the reasons for which it is by those wise men entertained. For the work of learning and inquiry is so large and of immense extension, that it is impossible all men should perfectly inquire of all things. But some especi∣ally attend to one thing, some to another; and where men have best conside∣red,

they consider for themselves and for others too, and themselves are help'd by those others, in the proper matter of their consideration. A mans life is too short, and his abilities less, and it may be his leisure is least of all, and unable so to consider all that is fit to be beleeved and taught, that it will be necessary we should help one another; and the great Teachers and Doctors in several in∣stances may ordinarily be relied upon without danger and inconvenience.

3. But if it happens that by circumstances and accidents the particular question be drawn out into a new inquiry;* 1.25 if a new doubt arise, or a scandal be feared, or the division of mens minds in the new inquest, then the reasons must be inquired into and the authority is not sufficient.

1. Because the authority is by the new doubt made less probable, and is part of the question, and therefore ought not to be presumed right in its own case.

2. Because the duty of Teachers is by this accident determined to this spe∣ciall inquiry, and call'd from their unactive rest, and implicit beleef; because the inquirers upon this new account will be determined by nothing but by that reason that shall pretend strongest; and therefore they who are thus call'd up∣on, can no other ways give answer to them that ask. It was the universal doctrine of the Church of God for many ages, even for fourteen Centuries of years, that Episcopacy is of Divine, or Apostolical institution: It was a sufficient war∣ranty for a Parish Priest to teach that doctrine to his Parishioners, because he found it taught every where, and questioned no where. But when afterwards this long prescribing truth came to be questioned, and reasons and Scriptures pretended and offered against it, and a schism likely to be commenc'd upon it, it is not sufficient then to rely upon the bare word of those excellent men who are able to prove it (as it is supposed,) but they who are to teach others must first be instructed themselves in the particular arguments of probation; that according to the precepts Apostolical,* 1.26 they may render a reason of the hope that is in them, and may be able both to exhort and to convince the gain-sayers; who because they expresly decline the authority, and the weight of testimony, can∣not be convinced but by reason, and the way of their own proceeding.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  L p. ver. Sed 〈◊〉〈◊〉 C de veter•• jure e∣nucle••••••o.
• * 1.3

  Cap. Nicaena Syn. dus. dist. 32.
• * 1.4

  2.
• * 1.5

  In Protag. Plat.
• * 1.6

  1. De nat. Deor.
• * 1.7

  Vide Libe. ep of Prophes. Sect. 8. D••ille du Vrai usage des Peres
• * 1.8

  3.
• * 1.9

  4.
• * 1.10

  5.
• * 1.11

  6.
• * 1.12

  C. earch.
• * 1.13

  7.
• * 1.14

  8.
• * 1.15

  10.
• * 1.16

  11.
• * 1.17

  12.
• * 1.18

  13.
• * 1.19

  Eth. lib. 10. ••. ••.
• * 1.20

  14.
• * 1.21

  15.
• * 1.22

  16.
• * 1.23

  17.
• * 1.24

  18.
• * 1.25

  19.
• * 1.26

  1 Pet 3. 15, Tit. 1. 9.