Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 8. An opinion relying upon very slender probability is not to be followed, except in the cases of great ne∣cessity, or great charity.

THAT it is not ordinarily to be followed is therefore certain,* 1.1 because it cannot be supposed, but that its contradictory hath greater probability, and either he that follows this trifle is light of beleef, or unreasonable in his choice, or his reason is to him, but as eyes to an Owl or Bat, half-sighted and imperfect; and at the best, no fit motive to the Will. And if it could be law∣ful to follow every degree of probability, it were perfectly in any mans choice to do, almost what he pleased, especially if he meets with an ill counsellor and a witty advocate. For at this rate all marriages may be dissolved, all vices ex∣cused upon pretence of some little probable necessity; and drunkenness will be entertained as Physick, and fornication as a thing allowed by some vicious persons whose wit is better then their manners; and all books of Conscience shall become patrons or indices of sins, and teach men what they pretend against, and there shall be no such thing as checks of Conscience, because few men

sin without some excuse, and it were no excuse unless it were mingled with some little probabilities; and there were in very many cases, no rule for con∣science but a witty inventer of pretty little inducements, which rather then a man shall want, his enemy will supply to him out of his magazine of falla∣cies.

2. But that there are some cases in which it is to be permitted is therefore certain,* 1.2 because it may be necessary in some circumstances to doe so, and in these cases the former impediments cannot intervene, because the causes of necessity or great charity occurring but seldome destroy all power or pretence of an easy deception. Anna Murrana was married to her near kinsman Tho∣maso Grillo, but supposed him not to be so near. It was afterwards discovered to her that the propinquity was so great that the marriage was null and invalid: while this trouble was upon her, there happily comes a discreet old woman who tells her, that though it be true that Grillo's Father was supposed to have lien with her Mother, and that her self was born of that conjunction, yet she her self being private to the transaction did put another woman into the place of Murrana's Mother, and that her Mother was also deceived in the same man∣ner; and though they thought they enjoyed each other, yet they were both cozened into more chast embraces. Now upon this the question arises, whe∣ther or no Murrana may safely rely upon so slight a testimony as the saying of this woman, in a matter of so great difficulty and concernment. Here the case is favourable. Murrana is passionately endeared to Grillo, and besides her love hath a tender conscience, and if her marriage be separated, dies at both ends of the evil, both for the evil conjunct••on, and for the sad separation. This therefore is to be presumed security enough for her to continue in her state.

Like to this is that of a woman in Brescia. Her husband had been con∣tracted to a woman of Panormo,* 1.3 Per verba de praesenti; she taking her pleasure upon the Sea, is with her company surprised by a Turks man of Warre, and is reported, first to have been defloured, and then kill'd. When the sorrow for this accident had boyld down, the Gentleman marries a Maid of Brescia, and lives with her some years; after which she hears that his first Spouse was not kill'd, but alive and in sorrow in the Isle of Malta, and therefore that her self liv'd in a state of adultery, because not she, but the woman in Malta was the true wife to her husband. In this agony of spirit a Mariner comes to her house and secretly tells her, that this woman was indeed at Malta, but lately dead, and so the impediment was removed. The question now arises, whether upon the taking away this impediment, it be required that the persons already engaged should contract anew? That a new contract is necessary, is universally belee∣ved, and is almost certain (as in its proper place will be made to appear) for the contrary opinion is affirm'd but by a very few, and relies but upon trifling motives, requiring onely the consent of either of the parties as sufficient for renewing of the contract. But this being but a slender probability ought not to govern her; she must contract anew by the consent of her husband as well as by her own act. But now the difficulty arises; for her husband is a vicious man, and hates her, and is weary of her, and wishes her dead; and if she disco∣ver the impediment of their marriage, and that it is now taken away, and there∣fore requires him to recontract himself, that the marriage which was innocently begun, may be firm in the progression, and legally valid, and in conscience; she hath great reason to beleeve that he will take advantage of it, and refuse to joyn in a new contract. In this case therefore, because it is necessary she should some way or other be releeved, it is lawful for her to follow that little pro∣bability

of opinion which says, that the consent of one is sufficient for the re∣novation of the contract. And in this case all the former inconveniences men∣tioned before doe cease: and this is a case of favour, in behalf of an innocent marriage, and in favour of the legitimation of children, and will prevent much evil to them b••th. So that although this case hath but few degrees of probabi∣lity from its proper and intrinsecal causes, yet by extrinsecal and collateral appendages it is grown favourable, and charitable, and reasonable: it is almost necessary, and therefore hath more then the little probabilities of its own ac∣count.

One case more happens in which a small probability may be pursued,* 1.4 viz. when the understanding hath not time to consider deeply, and handle the que∣stion on all sides; then that which first offers it self, though but mean and weak, yet if it be not against a strange argument at the same time presented, it may suffice to determine the action; for in case the determination prove to be on the wrong side, yet the ignorance is involuntary and unchosen.

These Rules are concerning a Conscience that is probable by intrinsecal mo∣tives, that is, by reason, whether the reason be direct or collateral. But because the conscience is also probably moved in very many cases, by Authority, which is an extrinsecal motive, this is also to be guided and conducted.

Notes

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