Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE 7. It is not lawful to change our practical sentence about the same object, while the same probability remains.

A Man may change his opinion as he sees cause,* 1.1 or alter the practice upon a new emergent reason; but when all things are equal without and within, a change is not to be made by the man, except it be in such cases in which no law, or vow, or duty, or the interest of a third is concerned; that is, unless the actions be indifferent in themselves, or innocent in their circumstances, and so not properly considerable in the fears of conscience, in which cases a mans li∣berty is not to be prejudiced.

This stating of the Rule does intimate the proper reasons of it,* 1.2 as appears in the following instances; Juan a Priest of Messina having fasted upon the Vespers of a Holy day, towards the middle of the night hath a great desire to eat flesh; he dwelling by the great Church, observed that the Clocks in the Neighbourhood differed half an hour: He watches the first Clock that struck midnight, and as soon as it had sounded, he eat his meat, because then he con∣cluded that the Ecclesiastical fasting day was expired, and that therefore it was then lawful by the Laws of his Church to eat flesh. But being to consecrate the blessed Eucharist the next morning, and obliged to a natural fast before the celebration of the holy Sacrament, he chang'd his computation, and reckon'd the day to begin by the later Clock; so that the first day ended half an hour before the next day began, and he broke his fast because the Eve was past, and yet he accounted that he was fasting, because the Holy day was not begun. This was to cozen the Law, and if it be translated to more material instances, the evil of it will be more apparent, but in this, the unreasonableness is as visible. * The like is the case of a Gentleman living in the Neighbourhood of Rome. Baptista Colonna happened to be in Rome on the three and twentieth of August, which is usually the Eve of S. Bartholomew, but there it is kept on the twenty fourth day; he refused to fast on the ordinary day of the Vigils as he used to doe, because in Rome where he then was, the custome was otherwise; he eat his meals, and resolved to keep it the next day, but on the morrow being very hungry and desirous of flesh, he chang'd his sentence, and went out of Rome to the Neighbourhood, and kept the feast of S. Bartholomew without the Eves. This is to elude the duty, and to run away from the severity of the Law, by trifling with the letter.

If the Case be not complicated with a Law,* 1.3 yet it is often infolded with the interest of a third Person, and then is not to be changed, but remains in∣variable. Maevius promised to Sertorius to give him a servant, either Ephodius or Taranta, but resolves to give him Taranta; immediately after the resolution Ephodius dies, and Maevius tels his friend he is disobliged, because he hath but one, and resolves not to part with Taranta, and it was in his liberty to give him either, and because he will not aSSign his part in this, it is wholly lost in the other; but this is unfriendly and unjust. To this sort of instance is to be redu∣ced a caution against fraudulency in the matter of Vows.

Vitellescus vows to fast upon the last of February,* 1.4 but changing his minde, beleeves he may commute his Fasting for Alms; he resolves to break his fast and to give a ducket to the poor. But when he had new dined, he discourses the question again, and thinks it unlawful to commute, and that he is bound to pay his vow in kinde; but the fast is broken, and yet if he refuses upon this new inquest to pay his commutation, he is a deceiver of his own soul. For in the present case, if to commute were not lawful, yet it is certain he is not dis∣obliged; and therefore he is to pay his commutation, because it was decree•• in the time of a probable conscience; and not being in it self unlawful, though it be now supposed to be insufficient, yet it is to be accounted for, upon the stock of the first resolution of the conscience, because the state of things is not intire; and advantages are not to be taken against Religion from the ac∣count and stock of our errors or delusions; and if after this, the conscience be not at rest, it is to be quieted by other actions of repentance and amends.

Quest.

BUT here also is to be inquired,* 1.5 Whether a man may to several persons, to serve distinct ends, in themselves lawful and honest, discourse of and per∣swade both the parts of a probability respectively? Titius wooes Orestilla for his wife; she being sickly, and fearful lest she shall have no children, declines it; he to perswade her, tells her it is very likely she will, and that it will cure her indisposition. But the interest of Titius is to have no children, as being already well stored, and therefore is disswaded by them that have power over him, not to marry Orestilla. He to answer their importunity tells them, it is very likely Orestilla will be barren, and upon that account he marries her because she is sickly, and unlikely to become a Mother. The Question is, Whether this be lawful?

I answer,* 1.6 1. If he be actually perswaded of that part of the probability when he urges it, and be changed into the other when he perswades the other, there is no question but it is as lawful to say both as one; for they are single affirmatives or negatives, and the time is but accidental to his perswasion; ye∣sterday this, and to morrow its contrary are alike, while in both or each of them his perswasion is hearty and sincere.

2. If Titius urges both parts severally,* 1.7 and yet remains actually per∣swaded but of one of them, he may urge them as probable in themselves, dispu∣table, and of indifferent argument and inducement, for so they are. But,

3. He must not imprint them by the efficacy of his own authority and opinion,* 1.8 nor speak that as certain which is at most but probable, and to him seems false; for so to doe is against ingenuity and Christian sincerity; it is to make a lie put on the face of truth and become a craft; it is not honest nor noble, nor agreeing to the spirit of a Christian, and is a direct deception on one side, and an indirect prosecution of a lawful end.

Notes

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