Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

A TABLE Of the TITLES of the Chapters, and the Rules of the FIRST BOOK.

Of COnscience, the kinds of it, and the generall Rules of conducting them.

CHAP. I. The Rule of Conscience in general.

• RULE. 1. Conscience is the mind of a man, gover∣ned by a Rule, and measured by the proportions of good and evil in order to practice. Pag. 1.
• 2. The Duty and Offices of Conscience are to dictate and to testifie or bear witness, to accuse or excuse, to loose or bind. 11
• 3. Be carefull that Prejudice or Passion, Fancy and Affection, Error or Illusion, be not mistaken for Conscience. 26
• 4. The Conscience of a Vitious man is an Evil Judge and an imperfect rule. 30
• 5. All Consciences are to walk by the same rule, and that which is just to one is so to all in the like Circumstances. 32
• 6. In Conscience that which is first is truest, easiest and most usefull. 34
• 7. Conscience by its several habitudes and relations and tendencies toward its proper object is divided into several kinds. 35

CHAP. II. Of the Right or Sure Conscience.

• 1. A Right Conscience is that which guides our actions by right and proportion'd means to a right end. 38
• 2. In a right Conscience the practical judg∣ment, that is the last determination to an action, ought to be sure and evident. 38
• 3. The practical judgment of a right Con∣science is alwaies agreeable to the speculative determination of the understanding. 40
• 4. A Judgment of Nature or Inclination is not sufficient to make a sure Conscience. 62
• 5. When two motives concur to the determi∣nation of an action, whereof one is vertuous and the other secular, a Right Conscience is not prejudic'd by the mixture. 64
• 6. An argument not sufficient nor compe∣tent, though it do perswade us to a thing in it

• self good, is not the ground of a right, nor a sufficient warrant for a sure Conscience. 73
• 7. A Conscience determined by the counsil of wise men, even against its own inclinati∣ons, may be sure and right. 80
• 8. He that sins against a right and a sure Conscience, what ever the instance be, com∣mits a great sin, but not a double one. 81
• 9. The goodnesse of an object is not made by Conscience, but is accepted, declared and pub∣lished by it, and made personally obligatory. 95

CHAP. III. Of the Confident or erroneous Conscience.

• 1. AN erroneous Conscience commands us to doe what we ought to omit, or to omit what we ought to doe, or to doe it otherwise then we should. 99
• 2. An erroneous Conscience binds us to Obedi∣ence, but not so as a right Conscience does. 102
• 3. A Conscience erring vincibly or culpably is an unavoidable cause of sin, whether it be resisted or complied with. 109
• 4. It is a greater sin to doe a good action a∣gainst our Conscience, then to doe an evil action in obedience to it. 111
• 5. It is not lawfull to delight in an evil acti∣on (after the discovery of our error) which we did innocently in our erroneous Consci∣ence. 112
• 6. An innocent or invincibly erring Consci∣ence is to be obeyed even against the known Commandements of a Superiour. 113
• 7. The Error of an abused Conscience ought to be reformed sometimes by the command of the Will, but ordinarily by a contrary reason. 116
• 8. The Error of a Conscience is not alwaies to be opened to the erring person by the Guides of Souls, or any other charitable adviser. 117

CHAP. IV. Of the Probable or thinking Con∣science.

• 1. A Probable Conscience is an imperfect as∣sent to an uncertain proposition, in which one part is indeed clearly and fully chosen, but with an explicit or implicit notice that the contrary is also fairly eligible. 119
• 2. A Conscience that is at first and in its own nature probable may be made certain by accumulation of many probabilities operating the same perswasion. 124
• 3. Of two Opinions equally probable upon the account of their proper reasons, one may be safer then another. 144
• 4. An Opinion that is speculatively probable is not alwaies practically the same. 144
• 5. The greater probability destroys the less. 146
• 6. When two Opinions seem equally probable the last determination is to be made by ac∣cidents, circumstances and collateral induce∣ments. 150
• 7. It is not lawfull to change our practicall sentence about the same object, while the

• same probability remains. 154
• 8. An Opinion relying upon very slender pro∣bability is not to be followed, except in the cases of great necessity or great charity. 154
• 9. Multitude of Authors is not ever the most probable inducement, nor doth it in all cases make a safe and sure Conscience. 156
• 10. In following the Authority of men, no rule can be antecedently given for the choice of the persons, but the choice is wholly to be conducted by prudence and according to the subject matter. 162
• 11. He that hath given assent to one part of a probable opinion, may lawfully depose that Conscience and that opinion upon confidence of the sentence of another. 168
• 12. He that enquires of several Doctors, untill he find one answering according to his mind, cannot by that enquiry make his Conscience safe; but according to the subject matter, and other circumstances he may. 171
• 13. He that is asked concerning a case that is on either side probable, may answer against his own opinion if the contrary be probable, or more safe, or more expedient, or more fa∣vourable. 172
• 14. When the Guide of Souls is of a different opinion from his charge or penitent, he is not bound to exact conformity to his own opinion that is but probable, but may proceed accor∣ding to the Conscience of the Penitent. 173
• 15. The sentence and arbitrement of a pru∣dent and good man, though it be of it self but probable, yet is more then a probable warran∣ty to actions otherwise undeterminable. ibid.

CHAP. V. Of a Doubtfull Conscience.

• 1. A Doubtfull Conscience assents to neither side of the question, and brings no di∣rect obligation. 174
• 2. A negative doubt neither binds to action nor inquiry nor repentance, but it binds only to caution and observance. 175
• 3. A privative doubt cannot of it self hinder a man from acting what he is moved to by an extrinsick argument or inducement that is in it self prudent or innocent. 177
• 4. In doubts of right or Law we are al∣waies bound to enquire: but in doubts of fact not alwaies. 178
• 5. In doubts the safer part is to be chosen. 180
• 6. It is lawfull for the Conscience to proceed to action against a doubt that is merely spe∣culative. 184
• 7. Every dictate and judgment of the Consci∣ence, though it be little and less material, is sufficient, and may be made use of for the de∣position of a doubt. 187
• 8. When two precepts contrary to each other meet together about the same question, that is to be preferred which binds most. 188

CHAP. VI. Of the Scrupulous Conscience.

• 1. A Scruple is a great trouble of mind pro∣ceeding from a little motive and a

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• great indisposition, by which the Conscience, though sufficiently determined by proper ar∣guments, dares not proceed to action, or if it does, it cannot rest. 208
• 2. A Conscience sufficiently instructed by its proper ••••guments of perswasion may with∣out sin proceed to action against the Scruple, and its weaker arguments or stronger trem∣blings. 213
• 3. He that is troubled with scruples ought to relie upon the judgment of a prudent Guide. ibid.
• 4. When a Doubt is resolved in the entrance of an action, we must judge of our action after∣wards by the same measures as before; for he that changes his measures, turns his doubt into a Scruple. ibid.
• 5. A Scrupulous Conscience is to be cured by remedies proper to the disease and to the man. 215