Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

CHAP. I. Of the efficient causes of all Humane actions good or evil.

§. 1. Of Choice and Election, voluntary and involuntary.

RULE I. An action is neither good nor evil, unlesse it be vo∣luntary, and chosen.

THis Rule is taken from the doctrine of S. Austin,* 1.1 who makes freedome and election to be of the constitution and definition of sin.* 1.2 Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod justitia vetat, & unde liberum est abstinere. The will is the mistresse of all our actions, of all but such as are ne∣cessary

and natural; and therefore to her it is to be imputed whatsoever is done. The action it self is good or bad by it's conformity to, or difformi∣ty from the Rule of Conscience; but the Man is good or bad by the will. Nemo nostrûm tenetur ad culpam,* 1.3 nisi propriâ voluntate deflexerit, said S. Ambrose. If the actions be natural and under no command of the will, they are good by creation and the act of God; but if it be a moral action it is to be conducted by another Oeconomy. For in these it is true which the Wise man said, Deus posuit hominem in manu consilii sui: God intending to be glorified by our free obedience hath set before us good and evil: we may put our hand to which we will; onely what we chuse that shall be our por∣tion: for all things of this nature he hath left us to our selves; not to our natural strengths, but to our one choice; he hath instructed us how to chuse; he hath open'd to us not onely the nature of things, but the event also of all actions, and invited the will with excellent amabilities and glorious objects; and by all the aides of the Spirit of Grace hath enabled it to doe it's own work well. Just as Nature is by Physic enabled to proceed in her own work of nutriment and increase by a removing of all impediments, so does the Spirit of God in us, and to us, and for us: and after all the will is to chuse by it's own concreated power.

I shall not here enter into the philosophy of this question,* 1.4 but con∣sider it onely as it is to be felt and handled. Let the will of man be enabled by what means it please God to chuse for it, without God's grace we are sure it cannot doe it's work; but we are sure also that we can doe our work that God requires of us, and we can let it alone: and therefore as sure as God's grace and help is necessary, so sure it is that we have that help that is necessary; for if we had not, we could not be commanded to work, and there were no need of arguments or of reason, of deliberation or inquiry, according to the words of S. Austin,* 1.5 Quis non clamet stultum esse praecepta dare ei, cui liberum non est quod praecipitur facere; & iniquum esse eum dam∣nare, cui non fuit potestas jussa complere? for if in humane actions, that is actions of morality, there be a fate, then there is no contingency, and then all deliberation were the greatest folly in the world; because since onely one part is possible (that being impossible to come to passe which God hath inevitably decreed shall never be) the other part is but a chimae∣ra, and therefore not subject to consultation. Adde to this, if all our acti∣ons were predetermin'd, then one man were not better then another, and there could be no difference of rewards in heaven or earth; God might give what he please, but he shall reward none, not in any sense whatsoever; & Christian Princes may as well hang a true man as a thief, because this man no more breaks his law then the other, for neither of them doe obey or disobey, but it is fortune that is hang'd, and fortune that is advanc'd:

Ille erucem [sortis] pretium tulit, hic diadema;

and there is no such thing as vertue, no praise, and no law. But in all this there is nothing new. For these were long since the discourses of S. Austin against the Manichees, and S. Hierom against the Pelagians; and S. Leo by these very Mediums confutes the Priscillianists, as appears in his 19^th Epistle to Turibius the Bishop. But certainly that is a strange proposition which affirms that nothing is possible but what is done; and to what purpose is re∣pentance? No man repents that he could not speak as soon as he was born, and no man repents that he was begotten into the world by the ordinary

way of all the earth. He that repents is troubled for doing what he ought not, and what he need not. But I will goe on no further in this particular; not because I cannot chuse, for I could adde very many more things, but because if a man hath not a power to will or nill, it is to no purpose to write cases of Conscience, or indeed to doe any thing as wise men should. A fool and a wise man differ not, a lazy man and a diligent, a good man and a bad, save onely one hath a better starre; they differ as a strong man and a weak: but though one be the better thing, he is not the better man. But I am not here to dispute, yet I shall observe a few things which may be usefull to the question as the question can minister to practice.

1. That whereas all men granting liberty of will in actions of natural life and common entercourse,* 1.6 many of them deny it in moral actions, and many more deny it in actions spiritual, they consider not that they evacuate and destroy the very nature and purpose of liberty and choice. For besides that the case of moral actions and spiritual is all one, for that action is mo∣ral which is done in obedience or disobedience to a law, and spiritual is no more, save onely it relates to another law, to the Evangelical or Spiritual law of liberty, but in the nature of the thing it is the same, and can as well be chosen one as the other, when they are equally taught, and alike com∣manded, and propounded under the same proportionable amability, and till they be so they are not equally laws; besides this, the denying liberty in all moral things, that is in all things of manners, in all things of obe∣dience to the laws of God and Man, and the allowing it in things under no law, is a destruction of the very nature and purpose of liberty. For the onely end of liberty is to make us capable of laws, of vertue and reward, and to distinguish us from beasts by a distinct manner of approach to God, and a way of conformity to him proper to us; and except in the matter of Divine and humane laws, except in the matter of vertue and vice, except in order to reward or punishment, liberty and choice were good for no∣thing: for to keep our selves from harm, and poison, and enemies, a natu∣ral instinct, and lower appetites, and more brutish faculties would serve our needs as well as the needs of birds and beasts. And therefore to allow it where it is good for nothing, and to deny it where onely it can be usefull and reasonable and fit to be done, and given by the wise Father of all his creatures, must needs be amisse.

2. Liberty of choice in moral actions,* 1.7 that is, in all that can be good or bad, is agreeable to the whole method and purpose, the Oeconomy and designe of humane nature and being. For we are a creature between An∣gel and beast, and we understand something, and are ignorant of much, and the things that are before us are mixt of good and evil, and our duty hath much good and some evil, and sin hath some good and much evil, and there∣fore these things are and they are not to be pursued; Omne volunta∣rium est etiam involuntarium, and there is a weight on both sides, and our propositions are probable, not true and false, but for several reasons seem∣ing both to several persons. Now if to all this there were not a faculty that should proportionably, and in even measures, and by a symbolical pro∣gression tend to these things, we could not understand, we could not see, we could not admire the numbers and music and proportions of the Divine wisedome in our creation in relation to this order of things. For since in our objects there is good and evil in confusion or imperfect mixture, if our

faculties tending to these objects were natural, and not deliberative & ele∣ctive, they must take all in, or thrust all out, and either they must receive no good, or admit every evil. It is natural for every thing to love it's good and to avoid it's evil: now when the good and evil are simple and unmixt or not discerned, an instinct and a natural tendency to the object is suffici∣ent to invest it in the possession. But when they are mixt, and we are com∣manded to chuse the good and eschew the evil, if to an indifferent object there be not an indifferent faculty, what Symmetry and proportion is in this creation? If there be two amabilities propounded, and onely one is to be followed, and the other avoided, since the hand hath five, the soul must at least have two fingers, the one to take, the other to put away. And this is so in all species or kinds of moral actions, even that kind which we call spiritual; for with that also there is mingled so much difficulty and displea∣sure, that is, so much evil, so much that we naturally and reasonably desire to avoid, and the avoiding of this evil does so stand against the chusing of the other good, that a natural and unchusing faculty can doe nothing at all in the question. But upon this account God hath commanded industry, di∣ligence, toleration, patience, longanimity, mortification; that is, he hath set before us several eligibilities in order to several ends, which must either be wholly to no purpose, or an art of vexation and instrument of torment to evil purpose, or else the means of a reward, and the way of felicity by the advantage of a free and a wise choice, and this is to very good pur∣pose.

Materiamque tuis tristem virtutibus imple:* 1.8 Ardua per praeceps gloria vadit iter. Hectora quis nosset, si felix Troja fuisset? Publica virtutis per mala facta via est.

It is difficulty and the mixture of several amabilities that presupposes choice and makes vertue. But if events and actions were equally prede∣termin'd, idlenesse would be as good as labour, and peevishnesse as good as patience; but then a man could never come to God. It was well said of Eusebius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. As idlenesse is to the body, so is carelesnesse and in∣consideration to the soul, but exercise and difficulty and mortification bring us unto God: but these things cannot be understood but where there is liberty and election, and yet without these there is no vertue.

—Nam virtus futile Nomen Ni decus adfuerit patiendo,* 1.9 ubi tempora lethi Proxima sint, pulchramque petat per vulnera laudem.

Difficulty makes vertue, and the contrariety of objects makes difficulty, and the various ends and amabilities make the contrariety, and liberty is the hand and fingers of the soul by which she picks and chuses, and if she gathers flowers she makes her self a garland of immortality.

3. All this state of things thus represented must needs signify a state much more perfect then that of beasts,* 1.10 but very imperfect in respect of that of Angels, and of that which we our selves expect hereafter; and therefore that liberty which is made in just proportion to fit this imper∣fection must also of it self needs be imperfect, and need not be envied to mankind as if it were a jewel of the celestial crown. Alas it is an imper∣fection,

fit to humble us, not to make us proud; it is not too much to be given us, it is a portion of our imperfect condition; it onely sets us higher then a Tulip, and enlarges our border beyond the folds of sheep or the Oxens stall, but it keeps us in our just station, servants to God, inferior to Angels, and in possibility of becoming Saints. For in moral or spiritual things liberty and indetermination is weaknesse, and supposes a great infir∣mity of our reason and a great want of love. For if we understood all the degrees of amability in the service of God, and if we could love God as he deserves, we could not deliberate concerning his service, and we could not possibly chuse or be in love with disobedience, we should have no liber∣ty left, nothing concerning which we could deliberate; for there is no de∣liberation but when something is to be refus'd, and something is to be pre∣ferr'd, which could not be but that we understand good but little, and love it lesse. For the Saints and Angels in heaven and God himself love good and cannot chuse evil, because to doe so were imperfection and infelicity; and the Devils and accursed souls hate all good, without liberty and indif∣ferency: but between these is the state of Man in the days of his pilgrimage, untill he comes to a confirmation in one of the opposite termes. Liberty of will is like the motion of a Magnetic needle toward the North, full of trembling and uncertainty till it be fixt in the beloved point: It wavers as long as it is free, and is at rest when it can chuse no more. It is humility and truth to allow to man this liberty; and therefore for this we may lay our faces in the dust, and confesse that our dignity and excellence supposes mi∣sery and is imperfection, but the instrument and capacity of all duty and all vertue.

4. In the inquiries concerning the efficient cause of moral actions men doe deny one truth for fear of loosing another,* 1.11 and will not allow ••o man a liberty of choice in spiritual actions and moral effects, for fear of dispa∣raging the grace of God; whereas it is by the grace of God that we have this liberty.* 1.12 Ipsa ratio quemlibet nostrum quaerentem vehe∣menter angustat, ne sic defendamus gratiam ut liberum ar∣bitrium auferre videamur: rursus nec liberum sic asseramus arbitrium, ut superbâ impietate ingrati Dei gratiae judice∣mur. It is very easy to reconcile God's grace with our li∣berty, because by this grace it is that we have this liberty. For no man can chuse what he does not know, and no man can love that which hath in it no amability. Now because we have all notices spiritual and the arguments of invita∣tion to obedience in duties Evangelical from revelation and the grace of God, therefore to this we owe the liber∣ty of our will, that is, a power to chuse spiritual things. Grace and truth come by Jesus Christ, and liberty of will comes from him; for if the Son makes us free, then are we free indeed: but this is not by giving us new fa∣culties, but new strengths and new instruments to these faculties we have already. But let it be this way or any other, we cannot work till we have powers to work, and we cannot chuse till we have liberty, and we cannot be under a law, and promises and threatnings, if we cannot chuse: and there∣fore it matters not as to our present inquiry, the explication and manner of speaking of which school of learning we or any man shall please to follow: this onely we are to rely upon, that the man cannot be a good man, if he doe not chuse the good and decline the evil; and there is no such thing as

Conscience, and there is no need of it, and no use (except it be merely to torment us,) unlesse it be to guide us into the choice of good, and to deterre us from doing evil.

But lastly,* 1.13 It will yet be sufficient to the verification of this Rule, that whether we affirm or deny the liberty of the will, yet that there be in every action good or bad the action of the will; and if that be not necessary to be admitted as the cause of morality, then he that kills a man against his will is as bad as he that did it with his will, and he that receives the holy Sa∣crament by constraint does as well as he that chuses it, and to confesse Christ against our Conscience is as good as if we confesse him according to it: for when the material actions are the same, there is nothing can distin∣guish the men that doe them, but something within that can doe this, or let it alone. Now because a good understanding, and a good fancy, and a great reason, and a great resolution, and a strong heart, and a healthfull body may be in a reprobate or vitious person, but a good will and the choice of ver∣tue is onely in a good man, it follows that all morality depends on the action of the will; and therefore that all other faculties are natural and ne∣cessary and obedient, this onely is the Empresse, and is free, and Mistresse of the action.

And yet beyond this heap of things,* 1.14 there is another reason why a man can be good or bad onely by the act of his will, and not of any other faculty, because the act of the will produces material and permanent events; it is acquisitive and effective, or recusative and destructive, otherwise then it is in any other faculties. For the other faculties are like the eye and ear, they can see or hear foul things and be never the worse, and good things and be never the better: but the will of a man is like the hand and the mouth and the belly, if they touch foul things they are defiled, and if they eat poison they die; so is the will of man, it becomes all one with it's ob∣ject. For it works onely by love or hatred, and therefore changes by the variety of the object it entertains. He that loves a lie is a liar; but he that onely understands it, is never the worse. Facti sunt abominabiles sicut ea quae dilexerunt,* 1.15 saith the Prophet, They are made abominable according as they loved; [as the things are which they loved] so the Vulgar Latin: and so it is in good things,* 1.16 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that is joyn'd to the Lord is one spirit: love makes the faculty like to the object, and therefore as the object of the will is, whose action is love, so is the man good or bad accordingly.

Now this is not so to be understood as if the actions of other faculties could not be sins;* 1.17 for a sin may be in the memory, in the fancy, in the un∣derstanding, in the eye, and in the members of the body: but then in these is onely the material part of the sin; if the actions subjected in them be in∣voluntary they are not criminal, they may be irregular, but not sinfull; one∣ly as the will commands them and they obey, so they are to stand or fall in judgment. For so ignorance is a sin when it is voluntary. Qui dixerunt Deo,* 1.18 Recede à nobis; scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus. The wicked say unto God, We will not understand thy ways. So the Psalmist complains, Noluit intelligere ut bene ageret, He refused understanding. Now since in all the faculties the will of man hath a dominion, and is the cause of all moral actions, from thence they have their estimate, and are acquitted or

condemned accordingly; according to that of S. Bernard, Nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas, Nothing makes fuel for the flames of hell, but the will of man, and evil actions that are voluntary and chosen.

The consequent of this discourse in order to Conscience is,* 1.19 that no man loose his peace concerning the controverted articles and disputes of Chri∣stendome. If he inquires after truth earnestly as after things of great con∣cernment; if he prays to God to assist, and uses those means which are in his hand and are his best for the finding it; if he be indifferent to any pro∣position, and loves it not for any consideration but because he thinks it true; if he will quit any interest rather then loose a truth; if he dares own what he hath found and believ'd; and if he loves it so much the more by how much he believes it more conducing to piety and the honour of God, he hath done what a good and a wise man should doe; he needs not regard what any man threatens, nor fear God's anger when a man of another sect threatens him with damnation: for he that heartily endeavours to please God, and searches what his will is that he may obey it, certainly loves God; and nothing that loves God can perish.

2. It follows also from hence that no unavoidable calamity,* 1.20 no being born of evil parents, no being born from illegitimate embraces, no un∣just sentences of men can irreconcile us to God, or prejudice our Eter∣nal interest. God will judge us according to our works, not according to his, or any mans else, or by any measures but by his own law and our obe∣dience.

3. Let no man think that either God will,* 1.21 or that the Devil can make us sin. God loves not sin, or that we should die; and therefore will not di∣vide his own kingdome, or set up that by his effective power which by his legislative and his persuasive, and his natural and eternal, he intends to de∣stroy. And as for the Devil, he can tempt indeed, but unlesse we please, he cannot prevail; it is our consent and willingnesse that makes him conque∣ror. And if we be really persuaded of these plain and evident truths, there is a plain way made to encourage our industry, to actuate our caution, to glorify God, to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, to walk humbly with our God, to devest our selves of all excuses, to lay the burden where it ought; that is, to walk in the right way, in the way of duty and the paths of the Divine commandements, without tempting our selves, or being fool'd and cosen'd out of our duty, or hindring our repentance and hu∣miliation, if we have done amisse.

These are the material events,* 1.22 and that proper usefulnesse of this proposition which can doe benefit to us in the conduct of Conscience. Our own will and choice is all that upon which we are to make judge∣ment of our actions. For the further declaration of which we are to in∣quire into divers particulars, in order to the institution and regulating of Conscience.

Question I.

Whether every action of our life ought to be directed by a right conscience, or a well-persuaded will: or, Are not some actions not onely in their whole kind, but in their circumstances and limitations also, merely indifferent?

To this I answer,* 1.23 that actions, if they be considered in their Physical or natural capacity, are all negatively indifferent; that is, neither good nor bad: the going into a house, the entring into a field, the striking of a blow, the act of generation, eating or drinking, as they are taken in their natural capacity, are not moral actions, that is, by all that they are in nature are nothing at all in manners: even homicide it self and adultery, in their na∣tural capacity, differ nothing from justice and the permissions of marriage; and the giving of almes is no better naturally then giving money to Mer∣cury, or to an Image.

2. Omissions of acts are oftentimes indifferent,* 1.24 even always when the omission is not of a thing commanded or morally good from some law, or sufficient principle of morality, as perfection, counsel, praise and fame, worthinesse and charity. The reason is, because omissions may come in upon a dead stock, and proceed from a negative principle, from sleep and forgetfulnesse, from a lethargy or dulnesse, from differing businesse and divertisements. And that which is nothing can produce nothing, and nei∣ther good nor evil can come from that which is not; they both must have a positive cause, if they have in them any morality. Even not to commit adultery is not commendable, unlesse that omission be chosen. * And this is very remarkable in order to Conscience. For the whole duty of man consists in eschewing evil and doing good: but to will and to chuse good is so necessary, and if we can, to doe it is so requir'd of us, that the very avoiding evil is exacted in that manner, that unlesse it be a doing good, it is a doing nothing at all, it is good for nothing, it will goe for nothing. To eschew evil is a labour and a mighty work, it is a running from temptation, a shutting the doors against it, a praying against it, it is a flying from it when we can, and a resisting of it when we cannot. A porter cannot be said to eschew ambition, nor does he doe well by not commencing of a proud warre, when he can think of nothing but how to fill his belly by breaking of his back; and the poor shepherd shall never be thank'd for not contend∣ing for the Arch-bishopric of Toledo, or not fighting against his Prince, when nothing enters into his armory but his bottle and his hook, and no∣thing into his head, but that his sheep may wander in wholesome and plea∣sant pastures, and his lambs be free from dogs and foxes. A mere negative does nothing in God's service. The avoiding evil is neither good nor bad, unlesse it be by a positive act, unlesse the will be in it: and indeed as things are order'd it is many times harder to decline evil then to doe good; and therefore the eschewing evil is a contention and a warre, it is a heap of severe actions, a state of mortification, it is a resisting of temptations. For he that was never tempted may be innocent; but he is not vertuous, and shall have no reward.

* This is to be understood to be true in all cases; unlesse his not acting a sin, and his not being tempted now, be the effect of a long prayer, and a

former contention; and that either the temptation by his preceding piety be turn'd aside, or made impotent by mortification, or by his chosen and be∣loved state of life be made impossible; that is, unlesse by the arts of the spirit he hath made it vain, or by his frequent victories he hath made the Devil flee away, and so bought his peace at the price of a mighty warre, and his rest at the charge of a pertinacious labour. In all these cases the omission is negative as to the present state of things; and yet it is vertuous, because it had a positive and a vertuous cause, which now it may be lies still, because it hath produc'd a permanent and perpetual effect.

And upon this account we also can hope for the reward even of those graces which we never exercise.* 1.25 The Prince that refuses the offer of a crown or the possibilities of Empire because they doe not belong to him, shall certainly have a great reward, because upon the noblest account he avoids a very great evil. But the poor herdsman that dwells upon his own acre, and feeds his little yokes and couples of sheep on high ways and moun∣tains, and looks not ambitiously on his neighbours farm, nor covets the next cottage, which yet he likes well, and thinks it excellent because it hath a chimny, nor would doe an act of falshood to get his own tenement rent∣free, this man shall have a reward in proportion great as that just Prince who refuses to oppresse his brother when his state is broken by rebellion and disadvantages. For there is no vertue but may be lov'd and courted, delighted in and commended in every state and circumstance of life: and though it be not exercis'd in noble temptations and trials proper to the most excellent and remarked persons; yet the very images and little records of trial may expresse a love and choice which may be equal to that which is prosperous by the greatest exercise and indication. For there are little envies & ambitions even in cottages, and therefore there may be the choice and volition of humility and peacefull thoughts and acts of charity: and there may be unchastity even in marriage; and therefore though the conten∣tion is easier, and the temptations but inconsiderable, yet they also when they are immur'd by their Sacramental defensatives and securities may de∣light in chastity, and therefore rejoyce in that state because it secures them from uncleanenesse; and therefore for this love, and act of choice, even for delighting in that safety, may find a reward of chastity: and there may be covetousnesse amongst them that are full of plenty, and therefore even the richest person can be imployed in securing the grace of contentednesse, though he have but little temptation to the contrary. * Indeed if a begger were tempted with the offer of 20000, the temptation would be too big for him, if he understood the summe; and possibly if he be a vertuous man, and would not be tempted to tell a lie for 20^s, or for one of his own possi∣ble and likely summes, yet for so vast a heap of gold bigger then his thoughts, he might be put beyond his vertue. But therefore God in his goodnesse to mankind does seldome permit such trials and unequal hazards, and to our not being so tempted (without disparagement to our vertue and our choice) we may well confesse we owe our innocence. But because God suffers our temptations to be by accidents happening in our own condition, and we are commonly tried by that which is before us, or next above us; every one can either exercise or chuse the worthinesse of every grace, and may hope for the reward of the whole vertue by resisting the most incon∣siderable temptation to it's contrary, if in case he have no bigger, he equal∣ly chuses the vertue and rejoyces in his innocence. And he that does resist,

or by any means expedite himself from his own temptation, shall be re∣warded equally to him, to whom the greatest is but his next best. * For our vertue is not to be estimated by the instance, but the willingnesse and the courage, the readinesse of mind and alacrity of choice, by the proportion of the man and the methods of his labour, the resolution of the will, and the preparation of the heart; and we must account our omissions or eschewings of evil to be vertuous, by what we have done against it, by our prayer and our watchfulnesse, our fear and caution, not by an unactive life, and a dull peace, and a negative omission: for he does not eschew evil that does not doe evil, but he that will not doe it.

3. All acts that passe without any consent of the will are indifferent;* 1.26 that is, they are natural, or unavoidable, or the productions of fancy, or some other unchusing faculty, or they are the first motions of a passion, or the emotions of some exterior violence; as the sudden motion of an eye, the head or heart, the hands or feet. Now that these are as indifferent as to grow, or to yawn, to cough or to sneeze, appears because they are of the same nature, and partake equally of the same reason. But these instances can be made to differ. For those which are so natural that the whole ef∣fect also is natural, and cannot passe on to morality or be subject to a com∣mand, are always indifferent in their whole kind, and in all their degrees and in all their circumstances. Thus to grow taller, to digest meat, to wink with the eye in the face of the Sun, are not capable of morality. But those things which are at first onely natural, and afterwards are nurs'd by the will and discourse, they are onely at first indifferent, because they then onely are unavoidable. To look upon a woman is no sin, if she suddenly comes into our presence, though every such look by reason of the mans weaknesse were a temptation: for at first there was no time to deliberate, and therefore we could not be bound not to look, and if we had not seen her, it had not been good at all, nor evil. But to look upon her so long till we lust after her, to look upon her but to the entertainment of any fa∣culty that ministers to lust, to observe that which is precious in her but so long that the will doe consent to that which is, or is likely to be vile, that corrupts the manners and prevaricates the law.

4. No action of the will is indifferent,* 1.27 but is either lawfull or unlawfull, and therefore good or bad. For although there is in many actions that which the School calls indifferentiam secundum speciem, an indifference in the kind of action, or in respect of the object; yet when such actions come under deliberation and to be invested with circumstances, they cannot be consider'd at all, but that first they must be understood to be lawfull or unlawfull; for that very objective or specific indifference supposes the action lawfull: and he that does a thing though but with that deliberation and precaution, does doe well, unlesse there be something else also to be consi∣der'd, and then it may be he does better, or it may be ill; but when it is come as far as to be chosen and considered, it must be good or bad. For whatsoever that is about which we deliberate, we doe it for a reason that to us cannot seem indifferent; it is for an innocent and a good end, for good to our selves or others: and nothing can come under the consideration of being an end of humane actions, but is directed by the words or by the reason, by the designe or the proportion of some law. For even our profit or our pleasure are to be conducted by the measures of the spirit: and there

is nothing else besides profit and pleasure that is good, or can become the end of an action, excepting onely what is honest: and therefore every thing that is good or can be the reason of an action is under a law, and conse∣quently cannot be indifferent, according to the doctrine of S. Austin, Quanquam voluntas,* 1.28 mirum, si potest in medio quodam ita consistere, ut nec bona nec mala sit: aut enim justitiam diligimus, & bona est, & si magis dili∣gimus, magis bona, si minus, minus bona; aut si omnino non diligimus, non bona est. Quis vero dubitet dicere voluntatem nullo modo justitiam diligen∣tem non modo esse malam, sed pessimam voluntatem? Ergo voluntas aut bo∣na est aut mala, &c. Whatsoever we doe, we doe it for a good end or an evil; for if we doe it for no end, we doe not work like men: and according as the reason is which moves the action so is the will, either good or bad: for though vertue oftentimes is in the midst between two evils; yet the will of man is never so in the middle as to be between good and evil; for every thing that can move the will is good, or it seems so, and accordingly so is the will.

Indeed every action we doe is not in an immediate order to Eternal blessing or infelicity;* 1.29 but yet mediately and by consequence, and in the whole disposition of affairs it addes great moments to it. Bonum est con∣tinentia, malum est luxuria; inter utrumque indifferens, ambulare, capitis na∣ribus purgamenta projicere, sputis rheumata jacere. Hoc nec bonum, nec ma∣lum: sive enim feceris, sive non, nec justitiam habebis nec injustitiam, said S. Hierom.* 1.30 Continence is good, and luxury is evil; but between these it is in∣different to walk, to blow the nose, to spit. These things are neither good nor bad, for whether you doe them or doe them not, you are by them neither just nor unjust. For besides that S. Hierom instances in things of a specific and objective indifference, of which I have already spoken, that which he saies is true in respect of the supernatural end of man, to which these things (concerning which oftentimes we doe not deliberate at all, and even then when we doe deliberate, they) operate but little. But because the instan∣ces are in natural things, where the will hath very little to doe, we shall best understand this proposition by the instance of S. Gregory;* 1.31 Nonnulli dili∣gunt proximos, sed per affectionem cognationis & carnis, quibus in hac dile∣ctione sacra eloquia non contradicunt. Our natural love to our kindred is a thing so indifferent, not in it's own nature, but of so little concern to eter∣nity if it be onely upon the stock of Nature, that all that can be said of it is, that the Scripture doe not forbid it. That is, whatsoever is natural is not considerable in morality. But because this which first enters by nature is commanded by God, and can be confirm'd and improv'd by the will, therefore it can become spiritual: but that which is natural is first, and then that which is spiritual: so that although at the first and when it is onely the product of nature, it is but a disposition and a facility towards a spiritual or moral duty; yet as soon as ever the will handles it, it puts on it's upper garment of morality, and may come to be invested with a robe of glory. And this was very well discours'd of by the Author of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in S. Austin;* 1.32 Esse fatemur liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus, habens qui∣dem judicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum quae ad Deum pertinent sine Deo aut inchoare, aut certè peragere, sed tantum in operibus vitae praesen∣tis, tam bonis quam etiam malis. Bonis dico quae de bono naturae oriuntur, id est, velle laborare in agro, velle manducare & bibere, In things pertaining to God we cannot begin, or at least we cannot finish any thing without God and

his grace. But in the things of this life we have a free choice, whether the things be good or evil. For those I call good which doe natural good, as to be willing to work in the field, to will to eat or to drink. Now even these things are always good or bad when they are once chosen by the will, and to these very things the Divine grace does give assistance. So the same author, Velle quicquid bonum ad praesentem pertinet vitam, non sine Divino guber∣naculo subsistunt, A man cannot chuse well even in things belonging to this life, without the Divine assistance. And therefore in things of great concernment we pray to God to conduct and direct our choice. And since the order and perfection of every creature is to doe actions agreeable to the end and perfection of his nature, it is a pursuance of the end of God and of his own felicity. Although to doe so is not vertue in beasts, because they are directed by an external principle, and themselves chuse it not; yet in men it is vertue, and it is obedience: and although it is natural to doe so, and it is unnatural to doe otherwise; yet because it is also chosen in many instances, in them it is a vertue or a vice respectively: and though it be no eminent vertue to doe so, yet it is a prodigious sin to doe otherwise; for sins against nature are ordinarily and in most instances the worst; which does demon∣strate, that even things of nature and the actions of our prime appetites, when they can be consider'd and chosen, never can be indifferent; and for other things which are not of nature, there is lesse question. Thus to walk, to eat, to drink, to rest, to take physic for the procuring health, or the ease of our labours, or any end of charity to our selves or others, to talk, to tell stories, or any other thing that is good or can minister good to nature or society is good, not onely naturally, but morally, and may also be spiritually so: for it being a duty to God to preserve our selves, and against a commandement to destroy our selves; it being a duty to be affable and courteous in our deportment, to be gentle and kind and charitable; it being charity to make our own lives and the lives of others pleasant, and their condition not onely tolerable but eligible; there is no peradventure but every thing of our lives can be good or bad, because if it can minister to good or evil ends, it can be chosen for those ends, and therefore must partake of good or evil accordingly. How these ends are to be considered, and with what intention and actual or habitual intuition, I am afterwards to consider: for the present it suffices that upon this account the actions them∣selves are not indifferent.

And this doctrine is to great and severe purposes taught by our Blessed Saviour,* 1.33 Of every idle word that a man shall speak,* 1.34 he shall give account in that day. It was a known saying among the Jews, Cavebit vir ne cum uxore lequatur turpia, quia etiam propter sermonem levem viri cum uxore adduce∣tur ille in judicium,* 1.35 said Rabbi Jonah; Even the loosenesse of a mans talk with his wife shall be brought into judgement: and Maimonides said, Plera∣que verba sunt otiosa & causam praebent iniquitatis, Most words are such which some way or other minister to iniquity, and therefore shall certainly passe the fiery trial. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so it is in some Greek copies, every wicked word: for an idle word is not indifferent; it may have in it some de∣gree of wickednesse, and therefore may be fit to be forbidden, and conse∣quently shall be judged. Otiosum verbum est quod sine utilitate & loquen∣tis dicitur & audientis, si omissis seriis de rebus frivolis loquamur, & fabulas narremus antiquas. Caeterum qui scurrilia explicat, & cachinuis ora dissol∣vit, & aliquid profert turpitudinis,* 1.36 hic non otiosi verbi, sed criminosi tenebi∣tur

reus, said S. Hierom, That which neither profits him that speaks nor him that hears, is an idle word; any thing that is not serious, but frivolous and like an old tale. But if it be dissolute or wanton, it is not idle but criminal. S. Chrysostome expounds the words to the same purpose, calling that an idle word, which is spoken without just inducement in some kind or order of good things,* 1.37 and that which is mixt with lying or slander. Omne verbum quod non conducit ad propositam in Domino utilitatem vanum & otiosum est, said S. Basil; That word which is not for edification, that is, that which does no good at all, must needs be evil: Nay further yet, Verbum otiosum est quod, etiamsi bonum sit, ad aedificationem fidei tamen non aptatur. Et si ejus∣modi verba in celeberrimo illo totius orbis conventu examinabuntur, quid scurrilibus, & detrahentibus, & obscoenis verbis fiet? That is an idle word, which although it be good, yet does not tend to the edification of faith: and if such words as these shall be examin'd in the great assembly of all mankind, what shall be done to detracting, scurrilous and lascivious talkings? I suppose, S. Basil's meaning is that all those propositions which being built upon the foundation are not fit for the promotion of it, they are not silver or gold, but a superstructure of wood or hay or stubble: even these and those shall be examin'd in the eternal scrutiny; nothing shall escape there; if it will not endure the fire, it shall be consumed. For if the action here have any material end, it shall hereafter have a material reward: if it have no end, yet the man that did it was sent hither to a better end then to doe foolish and uselesse things. The very doing or speaking that which is good for nothing, is evil, and shall be discern'd and judged. We see it even in the judgements of men. Martial tells of a good man that had got a trick to invite his friends to walk, to bath, to eat, to drink with him, and in all his enterviews he would be perpetually reading of his verses: one would have thought the thing it self were innocent, if the question had been ask'd concerning the thing alone; but they that felt the folly and the tediousnesse of it, were afraid to see him.

Vir probus, justus, innocens timeris.

And Sidonius tells of some idle persons,* 1.38 quos execrabilis popularitias agit; civium maximos manu prensant, éque consessu publico abducunt, ac se∣questratis oscula impingunt, operam suam spondent, sed non petiti. Ut∣que videantur in negotii communis assertione legari, evectionem refun∣dunt, ipsosque sumptus ultro recusant, & ab ambitu clam rogant singu∣los, ut ab omnibus palam rogentur, &c. their very civility is trouble∣some, their idlenesse is hugely busy, and their imployment signifies no∣thing.

Ardelionum natio, occupata in otio, Gratis anhelans,* 1.39 multa agendo nihil agens, Sibi molesta & aliis odiosissima.

They doe nothing, and yet never stand still, and are very troublesome to themselves and others. Such an idlenesse as this, whether in words or deeds, if it can be consider'd and observed here, shall not escape a stricter consideration hereafter. For none of these things in the event of affairs shall prove to be indifferent.

The effect of this question is very great;* 1.40 for it ingages us upon a strict watchfulnesse over all our words and actions, and to a wise inquiry when they are done, and scatters that incuriousnesse and inadvertency of

spirit which seizes upon most men while they doe actions which they consi∣der not whether they be right or wrong, and supposing actions, many more then there are, to be in their whole kind indifferent, would fain make them so in their individual, and by never disputing the particulars, detain the action in a neutrality as to the Conscience, never representing it either as lawfull or unlawfull, much lesse as good and evil. But our actions shall be judg'd by Gods measures, not by our wilfull and ignorant mistakes. 2. E∣very thing we doe must twice passe through the Conscience; once when it is to be done, and again when it is done: And not onely whatsoever is not of faith is sin, so that we sin if we are not persuaded it is lawfull; but it be∣comes a sin, when we are carelesse and consider not at all, either actually or habitually, either openly or by involution, as it is alone or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it is in con∣junction with something else, by direct intuition or consequent deduction, by expresse notices or by reasonable presumptions, by rule or by fame, by our own reason or by the reason of others whom we may fairly trust.

Question II.

Whether is it necessary for the doing of good that we have an expresse act of Volition?* 1.41 or is it not sufficient in some cases that we are not unwilling? Is it not enough that we doe not oppose it? but must we also promote it? That is, Although actions of themselves be not indifferent when they are chosen; may not the will be allowed to be indifferent to some good things that are laid before her? and what kind or degrees of indifference to good can be lawfull, and in what cases?

This is not a question of single actions principally,* 1.42 but of states of life and being▪ and of single actions onely by consequence and involution in the whole: But of great usefulnesse in the conduct of Conscience and making judgements concerning the state of our souls; and it is a great en∣dearment of the actions, the zeal and forwardnesses of the will and an active piety. First therefore in general I answer, then more particularly.

In the Law of Moses the righteousnesse commanded was a designe for Innocence,* 1.43 their great Religion was Rest, their Decalogue was a systeme espe∣cially of Negative commandements, the sanction of the Law was fear and terror, which affrights all men, but invites none, it makes them afraid, but never willing; their offices were purifications and cleansings away: but so little of good was to be done, that God was more carefull that the people should not commit idolatry, then severe in calling them to admire his beau∣ties; that they should learn no evil, then that they should learn much good. Now to this negative state of duty, a will doing nothing, an understanding not considering, a forgetfulnesse of the question, and a sitting still might in many cases minister; and then the will is accidentally indifferent, when the action never stands before it, either as good or evil. But now under the Gospel we are unclean unlesse we have active purities, and we are covetous unlesse we despise the world, and we are malicious by interpretation of law, unlesse we take what opportunities we have of doing good to them that have us'd us ill, and even to be luke-warm is abominable to God, and our tongues may sin with silence, and we are to keep holy-days not by rest, but by religious labour, and we dishonour the holy Name of God not one∣ly

by cursed swearing, and false oaths, and evil covenants, but if we doe not doe him honour; if we doe not advance his kingdome we are rebels, if we doe not set his glory forward we have prophan'd his holy name that is cal∣led upon us.

And this is with some mysteriousnesse intimated in the several senses of those words of Scripture [Therefore let my Name be called upon them.* 1.44] So Jacob's name was called upon Rebeccah,* 1.45 and Uriah's name upon Bathsheba; Rebecca Jacobi, & Uriae Bathsheba: and upon Ephraim and Manasseh when Jacob's name was called, the purpose was that they should be reckon'd not as if they had been sons of Joseph, but the sons of Jacob, having an equal portion in the divisions of Israel. So in the Prophet* 1.46, Onely let thy Name be called upon us, that is, let us be reckon'd in thy portion, accounted to be thy people, thou our Father, and we Sons and Daughters unto God. Now in these instances of the Old Testament, it signifies honour and privilege, security of title and advantage of relation, something that on their part was passive all the way. But in the New Testament we find the same ex∣pression rendred to such purposes as will signifie something on our parts also, some emanation of our will and choice, even an active duty. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.47 They blaspheme that holy Name which is invocated upon you, that is, they blaspheme the Name of Jesus Christ which was put upon them in baptisme, by invocation and solemn sacramental prayer. The Name of Christ was then put upon us in that manner which teaches us how to wear it for ever after: it was called upon and so put upon us; it must be called upon, and so worn by us. Here is invoca∣tion relative to two termes, both active and passive. And since it is evi∣dent and clear in the Scriptures of the New Testament that calling on the Name of the Lord is us'd for being Disciples and servants of the Lord, as appears in those words, Whosoever shall call on the Name of the Lord shall be saved, that is, all that have given up their names to Christ, all that have taken his Name and live accordingly; it follows that all we who bear the name of Christians must not be content with the glorious appelation, or the excellency of the relation, but we must by our holy lives, by our active obedience, by an operative faith, and a busy love doe honour to Christ, and glorify that Name by which we are called and made illustrious.

And this is rarely well taught us by a proverbial saying used by our Blessed Lord,* 1.48 He that is not with us is against us;* 1.49 and he that gathereth not, scattereth abroad: that is, it is not enough that our will doe not chuse evil, or oppose it self against God, and his holy laws and sermons. For many unconverted Gentiles, children and strangers, the luke-warm and the indif∣ferent, the deaf and the dumbe, the stones of the street and the gold of the Temple, the starers and the talkers, the Sceptic and the carelesse, these have a negative indifference of will; they doe not take part against Christ, but neither doe they fight of his side, and therefore are not populus volun∣tarius, their will and choice is not on Christ's side. But the particulars are these, which determine the cases of Conscience which can arise from this inquiry.

There are in the Gospels two proverbial sayings,* 1.50 each of them twice us'd. He that is not with us is against us] and,* 1.51 He that is not against us is with us.] The sayings are of contrary purpose and effect. For as the first

injoyns us to the labour of love, and an active will, and an effective zeal, and a religion productive of permanent effects; so the latter seems to be content with negative measures, to approve of an indifferent will, to allow a neutrality, and that not onely many single actions, but that a whole state of life may have a negative indifference and indetermination. Now because both the propositions must needs be true, they must have distinct measures, and proper significations. Therefore

1. When Christ said,* 1.52 He that is not against us is with us, he meant it principally of strangers and aliens, persons not admitted into the strictures of the Covenant Evangelical. For when the Princes of the nations con∣spire against the Lords Christ, he that refuses to joyn with them, declares that he will not be Christs enemy; and est quiddam prodire tenus, this little is more then nothing. Thus Gamaliel was on Christ's side, when he gave a gentle counsel in a case of the Apostles, with whom although he did not joyn, yet because he would not joyn against them, he was so far with them, that he was not esteem'd an enemy: and it was noted of Joseph of Arima∣thea, that he was not consenting to the sentence of the high Priests in put∣ting our Blessed Lord to death, and therefore he was a good man. His not doing that evil was a great indication of a friendly mind.

2. This is also true in questions of religion of difficult understanding,* 1.53 and lesse necessary knowledge, or not of immediate concernment to salvati∣on. He that does not disbelieve the miracles of Christ, he that does not stop his ears against the voice of Christ, he that does not run after a stran∣gers voice, is not far from the kingdome of heaven: though the man knows little, yet if he believes nothing against any word of Christ, though many words of Christ were deliver'd of which he knows nothing, he hath put his head into the folds of Christ. For in articles of belief which are not of the foundation, an implicite belief in God and his Christ is sufficient, when there is no vitious positive cause of the not knowing them explicitely: and if this were not true, ignorant and unletter'd persons were tied to as great learning and explicite knowledge as the profoundest Clercs; which because it is no where commanded, and is very often impossible, and al∣ways unreasonable to be exacted, it must follow that it will in most cases be enough for the ideot or unlearned that they doe not oppose what they doe not understand, but humbly submit themselves to God and their superiors, by a confident confession of what they understand, and a modest conformi∣ty to those other articles in which public peace is more concerned then pub∣lic truth, or their private duty. In this case a negative indifference of the will by reason of the ignorance of the understanding, that is, a not opposing what they understand not, and cannot understand, is their security and their innocence.

3. He that is not against Christ is with him,* 1.54 is true in the preparati∣ons and dispositions to conversion. For he that makes use of a little grace shall have more; and he that well uses the laws of his country, and keeps the justice of his nation, and observes the principles of reason, and walks ac∣cording to the light he hath, though he hath not the broad noon-day of the Gospel, yet he is so far on Christ's side, that Christ will joyn himself to his, and draw him nearer, and advance his Nature, and promote his ex∣cellent dispositions, and by the methods of the spirit bring him to God.

Upon this stock it was that God sent S. Peter to Cornelius, and that so many of the Jewish Proselytes were converted to Christianity, and so many wise Heathens, who had just and ingenuous souls and liv'd good lives, were brought into the schools of Christ.

4. This is true also in the habits or actions of any one vertue when it is alone,* 1.55 or when it comes in upon the stock of nature, or education, or passion, or humane laws. He that does one good act for Christ, though he doe no more, by that one action declares himself to be no-enemy, and therefore he shall not loose his reward; though he give but a cup of cold wa∣ter to a thirsty disciple, in that capacity of his being a disciple; nay if it be but in the consideration of his being thirsty, if it be but by a natural pity and tendernesse, by the emotions of humanity, by the meltings of a wor∣thy disposition and of tender bowels: and therefore much more shall every worthy habit, though it be alone, though entring from a lesse perfect prin∣ciple then a spiritual and Christian grace. The chastity of Lucretia, the honesty of Decianus, the truth of Rutiius, the bravery of Scaevola, the re∣pentance of Ahab, the humiliation of Manasses, the zeal of Jehu, the com∣passion of Titus over Jerusalem, these things and these persons are consi∣der'd by God, and have their portion of reward. And he is not wholly against Christ that does any thing for him: for our Blessed Lord is so gra∣cious, that no man shall speak a word for him, or relieve any of his servants, or keep a memorial, but as far as that action goes, according to the pro∣portion of the choice and the good will, Christ will reckon him to be on his side, and allot him a portion of his blessing, a yonger Brothers part, though not the inheritance.

5. This is true of those who being secretly convinc'd cannot yet shake off their prejudices and their pitiable fears,* 1.56 who own Christ in their hearts, whose faith is weak and their doubts are strong, who fear God hear∣tily, and yet cannot quite shake off the fear of men; they also are reckon'd on Christ's side so far, that they are not present and actual enemies, but actual friends, and but potential professors and Disciples. Thus Nicodemus was on Christ's side by not being against him. He owned as much as he durst; he spake in behalf of Christ, but profess'd him not; he believ'd in him, but fear'd the Jews. This was not enough to adopt him into the king∣dome, but this brought him from the enemies side, like the Kenites and the sons of Rechab in the land of Israel.

6. To be with Christ hath many parts and degrees of progression and avail.* 1.57 Every man that professes Christ is with him; he that is bap∣tized, he that is called Christian, he that delights in the name, he that is in the external communion of the Church is in some sense with Christ, be∣cause he is not against him. For whoever is a member of the Church, whosoever retains his baptismal right, he that hath not renounced Chri∣stianity, lost his faith, defied Christ, or turn'd Apostate, he is still within the covenant of mercy, within the limits of grace and the power of the spirit; that is, he hath a right to the privilege and grace of being admitted to repentance and the consequent grace of pardon: for baptisme is for the remission of sins, and as long as that is not renounc'd, we have a perpetual title to remission of sins, the Sacrament as to this purpose being of perpe∣tual effect. Every such person is yet a member of Christ, though barren

and unfruitfull: his leaf doth not prosper and his fruit springs not, yet there is a root remaining. For thus the Gospel is compar'd to a net with fishes good and bad, to a field of corn and tares. For no man is thrown from grace and mercy but the open, profess'd, irreconcileable enemies of Christ, voluntary and malicious Apostates; for they are cut off from the root, and have no portion in it, as S. Paul largely discourses in the sixth and tenth Chapters to the Hebrews. But those who sin against Christ, & dishonour and grieve the holy Spirit of Christ, who sin and repent and yet sin and re∣pent again, being always sorrowful, and always have cause, these men have hopes, and time, and helps, and arguments, and probabilities of life, which they could not have but by being members of Christ's mystical body. They are with Christ in Covenant and desire, in title and adoption, because they are not against him in profession and voluntary hostility: but they must goe further, or they die.

For all this effects nothing else,* 1.58 but that we are tied to treat such per∣sons not as enemies but as brethren; it exposes such to be chastis'd and guided by the rod of Ecclesiastical discipline, but not to be cut off by the sword of excision and anathema, and sentences of despair; it does manifest the goodnesse of God, the glorious mercies of our Redeemer, his aptnesse to pardon, his readinesse to receive us, his desires to have us sav'd, his passion for our felicity, and the presence of his preventing and auxiliary grace. But this was but the Proverb of strangers and beginners, of infants and babes in Christ.

7. But when we are entred into the Covenant of Grace,* 1.59 when we have declar'd, when the question is concerning final pardon and the hopes of glory, then the other Proverb is onely true. It is not enough that we are not against Christ, but we must be with him and for him, earnest and zea∣lous, passionate and obedient, diligent and true, industrious and inquisitive; then it is, He that is not with Christ, is against him. For it is not enough that we are in the root, that is, in preparation and disposition, but we must also bear fruit in the root;* 1.60 for so saith our Blessed Saviour, I am the Vine; my Father is the Husbandman: Every branch in me that beareth not fruit shall be cut off. First they are in Christ as in the vine, before they can bear fruit; and there he suffers them to be in expectation of fruit; of which if they fail in their season, they shall be cut off. * For the case between Christ and the world is as it was between Caesar and Pompey. Pompey had the pos∣session and the right: and therefore as Cicero in his Oration pro Ligario affirms, Pompey's party acknowledged none but his certain and professed friends; adversarios autem putare nisi qui nobiscum essent, and all to be against them that were not with them: Te autem (saith he to Caesar) qui con∣tra te non essent, tuos. For Caesar was but entring upon his new fortune, and all that he could get to himself, and all that would not assist his enemy, were his purchase or security. So it is with Christ in the beginnings of our Con∣version; it is a degree of victory to arrest our thoughts, and our not consent∣ings to the world and it's fond affections, is an approach and an accession to Christ. But when our Lord hath gotten the first victories, when he hath acquir'd possession as well as right to a soul, and hath a title to rule alone, then the proposition is chang'd. Christ will not be satisfied with neutrality and an indifferent undetermin'd will, but he will have our love and active choice, and he will be honour'd by all our services: and then the Christian

philosophy relies upon these principles: * He that does not love God is his enemy; * Not to goe forward is to goe backward; * Not to doe good is a doing evil, and luke-warmnesse is an evil state; and * We must not onely not resist the word of truth, but we must contend earnestly for it; and * We must confesse with our mouth, what we believe with the heart; * To be a Christian is to hurt no man, and to doe good to every man; and * We must not onely proceed when we are not hindred, but we must take care that we be not hindred, we must remove every impediment, and pare away that which is uselesse;* 1.61 for obstat quicquid non adjuvat, if it does no good, it does hurt: and when the talent is intrusted to us it must not onely not be spent riotously,* 1.62 but it must not be laid up in a napkin. Pensemus quod lucrum Dei fecimus nos qui accepto talento ad negotium missi sumus. Unlesse we gain and put something to God's heap, we are unprofitable servants.

By the proportion of this truth in the state of our life,* 1.63 we are to ac∣count concerning our single actions; not that every single action must be effective of a real, discernible event of piety, but that is be fitted to the ge∣neral designe of a Christians life; nothing of evil, but ministring to good some way or other, or at least in some good order of things; good for edi∣fication, or good in charitable society, or good for example, or usefull to some purpose that is fit to be design'd, and fit to be chosen.

RULE II. The virtual and interpretative consent of the Will is imputed to Good or Evil.

THis Rule is intended to explicate the Nature of Social Crimes,* 1.64 in which a mans will is deeper then his hand, though the action of the will is often indirect and collateral, consequent or distant; but if by any means it hath a portion into the effect, it is intire in the guilt. And this happens many ways.

1.* 1.65 By Ratihabition and Confirmation.

In maleficio Ratihabitio mandato comparatur,* 1.66 saith the law: To command another to doe violence is imputed to him that commands it more then him that does it. So Ulpian interpreting the interdict Unde tu illum vi dejecisti, affirms eum quoque dejicere qui alteri mandavit vel jussit: and therefore Ptolemy was guilty of the bloud of Pompey when he sent Pothinus to kill him,

Hic factum Domino praestitit….

Now because ratihabition is by presumption of law esteem'd as a Com∣mandement, therefore Ulpian affirms of both alike, Dejicit & qui mandat, & dejicit qui ratum habet. He that commands, and he that consents after it is done are equally responsible. Now though the law particularly af∣firms this onely In maleficio in criminal and injurious actions, yet in the edition of Holoander that clause is not inserted; and it is also certain that it holds and is true in contracts and civil affairs. Thus what a servant or a

son imployed by his Father or his Master shall contract for, is the Father's act if he accounts it valid. If the son borrows money in the Father's name, the Father is the debtor. But in matters Criminal and Civil there is a real difference as to this particular.

For in matters Criminal,* 1.67 ratihabition or approving of the act does always make the approver guilty. The Jews crucified their Lord and King: he that saies it was well done, is guilty of that intolerable murder, and for an ineffective malice and spite, procures to himself a real and effe∣ctive damnation. But in actions Criminal there is this difference to be ob∣served. Some actions are done by the lust and appetite of the Criminal agent onely, as adultery, rape, fornication; and if this be the state of that affair, that sin is wholly imputed to him that acted it, not to him that ap∣proves it. He that approves it is indeed guilty of the same kind of sin, be∣cause he hath applied his will to that which God forbids, and for his lustfull disposition approv'd and consented to by his will commits a sin like it, but is not guilty of that. 2. But if such approbation become an incouragement to the Criminal to doe so again, if it fortifies his heart in sin, or hardens his forehead, or makes it pleasant, he that approv'd the first is not onely guilty of a sin like the first, but partakes with the Criminal really in the guilt of the sins that follow upon that account. 3. But there are other sins which are, as the law speaks, ratihabentis nomine gesta, which are done in anothers Name, and either partly or wholly for his interest; and therefore if by him they be approv'd, the ratihabition is valid to all evil purposes, and is therefore all one as if the actions were by him commanded for whose interest they were acted, and by whose will they are approved. And thus it is also in the former sins which serve the lust of him that acts them, if besides the ser∣ving of his lust they are designed to serve anothers interest; as if Titius steal Sempronia and run away with her, or lie with Maevia the daughter of Amilius to doe a spite to the Father for the injury he did to Tubero, not onely Titius but Tubero is guilty of the crime, if Tubero approves what Titius did for his sake.

But now if it be inquir'd what real event as to Conscience this nice distinction without greater difference can have,* 1.68 that in one case he that ap∣proves the sin is not guilty of the same but another like it, and in the other cases he is partner of the same fault; I answer, First, in humane laws the difference of effect is very great. For to approve an act of sin done not in my name introduces no punishment upon the approver; but if it be done in my name and for my interest, by a fiction or presumption of law it is sup∣pos'd I gave command or warranty, and therefore I also shall partake of the punishment, unlesse by the consideration of other circumstances I be relieved in equity, and the presumption be found to fail. But in the court of Conscience the difference depends not upon presumption; but upon what it is in the truth of the thing, which shall be judged well enough by him that knows the secret. For whether the crime was done for me or not, I shall be judg'd according to that influence which I would have upon the effect. If I will'd it directly and caus'd it to be done knowingly, or by some causality which I at any time us'd to that purpose, I am liable to all the evil that can be consequent to that sin: but if I be guilty onely by rati∣habition, that is, if really I did not command it, or effect it, or cause it to be effected, but onely rejoyce in it and use it when it is done, then my ratiha∣bition is ordinarily (though very evil) yet much lesse then the other's action.

I say ordinarily, that is in all cases where craft and machination, plots and contrivances, intermedial violences and deceivings, and other evil things of the retinue of the sin are previous to the crime. For in all these things he that onely approves the act hath commonly no interest, or care, or no∣tice, or consideration. If it happens that he considers and approves them too, then the case is alter'd: but it is not always so. This case will explicate the Rule. Ventidius was married to Romanella; but growing rich, and be∣ing made a Roman Knight, grows weary of his first bed-fellow, because he hopes now to get a richer wife if she were gone. While he tumbled this often in his head, it hapned that a slave of Ventidius upon some trifling oc∣casion, but in a great passion, flings something at Romanella, which caused her to miscarry, and to die. Ventidius observing his good fortune, secretly puts away his servant that he may escape the hand of justice, and promises him liberty, making what pretences he found convenient to his purpose. He went presently to get him a new wife, but was arrested in his designe, because he was told that he that was guilty of his wives death was to loose the privilege of a second marriage; but because he confirm'd it and rejoyc'd in it, it was esteem'd in law as a Commandement. Upon this he takes ad∣vice, and was told, that though in Conscience he was guilty of murder, be∣cause he delighted in and approv'd it, yet mere ratihabition in such things which must be judg'd not by the effect but by the previous machination and designe, did not produce that punishment of impeding his future mar∣riage. And there is reason for it; because though Ventidius was so base as to wish his wife dead or kill'd, yet he would not doe it himself, nor procure it to be done, his covetousnesse had not prevail'd so far with him; and there∣fore neither ought the punishment goe to the extremity of the law. 2. In Divine laws and in the direct obligation of Conscience there is this great difference. If a crime be done in my name, and I approve it, I am not one∣ly guilty before God of the crime, and liable to an equal share of the punish∣ment (according to the foregoing measure) but I contract a new necessity of duty; I am bound to restore the man that sinn'd for my interest to his former state of justice and integrity as far as I can, by disallowing the act, by dis∣countenancing it, by professing my own repentance, by inviting him to the like: which obligation is not at all upon me by a simple and mere ratihabi∣tion of an act in which I have no interest, and to which I had no previous concurse, directly, nor by interpretation. This is the state of this question in relation to matters Criminal.

But in matters Civil,* 1.69 as in contracts, debts, pledges, provisions for pupils, the law is to determine the whole affair, and to account the ratiha∣bition at what rate she please, and upon what conditions; and therefore we are to be determin'd by our own laws in all such inquiries. That which can be a general measure and relates any way to Conscience is this; Where the law does require an expresse command pro forma, the after-ratification is of no effect in law, nor conscience, if the law impedes the effect. Thus if a Minor makes a contract without the consent of his Guardian, though afterward the Guardian allow it, the contract is invalid: because the law requir'd in the very form and solennity of the contract that the authority of the Guardian should be interpos'd; and ea quae pertinent ad solennitatem contractus, à contractu dividi non possunt, say the lawyers; and ubi forma actus deficit, corruit actus, l. Julianus. 9. §. si quis. ff. ad exhib. If there be an essential defect of what is by law requir'd to the validity of the act, the

act is null and invalid, and therefore is also invalid and effects nothing in Conscience, unlesse where the law of Nature intervenes; of which I have already given accounts* 1.70. Thus also it is in punishments which are not to be incurred but in cases nam'd in the law, and therefore are not to be im∣pos'd in cases of presumption or fiction of law, amongst which is this, of the equivalence of ratihabition to a command.* 1.71 If the son marries a wid∣dow within the year of mourning, he is legally infamous; but so is not the Father, though he approves it, unlesse he did consent in the beginning; be∣cause these effects being wholly depending upon positive laws, can have no other measures but what the laws put upon them. But in the Court of Conscience the matter is not so easy.

But since ratihabition is at the worst but an interpretative command,* 1.72 and yet is so very bad as to imprint the guilt of the whole action upon him that so hath influence into the effect by interpretation, it must needs be that a direct command is more evidently criminal, and in greater degrees; which I needed not to have observed but in order to a further inquiry, and that is,

Question.

Upon whom doth the greater portion of the Guilt lie; upon him that commands a sin, or him that sins in obedience?

Although the question of degrees may here be usefull to some pur∣poses of Conscience, yet it is just to condemn them both with a downright sentence. For so the wise Ape in Esop judg'd the question between the wolf and the fox about a piece of flesh which the fox had stoln from the village, and the wolf had stoln from the fox, who now complain'd of the wrong. The judicious ape answer'd,

Tu non vidêris perdidisse quod petis:* 1.73 Te credo subripuisse quod pulchre negas.

The fox saies he hath lost it, but he lies; and the wolf saies he hath not stoln it, and he lies too. They were both in the wrong, and it was hard to say which was the worse. But because although they were equally wick∣ed in their nature and their manners, yet in this cause there might be some difference, and in the partners and confederates in a crime some have more causality then others, though both of them are in a sad condemnation; therefore

To this I answer by a distinction known in the Civil law,* 1.74 of Manda∣tum & Jussio. Mandatum is amongst equals, by bidding, incouraging, war∣ranting and setting on; and in this case, they are both equally guilty, except what difference can be made by the degrees of confidence and earnestnesse, and by wit and folly, by the advantage and reputation of the man that bids, and the weaknesse of him that is bidden. But Jussio is from Superior to Inferior; Father to Son, Master to Servant, Prince to Subjects. In this case and amongst these persons the efficiency is unequal, and hath it's esti∣mate from the grandeur and sacrednesse of the authority, and the degree of the fear which can be the instrument of prevailing and determining.

And therefore when Attilius had spoken gently with Cracchus ut Patriae parceret, seeming to have discover'd his design, Gracchus looking terribly upon him, one of his servants, non expectato signo, ex solo vultu conjectans adesse tempus, ratusque initurum se gratiam apud Patronum si primus rem ag∣grederetur, stricto ferro trajecit Attilium,* 1.75 saith Appian, staied neither for com∣mand nor sign, but supposing by his forwardnesse he should please his Patron, and guessing by his cruel aspect it would not be displeasing to him, he kills Atti∣lius upon the place. Now such an influence as this from a superior to an in∣ferior is so little, that the servant is much more to blame then the Master. But when Henry the second in a rage complain'd that none about him would rid him of that peevish man, meaning Arch-Bishop Becket, it was more then the frown of Gracchus, but yet not so much as to lessen the fault of the sacrilegious homicides; because there was no violence done to their choice, but the crime entred upon the account of lust and ambition, and that was as bad as if it had begun and ended upon the stock of their own anger or revenge. But when a Prince or a Lord commands his subject to sin, as Domitius the Father of Nero commanded his freed man to drink to drunkennesse, so earnestly that he kill'd him for refusing it, and as Cambyses did to Praxaspes; then it is evident that the Prince is so much more guilty then he that obeys, by how much it is evident that the subject sins with lesse delight, and a more imperfect choice, and with a will which in it's acti∣ons suffers diminution: and therefore in such cases servants are very much excused from punishment in exterior courts, as knowing that such actions proceed from an excusable principle, from a regardfull obedience, and an undiscerning subjection; which because in most things it ought not to dis∣pute, they not discerning their utmost limit, being born to serve, not to rule and distinguish by their reason, and besides this, having all their fortune bound up in their Masters frown or favour, are very much to be pitied if they obey too much;* 1.76 etenim quod imperante te servus tuus Faciebat, abs te id esse factum existimo. And this the law it self observes in the commands of some superiors:* 1.77 Qui jussu judicis aliquid facit, non videtur dolo malo fa∣cere, cui parêre necesse habet; The command of such a superior whom we esteem it necessary to obey, exempts our obedience from being Criminal. And though this of Judges be a particular case,* 1.78 because Res judicata pro ve∣ritate accipitur, saies the law, they declare law by their sentence and com∣mands; yet the Romans observ'd it in the case of Clients and freed men to their Patrons, as Livy reports it in the case of the freed man of Appius the Decemvir; and the old books of Philosophers observ'd it in the obedience of children to their parents,* 1.79 as Aulus Gellius recites out of them.

But then this also admits of one distinction more,* 1.80 which the law thus expresses;* 1.81 Ad ea quae non habent atrocitatem sceleris vel facinoris, igno∣scitur servis, si vel Dominis vel his qui vice Dominorum sunt, velut Tutoribus & Curatoribus, obtemperaverint, Servants and inferiors are excus'd if they transgresse at the command of their superiors in a small matter, but not in a great. This is observed by the Sages of our Common law. If a Feme covert doth steal goods by the commandment of her husband (with∣out other constraint) this hath been holden to be felony in her, saith S^r Ri∣chard Bolton the L. Chancellor of Ireland: and for this he quotes Bracton, and addes this reason out of him; For licet Uxor obedire debeat viro, in atro∣cioribus tamen non est ei obediendum, In great matters, and sins of high nature, a wife is not to be excus'd for her obedience. But if the husband not onely

commands, but uses compulsion, then it is so far excus'd, that in the wife the theft is not felony; but murder is, because the greatnesse of the horror in such a fact is sufficient to prevail against the husbands threatnings and her own fear,* 1.82 unlesse there were in her some evil principle. If a servant defending his lords right doe some injury, he is excus'd in law, but not if he kills a man; if he speaks a rude word he may be born with, but not if he steals a horse. And this also hath some proportions of truth in the Court of Conscience, that if the superior be great, and the command be urgent, and the instance not very considerable, the fault is by every of these consi∣derations very much lessen'd, but the man is not totally excus'd; his excuse is upon the stock of fear or a great temptation: so far as they intervene in the present case, and so far as they can excuse in any (which I am afterwards to consider) so far the guilt suffers diminution. But the advice of the son of Sirach is the great rule in this question,* 1.83 Accept no person against thy soul, and let not the reverence of any man cause thee to fall.

But all this is to be understood of those actions which are Criminal both in the Commandement and in the obedience,* 1.84 in the sanction and in the execution, such as are adultery, murder, treason, blasphemy, and all the prevarications of the natural law, in all moral precepts, the transgres∣sion of which can by no intention become legitimate. But in the positive and temporary laws of God which enjoyn no moral, natural rectitude, but simple and just obedience during the abode of that law, the subject, the son or the servant if he be commanded by his just superior to an external ministery in the sin of the superior, if he consents not to the sin, and declares against it according as he can be requir'd, sins not at all in the obedience. Thus when Joab and the Captains numbred the people against their wills upon the peremptory command of David their King,* 1.85 they had no part in the sin, because they explicitely dissented all the way, and the execution and obedience did not implicitely and by interpretation involve them in it. The reason is, because the act of numbring the people was of it self innocent, and made criminal onely by David's circumstances; of which when they had advertis'd their King, and disclaim'd the malice and irregularity, they interested themselves in nothing but the material part: which when it can be separated from the evil heart, as in this it was, and in all the like it may, the obedience is innocent, though the commandement be impious; and therefore David wholly takes the fault upon himself,

—mea fraus omnis, nihil iste nec ausus, Nec potuit….

I have sinn'd and done wickedly, but what have these sheep done? * To this also is to be added, that even in the case of positive precepts our obedience must be wholly passive, and in no sense active; that is, it must be wholly an act of obedience, without any promoting or advancing the sin in him that commands, no way increasing, or incouraging, or confirming the sin or the sinner.

2. Under this head is reduc'd the praising of an action: Which if it be done with a designe to promote it, is first a sin in the approving it se∣cretly, and is another sin in setting it forward publicly. According to this is that saying of the Arabians, Qui laudat obscoenum perpetrat illud, He that praises an unclean action is himself an unclean person. And therefore it was good Counsel,

Qualem commendes etiam atque etiam aspice…* 1.86

for by our words we shall be judged: but, as Salust said of Caesar and Cato, Alius aliâ viâ, some one way, and some another get great names. Cato was famous for discountenancing, Caesar for being a patron of evil men; but Ca∣to was the better man: and upon this account Pliny commends one, or navit virtutes, Insectatus est vitia, he adorned vertues with a fair character, but reproach'd vitious persons: and he that by praises and dispraises respective∣ly does not distinguish vertue and vice cannot be a good man.

Ne laudet dignos,* 1.87 laudat Callistratus omnes. Cui malus est nemo, quî bonus esse potest?

For in vain doe laws make a distinction between good and bad, if they be all blended in a common reward. Malè pereas qui Gratias virgines, mere∣trices effecisti, said Democritus to one that gave large gifts to all men a∣like.* 1.88 Concerning which it was excellently said by Maximus Tyrius, Qui largiuntur indignis ea quae dignis conferenda essent, tria prae∣stant absurda: Nam & ipsi jacturam faciunt, in bonos sunt injuriosi, malos∣que roborant segete ac materiâ vitiorum suppeditatâ To give to vice any of the treatments or rewards of vertue is a treble mischief: The gift or re∣ward is lost, and injury is done to vertue, and evil men are incouraged in their evil courses.

3. By consent,* 1.89 silent and implicite, we are partakers of the fact of others: by not contradicting we are sometimes adjudged willing.

Of the main part of the proposition there is no doubt, but that a con∣senting to evil is a sin; a consenting to any action gives it as much authori∣ty, being and warranty as his consent can effect: but the question here is what are the signes of consent when it is not express'd, and when the man that is silent is justly presumed willing. This inquiry is of use in the matter of presumptive dispensations, and in the participation of good and evil actions and rewards. But it hath in it but little difficulty.

For 1. It is evident that then silence is an implicit consent,* 1.90 when the superior or the interested person, whose consent can verify the act, and whose power can easily hinder it, and who is bound to hinder it if it be unlawfull, does yet hold his peace, and forbids it not. The reason of this is, because every man is suppos'd to doe his duty, unlesse the contrary be known: and therefore when a Prince sees his subjects doing what the law forbids, and which he can easily hinder, it is to be presum'd that he dispenses with them in that case, because he knows that they will expound his silence to be a li∣cense; and therefore he also intends it so, so long as he is silent, or else he does unreasonably, and to no good purpose holds his peace.

But this is not true in those things which to their stabiliment or war∣ranty require a positive act.* 1.91 For sometimes a silence is but an indifference and neutrality,* 1.92 according to that of the law, Qui tacet non utique fatetur, sed tamen verum est eum non negare; He that holds his peace neither con∣fesses nor denies:* 1.93 and in the Canon law, Id in tua Ecclesia dissimulare po∣teris, ita quod nec contradicere, nec tuum videaris praestare assensum; The Bishop's dissembling or taking no notice in some cases, is expounded nei∣ther to be a contradiction nor consent: and the glosse in cap. cum jamdudum de praeben, affirms, Multa per patientiam tolerantur, quae si deducta fuerint

in judicium, exigente justitiâ non debent tolerari, Some things are patient∣ly suffer'd, which if they were publicly complain'd of, ought not to be suf∣fer'd. But these seeming antinomies are both very reasonable in their own senses, and therefore are easy to be reconcil'd.

For if the act about which the superior is patient be connvi'd at,* 1.94 it is either because for some reasonable cause he pardons the Criminal; or else because his patience is necessary and by constraint, he cannot help himself. For no silence is esteem'd a ratihabition of a past act: because when the thing is done without the leave of the superior, his silence or speaking cannot alter it, or legitimate the action if it was evil; at the most it does but par∣don what is past, which is no allowance of any future action of the same nature. Indeed in the Court of Conscience, such a silence, or not repro∣ving of a past fault, may be want of duty and discipline, and a criminal o∣mission of what we are oblig'd to; but hath no legal or natural causality upon that action which is past, and can be but an accidental cause or occa∣sion of a future.

But then silence is an interpretative consent,* 1.95 when it is 1. a silence of a thing observed, and 2. at present, and 3. that can be hindred: and then indeed in law it is a great presumption, but not always in Conscience; because it may proceed from a neglect of duty that the superior takes no notice of the action, or from many other causes, as pusillanimity, just fear, or weak∣nesse, which because they cannot always be prov'd or observ'd, they may conclude legally from silence to consent or dispensation: yet the processe of Conscience must be upon more wary grounds, and where there is so much fallibility in the presumption, the conscience must proceed to action upon more certain accounts, and must strictly follow her rule, or must have grea∣ter causes to justify her liberty.

And therefore though the superior be silent,* 1.96 and does observe the action, and can hinder me; yet I am not to presume that he dispenses, or consents, or gives me leave to goe besides the law, unlesse there be in the state of my affairs a just cause of dispensation, and yet a reasonable cause of hindring me from asking, or him from expressing his leave; then silence may be presum'd to be leave, though the cause of dispensation be probable one∣ly, and not very necessary.

In the reducing this to practice three cautions are to be attended.* 1.97

1. When a subject proceeds to action upon the presumption of leave, or a tacit dispensation, this presumption or supposition must be made use of before the action be done, not afterwards. For it can never be honest to doe an act in hope to get leave afterwards; for untill the leave be actually given or reasonably presum'd, it is prohibited, and consequently unlawfull; and if a dispensation were afterwards given and obtained, it were nothing but a pardon, which is so far from making the past action to be innocent, that it supposes it to be Criminal, for else there were no need of pardon. He that sins in hope of pardon, fears nothing of the sin but the smart, he thinks there is no evil but punishment; and therefore hath nothing towards vertue but the fear. If therefore before the action be undertaken the dispensation be not presum'd, nothing that comes after can change the action.

2. This presumption is not to be extended beyond that very action that is done in the presence,* 1.98 or within the notice and observation of the superior. For although it should be true that he does give tacit consent or leave to this particular, yet it follows not that therefore he does so to any or all of the same kind. For that may be just or tolerable once, which if repeated may be chang'd in circumstances, or become evil example, or of intolerable effect by the very repetition; or the mind of the superior may change, or the causes of dispensation may cease: and after all, since this dis∣pensation wholly depends upon the consent of the superior, and this con∣sent is then onely justly presum'd when he observes the action and forbids it not, the presumption is wholly at an end when he does not see it; and therefore a tacit consent or leave to an observed action can at no hand be extended to a consent or leave to others that are not observ'd by him.

3. If the tacit dispensation be of such nature that it cannot give leave to a present observed action,* 1.99 but by introducing a faculty, or state, or po∣tentiality of doing the like, then it is certain that if the present action be tacitly dispens'd withal or consented to, it may be extended to all of the like kind; but it is also as certain, that such a tacit consent is not so easily to be presum'd. The Bishop of Bitonto for his exercise was flinging of a leaden weight, and by chance kill'd his servant who unfortunately cross'd the way as the lead was irrecoverably passing from his hand, and for this misfortune in the chance of bloud is made irregular. Afterwards in the presence of his superior seeing a yong Turk dying who had express'd some inclinations to Christianity, baptizes him in the instant before his death, and was observ'd and conniv'd at by his superior, and therefore had a presump∣tive leave or dispensation for his irregularity. But because this single acti∣on could not have been dispens'd withall but by taking off his irregularity, it took away all that which could hinder his future doing his Episcopal office; and therefore he hath the same presumptive leave for the future actions which will not be observed, as for the present which was. But then the first presumption must be very reasonable and sure: for although a proba∣ble presumption may suffice to conclude for leave in a single present action whose effects determine with it self; yet if it have influence upon the fu∣ture (as in the case before cited) it ought to be better consider'd, and more warily conducted by the superior, and therefore not readiy presumed by the subject. These are the measures of guessing at a consent by silence. There is also one way more of implicit or secret consent, viz.

2. He does implicitely consent to an action, who consents or com∣mands any thing to be done,* 1.100 from whence such an action or leave must ne∣cessarily follow: and the reason is, because he ought not to doe things re∣pugnant to each other. He that makes it necessary for me to doe a thing, is the cause of my doing it, as much as if he commanded it. And this is more then a tacit consent or dispensation respectively, for it is a virtual. He that collates the order of Priesthood upon me, intends I should doe the whole office.* 1.101 Princeps enim qui illi dignitatem dedit, omnia gerere de∣crevit, saith the law. Thus he that dispenses in the irregularity, consents to all the actions which he does by virtue of the removing that impedi∣ment, who is so dispens'd with. Which proposition is onely so to be under∣stood, when there is nothing wanting to the effecting such an action but the removing that impediment: but it is suppos'd that he that is dispens'd

with, will use his liberty; and the dispensation if it be at all is directed so, and is in order to it. But if the superior does an action which is not in order to an end, neither in order of nature or of intention, but yet it can be consequent to it, that consequent action is not to be imputed to him who did something precedent, without which that action could not have been done. Thus if a Prince pardons a thief, or a friend begs his pardon that kill'd a man, although he could not have stoln any more without that par∣don, yet that after-theft or murder is not imputable to him that gave or to him that beg'd the pardon, unlesse they did it with that very intention; for the pardon is not in any natural order to any such consequent action, and therefore without his own actual or design'd conjunction and intuition, can∣not convey the crime and guiltinesse.

Question.

Upon the occasion of this,* 1.102 it is seasonable to inquire how far it may be lawfull, and can be innocent to permit a sin.

The case is this.* 1.103 Pancirone an Italian Gentleman invites a German Embassador to dinner, feasts him nobly, sets before him plenty of delicious wine, enough to exhilarate him and all his company; but the German after his country fashion thinks it no entertainment unlesse he be drunk. The question is whether Pancirone sins in setting before him so much more as will fill the utmost capacity of his intemperance. Is it lawfull to suffer him to be drunk?

If this Question had been ask'd in the Primitive Church,* 1.104 the answer would have been a reproof to the inquirer, as one who no better under∣stood the laws of sobriety and hospitality, and the measures of the Chri∣stian feastings. Posidonius tells of S. Austin, Usus est frugali mensa & so∣briâ, quae quidem inter olera & legumina etiam carnes aliquando propter hospi∣tes & quosque inferiores continebat. Semper autem vinum habebat, quod ta∣men moderatissime bibebat, quia noverat & docebat, ut Apostolus dicit, quod omnis creatura Dei bona sit, & nihil abjiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur. He had that which was good and usefull for himself according to his own measures, and something better for strangers. He always had wine, but it was drank very sparingly; because every creature of God is good, if it be received with thanksgiving. But if the guests be permitted to drink to drunkennesse, who shall say Amen at thy giving of thanks? or how shalt thou give thanks at the spoiling of the gifts of God? There is no perad∣venture but as a feast is the enlargement of our ordinary diet, so the enter∣tainment of guests is a freer use of our liberty, so it be within the limits and capacities of sobriety. But though the guests meal may be larger then our ordinary, yet we must secure our own duty more then we can secure theirs. When the Greeks whom Lucullus feasted wondred why for their sakes he should be so large in his expences,* 1.105 he answer'd, Nonnihil, O Hospi∣tes, vestri causâ, sed maxima pars Luculli gratiâ, Something of this, O Guests, is for your sakes, but the most of it is for my own magnificence. We should take care to doe so, that though for our guests we doe something more then ordinary, yet our greatest care should be for our selves, that we doe nothing that may misbecome the house of one of Christs servants. Would

Pancirone suffer the German Embassadour to lie with his women when he entertains him, and make his chambers a scene of lust? Certainly he would esteem it infinitely dishonest, if to an honest family he should offer so great an injury; and why may not his chambers minister to lust, as well as his dining-room or cellars to beastly drunkennesse? and is it not as honorable that the family should be accounted sober, as to be esteemed chast? or is not drunkennesse dishonesty as well as lust? and why may not Panicrone as well bid his servants keep the door to wantonnesse, as hold the chalice to beastly vomitings? In these things there is no other difference, but that as cloths, so vices also are in and out of fashion as it happens. He that means to be a servant of God, must for himself and all his house take care that God be not there dishonour'd. I and my house will serve the Lord, said Joshuah: and when God gave to the Israelites the law of the sabbath, he gave it for themselves and their families and the strangers within their gates. * But so corrupt and degenerous are the manners of Christians, that our feasts are ministeries of sin, and every guest hath leave to command the house even when he cannot command himself: but this is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Christian sobriety hath other laws. Does any man when he re∣lieves the poor at his gate give them leave to drink till they be drunk? and yet what they give to the poor is given for God's sake: but when they mi∣nister to the rich man within, for whose sake is that excesse given? If Co∣drus askes an almes, we refuse him, if we suppose he will make himself drunk with it, and we think we are bound to refuse him: & can it be lawfull to give to a guest within what it is unlawful to give to a guest without? If it be unlawful, it is certain it is not unavoidable: but if there be difficulty in declining it to some men, then besides that which is principally intended by our Blessed Saviour, we see also there is very great reason in those words, When thou makest a feast, call not the rich, but call the poor: These will not tempt you to make them drunk, it may be the others will. If our Guest makes himself drunk with the usual provisions which must be indistinctly ministred at feasts, that cannot be help'd, but by refusing to receive such persons again to our Table: but he that knowingly and observingly espies the meeting turn to God's dishonour, and does not put a limit to that sea of drink, and place a shore and a strand to the inundation, will find that God is departed from that meeting, and the pleasing of his drunken guests will not make him recompence for the losse of such an inhabitant. A man must at no hand consent to his brothers sin: and he that can and ought to hinder it, and does not, by interpretation does consent. For he that gives a man a goblet of intemperance, with which he sees him about to drown his soul, is just as innocent as he that lends him a knife to cut his own throat. But this is to be understood when the case is evident and notorious; for in the ap∣proaches and accesses to drunkennesse the matter is lesse then in the lending of a knife, because it is yet disputable whether he will finish his intempe∣rance: but if it be plain that drunkennesse is design'd, the case is all one; and if it be not perfectly design'd, yet as it steals on discernably, so the sin of him that ministers to the crime increases up to the same proportion of effect and guiltinesse. Hospitality is one of the kinds of charity: and that is but an ill welcome which first procures a feaver, and it may be after it an irrevocable damnation.

3. He that gives Counsel or aid to an action good or evil,* 1.106 consents to it,* 1.107 and it is imputed to him as a product of his will and choice.

This is expressely affirm'd by all laws Civil and Canon, and the Muni∣cipal laws of all those Nations of which I have seen any records concern∣ing this matter: and the interpreters universally consent, with this proviso, that the counsel be so much cause of the action, that without it it would not have been done. For if the action would have been done however, then he that counsels to it is guilty in Conscience always; but unlesse it be in great crimes, and in detestationem facti, it is not always punish'd in law. But if it were it would be very just, so that a difference were made in the degree of punishment: For he whose counsel is wholly author of the fact is guilty of more evil then he who onely addes hardnesse to him who was resolved upon the crime. But in the Court of Conscience he stands guilty that gives evil counsel, whether the Criminal would have done it with or without his counsel: and therefore the laws doe very well also to punish evil counsellors.

Quam bene dispositum terris,* 1.108 ut dignus iniqui Fructus consilii primis authoribus instet? Sic multos fluvio Vates arente per annos, Hospite qui caeso monuit placare Tonantem Inventas primùm Busyridis imbuit aras, Et cecidit saevi, quo dixerat, hostia sacri.

So Claudian. The evil counsellor is first to feel the evil effect of his own pernicious counsel; that is, if his counsel persuade to sin, not if it prove in∣fortunate: not but that even counsel that is given with purpose to doe a mis∣chief is highly to be punish'd not onely by the degree of the evil effect, but by the degree of the malice that advis'd it; but that those events which were not foreseen or design'd cannot be imputed to him that gave the best ad∣vice he could, but could not help it if he were deceiv'd in his judgment. But if the counsel be to a sin or an unworthy action, there is no need to ex∣pect the event to make a judgement of the counsel.

The same also is affirm'd in the case of giving aides to an action good or bad;* 1.109 in which there is no variety, but of degrees onely: for when they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in combination, it is mischief with a witnesse.

Non caret effectu quod voluere duo.

It is an aggravation of the impiety when the zeal of malice is so potent, that it is greater then the power, and therefore calls in aide to secure the mischief. But he that so assists, that he is the great effective cause of the evil which without his aide would not have been done at all, is intirely guilty.

Sic opifex Tauri,* 1.110 tormentorumque repertor, Qui funesta novo fabricaverat aera dolori, Primus inexpertum Siculo cogente Tyranno Sensit opus, docuitque suum mugire juvencum.

Perillus invented and made witty instruments of cruelty, to invite Phalaris to a witty mischief; but the Tyrant was just that once, and made him teach his own brazen bull to roar. * But if the aide doe but facilitate the work, the assistant is punishable according to the efficacy of his aide, in humane

laws; but in Conscience he is guilty according to the secret malice of the principle: and therefore when Lucius Carpentus kill'd Nicanor, his page that hated Nicanor mortally, and did nothing but thrust his Masters sword further into his heart, to shew his ill will, though Carpentus had sufficiently kill'd him, was as much a Murderer as his Master was. In humane laws there is great difference in these things.

1. For if many by joyn'd counsel set upon a man and kill him toge∣ther, though one onely gave him a deadly wound, yet all are guilty of the murder, because they all intended it, and did something towards it.

2. But if in heat of bloud and by the surprise of passion this be done, he onely that gave the deadly wound is the homicide, and the rest are in∣jurious, and are punish'd accordingly.

3. If one give the deadly wound, and the other knock him on the head and so speed him, they are both murderers alike.

4. If many strike a man, and of all these wounds together he dies, they are equally guilty; for the law justly presumes that their malice is equal, by their conjunct attempt, and there being nothing in the event to distinguish them, the presumption is reasonable and ought to passe into effect.

5. If the man be dead but with one wound, and it be not known which of the assistants did it, they are all alike accounted homicides; for every of them is justly suppos'd to have had malice enough to have done it, and which of them had the hap to doe it is not known; therefore there can be nothing to distinguish them in the punishment, because the guilt is alike, and the event not discernably any ones peculiar. But although in external judicatories the proceedings are various, and considering there is no other way of judging what is secret and indistinguishable, this way is necessary and unavoidable of proceeding by the most reasonable and probable me∣thods of justice; yet in the Court of Conscience there is a more certain pro∣ceeding, and the answer is regular, and one; according to the degree of the will and choice, and the tendency of our affections to the event, so we shall be judged: and therefore concerning this, our own conscience is the onely measure of our expectations; and the will is the measure of reward. But these things onely two can know, the Spirit of God, and the spirit of a man; and that's enough to finish the processe at the day of judgement.

Question.

Whether or no is the making and providing the instruments which usu∣ally minister to sin,* 1.111 by interpretation such an aid to the sin, as to involve our will and consent to the sin, and make us partakers of the guilt?

To this I answer, first in general, that all those arts and trades of life which minister onely to vanity and trifling pleasures are of ill fame, such as are Juglers,* 1.112 Tumblers, Players, Fencers and the like; it being an injun∣ction of the Apostle that every Christian should labour with his hands 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that which is good, that is, something profitable to the Common-wealth, and acceptable to God: and to the same purpose it is that all that a Christian does must be apt to be reckon'd amongst one of these heads,* 1.113 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, either the true or the honest, the just or the pure, the lovely or of good report; and it will be hard to reduce some of those trades to any of these heads. But I cannot

see reason enough to say that if any man sins by the using of these arts•• and their productions, that the artist is partaker of the crime; because he designing onely to maintain himself, and to please the eyes and ears and youthfull passions of others, may possibly not communicate in their sin, who over-act their liberty and their vanity. But because such persons are not so wise or discerning as to be able to discern so nicely one formality from another, but desire upon any termes to get as much money as they can, and that if they were so wise as to be able to discern the measures of their duty, they would imploy themselves better, therefore in the whole such persons are to be reprov'd, though the arts themselves might other∣wise be tolerated. They are not unlawfull because they are directly evil, but because they doe but little or no good, such as are jesters, and buffoons, and juglers; at the best they are but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 vain arts, and if they be not directly punishable, they can have no reward at all. But Alexander did very well to a fellow who made it his trade and livelyhood to stand at distance and throw little pease in at the eye of a needle made on purpose just so big as would receive them: the fellow seeing the Prince admire his dex∣terous aime expected a great reward; and the Prince observing the fellows expectation, rewarded him with a whole Bushel of pease. It was a reward worthy of such an imployment. A man cannot be blam'd for having such an art, but he that makes that to be his trade, cannot be otherwise then an idle person: and therefore although he may be tolerated in the Common-wealth where there live many persons more idle and uselesse then himself, and al∣though, if other things were well, the man could not be directly condemn'd for this, and said to be in a state of damnation; yet because if other things were well he would quickly imploy himself better, therefore such persons when they come near a spiritual guide are to be called off from that which at the best is good for nothing, and stands too near a sin to be endur'd in the scrutinies after life eternal.

But some inquire whether the trade of Card-makers and Dice-makers be lawfull:* 1.114 and the reason of their doubt is, because these things are us'd by the worst of men, and to very vile purposes; to which these arts doe minister, and therefore are reasonably suspected as guilty of a participation of the consequent crimes.

To which I answer,* 1.115 that some things minister to sin immediately, o∣thers mediately onely and by the intervention of something else; some mi∣nister to sin inevitably and by their design and institution, others by the fault of them that use them ill; and lastly, some things minister to evil and to no good, others to good and evil promiscuously. These three distincti∣ons make but one difference of things, but give several reasons of that dif∣ference. Those things which minister to sin immediately, by their very nature and designe, and therefore minister to no good unlesse it be acciden∣tally and by the virtue of something else nothing appertaining to them, are certainly unlawfull: and of this there is no question, and that for all those reasons contain'd in their description, they are of evil, and they are evil, and they tend to evil. But if they can minister to good, if they of themselves are innocent, if they can be us'd without doing hurt, although they are ge∣nerally abus'd, yet he that makes them in order onely to such uses to which of themselves they can and ought to minister, partakes not of the sin of them that abuse the productions of his art and labour. And this is re∣markable

in the case of pictures and images: concerning the making of which there was a great question in the Primitive Church; but the case of Conscience they thus determined: It was unlawfull to make pictures or images for heathen Temples, or for any use of religion: imò tu colis, qui fa∣cis ut coli possint; He that makes them that they may be worshipped, is a worshipper of them, that is, he partakes of his sin that does worship. But because the art statuary and of painting might be us'd to better purposes, therefore they were advis'd to doe so, but to separate them from all ap∣proaches toward religion;* 1.116 of which I have already given accounts out of Ter∣tullian De spectaculis c. 23. And the same is the answer concerning the trades of making cards and dice. But although this be but an instance of this Rule; yet because it relates to the practice of so great a part of mankind, it may deserve to be considered alone in order to that relation and that pra∣ctice. For it wholly depends upon this, If it be innocent, if it can be good to play at cards and dice, then the trade of making the instruments of playing is also innocent. If not, that which ministers to nothing but sin, must be of the kinred of sin, and in the same condemnation.

Question.

Whether it be lawfull to play at Cards or Dice.

S. Chrysostome affirms,* 1.117* 1.118 Non Deum invenisse ludum, sed Diabolum, Not God, but the Devil* 1.119 found out play. It may be he alluded to that ofa 1.120 Plato, who saies that the spirit Theuth invented tables and dice; but then he saies that the same spirit found out Arithmetic, Geometry and Astronomy; and therefore from hence we can make no conjecture. S.b 1.121 Cyprian saies that, quidam studio literarum bene eruditus, multum medi∣tando hoc malum & perniciosum studium adin∣venit, instinctu solius Zabuli qui eum artibus suis repleverat. Hanc ergo artem ostendit, quam & colendam sculpturis cum sua imagine fa∣bricavit, Some very learn'd person inspired and filled with the arts of the spirit Zabulus taught the art of dice and tables: and he addes, that he so or∣der'd it, that no man might touch the tables till he had first sacrific'd to Zabu∣lus. And therefore M. Mantua affirm'd it to be very unlawfull to play at dice or tables, upon this very reason; Non tantum aleae lusum crimen esse, sed malorum daemonum inventum, It must needs be unlawfull when it is more then so, as being the very invention of the devil. And this fierce declama∣tion hath prevail'd amongst many wise men to the condemnation of it.* 1.122 Vin∣centius saies, Manus Diaboli est ludus taxillorum: and Bodinus is yet more particular, he tells us how;* 1.123 for, saies he, in alea & fortuito illius jactu geo∣mantiam artemque diabolicam sitam esse, The chance and luck of it is a kind of geomancy or diabolicat art. Indeed if he had meant that the art of con∣ducting the fall of the contingent die had been diabolical and a jugling art, he had spoken reason and truth: but that there is a diabolical art in the con∣tingency and chance of it, is little better then a contradiction; unlesse he could make it appear that the fall of the dice was by God committed to

the Devils conduct: which truly is not very improbable in some cases to be admitted; but because it is uncertain, Apherdianus calls it diabolical or found out by the Devil, by reason of the craft us'd in it, and the evils con∣sequent to it.

Daemonis instinctu sibi quod reperêre maligni Cum variis homines in sua damna dolis.

And indeed this is almost the whole state of the question; for there are so many evils in the use of these sports, they are made trades of fraud and livelyhood, they are accompanied so with drinking and swearing, they are so scandalous by blasphemies and quarrels, so infamous by the mispending our precious time, and the ruine of many families, they so often make wise men fools and slaves of passion, that we may say of them that use these in∣ordinately,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.124 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

they are in an ocean of mischiefs, and can hardly swim to shore without pe∣rishing. And therefore it is no wonder that holy men and wise Common∣weaths, observing the great evil of them, and having not skill or experience enough to tell of any good that is in them, have forbidden them utterly. This is the observation of S. Isidore;* 1.125 Ab hac arte autem fraus & menda∣cium atque perjurium nunquam abest, postremo & odium & damna rerum. Unde & aliquando propter haec scelera interdicta legibus fuit, Fraud and lying and perjury are the inseparable attendants upon cards and dice, and hatred and great losses follow; and therefore because of this appendant wicked∣nesse, sometimes these are wholly forbidden by the laws.

For so we find it forbidden in the Civil laws of Princes and Repub∣lics.* 1.126 M. Mantua tells that by an old law of Egypt, every man was easily ad∣mitted to the accusation of a gamester or dice-player;* 1.127 and if he were con∣victed of it, he was condemned to the quarries: and Josephus Mascardus tells that those who were remark'd as daily and common gamesters were infamous, and not admitted to give testimony in a cause of law. It is cer∣tain it was forbidden by the laws;

Seu mavis vetitâ legibus aleâ.* 1.128

The lex Roscia punish'd those persons with banishment who lost any conside∣rable portions of their estates by playing at dice; and sometimes the laws did condemn them that lost money, to pay four times so much to the Fiscus, as Asconius Paedianus tells in his observations upon Cicero's second book de Divinatione. Justinian the Emperor made an expresse law against it,* 1.129 for∣bidding it both in public and private houses. Magnus Sfortia forbad dice and tables to be us'd in his campe: Philippus Adeodatus severely prohibited it in the Commonwealth; so did Charles the seventh of France: For in the perpetual and daily abuse of such sports the Commonwealth hath much in∣commodity, and consequently many interests in the prohibition.

Ludus enim genuit trepidum certamen &* 1.130 iram; Ira truces inimicitias & funebre bellum.

The public peace cannot be kept where public dicing-houses are permitted, and therefore the Romans were so severe against such public houses and scenes of debauchery, that the Praetor said, Si quis eum apud quem aleâ lu∣sum

esse dicetur,* 1.131 verberaverit, damnúmve ei dederit, sive quid eo tempore do∣mo ejus subtractum erit, judicium non dabo, If the Gentlemen beat the Ma∣ster of such gaming-houses, or stole any thing from his house at that time, he should have no remedy. For these were houses of public hatred, and therefore outlawed. And therefore Seneca calls them loca aedilem metuen∣tia, houses afraid of the Magistrate.* 1.132 Virtutem in Templo invenies, in foro, in Curia, pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam, callosas habentem manus; Voluptatem latitantem saepius ac tenebras captantem, circa balnea ac sudatoria, ac loca aedilem metuentia, You may find Vertue standing in Courts, and Temples, and upon the walls of a city, dusty and discolour'd, and with brawny hands; but Pleasure sneaks up and down to baths, and sweating-houses, and places that fear the presence of the Aedile; that is, gaming-houses, which we learn from Martial,

Arcana modo raptus è popina Aedilem rogat udus aleator,

The Dice-player half drunk newly snatcht from his Tavern or Ordinary be∣seeches the Aedile for mercy. But in the Civil law the punishments of the Gamesters, and especially the keepers of the gaming-houses, by the confi∣scation of the house, nay the destruction of it, that no man may dwell in it for ever, in that place where God hath been so many times dishonour'd and blasphem'd, are sufficient indication of that just detestation in which the laws had them: and who please may see them largely describ'd ina 1.133 Danaeus andb 1.134 Jodocus Damhouderius. But I observe that the especial remarks that the Civil laws of Princes and republics put upon this kind of ga••••ing is that it causes many quarrels;

—dum vitreo peraguntur milite bella:

the contention for the victory begets a more cruel war: but this is especially upon the account of money which is then lost, and which the laws most re∣gard, as the cause of all the mischief.

But when this question and these observations fell into ••he hands of the Church,* 1.135 that is, of Christian and pious Princes and Prelates, and they that were and ought to be zealous for souls had observ'd that God was ex∣ceedingly dishonour'd, that his name was infinitely blasphem'd, that much of that precious time which God had allowed to us for the working out our salvation with fear and trembling was spent in luxury, and swearing, and passion, and lying and cursing, and covetousnesse, and fraud, and quarrels, and intemperance of all sorts, & that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 d••inking and gaming are joyned so frequently that they are knit in a proverb, and that these to∣gether baffle the spirit of a man and drive away the spirit of God,

Aleáque &* 1.136 multo tempora quassa mero Eripiunt omnes animo sine vulnere vires,

they disarme and weaken the mind of a man without a wound; it is, I say, no wonder that they forbad it so fiercely, and censur'd it so severely. Alea∣tor quicunque es,* 1.137 Christianum te dicis, quod non es, said S. Cyprian, A common gamester or dice-player may call himself Christian, but indeed he is not: and S. Clemens Alexandrinus saies, inconsideratum luxuriae amorem otiofis isthaec ••••eae oblectamina suppeditare, desidiámque in causa esse, idlenesse and wanton∣nesse provides these games for the lazy and uselesse people of the world.

And therefore S. Bernard said that the pious and Christian souldiers that inhabit Jerusalem,* 1.138 aleas detestantur, mimos, & magos, & fabulatores, scur∣rilesque cantilenas, tanquam vanitates aut insanias respuunt & abominan∣tur; they hate dice, and abominate jesters, and juglers, and players, and idle songs like vanities and madnesse. Upon these or the like accounts the Fa∣thers of the Council of Eliberis separated these gamesters from the Com∣munion. Si quis fidelis aleâ,* 1.139 id est, tabulâ luserit, placuit eum abstinere. Et si emendatus cessaverit post annum poterit reconciliari; A Christian playing at dice or tables is not to be admitted to the Holy Communion, but after a years penance and abstention,* 1.140 and his total amendment: and the Canon law forbids a Clergy-man either to play at tables, or to be present at those places where they doe. But the Capitular of Charles the Great joynes dicing and drunkennesse together, as being usual companions, and forbids them both alike to Bishops, Priests and Deacons. And indeed when the case is thus, I may say as Schonaeus said in the case of Saul,

—quae potest esse in tanti sceleris Immanitate coercendâ crudelitas?

No laws are too severe,* 1.141 no sentence is too rigid for it's sentence and con∣demnation.

But if the case can be otherwise,* 1.142 if playing at dice and tables can be∣come an innocent recreation, then all these terrible and true sentences will not reach them that so use it. And indeed even amongst those places and republics where such gaming was so highly condemn'd & severely punish'd, some of their braver men did use it, but without the vile appendages, and therefore without scandal and reproach. For first in general, it cannot misbecome a wise and a good man to unbend his bow, and to relaxe the se∣verities, the strictures and more earnest tendences of his mind.

Quin ubi se à vulgo & scena in secreta remôrant* 1.143 Virtus Scipiadae & mitis sapientia Laeli, Nugari cum illo, & discincti ludere, donec Decoqueretur olus, soliti.—

Laelius and Scipio would play till they had digested their meal. And of Ar∣chias of Tarentum it was said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He was an old and a wise man in public Counsels and imployments, but he would play like a yong man. And concerning very many wise Princes and Philosophers you shall find many stories of their confident using lighter but innocent sports for the refreshment of their spirits 'tir'd with study and labour,* 1.144 collected by Alexander ab Alexandro. But in particular concerning dice and tables we find in Valerius Maximus related of Q. Mucius, Aleae quo∣que & calculis vacasse interdum dicitur, cum bene ac diu jura civium ac caeremonias deorum ordinasst: Ut enim in rebus seriis Scaevolam, ita & in scurrilibus* 1.145 lusibus hominem agebat: that sometimes he would play at dice and tables, when he had first dispatch'd the businesse of the Commonwealth prospe∣rously, and the affairs of religion wisely: In serious things doing as Scaevola should, in his recreations doing as a man: quâ quidem aleâ Porcius Cato lusisse fertur animi laxandi causâ, and Porcius Cato himself, wise and severe though he was, yet play'd at tables to refresh and relaxe his mind. And if cards or tables have in their own nature nothing that is evil, provided it can be also separated from all the evil appendages,* 1.146 from the crimes and from the re∣proach,

from the danger and from the scandal, that which onely remains is, that they as well as other innocent recreations and divertisements may be us'd. In the case so stated we suppose them onely to be recreations and relaxations of the mind: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Julian,* 1.147 such little imployments are like the pauses of music, they are rests to the spirit and intervals of labour. And therefore Johannes Sarisburiensis allows of every game,* 1.148 quae absque vitio curarum gravium pondus allevat, & sine virtutis dispendio jucundam interpolationem gaudiorum affert, if it can ease our griefs, or alleviate our burdens without the losse of our innocence.

Now that cards and dice are of themselves lawfull I doe not know any reason to doubt.* 1.149 For if they be unlawfull, it is because they are forbid∣den, or because there is in them something that is forbidden. They are no where of themselves forbidden: and what is in them that is criminal or suspicious? Is it because there is chance and contingency in them? There is so in all humane affairs; in Merchandise, in laying wagers, in all consulta∣tions and warres, in journeys and agriculture, in teaching and learning, in putting children to school or keeping them at home, in the price of the market, and the vendibility of commodities. And if it be said that there is in all these things an overruling providence; though no man can tell in what manner or by what means the Divine providence brings such things to a determinate event, yet it is certain that every little thing as well as every great thing is under God's government, and our recreations as well as our wagers. But what if it be and what if it be not? He can never be sus∣pected in any Criminal sense to tempt the Divine providence, who by con∣tingent things recreates his labour, and having acquir'd his refreshment, hath no other end to serve, and no desires to engage the Divine providence to any other purpose: and this end is sufficiently secur'd by whatsoever hap∣pens. I know nothing else that can be pretended to render the nature of these things suspicious; and this is perfectly nothing: and as for the evil ap∣pendages which are so frequently attending upon these kinds of games, be∣sides that they also are as near to other exercises as to these, as to bowling, horse-racing, cock-fighting, the fight of quailes and of partridges, bul∣baiting, pall-mall, billiards, and all other games for money and victory, to some more and to some lesse, besides this, I say, the evil appendages are all separable from these games, and till they be separated they are not law ••ull: but they may be separated by the following advices.

Rules of conducting our Sports and Recreations.

1. Let no mans affections be immoderately addicted to them.* 1.150 And this requires a great diligence and caution. For as Petrarch said well, Hoc est in regno stultitiae commune, ut quarum rerum minor est fructus, & cupi∣ditas & delectatio major sit, In the kingdome of folly we are most pleased with those things by which we have the least profit. And the want of do∣ing us good, is supplied by doing us pleasure. But the moderation of our affections to our sports is best express'd, by using them according to those measures which wise and severe men use in their recreations, that is, not to be frequent or long in them. For it is in these as in meat and drink, which are then good when they are necessary and usefull to the purposes of our na∣ture

and imployment. Sleep is necessary, and so long it is good: but a man must not therefore spend the best of his time in sleep, but that time that is allowed to it, and without which he cannot well doe his businesse. The limits of these things are not so streight as necessity, nor yet so large as humor or desire; but as a man may drink to quench his thirst, and he may yet drink more to refresh his sorrow, and to alleviate his spirits, and to ease his grief, provided that he turn not his liberty into a snare, so he may in his recrea∣tion and his sports.

Cito rumpes arcum semper si tensum habueris:* 1.151 At si laxâris, cum voles, erit utilis. Sic lusus animo debent aliquando dari, Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi.

Within this bound he must keep, * that he loose none of his businesse for his sport; * that he make his other time more usefull; * that this be the lesse principal; * that it be taken as Physic, * or as wine at most: * and the minutes and little points of this measure are no otherwise to be weighed and consi∣der'd, but that we take those proportions which our selves think we need to good purposes, or which we are advis'd to by a wise guide. To this pur∣pose was that saying of Plato reported by Laertius; Parum est aleâ ludere, at non parum est assuescere, It is no great matter to play at dice or tables, but to be accustom'd to it is a great matter; that is, to make it a portion of our businesse, an expence of our time due to worthy imployments: and there∣fore in the laws, not the action it self, but the abuse, and particularly the frequency,* 1.152 is noted and forbidden. Ludentes quotidie ad aleam, & taberna∣rum frequentatores inter infames habentur, saies the constitution. Quorum aut latrunculi, aut excoquendi in sole corporis cura consumpsêre vitam, Men that spend their lives in cards and dice, and making much of themselves, Haunters of drinking and gaming-houses. A man may innocently and to good purposes goe to a Tavern; but they that frequent them have no excuse, unlesse their innocent businesse does frequently ingage, and their severe re∣ligion bring them off safely. And so it is in these sports, with this onely difference, that there can be no just cause to frequent these sports: there is onely one cause of using them, and that comes but seldome, the refresh∣ment I mean of my self or my friend, to which I minister in justice or in charity; but when our sports come to that excesse that we long and seek for opportunities, when we tempt others, are weary of our businesse, and not weary of our game,

….Cum mediae nequeant te frangere noctes, Nec tua sit talos mittere lassa manus,

when we sit up till midnight, and spend half days, and that often too; then we have spoil'd the sport, it is not a recreation but a sinne.

2. He that means to make his games lawfull must not play for money,* 1.153 but for refreshment. This, though (it may be) few will believe, yet it is the most considerable thing to be amended in the games of civil and sober persons. For the gaining of money can have no influence into the game to make it the more recreative, unlesse convetousnesse hold the box. The re∣creation is to divert the mind or body from labours by attending to some∣thing that pleases and gives no trouble; now this is in the conduct of your game, in the managing a prosperous chance to advantage, and removing the

unprosperous from detriment and losse of victory, so to crosse the pro∣verb,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

and that by wit he may relieve his adverse chance, and by a symbol learn to make good and vertuous use of every crosse accident. But when money is at stake, either the summe is trifling, or it is considerable. If trifling, it can be of no purpose unlesse to serve the ends of some little hospitable en∣tertainment or love-feast, and then there is nothing amisse; but if it be con∣siderable, there is a wide door open to temptation, and a man cannot be in∣different to winne or loose a great summe of money, though he can easily pretend it. If a man be willing or indifferent to loose his own money, and not at all desirous to get anothers, to what purpose is it that he playes for it? if he be not indifferent, then he is covetous, or he is a fool; he covets that which is not his own, or unreasonably ventures that which is. If with∣out the money he cannot mind his game, then the game is no divertise∣ment, no recreation, but the money is all the sport, and therefore covetous∣nesse is all the designe: but if he can be recreated by the game alone, the money does but change it from lawfull to unlawfull, and the man from be∣ing weary to become covetous, and from the trouble of labour or study re∣move him to the worse trouble of fear and anger and impatient desires. But here indeed begins the mischief, here men begin for the money to use vile arts,

Quaerit compositos manus improba mittere talos,

here cards and dice begin to be a diabolical art, and men are witty to undoe or defraud one another,

…..Neque enim loculis comitantibus itur Ad casum tabulae, positâ sed luditur arcâ.

Men venture their estates at it, and make their families sad not poor, be∣cause the dice turn up an unlucky chance: and what sport is it for me to loose my money if it be at all valuable? and if it be not, what is it to my game? But sure the pleasure is in winning the money. That is it certain∣ly. But

Hoccine credibile est aut memorabile,* 1.154 Tanta vecordia innata cuiquam ut siet Ut malis gaudeant, atque ex incommodis Alterius sua comparent ut commoda? ah! Idne est verum? Imo id genus hominum Est pessimum…..

Nothing is more base then to get advantages by the losse of others; they that doe so, and make the losse of their neighbour their game & pastime, are the worst of men, said the Comedy. But concerning the losse of our mo∣ney, let a man pretend what he please, that he plaies for no more then he is willing to loose; it is certain, he is not to be believ'd: for if that summe be so indifferent to him, why is not he easy to be tempted to give such a summe to the poor? to give that summe? his sport will not be the lesse if that be all he designes.* 1.155 Positâ dum luditur arcâ, stat pauper nudus atque esuriens ante fores, Christusque in paupere moritur, Whilest men play for great summes of money, a poor man at the door, redeem'd by the bloud of Christ, wants a shilling, and begs it for Christs sake, and goes without it.

Whenever the case is this or like this, he sins that plays at cards or dice or any other game for money. It is alike in all games, for I know no diffe∣rence; Money is the way to abuse them all: and cards and dice, if there be no money at stake, will make as good sport and please the mind as well as any the sports of boys, and are as innocent as push-pin. For if we consider it rightly, from hence is taken the great objection against cards and tables, because men at these venture their money, and expose their money to ha∣zard for no good end, and therefore tempt God; and certainly to doe so is unlawfull, and that for the reason alleged: but when we play onely for recreation, we expose nothing of considerable interest to hazard, and therefore it cannot be a criminal tempting of God, as it is in gaming for money,

Ubi centuplex murus rebus servandis parum est,* 1.156 where no wit, no observation, no caution, can save our stake: for Adversis punctis doctum se nemo fatetur; Vulnera plus crescunt punctis quam bella sagittis,

saies the Epigram, No man is crafty enough to play against an ill hand; and therefore to put a considerable interest, to the hazard of the ruine of a fa∣mily, or at least more then we find in our hearts to give to Christ, is a great tempting of God. And in these cases, as I have heard from them that have skill in such things, there are such strange chances, such promoting of a hand by fancy and little arts of Geomancy, such constant winning on one side, such unreasonable losses on the other, and these strange contingencies produce such horrible effects, that it is not improbable that God hath per∣mitted the conduct of such games of chance to the Devil, who will order them so where he can doe most mischief; but without the instrumentality of money he could doe nothing at all.

There are two little cases pretended to lessen this evil,* 1.157 and bring it from unlawfull to lawfull. The one is, that when a man hath lost his mo∣ney, he desires to play on for no other reason but to recover his own: the question is whether that be lawfull or no. To this I can give no direct answer, for no man can at first tell whether it be or no: but at the best it is very suspicious, for it engages him upon more losse of time, and he tempts God in a further hazard, and gives himself the lie by making it appear that, what∣ever he pretended, he did play for more then he was willing to loose.

Sic ne perdiderit,* 1.158 non cessat perdere lusor, Et revocat cupidas alea saepe manus.

He plays on that he may give over, and looses more that he may not loose so much, and is vexed with covetousnesse, and chides his fortune, and re∣proves he knows not what: so that by this time I can tell whether he sinn'd or no; for though it was hard to say whether he did well or ill to desire the recovery of his money, yet when we see upon what termes it is design'd and acted, the question is very easy to be resolved, and the man had better sit down with that losse then venture a greater, and commit more sins.

The other case is this;* 1.159 If I can without covetousnesse of the money play, is it then lawfull? and to shew that I am not covetous, I will give the money I win to the standers by, or to my servants, or to the poor. When Theodoric King of the Goths did win at dice or tables he was very bountifull

to his servants, and being over-pleas'd with his own good fortune, would grant them any thing.* 1.160 But Augustus Caesar did use to doe this thing brave∣ly. He gives this account of himself in a letter of his to Tiberius; Ego per∣didi viginti millia nummûm meo nomine: sed cum effusè in lusu liberalis fuissem, ut soleo plerumque. Nam si quas manus remisi cuique exegissem, ant retinuissem quod cuique donavi, vicissem vel quinquaginta millia: sed hoc ma∣lo. Benignitas enim mea me ad coelestem gloriam efferet. He lost (suppose) 20000 Crowns; but it was not his ill fortune or his ill conduct, but his ex∣cessive liberality: he forgave to many what he had wone, and other summes which he took, he gave to the standers by, and chose this bounty as the way to immortality. Now it is true this is a fair indication that convetous∣nesse is not the prevailing ingredient; but to him that considers it wisely it will appear to be but a splendid nothing. For what kind of sport is that to bring it into my power to oblige my play-fellow with his own money? and what bounty is that by which I reward my friends and servants with another mans estate? Parysatis did it yet more innocently, when playing with her yong son Artaxerxes, she on purpose lost a thousand Darics at a throw, to help the yong Prince to money. Thus far it was well enough; for I doubt not but it is as lawfull to loose my money as to give it away, if there be nothing else in it: but besides that it is not so honourable, it may be, he that plays against me is not of my mind, or of my ability, and I cor∣respond to him in an action in which he is not so innocent as I should be, if I did not something minister to his evi: so that though I play that I may oblige him, yet there are so many circumstances requir'd to keep my self and him innocent, that it is a thousand times better in some cases to give him something, and in all cases to play for nothing.

3. For it is a worthy inquiry,* 1.161 if we ask whether it be lawfull for a man to possesse what he gaines by play. For if it be unlawfull, then when he hath wone he hath got nothing, but is bound to make restitution, and cannot give almes of that; and then it can be good for nothing, but on all sides pierces his hand that holds it like a handfull of thorns. But in an∣swer to this question, if I shall speak what I think, I am like to prevail but little, because the whole world practises the contrary;

…..Et nunc in hacce publica Contage morum, congreges inter malos Malum esse jus est. Nam nunc Leges nihil faciunt quod licet, nisi quod lubet,

Nothing prevails but evil manners and evil propositions: and in such things as these it is easy to confute a good counsel or a severe reproof, by saying, The man is angry, or too strict, and all men are not of his mind. There∣fore in this inquiry I shall onely tell what I have learn'd in the schools of wisedome, in the laws of wise people, and the sayings of holy men. In the Civil laws of the Romans,* 1.162 all the money that these gamesters wone was taken from them and spent upon public works; and he that lost and paid the money was punishable, for the Senate forbad to play for money, or to make any promise or give any pledge for payment. The same hath been forbidden by the laws of many republics, ut quod ille in alea perdiderat, be∣neficio legis dissolveret, that the law should pay what the fool and the prodi∣gal had lost. An old Epigrammatist affirmes that such gains will never thrive,

Per scelus immensas quid opes cumulare juvabit? Turpiter è manibus res malè parta fluit.

And no wonder if such gains be the purchaces of a thief, and no better then robbery.* 1.163 Aristotle joyns them together in the same kind of dishonou∣rable crime, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that plays at dice for money, and the thief are illiberal gamesters, for they are guilty of filthy lucre: and Seneca says,

—immensas opes Jampridem avaris manibus, ut perdat, rapit.

He is greedy, and gets nothing; he wins much, and looses more; he snatches from his neighbour what belongs to him, and looses that and his own be∣side. Pascasius Justus observes that the Spaniards call such gamesters Ta∣hur, which is the Metathesis of Hurta, a thief; for to cast the dice for money what is it but to desire to take another mans money against his will? and that is theft.* 1.164 S. Bonaventure saies that which is gotten by play is possess'd by no good title, and cannot be lawfully retain'd: he that lost it, hath in∣deed for his folly deserv'd to loose it; but he that hath it, does not deserve to keep it, and therefore he must not, nor yet must he restore it to him that lost it, unlesse he persuaded or compell'd him to play; but therefore the money is to be given to the poor: and the same also is expressely affirmed by S. Austin.* 1.165 Now if it be not lawfull to retain such purchaces, they are not our own when we have wone them, and therefore it is no thanks to us if we give them away. Aleatoris eleemosyna invalida est & nihili apud Deum,* 1.166 saith S. Bonaventure. Oblatio enim de rapina reprobatur▪ saith the Canon law, and eleemosynae & sacrificium non placent Deo quae offeruntur ex scelere. The money is gotten by an equivocal contract, and an indirect ra∣pine, and therefore can never become a pleasing sacrifice to God; it is a giving our good to the poor without charity, and that profits not, saith S. Paul. But at last,* 1.167 although he that looses his money, deserves to loose it; yet because by laws such purchaces and acquisitions are forbidden, and we have no right to give almes of what is not our own, and as God will not ac∣cept it when it is done by us, so he hath no where commanded that it should be done at all, therefore it is certain that all such money is to be restor'd, if the looser please.* 1.168 Bona aleâ amissa tanquam furto ablata [veteres] resti∣tuenda putabant. S. Austin said, that the Ancients did affirm, money wone by dice and tables ought to be restor'd, like the money that was stollen. But if the owner will not, let it ascend to pious uses. And if this be the state of this affair, it cannot be lawfull to play at cards or dice for money. For the love of money is the root of all evil, which some having coveted, have pierced themselves through with many sorrows. And this appears yet more in the next advice.

3. No man can play lawfully at such games but those who are dispas∣sionate,* 1.169 and of sober spirits, under the command of reason and religion; and therefore to play for money will be quickly criminal, for

Ploratur lachrymis amissa pecunia veris;* 1.170 Et majore domus gemitu, majore tumultu Planguntur nummi quam funera.

Men may weep solemnly for the dead, but they will be heartily troubled

when their money is departed; and therefore there is but little sport in such games. And this Alexander the Great rightly observ'd, when he set a fine upon some friends of his,* 1.171 quod in ludo aleae sensisset eos non ludere, sed velut in re maximè seria versari, fortunas suas omnes aleae permittentes arbitrio, because they did not play at dice, but contend as in a matter of greatest concernment. And certainly so it is. For doe not all the nations of the world think the defence of their money and estates a just cause of taking up armes and venturing their lives? He that plays at games of fortune should put nothing to fortunes conduct, but what he can perfectly subject to reason every minute. Seneca tells that Julius Canus was playing at ta∣bles, when the Centurion being sent upon a desperate service, and went out leading agmen hominum periturorum a troup of men to death, hapned to call him out to march in that service. Julius Canus knew the danger well enough, but being summon'd, call'd to his play-fellow to tell the men upon the tables; and now, saies he, doe not say when I am dead that you had the better of the game; and desir'd the Centurion to bear him witnesse that he had one man more then the other. He that is thus even and serene may fairly play; but he that would be so, must not venture considerable portions of his estate, nor any thing, the losse of which displeases him and shakes him into passion. Not that every displeasure, though for a trifle, is criminal; but that every degree of it tends to evil, and the use of it is not safe, and the effect may be intolerable.

Ludit cum multis Vatanas, sed ludere nescit: Et putat imperio currere puncta suo.

If the chances will not run as we would have them, or if our passions will not, then it is at no hand safe to play; unlesse to fret, and vex secretly for trifles, to swear and lie, to blaspheme and curse, to cheat and forswear, to covet and to hate can be innocent.

4.* 1.172 Upon these accounts it is that wise men advise that yong men be at no hand permitted to play at dice or the like games. Ab isto lusu arcendi sunt pueri,* 1.173 tum propter pecunias quas perdunt, tum propter vitia quae colli∣gunt, & mores pravos quos inde addiscunt: Yong men and boys loose their money and learn evil manners at such games, they have great passions, fierce desires and quick angers, and their flames are stirr'd perpetually with chance. It is a sad story that is told of the yong Prince,* 1.174 the onely son of Claudius the Emperor, who when he had lost all his money at dice, and had tir'd out all his invention for the getting more, and could not doe it fairly, being impatient of his losse, and desirous of new hopes and ventures, he stole a rich jewel from his Fathers closet, the Princes Tutor knowing and concealing the theft. But it came to the Emperors ear, and produc'd this tragedy. He disinherited his son, he banished all the Princes play-fellows, and put the Tutor to death. Yong men are not to be trusted to play with such aspics. And therefore Sidonius saies, Alea est oblectamentum senum, ut pila juvenum, Tables for old men, and the Ball for yong men. Cato allows to yong men, armes, horses and bows, and such like sports; but would have dice and tables permitted to old men, whose minds are more to be refreshed with diversion then their bodies by laborious exercise. And in allusion to this, Augustus in his letter to Tiberius mention'd by Suetonius hath these words, Inter coenam lusimus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & heri & hodie, Yesterday and to day we plai'd like old men; that is, at tables. But this is matter of pru∣dence,

and not of Conscience; save onely that old men are more masters of reason and rulers of their passion, and a sedentary exercise being fittest for them, they who cannot but remember that they are every day dying, though possibly they need some divertisement to their busied and weary spirits, yet they doe more need to remember their later end, and take care to redeem their time, and above all things not to play for any considerable money, not for any money the losse whereof is bigger then a jest: and they that doe thus, will not easily doe amisse. But better then all these permis∣sions is that resolution of Cicero,* 1.175 Quantum alii tribuunt intempestivis con∣viviis, quantum denique aleae, quantum pilae, tantum mihi egomet ad haec studia recolenda sumpsero, What time other men spend in feasting and revellings, in dice and gaming, all that I spend in my studies: and that is very well. For though there is good charity in preserving our health, yet there is a greater necessity upon us that we doe not loose our time.

5. That our games may be innocent,* 1.176 we must take care they be not scandalous, that is, not with evil company, not with suspicious company. Ciceroni nequissimorum hominum in ludo talario consessus?* 1.177 shall Cicero suffer base persons to sit and play at tables in his house? That's not well: and therefore he objected it as a great crime to Marc Anthony, domum ejus ple∣nam ebriorum aleatorumque,* 1.178 his house was frequented with gamesters and drunkards. We must neither doe evil, nor seem to doe evil: We must not converse with evil persons, nor use our liberty to our brothers preju∣dice or grief: we must not doe any thing which he with probability or with innocent weaknesse thinks to be amisse, untill he be instructed rightly; and if he be, yet if he will be an adversary and apt to take opportunities to re∣proach you, we must give him no occasion. In these cases, it is fit we ab∣stain: where nothing of these things does intervene, and nothing of the former evils is appendant, we may use our liberty with reason and sobriety. * And then, if this liberty can be so us'd, and such recreations can be inno∣cent, there is no further question, but those trades which minister to these divertisements are innocent and lawfull.

RULE III. The act of the Will alone, although no external acti∣on or event doe follow, is imputed to good or evil by God and men.

THe will of man in the production and perfecting of a sin hath six steps or degrees of volition,* 1.179 in all which the sin is actual, excepting the first onely. 1. The inclination of the will is the first; and that so far as it is natural, so far it is innocent. Sin oftentimes enters in at that door, but the door was plac'd there in the first creation; it was a part of that building which God made and not man, and in which every stone and stick was good. It was not made for sin, but for vertue; but it was made so, that if we would bring sin in that way, it was in our choice, and at our perill. But al∣though this be the case of our natural inclination, yet if our inclinations be

acquir'd, or increas'd, or habitual, that is, if they become facilities and promptitudes to sin, they are not innocent: for this state is a state of sin and death, it is the effect of many vile actions and vile desires, it is an aversion from and an enmity against God; it is a bed of desires which are sometimes asleep, and then doe no more mischief then a sleeping wolfe, but when they are awake they doe all the evil they can.* 1.180 And therefore the case of an ha∣bitual sinner is such, that even his first inclinations to any forbidden action in the instance of his own habit are criminal as the external effect. But in natural inclinations the case is different. 2. The first beginning of the sin is when the will stops and arrests it self upon the tempting object, and con∣sents onely so far that it will have it consider'd and disputed. Then the will is come too far, not when it is willing a thing should be disputed whether it be lawfull or unlawfull, good or evil; but when it is willing it be considered which is to be followed, Reason or Sense, wise counsels or sensual pleasures: for when the will is gone so far it is past beyond what is natural, and come so far towards choice and guiltinesse, that it is yet no more friend to ver∣tue then to vice, and knows not which to chuse. 3. The next step the will makes is when it is pleas'd with the thought of it, and tasts the honey with the top of a rod, a little phantastic pleasure before-hand in the medi∣tation of the sin. This prelibation is but the antepast of the action, and as the twilight to the dark night, it is too near an approach to a deed of darknesse. 4. When the will is gone thus far and is beyond the white lines of innocence, the next step towards a perfect sin is a desire to doe the acti∣on; not clearly and distinctly, but upon certain conditions, if it were lawfull, and if it were convenient, and if it were not for something that lies crosse in the way. Here our love to vertue is lost, onely fear and God's restrain∣ing grace remains still for the revocation of the man to wisedome and se∣curity. 5. But when this obstacle is remov'd, and that the heart consents to the sin, then the Spirit is departed, and then there remains nothing but that the sin be [6] contriv'd within, and [7.] committed to the faculties and members to goe about their new and unhappy imployment; and then both the outward and the inward man have combin'd and made up the body of a sin. But the sin begins within, and the guilt is contracted by what is done at home, by that which is in our own power, by that which nothing from without can hinder. For as for the external act, God for ends of his own providence does often hinder it; and yet he that fain would, but cannot bring his evil purposes to passe, is not at all excused, or the lesse a Criminal before God.

Question.

But is it not a mercy for a man to be recalled from acting his adultery?* 1.181 is it not charity to two persons to keep Autolycus from killing the steward of Stratocles? and if so, then there is sin in the action as well as in the affe∣ction, and the hand sins distinctly from the heart: but then it will be found untrue to say that all our good and evil comes from the will and choice, and yet it will not be possible to tell from what principle the evil of the hand is derived, if not from the evil will. This brings a necessity of inquiring into the union, or difference of the actions internal and external, and the influence the will hath upon the external act, and whether it can have any aggravation or degree beyond what it receives from the inward principle.

To this therefore I answer,* 1.182 That all the morality of any action depends wholly on the will, and is seated in the inner man; and the eye is not adul∣terous, but it is the instrument of an adulterous heart; and the hand is not the thief before God, but the covetous desire is guilty: and this appears in this, because if a man takes the goods of his neighbour, which he would not have taken if he had suppos'd they had been his neighbours, he is in∣nocent before God. And yet it cannot be denied but it is worse to steal then to covet, it is worse to humble and dishonour our neighbours wife then to lust after her. But the reason is, because the doing of the action supposes a great many precedent acts of lust, even the whole method and oeconomy of sin: for every act of the will, every degree of desire is lusting or cove∣tousnesse; and the external act which supposes them all, is worse then all them except the last. The natural inclination of the will is but a capaci∣ty or readinesse and disposition of the faculty, and is no act. But the arrest and stop of the will, the delight in fancying, the desire of action, the con∣sent of the heart, and the deliberation and resolution, these are the acts and products of the will; and the second is worse then the first, and the third worse then the second, and so till we come to the immediate addresse to the action: but that action is not worse then the last resolution and deliberate purpose of the will; and therefore when it is charity to hinder the man from acting his lust, it is therefore charity, because in the acting of the sin ex∣ternally there are more acts of the will, even the whole method of death is completed, and the same acts of will are repeated, or confirm'd, and there is mischief done to some person or to some interest, to something be∣sides the sinning man, and there are some contingencies and some circum∣stances to which new actions of the will must be consenting and give their influence and renew their acts: but still, if we compare every consent and deliberate purpose of the will with the action, or that part of the action which is immediately produc'd in it, there is in that event no morality, and no good, and no evil but what is first within. So that he who hinders a man from acting of his lust, does hinder him not from sins distinct from those of his will, but from more sins of the will, from repetition, or con∣firmation, or abiding in the same chosen folly.

Upon this account it will be easy to answer whether is the greater sin,* 1.183 the wishing and desiring a very great evil, and willingly doing but a little one, or the doing a very great evil and an intolerable mischief with a little malice. For it is certain that the sin is much more increas'd by the malice of the action and effect then by the malice of the will, if the malice of the will be little, and the evil of the event be great and intolerable. For at first to desire a very great mischief, and then to act but a little one, sup∣poses that the great malice went not to it's utmost period; it was desir'd, but not resolved on, and deliberately determin'd: and then that malice though in it self great, yet it was ineffective, and was retracted before it was consummate by the will, and acted by her subjects the other faculties and members. But now, if a great mischief be done by a little malice, to that little malice all that event is to be imputed: though not to it alone, yet to that malice manag'd by ignorance, carelessenesse and folly; which being no excuses, but of themselves criminal appendages, the man shall be judged by his action, not by his ignorant and imperfect choice; because though the choice was naturally imperfect, yet morally and in the whole conjunction of it's circumstances it was completely Criminal. If this thing happens to

be otherwise in any particular, God will discern it, and not man; for the greatnesse of the mischief in humane laws and accounts supposes the great∣nesse of the malice, if malice at all, and not chance wholly was the prin∣ciple. But if the question be in the acting of a great mischief where the sin most lies, in the will or in the event, I say it is originally in the will; and it is equally in the event, if all that event was foreseen and known, al∣though it was not principally or at all design'd. He that steales a cow from a widow, and does verily believe that the losse of her cow will not onely undoe her, but break her heart, though he does not designe this, yet because he knows it, all that event is to be imputed to him. They that abuse their own bodies by abominable and unclean contacts, & the sin of Onan, though they design onely the pleasing of their lust, yet if they consider what they doe, and what will be the event, they secondarily chuse all that event, and are as guilty of it as of that which they principally design'd.

—quòd pellice laevâ* 1.184 Uteris, & Veneri servit amica manus, Hoc nihil esse putas? scelus est, mihi crede, sed ingens, Quantum vix animo concipis ipse tuo. Ipsam crede tibi naturam dicere rerum, Istud quod digitis, Pontice, perdis, homo est.

For the internal act of the will and the external act of the man are but one act, unlesse the instrument and the efficient cause produce two distinct effects in every concourse; and whatsoever is done without is first consen∣ted to within, and is but the ministery and execution of the sin within. For the act of chusing is the foundation of all morality: and therefore when not onely the first design, but the appendages and other consequents are foreseen, and yet the action is chosen, the will is guilty of so many evils as it chuses directly and indirectly, principally and consequently.

But to reduce this doctrine to more minute and particular considera∣tions* 1.185 and order.

Of the identity and diversity respectively of actions internal and external, and the multiplications of sins by them.

1. Every external act proceeding from the internal makes but one moral act, whether it be good or bad. The election and choice is the foundation: and as they are many houses which are built upon many foundations, but many chambers and galleries built upon one foundation is but one house, though there be many rooms; so the internal and external relying upon one basis operating to the same end, effecting the same work, having the same cause, and being but several lengths of the same thrid, doe not make two acts; as the soul seeing by the eye hath but one vision, and the will acting by the hand does but her own act by her own instrument: and therefore although they are Physically or Naturally several actions, because elicite and acted by several faculties, yet morally they are but one; for what the hand or eye alone does, is neither good nor evil, but it is made so by the mind and will.

2. If there be two acts of will in one external act,* 1.186 there is a double malice or goodnesse respectively. A Prince commands his Almoner to give much almes to the poor; the almoner being also a good man loves the imployment, and does it very often: the external act is but the one ministery of almes, but the internal is both obedience and charity.

3. The external act is the occasion of the intending or extending the internal,* 1.187 but directly & of it self increases not the goodnesse or the badnesse of it. For the external act is not properly and formally good or bad, but onely objectively and materially; just as a wall cannot increase the white∣nesse, unlesse the quality it self be intended by it's own principle. But as heat in iron is more intense then it is in straw; so may the goodnesse or the badnesse of an internal act be increased by the external: but this is onely by accident. By instances of these several assertions, they will be more in∣telligible. When John surnam'd the Almoner commanded his boy to carry an almes to a poor man that was sick in the next village, the boy sometimes would detain it and reserve it for his own vanity; but S. John lost not the reward of his charity, for his internal act was good, but it was no cause of the outward event at all. And on the other side, when Maevius lay with his wife Petronilla, supposing she had been Nicostrata, he was an adulterer before God, though by the laws of men he was harmlesse. And if a man steals a horse in the night from his neighbours field, and carries him away secretly, and by the morning perceives it to be his own, he is no lesse guilty before God and his Confesssor then if he had indeed stoln his neighbours. The rea∣son is, because the external act hath another cause, which is or may be in∣nocent, but the internal act was of it self completely evil and malicious. In these cases, where the internal volition is not the cause of the external event, the sin is terminated within, and that to him who is to be our Judge is as vi∣sible as any thing. But when the internal volition is properly the cause of the action external, there more is done then it could doe alone. For in a good work the will finds the difficulties which it could not perceive while it was onely in purpose; and it is easy to resolve to be patient in sicknesse when we feel nothing of it, but onely discourse it, and cast about in our easy minds what we suppose it will be: but Tu si hic esses, aliter sentires, said the sick man; it may be when it comes to be acted, the will shall find new work, new difficulties, and will need new fortifications, and renewed resolutions, and the repetition of acts, and fresh aids of reason: so that although all the good or evil that is in all this, is the good or evil of the will; yet this is it which I said, that the external action hath in it the materiality of good and evil, and by accident the external act is better then the internal, that is, the will does better when she reduces her purposes to act very often, then when she does onely resolve. And for this very reason

4. The external act does superadde new obligations beyond those* 1.188 which are consequent to the mere internal volition though never so perfect and complete. For the external act is exemplar in vertue, or scandalous in evil; it obliges to restitution, to Ecclesiastical censures and legal penalties, in which there are active and passive duties incumbent on us (as I have re∣presented in the third book.) Thus also in good things; the external par∣ticipation of the Sacraments hath in it some advantages beyond the inter∣nal: but these things are accidental to the action, and nothing of the nature of it; they are nothing of the direct morality, but the consequent of it;

which the sinner ought indeed to have consider'd beforehand, and to act or to omit accordingly.

5. If the course and continuance of the outward act be interrupted,* 1.189 and then proceeded in again, when the cause of the intercision is over, that action seeming but one, is more then one sin, or vertuous act respectively. He that resolves to bring up a poor orphan in learning and capacities of doing and receiving worthy benefit, does often sleep and often not think of it, and hath many occasions to renew his resolution: although his obli∣gation be still permanent, yet if he delights in it, and again chuses, so often is the almes imputed to him, he does so many acts of charity. Titius in∣tends to give to Codrus a new gown at the next Calends, but forgets his in∣tention; but yet at the Calends does upon a new intention give him a gown. This act is but one, but hath no morality from the first intention, but from the second, though there were two internal acts of volition to the same external; because the first did cease to be, and therefore could have no in∣fluence into the effect. But this multiplication of actions and imputati∣ons cannot be by every suddain and physical interruption, but by such an interruption onely where the first intention is not sufficient to finish the external act. Thus if a man against his will nod at his prayers, and awaken∣ing himself by his nodding proceed in his devotion, he does not pray twice, but once, because the first intention is sufficient to finish his prayer. But if he falls asleep over-night and sleeps till morning, his morning-prayer is upon a new account, and his will must renew her act, or nothing is done. But in instances of good this part of the Rule hath but little use; for no man will dare to call God to a strict and minute reckoning, and require his reward by number and weight. But in sinfull actions there is more consideration; and if we be not strict in our weights and measures, God will; and if we will not be sure to put enough into the ballance of repentance, there will be too much in that of judgment and condemnation: and therefore it con∣cerns us as much as we can, to tell the number of our sins. Therefore

6.* 1.190 External actions in order to one end, though produc'd by one inter∣nal act or resolution of the will, yet doe not make one external act, unlesse the end be at the same time acquir'd. Thus if the man resolves to lay wait for his enemy till he have destroyed him, and therefore lays wait to day and to morrow, and prevails not untill the third day, his sin is more then one, though his resolution was but one. The reason is, because there must of necessity be a repetition of the same resolution, or at least of some ministring acts toward the perfecting that resolution; and although the resolution and the end were one, yet to every ministring intermedial act there is also some internal act proportionate. Thus every impure contact in order to impure embraces are sins distinct from the final adultery, and so is the joyfull re∣membrance of it afterwards. But because these things have in them some little intricacy, therefore I add this which is plain and usefull: Every re∣newing of an external action subordinate to a sinfull end is either a repea∣ting of the sin, or, which is all one, it is an aggravation of it; it extends it, or intends it. He that calls a man fool three times together either com∣mits three sins, or one as great as three: and he that strikes seven blows to kill a man, hath so many times lift up his hand against God; and though he hath kill'd the man but once, yet he shall be avenged seven times. But if after any notable interruption of the act, the intention be renewed, so often

is the sin repeated, though it be but one external event afterward. He that resolves every day of the week to be absent from Divine service the Sun∣day following, is to estimate his sin by the number of his internal actions, and not by the singularity of that omission.

7.* 1.191 Internal acts of the will are then multiplied, when they proceed after an expresse revocation, or a deliberate intermission, or a considerable physical interruption, or by an actual attendance to things incompossible and inconsistent with the first resolution. There is no difficulty in these particulars, save onely that in making judgments concerning them we pro∣ceed by prudent and moral proportions, by the usual measures of laws, and the accounts of wise men; onely the extremes are evident and notori∣ous. For he that being upon his knees looses his attention for a minute & then recalls it, does not pray twice, or so often as he again thinks actually of what he is doing; and we are sure that he who saies a Pater noster to day, and another to morrow, does pray twice: and between these no certain rule can be given but what is measur'd and divided by prudence and similitude with the unity of natural and artificial compositions. But he onely does well who secures his cases of conscience in this inquiry, by interrupting his evil acts as soon as they begin, and gives them quite over as soon as they are interrupted, and when he hath chosen well, perseveres as long as nature and exteriour accidents will give him leave, and renews that choice as soon as his divertisement can cease.

Question.

In the pursuit of the matter of this Rule,* 1.192 it is seasonable to inquire concerning [what degrees of guiltinesse are contracted by the beginnings and desires of wickednesse which are imperfect and unfinish'd.]

I have already* 1.193 given account that the inward acts of will are very often punishable by humane laws, and from thence some light may be reflected to this inquiry, which is concerning the estimate which God and the Conscience are to make of imperfect actions: for though in humane accounts and the estimate of our laws, that a thing is secret or public is a great difference and concernment; yet in this question, and in relation to God and the conscience immediately, it is nothing at all, for nothing here is secret, every thing is visible, and it is always day here. But now the inquiry is concerning those things which are imperfect, and so sometimes are secret as to men because they are onely in desires, and sometimes they are public, but yet not finished & completed:* 1.194 And here the rule is, Nunquam mens exitu aestimanda est. God judges not by the event, but by the mind, by the good or ill will: so Apuleius, In maleficiis etiam cogitata scelera, non perfecta adhuc, vindicantur, cruentâ mente, purâ manu. He that thinks it, that is, that resolves it perfectly, putting the last hand of the will to it, his mind is bloudy, though his hand be pure, and shall find an equal vengeance. But this is to be understood of the last act of the will, and that which is immediate to the external action; if it be in counsel, that is, not whether it shall be done or no, but how it shall be done, it is as bad and hatefull in the eyes of God as the external violence.* 1.195 To this purpose is that of Paulus the Lawyer, Consilium unius∣cujusque, non factum puniendum est, Not the fact; but the Counsel is to be

punished: by Counsel meaning the design and resolution, the perfect and complete volition, which is then without all question come to the perfe∣ction of its malice and evil heart, when it is gone as far as to the beginning of action. Insidiatus civi etiamsi non effecerit scelus, poenas tamen legibus solvet, said Quintilian, He that lays a snare for a mans life shall smart for it, though the man escape; the laws shall punish him: but if they doe not, it is all one in Conscience.* 1.196 For as Donatus said well, Non perficere, sed conari velle aliquid ad scelus, effectio est, etiamsi non potest fieri. It is nothing to the sinner that God defends the innocent and rescues him from his fraud or violence, or slander; he hath done his work when he resolv'd and endea∣vour'd it. For there is no degrees of morality beyond the last act of the will: the sin or vertue may be extended by multiplication or confirmation of the same acts, but no way intended beyond that act of the will which com∣mands execution.

But this distinction ought to be observed not onely in order to punish∣ments inflicted by humane laws upon Criminals accus'd of imperfect acts,* 1.197 but in order to conscience. For though the whole morality of the act de∣pends upon the last purpose of the will, and is before God the fulnesse of the sin in respect of degrees of any simple sin; yet when it passes on to ex∣ecution the will may grow worse by repetition of her acts, or abiding in them, she may sin more sins. For the acts themselves about which there are endeavours made, are not always perfect, so as the criminal can perfect them; for it is not to all purposes perfect when the will hath commanded the resolution to be acted, no nor when something is done towards it by the sinning man, but something else may be added, and till it be, there is some difference in the case. The examples will clear it. Priscus Merula resolves to kill his brother Taurinus, and in order to it, buyes a dagger, way-lays him as he goes to Augustus, set upon him, throws him down; but as he is lifting up his hand to strike, hears a noise behind the hedge, and being af∣frighted, curses his brother and wished him dead, and runs away. Merula is in the sight of God guilty of murder, and if he had kill'd him effective∣ly, there had been no greater malice, but more mischief, and more acts of malice; and therefore the judges are to diminish something of his punish∣ment, not onely because the life of a citizen was not lost, but because Meru∣la had not done all his part of the murder, that is, his brother could not have died, unlesse he had done something beyond what he did. But when the Egyptian nobility being weary of a dull melancholy Prince, who by his healthlesse spirit was good for nothing, gave him a brisk poison to dispatch him; that which would have burnt to ashes any person that had any fire within him, did but heighten him to the ordinary temper of another man, it onely warm'd him into an active spirit, and he became a wise Prince. Here the murder was not effected, but there was on the traytors part no∣thing wanting to the completing of the wickednesse: and therefore as in hu∣mane laws they are to have no abatement of sentence extraordinary, so in the Court of Conscience they are to think of no excuse, no diminution, but every thing is present that can make all that greatnesse which can be in the nature of that sin: and in the first case there may be an alteration so timely as to change the mind before it was at the utmost end of the line of wicked∣nesse; but in the second case, whether the effect follow or no, there is place left for nothing, unlesse peradventure for repentance. That part which concerns humane laws is alterable as men please, and in Christendome (un∣lesse

it be in the greatest crimes) custome hath against the purpose of laws given impunity to them who without effect have attempted to commit vile actions; yet in the Court of Conscience and by the measures of religion the matter is unchangeable.

There are some other ways of imperfect acts,* 1.198 which are to be regulated by the proportion of these measures. 1. He that kills a child in his Mo∣thers wombe is as guilty of murder as he that kills a man in the field, if he did equally intend it. In this it is true that the Lawyers and Physicians distinguish the time of the abortion. If the child was efform'd into a hu∣mane shape it is capital by the laws; but not if it was inform and unshapen. But in order to Conscience I perfectly consent to the doctrine of the old Christians,* 1.199 recorded by Tertullian, Etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc san∣guis in hominem deliberatur, dissolvere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est prohibere nasci. Nec refert natam quis eripiat animam an nascentem distur∣bet. Homo est, & qui futurus est: etiam fructus omnis jam in semine est. While the bloud is in deliberation whether it shall be male or female, it is not lawfull to dissolve it; and he that intends to hinder it from life is but a hasty murderer. He is guilty of inferring death who prevents that to have life to which God and nature did design it. But this is owing to the choice and design of the will, for the effect of one is much lesse then the effect of the other upon many considerations: but if the malice was not lesse, the dif∣ference of the effect makes no diminution.

The other case is,* 1.200 If a man smite his neighbour that he die, he shall sure∣ly be put to death,* 1.201 saith God to Moses. That is, if he purpose to smite him, though he did not purpose to kill him, but wound him onely, he hath sinn'd unto death. The Vulgar Latin reads it, Qui percusserit hominem volens occidere] He that smites a man, willing to kill him. But this last clause is nei∣ther in the Hebrew nor the Greek. And though it is something lesse to in∣tend to wound him grievously, then to kill him; yet he that willingly gives that wound which he would have doe him a mischief, and gives it so that it does give him his death, had a malice so great that it could not well discern between wounds and death. But in this case though it is certain God will judge righteously, and make abatement if there be any cause; yet in humane laws, and in the measures of his own repentance he will not and ought not to find gentle sentences, but the whole perfect event will be imputed to the imperfect act of his will. For it was too much that he was willing to doe any mischief; and ex toto noluisse debet qui imprudentiâ defenditur, said Seneca: He cannot pretend that the evil event was against his will, when it is certain he did perfectly consent to a great part of it.

RULE IV. An involuntary effect proceeding from a voluntary cause is imputed to the agent, as if it were volun∣tary and directly chosen.

HE that is Husband of the wife is justly presum'd to be the Father of the child,* 1.202 and he that chuses the cause must own all those which are the ef∣fects and proper productions of it; and all causes are not immediate and contiguous to the effect. He that drinks himself drunk that without fear and shame he may fornicate, though when he fornicates he hath not the use of his reason any more then of his modesty, and cannot deliberate, and therefore cannot chuse, yet he is guilty of fornication as well as drunken∣nesse. He that eats high and drinks deep that in his sleep he may procure pollution, is guilty of that uncleannesse as well as of that excesse, which S. Paul intimates in those words, Make not provision for the flesh to fullfill the lusts thereof; that is, what you design as the purpose of your intemperance, is your crime, though it be a natural effect when things are by your choice so disposed:* 1.203 and when our Blessed Saviour commanded us to take heed of surfeting and drunkennesse, he forewarned us as well of the effect as of the cause; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, surfeting hath it's name from the event, because it causes dissolutions of the nerves and dilutions of the brain, and consequently palsies, which when we have contracted, we are by our own fault disabled in the service of God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, surfeting is the product of yesterdayes debauchery: and since the effect is also forbidden, he that chuses it by delighting in the cause, chuses also what is forbidden, and therefore that which will be imputed to him.* 1.204 But this I have largely proved upon a distinct account, by making it appear that even a vitious habit, the facility and promptnesse to sin is an aversion from God, and makes us hatefull by a malignity distinct from that which is inherent in all the single actions. Thus he sins that swears by custome, though he have no advertency to what he saies, and knows no∣thing of it: he chose those actions which introduc'd the habit, and he can derive no impunity from his first crime: and he that is the greatest sinner can never come to that state of things that he shall take God's name in vain, and yet be held guiltlesse.

But this Rule is to be understood with these Cautions.* 1.205

1. The involuntary effect is imputed to the voluntary cause, if that effect was foreseen, or if it was design'd, though when it be acted, the foolish man knows but little of it, no more then a beast does of his own acts of pleasure, which he perceives by sense, but does not by Counsel enter into it. Of this there is no question, because he put his hand to a hook of iron, and that being fastned upon the rich vessels in the house draws forth what the man it may be knows not to be there; but his hand willingly mov'd the iron hook, and therefore his hand and his will is the thief.

2. The involuntary effect is not imputed to the voluntary cause,* 1.206 if after it is chosen by the will in one act, it is revok'd by another before the mischief be effected. Thus if Maevius shoot an arrow to kill Paternus, and in the instant of it's egression nollet factum, repents of the intended evil, that mischief which is then done shall not be imputed to him. This indeed is generally said both by the Divines and Lawyers; but it hath no effect at all that is material and considerable, save onely this, that the re∣pentance does wash away the guilt: but in true speaking the whole guilt was contracted, because the act of the will was completed up to action and execution, beyond which there can be no intension of the evil; but then the effect is therefore not imputed because the cause also is pardon'd by the meanes of repentance, and so it is even after the mischief is done. He that by repentance recalls the mischief, shall by pardon be clear'd from guilti∣nesse, whether that repentance be before or after.

3. But that which we can rely upon in this particular,* 1.207 and of which great use is to be made, is this, That though all the evil events which are foreseen, or ought to have been consider'd, are imputed even then when they are not in our power, to him who willingly brought in the cause of those evils; yet whatsoever was not foreseen, and therefore not design'd, nor yet chosen, by consequence and implication is not imputed to him that brought that foolish necessity upon himself. Consonant to this is the do∣ctrine of S. Austin,* 1.208 Culpandus est Loth non quantum incestus in ebrietate ad∣missus, sed quantum ebrietas meretur, Lot was answerable for his drunken∣nesse, but not for his incest caused by his drunkennnesse, which he foresaw not and designed not. But this case also suffers alteration. For if Lot had been warned of the evils of his first nights drunkennesse, and yet would be drunk the next night, he is not so innocent of the effect, the in∣cest lies nearer to him. Onely if after that monition he suspected as little as at first, he was not indeed guilty of the incest directly, but of a more in∣tolerable drunkennesse and a carelesse spirit, who by the first sad event did not consider and was not affrighted from the intolerable cause. But thus if a servant throws himself into a pit, and breaks a leg or an arme that he might not work, his not working is as much imputed to him as his uncha∣ritable injury to himself: but if afterwards, as Pyrrho saw his Master faln into a ditch, and by reason of that first fall he cannot help his Master out, that is not to be imputed to him; for he will'd it not, it was not included virtually in any act of his will or understanding. And thus it is also in the Divine judgements, which if we procure by our own vilenesses, all that impotency and disability of obeying God in external religion which is con∣sequent to the suffering that judgment which himself procur'd, & by which he is faln sick or mad or lame, is not imputed to him; because to make him∣self guilty of a thing, it is not sufficient that he be the meritorious cause of that which procur'd it, but he must be the voluntary and discerning cause. That evil of which a man is onely the meritorious cause depends upon another will besides his own, and is indeed an effect deserv'd by him, but not willingly consented to, but very much against him; and therefore can never be imputed to him to any other purpose but to upbraid his infelicity, who justly suffers what he would not foresee, and now cannot avoid.

4. When a man falls into a state or condition in which he cannot chuse,* 1.209 those acts which are done in that state are imputed to him, if they be such

acts to which no new consent is requir'd, but that it be sufficient that he doe not dissent, and if those acts be consonant to his former will, all such effects are imputed to the will. Thus if Titius being a Catechumen desir'd to be baptized, and then falls into madnesse, or stupidity, or a lethargy he is capable of being baptized, because nothing is in some persons requir'd but a mere susceptibility, and that there be no just impediment; the grace of the Sacrament being so mere a favour, that it is the first grace to which no∣thing on our parts is previous but that all impediments be removed. Since therefore in this a man is passive, his present indisposition of making new acts of election renders him not incapable of receiving a favour; always pro∣vided that there was in him no indisposition and impediment before his present accident, but that he did desire it and was capable before: that vo∣lition hath the same effect in the present state of madnesse or stupidity as it could have if he had been well. But when this comes to be reduc'd to practice, I know of no material change it works upon the man in case he dies in that sad affliction, but what was by the mercies of God laid up for him upon the account of his own goodnesse and the mans former desire. But if he does live, that susception of the Sacrament of baptisme is suffi∣cient for him for his whole life, and the daies of his recovery; that is, all that which he could be bound to in the susception, is perform'd effectively in that state in which he could not presently chuse. But I shall resume this consi∣deration and inquiry upon occasion of something to be explicated in the sixth Rule of this Chapter.

5. But in matter of punishment the case is something different.* 1.210 The case is this; Mizaldus a Florentine smote an Officer of the Great Duke in the Court, and apprehending that he was in great danger of suffering a great punishment, grew sad and impatient, and at last distracted •• the que∣stion upon the case is,

Question.

Whether or no Mizaldus may, being mad, be punished by death, or the abscission of his hand, for a fact he did in his health and the days of under∣standing. To this the answers are various by reason of the several cases that may arise.

1. If the punishment cannot be inflicted without legal processe,* 1.211 trial, conviction and sentence, the mad man cannot be punish'd, because he is not capable of passing through the solennities of law: but if the sentence was pass'd before his madnesse, then the evil may be inflicted, that is, it is just if it be; and it may be done unlesse some other consideration interpose to hinder it.

2. In punishments where no judicial processe is requir'd,* 1.212 a man that is mad may be punish'd for what he did when he was sober. If a son strikes his Father,* 1.213 and then falls mad, the Father may disinherit him for all his mad∣nesse, because the Father may proceed summarily and upon sense of the crime; and he that by his own voluntary act did deserve it, is not by mad∣nesse made uncapable of the punishment, to which in this case nothing but a passivenesse is requir'd.

3. This also holds in cases of punishments ipso facto incurr'd, that is,* 1.214 which a man is fallen into as soon as ever the crime is committed. And of this there is a double reason; the one is because the punishment is actu∣ally incurred before he is actually mad, for the very crime it self is to him as a Judge and sentence, and the sanction of the law is all the solennity: and that's the other reason, consequent to the former; in this case there needs no processe, and therefore the sinners indisposition cannot make him unca∣pable of passing into punishment.

4. In punishments Emendatory,* 1.215 that is, such which besides the exem∣plar justice, intend to reform the Criminal, he that is fallen into madnesse ought not to suffer them, whether the sentence be to be pass'd by the law or by the Judge, whether it be solemn or summary, whether it be pass'd before his calamity or after. The reason of this is plain, because such punishments being in order to an end which cannot be acquired, are wholly to no purpose, and therefore are tyrannical and unreasonable; the man is not capable of amendment, and therefore not of such punishments which are emendatory.

But after all this,* 1.216 the moderation of charity in Christian Judicatories is such, as that they refuse to inflict corporal penalties on distracted people, it being enough that they are already but too miserable.

Solus te jam praestare potest Furor insontem:* 1.217 proxima puris Sors est manibus, nescire nefas.

He that knows not what he does, or what he hath done, is next to him that is innocent. And when the man is civilly dead, it is to little purpose to make him sink further under the civil sword. That's a dreadfull justice and security that would kill a man twice over. Onely when any thing of ex∣ample, or public interest, or detestation of the fact is concern'd, it may be done according to the former measures, and for the present considerations; just as it is in some cases lawfull to punish a man after he is dead, by denying him an honourable or Christian sepulture: where although there be some∣thing particular in the case, the nature of this punishment being such, that because we doe not bury them before they be dead, this evil must be inflicted upon him that feels it not, or not all be inflicted; yet indeed it is true that it ought not at all to be inflicted upon any direct account of justice, but upon collateral considerations, as for terror and exemplarity; and so it may be in the case of the present question.

§. 2. Of the Diminutions of voluntary actions: and first of Igno∣rance, and it's influence into the morality of Humane actions.

RULE V. Nothing is good or bad, but what we know, or con∣cerning which we can deliberate.

1. THe great measures of morality are,* 1.218 Chuse the good, and eschew the evil: before these can be chosen or avoided they must be consider'd and dis∣cern'd. And therefore those things concerning which there can be no de∣liberation are neither morally good nor bad, and those persons who cannot deliberate, can neither be vertuous nor vicious; but the things may be law∣full, and the persons be innocent, but both of them negatively, that is, the things are not evil, and the persons are not criminal. And therefore S. Paul celebrating the immense love of God to mankind,* 1.219 says that God would have all men to be saved; and in order to this, he addes, he would have all men come to the knowledge of the truth, as knowing this to be the onely way: no man can be sav'd unlesse he knows saving truth, but every man may be sav'd unlesse it be his own fault; and therefore there is to every man reveal'd so much truth as is sufficient to his salvation. It may be this saving truth is reveal'd by degrees, and so that he who hath the first general propositions of nature and reason, and uses them well, shall have more, even so much as is necessary untill he comes to all sufficient knowledge. He that comes to God (saith S. Paul) must believe that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. This is the Gen∣tiles Creed, but such as at first will be sufficient to bring them unto God; whether when they are come he will give them his Holy Spirit, and teach them whatsoever is yet necessary. I am not here to dispute what is likely to be the condition of Heathens in the other world: it concerns not us, it is not a case of Conscience: but we are sure that all me have the Law of God written in their hearts; that God is so manifested in the creatures, and so communicates himself to mankind in benefits and blessings, that no man hath just cause to say he knows not God. We see also that the Hea∣thens are not fools, that they understand arts and sciences, that they dis∣course rarely well of the works of God, of good and evil, of punishment and reward: and it were strange that it should be impossible for them to know what is necessary, and stranger yet that God should exact that of them which is not possible for them to know. But yet on the other side, we see infinite numbers of Christians that know very little of God, and very many for whom there is no course taken that they should know him; and what shall be the event of these things is hard to tell. But it is very certain that without a mans own fault, no man shall eternally perish: and therefore it is also certain that every man that will use what diligence he can and ought in his circumstances, he shall know all that in his circum∣stances is necessary; and therefore Justin Martyr said well, voluntate igno∣rare illos, qui res ad cognitionem ducentes hebent, nec de scientia laborant.

Every man hath enough of knowledge to make him good if he please: and it is infinitely culpable and criminal that men by their industry shall be∣come so wise in the affairs of the world, and so ignorant in that which is their Eternal interest; it is because they love it not.

Non aurum in viridi quaeritis arbore,* 1.220 Nec vite gemmas carpitis: Non altis laqueos montibus abditis Ut pisce ditetis dapes,

No man looks for Emeralds in a tree, nor cuts his vines hoping that they will bleed rubies or weep pearls. Which of all the Heathens or Christians ever went to take goats in the Tyrrhene waters, or look'd for Crystall in a furnace? Many know what pits have the best Oysters, and where the fat∣test Tortoise feeds.

Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum Nescire caeci sustinent: Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum Tellure demersi petunt,

and yet they look for immortality in money, and dig deep into the earth, hoping there to find that blessednesse which their reason tells them dwells beyond the starres. Men have enough of reason and law put into their hearts by which they read the will of God; and therefore no man can in the universall lines and measures of salvation pretend ignorance: I am sure we cannot, and that is all that concerns us. And therefore ignorance in the Law of God, in that which concerns our necessary duty, is so far from ex∣cusing any thing it causes, that it self is very criminal. Non est levius omnino nescire quod liceat,* 1.221 quam facere aliquid quod scias non licere, To doe somethings that we know to be unlawfull, is not so great a crime, as to be wholly ignorant of what is and what is not lawfull. So that since the great end why God hath given us liberty and election, reason and under∣standing, is that by these we should serve him and partake of his felicities, it follows that in all that is of necessity to our salvation God is not wan∣ting to give us sufficient notice; and of good and evil in general every man that hath the use of reason does or may understand the rules and diffe∣rences.

But if we descend to particular rules and laws,* 1.222 the case is different. So Gregory Nyssen said,* 1.223 Universalium secundum electionem non esse invo∣luntariam ignorantiam, sed particularium, A man cannot against his will be ignorant of the universal precepts that concern our life Eternal and Ele∣ction, but of particulars a man may. That a man must not oppresse his brother by cruel or crafty bargains every man ought to know: but there are many that doe not know whether all usury be a cruelty or oppression, or in any sense criminal. But concerning these things we may better take an estimate by the following measures.

Of what things a man may or may not be innocently ignorant.

1. No man can be innocently ignorant of that which all the Nations of the world have ever believed and publicly professed;* 1.224 as that there is a

God; that God is good and just and true; that he is to be worshipped; that we must doe no more wrong then we are willing to receive or suffer. Because these things and the like are so conveyed to us in our creation that we know them without an external Teacher; and yet they are so every where taught, that we cannot but know them, if we never consulted with our natural reason.

2. No Christian can be innocently ignorant of that which the Catho∣lic Church teaches to be necessary to salvation.* 1.225 The reason of this is, be∣cause every one that knows any thing of God, and of heaven and hell, as every Christian is suppos'd to doe, cannot but know it is necessary he learn something or other in order to it; and if any thing, then certainly that which is necessary: and of that nothing can so well judge, nothing can teach so readily as the whole Church; for if the whole Church teaches it as ne∣cessary, then it is taught every where, and at all times, and therefore to be ignorant of such things can never be suppos'd innocent.

3. Of that which is by several Churches and societies of wise and good men disputed,* 1.226 a man may be innocently ignorant; for there is suppos'd dif∣ficulty, and obscurity, and every degree of these is the greatest indication that there is not of them any absolute necessity. What God hath made necessary to be known, he hath given sufficient means by which it can be known. But because every man cannot dispute, and of them that can, very many doe it to very little purpose, and they had better let it alone, and by disputing men often make more intrigues, but seldome more manifesta∣tions of what is obscure; it is certain that which cannot be known but with some difficulty and more uncertainty, may be unknown with very much innocence.

4. Those things which doe not concern good life,* 1.227 and the necessities of this world and of the other, are not of necessity to be known by every one; because there is beyond these no common and universal necessity. But beyond these.

5. Whatsoever concerns every mans duty in special,* 1.228 to which he is specially oblig'd, of that he cannot innocently be ignorant, because he hath brought upon himself a special obligation of a new duty, to which he must take care that sufficient aides and notices be procur'd. Thus must a Bishop understand not onely the articles of faith, but the rules of manners, not onely for himself, but for those which are under his charge; he must be able to instruct others in the mysteries of religion, and to convince the gainsayers; that is, he must have knowledge sufficient to doe what God re∣quires of him, and what himself hath undertaken. * But then as there is in the duty of every Christian, so there is in the charge of every office, some things that are primely necessary, some things that are onely usefull, and some for ornament, and some for excellency and perfection. So that as of every Christian so much knowledge is requir'd, that he be not igno∣rant of what is necessary for his great calling, but of other things lesse ne∣cessary there is lesse knowledge requir'd; so it is in every special calling. For although a Bishop must know how to teach sound doctrine, and to re∣prove evil manners; & if he knows not these things, his ignorance is crimi∣nal: yet a Bishop may be innocent and laudable though he be not so learned

as S. Gregory Nyssen. Valerius the Bishop of Hippo was a good man and a good Bishop, yet he was not so instructed and able as his successor S. Au∣stin; and Nectarius of Constantinople was accounted a good Patriarch, yet he was very far short of S. Chrysostome. Of what is more then of simple necessity, some may be innocently ignorant, but yet very few are. Because God hath not confin'd his providence and his spirit to the ministery onely of what is merely and indispensably necessary: and therefore when God hath largely dispensed and open'd the treasures of his wisedome and hea∣venly notices, we should doe well not to content our selves with so much onely as will keep us from perishing. Therefore that the Conscience may be directed how far it's obligation of inquiry does extend, and may be at peace when it inquires wisely whether the duty be done, these are the best measures whereby we can take account.

What diligence is necessary that our ignorance may be innocent.

1. Our inquirie after things necessary must have no abatement or di∣minution,* 1.229 nothing lesse then that it be so great and diligent as that the work be done. Because whatsoever is necessary is sufficiently communi∣cated, and without that we cannot doe our duty, or receive the felicity de∣sign'd for us; and in that where God's part is done, if the event answer not, it is because we have not done our part, and then we are not innocent. So that in these inquiries we are no otherwise to make a judgement of our diligence then by the event: whatsoever is lesse then that, is lesse then duty.

2. But in things not absolutely necessary,* 1.230 such which are of conve∣niency and ornament, of advantage and perfection, it is certain we are not tied to all diligence that is naturally possible: and the reason is, because these things are not simply necessary, and therefore not of necessity to be ac∣quir'd by all means. Adde to this, if a man were bound to use all dili∣gence to acquire all notices that can be usefull to him in his general or in his special calling, he should fall under a perpetual rack of Conscience. For considering that a mans life were not sufficient to doe this in some callings, and it is necessary in this world that a man doe many things more then the works of his office, he could never be suffer'd to attend to any necessity but what is mere and indispensable and indivisible, and never use any diver∣tisement, recreation, variety or ease, but he must first be tied upon the wheel, and feel the pains of a doubting and tormenting Conscience, by rea∣son of the impossibility of knowing whether we have done all that we can.

3. In acquiring notices concerning doing any work with advantages a moral diligence is necessary:* 1.231 for he that stops at the gate of simple necessi∣ty hath some love to himself, and great dread of God, but no love to him; for love cannot consist with a resolution of knowing no more then we must needs; to get so much and no more will well enough serve the ends and the design of fear, but not of love: and therefore although the man that does so is innocent as long as he is in that state, and as long as that state is ac∣ceptable; yet because the state of fear is but the state of infancy and imper∣fection, it must proceed further, or be imperfect for ever; that state will not be accepted long. For if a man does his duty in that state, he shall be

enabled to goe further; and then he must, or else he sins by despising the spirit of grace. But if he does not doe his duty in the first state, then he must not in that state of carelesnesse and neglect of using moral diligence pretend that he is innocent. A man that hath been blessed in his first at∣tempts must still follow the method and Oeconomy of the Divine spirit; that is, as God increases in aides, so the man must increase in diligence and labour, and must use what means are before him to doe still better and better.

4. In acquiring notices not simply necessary,* 1.232 a moral diligence is suffi∣cient. This is an immediate consequent of the second Rule, and therefore needs not particular confirmation, but explication rather.

Therefore by Moral diligence is to be understood such a diligence in acquiring notices as can * 1. consist with our other affairs, and the requi∣sites of our calling and necessities; * 2. such as is usual by our selves in the obtaining things which we value; * 3. such which is allowed by wise men, such which a spiritual guide will approve; * 4. and such as we our selves doe perceive to be the effects of a real desire. For there ought to be no∣thing of scruple or vexation in the acts of this diligence, nor in the inqui∣ries concerning it. And therefore if we are sure we desire to know what we can, and doe towards it such like things as we doe in the purchase of other things which we greatly value, we may be at peace. For this thing does not consist in an indivisible point, it is not just thus much, neither more nor lesse; but it is more or lesse according as our love is and our lei∣sure, our opportunities and abilities: and if we cannot judge concerning our selves so well as to rest in peace, let us ask a spiritual guide, having first declar'd to him the narrative of our life and actions whereby he shall be enabled to make a judgement.

What is a probable ignorance?

Upon this account we can also give the measures and definitions of a probable ignorance,* 1.233 that is, such an ignorance which is next to an invincible or an irremediable ignorance: this the Schools call probable. For as the invincible ignorance is a mere nescience, and is either of such things which we are not bound to know, because God requires them of no man; or of such things which we cannot know, because we never heard of them, and are not taught sufficiently, and so God will not require them of us: so next to this stands the probable ignorance, that is, when the things are pro∣pounded to be known, and can be known if we would use all our natural and possible diligence; but yet because God hath not plac'd them in a neces∣sary order to salvation, he hath not tied us to use all our natural diligence, but some diligence he does require, which when we have us'd, and yet misse, the ignorance is probable. Now when that is so, we shall learn by the pro∣portions to the description of the parts and requisites of a moral diligence, and by these following measures.

1. Then our ignorance is probable,* 1.234 when we enter upon the action without temerity, and yet without doubt or trepidation; that is, when our addresse is with consideration, but we find no reluctancy against the action,

nor remorse after it. For then it must be that we have faith, and doe it with a good mind, not against our Conscience; and yet having no fierce∣nesse of passion or fancy, and a mind wary enough to discern any objection that is near, it will be very probable that there is none at all but what stands a great way off, and therefore farre enough from disturbing the innocence of the action.

2. But this is to be understood onely in the ordinary accidents and traverses of our lives.* 1.235 But if it be in matters of great concernment, such as are above our ordinary imployments, as if it be in the actions and duties of an eminent office, it is not sufficient that we have no regret or remorse, but we must have an actual consideration, a plain perceiv'd deliberation and counsel, and then no regret. It is not here enough that we have nothing against it, but we must have something for it, because in such persons and in such accidents the processe ought to be more then ordinary; that as there are greater abilities requir'd to the performance of that office, so there may be a proper use and exercise of those abilities. And there is in this a great evidence of truth. For in ordinary things, it is very often so that they are well enough if they have not evidently any evil in them. But in the actions of public imployments things are not so indifferent; they doe hurt unlesse they doe good, they are scandalous if they be suspicious; they are design'd always to doe benefit, and if they doe not they cannot be justified, and therefore they must be look'd on with an actual consideration: in which state of things it is certain that every thing will occurre that is obvious to be considered; and what it not obvious to such persons is indeed very difficult, and may well be suppos'd to leave a probable and very excu∣sable ignorance.

3. This also is to be extended to the case of confident asseverations,* 1.236 and confirming any proposition with an oath, in which no man can have a probable ignorance, but he that hath us'd a diligence of inquiry so great as to give confidence great enough to an oath, which must be of a thing so sure, that nothing can be a cause of doubt, unlesse some secret and undis∣cerned thing, to which a great and proportionable diligence hath not ar∣riv'd and made discovery, doe accidentally intervene. No man must swear a thing is so, and yet at last say, I did bonâ fide suppose it so: but I examin'd it, I search'd as well as I could, I entred into all the corners of it, I had great reasons to believe, I had fair assurances it was so, and I every day am assur'd of many things of which I had lesse testimony. If beyond this any thing escapes him, the ignorance is probable and excusable. But the rule is the same as at first: He is sufficiently and innocently confident, who hath no distrust, and upon inquiry finds no cause of distrust; always provided that the inquiry be in proportion to the dignity, and difficulty, and duty of the occasion and subject matter.

By the use of these premisses it will be easy to determine Plato's Case of Conscience which he propounded to Hippias the Sophister.* 1.237 Whether is the better or worse,* 1.238 he that sins willingly, or he that sins by folly & igno∣rance? of them that wrastle, whether is the more inglorious, he that falls willingly, or he that is thrown in despite of himself and all his strength? whether foot is better, that which halts upon designe, or that which halts with lamenesse? whether were it better for a man to have a fool or a knave

to his servant? But this discourse of Plato concerns arts onely and sciences. But Hippias answer'd well, It was not so in vertues; the differences of which Plato did not seem to discern,* 1.239 but Aristotle afterwards very well explicated. The sense of which in order to the purpose of the present Rule is well ex∣pressed by Seneca;* 1.240 Vis scire quam dissimilis est altarum artium cognitio & hujus? In illis excusatius est voluntate peccare quam [casu,] ignorantiâ: in hac maxime culpa est, sponte delinquere. If a Grammarian speaks a soloe∣cisme on purpose, he blushes not; but if ignorantly, he hath reason to be asham'd. If the Physician knows not what his patient ailes, it is more shame to him then if he on purpose names a wrong disease. At in hac parte vivendi, turpior volentium culpa est; But in manners to erre willingly is the more intolerable. The reason of these things is plain, which who please may read ina 1.241 Gifanius the interpreter of Aristotle, andb 1.242 Marsilius Fi∣cinus the expositor of Plato: for indeed it is evident that to moral actions the rectitude of the appetite is requir'd, not so to arts and sciences and the vertues intellectual. It is enough to art that the work be well done, though with what mind it matters not as to that: and when the Italian painter, who was to depict a Crucifix, hir'd a slave to be tied to a Crosse, that he might lively represent a body so hanging and so extended, did afterward stab him to the heart, that he might see and perceive every posture and accent and little convulsion of a dying man, he was very much the worse man for it, but no whit the worse Painter; as appear'd by the incomparable excellency of that piece; and the principles of Art cannot be corrupted with the evil manners of the Man: but because evil desires pollute the manners, the will is to be taken care of, as the principle of all morality. To which we may adde that he who in arts erres willingly, can mend it when he please; but so cannot he that erres ignorantly. Ignorance is the onely disparagement of his art, and malice is the onely disparagement of our manners.

But this, though disputed to little purpose amongst the Philosophers,* 1.243 may be of good use in Cases of Conscience.* 1.244 Cardinal Campegius having wickedly said to the Senate at Norimberg, that it was worse for a Priest to marry then to fornicate, offer'd in justification of it a reason that could lesse be justified. For (saith he) the Priest that fornicates knows he does amisse, and therefore may in time repent; but the Priest that marries thinks he does well, and therefore will never change his mind, he will never re∣pent. It is true, he needs not, because he believes he does well; and he is not deceiv'd. But suppose he were deceiv'd, and abus'd by error, what man before him was ever so impious as to say that he that knows he does evil is in a better condition then he that erres with a good mind, & supposes he does very well? For the present, the state is infinitely different: & for the time to come, which is the more likely to obtain mercy, he that does a thing ignorantly, or he that does it maliciously, we shall not need to appeal any whether but to all the notices of vertue and vice which are in mankind.

Indeed there are some sins of ignorance,* 1.245 that is, such which are sub∣jected in the understanding, which are worse then some sins of malice, or such which are subjected wholly in the will and the faculties which obey it. Thus to be ignorant of the fundamental articles of faith is a worse state of things then to have committed an act of gluttony, or to have en∣tertain'd a wanton thought, or to have omitted Divine service upon a Fe∣stival. They Jewes had an opinion that thoughts were free, and God did

not require them of us with severity; but a thought against faith, that was highly criminal. Cogitationem pravam Deus non habet vice facti, nisi concepta fuerit in Dei fidem atque religionem,* 1.246 said R. David Kimchi; mea∣ning that no sin was greater then heresy, or an error in faith. But the rea∣son of this is, not onely because the effect of heresy is, like the plague, infectious and disseminative; but because by how much the articles of faith are more necessary to be believed, by so much is the ignorance of them more criminal, and more voluntary, and therefore lesse excusable. But even in matters of faith, where there is lesse of malice or wilfull negli∣gence ingredient into the ignorance of them, there the crime is lesse then any thing else, be the instance what it will. But this will be more expli∣cite in the sequel.

RULE VI. Ignorance does always excuse the fact, or diminish the malignity of it, or change the kind and na∣ture of the sinne.

IGnorance according to it's several capacities,* 1.247 and the several methods of art and ways of speaking, hath several divisions. But all are redu∣cible to this in order to Conscience. Ignorance is either voluntary or in∣voluntary. It is vincible or invincible, that is, it can be helped or it can not. It is the cause of an action, or it onely goes along with it. And of these several ignorances there are many degrees, but no more kinds that are here fit to be considered.

1. The first sort of ignorance,* 1.248 which is involuntary, invincible, and antecedent, that is, is the cause of an action, so that the thing would not be done but by that ignorance, does certainly make the action also it self involuntary, and consequently not criminal. In this sense is that of the law,* 1.249 Errantis nulla voluntas, nullus consensus, They that know nothing of it, consent not. This is meant of ignorance that is involuntary in all regards, that is, such as is neither chosen directly nor indirectly, but is involuntary both in the effect and in the cause. Thus what fools and mad-men and infants doe is not at all imputed to them, because they have no understanding to discern good from evil, and therefore their appetite is not deprav'd or malicious which part soever they take.* 1.250 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith the law, according to the interpretation of the Greeks. Injury proceeds from the affection, and consequently we say that a mad-man or an infant if they strike or reproch anyone they are not cri∣minal, they have done no injury because they perceiv'd it not. Nec reputantur infantiae anni qui sensu carent, saith Pliny; The years of infancy come not un∣der the notice of laws and judges, of right or wrong, for they have no reason, that is,* 1.251 they use none. So Galen, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All the scholars of Chrysippus constantly affirm that beasts and babies have no use of reason.

And Iamblichus suppos'd that the rational soul was not infus'd into chil∣dren before the tenth year of their age.* 1.252 But that is more reasonable which almost all wise men (excepting the Stoics) affirm, and is thus expressed by a 1.253 Gregory Nyssen, and his contemporaryb 1.254 Nemesius in the very same words; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Although in infants there is no action or motion of reason, yet we say that they have a reasonable soul, for they manifest the use of it when they are growing up.

But this occasions a difficulty in this subject.* 1.255 For we see the ratio∣nal soul exercising it's operations in some sooner in some later; and as the body grows in strength and grandeur, so does the soul in the use of reason and powers of deliberation and choice.

Nam velut infirmo pueri teneroque vagantur* 1.256 Corpore, sic animi sequitur sententia tenuis. Inde ubi robustis adolevit viribus aetas, Consilium quoque majus, & auctior est animi vis.

And Hippocrates addes that the soul does always grow, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, A mans soul is born every day of a mans life, it always receives some increment. Now the question is How long shall infant ignorance or childshnesse excuse so far as that the actions they doe shall be reckon'd neither to vertue nor to vice?

To this it will not be possible to give a strict and definite answer,* 1.257 but a rule and a measure may be given. Possidonius said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The rational faculty is at first very weak, but it is great and strong about the age of fourteen years:* 1.258 and Plutarch saies that the Stoics affirm'd 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, about the second septenary, or the fourteenth year,* 1.259 they begin to be perfect: but Zeno said that from that year complete, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it is perfect, that is, as to all capacities of reward and punishment. But in this there was great variety. For some laws would punish boys after twelve years, not before: so the Salic law,* 1.260 Si quis puer infra duodecim annos aliquam culpam commiserit, fredus ei non requiratur, A boy before he is twelve years old, committing a fault is not tied to make amends or composition.* 1.261 Servius upon that of Virgil, Alter ab undecimo tum me jam ceperat annus, saies, the thirteenth year is meant, because that was next to puberty; for, saies, he, the law judges of maturity not onely by years but by the habit and strength of the body. But though this be lesse by one year then that of the Stoical account, and more by one year then that of the Salic law; yet we find in the law of the Greeks and Romans that after seven years complete boys were punishable; so the * 1.262 Basilica,† 1.263 Michael Attaliotes and some others.

But this variety was not wholly arbitrary,* 1.264 but it was commonly esta∣blished upon reason; for the differences were made by the different nature of the crimes of which boys were not equally capable in every year: but al∣though in every crime some were forwarder then others, yet all were capa∣ble

of some sooner then of others. Spite and malice comes sooner then lust: and therefore if a boy after seven years old kill'd a man, he was liable to the lex Cornelia de Sicariis;* 1.265 but not so if he were a pathic and a correspon∣dent in unnatural lusts, as appears in Matthaeus Blastares and Leo; if he were under twelve years, he had impunity, quum aetas ipsa argumento sit nescire eum quid patiatur, said the Emperor, His age is an argument of his igno∣rance, that he knows not what he suffers. For in these things it was reaso∣nable that Galen said of Hippocrates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, infancy is to be reckon'd untill youth, or a power of generation: and that was it which I observ'd before out of Servius, Bene cum annis jungit habitum corporis. Nam & in jure pubertas ex utroque colligitur. The strength of body must be suppos'd before you allow them strength of reason, that is, a power to deliberate and chuse those sins to which they cannot be tempted before they have natural capacities. But this, I say, relates onely to the crime of unclean∣nesse. Now because this was commonly the first of our youthfull sins, malice in infancy being prodigious and unnatural, which caus'd that advice of S. Paul, In malice be children; therefore wise men and the laws did usu∣ally reckon that age to be the first beginning of their choice as well as of their strength. But this rule is very far from being certain, and therefore S. Austin blames those that doe not impute any sins to boys before the age of fourteen;* 1.266 Meritò crederemus (saith he) si nulla essent peccata nisi quae membris genitalibus admittuntur, We might well doe so if there were no sins but the sins of lust: but they can steal sooner, and they can lie, and, as unnatural and as unusual as it is, they can be malicious, some sooner, some later, according to the basenesse of their disposition, their pregnancy and education.* 1.267 A. Gellius tells that the Decemviri, who wrote the laws of the XII Tables, ex caeteris manifestis furibus liberos verberari, addicique jusse∣runt ei cui factum furtum esset, They caus'd thieving boys to be whipp'd and given up to them from whom they had stoln; and if they cut corn by night and stole it, they were to be chastis'd by the discretion of the Praetor; which also Pliny notes.* 1.268 But then this also is to be added, that even in these things although they did not esteem them innocent, yet because their understanding was but little, and their choice proportionable, they inflicted but easy punishments:* 1.269 which Theophanes expressed by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they were beaten with thongs, or rods, or ferula's.

From hence we may take an estimate how it is in this affair as to the question and relation of Conscience.* 1.270 For then these wise men and wise law-givers did declare them punishable when they did suppose them crimi∣nal; though in the Sanction of laws they were to proceed by rule, and de∣termine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as things were most commonly. But then it is to be consider'd, that since they being to make a rule could not at all take in extraordinaries, and there would many particulars and hasty instances be pass'd before it could come to a just measure and regular establishment, we must therefore proceed something otherwise in the Court of Conscience. For,* 1.271 as Libanius speaking concerning boys, said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this is not a name of age that cannot sin and cannot be punished. But Anastasius Sinaita saies that some∣times God imputes sins to boys from twelve year old and upwards. But S. Austin confess'd the sins of his first years,* 1.272 the peevishnesse of his infancy, his wrangling with his nurses, his very envying for the nurses milk and fondnesses: this was indeed a greater piety then reason. But when he was a

boy and robb'd an Orchyard, he had reason then to be troubled for it. The sins of children are but little,* 1.273 but they are sins. Puerorum sensus in qua∣liacunque verba prorumpens, qui certè ad ea quae majores sapiunt penè nullus est. When boys give evil words, it is almost nothing. But because it is but almost and comparatively nothing, it is of it self and absolutely some∣thing; and we know not at what period of time any child first comes to the use of reason, and therefore neither can we tell when God will impute their follies; and when he does not impute their follies to damnation, it may be he will impute them so far as to cause a sicknesse or an immature and a hasty death. And therefore Parents and Tutors can never discharge their duty but by a coercion and strict restraint of children, from the very first begin∣ning of their being capable of laws, of the laws I mean of their parents, and even before that to restrain them from the material parts of any evil, even from evil words which they understand not. For when they once have learnt the sound they will quickly perceive the sense: and although we account their infant malices pretty and sportive, yet because we know not from what an early principle they come, nor how soon God will impute them, nor whether they will tend, nor what impression they leave, we should betimes exercise our legislative; and it is God's great mercy to chil∣dren that they can understand fear as soon as they can learn to sin, that their evil company and evil inclinations may not prevent the discipline of the parents, but that God and the good things of his law may get the first possession. And he that will let his children alone till they have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, animum consilio ac ratione firmatum,* 1.274 a fixed and settled judgement, shall find evil habits fixt and permanent as the foot of a rock, and that good counsel will be too late, too easy a remedy. The summe is this; So long as they are ignorant, that is, so ignorant that they know not how to deliberate sufficiently to avoid a sin, so long their evil is not imputed, but together with their reason begins their vertue or their vice.

2. The second sort of ignorance is concomitant,* 1.275 that is, such which is really and actually conjoyn'd with the cause of the action, but it self is not the cause; for if the man were not ignorant, he would doe the thing never∣thelesse. Thus the boy that flung a stone at a bird, and hit his cruel step∣mother whom he knew not to be there, said he did not then design it, but the stone was well thrown. He that shoots an arrow at a stag and hits his enemy whom he resolved to kill when he could well doe it, but knew not at all that he was in the bush, hath an ignorance and a malice at the same time; and here the question is which prevails, the ignorance to excuse, or the malice to condemn. To this I answer, that the ignorance excuses that action, but not that man. He is not a murderer in that shooting, nor in the counsels and deliberation of that action; but for his mind and his malice distinct from that action, he is proportionably guilty. But if the man have no malice to the unfortunate man that is kill'd, then he is intirely inno∣cent, if his ignorance be innocent. The mind of the man is, and the action is; and if the ignorance were invincible and irremediable, then there is in∣nocence on all parts.* 1.276 Non consentiunt qui errant, saith the law. For there is in this concomitant ignorance the same reason as in the antecedent, so far as relates to that event, though not as to that action: the action was indeed voluntary and not procur'd by ignorance, but that event was; and that be∣ing the thing onely in question, is to be accounted for, just as those actions which are wholly produc'd by ignorance antecedent.

I deny not but the laws of wise Republics have principally regarded the mind and Counsel of him that sin'd,* 1.277 and that therefore the laws of the Romans under their Christian Princes did professe to follow the law of God in the matter of involuntary murder, and so did the Lombards and the Vi∣sigoths; yet sometimes this chance-medly was punish'd by a lesser punish∣ment: so we find in the laws of the Thuringians, Qui nolens sed casu quodam hominem vulneraverit vel occiderit, compositionem legitimam solvat. If a man unwittingly wounds or kills a man,* 1.278 si telum fugit potius quam jecerit, as Ci∣cero expresses the instance, if his arrow or weapon slipt from him, rather then was flung, he shall not be put to death; but yet neither shall he wholly escape, but must pay a fine appointed by law. And there is some reason for this. 1. Because the law must require the life and bloud of every of her citizens from whom it is taken, and the external event, of which she is the most competent judge, must as well as it may be repair'd. But 2. although it may appear that the event was not intended, yet it cannot so well appear whether the man did use all that diligence and precaution which wise and good men ought to doe to prevent mischiefs. And 3. something is to be indulged to the injur'd person, some consideration had of the grief and losse and the passion of the relatives of the slain person. And upon these con∣siderations God was pleased to appoint sanctuaries for such persons; which in true speaking is but a just remedy for an unjust calamity, and supposes that something was permitted in favour of the relatives of the unhappy man that died, something, I say, which yet was not always deserv'd of him that was in danger to suffer it.

3. The third sort of ignorance is the worst,* 1.279 it is that which is vin∣cible and voluntary, that is, procur'd by the will, is not the prime cause of it's actions but the effect, brought in on purpose to make way for an easy mischief with a colour and excuse. Of this there are two noted and dis∣cernible degrees: An ignorance crasse and dul, and introduc'd by negligence voluntary and observed more or lesse; and an ignorance affected, that is, chosen and delighted in, to serve evil purposes. Now concerning these degrees of this criminal ignorance it is true of them both that they bring guilt upon the head of the ignorant, according to their several proportions: but concerning the actions themselves which are acted by men in that state of ignorance and disorder, there is something of particular consideration. For we find our Blessed Saviour praying for pardon for his persecutors upon this very inducement:* 1.280 Father, forgive them, for they know not what they doe; that is, they doe not now know, for they are blinded and are in a state of ignorance: but that it was vincible and voluntary appears by those words of Christ,* 1.281 If ye were blind, ye had not sinn'd; but now ye say that you see, therefore your sin remains; and having eyes they see not, that is, they would not see, they did it ignorantly, and they would not cure their igno∣rance, for it was evident that Christ said and did enough infinitely to con∣vince them that he was the Messias.* 1.282 So also S. Paul's ignorance was very culpable, when in zeal and rage he persecuted the Church of God; but yet this ignorance lessen'd the malice of the effect, and dispos'd him greatly towards pardon. Upon these considerations, it is a worthy inquiry into that effect or influence which proceeds even from a criminal ignorance and undiscerning estate, and what it can operate towards pardon. The questi∣on then is, whether what is done by persons that know not what they doe, when that disability to know is procur'd by themselves, either by volun∣tary

negligence, or malicious purpose, is a sin as great as if it were done knowingly.

Question.

The case is this,* 1.283 Marcus Bibulus falls frequently into drunkennesse; when he is drunk he fights, and fornicates, and steals, and does (as it hap∣pens) all manner of impiety. Does his drunkennesse excuse, or does it exte∣nuate, or does it aggravate his fault?

The Greeks call'd these things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.284 that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Contention and every mischief that comes from wine, saith Hesychius; which when a man hath observed to be consequent to his intemperance, or hath been foretold of it by laws and wise persons, he may justly fall under the sentence not onely of drunkennesse, but of homicide, or incest, or whatever happens to be the vile daughter of so disgrac'd a Mother. Drunkards are very often proud and quarrelsome: and there∣fore to that of Solomon, Look not upon the wine when it is red, Rabba saith, Ne spectes vinum cujus finis est sanguis,* 1.285 Look not upon the wine whose end is bloud: and Eustathius saith that the nurses of Bacchus were painted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, having snakes and daggers in their hands, to shew that drunkards were beastly and bloudy. And therefore if such persons could have impunity, there were no safety for the lives of innocent men, or the chastity of modest women. But they neither have, nor have they reason why they should 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.286 said Aristotle; They that being drunk doe evil, are guilty of the injury. Be∣cause they are causes of their own ignorance: for they might have abstain'd from that excesse which caus'd them ignorantly to smite their Father. Pitta∣cus by a law caus'd a double punishment to be inflicted upon drunkards, one for the cause, and the other for the evil effect. The same also seems to be the sense of Plato both in his first and in his sixth book of Laws: but gene∣rally all the interpreters of Aristotle,* 1.287 the old Philosophers, the Mahumetans and the Christians and the Heathens, are perfectly of this persuasion, that the sins they doe in their drunken fit are perfectly to be imputed to them. To this purpose is that of Cicero,* 1.288 Nam qui se propter vinum aut amorem aut iracundiam fugisse rationem dicet, is animi vitio videbitur nescisse, non imprudentiâ. Quare non imprudentiâ se defendet, sed culpâ contaminabit, He that with wine or anger or lust looses his reason, cannot pretend igno∣rance or want of knowledge for his excuse, for by his own fault he is pol∣luted. And this is the sense of the Doctors of the Church. S. Basil saies drunkennesse is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so S. Chrysostome; vo∣luntaria insania, so S. Austin; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so Isidore Pelusiot: A vo∣luntary Devil, a chosen madnesse, a spontaneous fury. And the very same words are us'd by Seneca and Ammianus Marcellinus. And therefore the sinning man must not excuse him by his stupidity, and blame the wine, but himself onely;* 1.289 as Callicles in the Comedy convinc'd Dinarchus when he pray'd him to give him pardon,

Quod animi impos vini vitio fecerim;

he was not himself when he did it, it was his wine not he. The old man answer'd him,

—non placet In mutum quippiam conferri quod loqui non potest. Nam vinum si Fabulari possit, se defenderet: non vinum moderari, Sed vino solent qui quidem probi sunt: verum Qui improbus est, sive subbibit, sive adeo caret temeto, Tamen ab ingenio est improbus.

Blame not the wine; for wine does not govern a good man, but a good man the wine: But he that is wicked is wicked from within, whether he drinks or no. By these sayings of wise men we perceive that they held not the drunkard innocent even in those vilenesses which he did in his drunken∣nesse; and their reason was Philosophical, The effect from a voluntary cause is to be imputed to the first principle.

But Commonwealths have another interest to serve;* 1.290 they are to se∣cure the lives and good things of their citizens, and therefore they are by all means to effect what is necessary: and if drunken mischiefs were unpu∣nish'd, men might pretend drunkennesse for an excuse, and make it really to be the warrant of their licentiousnesse, their rapine, their lust or their re∣venge.

Nam si isthuc jus est,* 1.291 ut tu isthuc excusare possies, Luce clarâ diripiamus aurum Matronis palam; Post id si prensi simus excusemus ebrios Nos fecisse amoris causâ: nimis vile'st vinum atque amor, Si ebrio atque amanti impunè facere quod lubeat, licet,

said old Euclio to Lyconides. If drunkennesse may be our excuse, let us goe and drink drunk that we may rob the Matrons in the streets. And Manuel Palaeologus tells of one that had a mind to be reveng'd and put some affront upon a great man;* 1.292 and because he durst not when he was sober, he drank himself into an impudent fiercenesse, that he might first have boldnesse and then, as he hop'd, impunity. And therefore there may be great reason why the Civil laws of any Nation should punish the evil ef∣fects of drunkennesse not onely for the evil mothers sake, but for the secu∣rity of the citizens.

But in Theology and in the just estimate of things in order to Con∣science we are to speak and to proceed with some little difference.* 1.293 For if it be ask'd concerning the drunkennesse, or concerning the man, there is no peradventure but he is for these evil effects the worse man, and the drunkennesse is also the greater crime. The drunkennesse makes the in∣jury or the murder lesse criminal then if it were done with actual reason and choice, but these make the drunkennesse more intolerable and crimi∣nal. The man in chusing drunkennesse with or for these effects is much the worse man; but the crime is the voluntary drunkennesse, not the in∣voluntary rage and injury. And this appears upon these reasons.

1. Because by how much more the sense and reason is depraved,* 1.294 by so much the lesse the man hath pleasure in his sin. For if he be wholly mad or senselesse, his sin is wholly uselesse to him, it does him no present de∣light, any more then to a beast to push with his horns; which therefore is

not criminal because he cannot reflect upon his own act, he cannot chuse it for a reasonable consideration, he hath no will to entertain it. But if he be not so far gone, then there is some proportion of guilt, because there is of choice in the shipwracks of his reason and his will: and therefore Theo∣doret said,* 1.295 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Drunken∣nesse hath some reproof, and some pity; some punishment, and some par∣don. And Arrius Menander said that per vinum aut lasciviam lapsis ca∣pitalis poena remittenda est,* 1.296 They that sin by drunkennesse or passion may be punish'd, but not capitally; the same with that in Stobaeus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Even in the follies and stupidities of drunken∣nesse there is something amisse besides the material part. But this is when there is something left by which he can understand and chuse some∣thing of the crime.

2. The mischiefs consequent to drunkennesse are therefore lesse mo∣ral evils,* 1.297 because they doe lesse moral mischief. For no man by his lust acted in his drunkennesse is made more lustfull, or by any act then done is promoted towards a vitious habit; for he knew not what he did, and re∣members it not: it is like Lot's incest, no more known after then before, and therefore it leaves no sediment or lees behind it; which shews it to have more natural vilenesse then moral, and therefore is nearer to pardon.

Et causa justa est,* 1.298 siquidem ita est ut praedicas, Te eam compressisse vinolentum virginem.

If the yong man was drunk when he lay with her, he hath some excuse, that is, as to his lust; but that is an aggravation of his drunkennesse, and he is not the more acquitted, when the aggravation of his sin and punish∣ment is onely plac'd upon the right cause.

3. If the consequent mischiefs of drunkennesse were formally those sins which materially they are,* 1.299 that is, if they were properly guilty of all that they ignorantly doe, then it would follow that because murder is worse then drunkennesse, and yet that murder was involuntary, some action that is involuntary would be more malicious then that which is chosen. If it be replied that those consequent acts are chosen because the cause of them is chosen, according to what is discours'd in the 4^th Rule of this Chapter; I answer, that this is true if drunkennesse were not an accidental cause of them: but these effects being but contingent to drunkennesse, and the effect of some other evil principle, which then prevails when by drunkennesse the mans guards are called off, therefore they cannot be intirely attributed to drunkennesse; and therefore if a man be surpris'd with drink, or is advis'd to it as to a medicine, if he falls into such consequent disorders, it would be hard to damne this man as a murderer or as an incestuous person, when he is so neither by his present, nor his antecedent choice. Therefore it is that Libanius saies that one who hath grievously offended another 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.300 oftentimes is not punished when wine was his excuse; and the Scholiast upon the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 saies that he that kills a man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; with deliberation is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not to be pardon'd: If he does it by chance, he is free; but if by drunkennesse, he was by the Roman law banish'd for five years: and thus justice is preserved on all hands, that the drunkennesse should be punish'd more then drunkennesse, and the murder lesse then murder. For that is the worse for having such a daugh∣ter,

but this is more pardonable for having such a Mother.

But if the drunkennesse be but imperfect,* 1.301 if the consequent crimes be remembred and delighted in afterwards, (for that is a certain indication the stupidity was not extreme, nor equal to an excuse) then

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

such a drunkard is also all that which he acts and professes in his folly: a re∣membring drunkard, as he is but an ill companion, so if he falls into the horrid consequents which too often are the punishments of intemperance, hath no excuse. But if he chose drunkennesse on purpose that he might have impudence enough to doe a mischief, he committed the sin before∣hand, and was before he acted it guilty before God; and when he hath acted it, he is also guilty before men* 1.302. But unlesse it be in these cases, the actions done by him that understands not what he does are as the actions of a mad man or a fool. The sin was done before, and the mischief and the punish∣ment doe follow: but the guilt is in the cause, not in the effect that is in∣voluntary; though proceeding from a cause that was indeed voluntary, but not univocal and proper.

The sense of this question thus explicated agrees with the doctrine of the Fathers,* 1.303 who in the instance of Lot declare him criminal onely as to his drunkennesse,* 1.304 not to his incest. So Origen, S. Chrysostom, S. Austin: and S. Ambrose gives this account of the whole question; Sanè discimus vitandam ebrietatem, &c. We learn that drunkennesse is to be avoided, by which we are brought to that evil state of things, that we cannot beware of crimes. For those things which being sober we avoid, when we are drunk we ignorantly commit. And a little after; They who have been too free in drink∣ing wine, know not what they speak, they are like men dead and buried: ideoque siqua per vinum deliquerint,* 1.305 apud sapientes Judices veniâ quidem facta donantur, sed levitatis damnatur authores, Therefore what vilenesses they commit in their wine (meaning when they know not what they doe) for the deeds themselves so ignorantly committed they find pardon amongst wise Judges, but for their temulency a condemnation.

The result of these discourses is this.* 1.306 The vilenesses which are done by drunken and stupid persons unwittingly, are not of the same kind of which naturally they are and would be if the actors were sober: they are not the crimes of murder or lust or incest respectively, but circumstances of great horrour aggravating the drunkennesse, and deeply condemning the man. And yet, if the drunkennesse be not extreme, I mean the stupi∣dity and ignorance, if that be not such as to take away wholly the use of reason and moral choice, all the remaining portions of reason doe in their proper degree make the imperfect drunkard guilty of other perfect crimes, even of whatsoever he then shall act; and they shall for their own degrees of remaining choice be imputed to him as certainly as the drunk∣ennesse.

The same is the case of Inconsideration and Oblivion,* 1.307 whose effects are innocent upon the same accounts and no other. If they come in upon a ne∣gative principle, that is, begin and proceed upon a natural deficiency and an unavoidable cause, that which is forgotten, or that which is done by for∣getfulnesse

must be amended and repair'd as well as we can; but by a pre∣ceding morally-diligent care, and an after-revocation, nolition or amends, it may be kept innocent. This onely thing is to be interpos'd, that if by the precontract of a vitious habit there is ingenerated in our spirits and ex∣teriour faculties such a promptnesse and facility of sinning, that many of the acts of such a habit are done without advertency, as in vile and habitual swearing, every such action though passing without notice is criminal, be∣cause it is the product of the will habitually depraved; and there is no other cause why the actual consent of the will is not at it, but because it was not requir'd, but presum'd, and taken without dispute. A yong Lutenist dis∣putes and contends for every single touch of a string: but when he hath made it easy and habitual, he resolves to play a set of lessons, and every stroke is voluntary, though every one is not now actually consider'd.

Question.

To this §.* 1.308 of Ignorance belongs the question concerning Fraud and Guile. For if another man cosens and abuses my understanding, he places me in ignorance; and then it is worth our inquiry, What morality or what obli∣gation there is in those actions which are done by us so abus'd, so deceiv'd, so made ignorant, and incapable of judging rightly.

The answer relies upon the same grounds as formerly,* 1.309 with this advan∣tage, that he who is deceiv'd by the crafts of another, hath most common∣ly an ignorance that is very innocent; and then if that ignorance be wholly the cause of any action, the cause is innocent and so is the production. And upon the same accounts we are to judge concerning the obligation of pro∣mises and contracts made by persons in error and deception. 1. If the er∣ror be concerning the substance of the thing contracted for, the contract is naturally invalid, and obliges not at all. If Titius buy a horse, and Caius send him a Mule or an Oxe, there is nothing done, Titius hath made no bargain at all. If I buy a man-servant, and the Merchant sells me a mai∣den dress'd in mans apparrel, this makes the contract invalid; I made no bargain for a maid-servant, but for a man. When Jacob married Rachel, and lay with Leah, that Concumbency made no marriage between them; for the substitution of another person was such an injury as made the contract to be none at all: and unlesse Jacob had afterwards consented, Leah had been none of his wife. 2. If the error and ignorance be not in the sub∣stance of the contract, whatever else the error be, the contract is natural∣ly valid, that is, without a new contract and renewed consent it can stand; but if that error was the cause of the contract, which if the error had not been would not have been at all, then it is in the power of the abused per∣son to rescind the contract, and the fraudulent contractor is in Conscience bound to recede from all his ill-acquir'd advantages. The reason is, be∣cause he did injury to his neighbour, and plac'd him in evil dispositions and unaptnesse to chuse wisely, otherwise then God and the laws of nations and the common intention of contractors doe intend: and therefore although there was so much of the substantial requisites as could make a contract na∣turally valid,* 1.310 yet it was so ill, that all laws and intentions and tacit condi∣tions of contractors have thought fit to relieve the abused person, Dolo vel metu adhibito, actio quidem nascitur, si subdita stipulatio sit: per doli mali

tamen vel metûs exceptionem submoveri petitio debet: and the reason is given l. si dolo. 5. C. de rescindenda venditione; Si dolo adversarii deceptum venditionem praedii te fecisse Praeses provinciae aditus animadverterit, sciens contrarium esse dolum bonae fidei (quae in huju smodi contractibus maxime exi∣gitur) rescindi venditionem jubebit. In Contracts the honesty of the con∣tractors is principally to be regarded, and fraud is destructive of all honest intentions; and therefore the Praetor shall rescind such fraudulent bargains. 3. But if the error was not the intire cause of the contract, but that upon other accounts we would have bargain'd, onely we would not have paid so great a price, then the bargain is valid, and the Praetor cannot rescind it, nor the injur'd person revoke it; but the Civil law in this case did permit actio∣nem quanti minoris, that is, an amends for so much detriment as I suffer ap∣parently by the fraud.* 1.311 If Caius sells to Maevius sheep which he affirms to be sound, but they are indeed rotten, the law permits not rescission of the bargain, but forces Caius to restore so much of the price as the sheep were overvalued. And this is also the measure in the Court of Conscience. But this is to be understood in such cases where the fault of the vendible com∣modity cannot be discerned by the buyer, and where the seller did deceive voluntarily. For in other cases Caveat emptor is the rule of the law, let the buyer look to it, and it is also the rule in Conscience. The seller must not affirm the thing to be without fault, if he knows it vitious and faulty. But neither is he bound to proclaim the faults of his goods, if they be discer∣nible. And of this Cicero discourses reasonably,* 1.312 Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille quod non placebat proscripsit; quod placebat emisti. Quod si qui proscribunt villam bonam benéque aedificatam, non exi∣stimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est, nec aedificata ratione; multo mi∣nus qui domum non laudarunt: ubi enim judicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas? Quid vero est stultius quam vendito∣rem ejus rei quam vendat vitia narrare? Quid autem tam absurdum, quam si Domini jussu ita praeco praedicet, Domum vendo pestilentem? Who com∣pell'd thee to buy? The man that sold it did not (it may be) so much as de∣sire thee. He sold it because it did not please him; and because it did please thee, thou hast bought it. He that sets up a bill of sale and proclaims a house fair, and well-built and well-seated, hath not deceiv'd thee, though it be neither well-built, nor well-seated; because if it be intire for thee to make a judgement, he hath not deceiv'd thee. Much lesse if he hath not prais'd it. For if all that is spoken in the bill is not of necessity (viz. in order to the bargain or thy choice) to be verified, much lesse must that be perform'd or requir'd which was not spoken. But does ever any man cry stinking fish to be sold, or say, Come and buy a house that hath the plague in it? All this is great reason: Onely this is to be added, that such faults as cannot be discerned by the buyer, must be declar'd, or must be allowed for in the price: and the case is the same, if the buyer be a child, or a fool, or an ignorant undiscerning person;* 1.313 for no man must be made richer by the injurie and folly of his Brother. I know that in all the public contracts of mankind, that which all men consent in is, to buy cheap and to sell dear: but Christian religion, and the contempt of the world, and the love of spiritual interests,* 1.314 are sent from heaven, to cause merchandise to be an instance of society, and not a craft and robbery. 4. If the buyer be deceiv'd, but not by the seller, but by a third person, and that deception be the cause of the contract, the buyer may rescind the contract if he can; that is, he is

not in Conscience oblig'd to stand to it, if he can be quit in law: but he that deceiv'd him is bound to repair his injury if he have suffer'd any, or to break the bargain, if the goods be unalter'd. These things have no particular reason, but are evident upon the former accounts.

§. 3. Of Fear and Violence, and how these can make an action involuntary.

RULE VII. Fear that makes our reason uselesse, and suffers us not to consider, leaves the actions it produces free from crime, even though it self be culpable.

THe case is this;* 1.315 Roberto Mangone a poor Neapolitan travelling upon the Mountains to his own house, is seized on by the Banditi, a pistol is put to his breast, and he threatned to be kill'd unlesse he will be their guide to the house of Signior Seguiri his Landlord, whom he knows they intend to rob and murder. The poor Mangone did so: his Lord was murder'd, his goods rifled and his house burned. The question is, whether Mangone be guilty of his Lords death.

To this the answer is easy,* 1.316 that Mangone is not innocent; and though he did not consent clearly and delightingly to Seguiri's death, yet rather then die himself he was willing the other should. No man is desirous in a storm to throw his goods into the sea, if he could help it, and save his life; but rather then loose his goods and his life too, he heaves them over∣board. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.317 said Aristotle, These kind of actions are mixt, but they have more of spontaneity and election in them then of constraint. No Christian remaining a Chri∣stian is willing to offer sacrifice to Daemons, or to abjure Christ, if he be let alone: but he that in time of persecution falls away, not changing his heart, but denying his profession, this man is not excus'd by his fear, but betray'd by it.* 1.318 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, There are some things to which a man must not suf∣fer himself to be compell'd by any force, but he must rather die then doe them. And because there are some things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are insufferable to humane Nature, and therefore there is in laws as∣sign'd a certain allowance of fear qui potest cadere in fortem & constantem virum, that is, in the case of danger of suffering the extremest evils, and our obedience to humane laws is excus'd in such cases, because no man is ordinarily bound by the laws to suffer a greater evil in keeping the law, then is threatned by the law it self to him that breaks them; therefore the law allows an omission of obedience in the fear of the greatest evils, as I have already explicated* 1.319. But in Divine lawes it is otherwise, because no man can threaten or inflict on another an evil comparably so great as God does on them that break his laws; and therefore the lesse fear cannot be a reasonable excuse against a greater; and in all cases, the fear of man must

yield to the fear of God. And therefore in the matter of a Divine Com∣mandement, no fear of temporal evil is an excuse or warranty. Because we are taught to despise poverty and pain and death, and to doe all this chearfully and gloriously. And therefore this case of Conscience and it's whole dimensions are quickly measur'd.

But this is onely in Negative commandements,* 1.320 for they can never be broken with innocence upon what pretended necessity or violence soever. But in positive Commandements the case is not so clear, but fit to be more consider'd: But it will quickly also come to an issue, if we distinguish o∣missions from commissions. For no man may upon any pretence doe anything against a positive Commandement. He may omit to visit a Christian in prison, if he fears he shall loose his life in the visitation, or be threatned with any great calamity; but he may not doe him any injury or oppression to save his life and liberty.* 1.321 But I have to this also given particular answer upon another occasion. That which I am to adde here is this; There is no peradventure but the obedience to a positive commandement, till it be plac'd in it's own circumstances and requir'd here and now and so, will give place to so just a cause of deference and stay as is the securing our selves against a great fear. For where God hath not requir'd us in particular manner to doe a duty, he hath requir'd it in a very particular manner to preserve our selves. But when the case is so, that the particular is requir'd, no fear of man can hinder us. For in all things God is to be preferred. And therefore it is so rarely well order'd that unlesse it be in extraordinary cases, as the Apostles preaching the Gospel, their open confessions of faith, their declaring against the religions of the world at that time, for which they had special commands, and were to doe them and not to fear the fear of men, there is scarce any positive law of God but either it may be per∣form'd by an internal suppletory, by a desire and willingnesse and endea∣vour, or else will be sufficient to be done in the article of death, that is, then when we need not fear the worst that man can doe unto us. Thus it is in the susception of the Sacraments; from the actual susception of which by a great and just fear if we be frighted, we cannot be hindred from the desire and spiritual and most effective susception of them: and from the actual if we be by a just fear delayed (though the case cannot often happen) yet it is generally suppos'd that if they be done before our death, the commande∣ment is obeyed, if the delay was not on our part; and at our death no new fear of death can be a just excuse. However, if it or any thing else be po∣sitively and determinately requir'd in circumstances, we must not be afraid of them that can onely kill the body; or if we be, the fear and the omission are both criminal, and this is not excus'd by that.

But if in these or any other cases the fear be a surprise,* 1.322 sudden, and violent, and impetuous, that is, such that our reason is invaded and made uselesse, such as by a natural effort disorders all our faculties, such as that of Arachne in Ovid,

Quid mihi tunc animi misera fuit? anne quod agnae est Siqua lupos audit circum stabula alta frementes? Aut lepori, qui vepre latens hostilia cernit Ora canum, nullos audet dare corpore motus?

such a fright as a hare or lambe are in when they are pursued by dogs and ••oxes,

Occupat obsessos sudor mihi frigidus artus,* 1.323 Caerule aeque cadunt toto de corpore guttae,

when nature is in a lipothymie, and our strengths are made extravagant, when we can doe any thing in flying and nothing at all to consider; then our understanding cannot deliberate, and then our will does not consent, and then the effect is pityable but not criminal, but the fear it self possibly may be both. For sometimes our fear may be so great, that it fills all our fa∣culties, and then there cannot be any deliberation; for that must be at leisure, and must look upon two objects. Statius well describes this kind of fear in the similitude of a hunted stagge.

…..qualis cum cerva cruentis Circumventa lupis,* 1.324 nullum cui pectore molli Robur, & in volucri tenuis fiducia cursu, Praecipitat suspensa fugam, jam jamque teneri Credit, & illusos audit concurrere morsus:

she hath no courage, no confidence, no hope of any thing; she dies if she stayes, but she cannot stay to consider so long; and when she runs, she dies too, and she hears the wolf at her ear, and sees him with her eye, and feels the teeth in her heart, and dies with fear. In such cases as these we are as men without reason, and therefore to be judg'd accordingly. I have heard of a Trouper who in the late sad warres of England being alarm'd, was so affrighted that he bridled his Comerade instead of his horse: and in the last inroad which the Turks made into the Empire, a German carrier was so affrighted with the noise of Turkish horses coming, that he knew not how to make use of his own to fly away, but deploring his condition that his horse being loaden could not run fast, had not the reason left him, though he had time, to throw off his pack, but staid in that amazement, till the prisoner of fear became a slave to the Turks. What a man does in such a case, no equal estimator of things will impute to choice or malice. He that flies from a lion pursuing him, and in his affrightment runs into a River, is not criminally guilty of his own death. He runs into one death before another, but prefers it not: for if he were in the same fear of drow∣ning, he would leap ashore though a Lion did stand there expecting of a prey.

Concerning degrees of fear which are lesse,* 1.325 such which leave us in a power to consider and deliberate, they may lessen the malice of the crime to which they drive, but cannot make the fact innocent. He that is taken by a Tyrant and an unjust power and put amongst the troups, is not innocent though in that fear and against his will he fight against his Prince. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Dio Cocceius, They went willingly to warre, if at least they may be said to be willing who are constrain'd by fear. It is an unwilling willing∣nesse, and therefore it is a sin almost against their will. For in despite of such a constraint,* 1.326 a man may use his liberty; as Lucian saies of the yong man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He did not marry, but though his Father forc'd and compell••d him, yet he refus'd.

The same is the case of Superstition,* 1.327 which is an excessive and inordi∣nate fear in the matter of religion. If the fear be supreme and distracting, the effects of it are very pityable; but criminal onely in that degree in which

it is vincible and can be subdued by reason. When Michael Stifelius a Ger∣man in Luther's time had affrighted the people with a confident and terrible prediction of the day of Judgement within a few days to be revealed, the poor affrighted people left off their daily labours, and took care of no du∣ty for this life. This omission at another time would have been very cri∣minal; but now their superstitious fear did alleviate it, if not wholly take it away. But in this there is nothing particular, save onely that the causes of fear in this case are worse then in other things; but the effects themselves are not commonly very bad.

But this passion of fear hath in it yet more difficulty in relation to humane contracts and obligations,* 1.328 which can be evacuated and declar'd ne∣ver to have oblig'd if they commenc'd with fear. For upon this account some pretend contracts of marriages, absolutions from Ecclesiastical cen∣sures, testimonies in testamentary causes, vowes, donations, sentences, re∣signations of Benefices, constitutions of Proctors, election to offices, and oaths of obligation to men, and promises, not to oblige, if the promiser or contractor was constrained by fear.

But to all these the answer will be the same,* 1.329 for they are all discernable by the same reason. If the fear was such that it might affright a wise and a constant person, the law judges the contract to be null, and not to oblige in law, which is the measure of contracts and legal obligations. But al∣though the law declares many particular cases, in which the fear does annul the contract, and in such cases ordinarily there needs no further inquiry; yet because many cases happen in which the law hath not regularly declar'd her sentence, by that measure which the law goes by, we may without trou∣ble determine our selves. The rule therefore is this; When any evil threat∣ned is so great, that to suffer it is more intolerable then to doe the thing to which you are compell'd, there the fear is suppos'd great enough to nullify the contract. If a rich person be threatned, that he shall be forc'd to pay a hundred pound, or marry the oppressors daughter; if he promises to marry her he is oblig'd, and that fear and that threatning shall not prevail to eva∣cuate his promise. Because he that so threatens intending but an evil that is very tolerable, if the marriage be of worse mischief, he did not chuse it out of fear; for he that does so, chuses the lesse evil to avoid a greater, not a greater to avoid a lesse:* 1.330 so S. Austin observes, Neque enim dici solet quispiam voluntate fecisse, siquid fecit invitus; quanquam si subtiliùs advertamus, etiam quod quisque invitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate fecit: sed quia malit aliud,* 1.331 ideo invitus, hoc est, nolens, facere dicitur; and Simplicius to the same purpose, quia licet inviti agamus, tamen sic agere eligimus, It is in∣deed against our will; but when things are in an evil state, we chuse the least. If therefore he chuses that which he saies is a worse evil, he cannot pretend it is for that fear; and consequently it must be upon some other motive, something of his own; and if it be, it will verify the contract. Titius finds Caius at an advantage with a Watch & a Ring about him of no great value; he threatens to take them from him, unlesse Caius will promise the next day to bring him twenty talents. Caius promises it, and therefore is oblig'd, for he cannot say, he was compell'd. For no lesse violence can constrain us to suffer a greater, because that is far more eligible then this. And there∣fore the law calls nothing a just cause of fear, but the fear of the greatest evils, as death, torment, dismembring, intolerable disgrace; that is, such

things which to avoid a man would suffer any evil that is lesse. Now be∣cause in contracts we intend some advantage to our selves, real or imagina∣ry, and in contracts effected by a great fear we can design none but the avoiding of a greater mischief, the law and right reason wholly attribute it to fear, and therefore annul the contract. Martial's case is pertinent to this inquiry,

Quod si me tonsor,* 1.332 cum stricta novacula supra est, Tunc libertatem divitiasque roget, Promittam: nec enim rogat illo tempore tonsor; Latro rogat: res est imperiosa timor. Sed fuerit curvâ cùm tuta novacula thecâ, Frangam tonsori crura manusque simul.

If a Barber when the rasor is upon my throat contracts with me for twenty pound, if I fear he will cut my throat if he be denied, I promise to him as to a thief, with whom whatsoever contract I make in my intolerable fear, no law of man does verify it. But Martial as to his instance was no good Casuist.

For if it be inquir'd whether I am oblig'd in Conscience to keep my promise to a thief or a bandito,* 1.333 which I made to save my life; I answer that I am. Because he being an outlaw and rebell against all Civil laws, and in a state of warre, whatever you promise to him, you are to understand it ac∣cording to that law under which then you are, which is the law of Nature and Force together. So that you cannot be guarded by the defensative of the Civil laws, nor is your contract under it's guard and conditions. In contracts under the protection of Civil laws, we are to goe by it's mea∣sures, and the contract is good or bad accordingly. But when we have no measures but what we can get of our selves, our contracts are to begin and end between our selves, and by our own proportions. But in law no man is suppos'd to have consented, but he in whose power it is to dissent. Si vis scire ut velim,* 1.334 effice ut possim nolle: and every contract must have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Damascen calls it, a desire free from all bond. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If there be force and a sad necessity in it, it is a calamity ra∣ther then a contract; and therefore the laws intend to defend and rescue us from the oppression.

I am to adde one caution,* 1.335 That no reverential fear, let it be never so great, and the person never so timorous, so that the use and ministeries of reason be left, can excuse a sin, or nullify a contract. The reason is given by Aristotle,* 1.336 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Fathers Empire hath in it no violence and no coaction. And Heliodorus Prusaeus in his paraphrase saith the same thing, that the commands of Pa∣rents, or such whom we reverence and fear, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have not such force as to compel: not but that we are to obey; but that what we doe out of reverential fear to them is not compell'd, but voluntary and chosen.

What is said of Fear,* 1.337 is not true of other passions, lust and anger, or whatever else is productive of those effects which use to make men asham'd, and disorder all their interests. 1. Because these passions are seldome of that nature and degree of violence as to take away all powers of delibera∣tion, and therefore they are but seldome fit to be pretended in excuse of any

action. 2. They are commonly the true Mothers, the univocal parents of their productions, otherwise then it is in fear and drunkennesse and igno∣rance; for these produce things of a nature different from their immediate principles, as drunkennesse produces effects of anger, of lust, &c. that is, it is the occasion of them, not the proper Mother. But lust produces lust, and anger sends forth angry words, and spitefull actions, and resolutions of revenge. 3. The products which come from these passions are so very far from being rendred involuntary, that by these passions they are made most delightfull, and without them they could not please at all. 4. Whenever they prevail to any violence or extremity of degree, it is by an increasing will; not by weaknesse and natural infirmity, but by a moral state of infir∣mity, that is, a state of sinfulnesse. 5. It is not in these as it is in fear, or vincible ignorance, that what is voluntary in the cause may be involuntary in the effect: but in these passions and temptations, the Mother and the daughter are chosen; not the one directly and the other by interpretation, but both of them properly, directly and immediately. For these rea∣sons the case of these passions is curiously to be distinguish'd from the pre∣cedent. But when these passions doe come to extremity, although their proper acts are not the lesse sins but the greater, as an act of anger is the more devilish by how much the passion is the more extreme; yet if any aequivocal and contingent effects be produc'd, as if in the violence of lust a child be run over and hurt, or any thing that is not natrual to that passion, nor intended by the man, then according to the degree of the ecstasy and transport by the passion, the contingent effect may be lessen'd in it's malig∣nity. And in this sense is that of Libanius to be understood;* 1.338 or else it is not true, that injuries are very often to be remitted if the man hath drunken∣nesse for his excuse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or anger, or for∣getfullnesse, or arrogance, or any such like thing. Like to this is that of Arrius Menander,* 1.339 Capital punishments are not to be inflicted per vinum aut lasci∣viam lapsis, to them that offend by the follies of drunkennesse or the violence of lust.

—Et vino tortus, & irâ:

Wine & rage are like two racks, & compel men to open secrets. Now when the case is so that the effect is aequivocal, as it is in drunkennesse in many instances, and in other passions sometimes, there onely there is some dimi∣nution or excusing of the crime. But the Ancients gave too much liberty, and an indifferent sentence in these cases, because wanting the Christian measures they understood no better.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  habetur 15. qu. 1. in princip. lib. De duabu•• animabus cap. 11.
• * 1.3

  ibid. ubi suprá. cap. non est.
• * 1.4

  2.
• * 1.5

  lib. de fide con∣tra Manichaeos cap. 10.
• * 1.6

  3.
• * 1.7

  4.
• * 1.8

  Ovid. Trist. lib. 4. El. 3.
• * 1.9

  Sil. Ital. l. 9.
• * 1.10

  5.
• * 1.11

  6.
• * 1.12

  S. Augusti〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 2. de peccator. merit. cap. 18. Vide etiam Prosper. lib. 1. de vocat. g••••tium cap. 8. & ad capi∣tula Gallor•••••• Sent. 6. & contra Col∣latorem, cap. ••••. & carmen d•• ingratis capp. 26, 2••. & ult. Vide etiam & Fulgent. lib. de incarnat. & gratiâ Christi. cap. 20. Gregorii lib. 18. moral cap. 21. & lib. 33. cap. 25. & V. B••••••m in Gen. 4. super verbis Do∣mini ad Cain. Sed super omnes videa∣tur 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Bernardi liber de gratia & li∣ber•• arbitrio: vide eundem serm. 81. in Canti••a.
• * 1.13

  7.
• * 1.14

  8.
• * 1.15

  Hose. 9. 10.
• * 1.16

  1 Cor. 6. 17.
• * 1.17

  9.
• * 1.18

  Job 21. Psal. 35.
• * 1.19

  10.
• * 1.20

  11.
• * 1.21

  12.
• * 1.22

  13.
• * 1.23

  14.
• * 1.24

  15.
• * 1.25

  16.
• * 1.26

  17.
• * 1.27

  18.
• * 1.28

  de Peccator. merit. & remiss. c. 18.
• * 1.29

  19.
• * 1.30

  Epist. 11. ad Augustin.
• * 1.31

  homil. 27. in Evang.
• * 1.32

  tom. 7. l. 3.
• * 1.33

  20.
• * 1.34

  Matth. 12. 36.
• * 1.35

  in libr. Timo∣ris.
• * 1.36

  In comment ad hunc locum.
• * 1.37

  in Regul, bre∣vior. resp. ad interr. 23.
• * 1.38

  Epist. 20. lib. 5
• * 1.39

  Phaedr. fab. l. 2. 36.
• * 1.40

  21.
• * 1.41

  22.
• * 1.42

  23.
• * 1.43

  24.
• * 1.44

  25.
• * 1.45

  Gen. 48. 16.
• * 1.46

  Isai. 4. 1.
• * 1.47

  James 2. 7.
• * 1.48

  26.
• * 1.49

  Matth. 12. 30. Luk•• 11. 23.
• * 1.50

  27.
• * 1.51

  Marc. 9. 40. Luke 9. 50.
• * 1.52

  28.
• * 1.53

  29.
• * 1.54

  30.
• * 1.55

  31.
• * 1.56

  32.
• * 1.57

  33.
• * 1.58

  34.
• * 1.59

  35.
• * 1.60

  John 15. 1, 2.
• * 1.61

  Quintil. l. 8. 6.
• * 1.62

  S. Greg. Homil. 7. in Evang.
• * 1.63

  36.
• * 1.64

  1.
• * 1.65

  2.
• * 1.66

  ff. de reg. ju. l. 152.
• * 1.67

  3.
• * 1.68

  4.
• * 1.69

  5.
• * 1.70

  lib. 2. Chap. 1. Rule 5.
• * 1.71

  Vide Petrum Peckium ad c. 10. Ratihabiti∣onem. de regul. jur. in 6••0.
• * 1.72

  6.
• * 1.73

  Phaedr. fab. 10.
• * 1.74

  7.
• * 1.75

  de Bello civill▪ l. 1.
• * 1.76

  Avian. fab.
• * 1.77

  l. 167. §. 1. Qui ju••••u.
• * 1.78

  l. 207. ff. de reg. jur. & Ulpian. lib. 1. ad segem Juliam & Pa∣piam. lib. 3.
• * 1.79

  lib. 2. c. 7.
• * 1.80

  8.
• * 1.81

  l. 157. §. ad ea quae.
• * 1.82

  l. 11. is qui in puteum. §. 6. si Tutoris jussu. ff. quod vi a••clam. l. 17. sed si unius. §. si jussu Domini. ff. de injuriis.
• * 1.83

  Ecclus. 4. 22.
• * 1.84

  9.
• * 1.85

  2 Sam. 24.
• * 1.86

  Horat.
• * 1.87

  Martial.
• * 1.88

  Serm. 8. de Benef.
• * 1.89

  10.
• * 1.90

  11.
• * 1.91

  12.
• * 1.92

  l. 142. ff. de reg. Jur.
• * 1.93

  c. super eo. de cognat. spiri∣tuali.
• * 1.94

  13.
• * 1.95

  14.
• * 1.96

  15.
• * 1.97

  16.
• * 1.98

  17.
• * 1.99

  18.
• * 1.100

  19.
• * 1.101

  l. quidam. ff. de re judic. & l. Barbarius. ff. de offic. praetor.
• * 1.102

  20.
• * 1.103

  See Book 1. Chapt. 5. Rule 8. Numb. 17, 18.
• * 1.104

  21.
• * 1.105

  Plutarch. in apoph. Rom.
• * 1.106

  22.
• * 1.107

  cap. si quis vi∣duam. 50. di∣stinct. c. 2. de cler. pug. in duello. c. sicut dignum ••. cle∣ricos. de homici.
• * 1.108

  Claudian. lib. 1. in Eutrop.
• * 1.109

  23.
• * 1.110

  Claud. ibid.
• * 1.111

  24.
• * 1.112

  Ephes. 4. 28.
• * 1.113

  Phil. 4. 8.
• * 1.114

  25.
• * 1.115

  26.
• * 1.116

  See lib. 2. Chap. 2. Rule 6. Numb. 31.
• * 1.117

  27.
• * 1.118

  Homil. 6. in Matth.
• * 1.119

  Quem Deum hujus mundi vocat Apostolus: quem Deum scil. hujusmodi ludorum auth••rem indigitat Hieronymus.

  Vida Cremonensis, Poeta non incelebris, Mox verò gratum ludum mortalibus ipse Ostendit Deus, & morem certaminis hujus. Namque olim, ut perhibent, dilectam Scacc••ida, quá non Inter Serialas praestantior altera Nymphas, Compressit ripā errantem, & nil tale putantem, Dum pascit niveos herbosa ad flumina olores. Tum bicolor••m buxum dedit, atque pudoris Amissi pretium, vario ordine picturatum Argentique auriq••c gravem tabulam addit, usumque Edocuit; Nymphaeque etiam nunc servat honorem Et Nomen Ludus, celebrat quem maxime, Roma, Extremaeque hominum diversa ad littora gentes.
• a 1.120

  in Phaedro.
• b 1.121

  de alcatoribus
• * 1.122

  Serm. de S. Mattkia.
• * 1.123

  lib. 1. de Dae∣monol.
• * 1.124

  Eurip.
• * 1.125

  lib. 1. Origin. c. 67.
• * 1.126

  28.
• * 1.127

  Polymath. l. 8. c. 3. De prob. vol. 2. conc. 13. 6.
• * 1.128

  Horat.
• * 1.129

  lib. 3. Cod. Justin. tit. 43. & in Authen∣tic. tit. de Sa∣crosanctis E∣piscopis. §. inter∣dicimus.
• * 1.130

  Horat. Ep. 1.
• * 1.131

  ff. l. 11. tit. 5. de alcator. vide etiam Wesen∣bech. ibid.
• * 1.132

  de Vita beara c. 7.
• a 1.133

  de Alea.
• b 1.134

  praxis. p. 507. c. 126. & alibi.
• * 1.135

  29.
• * 1.136

  Ovid. de r••∣med.
• * 1.137

  lib. de Al••••••ri∣bus.
• * 1.138

  de Christian. milite.
• * 1.139

  Can. 79. Vide etiam can. 41, & 42. A∣postol.
• * 1.140

  de vita & ho∣nestate Clericor. cap. Cleric. L. 6. c. 200.
• * 1.141

  Vide etiam De∣cretum dist. 35. c. 8. Episcop. & de excessu prae∣latorum, cap. in∣ter dilectos.
• * 1.142

  30.
• * 1.143

  Horat. l. 2. Sat. 1.
• * 1.144

  lib. 3. c. 21. l. 8. c. 8.
• * 1.145

  Janus Rut∣gersius legit [in scnilibus] non [in scurrili∣bus] Pontanus [in serotinis lusibus] Scrive∣rius [inheroicis] alii [inseriis] unico verbo.
• * 1.146

  † Alex. ab Alex.
• * 1.147

  in Caesarib.
• * 1.148

  Polyc. lib. 1. c. 5.
• * 1.149

  31.
• * 1.150

  32.
• * 1.151

  Phaedrus. LIII
• * 1.152

  Petrus Folle∣rius. Senec. de Brevit. vitae c. 13.
• * 1.153

  33.
• * 1.154

  Teren. Andria.
• * 1.155

  S. Hieron. ep. ad Gaudent.
• * 1.156

  Plaut. Persâ.
• * 1.157

  34.
• * 1.158

  Ovid.
• * 1.159

  35.
• * 1.160

  apud Sucton.
• * 1.161

  36.
• * 1.162

  lib. 3. Cod. tit. 43. Vide ibi Cuja∣cium, & Wesen∣bech. ff. l. 11. tit. 5. Cicer. ad At∣ticum. Ep. 13. l. 1.
• * 1.163

  ib. 4. Ethic. c. 1.
• * 1.164

  Specul. anim. c. 2. & in Sent. lib. 1. dist. 25. part. 2. art. 2. q. 1. in conclus. ad 4.
• * 1.165

  Epist. 54. ad Macedon.
• * 1.166

  ibid.
• * 1.167

  1 Cor. 13.
• * 1.168

  ubi supra.
• * 1.169

  37.
• * 1.170

  Juven. sat. 13.
• * 1.171

  Plutarch. in Reg. & Imper∣apoph.
• * 1.172

  38.
• * 1.173

  Anton Gu••va∣ta. horol. Prine.
• * 1.174

  per Anton. Guevata.
• * 1.175

  orat. pro A••∣chia ••o••t.
• * 1.176

  39.
• * 1.177

  ad Attic. ep. 13. l. 1.
• * 1.178

  in 2^â Philip∣pic.
• * 1.179

  1.
• * 1.180

  Vide Unum necessar. cap. 5. of Habitual sins.
• * 1.181

  2.
• * 1.182

  3.
• * 1.183

  4.
• * 1.184

  Mart. Ep. 42. l. 9.
• * 1.185

  5.
• * 1.186

  6.
• * 1.187

  7.
• * 1.188

  8.
• * 1.189

  9.
• * 1.190

  10.
• * 1.191

  11.
• * 1.192

  12.
• * 1.193

  Lib. 3. Chap. 1. Rule 4.
• * 1.194

  Quintil.
• * 1.195

  Sententiar. 5.
• * 1.196

  in Andria, act. 1. sc. 4.
• * 1.197

  13.
• * 1.198

  14.
• * 1.199

  in Apologet. & in Exhortat. castit. & de Virg. velandis.
• * 1.200

  15.
• * 1.201

  Exod. 21. 12.
• * 1.202

  1.
• * 1.203

  Luke 21. 34.
• * 1.204

  Unum necessar. cap. 5.
• * 1.205

  2.
• * 1.206

  3.
• * 1.207

  4.
• * 1.208

  lib. 22. contr. Faust. cap. 44.
• * 1.209

  5.
• * 1.210

  6.
• * 1.211

  7.
• * 1.212

  8.
• * 1.213

  Bartol. in l. ex facto. in prin∣cip. ff. de vulg. & pupilla sub∣stit.
• * 1.214

  9.
• * 1.215

  10.
• * 1.216

  11.
• * 1.217

  Senec. Herc. Fur.
• * 1.218

  1.
• * 1.219

  1 Timoth. 4.
• * 1.220

  Bo••th. lib. 3. de Consol. Phi∣los.
• * 1.221

  Seneca.
• * 1.222

  2.
• * 1.223

  lib. 5. de Phi∣losoph. cap. 2.
• * 1.224

  3.
• * 1.225

  4.
• * 1.226

  5.
• * 1.227

  6.
• * 1.228

  7.
• * 1.229

  8.
• * 1.230

  9.
• * 1.231

  10.
• * 1.232

  11.
• * 1.233

  12.
• * 1.234

  13.
• * 1.235

  14.
• * 1.236

  15.
• * 1.237

  16.
• * 1.238

  l. de Mendacio.
• * 1.239

  lib. 6. Ethic. cap. 5.
• * 1.240

  Epist. 98.
• a 1.241

  in l. 6. Eth. c. 5.
• b 1.242

  in Hippia minor.
• * 1.243

  17.
• * 1.244

  Sleidan. lib. 4.
• * 1.245

  18.
• * 1.246

  in Psal. 66. v. 18.
• * 1.247

  1.
• * 1.248

  2.
• * 1.249

  l. 9. ff. de jur. & fact. ignor. & l. 20. ff. de aqua & aquae pluvi.
• * 1.250

  l. 3. §. 2. ff. de injur.
• * 1.251

  de Hippocrat. & Platon. placit.
• * 1.252

  apud Stobaeu•••• in Physicis Eclogis.
• a 1.253

  de Anima.
• b 1.254

  de Nat. Hom. cap. 2.
• * 1.255

  3.
• * 1.256

  Lucret. l. 3.
• * 1.257

  4.
• * 1.258

  de Placit. philos. 5. c. 24.
• * 1.259

  Diog. Laert. in Zenone.
• * 1.260

  tit. 26.
• * 1.261

  in 8. Eclog. Virgil.
• * 1.262

  lib. 60. tit. 39.
• † 1.263

  tit. 71.
• * 1.264

  5.
• * 1.265

  Vide 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. ubi supra. in Epit. leg. tit. ult. num. 21.
• * 1.266

  lib. 10. de Ge∣nes. ad liter. cap. 13.
• * 1.267

  lib. 11. cap. 18.
• * 1.268

  lib. 18. cap. 3.
• * 1.269

  l. 1. §. impuberi, ff. de Senat. Silan. habena.
• * 1.270

  6.
• * 1.271

  Declamat. 21.
• * 1.272

  Quaest. 84.
• * 1.273

  Epist. 57.
• * 1.274

  Cicer. pro Cluent.
• * 1.275

  7.
• * 1.276

  l. 15. ff. de juris. l. Divus. ff. ad leg. Cornel.
• * 1.277

  8.
• * 1.278

  l. 5. Epist.
• * 1.279

  9.
• * 1.280

  Luke 23. 34. Acts 3. 17.
• * 1.281

  John 9. 41.
• * 1.282

  1 Tim. 1. Gal. 1.
• * 1.283

  10.
• * 1.284

  11.
• * 1.285

  Gemara San∣hed••in cap. 8. Ad Iliad. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.286

  Moral. l. 1. ad Eudem. c. 34. & Ethic. ad Nicom. l. 3. c. 3, & 4. Vide etiam Po∣litic. 2. cap. ult. & Rhetor. 2. cap. 27.
• * 1.287

  Averroes in l. 3. Ethic. c. 5.
• * 1.288

  ad Herennium 2.
• * 1.289

  Tr••cul. Act. 4. Sc••n. 2.
• * 1.290

  12.
• * 1.291

  Aulul. Act. 4. Scen. 10.
• * 1.292

  Orat. 3.
• * 1.293

  13.
• * 1.294

  14.
• * 1.295

  qu. 59. in Genes.
• * 1.296

  in l. 6. de R•• milit.
• * 1.297

  15.
• * 1.298

  Aulul. Act. 4. Scen. 7.
• * 1.299

  16.
• * 1.300

  Declamat. 22.
• * 1.301

  17.
• * 1.302

  See Rule 4. of this Chap. Num. 2.
• * 1.303

  18.
• * 1.304

  Homil. 5. in Genes. Homil. 44. in Genes. lib. 2. contr. Faust. Manic. cap. 44.
• * 1.305

  lib. de Patri∣arch. cap. 6.
• * 1.306

  19.
• * 1.307

  20.
• * 1.308

  21.
• * 1.309

  22.
• * 1.310

  l. Dolo. 5. C. de inutilib. sti∣pulat. & instit. de exceptionib. in initio.
• * 1.311

  l. 13. ff. de acti∣onibus empti. in princ.
• * 1.312

  lib. 3. Offic.
• * 1.313

  l. in causae. §. Idem Pomp. ff. de minor. & l. item si. §. ult. ff. loc.
• * 1.314

  l. si volun∣tate. C. de re∣scind. vend.
• * 1.315

  1.
• * 1.316

  2.
• * 1.317

  Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 1.
• * 1.318

  ibid.
• * 1.319

  lib. 3. Chap. 1. Rule 2.
• * 1.320

  3.
• * 1.321

  ubi suprá. & lib. 2. Chap. 3. Rule 11.
• * 1.322

  4.
• * 1.323

  lib. 3 Metam
• * 1.324

  lib. 5. Thebais.
• * 1.325

  5.
• * 1.326

  Dial. Me••etrie.
• * 1.327

  6.
• * 1.328

  7.
• * 1.329

  8.
• * 1.330

  lib••. singul. ad Marcellin. de Spir. & liter.
• * 1.331

  in Epicte••um.
• * 1.332

  lib. 11. Ep. 59.
• * 1.333

  9.
• * 1.334

  Seneca.
• * 1.335

  10.
• * 1.336

  Ethic. lib. 10. c. ult.
• * 1.337

  11.
• * 1.338

  Declamat. 22.
• * 1.339

  ubi suprá.