Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE III. The act of the Will alone, although no external acti∣on or event doe follow, is imputed to good or evil by God and men.

THe will of man in the production and perfecting of a sin hath six steps or degrees of volition,* 1.1 in all which the sin is actual, excepting the first onely. 1. The inclination of the will is the first; and that so far as it is natural, so far it is innocent. Sin oftentimes enters in at that door, but the door was plac'd there in the first creation; it was a part of that building which God made and not man, and in which every stone and stick was good. It was not made for sin, but for vertue; but it was made so, that if we would bring sin in that way, it was in our choice, and at our perill. But al∣though this be the case of our natural inclination, yet if our inclinations be

acquir'd, or increas'd, or habitual, that is, if they become facilities and promptitudes to sin, they are not innocent: for this state is a state of sin and death, it is the effect of many vile actions and vile desires, it is an aversion from and an enmity against God; it is a bed of desires which are sometimes asleep, and then doe no more mischief then a sleeping wolfe, but when they are awake they doe all the evil they can.* 1.2 And therefore the case of an ha∣bitual sinner is such, that even his first inclinations to any forbidden action in the instance of his own habit are criminal as the external effect. But in natural inclinations the case is different. 2. The first beginning of the sin is when the will stops and arrests it self upon the tempting object, and con∣sents onely so far that it will have it consider'd and disputed. Then the will is come too far, not when it is willing a thing should be disputed whether it be lawfull or unlawfull, good or evil; but when it is willing it be considered which is to be followed, Reason or Sense, wise counsels or sensual pleasures: for when the will is gone so far it is past beyond what is natural, and come so far towards choice and guiltinesse, that it is yet no more friend to ver∣tue then to vice, and knows not which to chuse. 3. The next step the will makes is when it is pleas'd with the thought of it, and tasts the honey with the top of a rod, a little phantastic pleasure before-hand in the medi∣tation of the sin. This prelibation is but the antepast of the action, and as the twilight to the dark night, it is too near an approach to a deed of darknesse. 4. When the will is gone thus far and is beyond the white lines of innocence, the next step towards a perfect sin is a desire to doe the acti∣on; not clearly and distinctly, but upon certain conditions, if it were lawfull, and if it were convenient, and if it were not for something that lies crosse in the way. Here our love to vertue is lost, onely fear and God's restrain∣ing grace remains still for the revocation of the man to wisedome and se∣curity. 5. But when this obstacle is remov'd, and that the heart consents to the sin, then the Spirit is departed, and then there remains nothing but that the sin be [6] contriv'd within, and [7.] committed to the faculties and members to goe about their new and unhappy imployment; and then both the outward and the inward man have combin'd and made up the body of a sin. But the sin begins within, and the guilt is contracted by what is done at home, by that which is in our own power, by that which nothing from without can hinder. For as for the external act, God for ends of his own providence does often hinder it; and yet he that fain would, but cannot bring his evil purposes to passe, is not at all excused, or the lesse a Criminal before God.

Question.

But is it not a mercy for a man to be recalled from acting his adultery?* 1.3 is it not charity to two persons to keep Autolycus from killing the steward of Stratocles? and if so, then there is sin in the action as well as in the affe∣ction, and the hand sins distinctly from the heart: but then it will be found untrue to say that all our good and evil comes from the will and choice, and yet it will not be possible to tell from what principle the evil of the hand is derived, if not from the evil will. This brings a necessity of inquiring into the union, or difference of the actions internal and external, and the influence the will hath upon the external act, and whether it can have any aggravation or degree beyond what it receives from the inward principle.

To this therefore I answer,* 1.4 That all the morality of any action depends wholly on the will, and is seated in the inner man; and the eye is not adul∣terous, but it is the instrument of an adulterous heart; and the hand is not the thief before God, but the covetous desire is guilty: and this appears in this, because if a man takes the goods of his neighbour, which he would not have taken if he had suppos'd they had been his neighbours, he is in∣nocent before God. And yet it cannot be denied but it is worse to steal then to covet, it is worse to humble and dishonour our neighbours wife then to lust after her. But the reason is, because the doing of the action supposes a great many precedent acts of lust, even the whole method and oeconomy of sin: for every act of the will, every degree of desire is lusting or cove∣tousnesse; and the external act which supposes them all, is worse then all them except the last. The natural inclination of the will is but a capaci∣ty or readinesse and disposition of the faculty, and is no act. But the arrest and stop of the will, the delight in fancying, the desire of action, the con∣sent of the heart, and the deliberation and resolution, these are the acts and products of the will; and the second is worse then the first, and the third worse then the second, and so till we come to the immediate addresse to the action: but that action is not worse then the last resolution and deliberate purpose of the will; and therefore when it is charity to hinder the man from acting his lust, it is therefore charity, because in the acting of the sin ex∣ternally there are more acts of the will, even the whole method of death is completed, and the same acts of will are repeated, or confirm'd, and there is mischief done to some person or to some interest, to something be∣sides the sinning man, and there are some contingencies and some circum∣stances to which new actions of the will must be consenting and give their influence and renew their acts: but still, if we compare every consent and deliberate purpose of the will with the action, or that part of the action which is immediately produc'd in it, there is in that event no morality, and no good, and no evil but what is first within. So that he who hinders a man from acting of his lust, does hinder him not from sins distinct from those of his will, but from more sins of the will, from repetition, or con∣firmation, or abiding in the same chosen folly.

Upon this account it will be easy to answer whether is the greater sin,* 1.5 the wishing and desiring a very great evil, and willingly doing but a little one, or the doing a very great evil and an intolerable mischief with a little malice. For it is certain that the sin is much more increas'd by the malice of the action and effect then by the malice of the will, if the malice of the will be little, and the evil of the event be great and intolerable. For at first to desire a very great mischief, and then to act but a little one, sup∣poses that the great malice went not to it's utmost period; it was desir'd, but not resolved on, and deliberately determin'd: and then that malice though in it self great, yet it was ineffective, and was retracted before it was consummate by the will, and acted by her subjects the other faculties and members. But now, if a great mischief be done by a little malice, to that little malice all that event is to be imputed: though not to it alone, yet to that malice manag'd by ignorance, carelessenesse and folly; which being no excuses, but of themselves criminal appendages, the man shall be judged by his action, not by his ignorant and imperfect choice; because though the choice was naturally imperfect, yet morally and in the whole conjunction of it's circumstances it was completely Criminal. If this thing happens to

be otherwise in any particular, God will discern it, and not man; for the greatnesse of the mischief in humane laws and accounts supposes the great∣nesse of the malice, if malice at all, and not chance wholly was the prin∣ciple. But if the question be in the acting of a great mischief where the sin most lies, in the will or in the event, I say it is originally in the will; and it is equally in the event, if all that event was foreseen and known, al∣though it was not principally or at all design'd. He that steales a cow from a widow, and does verily believe that the losse of her cow will not onely undoe her, but break her heart, though he does not designe this, yet because he knows it, all that event is to be imputed to him. They that abuse their own bodies by abominable and unclean contacts, & the sin of Onan, though they design onely the pleasing of their lust, yet if they consider what they doe, and what will be the event, they secondarily chuse all that event, and are as guilty of it as of that which they principally design'd.

—quòd pellice laevâ* 1.6 Uteris, & Veneri servit amica manus, Hoc nihil esse putas? scelus est, mihi crede, sed ingens, Quantum vix animo concipis ipse tuo. Ipsam crede tibi naturam dicere rerum, Istud quod digitis, Pontice, perdis, homo est.

For the internal act of the will and the external act of the man are but one act, unlesse the instrument and the efficient cause produce two distinct effects in every concourse; and whatsoever is done without is first consen∣ted to within, and is but the ministery and execution of the sin within. For the act of chusing is the foundation of all morality: and therefore when not onely the first design, but the appendages and other consequents are foreseen, and yet the action is chosen, the will is guilty of so many evils as it chuses directly and indirectly, principally and consequently.

But to reduce this doctrine to more minute and particular considera∣tions* 1.7 and order.

Of the identity and diversity respectively of actions internal and external, and the multiplications of sins by them.

1. Every external act proceeding from the internal makes but one moral act, whether it be good or bad. The election and choice is the foundation: and as they are many houses which are built upon many foundations, but many chambers and galleries built upon one foundation is but one house, though there be many rooms; so the internal and external relying upon one basis operating to the same end, effecting the same work, having the same cause, and being but several lengths of the same thrid, doe not make two acts; as the soul seeing by the eye hath but one vision, and the will acting by the hand does but her own act by her own instrument: and therefore although they are Physically or Naturally several actions, because elicite and acted by several faculties, yet morally they are but one; for what the hand or eye alone does, is neither good nor evil, but it is made so by the mind and will.

2. If there be two acts of will in one external act,* 1.8 there is a double malice or goodnesse respectively. A Prince commands his Almoner to give much almes to the poor; the almoner being also a good man loves the imployment, and does it very often: the external act is but the one ministery of almes, but the internal is both obedience and charity.

3. The external act is the occasion of the intending or extending the internal,* 1.9 but directly & of it self increases not the goodnesse or the badnesse of it. For the external act is not properly and formally good or bad, but onely objectively and materially; just as a wall cannot increase the white∣nesse, unlesse the quality it self be intended by it's own principle. But as heat in iron is more intense then it is in straw; so may the goodnesse or the badnesse of an internal act be increased by the external: but this is onely by accident. By instances of these several assertions, they will be more in∣telligible. When John surnam'd the Almoner commanded his boy to carry an almes to a poor man that was sick in the next village, the boy sometimes would detain it and reserve it for his own vanity; but S. John lost not the reward of his charity, for his internal act was good, but it was no cause of the outward event at all. And on the other side, when Maevius lay with his wife Petronilla, supposing she had been Nicostrata, he was an adulterer before God, though by the laws of men he was harmlesse. And if a man steals a horse in the night from his neighbours field, and carries him away secretly, and by the morning perceives it to be his own, he is no lesse guilty before God and his Confesssor then if he had indeed stoln his neighbours. The rea∣son is, because the external act hath another cause, which is or may be in∣nocent, but the internal act was of it self completely evil and malicious. In these cases, where the internal volition is not the cause of the external event, the sin is terminated within, and that to him who is to be our Judge is as vi∣sible as any thing. But when the internal volition is properly the cause of the action external, there more is done then it could doe alone. For in a good work the will finds the difficulties which it could not perceive while it was onely in purpose; and it is easy to resolve to be patient in sicknesse when we feel nothing of it, but onely discourse it, and cast about in our easy minds what we suppose it will be: but Tu si hic esses, aliter sentires, said the sick man; it may be when it comes to be acted, the will shall find new work, new difficulties, and will need new fortifications, and renewed resolutions, and the repetition of acts, and fresh aids of reason: so that although all the good or evil that is in all this, is the good or evil of the will; yet this is it which I said, that the external action hath in it the materiality of good and evil, and by accident the external act is better then the internal, that is, the will does better when she reduces her purposes to act very often, then when she does onely resolve. And for this very reason

4. The external act does superadde new obligations beyond those* 1.10 which are consequent to the mere internal volition though never so perfect and complete. For the external act is exemplar in vertue, or scandalous in evil; it obliges to restitution, to Ecclesiastical censures and legal penalties, in which there are active and passive duties incumbent on us (as I have re∣presented in the third book.) Thus also in good things; the external par∣ticipation of the Sacraments hath in it some advantages beyond the inter∣nal: but these things are accidental to the action, and nothing of the nature of it; they are nothing of the direct morality, but the consequent of it;

which the sinner ought indeed to have consider'd beforehand, and to act or to omit accordingly.

5. If the course and continuance of the outward act be interrupted,* 1.11 and then proceeded in again, when the cause of the intercision is over, that action seeming but one, is more then one sin, or vertuous act respectively. He that resolves to bring up a poor orphan in learning and capacities of doing and receiving worthy benefit, does often sleep and often not think of it, and hath many occasions to renew his resolution: although his obli∣gation be still permanent, yet if he delights in it, and again chuses, so often is the almes imputed to him, he does so many acts of charity. Titius in∣tends to give to Codrus a new gown at the next Calends, but forgets his in∣tention; but yet at the Calends does upon a new intention give him a gown. This act is but one, but hath no morality from the first intention, but from the second, though there were two internal acts of volition to the same external; because the first did cease to be, and therefore could have no in∣fluence into the effect. But this multiplication of actions and imputati∣ons cannot be by every suddain and physical interruption, but by such an interruption onely where the first intention is not sufficient to finish the external act. Thus if a man against his will nod at his prayers, and awaken∣ing himself by his nodding proceed in his devotion, he does not pray twice, but once, because the first intention is sufficient to finish his prayer. But if he falls asleep over-night and sleeps till morning, his morning-prayer is upon a new account, and his will must renew her act, or nothing is done. But in instances of good this part of the Rule hath but little use; for no man will dare to call God to a strict and minute reckoning, and require his reward by number and weight. But in sinfull actions there is more consideration; and if we be not strict in our weights and measures, God will; and if we will not be sure to put enough into the ballance of repentance, there will be too much in that of judgment and condemnation: and therefore it con∣cerns us as much as we can, to tell the number of our sins. Therefore

6.* 1.12 External actions in order to one end, though produc'd by one inter∣nal act or resolution of the will, yet doe not make one external act, unlesse the end be at the same time acquir'd. Thus if the man resolves to lay wait for his enemy till he have destroyed him, and therefore lays wait to day and to morrow, and prevails not untill the third day, his sin is more then one, though his resolution was but one. The reason is, because there must of necessity be a repetition of the same resolution, or at least of some ministring acts toward the perfecting that resolution; and although the resolution and the end were one, yet to every ministring intermedial act there is also some internal act proportionate. Thus every impure contact in order to impure embraces are sins distinct from the final adultery, and so is the joyfull re∣membrance of it afterwards. But because these things have in them some little intricacy, therefore I add this which is plain and usefull: Every re∣newing of an external action subordinate to a sinfull end is either a repea∣ting of the sin, or, which is all one, it is an aggravation of it; it extends it, or intends it. He that calls a man fool three times together either com∣mits three sins, or one as great as three: and he that strikes seven blows to kill a man, hath so many times lift up his hand against God; and though he hath kill'd the man but once, yet he shall be avenged seven times. But if after any notable interruption of the act, the intention be renewed, so often

is the sin repeated, though it be but one external event afterward. He that resolves every day of the week to be absent from Divine service the Sun∣day following, is to estimate his sin by the number of his internal actions, and not by the singularity of that omission.

7.* 1.13 Internal acts of the will are then multiplied, when they proceed after an expresse revocation, or a deliberate intermission, or a considerable physical interruption, or by an actual attendance to things incompossible and inconsistent with the first resolution. There is no difficulty in these particulars, save onely that in making judgments concerning them we pro∣ceed by prudent and moral proportions, by the usual measures of laws, and the accounts of wise men; onely the extremes are evident and notori∣ous. For he that being upon his knees looses his attention for a minute & then recalls it, does not pray twice, or so often as he again thinks actually of what he is doing; and we are sure that he who saies a Pater noster to day, and another to morrow, does pray twice: and between these no certain rule can be given but what is measur'd and divided by prudence and similitude with the unity of natural and artificial compositions. But he onely does well who secures his cases of conscience in this inquiry, by interrupting his evil acts as soon as they begin, and gives them quite over as soon as they are interrupted, and when he hath chosen well, perseveres as long as nature and exteriour accidents will give him leave, and renews that choice as soon as his divertisement can cease.

Question.

In the pursuit of the matter of this Rule,* 1.14 it is seasonable to inquire concerning [what degrees of guiltinesse are contracted by the beginnings and desires of wickednesse which are imperfect and unfinish'd.]

I have already* 1.15 given account that the inward acts of will are very often punishable by humane laws, and from thence some light may be reflected to this inquiry, which is concerning the estimate which God and the Conscience are to make of imperfect actions: for though in humane accounts and the estimate of our laws, that a thing is secret or public is a great difference and concernment; yet in this question, and in relation to God and the conscience immediately, it is nothing at all, for nothing here is secret, every thing is visible, and it is always day here. But now the inquiry is concerning those things which are imperfect, and so sometimes are secret as to men because they are onely in desires, and sometimes they are public, but yet not finished & completed:* 1.16 And here the rule is, Nunquam mens exitu aestimanda est. God judges not by the event, but by the mind, by the good or ill will: so Apuleius, In maleficiis etiam cogitata scelera, non perfecta adhuc, vindicantur, cruentâ mente, purâ manu. He that thinks it, that is, that resolves it perfectly, putting the last hand of the will to it, his mind is bloudy, though his hand be pure, and shall find an equal vengeance. But this is to be understood of the last act of the will, and that which is immediate to the external action; if it be in counsel, that is, not whether it shall be done or no, but how it shall be done, it is as bad and hatefull in the eyes of God as the external violence.* 1.17 To this purpose is that of Paulus the Lawyer, Consilium unius∣cujusque, non factum puniendum est, Not the fact; but the Counsel is to be

punished: by Counsel meaning the design and resolution, the perfect and complete volition, which is then without all question come to the perfe∣ction of its malice and evil heart, when it is gone as far as to the beginning of action. Insidiatus civi etiamsi non effecerit scelus, poenas tamen legibus solvet, said Quintilian, He that lays a snare for a mans life shall smart for it, though the man escape; the laws shall punish him: but if they doe not, it is all one in Conscience.* 1.18 For as Donatus said well, Non perficere, sed conari velle aliquid ad scelus, effectio est, etiamsi non potest fieri. It is nothing to the sinner that God defends the innocent and rescues him from his fraud or violence, or slander; he hath done his work when he resolv'd and endea∣vour'd it. For there is no degrees of morality beyond the last act of the will: the sin or vertue may be extended by multiplication or confirmation of the same acts, but no way intended beyond that act of the will which com∣mands execution.

But this distinction ought to be observed not onely in order to punish∣ments inflicted by humane laws upon Criminals accus'd of imperfect acts,* 1.19 but in order to conscience. For though the whole morality of the act de∣pends upon the last purpose of the will, and is before God the fulnesse of the sin in respect of degrees of any simple sin; yet when it passes on to ex∣ecution the will may grow worse by repetition of her acts, or abiding in them, she may sin more sins. For the acts themselves about which there are endeavours made, are not always perfect, so as the criminal can perfect them; for it is not to all purposes perfect when the will hath commanded the resolution to be acted, no nor when something is done towards it by the sinning man, but something else may be added, and till it be, there is some difference in the case. The examples will clear it. Priscus Merula resolves to kill his brother Taurinus, and in order to it, buyes a dagger, way-lays him as he goes to Augustus, set upon him, throws him down; but as he is lifting up his hand to strike, hears a noise behind the hedge, and being af∣frighted, curses his brother and wished him dead, and runs away. Merula is in the sight of God guilty of murder, and if he had kill'd him effective∣ly, there had been no greater malice, but more mischief, and more acts of malice; and therefore the judges are to diminish something of his punish∣ment, not onely because the life of a citizen was not lost, but because Meru∣la had not done all his part of the murder, that is, his brother could not have died, unlesse he had done something beyond what he did. But when the Egyptian nobility being weary of a dull melancholy Prince, who by his healthlesse spirit was good for nothing, gave him a brisk poison to dispatch him; that which would have burnt to ashes any person that had any fire within him, did but heighten him to the ordinary temper of another man, it onely warm'd him into an active spirit, and he became a wise Prince. Here the murder was not effected, but there was on the traytors part no∣thing wanting to the completing of the wickednesse: and therefore as in hu∣mane laws they are to have no abatement of sentence extraordinary, so in the Court of Conscience they are to think of no excuse, no diminution, but every thing is present that can make all that greatnesse which can be in the nature of that sin: and in the first case there may be an alteration so timely as to change the mind before it was at the utmost end of the line of wicked∣nesse; but in the second case, whether the effect follow or no, there is place left for nothing, unlesse peradventure for repentance. That part which concerns humane laws is alterable as men please, and in Christendome (un∣lesse

it be in the greatest crimes) custome hath against the purpose of laws given impunity to them who without effect have attempted to commit vile actions; yet in the Court of Conscience and by the measures of religion the matter is unchangeable.

There are some other ways of imperfect acts,* 1.20 which are to be regulated by the proportion of these measures. 1. He that kills a child in his Mo∣thers wombe is as guilty of murder as he that kills a man in the field, if he did equally intend it. In this it is true that the Lawyers and Physicians distinguish the time of the abortion. If the child was efform'd into a hu∣mane shape it is capital by the laws; but not if it was inform and unshapen. But in order to Conscience I perfectly consent to the doctrine of the old Christians,* 1.21 recorded by Tertullian, Etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc san∣guis in hominem deliberatur, dissolvere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est prohibere nasci. Nec refert natam quis eripiat animam an nascentem distur∣bet. Homo est, & qui futurus est: etiam fructus omnis jam in semine est. While the bloud is in deliberation whether it shall be male or female, it is not lawfull to dissolve it; and he that intends to hinder it from life is but a hasty murderer. He is guilty of inferring death who prevents that to have life to which God and nature did design it. But this is owing to the choice and design of the will, for the effect of one is much lesse then the effect of the other upon many considerations: but if the malice was not lesse, the dif∣ference of the effect makes no diminution.

The other case is,* 1.22 If a man smite his neighbour that he die, he shall sure∣ly be put to death,* 1.23 saith God to Moses. That is, if he purpose to smite him, though he did not purpose to kill him, but wound him onely, he hath sinn'd unto death. The Vulgar Latin reads it, Qui percusserit hominem volens occidere] He that smites a man, willing to kill him. But this last clause is nei∣ther in the Hebrew nor the Greek. And though it is something lesse to in∣tend to wound him grievously, then to kill him; yet he that willingly gives that wound which he would have doe him a mischief, and gives it so that it does give him his death, had a malice so great that it could not well discern between wounds and death. But in this case though it is certain God will judge righteously, and make abatement if there be any cause; yet in humane laws, and in the measures of his own repentance he will not and ought not to find gentle sentences, but the whole perfect event will be imputed to the imperfect act of his will. For it was too much that he was willing to doe any mischief; and ex toto noluisse debet qui imprudentiâ defenditur, said Seneca: He cannot pretend that the evil event was against his will, when it is certain he did perfectly consent to a great part of it.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  Vide Unum necessar. cap. 5. of Habitual sins.
• * 1.3

  2.
• * 1.4

  3.
• * 1.5

  4.
• * 1.6

  Mart. Ep. 42. l. 9.
• * 1.7

  5.
• * 1.8

  6.
• * 1.9

  7.
• * 1.10

  8.
• * 1.11

  9.
• * 1.12

  10.
• * 1.13

  11.
• * 1.14

  12.
• * 1.15

  Lib. 3. Chap. 1. Rule 4.
• * 1.16

  Quintil.
• * 1.17

  Sententiar. 5.
• * 1.18

  in Andria, act. 1. sc. 4.
• * 1.19

  13.
• * 1.20

  14.
• * 1.21

  in Apologet. & in Exhortat. castit. & de Virg. velandis.
• * 1.22

  15.
• * 1.23

  Exod. 21. 12.