Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

§. 7. Abrogation.

RULE VII. Abrogation of a law by a competent, that is, by the Supreme power, may be just and reasonable, though the law it self be neither unreasonable nor unjust.

THe causes of abrogating a law are all those which are sufficient to make a good and a wise man change his mind.* 1.1 The alteration of the cause of the law, new emergencies, unfit circumstances, public dislike, a greater good: for it is no otherwise in the public then in the private will; there where a man is master of his will and ruler of his own affairs, there is no∣thing to be consider'd, but that what he does be done wisely and justly and charitably. The same power that makes the law, the same can annul it, and the same reason which introduc'd the law, can also change it: and there is no difference but this onely, that a law may not be imposed unlesse the matter of it be honest, or holy, or profitable; but it may be abrogated though it be all this, provided it be not necessary. For to the making of a law all the conditions are requir'd, a competent authority, and just mat∣ter, and fitting promulgation; but to the abrogation of it, the defect of any one cause is sufficient. And therefore if the law be unjust, it ceases of it self; if it be uselesse, it falls into just neglect; if it be not publish'd, it is not born; if it be generally dislik'd, it is suppos'd to be uncharitable, and there∣fore is as good as if it were not born, for it will be starv'd at Nurse. But when it is made it must continue and be maintain'd by all these things to∣gether;

and therefore when any one fails, the whole structure descends into dissolution and a heap. But therefore if the will of the Prince changes, and that he will not have it to be a law, it looses the spirit, though the body and the external causes of life remain. For though an action must not be done unlesse it be good and innocent, yet it is not necessary that it be done, though it be so. Every thing that is good is not necessary, and many good things are let alone, and at the same time others as good as they are done, and sometimes better: and because there are many good provisions and counsels which are not taken, and are not made into laws, many such things which are well enough may be laid aside, either for the procuring a greater good, or for the avoiding of some appendant inconvenience. But in these cases, unlesse the Prince be obliged by oath or promise to preserve this law, his abrogating even of a good law is no question of justice, but of prudence and charity, both which also may be preserved, if the good be chang'd, or improv'd, or recompens'd. But whether it be right or wrong on the Princes part, yet if the law be annull'd, the conscience of the subject is no longer bound. The Prince cannot bind the conscience, unlesse the law be good; but the conscience is at liberty, though the abrogation be not good. Because the goodnesse of the matter cannot make it into a law with∣out the Prince's will, but the Prince's will can alone make it cease to be.

Upon this account,* 1.2 it is not unseasonable to inquire whether, that a thing hath been abus'd may be accounted a just and a prudent cause to take it quite away.

That it may be a just,* 1.3 that is, a sufficient cause, is out of all question, because it is not unjust; for then in this case it is just enough, though it be not necessary. But whether it be prudent for the Prince to doe it, and whether it be necessary that it be done, is another consideration. But to this the precedent of Hezekiah King of Judah is a good guide. For he brake in pieces the brazen serpent, because the people made it an idol; and he did prudently, because the people who were too apt to that crime could not easily be kept from doing it so long as that great memorial of the di∣vine power did remain. It is like removing a beautifull woman from the greedy eyes of a yong person; he cannot behold her and be safe: and thus it is in all cases, if the evil be incumbent, and not remediable, nor to be cleans'd from mischief or just suspicion and actual danger, then whatsoever is so abus'd not onely may, but ought to be remov'd. But if that which was abus'd be now quitted from the abuse, then it may be kept, if it be good for any thing: and if it were not, I suppose there would be no question about it.

But in the change of laws,* 1.4 or reformation of prevailing evil customes, prudence is good always, and zeal sometimes: but certainly the contrary and the exterminating way of reformation is not always the best, because he that opposes a vice too fiercely may passe into a contrary vice as readily as into a contrary vertue. If a Church happens to command some rituals and formes of worship in a superstitious manner or to superstitious purposes, or if men doe observe them with a curiosity great as to the nicenesse of su∣perstition, it is not good to oppose them superstitiously. If the obedient doe keep the rituals as if they were the Commandements of God, they are to blame: but if the disobedient will reject them as if they were of them∣selves

against God's Commandements they are more to blame, because a superstitious obedience is better then a superstitious rebellion; that hath piety and error in an evil mixture, but this hath error and impiety.

But as to the subject matter and inquiry of the Rule;* 1.5 That a thing hath been abus'd, and a law hath been made the occasion of evil, it does not make the law of it self to cease, unlesse that abuse and deception be not to be cur'd without abrogation of the law. So that if a subject sees the abuse and is offended at it, and is not tempted to comply with it, he is still tied to observe the law, and in his own practice separate it from the abuse. Thus in the Primitive Church, the observation of Vigils and Wakes was a holy custome, and yet it afterwards grew into such abuse, that the Ecclesiastic authority thought it fit to abrogate it; because the custome in the declining piety and corrupted manners of the world was a ready temptation to the evil. But till the Vigils were taken away by authority, the laws of the Church did still oblige, and did not cease of themselves: and therefore where with innocence and without active scandal they could be observed, the subject was oblig'd. But then this was cause enough why the Rulers of Churches should annul that law or custome. If they could easily have quitted those meetings from corruption, they might if they pleas'd retain them or annul them, as they listed; onely they were bound to annul them when the evil could find no other remedy. The abuse even so long as it was curable was yet cause enough why the Supreme power might abrogate the law, but not sufficient to make the abrogation necessary, nor yet for the subject to disobey it. For the inferior cannot lawfully with∣draw his obedience, till the superior cannot lawfully retain the law: but when to abrogate it is necessary, then to disobey it is no sin.

I conclude these numerous inquiries and large accounts of the obliga∣tion of Conscience by Humane laws,* 1.6 with the Apologue taken out of Nico∣laus Damascenus his Politics. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Laws are like the girdles of the Iberian women: if any mans belly or his heart is too big for those circles, he is a dissolute and a dishonour'd person.

Notes

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