Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

CHAP. V^th. Of Laws Domestic: or the power which Fathers of Fami∣lies have to bind the Consciences of their Relatives.

RULE I. Children are bound to obey the laws and Com∣mandements of their Parents in all things dome∣stical, and in all actions personal relating to the family, or done within it.

THE word of the Commandement is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifies to be or to make weighty;* 1.1 but in Piel it signifies to honour, that is, Honour your Parents, and doe not lightly account of them: But in Levit. 19. 3. the word is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 fear thy Mother and thy Father. They signify the same event of things, for a reverential fear is honour, and they both imply obe∣dience. And there are three great endearments of this which make it necessary, and make it as absolute as it can be. The one is that our Parents are to us in the place of God:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

said the Greek Comedy,* 1.2 Suppose your Parents to be to you as God. Haec enim paternitas est nobis Sacramentum & imago Divinae paternitatis, ut discat cor humanum in eo principio quod videt, quid debeat illi principio à quo est, & quod non videt. For the Fathers power is a Sacrament and image of the Divine Paternity, that a man may learn by the principle of his Being which he sees, what he owes to the principle of his Being which he sees not: and Plato saies there is no image by which we can worship God so well as our Fathers,* 1.3 our Grandfathers and our Mothers. And therefore it is impiety to dishonour or disobey our Parents, and it is piety when we pay our duty to them. The same word signifies religion to God, which expresses this du∣ty. Parentes not amare,* 1.4 impietas est; non agnoscere, insaniae. For as there are two great crimes which we commit properly against God, Impiety or Irre∣ligion, and Atheisme: so there are these two crimes against our Parents. He that does not honour and revere them is impious or irreligious; and he that will not acknowledge them is Atheistical, that is, like the Atheists, he denies the principle of his Being. And therefore upon that of Virgil,

Huc Pater O Lenaee veni—* 1.5

Servius observes that the Heathens called all their Gods by the name of Fathers: and an injury done to our Father is said to be done to God, accor∣ding to that of Menander,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

He that reviles and speaks evil of his Father* 1.6, does blas∣pheme God; for

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

God is the Great Father of the world, and therefore he hath by great∣est religion immur'd the Fathers honour.

Et Jovis imperium & chari praecepta parentis, Edocet….

Next to God is our duty to our Father.

2. The second endearment of our duty,* 1.7 obedience and regard to pa∣rents, is gratitude; which here hath the greatest obligation, and is to this purpose remark'd by all laws and by all wise men of the World.

Omnis in Ascanio chari stat cura Parentis.

All their love and all their care is for their dear boy. The child is a part of his parents, a tender part, but under custody and a guard; and the state of descent and succession from parents or children is called Suitas in the law: and there is so much of a Father in his child, that if a Father and a Son be partners in a crime, and refuse to confesse it before torments, the law commands the Son first to be tormented; Charles the second, the Em∣peror, did so; as knowing that the Father will confesse rather then endure to see his son tormented: and when the Father does confesse upon the tor∣ment of his son,* 1.8 the Father is said to be confessus in tormentis, said Baldus, he confessed in his own torments. And as long as the Son is in prison, the Fa∣ther is not accounted free in law: and the Fathers sins are then punish'd, when the child is made sick, or unfortunate. So that the government of children is no otherwise then as a mans will governs his own hand & foot; over which, always supposing him to abide within the limits and inclinations of nature, that is, to love and cherish them, and in no sense to hate them, in all other he hath an intire power of command.

3. The third endearment of childrens obedience is the power of bles∣sing and cursing which God hath given to Parents,* 1.9 and which himself by his providence and great Oeconomy will verify. The Fathers blessing establisheth the houses of children* 1.10 but the curse of the Mother rooteth out foun∣dations, saith Ben-Sirach. And S. Paul exhorting children to obey their pa∣rents,* 1.11 saies it is the first Commandement with promise, that is, the first to which any special promise is annexed, the promise of longaevity in the land of promise. Benedictio merces obedientiae est, saith Elias Cretensis, The Fathers blessing is the reward of the sons obedience. But it is observable that the original word in the fifth Commandement is of active significati∣on, Honour thy Father and thy Mother that they may prolong thy days upon the Earth; that is, saith Paulus Fagius, thy parents are Gods ministers and instruments, the chanels and conveyances of the Divine blessing: for God hears the prayers of Fathers and Mothers blessing their obedient children, or cursing their disobedience;* 1.12 insomuch that Ezekiel reckons their disobe∣dience to their parents to be to the Jewes the cause of their banishment from their own Country. Suidas tells that Leontius the Bishop of Tripolis in Lydia seeing his onely son of an ill nature and apt to mischief, prayed

to God that his son might die yong, lest he should fall into impiety: and God heard the Fathers prayer.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

The curses of parents are grievous upon the earth.* 1.13 And this was observed a∣mong the Heathens in the sad examples of the children of O Edipus, Amin∣tor and Theseus, who grew miserable upon their Fathers curses; and there∣fore Telemachus was afraid to cast his Mother out of Ulysses house, lest she should curse him. And this was it that brought servitude or slavery into the world; God having in one of the fountains of mankind, in the great Patriarch of the world, consign'd a sad example that for ever children should be afraid to dishonour their parents, and discover their nakednesse, or re∣veal their turpitude, their follies and dishonours.

To these I need not adde their natural necessity,* 1.14 their disability to help themselves, their obnoxiousnesse to every evil, their defencelesse condition, the miseries and calamities and infirmities by their want of wisedome, all which at first doe infinitely endeare obedience, and make it necessary: but I remember that this very thing was of great value amongst the Ancients, and they did use to tell this fable to their children to teach them to obey their parents.

An old Lion, amongst other precepts that he gave his son, charg'd him that he should never fight with a Man, because if he was not too strong, he would at least be too crafty. The young Lion heard him, but regarded him not, but therefore as soon as ever he was full grown, hastens abroad to seek a man to be his enemy. He came into a field, and saw a yoke of oxen standing ready furnish'd to plow, and ask∣ing them if they were men, they said, No, but that a man had put those yokes upon them. He left them and went aside, and espying a horse bridled and tied to a tree, ask'd if he were a man. He was answer'd, No, but a man had bridled him, and would by and by come to ride him, for a man was his Master. At last he finds a man cleaving wood, and ask'd him: and finding him to be so, told him he must then prepare to fight with him. The man told him, With all his heart, but first desired him to help to draw the wedge out of that tree, and then he would. The yong Lion thrusts in his paws, and a little opens the tree till the wedge fell out, and the tree clos'd upon his feet by it's returning violence. The man seeing the lion fastned, and the lion seeing himself entrap'd, the man cried out to his Neighbours to come to his help; and the lion to escape his danger tore his feet from the tree, and left his nailes and bloud be∣hind him, and returning with shame and smart to his old Father said to him, Mi Pater, si paruissem monitis tuis ungulas non amisissem, I had not lost my nailes if I had obeyed my Fathers commandement.

For the com∣mandements of parents being for the good of their children, he cannot be prosperous that will not obey his Father. That was their meaning.

But concerning the duty it self there is no question;* 1.15 nothing is plain∣er, nothing is easier: but concerning the limits and administration of this power there is very great difficulty; the Scripture speaking either indefi∣nitely or universally, either of which does equally need a limit and specifi∣cation. Children, obey your parents in all things, saith S. Paul: and if that all were absolutely all, there were no difficulty in the understanding it; but infinitely difficult it would be to observe it, and reconcile it with our other duties and just interests. And just so is that law which by the consent of all

the world is represented as universally, Liberi quacunque in re parentibus dicto audientes sunto;* 1.16 and he in the Comedy, Pater adsum, Impera quodvis, neque tibi ero in mora, Here am I my Father, Command me any thing, nei∣ther will I resist. But this any thing and this every thing, is but any thing and every thing of a certain kind; which if we can establish upon certain measures, we have one great line more for the conduct of conscience. The Divines and Lawyers reduce the issues of this relation to three heads, 1. Reverence, 2. Animadversion, 3. Piety.

Of Reverence to Parents.

And first it is certain whatever can be signified by honour and fear and reverence is the duty of children;* 1.17 that is, so far as to think honoura∣bly of them, to speak well of them, to conceal their faults, to excuse them to others, to comport themselves with reverence and great regard before them.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

Above all things have your parents in honour: and this is to be express'd ac∣cording as the parents shall require, and according to the customes of the nation and the most pious and obedient in it; for vultu quoque laedi pieta∣tem, was an old rule, A child may be rude and undutifull in his very looks; and he deserves to be punished with blindnesse, qui parentum vultus torvo visu despexerit, & elatis oculis laeserit pietatem, saith S. Hierom, who by proud looks and scornfull eyes is impious to his parents. But this duty is well describ'd by Theophilus to Autolycus, Sanctum & laudabile censetur, non solùm apud Deum sed & apud homines, videlicet ut in simplicitate & absque omni malitia subjiciamur parentibus. Children must be subject to their parents without all malice perversenesse, and in all simplicity, that is, ••ngenuity of words and manners. And when Ptolemy asked one of the 72 translators of the Bible how a son should pay due thankfulnesse to his parents, he was answer'd, Si nullâ re illos tristitiâ affeceris, If you grieve them in nothing. That's the surest measure.

The next thing that is also certain in this is,* 1.18 that all the good Coun∣sels and precepts of holinesse and wisedome which the parents give, it is ne∣cessary the children should observe; and besides that the not observing them is a sin against the special Commandements, it is also a sin of disobedience, and a rebellion against the Fathers authority. So the Father in the Comedy urges his authority,

Feceris par tuis caeteris factis,* 1.19 Patrem Tuum si percoles per pietatem. Nolo ego cum improbis te viris, Gnate mi, neque in via, neque in foro ullum sermonem exequi. Haec noctes diesque tibi canto ut caveas …..meo modo, & moribus vivito antiquis: Quae ego tibi praecipio, haec facito: haec tibi Si mea Imperia capesses, multa bona in pectore consident.

Keep good company, avoid the debaucheries of the present times, live as I command, and as your forefathers did live; and if to these purposes you sub∣mit to my government, good things shall dwell within you.

But we find amongst the Ancients some little instances of this honour and reverence besides obedience specified.* 1.20 The Ancients would not with∣out leave goe from the presence of their Father: so he in the Comedy,

—neque latebrosè me abs tuo Conspectu occultabo—* 1.21

* They would not conceal from their parents the entercourses and acci∣dents of their youth, their amours, their mistresses, their designes of mar∣riage, their little plots, and advantages or disadvantages.

Quae fert adolescentia Ea ne me celet consuefeci filium:

that is, they accounted it part of the honour due to their parents, to tell them truth in all things where they were interrogated, or suspected.

Nam qui mentiri aut fallere insuerit Patrem,* 1.22 aut Audebit, tanto magis audebit caeteros.

He that lies before his Father dishonours him, and commits two sins; he transgresses two commandements. * Adde to this, they counted it impie∣ty to steal any thing from their parents.* 1.23

Egon' Patri surripere possim quidquam tam cauto seni? Atque adeo si facere possem, pietas prohibet.

That is, whatever was a single injury if done to a stranger,* 1.24 was double if committed against their parents: for as to doe good to them was piety as well as charity, it was religion and justice too; so to doe any evil to them is to doe them dishonour, and expressely against the fifth Commandement. These are the first general measures, and the indication of very many par∣ticulars.

But there is one great measure more,* 1.25 and that is, that specification of the duties of this Commandement which we find in the laws of Nations and the consent of all wise men, and particularly of those with whom we doe converse, and by whom we are governed. For our parents have a double power over us, one by the law of Nature, and the other by the Ci∣vil law; that is, there are some duties which children doe owe to their pa∣rents, which are primely and indispensably necessary, others which are spe∣cifications and instances of a general duty, but such which may suffer in∣crease and diminution, but are necessary by virtue of a Divine Commande∣ment when they are bound upon us by the laws of our Country; because these are of the nature of those things whose natures can be chang'd by be∣coming laws, and are reduc'd under the Category of their proper ver∣tues. The particulars I shall draw out of the laws of Nations, from the Civil and Canon laws, reducing them to distinct rules shall describe their several obligations of the conscience: and they relate to the other two parts of parental power, signified by Castigation and Piety.

Of Castigation, or the Coercitive power of Parents. RULE II. Fathers have a power to chastise their offending children, but not a power of life and death.

IN the laws of Romulus and Numa,* 1.26 Fathers had a power three times to sell their children, and a power to put them to death in certain cases: and they attribute much of the prosperity of their city to this permission, no∣thing being a better instrument to make good citizens, then by making them good sons: it being very unlikely that ever he should command well abroad, that knows not well how to obey at home.

Quicunque patrem timet ac reveretur, Hic in bonum civem evadet proculdubio,

said Timocles, He that fears and obeys his Father, without a good citizen* 1.27. And therefore it was observed by Dionysius Halicarnasseus that amongst the Greeks, Contu∣macy, Impiety and Parricide were very common; and he gives this rea∣son, because Charondas, Pittacus and Solon did by their laws give the Fathers no great power over their children. But I said that the Ro∣mans did, and those great examples of Titus Manlius, C. Flaminius, C. Cassius, who put their sons to death, were indeed very severe, but did imprint great terrors upon all the Roman youth. Bodinus thinks this to be a natural and unalterable power; and Aerodius supposes that God would not have commanded Abraham to kill his son, but that it was a part of his ordinary and inherent power; and when Judah commanded his daughter in law Thamar to be brought forth and burn'd for her adultery, it gave indication that he by his supreme paternal power in the family had power of life and death. And of this there is no question in the heads of families, where the Father is a Patriarch, the fountain of his nation, or of his society, and under the command of no superior: for the paternal power is the fountain of the Royal; and Abimelech was nothing but the King my Father.

But when families were multiplied,* 1.28 though Fathers were fitter to be trusted with the severest power then any other sort of interested persons, yet because this might fall into disorder, God was pleas'd in the law of Moses so to order this affair, that the Fathers power should not be dimi∣nished, & yet the execution of it and the declaration of the sentence should be trusted to the Judge. For if a Father found his son stubborn, rebelli∣ous, disobedient, a glutton or a drunkard, all which are personal crimes, and against the private authority and counsel of the Father,* 1.29 the Father and the Mother might delate him to the Judge, and without further proof but their own testimony he was to be ston'd to death. Drunkennesse & gluttony were in no other cases capital in the law of Moses, but when joyn'd with rebellion or disobedience to their parents. And like to this proceeding in Moses law was the processe in the Persian Monarchy. For Aelian tells that when

Rhaco the Mardian brought Cartomes his son with his hands bound behind him to Artaxerxes, desiring that the Prince would command him to be slain, because he was impudent, he was naught, he was a villain; the Persian King ask'd him if he could find in his heart to see his son die with violence. The Father replied, I have in my garden a goodly lettice, fat and wanton and full of leaves. When I find any of them luxuriant, proud and exor∣bitant, though it be a part of the body I cut it off; and so I doe to what∣soever is bitter and superfluous, and my lettice is the sweeter for it, it does not bewail the losse of it's bad leaves, but thrives the better. Think the same of me, O King; for though he be par'd away that hurts my family, that gives ill example to his Brothers, my stock will be the more thriving, florid and fruitfull in all good things.] By this instance we perceive that when Fathers had not power to put to death their rebellious children, they could require it of the Prince, who was to proceed summarily and meerly upon the Fathers instance. And we find in the French Annals that Stephen Boslée the President of Paris impal'd a yong fellow because his Mother said that she could by no arts or labour keep him from being a thief.

But this went off very much in the manners of men; and children were by other means restrain'd ordinarily,* 1.30 before things were brought to that extremity;* 1.31 and in the Civil law parents were forbidden to kill their children, and this law hath prevail'd in all Christendome, excepting that a man is in some places permitted to kill his daughter if he sees her in un∣chast Embraces. But in stead of these great excesses of power, there is left to Christian parents nothing but a decent castigation in the lesser and single faults, and disinherison in case of great and persevering. That children are to submit to the animadversions and chastisements of their Fathers is the voice of nature, and of all Nations, of Scripture and right Reason. So S. Paul,* 1.32 We have had Fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: and Ben-Sirach teaches us, In opere & sermone & omni pati∣entia honora Patrem tuum,* 1.33 Honour thy Father in thy work and in thy word, and in all patience, so the Vulgar Latin reads it; that is, suffer what he im∣poses upon you: and this was it which the yong Greek that Plutarch speaks of had learn'd in Zeno's school, Didici Patris iram ferre; I have learn'd (saith he) patiently to bear my Fathers anger. The authority is plain; the mea∣sures of it are onely, that it be done for amendment; that is, that it be dis∣cipline, not anger and revenge, and that it be done with charity and mode∣ration, which is signified by S.* 1.34 Paul, Parents, provoke not your children to wrath; which precept he repeats, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.35 give them no opprobrious words, no contumelious and provoking language, and there∣fore much lesse any cruel and undecent castigations.

Pudore & liberalitate liberos Retinere satius esse credo,* 1.36 quam metu. Hoc patrium est, potius consuefacere filium Suâ sponte rectè facere, quam alieno metu. Hoc Pater ac Dominus interest: hoc qui nequit, Fateatur se nescire imperare liberis.

A Master governs by fear, & a Father by love, & both by their authority: but the gentle way is the Fathers method; but if he will use the severe, he hath authority to doe it, and right or wrong he must be suffered, till the evil be insufferable, and then he may decline it, but ever with reverence to his Fathers honour; for indeed against a Fathers tyranny there is no aid, no

remedy, no intercession, but by an appeal to the common Father, the chief of all the tribes and all the families. This onely I am to adde, That as Fa∣thers have not a power of life and death over their children; so neither are they lightly to use that power which they have, and is next to this, that is, that I may use S.* 1.37 Ambrose his expression, ne laesa pietas Patris ulciscatur se exhaeredatione vel abdicatione contumacis generis, a power of disinherison is not to be us'd for every great offence, much lesse for a litte. Pater, nisi magnae & multae injuriae patientiam evicerint,* 1.38 nisi plus est quod timet quam quod damnat, non facile accedit ad decretorium stylum, said Seneca, A Father will not easily proceed to an exterminating sentence, unlesse great and many in∣juries have quite overcome his patience. Nor then neither, unlesse he fear worse things then those which he already blames. For, as Quintilian observ'd well, this power was not given to Fathers but when their sons are incor∣rigible.* 1.39 Fulmen istud Patrum adversus ferociam adolescentiae datum est, adversus filios qui peccare plus possunt. If they will sin yet more, and will not be corrected, then they may unwillingly use this thunderbolt. It is like the sentence of excommunication, never to be us'd but when nothing else will cure the man, and nothing at all will make the mischief tolerable: that is, a son may not be disinherited, but when he may be hated, which may never be,* 1.40 sine causis multis, magnis & necessariis (as Cicero affirms) The causes must be great and many, and intolerable, and without remedy. But of these things because the Fathers are judges, they must judge accor∣ding to the permissions of law, and the analogies of Christian prudence and charity; for if they doe amisse, the Child is miserable by the Fathers pas∣sion, and the Father by his own.

Of Piety to Parents. RULE III. A Father hath power over the goods and persons of his Children, so as to be maintain'd by them.

THe Lawyers define the Paternal power to be jus moribus legibusque con∣stitutum,* 1.41 quo Patri in filium bonaque ipsius plenum jus olim tributum fuit;* 1.42 a full right upon his son and his sons goods introduc'd by laws and cu∣stomes. Now this full right is alterable by the Civil law of any nation: that is, whereas amongst the Romans whatsoever the son acquir'd, he ac∣quir'd it not for himself, but for his Father; this may determine sooner or last longer, according to the appointments of law, for the heir so long as he is a child differs nothing from a servant, and therefore if the law please, may be us'd accordingly; and when the law hath so appointed, the Consci∣ence is bound by it.

But that which is not alterable by laws is that which is the natural and necessary duty,* 1.43 that parents be maintain'd by their children if they need it: for this is in the Commandement, this is a part of the honour that is due to them. For so our Blessed Saviour remarks the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: the Pharisees that taught the children to cry Corban, it is a gift, and therefore out of it

the parents must not be profited,* 1.44 he calls it a not honouring the Father and Mother;* 1.45 and the double honour which S. Paul commands to be given to the Elders that rule well is instanc'd in the matter of maintenance. And this the Heathens had. So Hierocles, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Let us greatly honour our parents, affording them the ministery of our bodies and the use of our wealth most chearfully.* 1.46 But this Cicero limits to the necessa∣ria vitae praesidia, quae debentur his maxime, the necessary aides of life; that is, what is for their support, to keep them from need and shame, ac∣cording to the quality of the parent and ability of the child:* 1.47 so that this be first respected,* 1.48 and then that, saith Bartolus. To this purpose is that of S. Ambrose, If the contumely of the Father and the reproaching or vilifying of the Mother be punish'd so severely, what shall their starving or their beggery be? This the Romans did resent so deeply, that they made a law that if a son that was emancipated or quitted from his Fathers government did de∣ny aliment to his indigent Father,* 1.49 he was to be reduc'd under his Fathers power, and so to abide for ever. But by this instance it is apparent that this is no part of the Fathers power, but is an office of the sons piety. For be∣tween the Father & the son there is a threefold chord or tie, as I have already observed, the band of Reverence, of Castigation, and Piety; the two first are the Fathers authority, this last gives the Father properly no right, but obliges the son directly. But then this is to be added, that this obligation is onely confirm'd by the Civil laws, but it is immediately tied upon him by the Natural: for a son is bound to keep his Father from starving though he be a Bandito, or an Out-law, that is, though he have lost all civil rights, because no Civil power can prejudice a Divine Commandement.* 1.50 Plutarch tells that by Solon's law the son was not bound to give his Father aliment, if his Father caus'd him to learn no trade, or taught him nothing whereby he might get his living. Indeed if the Father neither did give him where∣on to live, nor teach him whereby he might get it himself, the son is the lesse oblig'd; but yet sufficiently for this, because it is by a law of Nature that he is oblig'd, and all such obligations are before such conditions can intervene. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Ari∣stotle. Something else is to be considered besides the advantages of edu∣cation: the Father was the principle of his Being, and in that he can never be requited in kind, and therefore let him be paid by duty.

But if the case be such as divides the duty,* 1.51 and the money cannot be divided, what shall then be done? Marco Tomaso a tradesman in Venice had a Father and a Son, both lame, both in great necessity. The Father lost all his goods to the Turks, and the son had rowed in the Gallies till all his strength and health was gone: but the poor Cutler (for Tomaso was no more) was not able to relieve them both: what shall he doe? The case here is hard. But love descends, and ascends not: therefore Tomaso's bowels yern upon his son; and he cannot have that tendernesse for his Father, and he were unnatural if he should let his son perish. It is true, but therefore he ought not to neglect his Father and feed his son, because his son does not, cannot love him so well as his Father does; and therefore he is obliged by gratitude to his Father, and by tendernesse to his son; to this there is more natural inclination, but to the other there is more natural duty. And therefore the Lawyers say that amor descendit, non ascendit, is to be under∣stood quoad ordinem dilectionis, non quoad effectum obligationis. Love does

descend, but it should not in some cases. And therefore when the law gives leave that a Son may by his Father be sold to keep the Father from starving, it shews plainly that the Father is in cases of necessity to be preferred.

And this indeed by the help of the Civil laws brings this rule to an instance of Paternal power;* 1.52 for a Father in this law hath a right over his son, and can deliver him to labour and service for the necessary support of his helplesse Father. This we find done frequently,

—Et tandem demissa in viscera censu Filia restabat non isto digna parente:* 1.53 Hanc quoque vendit inops.

And Eusebius tells it was done in the time of Maximianus the Emperor; and the Prophet Jeremy brings in the people complaining in a time of famine, Our sons and our daughters are too many, let us take corn for their price, that we may eat and live. But this being onely in the case of extreme necessity is not to be drawn to any thing else, for this power is onely just when it is unavoidable: and therefore it is permitted in laws, which doe therefore so comply with the necessity, and endeavour to find a remedy, or to make it tolerable, that in such cases the judges, if there be a contest in the particular, are tied to proceed summarily: and if a son should pretend causes of excuse from giving aliment to his Father, during the whole contestation, and till the proof be made, the Son is tied to maintain his Father in the interval; so carefull are the laws to secure the performance of this duty, for the omis∣sion of which all the world hath observed great marks of the Divine dis∣pleasure, expressed in judgments, and particularly of immature deaths;* 1.54 so Homer observes of Semoisius

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

He refus'd to nourish his loving parents, and therefore he liv'd but a short life.

One particular more is to be added,* 1.55 and that is, if an indigent Father have a rich Father living and a rich Son, although both are oblig'd to nou∣rish him, yet it is in the Fathers power to burden the Son and to excuse the Grandfather; that is, the power which the Father hath over the Son can require this duty: The Grandfather is equally oblig'd, but the Son hath no power over him, the law hath. For as for the thing it self there is no o∣ther difference in it. But if the rich Father refuses he is worse then an In∣fidel, if the rich Son refuses he is impious; the first is unnatural, and the second is ungodly; the first is a heathen, and the other is no Christian; the Grandfather hath no bowels, and the Grandchild no gratitude; the first hath no humanity, and the other no Religion; so that is an even lay between them which is the worst: but the necessitous Father may put the duty actu∣ally upon the Son by reason of his Paternal power, that is, he may so or∣der it, that if the Son refuses he is not onely uncharitable, but undutifull also, he commits two great sins; whereas the refusing Grandfather commits but one, though that also be enough to bring him an extreme damnation.

RULE IV. The Fathers power does not extend to matter of Re∣ligion, and persuasions of Faith.

IN the law of the XII Tables it was written,* 1.56 Sacra privata perpetua ma∣nento, that the private Religion of a family should not be alter'd: which Cicero expounds to mean that all those to whom the care of the Father of the family did appertain were tied to the celebration of the same rites;* 1.57 and the lawyers say,* 1.58 that Filii sunt in sacris parentum dum sunt in eorum po∣testate, Children are within the holy rites of their parents while they are in their power. And indeed this is very true in the Court of Conscience so long as their understanding is in their Fathers power; but that is of all things first emancipated: when a Son can chuse for himself, when he is ca∣pable of malice and perversenesse, when he is judicable by external and pub∣lic laws, then he is emancipated and set free, so as he can chuse his religion, and for that the Father hath no other power over him but persuasion and instruction. For it is very observable that as it was said of the law of Moses, it was a school-master to bring us unto Christ, so it is true of the Im∣perium domesticum, the Fathers government, it is a pedagogy to bring us to the obedience of the laws both of God and Man: the Fathers commands are exacted before the laws of God or Princes doe require obedience; because the Government of children is like the Government of the sick and the mad-men, it is a protection of them from harm, and an institution of them to obedience of God and of Kings; and therefore the Father is to rule the Understanding of his child, till it be fit to be rul'd by the laws of God; that is, the child must believe and learn, that he may chuse and obey; for so we see it in the baptising infants, the Fathers and Susceptors first chuse the childs religion, and then teach it him, and then he must chuse it himself. For the Fathers authority to the understanding of the child is but like a false arch or temporary supporter, put under the building till it can stand alone: and it onely hath this advantage, that the Father hath the preroga∣tive of education, the priority of possession, which how great it is all the experience of the world can tell. But that this is part of the Paternal power is evident, because no child is to be baptized without his Fathers will. A Turk, a Jew, a Heathen can reckon their children in ••acris Paren∣tum* 1.59, they have power, a natural and proper power to breed up their chil∣dren in what religion they please, but not to keep them in it; for then when they can chuse they are under no power of man, God onely is the Lord of the understanding: and therefore it is no disobedience if a Son changes his Fathers religion, or refuses to follow his Fathers change, for he cannot be injur'd in that where he hath no right and no authority.

But this is so to be understood that the religion of the Son must at no hand prejudice the Fathers Civil rights,* 1.60 so that he must not quit his Fa∣thers house, if he be under his Fathers power, and by the laws o•• his coun∣try be oblig'd under that government. Vigoreus in his Sermon of S. Martin, tells that S. Martin being but a Catechumen and yet unbaptiz'd did still

abide with his Father and Mother though they were heathens, and he ne∣verthelesse did all the offices of a Christian. And there is in this great duty, because one right must not destroy another; and a man may be of what religion he please without doing wrong to any man, for a man cannot be hindred in his persuasion, for though he dies, he is of that religion; but no good religion does warrant the Son to doe wrong to his Fathers legal rights.* 1.61 And therefore Marius Victor observes of Abraham,

Verum mente Deum venerans, Gentilia Sacra Aversatus erat—

He was a great hater of his Fathers idolatry and the impious rites of his family, yet he did not leave his Fathers house till after his Fathers death.

Linqueret ut sedes patrias, terramque nocentem Pollutamque domum, nisi postquam morte parentis Jussa sequi jam posse Dei sine fraude licebat.

He might doe it justly when he had no just power over him to restrain him by the cords of another justice and a differing duty.

There is onely this variety to be added,* 1.62 that when either of the pa∣rents is Christian, and the other Infidel, the Son is to be reckon'd to the believing parent: the effect whereof can be this, that he or she that believes hath a right to educate the children in Christianity without injury to the other, and the Church may baptize the children against the will of the unbeliever: and the reason of this is, the prerogative of God, and of Christ who is head of the Church, and the Soveraign of all the world; for if the child is sanctified and made holy by the believing parent, then it may be brought to Christ; that sanctification of it is Christs seizure of it, it is his right, because he hath made a Covenant with the parents for themselves and for their children.

This is practis'd in the Countries of the Roman Communion to evil purposes;* 1.63 and if the Father be a heretic in their account, they teach their children to disobey their parents, and suppose heresy to destroy the Fa∣thers right of power and government. Between Christian and Christian there is no difference as to matter of Civil rights; no law allows that: but between Heathen and Christian, so far as the soul is concern'd, the right of Christ is indubitable; for we are sure Christianity is the true religion: but amongst the Sects of Christians the case is wholly differing, for they may both have enough to secure the souls of pious persons, and yet may both be deceiv'd in their question, and unnecessary article.

RULE V. The Fathers power over the children can remit an injury done to them, without their leave or con∣sent.

THe reason of this depends upon the former considerations,* 1.64 and is to have it's understanding accordingly. So long as the Son is within the Civil power of the Father, so long as he lives in his house, is subject to his command, is nourish'd by his Fathers charge, hath no distinct rights of his own, he is in his Fathers possession, and to be reckon'd by his measures, and therefore cannot have any actions of injury for his own amendment.

But this is to be limited onely to the effects of law and external Courts and trials of right,* 1.65 or external actions of injury. For although a Son cannot repeat what the Father hath legally acquitted, yet if it be a per∣sonal action, in which charity and peace are concerned, the injurious per∣son is bound in conscience to ask the Son forgivenesse, upon the account of S. Paul's words, Follow peace with all men and holinesse, and, for as much as is possible live peaceably with all men; which no man can be said to doe who hath done wrong to a person, to whom he will not doe right. For be∣sides the relation and the communication of it's effect between Father and Son, the Son is a person too, and in personal actions hath an interest natu∣rally and unalterably, which no fiction of law, no supposition of case can take off. So that all the legal and external obligation the Father may re∣mit; but in the personal there is something of proper concernment.

This is also to be limited to an entercourse with extraneous persons,* 1.66 and is not true in actions between the Son and a conjunct person to him. As if the injury be done by a wife, or a spouse, or a freed man, or a person endeared and oblig'd by the Son, the Father cannot remit any such injury. The reason is, because although by the force of the Civil or Municipal laws the Son be suppos'd to be still in the Fathers power, yet in such things he hath some peculiarity, and is as to those things free and in his own pow∣er. If the Sons wife commit adultery, the Father cannot forgive it, though the Son be under his Fathers power by law; because as to all personal acti∣ons the Son hath a personal right, and such things have great dependance upon the law of God and Nature, and these things to some great purposes doe not at all communicate with the Civil laws.

Lastly,* 1.67 this Rule is so to be understood and practis'd, that it be no pre∣judice to the just interests of any other: and therefore a Father cannot so forgive an injury done to his Son, that he shall be tied not to witnesse it in public, when he is requir'd by the Civil power; for it may concern the Common-wealth that the Criminal be punish'd, when it may become the Father to pardon his and his Sons share. He may remit all with which he hath to doe, but not that which may passe into the Exchequer. But in

such cases the Judge may inquire, but the Son without the Fathers leave may be no voluntary accuser.

RULE VI. A Fathers authority cannot abide after his death, but the Sons piety to his Father must, and may passe upon him some indirect obligations.

THe Son after his Fathers death is as much lord of his person and his estate as his Father was:* 1.68 and therefore although all the actions which the living Father did, which by law or the nature of the thing have a per∣manent effect, still doe abide as they were left; yet those things which are of an alterable nature, and to be administred by new Counsels, and to be determin'd by emergencies and proper circumstances, or are directly sub∣ject to Empire, or are personal concernments, these are in the power of the Son after his Fathers death. A Father cannot by his power command a Son to marry a person whom the Father does, but the Son does not love: He cannot command the Son by a just and a sufficient authority never to be a Priest, or Bishop, or a Magistrate: for in those things in which his own meer interest is concerned, his own understanding must be his guide, and his will his Ruler, for he alone does lie at stake whether it be good or bad; and it is not reasonable that he should govern who neither gets, nor looses, nor knows.

But though the Fathers authority be extinct,* 1.69 yet his memory is not, and there is piety towards the dead, and to parents much more; and of this the Heathens gave some worthy examples.* 1.70 Herodotus tells that the Issio∣nides, a people of Scythia, did use to embalm their Fathers head, and then to cover it with gold, and use it for a Divine image, and pay to it the ve∣neration of a yearly sacrifice. This they intended for an honour to their dead Father: but in this there were no signes of obedience. Nearer to this was that which Tertullian tells of the Nasamones,* 1.71 that they took their ora∣cles at the graves of their Fathers, as supposing the souls of their Proge∣nitors to have some right or care to conduct their children. But it was a pretty story that AElian saies the Brachmanes tell of a certain King of the Indians that had many Sons,* 1.72 who being all of them (the yongest onely ex∣cepted) immorigerous and rebellious, at last drove their Father and Mother from their Kingdome; and they with their yongest Son wandring in strange places were quickly consumed with age and wearinesse and inconvenience. The yong Son seeing his parents dead, burnt their bodies, and striking his head with a sword, put the ashes into the wound, by that act of piety giving his parents the most honourable sepulture, but with it also emblematically representing that his parents even after death had power upon his head, and that his head ought to be submitted to them. And it was well; if pie∣ty goes before, whatever duteousnesse or observance comes afterwards it cannot easily be amisse.

Piety sometimes does more then Authority can.* 1.73 Plus potest patria potestas in liberos quam lex, legi••ve, aut summa Dictatura, say the lawyers; A Father or a Mother can prevail, when a Consul or a Prince cannot. Cum Martius Coriolanus pergebat infesto agmine adversus Patriam, quis illi arma succussit è manibus nisi una Veturia? saith the Roman story. Coriolanus took up armes in rage against his Country; and no authority could dis∣arme him but his piety to his Mother Veturia. Now this principle is a good one; but it hath no limits of it self, but onely what we give to it our selves by prudence, and necessity, and the nature of the things that are to be done. But in things that are pious and prudent, or that are innocent and indifferent, a dying Fathers desire, or a living Fathers counsel ought to be esteemed sacred: and though they make no law, yet they passe an in∣direct obligation; that is, if they be transgressed without reason, they can∣not be transgressed without impiety. It is certain, God is pleas'd with this obedience of piety, as is apparent in the case of the Rechabites; and such actions are exemplar in a family, and make the name of Father venerable and sacred; and sometimes the neglect of a dying Fathers charge hath met with a sad event; and a petulant disobedience hath been a rebellion against the greatest reason, which sometimes is the greater by how much it ought the more to be conceal'd. Philotimus of Athens having observ'd his Son given to amours and wandring fancies, upon his death-bed charg'd him by all that was Sacred and Prophane, that however he did resolve to please his fancy and satisfy his impotent desires, he should be sure not to court or to fall in love with Paegnium. Philotimus dies, and Philodectes his Son having quickly dried up his teares which were caus'd by the smoke of the funeral pile, hath a great curiosity to visit this pretty Greek that his Father had so forbidden to him. He sees her, likes her, courts her and lies with her; and in the first night of their congresse, she being over-pleas'd, told him that she infinitely preferr'd his kindnesse before the dull embraces of his Father Philotimus which had so often tir'd her. Upon this the yong man starts and trembles, and finds his sin and shame, the rewards of an impious disobedience. His want of piety to his dead Father made him incestuous in his mixtures and impious in his lusts.* 1.74 And Pausanias telling of a Fa∣ther who meeting his Son in Charon's boat did then attempt to strangle him, to revenge his impiety and disobedience, by this does represent what their sentence was concerning the resentment of rebellion of Sons and their undecent stubbornnesse even after death.

And this is of so much the greater regard,* 1.75 if the Father charges it upon the Son upon his blessing, and with great imprecations: for then un∣lesse the Father be evidently a light or trifling person, there is to be sup∣posed some great reason for the imposition, and then nothing can warrant the laying it aside, but a great necessity, or a very great, good, and certain reason to the contrary; that is, such a cause as may make the contrary ef∣fect to be infinitely unlike any image of impiety or disregard. But of this parents also must be very cautious, and not to put a load of duty upon a trifle that ought not to bear it. For he is foolish that upon his blessing will command his Son to make much of his Sparrow or his Monkey; and that Son is prodigal of his Fathers blessing, that will venture it all to please his humor, and his itch of liberty.

RULE VII. Neither the Father's authority, nor the Sonnes piety can oblige them to doe an action against the laws of God, or of the Father's and our just Superior.

THis Rule although it seems to contain in it nothing but what is ordi∣nary and confessed,* 1.76 because God is rather to be obeyed then Man, and amongst men the supreme rather then the superior; yet I have here de∣scrib'd it, because the explication of it will not onely contain one great measure of our duty and conduct of conscience, but it will give the full ge∣neral proportion of the Fathers power and the Sons piety, and also very much endear the obedience and piety of children.

When Bias had discoursed well and wisely that God was present in every place,* 1.77 he soon after argued weakly; If God dwels in all places, his presence makes all places holy, for it is his presence that hallows a Temple, and then there can be no such thing as sacrilege; for a thief that robs a Temple cannot carry it out of a Temple, but by carrying it into another.* 1.78 And upon such a trick as this some in A. Gellius did argue that we were not to obey our parents. For either they command that which is good, or that which is not good: If of it self it be good, then for it's own sake we are to doe it, not for their command; but if it be not good, then though they doe command it, it is not to be done at all. For these men supposed, there is necessity and holinesse in every lawfull action, as the other did suppose there was holinesse in every place of Gods abode. But this Sophistry is quickly discover'd. For besides that every thing is not necessary to be done because it is good, but many are left to our choice to doe or not to doe them, there are many things also which are not good in themselves, but onely become so when they are commanded. In both these cases the au∣thority of our parents is competent. For if they be in themselves good but not necessary, by the command of our parents they are made necessary and passe into a law. But if they be not good of themselves, but when they are commanded become good, then also they become necessary. A. Gellius instances, in militiam ire, rus colere, honores capescere, causas defendere, uxorem ducere, uti jussum proficisci, accersitum venire, to goe into the coun∣try or to stay in the city, to live at court or to live in your farm, to take up armes or to be a merchant, to marry a wife, and to come when you are called, and to work in the vineyard, these things of themselves are inno∣cent and harmlesse,* 1.79 but not necessary of themselves; propterea in ejusmodi omnium rerum generibus patri parendum esse, In all things of this nature we are to obey our Father. But adde this also, that if it be of it self a duty, and of that nature that it ought to be done sive imperet Pater, sive non imperet, whether his Father command or no, yet even here also the Fathers command is of great authority and great effect; for it addes a new law to the old commandement, and therefore the disobedience is guilty of a new sinne.

But in things dishonest and impious the Father hath no authority to give a commandement;* 1.80 and if he does, the children are bound not to obey. If the Father commands the Son to marry a wife, to plead a cause for the guilty, obsequendum est; there is no more to be said, the Father must be obeyed. But if he command the Son to marry a harlot, an impudent woman, a drunkard, or to be an advocate for Catiline or Clodius, for Ra∣villas or Guido Faux,* 1.81 he is not to be obeyed, quoniam accedente aliquo tur∣pitudinis numero, desinunt esse per sese haec media & indifferentia, When any turpitude is mingled with the action, it is no longer indifferent, or subject to command.

And therefore we find Acrotatus commended among the an∣cients because when his parents had requir'd of him to doe an unjust thing, he answer'd, I know that you are willing I should doe that which is just, for so you taught me to doe. I will doe therefore that which you desire I should, but what you bid me I will not doe.

And yet if a Father commands an unjust thing,* 1.82 his Authority is not wholly nothing. For first, though it must not be obeyed, yet it must not be dishonour'd, nor yet rejected but with great regard. Quaedam esse pa∣rendum, quaedam non obsequendum, said some in A. Gellius. Sed ea tamen quae obsequi non oportet, leniter & verecunde, ac sine detestatione nimia, sine op∣probratione acerba reprehensionis declinanda sensim, & relinquenda esse dicunt, quam respuenda. What is not fit to be obeyed, must be declin'd and avoid∣ed rather then rail'd at and rejected with reproach. Etiam in bona causa filii apud parentes debet humilis esse oratio, said Salvian. When a Son denies his Father he must doe it with the language of obedience. Such as was the answer of Agesilaus to his Father when he would have had him to give judgement against the laws,* 1.83 A te, Pater, à puero didici parêre legibus, quam∣obrem nunc quoque tibi obtempero, cavens nequid faciam praeter leges, Thou hast from my childhood, O Father, taught me to observe the laws; there∣fore even now also I obey your command, because I take care not to break them. For whatsoever the command be, yet the authority is venerable; if the command be unholy, yet the person is sacred. Liberto & filio sem∣per honesta & sancta persona Patris & Patroni videri debet, said Ulpian, The person of a Father is always honest and venerable to the Son, and so is that of a Patron to his freed man.

2. Though the command is not to be obeyed in things dishonest,* 1.84 yet that then also the Fathers authority hath in it some regard appears by this, that if a Son transgresses the law by the command of his Father, his punish∣ment is something the more easy upon that account, though the offence be great, l. fin. de bon. damn. But if the offence be little, he is wholly ex∣cus'd saith the law, l. liberorum. §. fin. & seq. de his qui no. infam. Thus if a Son by the command of his Father marries a widow within the year of mourning, he does not incurre infamy by the law, say the Doctors. Velle enim non creditur qui obsequitur Imperio Patris vel Domini, saith the law; and Venia dignus est qui obtemperavit, saith Ulpian: If he did obey the command of his Father, he is to be pardon'd, it was not his own will; that is, not his absolutely, but in a certain regard, and in a degree of dimi∣nution.

3.* 1.85 The Fathers authority hath this effect also upon children, that if the Father does wrong, the Son must bear it as long as it can be born: and

therefore the Son may not goe to law with the Father, and complain of him to the Judge, without leave from both their Superiors. For if by any means the Son can make the Father lesse then he is, it will destroy all duty, and dispark the inclosure which Nature and the laws have made with fear and reverence. But this hath a double consideration, the one in Religion, and the other in Laws.

1. In Religion we are to consider not onely what is lawfull in the pre∣cise question,* 1.86 but what is to be done in the whole complication and practice of it. For if the Supreme can give leave in some case for a Son to com∣plain of his Father to a Judge, then in some cases it may be lawfull to doe it, that is, in those cases in which the law hath specified and restrain'd the Paternal power, in those things which the laws call excesses and injuries, and which indeed in themselves are cruel and intolerable. For in such cases the laws are a guard and defence to the oppressed Son; concerning whom although it is suppos'd that the Father takes sufficient care to keep him harmlesse, yet if the Father does not, the law does: and the law does in∣deed allow the greatest power to Fathers, because it presumes it will be for the childs good; but because there are some persons whom no presumption can measure, who are wicked beyond all the usual temptations and infirmi∣ties of mankind, therefore even in extraordinary cases there must be some provision; and therefore it is not to be supposed that it shall for ever be un∣lawfull for Sons to complain of their Fathers to the Prince. But what those cases are we can be taught by nothing but by the laws themselves, and by our own natural necessities. We must cry out when we cannot for∣bear, and we must throw off the burden under which we cannot stand; onely we must not throw it off as a wild horse does his load, and kick it with our feet, but we must lay it as gently down as we can. Thus if a Fa∣ther refuses to give alimony to his Son who cannot be otherwise provided for, the aid of the Prince or any superior that can rightly give us remedy may be implor'd. If a Father beats his child till he lame or dismember him, or endanger his life, the Son can be remedied, and without breach of duty can implore it. So long as a child is in his Fathers house, and under his Fathers power, these are the onely causes in which he can be allowed le∣gally to complain: because in all other things he is intirely under his Fa∣thers power. But when he is emancipated, and quit from his direct au∣thority, which the Lawyers signify by the power of Castigation, then the Son hath distinct rights, and in them because he can be injured, there are more causes of difference. To this therefore the answer is,

That in matters of contract,* 1.87 in little injustices, in any thing that is tolerable, in such things the suffering of which can consist with charity to our selves and piety to our relatives, if a Son does contest with his Father at law, it may be it is no proper act of disobedience, and there is nothing of rebellion in it against his just authority; but there is also as little of piety; especially if we consider that such contests at law are extremely seldome manag'd with ordinary charity, and never without the greatest reproach on one side, and scandal on both: and if the Son can secure that on his own part, yet whether that seeming undutifulnesse, and more then seeming want of pious and loving regard, may not exasperate the Father into angry cur∣sings and evil thoughts, is a consideration of religion which ought to be taken care of by all that would be Innocent. There is not one of a thou∣sand

that goes to law at all but he runs into so many temptations that it is very hard for him to doe right and to doe nothing that is wrong: but not one in ten thousand can justify his cause and his person too, if he goes to law with a Father. And he will for no cause suffer wrong at any mans hands that will take no wrong of his Father; and he that does so, will give but an ill account of his Christianity.

2.* 1.88 And these things appear the more by reason of the open dislikes which the Law professes against such proceedings. For look at this thing in Law, and we find that the laws expresse the Sons obedience in universal termes; Omnibus quae Pater imperat parendum, Sons must be obedient to their Parents in all things. Now if the dispute be betwixt our obedience to God or to our parents, it is an ill case; we know whom we are to obey, but the dispute it self is not good; and the very making a question of either is a disadvantage to the honour of both: and therefore the Law, which never supposes a question to be between God and our Father, does not think it fit to make this to be any exception to her indefinite termes; and therefore Tiberius said it without a limitation, Filium non posse detrectare jussa Patris; and Turnus against Tarquin said summarily and clearly, Nullam breviorem esse cognitionem quam quae inter Patrem & Filium, paucisque ver∣bis transigi posse; Ni pareat Patri, habendum infortunium, Between a Father and a Son the proceeding is short, and the case quickly summ'd up; Either let the Son obey, or let him be punish'd. And the law accounts it a dimi∣nution of such supreme authorities, to have exceptions and reservations ex∣press'd in the first provisions of the law; and the very making God and the Father to be the opposite and compar'd persons in the question, is to lessen them both. In comparatione personarum inest laesio & injuria, say the Lawyers; There is some wrong done when you compare two Emi∣nencies. Therefore in this case, if ever any such thing does happen, with∣out dispute we know what we are to doe: but it is not good that the laws should take public notice of it beforehand. * But if the question be be∣tween the Father and the Son, the law is so great an enemy to all such que∣stions, right or wrong, that the law judges for the person of the Father, even when it does not like the cause. It does so in the case of all Superiors in some degree, and therefore much more in the case of Fathers. Jus quod deprimitur, aufertur; if you lessen the authority, you take it away; and then you doe injury, though by doing of right. When Accia Variola question'd her Fathers Testament, because he had left immoderate Legacies to her Mother in law, the Fathers of rich families were present in great numbers, and the Sons of those families attended for the sentence in great and anxious expectations, looking which interest should get the advantage. But the Judges very wisely left the case undetermin'd, because it was hard on the Fathers side; but they were resolved never to leave a precedent in which the children should be in any thing superior to their Fathers: or that as Death and Love chang'd their quivers, so old age should be reckon'd as void of Counsel, and wisedome and prudence should be the portion of yong men.

RULE VIII. It is not lawfull for Children to enter into any lasting Course of life against the will or approbation of their Parents.

THis Rule contains two great Cases.* 1.89 The first is concerning the states of Religion; the other is concerning the states of Civil life.

1. It is not lawfull for children to take them any religious vows,* 1.90 or enter into any of those which are called states of Religion, viz. to take upon them the state of single life, to be Priests, Monks, Friers, Hermits, or any thing of the like nature, without the consent of their Parents.

Thomas Aquinas entred into the Dominican Order,* 1.91 and became a Frier without the consent of his parents: and that unjustifiable action begat a more unjustifiable doctrine, Post annos pubertatis posse liberos se voto reli∣gionis obligare, absque voluntate parentum,* 1.92 That afer 14 years of age or the first ripenesse, it is lawfull for children to take upon them the vows of Religion, whether their parents be willing or unwilling. And after his time it grew into a common doctrine and frequent practice; and if a Monk could persuade a yong heir,* 1.93 or a pregnant youth into their cloysters, they pre∣tended to serve God, though certainly they serv'd themselves, and disserv'd a family. The ground they went upon was, the pretence of the great san∣ctity of the state Monastical; that it was for God and for religion; that to serve God no man that can chuse hath need to ask leave; that if the Father be superior, yet God is the supreme; that it is Corban; that if the yong man or maiden be given to God, he is given to him that hath more right to him or her then his parents; that religion in all things is to be preferr'd; and that although the parents have a right over the bodies of their children, yet of their souls they are themselves to dispose, because theirs is the big∣gest interest and concern: and whereas God hath commanded to Honour our Father and Mother, we know that God is our Father, and the Church is our Mother; and what does accrue to these, is no diminution to the o∣thers right.

Against all these fair pretences it is sufficient to oppose this one truth,* 1.94 That Religion and Piety cannot of themselves crosse each other, but may very well stand together, and nothing is better then to doe a necessary du∣ty. And there needs not much consideration to tell which is better, to make our love to God and our love to our Parents, and our duty to them both to stand together, or to fight one with another. God intends the first, that is certain, for he is not the author of division, nor hath he made one good contrary to another. For if one be set up against another they are both spoiled. For that duty that goes away is lost; and that duty which thrust it away hath done evil, and therefore is not good. If therefore it be possible to doe our duty to our parents and to love God greatly at the same time, there needs no more to be said in this affair, but that we are to re∣member

that a man may greatly serve God, and yet never be a Frier or a Priest; and that allowing or supposing that these are great advantages, or ra∣ther engagements of duty, yet it is certain that no state of perfection can be set forward by doing evil; and he enters ill into the state of perfection that passes into it by the door of Undutifulnesse.

Now then,* 1.95 we are certain of this, that Parents have the first right, and the first possession, and that to dispossesse any one of his rights against his will is great injustice, and therefore that no end can sanctify it; and that it would be a strange religion which teaches impiety for pious conside∣rations: and therefore without further inquiry, it follows that a Son may not upon any pretences of a religious manner and circumstances of life sub∣duct himself from his Fathers power, and put himself under other govern∣ments with which his Father shall have nothing to doe. A Son hath no power over himself, for he belongs to and is under the power of another; & therefore if he does subduct himself, he is undutifull, and impious, & unjust, and does not Honour his Father and his Mother. But he that does per∣suade the Son from his Fathers house into a Monastery, is reus Plagii, he is a Man-stealer.* 1.96 Qui Patri eripit filium, educatori alumnum, Domino ser∣vum, Deo efficit impium, educatori ingratum, Domino nequam, said Tertul∣lian, He that debauches a Son, a Pupil, or a Servant, and snatches them from their Father, their Guardian, or their Lord, makes them impious, ingratefull and vile. And because this was done by some upon pretence of piety, the Council of Gangra forbad it upon a curse.* 1.97 Quicunque fil•••• à parentibus pratextu Divini cultûs abscedunt, nec debitam reverentiam im∣pendunt illis….anathema sint. Pretence of the Divine service is no good warranty for disobedience to parents; and they who so neglect their Fathers blessing, will meet with the curse of their Mother. And this Canon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cited and renewed in the sixth Council of Constantinople. * The Council of Tribur forbids expressely a yong maiden before twelve years of age ••o enter into a Monastery without the consent of her Guardian. Gratian citing this Decree, addes something of his own; for it is not known whence he had it, except from the degenerous and corrupt practices of his own times. Si verò in fortiori aetate adolescens vel adolescentula servire Deo ele∣gerit, non est potestas parentibus prohibendi, If the yong man or maiden be of greater age, the parents have no power to forbid him: which ••s a clause which is not to be found in the Codes of Councils, in any editions old or new. But when Monastical life had reputation and secular advantages upon religious pretences, then the advocates and promoters of it were willing by right and wrong to set it forward. But the corruption is plain, and appa∣rently against the doctrine and practices of the Fathers of the Church.

S.* 1.98a 1.99 Ambrose and S.b 1.100 Austin say that a Father or Mother ought not to hinder a son or daughter from entring to a Monastery. But the▪ things were so ordered that the entry thither was not a perpetual bond, but a going thither as to a Christian School, a place for institution and holy practice, and from thence they might return when they would, they might serve God and their Parents too: the profession of a Monk was then nothing else but priscae liberaeque vitae ac pure Christianae meditatio, a meditation and in∣stitution of a Christian life according to the rate of the Primitive simplici∣ty,* 1.101 liberty and devotion. But besides this, though they exhort parents not to hinder their children, yet they affirm that they have power to doe it▪

and they may if they will; as appears amply in S. Austin's Epistle to Ecdicia, and in his 233. Epistle to Benenatus. But most plainly and dogmatically it is affirm'd by S. Basil,* 1.102 liberos non esse recipiendos in Monasteriis, nisi à pa∣rentibus suis offerantur, Children are not to be receiv'd into Monasteries un∣lesse their parents present them: and when S. Gregory Nazianzen had against his Fathers commandement run into a Monastery, he began to bethink himself what he had done, and found that without impiety he could not be contumacious against his Father, and therefore left his solitude and return'd home. Et hoc facio (saith he) jussu Dei magis quam hominum metu. Ita∣que, O pataer, dicto jam audienti praeb•• benedictionem. This he did in obe∣dience to God, and not for the fear of men; and therefore upon the account of his obedience and return, he begg'd his Fathers blessing. But besides this, there were two remarkable examples which abundantly conclude this duty. * The one was of Heliodorus, who together with S. Hierom had undertaken a Monastical life by vow; but finding that by Piety and Nature he was to regard his onely sister and her son, he return'd to her house, and took upon him the habit of the Clergy, and left that of Monks. Against him S. Hierom, who was then a yong man, newly come from the Universi∣ty and the schools of Rhetoric, storms very much, and saies some things which when he was older and wiser he changes and revokes, as appears in his Epistle to Nepotian, where he imputes his former sayings to his juve∣nile years and learning. Now though Heliodorus had no parents when he undertook a Monastical life, and therefore had his liberty; yet it is there∣fore certain he believ'd he ought not to have done it without the consent of parents if they had been living, because he did suppose a lesse Piety, even to his Sister and his Nephew, to be a sufficient reason for him to leave his solitude and shew Piety at home. * But the other instance is more mate∣rial. Stagirius was made a Monk, not against his Fathers commandement, but against his Counsel. The Father was very unwilling, but durst not ex∣pressely forbid it, upon some scruples which were put into his head by the humors which were then beginning. But because he had neglected his Fa∣thers Counsel, and caus'd trouble to him, Stagirius was vexed with the Devil,* 1.103 and S. Chrysostome took great pains to comfort him. But afterwards the manners of men grew worse, and all religion was inclosed in a Friers habit, and it grew to be esteemed excellent to enter into a Monastery, and whatsoever did hinder it was to be despis'd, or us'd like a temptation; and the Orders of Religion grew potent and prevail'd over private interests and private religion, and by degrees it enter'd into unsufferable mischiefs and impiety. It was sometimes restrain'd by good laws, so that it could not grow so fast,* 1.104 Charles the Great made a law concerning it: De pueris verò sine voluntate parentum ut tonsurentur, vel puellae velentur, modis omnibus inhibitum est, Boys must not be shorn nor maidens vail'd without the con∣sent of their parents. And to the transgressors of this law a fine was im∣pos'd, the same with that which was appointed in the Salic law* 1.105; which did equally forbid them to be slain and to be shorn. For by religious pre∣tences not to doe kindnesse to their parents our Blessed Saviour called hy∣pocrisy in the Pharisees; and therefore upon the like pretences to doe them wrong, to take their right from them, to dispossesse them of their dearest pledges, must needs be so mcuh the worse. It is that which our Blessed Saviour calls Hypocrisy, and dishonouring our parents: It is that which the Church does call an anathema, which the Laws call plagium, or man∣stealing: It is homicide in the account of the Imperial laws: and S. Bernard

calls them wolves that doe it, in his first Epistle, which, as the story runs, was not written without a Miracle.

The other great case is in the Marriage of their Children,* 1.106 concern∣ing which the sentence is ready and acknowledged in the greatest part of it.

2. It is unlawfull for Children to marry without and against the consent of their Parents.

That such marriages are not licitae is confess'd on all hands; that is, the son or daughter sin against God and the laws, by marrying against his Fa∣thers Commandement.

Adeone impotenti animo esse,* 1.107 ut praeter civium Morem atque legem, & sui voluntatem patris, Tamen hanc habere studeat, cum summo probro?

said he in the Comedy. It is dishonourable, and a shame to take a wise against the will of his Father; it is against the manners and the laws of all Republics. But whether they be legitimae or no is a great question; that is, whether they be wholly invalid and null in law, or in case they be valid, whether or no they suffer any diminution, and what it is.

Amongst the Ancients,* 1.108 and for a long time in the Civil law, such mar∣riages were esteem'd illegitimate, and no better then a meer Concubinate. So Ovid intimates in the marriage of Pyramus and Thisbe;

—Tedae quoque jure coissent, Sed vetuere patres—

If the parents had not forbidden, the marriage had been legitimate; but therefore not then when they are forbidden: and therefore as incestuous marriages were not onely Impious but Null, they are not onely sinfull in the entry, but all the way; so are these, alike evil in all the progression, though as yet they have not a proper name in law, as the other have. But Apulcius is more expresse;* 1.109 Impares nuptiae, & praeterea in villa sine testi∣bus & Patre non consentiente factae, legitima non possunt videri, ac per hoc spurius iste nascetur. Unequal marriages, clandestine, and made without the Fathers consent can never seem legitimate, and therefore the children that are born will be illegitimate. And Musaeus observes in the marriage of Lean∣der, that it was ominous and unlucky upon this reason, because

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

The Father and the Mother did not sing the Hymenaeal or Marriage song The same thing was observ'd also by the Christians;* 1.110 for when Tertullian is recounting the auspicious signes and causes of a blessed marriage, he puts this in, Unde sufficiam ad enarrandam felicitatem ejus Matrimonii quod Ec∣clesia conciliat, & confirmat oblatio, & obsignatum Angeli renunciant, Pater rato habet? That marriage will be very prosperous which is blessed by the Church, made solemn by publication and the rituals of religion, and esta∣blishe'd by the consent of the Father. For without it it is not onely inauspi∣cious

and unlucky, but illegal,* 1.111 unfirm and insufficient. Nam nec in terris filii sine consensu Patrum ritè & jure nubent, saith he. For he liv'd in a time when the law pronounc'd such marriages illegal, and the children ba∣stards. For as some contracts are invalid unlesse the solemnity of the law be observed, and Testaments are ineffective without such a number of wit∣nesses; so the law requires the consent of Parents to make the espousals to be a legal and valid contract.* 1.112 Non videri justum filium qui ex eo Matri∣monio natus est cui Pater non consensit, said Paulus the Lawyer: and this went so farre, that if a daughter were expos'd by her Father like a child of the people, and no care of her education or alimony taken, yet before the time of Constantine, that daughter might not marry without the leave even of that unnatural Father. And amongst the children of Abraham this was so sacredly observed, that even there where by the event of things we per∣ceive that the marriage was design'd by God, yet it was not to be acted but by the Fathers willingnesse;* 1.113 as appears in the cases of Isaac and Rebecca, Sampson and his wife at Timnath.* 1.114 Thus Agar took a wife for her son Ishmael, and Jacob went into Mesopotamia for a wife by the consent of his Father and Mother; and Sichem ask'd of his Father Hemor that he would get him the daughter of Jacob to wife.* 1.115 And the words of the Law were directed to the Father,* 1.116 not to the Son; Non accipies Uxorem filiis tuis de filiabus eorum, & filiam tuam non dabis filio ejus: and in the New Testament, He that giveth his Virgin in marriage doth well: still it is the Parent that hath the right and the power; it is the Parent that can make the contract;* 1.117 he is the person suppos'd onely competent in law.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

said Hermione in Euripides, My Father is to take care of my espousals; that's no part of my care or determination.* 1.118 And S. Ambrose, by the example of Rebecca, said that the choice of a husband for his daughter is to be permit∣ted to the Father.

And indeed by these instances and the perpetual practice and persua∣sion of the old world we cannot suppose it to be lesse then a Natural law,* 1.119 or a natural reason, of great effect, or of great necessity. When the daughter of Cyaxarus was ask'd whom she would marry, she answer'd, Cyrus; for when they were children together he had delighted her with pretty songs and conversation: And when she was offer'd to him with a royal robe, Jewels and a crown of gold, and all Media for her dowry, Cyrus answer'd,* 1.120 Et genus & puellam & dotalia laudo, I like the Lady, her dow∣ry and her family, but I must have these agree with the mind of my Father and my Mother, and then I will marry her. For (as Panaegyris in Plautus told his sister) in Patris potestate esse situm liberorum matrimonium, quibus faciendum hac in parte sit quod Patres imperant, Childrens marriage is in the power of their Father, and they must doe what their Father commands: and Simo would not allow Pamphilus to call him Father,* 1.121 when he disobey'd him in this particular,

Quid, mi Pater? quasi tu hujus indigeas Patris. Domus, Uxor, liberi inventi invito Patre.

But Pamphilus in despite of his passion, suffered his duty to prevail,

Tibi, Pater, me dedo: quidvis oneris impone, impera. Vis me Uxorem ducere? hanc vis amittere? ut potero feram.

Pamphilus offer'd to quit Glycerium if his Father pleas'd, and yet he had been contracted to her, and had a Son by her. Certain it is, these contracts were to all purposes invalid by the Civil law both of the Greeks and Ro∣mans. Nuptias consistere non posse nisi consentiant omnes, hoc est, qui coeunt, quorumque in potestate sunt, saith the Law, Inst. de Nuptiis. ff. de ritu nupti∣arum.* 1.122 And in the Jus Graeco-Romanum there is an expresse Canon, Qui in aliena potestate sunt eorum pacta nihil habent firmi: propterea quae citra voluntatem nuptiae fiunt eorum penes quos potestas est, pro scortationibus ha∣bentur. This is peremptory. Such marriages are fornications, and there∣fore the children are Bastards. And of this Justinian gives this account, Just••••••. nuptias inter se contrahunt qui secundum praecepta legum coeunt, Those marriages are true which are confederated according to the precepts of laws, when the contractors are of fitting age, whether they be the chief, or the sons of families. Onely if they be sons of families, they must have their con∣sent in whose power they are. Nam hoc fieri debere, & civilis & naturalis ratio suadet, in tantum ut jussus parentum praecedere debeat. For that this ought to be done, that the Fathers consent must be before the marriage, not onely is concluded by civil or political reason, but also by the natural.

Thus it was in the Natural and in the Civil law;* 1.123 and at first, and for a long time after, it was no otherwise in the Canon law. To this purpose is that famous Decree of Pope Euaristus;* 1.124 Aliter legitimum non sit conjugi∣um nisi ab iis qui super ipsam foeminam dominationem habere videntur, & à quibus custoditur, uxor petatur, & à parentibus & propinquioribus sponsetur, & legibus dotetur. Euaristus had enumerated a great many things which were fit (as he thought) and much for the honesty and decency, the blessing and prosperity of the marriage; as attending to solemn prayers for two or three days, oblations and bridemen, and some other things which are now out of use: he proceeds to that which was essentiall to the contract, the con∣sent of parents; and aliter legitimum non sit, it cannot otherwise be legiti∣mate: and he addes, aliter verò praesumpta non conjugia, sed adulteria, vel contubernia, vel stupra aut fornicationes potius quam legitima conjugia esse non dubitatur, Marriages without the consent of parents are adulteries and ravishments, fornications and concubinate, any thing rather then marri∣ages.* 1.125 To this accords that Canon of S. Basil, Puellis quae praeter Patris sententiam fornicatores secutae sunt reconciliatis parentibus videtur res re∣medium accipere: sed non protinus ad communionem restituentur, sed triennio punientur. If Fathers will pardon their daughters that without their leave run after wanton persons, their crime as to him seems to be taken off; yet let them be put for three years into the station of Penitents. Upon this Canon Theodorus Balsamon saies,

that by [Puellis] or Girles, S. Basil means those that are under their Fathers power: and that if any such give themselves up to their lovers without their Fathers consent and are dishonour'd, although they to themselves seem to be married, yet such marriages are not valid, they cannot stand: and for this there is no remedy but being reconcil'd to their Fathers.

But S. Basil is also as expresse him∣self in his text as Balsamon in his Commentary, for in his 40^•h Canon he saies

that marriages without the consent of them in whose power they are, are fornications and not marriages

. And therefore the Council of Carthage requires that when the bridegroom and his bride are to be blessed by the Priest, that is, solemnly married, they should be presented to the Priest by their parents or their deputies; which thing is carefully to this

day observed in the Church of England. For according to the saying of S. Leo,* 1.126 Paterno arbitrio foeminae viris junctae carent culpâ; If maidens be joyn'd to their Husbands by the consent of their parents, there is then no∣thing but innocence, no body hath cause to complain. But that's not all. For Gratian expounding these words, saies that from hence [datur intelligi quod Paternus consensus desideratur in nuptiis, nec sine eo legitimae nuptiae ha∣beantur] we are given to understand that the Fathers consent is requir'd, and without it the marriages are not to be accounted legitimate: and for it he quotes the words of Euaristus before mention'd. But the Council of Aquisgrane did not onely separate such marriages when the maiden was stoln away without her parents leave, but would not allow that ever after they should be man and wife,* 1.127 as we find in Burchard; and the same was ve∣rified in the Council of Melda, which for it's warrant quotes a synodal de∣finition of S. Gregory to the same purpose.

The Church was indeed very severe against such undutifull proceed∣ings and rebellions against the supreme natural power;* 1.128 and therefore the Council in Paris & divers others did anathematize them that so married,* 1.129 & even when they were reconcil'd to their parents did impose on them severe penances. But because when things were once come to that passe, Fathers perceived that the reputation of their children was lost, and that it was not easy to get other honest Matches for their children, and especially when Marriage began to be called a Sacrament, and some scruples were by the Clergy cast into this affair, and because men were willing to make the best of a bad Market; the Fathers gave over making use of this power given them by the laws, and thought the public penances were castigation suffi∣cient. But then according to the nature of all good laws and manners running down the hill, this thing never left running till children had leave to despise their parents, and marry where and when they pleas'd; and though it was said to be a fault, yet factum valet, fieri non debuit, it was decreed in the Council of Trent to be valid and effectual.

But now this sentence which indeed relies upon some reason and very great authority,* 1.130 and is wise and fit to prevent much evil in families, is yet very severe, and ought to receive some allay; which when I have represen∣ted upon the general consideration, I shall endeavour to give it a right un∣derstanding, and describe the truth that lies between the two extremes, and was yet never affirm'd and describ'd by any one that I know of, but is de∣terminable by a just weighing of all that which very many wise men have said, being put together.

First therefore I consider what Quintilian said:* 1.131

If it be lawfull at any time for a son to doe an action otherwise unreprovable without the con∣sent of parents,* 1.132 certainly liberty is in nothing so necessary as in marriage.

Ego eligam cum qua victurus sum, ego comitem laborum, sollicitudinum, cu∣rarum ipse perpendam. Quis enim amare alieno animo potest? It is fit that I should chuse her or him with whom I must always live, the partner of my joys and sorrows, the companion of my cares, the Father or the Mother of my own children: for it is impossible that a man should love with any affe∣ctions but his own. And if Pamphilus can love none but Glycerium, it will be hard for Simo, whose fires are extinct by age,* 1.133 to command his son to burn and pine away without remedy and pitty. It was better which Pausanias

tells of Danaus, that he gave his daughters leave to chuse their husbands; and Herodotus tells that Callias the Athenian was much commended by the Greeks because he permitted to his daughters to chuse what husbands,* 1.134 not he, but themselves lik'd best.

But the case is to be determin'd by these three Propositions.

1. When sons or daughters are of competent years and have the use of rea∣son,* 1.135 they can naturally contract marriages; that is, there is nothing naturally requir'd but that they can consent, and be of a marriageable strength. Suf∣ficiat solus consensus illorum de quorum, quarumque conjunctionibus agitur, said Clement the third,* 1.136 Consent alone makes marriage; that is, it makes a marriage naturally valid, if it be done by those persons who naturally can consent. For that the consent of parents is not essentially necessary to the validity of the contract naturally, appears in many instances. 1. Because children can contract when their parents are dead. 2. Because if their Father be dead, and their Mother living, the son that is of years of dis∣cretion is not under his Mothers power as to that, but that upon great and good reason he may marry by his own choice. 3. A son may marry at the command of a Prince, when it is for the public good, though his Father at the same time regard nothing but his private. 4. If a Father say nothing to hinder it, though he be secretly unwilling, or owns the unwillingnesse, but behaves himself negatively as to any cooperation, yet the son may marry: which demonstrates that the Fathers consent is no active principle, ingredient into the marriage, but a privative or a negative onely; that is, he can forbid it, and so hinder it, but it is not therefore naturally invalid; that is, he can legally prevent it, but not naturally annul it. 5. If the mar∣riage of the son be not onely of regard and advantage to the son, but so far from doing injury to the Father, that it does him honour; the laws de∣clare that such a marriage is valid, though the Father out of humor dis∣agree. And therefore when the law saies that the son cannot contract mar∣riage but with his Fathers consent, the Doctors limit it amongst other cases to this especially,* 1.137 quando filius duceret uxorem turpem & indignam, when the son marries dishonorably; for then (say Bartolus and Decius) there is injury done to the Father: so that the prohibition lying for this reason, when the case is contrary to the reason, the extraordinary effect must be contrary to the ordinary law. 6. Whatever the law decrees in detestation of childrens disobedience, yet the marriage though to some civil effects it is null'd, yet that it is naturally valid appears in this, because the son that is born of that marriage is the Grandfathers own, and if the Father die be∣fore the Grandfather,* 1.138 the Grandchild must inherit. So that the punish∣ment is but personally on the Son, and is not a perfect invalidating of the marriage. And this very case was determin'd in the Parliament of Har∣lay in behalf of Marguerite de Nesdes her children, the Nephews of her husbands Father, in the year 1584. 7. If the Father be unreasonable, and offers to his son or daughter an ugly, a deform'd, a vitious or a base person, and gives him no other choice, and the son cannot contain and live a single life, by the consent of all men the son may refuse, and he cannot but chuse another.* 1.139 8. The same is the case, if the Father be negligent; then by the law a son sooner and a maiden after 25. years of age can chuse for her self. * 1.140 An sedere oportuit domi virginem tam grandem? said Phalaris. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 For it is intolerable that a maid should be suffer'd to passe the

flower of her age at home.* 1.141 And when the Gemara Sanhedrin had said [Doe not prostitute thy daughter, to make her a harlot] Rabbi Eliezer said this was spoken to him that marries his daughter to an old man. R. Akiba saies, it was meant of him qui domi retinet filiam nubilem, that keeps his daughter at home too long. Which two last cases relying upon the same reason produce the same effect, That the Fathers consent, though highly to be requir'd, yet is not essentially necessary; it may be a valid marriage without it. 9. And this is true also in case of Emancipation* 1.142, or quitting the Son from the Fathers power; he is sui juris, and can marry where he will, and yet he owes to his Father all the obedience to which by the law of Nature he was obliged. 10. If a Son marries without his Fathers consent, the law saies it is void; but yet it is not so void, but that the Fathers ap∣probation makes it valid without marrying again: which could not be if it were naturally invalid, but therefore it is both naturally and Ecclesiasti∣cally good.* 1.143 Quod enim ab initio malè factum est, parentum postea consensus reparare videtur, said Balsamon: it was ill done at first, and the Fathers consent repairs the dammage; but if it was invalid and null at first, nothing can make it alive upon the first stock. Quod enim ab initio non valuit, pro∣gressu temporis valere non debet, saith the law. 11. Servants or slaves in the Civil law were as much in the power of their lords as sons in the pow∣er of their Fathers; as much I say, though not for so many reasons; and yet the marriage of servants was valid in law though contracted without the consent of their Lords;* 1.144 as Pope Alexander the third wrote in a decretal Epistle to the Arch-bishop of Canterbury: and therefore that the marriage of sons and daughters may be so too, that is, not to be dissolved, not to be declar'd null in conscience, I can find no reason to the contrary. 12. We find in Scripture that Esau's marriages were valid and went on, though con∣tracted against the interest of that family, the pleasure of the parents and, as Lyra saies, without their consent. It is true indeed that the Jerusalem Thargum saies that they were a grief to Isaac and Rebecca because they were undutifull, and proud, and idolatrous, refusing to be taught by their Husbands Father or Mother. But when I consider that it is not onely af∣firmed by Rebecca that they were an affliction to her,* 1.145 but observ'd at the very first taking of them in, that they were a grief to both of them, and that Esau afterwards to gratify his Father did marry his Cosen german, the daughter of his Uncle Ishmael; the opinion of Lyra seems most proba∣ble, and that Isaac and Rebecca did not consent, and were not pleas'd with those first marriages. But if this should fail, there are arguments enough besides to evince that naturally such marriages are valid, though at no hand they ought to be done.

But what then shall we say to all the former discourse,* 1.146 which prov'd that those marriages were illegitimate, and the conjunctions no better then concubinate? Does all that heap of things, and sayings of wise men, and laws Ecclesiastical and Civil and Natural, effect nothing? or doe they pre∣vail intirely? That they effect something their own strength does evidence; that they doe not prevail to effect a natural nullity in marriage, the contra∣ry arguments describ'd in the former Number doe sufficiently prove. What then is the conclusion?

From hence we may learn it.* 1.147 2. Although the marriage is naturally valid, yet that natural validity can have this effect onely, that it can for ever

bind the conscience of the engaged parties to faith and mutual love, and to cohabitation when it is not hindred; and it is, even when it is most of all forbidden, yet potentially legitimate, that is, it wants no features and li∣neaments, nor life, but it wants solennity and publication; that is, it is like an Embryo in his Mothers womb, there it must stay till the law gives it name and birth. * For it is to be considered, that although the yong folks can contract even against their parents will, yet they can be hindred from possession: Not onely because natural rights can be impeded in their use and challenge by the Supreme Civil power; but because there is in marri∣age something that is wholly in the power of the Civil law. For in mar∣riage there are three things, Unity, and Society, and Mystery. This last is not of present consideration, because it is wholly of spiritual nature, and therefore of Ecclesiastical cognisance. But of the other two, the first is in the power of the Contractors, the latter is in the power of the Com∣mon-wealth. From union of minds, and obligation of mutual duties and affections, and perpetuity of relations they cannot be kept by their dissen∣ting parents, or by the Civil law. But from being a society, from begin∣ning a legal family, from rights of succession, from reckoning descents in their line, and from cohabitation they can be kept by that power which is the Supreme in the establishment and conduct of all societies. And the consequent of this will be, not onely that such persons shall loose all civil benefits and profits of inheritance, that is, all that can come from Society, but even their very Unity will be disparag'd, so as it shall be esteem'd no better then fornication; not that it is so before God, or is against the vertue of Chastity, but that it is so in the Civil account, and is against the laws of Marriage. It is in this as it is in the case of Raptus or Ravishment. In the Civil law, he that takes away a mans daughter without the consent of her parents rapuisse dicitur is a Ravisher: but it is not so in the Canon law, it is not so in Nature or Conscience. Raptus ibi dicitur admitti ubi nihil ante de nuptiis dicitur: If there was no treaty of marriage, it is a rape; but if the man was secretly betrothed, to carry her away and lye with her is no rape, licèt parentes reclamarent,* 1.148 although the parents were against it, said Pope Lucius the third. Now to call this a rape, and to punish it as if it were, is in the power of law: just as the stealing of a knife out of a Church, or a Chalice out of the Clercs house, may by law be called Sacrilege; and then it is so to all the purposes of law; though before God it may not differ from simple theft. So for yong lovers to lye together before publication is by the Canon law called Antenuptialis fornicatio, and is punished as if it were so indeed: and yet though it be evil in the eye of men, and upon that account is so in it self, yet in the eyes of God it is not fornication; God himself having expressely called a Betrothed woman by the name of wife,* 1.149 and punish'd her falshood to her husband before marriage with the same evil as adultery. And thus it is in the present inquiry: Marriage of per∣sons in minority is naturally invalid, because they are naturally unable to make a contract for their good, they understand it not; but if they be of good years, though under their Fathers power, they are naturally able, but politically unable, and therefore are inevitably engag'd in an evil condition, and they have sinn'd, and it is a miracle if they doe not sin again, and abide in it upon this account. For the marriage is good within doors, but it is not good abroad: they are both oblig'd, and yet cannot pay their ob∣ligation: this marriage is not good in law, and yet they cannot chuse ano∣ther in conscience: it was by their own fault, and therefore they must bear

their own burden: they are guilty of fornication, but it is not a sin against the seventh Commandement: they have not dishonour'd their own bodies between themselves, but they have dishonour'd them before all the world besides. And as covetousnesse is idolatry, and rebellion is witchcraft, so this disobedience is unchastity, it is uncleannesse against the fifth Commandement: and therefore it is no legal marriage, but unlawfull at first, and remains so all the way, till a legal remedy be found out. For this things is rightly stated by Paulus the Lawyer:* 1.150 Matrimonia haec jure non contrahi, sed tamen con∣tracta non solvi, Such marriages ought not to be made, but being made they can∣not be dissolved. And he gives an excellent reason for it; contemplationem enim publicae utilitatis privatorum commodis anteferri. It is of public con∣cern that marriages naturally valid be not rescinded; but it is but of private emolument that the Father should be pleas'd in his daughter in law: and therefore although the* 1.151 Law of God and man doe their several shares for the securing of every interest and concern, yet that regard which is greatest and more public is to be preferred. Now for the understanding of the full effect of this, and for the verification of it, it is to be consider'd, that laws are called Perfect, or Imperfect. A perfect law is that which either in it self or by the Magistrate rescinds whatsoever was done against her prescript. l. Non dubium, C. de legib. The imperfect law is that which does not indeed rescind the thing, but inflicts a punishment upon the transgressors: such as was the lex Furia Testamentaria, and such as is the law concerning these forbidden marriages against their Fathers will; the Marriage must stand, and the married must lie under the punishment* 1.152: they in the civil law were reckon'd as Concubines, and their Children bastards, and there was neither dowry nor marriage allowed. And upon this account, all those sayings which I brought in the former numbers † are true: the marriages were then civilly null, that is, in estimation of law and to all intents and purposes of law were outlawed, and made uncapable of civil benefits and advantages; but the law could not make them naturally null:* 1.153 and in the Law of Moses, although a maiden that had been humbled was to become the wife of him that did it, and to have her dowry accordingly, if her Father pleas'd, and he might chuse whether he would or no; yet there is no footstep or signe, that if he had betrothed himself to her, and lyen with her, that then she was not his wife, or that her dissenting Father could make it null. Indeed divorces were so easily granted then, that even in this case they had a re∣medy at hand: but we are tied up by stricter and more holy bands; and since Christ reduc'd it to the first institution, and that it was made to represent the union of the Church unto him, it is not so easy to untie this knot. So much as is in the power of law, so much is fit to be done for the securing the Fathers authority and his rights according to the interests of religion and the public: but the laws themselves have a limit; and though they can verify all their own acts, yet they cannot annul the Act of God: Quae Deus conjunxit, nemo separet. Conjunction of marriages is by a law of God and Nature, and to it nothing is requir'd but a natural capacity and an ex∣plicit consent, and therefore this no man can separate. But yet,

3. The Father hath over his children a double power;* 1.154 a natural power and a political. His Natural power is intire, absolute, and unlimited, except where the Law of God or of Nations does intervene; but then it lasts but till the children are able to understand and chuse, and shift for themselves. For there are some natural and personal rights relating to duty, to the perpe∣tuating

the kind, to defending and providing for themselves, which are not to be taken from us, unlesse they be as well or better supplied otherwhere; for some can, and some cannot. The desires relating to marriage have in th••m so much natural necessity, and so much relation to personal duties, that either they must be in our own powers, or else our salvation must de∣pend on other men.* 1.155 Nescis nostri arbitrii esse Matrimonia? Affectus nostri nobis non serviunt. Non potes efficere Imperio ut vel amen quam velis, vel oderim. Matrimonium vero tum perpetuum est, si mutuâ voluntate jungitur. Cum ergo quaeratur mihi uxor, socia thori, vitae consors, in omne seculum mihi eligenda est.

My wife is to dwell with me for ever, the half of my self, my lasting joy or my lasting sorrow, and if I doe not love her we cannot live comfortably, and to love I cannot be commanded, for my affections are not at my own command, much lesse at anothers:

and therefore the conduct of this belongs to my selfe, and to none else, for so much of the interest as the union and conjunction comes to; and in this I am no mans subject, when I am a man my self.

But the Father hath a political power.* 1.156 Patria potestas est jus quod∣dam quod habent qui sunt de Imperio Romano in liberos Naturales & legitimos,* 1.157 say the Lawyers. The paternal power is defin'd by the measures of the Roman law; and so it is in all Countries by their own measures. Now in most Countries, especially of old, the Father had so much power given to him over his children that they were a part of his possessions; they ac∣quir'd what they did acquire for their Father, not for themselves; they might be pawn'd, they might be sold three times for their Fathers profit; they must last and abide under this power till they were dismissed or eman∣cipated by their Father. Now whatsoever rights were consequent to these powers were so wholly to be dispos'd of by the Fathers, that whatsoever actions of the sons did destroy those rights were so far, and in relation to those rights, null and invalid. When therefore the Father had by the Ci∣vil law a power over the person of his son, so as to have the profit of his labours, the issues of his marriage, his children to succeed, the sons wife to be partner of his goods and his holy rites, and to perpetuate his family, he had by the Civil law power to dispose of him so far as concern'd these things, but no further. And therefore the Father had power to disinherit the son that married without his Fathers leave; and all the Emperors and all the Lawyers till the time of Constantine did allow it: but then it felt variety and change, and it was limited to the case of the sons marrying dishonourably.

The result of these three Propositions is this,* 1.158 That every Common∣wealth hath power to extend or to streighten the Fathers political power, & to give sentences and judgements upon the actions that relate to such power: and if the law does declare the children of marriages against the parents will to be bastards, they are so; and the Son not to succeed in his Fathers estate, it must be so; and the marriage to be a concubinate, it must be accounted so; and the conjunction to be uncleannesse, it must be called dishonourable, and may be punished as if it were so: and this must last so long till the son be by the same law declar'd not to be under his Fathers power as to that particular; and when it is so, he can then chuse for himself without fraud or detriment; though even then also he hath upon him two bands, Reverence and Piety, from which the son can never be emanci∣pated

as long as he lives, and as long as he can be obliged to be a thankfull person, ever remembring what the old Sibyll said, that they deserve damna∣tion

… quíve parentes In senio linquunt, neque praemia digna rependunt Pro Nutricatu, vel qui parere recusant, Aspera vel contra dixerunt verba parentes,

who leave their parents in their old age, who speak words against them, who doe not pay their thankfull duty for their alimony and education, and who refuse to obey them, viz. according to the laws, and according to the exigence of reverence and piety which must be for ever.

Of exemption from the power of Fathers.

For by this means we shall the shortest and truest answer the inquiry,* 1.159 when a Son is free from his Fathers power, and how long he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Demosthenes his expression is,* 1.160 subject to the necessity of the Fathers laws. I answer that, in those things which are parts of natural power and relate to personal duties, the Father hath always a power of Counsel, which must be regarded by the ties and analogies of reve∣rence and piety, and the reasons of the things themselves. But in those powers which the law hath given him, he is to abide in them as long as the law permits; for in this there is no other measure but the law. But in these and all other things whatsoever, when by nature and the laws we are quit from the Empire of the Father, and that power which is called Castigation, or the power of command and coercion, we are still tied to fear him with a reverential fear, and to obey him with the readinesse of piety in all things where Reverence and Piety are to have regard and prevail, that is, where∣ever it is possible and reasonable to obey. Quae praerogativa ex beneficentia acquiritur perpetuo durat, said Aristotle, The authority that is acquir'd by boun∣ty is perpetual.

And therefore even Marriage it self does not quit the children from their duty:* 1.161 Not onely by force of Civil laws, in which sense the sons wife was in the Fathers power as well as the son himself till he was emancipa∣ted; but I mean it in respect of reverence and pious regards, and natural duty,* 1.162 and humble observation. For Nomen Patris grande Mysterium est, & nomen Matris arcana Reverentia, said Origen; there is Reverence, and there is mystery, and all sacrednesse in the Names of Father and Mother; and that dignity lasts for ever. The Ancients tell that when Danaus, who had given liberty to his fifty daughters to marry according to their own liking, was compelled to give them to the fifty Grandchildren of Aegisthus, he gave to each of them a sword, and commanded them to kill their hus∣bands the first night before their congresse: and they thought themselves, though married, oblig'd to obey their Father, and all did so but Hypermne∣stra, who for her disobedience was question'd upon her life, and was by the equally-divided sentences of the Judges acquitted. The like story to this is told by Chalcondylas, that a daughter of a Florentine Physician being by the public request and necessity of the Town given to Lantislaus an amo∣rous Prince, who to get her besieged the Town, her Father gave her a poy∣son'd

handkerchief which he commanded her to use upon the Prince; and she did so, and upon her self, and both died. These indeed were excesses of power and obedience: but I noted them to shew that the sense of the world is to suppose children oblig'd to their parents even when they are in the power of a husband, or in necessitude and conjunction with a wife. And this is extended also to daughters that are Widows, if they be in mino∣rity, that is under 25 years; for so it was in the Roman law; or, if under any other number of years which the law calls minority in any Government. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If she will marry again,* 1.163 let her marry by the consent of her Father.

2. If a Son be a Magistrate,* 1.164 the Magistrate is exempted, but not the Son. That is, in those things which concern his office and dignity the Father hath nothing to doe with him: but in things Oeconomical the Fathers power stands, and his person is capable of the same regards as formerly; of all the same, Salvo honore Magistratus. But yet the reverence of such a Son to a Father ought to be no otherwise exacted then by the measures of prudence and custome, and the common usages of the place. When Fa∣bius Maximus came to his Son who was then Consul, and sate upon his horse, otherwise then he ought, his Son sent the Lictors to him to call him to descend and come to him:* 1.165 and the old Man gladly obeyed, and told him, Non ego Imperium tuum, mi Fili, contempsi, I did not despise thy authority, but I tried if you knew how to be a Consul: nec ignoro quid Patriae venera∣tioni debeatur; verum publica instituta privatâ pietate potiora judico, I know what veneration is due to a Father; but the private regard must give place to the public laws. And yet even in things of public nature, if a Father be wise, his Counsel ought to have some force besides the reason. When the Tri∣bunes of the people, who sometime had Consular dignity, contended which of them should goe to the Warre against the Lavicani (for they all would fain have gone, but none would stay at home to take care of the city) Quintus Servilius commanded his Son to stay, and doe his duty at home; and he did so, for it was for the public interest that one should, and the power of his Father determin'd him when they all refus'd at first.

3. If a Son enters into holy Orders,* 1.166 it does not quit him from his duty and obedience to his Father, unlesse the law declare it so; that is, in such things wherein the Fathers political power did consist. And we find in that collection of Canons which is called Apostolical,* 1.167 it is decreed that if a servant take on him holy Orders against the will of his lord, there was a redhibition allowed; he was to return to his service, till he was freed by his lord. The case is the same in Princes and in Fathers.

There are four little Queres more for the finishing this Rule; the answers to which will be short, because they depend upon the former discourses.

1. Whether if the Grandfather be alive,* 1.168 and the Son be in his power, it be sufficient to legitimate the marriage of the Nephew if the Grandfather consent, though the Father be not ask'd.

To this the Lawyers answer with a distinction:* 1.169 If the Nephew mar∣ry a wife,* 1.170 the consent of the Son must be ask'd; but if the Niece mar∣ry,

the consent of the Grandfather is sufficient: and so it is if the Nephew marry in the same family, that is, the Niece by another son. The reason of the last is, because the Fathers are suppos'd willing to doe advantage to their own family, and therefore it may be sufficient that he who is in actual pos∣session of the Government should explicitly consent, and the other impli∣citely. But why to the marriage of the Niece the Grandfathers consent should be enough, but to the Nephew's marriage the Fathers consent also be requir'd, the reason that is pretended is onely this, Because no man ought to have his heir provided for him against his will, of which there is no danger in the marriage of a daughter. But in short, though this was thus in the Civil law of the Romans, and was no more reasonable then we see; yet now that it is a case of Conscience I am to answer otherwise. For it is against Natural and Divine reason and laws that the Father should in either of the cases be neglected, who ought rather to be preferred, as he that is most and longest like to be concerned in the good and evil of the mar∣riage.

2. Whether if the parents have consented and authoris'd the treaty of marriage till the affections of the children are irrevocably ingag'd,* 1.171 and afterwards retract that consent, the children are bound to obey their pa∣rents, and quit their loves.

This I find in an elegant case related by Gentian Hervet in his oration to the Council.* 1.172 Damoiselle Vitrou was espoused to a Cavalier by her pa∣rents;* 1.173 but when he would have married her and carried her home to his friends, her parents, I know not upon what account, chang'd their minds and refus'd to let her goe. But the Souldier carries her away by force and marries her and lies with her, but us'd her ill; of which she being quick∣ly weary, flies into a Monastery; and that she might not be drawn thence and forc'd to return under her bondage, she pretends that he was not her husband by law, because he forc'd her from her Fathers house against the will of her parents. To this it was answered in behalf of the husband, that she who was espoused legally, might be carried away by the spouse lawfully,* 1.174 according to that of Gregory, and Eusebius, Si quis virginem aut viduam furatus fuerit, nisi fuerit à se desponsata, anathema sit. If she was not espoused, it is Plagium & raptus, a rape and stealth; but if she was, it was no fraud to him.* 1.175 Now if this was no ravishment, as it is plain, be∣cause she was espoused, and she was willing, though her parents were not, then she was his wife, saies the Law; and if so, then the revocation or dis∣sent of the Father hindred not but that she might proceed thither where she was ingag'd. Now this case went farre indeed: But if it be not gone so farre, yet if it be gone thither from whence they cannot honestly or de∣cently recede, the Fathers dissent ought not to be a prejudice to the con∣summation: for it began from an honest and a competent cause, it was a fire kindled from the Sun, and it proceeds to that which is honest in it self; and therefore there is no evil done. But if the parties are unengag'd, or be in∣different, or can well retire, the first liberty did not let them loose from du∣ty, but that they are to abide therewhere they were, unlesse (I say) by that first leave they are pass'd beyond a fair return. For the affections and the great content of children is not to be plaid with, as with a tennis-ball; and it is in this as in his children, if he have begotten the affection unto life, he must maintain it at his own charge.

3.* 1.176 Whether Mothers have the same authority over their children as the Fathers have.

To this I answer, that in the Civil law sons were not in their Mothers power, but in their Fathers:* 1.177 Appellare de nuptiis debui Patrem; and Eustathius upon Homer, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He that gives the dowry, it is fit that by his will the marriage be contracted. This is well enough, that the Father should doe it: but it becomes the piety of children to endeavour that their Mother be pleased; for to her also there is the same natural relation, obligation and minority, and in all things they are equal, abating the privilege of the sex; and there∣fore though the same duty is owing to them both, yet their authority is se∣verally express'd,* 1.178 which to my sense is well intimated by Eustathius: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Not the pow∣er of my Father, nor the persuasion of my Mother, should make me marry even Venus her self. Where the Mother is allowed onely the power of per∣suasion. But that also implies all her power, onely that is the most pro∣per way for her exercise of it.* 1.179 And it is the most forcible. Jussum erat, quodque est potentissimum Imperandi genus, rogabat, qui jubere poterat, said Ausonius. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Julian the Emperor.* 1.180 For they that can if they please compel, ought most of all to prevail when they counsel and intreat. But however things were in the law of the Romans, yet by the laws of nature Mothers, who have so great an affection to their children, and so great an interest in the good and evil respectively of their Son in law's or their Daughters manners, must with duty & tendernesse be regarded like the Fa∣thers. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said S.* 1.181 Cyril of Alexandria: Consonantly to the law of Nature he commanded his son to abstain from such marriages as were displeasing to his Mother. Isaac did so to Jacob. And to this purpose Catullus elegantly presses this obligation.

At tu ne pugna cum tali conjuge, virgo. Non aequum est pugnare, Pater cui tradidit ipse, Ipse Pater cum Matre, quibus parêre necesse est. Virginitas non tota tua est: ex parte parentum est. Tertia pars Matri data, pars data tertia Patri, Tertia sola tua est.—

Her Father and her Mother and her self had in her self equal share.

But if the Father be dead,* 1.182 then the question is greater, because if the Mother have any power, she hath it alone: when her Husband liv'd she had power as the Moon hath light by the aspect of the Sun; but now that her light is extinguish'd, hath she any natural and proper power of her own? To this S. Austin answers clearly,* 1.183 Fortassis enim quae nunc non apparet, apparebit & Mater, cujus voluntatem in tradenda filia omnibus ut arbitror Natura praeponit: nisi eadem puella in ea jam aetate fuerit, ut jure licentiore sibi eligat ipsa quod velit. From which words of S. Austin it is plain, that in the disposing of her daughter in marriage by the voice of Nature the Mother hath a power; and this is rather, and more, and longer then in the disposal of her son. The reason of both is the same, because by the advan∣tage of the sex and breeding, the son will be fit to govern in the family; and at the same time the daughter hath the weaknesses of feminine spirit

upon her as much as the Mother, and more by reason of her tender age and want of experience. To which may be added, that if the Father be dead, the estate is descended upon the Son, and then he is put by law under the power of Tutors and Guardians, and then is to marry, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies the law, by the consent of his Kindred and Guardians; that is, if he be not come to maturity: but if he be, the rule is,* 1.184 Filius quidem pubes nullius expectat arbitrium, filia verò Matris & pro∣pinquorum, A son that is of a marriageable age if his Father be dead is wholly in his own power, but a daughter is under the power of her Mo∣ther. And yet this also lasts no longer but to a certain age, which is deter∣min'd by the laws of every Nation respectively. And yet both the Son and the Daughter are to shew piety to their Mother, and not to grieve her. Pulchre Deo obtemperat qui tristis est Parenti, for he does ill serve God, that brings sorrow to his parent. And therefore the Ancient laws of the Romans were ever favourable to that part of the marriage which the Mother chose. Postulatu audito Matris Tutorumque, Magistratus secundum parentis arbi∣trium dant jus Nuptiarum,* 1.185 saies Livy. But the Wisigoths by their law were more kind to the Mothers interst,* 1.186 for Patre mortuo utriusque sexus filiorum conjunctio in Matris potestate consistat; Both son and daughter if their Fa∣ther was dead were in the power of their Mother, and were to marry by her appointment and counsel.* 1.187 And therefore Simeon Metaphrastes commends Abraham for taking a wife at the command of his parents, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as knowing it to be one of the Divine Commandements to obey his Father and his Mother. But these things were varied by laws and particular considerations. That which is of universal truth is this onely, That in their natural minority children are equally under the power of their Mother, as of their Father when he was alive; but when they can chuse, they are sooner quit from the Castigation or legal coerci∣tive powers of their Mother, then of their Father if he had liv'd. And this relies upon the practice and consent of all the world, and hath this reason, because women are not by laws suppos'd very fit to govern lasting interests. But lastly, they are never quit from their reverence and duty, piety and greatest and kindest regards: but the Mothers dissenting does not annul the marriage of her sons that are of age; and it is so far from that, that their not complying with their Mother in this affair is onely then a sin when it is done with unregarding circumstances, or hath not in it a great weight of reason. But every child should doe well to remember their obligation to their Mothers;* 1.188 and as S. Chrysostom said in his own case, when he had a mind to enter into a Monastery his Mother recalled him, or rather the voice of God crying, Fili colito Anthusam, Son remember thy Mother An∣thusa, and grieve her not as long as she lives.* 1.189 For Nomen Matris, arcana reverentia, There is a secret veneration due to the very Name of a Mo∣ther.

4. Although a Fathers authority is such that against it a Son may not marry;* 1.190 yet whether or no is the power of the parents such that they can compel a son or a daughter to marry whom or when they will?

To this I answer,* 1.191 that in the matters of marriage especially, and pro∣portionably to the probable event of things in other lasting states of life, that of Aristotle is very true, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Fathers authority hath in it no necessity, no constraint

Which Heliodorus Prusaeensis thus paraphrases, The commandements of Fa∣thers of their children 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have not in them such force that they can compel their children. And therefore Pamphilus in the Comedy complains passionately, and yet reasonably,

Proh Deûm atque hominum fidem! quid est,* 1.192 si non haec contumelia'st? Uxorem decrêrat sese dare mihi hodie: nonne oportuit Praescisse me ante? nonne priùs communicatum oportuit?

Upon which place Donatus said well, quia nuptiarum non omnis potestas in Patre est, All the intire power of marriages is not in the Fathers. It may not be done against their wills, but neither is their will alone sufficient. The Fathers have a negative, but the children must also like. Constat enim circa nuptias esse filiis liberam voluntatem: ideo servatâ ratione pietatis com∣municatum oportuit, said Eugraphius. For it is certain they have the power of choice, and therefore in piety the Father ought to have acquainted the Son with it. And the same also is the case of the daughter, she is not to be forc'd to marry against her inclination and affections. Eustathius upon that of Homer,* 1.193 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it was spoken according to the exactest political measures, that the Father should chuse an husband for his daughter ••enelope, and yet that his daughter should like the yong Prince Ulysses; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For there is diffe∣rence between a servant and a child; the Father may chuse for his daugh∣ter, so that at the same time she may chuse for her self: and therefore (saies he) when Homer said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he saies it in respect of the Father, that he may give her to whom he please; but when he saies 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he saies it in respect of the Daughter, that the man whom the Father chuses must be gracious in her eyes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Priscus,* 1.194 It is impious to marry a daughter against her will.

But this is to be understood with some restraint.* 1.195 For if a Father may chuse, and the daughter may chuse too, how if it happens that they fancy several persons? shall the Fathers authority, or the daughters liking pre∣vail? both cannot prevail at once: but the question is, which shall, and when, and how long, or in what cases. To this I answer that if the matter be indifferent, or the person be fit, the Father ought to prevail. Patris quippe jussa non potuisse filium detrectare,* 1.196 A son may not refuse his Fathers commandement. For the Fathers authority is certainly a very great thing; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.197 A Father is by Nature to his child both a Lord and a Prince: and therefore Theophilus calls the Paternal power 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.198 which is the title of the Royal Majesty: and though the old name for disobedience in the Scripture is Witchcraft, yet Ennodius would fain have found a new name for this kind of it. Non in∣venio quâ novum facinoris genus explicem novitate sermonum, quibus fuit Sacrilegium non parere. It is Sacrilege at least not to obey our parents. Now although this be spoken generally and indefinitely, yet it must have it's effect in such commandements which have no great reason against them: and therefore if a Father offers a wife to a son, or a husband to a daughter, such as a wise or a good man may offer without folly and injury, the child is not to dispute at all, but to obey, if the Father urges and insists upon the precept.

But there are some cases in which the Father ought not to urge the children.* 1.199 1. If the children be not capable or able for marriage, if it be destructive of their health, or against his nature; and this excuse was allowed amongst the Romans even where the Paternal power was at the highest.* 1.200 Solent qui coguntur à Patribus ut Uxores ducant, illa dicere, Non sumus etiam nunc apti nuptiis. It is not fit to require them to marry that hate, or are unable to doe the offices of that state. 2. If the Father offer to his child a dishonest or filthy person, un∣equal, or unfit; that is, when it is notoriously or scandalously so: when the person is intolerably and irreconcileably displeasing, then the command is tyranny. The Son is bound to obey his Father commanding him to marry; Sed enim si imperet uxorem ducere infamem, propudiosam, crimino∣sam, non scilicet parendum,* 1.201 said A. Gellius; But not if he offers to his child an infamous, a dishonest person. And so the law provides in behalf of the daughter, that she ought not to be compelled to marry an infamous man; l. sed quae Patris, ff. de Sponsal. and so Harmenopulus renders it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.202 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, She that is under her Fathers power can then onely refuse her Fathers command, when he chuses for her a man that is unworthy in his manners, and a filthy person: and indeed in this case she hath leave to refuse the most Imperious command of an angry Father. Son and daugh∣ter in this have equal right: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so Lucian.* 1.203 Though his Father would have compell'd and forc'd him to marry a wife, yet he refus'd it: and he might lawfully, when he offer'd him a strumpet.

But there is another sort of persons which are called Turpes filthy or hatefull;* 1.204 and that is, such as are deformed and intolerably ugly. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Lucian,* 1.205 We call them filthy that are not fair or comely. But in this sense, if the Father offers a husband to his daughter, she hath not liberty to dissent, but onely to petition for liberty: for beauty is not the praise of a man, and he may be a worthy person, though of an ill shape, and his wit and manners may be better then his countenance. And there is no exception in this, but that if the daughter hath us'd all means she can to endure him, and cannot obtain it, she can onely then refuse when she can be sure that with him she can never doe her duty; of which because she cannot be sure beforehand, because his worthi∣nesse may overcome the aire and follies of her fancy, therefore the unhand∣somenesse of a man is not alone a sufficient cause for a daughter to refuse her Fathers earnest commands. But yet in this case though a Father have authority, yet a good Father will never use it, when it is very much against his Daughter, unlesse it be also very much more for her good. But a Son hath in this some more liberty, because he is to be the head of a family, and he is more easily tempted, and can sooner be drawn aside to wander, and beauty or comelinesse is the proper praise of a woman; comelinesse and good humor, forma uxoria, and a meek and quiet spirit are her best dressings, and all that she can be good for in her self; and therefore the uglinesse of a woman will sooner passe into an incapacity of person, then it can doe in a man. But in these cases, as children should not be too forward to dispute the limits of their Fathers power, lest they mistake their own leave or their Fathers authority; so Fathers also should remember what the

Lawyers say,* 1.206 Patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate consistere, The Fathers power consists not in the surliest part of Empire, but in the sun∣shine side, in the gentlest and warmest part. Quis enim non magis filiorum salutem quam suam curat? saith Tertullian. He is an ill Father that will not take more care for the good of his child, then his own humor.

The like is to be said in case the Father offers to his child a person of a condition much inferior.* 1.207 For though this difference is introduc'd prin∣cipally by pride and vanity in all the last ages of the world, and Nobility is not the reward of vertue, but the adornment of fortune, or the effect of Princes humors, unlesse it be in some rare cases; yet now that it is in the humors and manners of men, it is to be regarded, and a Diamond is really of so much value as men will give for it: and therefore a son or daughter may justly refuse to marry a person whose conjunction will be very disho∣nourable and shamefull: but at little differences children must not start. If the Nobility marries into the family of a Merchant, the difference is not so great, but that portion makes up the want of great extraction. For a hus∣band or a wife may be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Noble by their wealth; so the Greek proverb means: and old Ennius translating of Euripides his Hecuba, makes wealth to be Nobility,

Haec ita etsi perversè dicas,* 1.208 facile Achivos flexeris. Nam cum opulenti loquuntur pariter atque ignobiles, Eadem dicta, eademque oratio aequa, non aequa valet.

When the rich and the ignoble speak the same things, the rich man shall prevail when the ignoble shall not.

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.209

Wealth makes nobility. And therefore in such cases, if the sons or daughters refuse the command of their Father, it is to be accounted rebellion and dis∣obedience. But this whole inquiry is well summ'd up in those excellent words of Heliodorus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If the Fathers will use the utmost power of law, it is enough for them to say, It is their will. And it is to no purpose to ask, where they have power to compel. But when there is a marriage to be contracted, it is fit that they both consent.

There are some inquiries relating to the title of this Chapter, which would be seasonable enough here to be considered, concerning the powers of Husbands over their Wives: But because the Matrimonial questions and cases of Conscience are very Material and very Numerous, and of all things have been most injur'd by evil and imperfect principles and worse conduct; I though it better to leave this to fall into the heap of Matri∣monial cases, which I design in a book by it self, if God shall give me opportunity, and fit me with circumstances accordingly.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  Hugo de S. Vi∣ctore lib. 1. de Sacram. c. 7.
• * 1.3

  lib. 2. de Legib.
• * 1.4

  Seneca l. 3. de Benef. c. 1.
• * 1.5

  in lib. 2. Georg.
• * 1.6

  In verbis per totam vitam parentes venerari maximè decet, levium enim volatiliumque verborum gravissima imminet poena. Plato. l. 4. de repub.
• * 1.7

  2.
• * 1.8

  l. 1. in fi. C. si rect. provi. in 2. lec.
• * 1.9

  3.
• * 1.10

  Ecclus. 3. 10.
• * 1.11

  Ephes. 6. 2, 3.
• * 1.12

  Ezek. 22. 7.
• * 1.13

  Orpheus. Plato lib. 11. de Leg.
• * 1.14

  4.
• * 1.15

  5.
• * 1.16

  Trinum. Act. 3.
• * 1.17

  6.
• * 1.18

  7.
• * 1.19

  Plaut. Trinum. Act. 3.
• * 1.20

  8.
• * 1.21

  Trinum. ubi supr.
• * 1.22

  Terent. Adelph Act. 1. Scen. 1.
• * 1.23

  ibid.
• * 1.24

  Prov. 28. 24.
• * 1.25

  9.
• * 1.26

  1.
• * 1.27

  Si quis in∣•••••••••• fuerit in parente 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Magi∣stratuum s•••• in∣capax Xenoph. l. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & fact. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.28

  2.
• * 1.29

  Deater. 21. 18.
• * 1.30

  3.
• * 1.31

  § final. inst. de noxa. l. Divus. ff. ad leg. Pomp. de parricid. & toto tit. C. de his qui Parent. vel fil. occid.
• * 1.32

  Hebr. 12. 9.
• * 1.33

  Ecclus. 3. 8.
• * 1.34

  Ephes. 6. 4.
• * 1.35

  Coloss. 3. 21.
• * 1.36

  Adelph. Act▪ 1. Sc. 1.
• * 1.37

  lib. 5. Epist. 20.
• * 1.38

  lib. 1. c. 14. de Clement.
• * 1.39

  Declam. 259.
• * 1.40

  Orat. pro Rosc. Amer.
• * 1.41

  1.
• * 1.42

  Sebast. Monti∣cul. de Patria potest.
• * 1.43

  2.
• * 1.44

  * Matth. 15. 6.
• * 1.45

  1 Tim. 5. 17.
• * 1.46

  Offic. 1.
• * 1.47

  in l. Si libertis: §. manumissis: ff. de alim.
• * 1.48

  In Luc. 18.
• * 1.49

  l. Unic. C. de ingrat. liber.
• * 1.50

  in vita Solon••
• * 1.51

  3.
• * 1.52

  4.
• * 1.53

  Metamorph. 8.
• * 1.54

  Iliad. 4.
• * 1.55

  5.
• * 1.56

  1.
• * 1.57

  lib. 2. de Legib.
• * 1.58

  Alciat. lib. 1. praeterm. in verb. sacra.
• * 1.59

  Panormit. in cap. 2. de con∣vers. infid. & Baldus in l. item in pote∣state. ff. de ju∣person.
• * 1.60

  2.
• * 1.61

  Tit. 3. Com∣ment. in Ge∣nesin.
• * 1.62

  3.
• * 1.63

  4.
• * 1.64

  1.
• * 1.65

  2.
• * 1.66

  3.
• * 1.67

  4.
• * 1.68

  1.
• * 1.69

  2.
• * 1.70

  lib. 10.
• * 1.71

  de Anima c. 57.
• * 1.72

  lib. 16. c. 5.
• * 1.73

  3.
• * 1.74

  lib. 10.
• * 1.75

  4.
• * 1.76

  1.
• * 1.77

  2.
• * 1.78

  lib. 2. cap. 7.
• * 1.79

  idem ibid
• * 1.80

  3.
• * 1.81

  A. Gell. ibid.
• * 1.82

  4.
• * 1.83

  Plutarch. lib. de Vitios. vere∣cund.
• * 1.84

  5.
• * 1.85

  6.
• * 1.86

  7.
• * 1.87

  8.
• * 1.88

  9.
• * 1.89

  1.
• * 1.90

  2.
• * 1.91

  3.
• * 1.92

  2. 2••. qu. 88. art. 9.
• * 1.93

  Bellar. l. 2. de Monachis, c. 36.
• * 1.94

  4.
• * 1.95

  5.
• * 1.96

  advers. Marcion.
• * 1.97

  Can. 16.
• * 1.98

  6.
• a 1.99

  lib. 1. de Vir∣gin.
• b 1.100

  Epist. 109. 110.
• * 1.101

  •• Aug. Epist. ••d Bonifac. Comit.
• * 1.102

  in quaest. fuse explic. q. 15.
• * 1.103

  libr. de Provi∣dentia.
• * 1.104

  lib. 5. cap. 95.
• * 1.105

  tit. de iis qui pueros vel puel∣las occiderint, vel totonderint.
• * 1.106

  7.
• * 1.107

  Terent.
• * 1.108

  8.
• * 1.109

  lib. 6. de Asino a••reo.
• * 1.110

  ad Uxotem.
• * 1.111

  Ibid. l. 2. in fi.
• * 1.112

  ff. de statu ho∣minum.
• * 1.113

  Genes. 24.
• * 1.114

  Judges 14. 2, 4.
• * 1.115

  Exod. 34. 16. Deuter. 7. 3.
• * 1.116

  1 Cor. 7.
• * 1.117

  Andromach. Eurip.
• * 1.118

  lib. de Patriarch.
• * 1.119

  9.
• * 1.120

  Xenoph. lib. 8. in Stich.
• * 1.121

  Andria, Act. 5. Scen. 3.
• * 1.122

  in respons. Ma∣trimon. Matth. Monachi.
• * 1.123

  10.
• * 1.124

  & habetur 30 q. 5.
• * 1.125

  Can. 38. in Can. Patrum. in Graecor. Nomocan.
• * 1.126

  et habetur 32. q. 2.
• * 1.127

  in tit. de foe∣min. non con∣secrat. cap. 33, 36. q. 2. pla∣cuit.
• * 1.128

  11.
• * 1.129

  Ibid. Vide etiam Concil. Paris. 36. q. 2. 27. q. 2. nullus.
• * 1.130

  12.
• * 1.131

  13.
• * 1.132

  Declam. 257, & 376.
• * 1.133

  lib. 3. in La∣conic.
• * 1.134

  in Erato, l. 6.
• * 1.135

  14.
• * 1.136

  c. tuae. de Spons. extr.
• * 1.137

  vide Ascanium Clement. A∣merin. de pa∣tria potest. cap. 6. effect. 6.
• * 1.138

  l. Divi fratres. ff. de jure pa∣tron.
• * 1.139

  l. Filius 25. ff. de ritu Nupti∣arum. l. 3. §. Eman∣cipatus. ff. de cont. tab.
• * 1.140

  Phalar. Epist. 143. cap. 9.
• * 1.141

  Cap. 9.
• * 1.142

  Ulpian. l. 3. §. si emancipa∣tus. ff. de bonor. possess. contr. tabulas. Hoc observant Giae∣ci ad l. 10. de sponsal. l. 28. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. tit. 1.
• * 1.143

  in Can. Pasil. 38. in Can. PP.
• * 1.144

  C. 1. extra. de conjug. servor.
• * 1.145

  Gen. 26. 35.
• * 1.146

  15.
• * 1.147

  16.
• * 1.148

  C. cum causam. de rapt. extra.
• * 1.149

  Deuter. 22.
• * 1.150

  lib. Sentent. 2. tit. 19. Idem dixitvetus Scho∣liastes ad Pau∣lum.
• * 1.151

  Exod. 22. 16, 17.
• * 1.152

  O sententiam necessitate con∣fusam•• parcit & s••vit, dissimu∣lat & animad∣ver••it. Tertull. 18, 9, 10, 11.
• * 1.153

  Exod. 22.
• * 1.154

  17.
• * 1.155

  Quintilian. de∣clam. 376.
• * 1.156

  18.
• * 1.157

  ••jus autem po∣testatis. Inst. de potest. Patr. & l. nam in civium. & l. item in potesta∣te. ff. de his qui sant sui & ali∣eni juris.
• * 1.158

  19.
• * 1.159

  20.
• * 1.160

  in Encomio.
• * 1.161

  21.
• * 1.162

  Homil. 11. in Levit.
• * 1.163

  In Basi••ico.
• * 1.164

  22.
• * 1.165

  Vale. Max. l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.166

  23.
• * 1.167

  Cap. 81.
• * 1.168

  24.
• * 1.169

  25.
• * 1.170

  l. oratione 16. §. 1. ff. de rit•• nuptiar. l. 3. D. eod.
• * 1.171

  26.
• * 1.172

  27.
• * 1.173

  de clandest. Ma∣trim. impress. Paris. 1556.
• * 1.174

  in Burchard. & in decretis.
• * 1.175

  Idem dixit Lu∣cius 3. in C. cum causam de rapt. extra.
• * 1.176

  28.
• * 1.177

  Seneca controv. l. 3. c. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.178

  Ismeniae & Is∣men. 5.
• * 1.179

  Epist. ad Pau∣lum.
• * 1.180

  Orat. 2.
• * 1.181

  in Genes. l. 4.
• * 1.182

  29.
• * 1.183

  Epist. 233.
• * 1.184

  l. filia. 20. C. de inoffic. te∣stam. & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. lib. 28. c. 4. Constanti••n. Harm••nopul. Epitom. l. 4. tit. 7. §. 12.
• * 1.185

  Liv. lib. 4.
• * 1.186

  lib. 3. tit. 1. §. 7.
• * 1.187

  in Abramio.
• * 1.188

  lib. 1. de Sa∣cerdot.
• * 1.189

  Origen. ubi supra.
• * 1.190

  30.
• * 1.191

  31.
• * 1.192

  Andria, Act. 1. Scen. 5.
• * 1.193

  ad 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.194

  in Eclogis le∣gationum.
• * 1.195

  32.
• * 1.196

  Tacit. Annal. 3.
• * 1.197

  Manuel Palae∣olog. orat. 7.
• * 1.198

  a ••. §. 1. de his qui sui vel ali∣en. jur. Dec••am. 10.
• * 1.199

  33.
• * 1.200

  Senec. controv. 1. 6.
• * 1.201

  lib. 2. c. 7.
• * 1.202

  Matthaus Monachus legit 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ut filiū etiam compre•• 〈…〉〈…〉 malè, quia eo loci JC. 〈…〉〈…〉 qui∣tur de filio & filia, & de filio con∣troversia non erat. Harm••nopalo a. conscntiunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 lib. 28. tit. 1.
• * 1.203

  in dial. Meretr.
• * 1.204

  34.
• * 1.205

  in Charidemo.
• * 1.206

  l. D. Adrianus. ff. ad legem Pompeian. de partic. Advers. Mar∣cion.
• * 1.207

  35.
• * 1.208

  apud A. Gell. lib. 11. c. 4.
• * 1.209

  Eurip. in Ar∣chelao.