Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

The Rule [The Accessory followes the nature of the Principal] explicated.

Therefore for the understanding of it so far as can be in order to our design,* 1.1 it is to be inquir'd, how we shall know which is the principal and which is the accessory? 2. In what sense the accessory must follow the na∣ture of the principal.

1. That which is principal to one purpose,* 1.2 is but the accessory to ano∣ther sometimes. If Titius hires my land and builds a house upon it, the house is but the accessory, because it came after my land was in possession. But if Titius buyes my house standing upon my own land, he buyes the land too; for the land is but the accessory, and the house is the principal: because the house being the purchase, it cannot be at all but upon a foundation, and therefore the ground is the accessory, and after the house in the intention of the buyer. Villa fundum quaerat, it is sometimes true; but ordinarily, Fundus quaerit villam.

2. That which is of greatest value is not always the principal,* 1.3 but sometimes is the accessory. The picture of Apollo upon a laurel board is much more precious then the wood, and yet if Apelles should take Lucian's wood and draw the picture. Lucian will make bold with the board, and consequently carry away the picture. A jewel set in gold is much better then the gold, but yet the gold is the principal, because it was put there to illustrate and to adorn the gold;* 1.4 according to that of Ulpian, Semper cum quaerimus quid cui cedat, illud spectamus, quid cujus rei ornanda causâ adhi∣betur. And therefore if Caius dying leave me in legacy his black-cloth suit, I shall also receive the diamond-buttons that adorn it: because these were

plac'd there to adorn it; and therefore are the accessory, because they are usu minores, and wholly set there for the ministery of the other. Quod adhibetur alterius rei causâ; that is principal for whose sake the other was sent or put. And therefore it is no good argument to conclude that the body is the accessory, because the soul is more noble. Cedent gemmal phialis vel lancibus inclusae auro argentove. The soul is indeed a jewel set in gold; but is therefore an accessory to the body in some cases. He that buyes the body of a slave, hath right to all the ministeries of the soul; and the man is bound to serve his Master with a ready mind and a good will; and the soul is a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the body. The body is first, and the soul comes afterwards to give it life and motion.

3. When two substances concurre to the constitution or integrity of a third,* 1.5 one is not the accessory to the other. The eye is not the accessory to the head, nor the foot to the leg, nor the hand to the arme; for that onely is an accessory, quod alterius rei causâ adhibetur aut accedit: If it comes in accidentally and be wholly for the others sake, then it is an acces∣sory. Thus order and decency and circumstances of time and place are for the ministeries and ornament of religion, and therefore are acces∣sories. The outward act is the lesse principal and an accessory to the in∣ward, for to the inward it wholly ministers; and consequently he that dis∣poses of one may also govern the other, because the lesse principal is inclu∣ded in the more, and the lesse and the more have not two administrations, because they have but one use. But the soul and the body are two distinct substances of differing ministrations, acting to several and sometimes to contrary purposes; they are parts of the same man, a better and a worse, but not a principal and accessory, unlesse it be by accident and in some uses and to some purposes; and then sometimes one sometimes the other is the principal. Concerning which the Rule is this.

4. Those things which of themselves are not,* 1.6 but by accident may be made accessories to a principal, are then to be esteem'd to be so when they actually and wholly are joyn'd in use to the principal, and serve the end of the principal, but have none of their own. Thus when the soul prays pas∣sionately, if the lips move without a deliberate act of understanding, but obeying the fancy, the body in that case is purely the accessory. I say in that case: for if the body receive a command to other purposes, as to attend upon the Prince at the same time when the soul prays, in that case they are both principals; and neither of them is accessory to the other. And there∣fore although it will follow that when the body ministers to the action of the soul wholly, and hath no distinct work & office of its own in that action, he that commands the soul, can also command the body; for they are in that ministery but as one: yet it will not follow that when the body is not 〈…〉〈…〉 have also an absolute and irrespective nature, operation or designe, it

cannot be governed in any thing of this, because of it's relative nature and conjunction in the other; for there it is not accessory. For it is the nature of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The conjunct cause or reason, when it is there, the work will follow: but when it is away, there will be no event, says the Philosopher.

6. It is not enough to make a thing to be accessory,* 1.7 that it is design'd for the use and ministery of another that is principal; but it must be actu∣ally applied: for till then it is but a potential accessory, which gives no right, and changes no nature, and produces no effect. Bridles and saddles are made to be us'd with horses: but he that buyes all the horses in a faire cannot claim all the saddles and bridles which are in the same faire to be sold; because they are not yet become the accessories, but are onely design'd to be so. It is intended that the body should minister to the soul in matters of religion; but because it ministers also to other actions of the soul, he that rules the soul does not by consequence rule the body, unlesse it be actually applied, and be conjunct with the soul in the ministeries of religion.

2. These may be sufficient to declare so much of the nature of acces∣sories as is of use in our present questions.* 1.8 The next inquiry is, what is the meaning of these words, [The accessory [follows the nature] of the principal.] For it cannot be meant that whatsoever is said of one may be said of the other; or whatsoever may be done to one, may be done to the other. The Rulers of souls have power to excommunicate or to cut them off from the body of the Church, which is the greatest spiritual power, and is after it's own manner a spiritual death. Now suppose the body be an accessory to the soul, it will not follow that he that can cut the soul off from the Church, can cut the body also off from the Common∣wealth. But the meaning is, that duplici & diverso jure censeri non debent, they who are joyn'd in one action are to have one judgment, though accor∣ding to their respective measures. If the soul does well, so does the body ministring to the soul. If it be good to pray, it is good to appoint times and places to pray in, because without time and place you cannot pray: If time and place be contingent and irregular, so are our prayers; if our pray∣ers be solemn and fixt, so must they. And thus also it is in matter of Go∣vernment. If the Bishop is to guide the devotion of the soul, he can also give rules to the body in all that which it ministers to that action of the soul; and when they two make one compleat action by way of principal and accessory, they are the same one intire subject of government. But this is to be extended no further. This passes not to the distinct actions or mini∣steries of the body; but is confin'd to that in which it is, and so long as it is one agent with the soul: neither can it passe to warrant any other im∣pression upon the body, but that it be commanded and conducted in the 〈…〉〈…〉 the Curator bonorum; and the Physician that gives physic to the body, and

conducts the regiment of health, is not Master of his wardrobe: and the Epigram derided Herod the Empiric,

Clinicus Herodes trullam subduxerat aegro: Deprensus dixit, Stulte, quid ergo bibis?

because when he came to take away his patients sicknesse, he took away his plate. If the principal act be confirm'd by an accessory oath, though the principal act prove null and invalid in law, yet the man is tied by the re∣maining oath. A man cannot offer to God an indifferent action or thing. And therefore he that promises to God to walk three turns every day, hath done nothing; the act is null, and he is not obliged to pay that to God: but if an oath did supervene, that must stand,* 1.9 though the principal of it self be null; because every oath that can without sin be kept, must stand. The alienation of a Minors lands is rescinded by law, yet the obligation and caution of the Tutor for the accessory verification of the principal sale will stand: because there is a reason that separates the accessory from the prin∣cipal, and the law intending to rescind the translation of the Dominion, not to rescind the contract, leaves the principal loose, and the accessory bound. This is also thus in actions principal and accessory, which the law cals per∣sonales & hypothecarias. Maevius dies and divides his estate between Lucius and Lucullus; but he was indebted 20 talents, and for caution had ingag'd some jewels. Lucius payes his five talents, and Lucullus payes foure of the other: the personal action of Lucius is dissolv'd, but the accessory is not; for till Lucullus his personal or principal be taken off, the accessory and cau∣tionary remaines upon them both: and this also hath a particular reason, and so have all those cases in which this Rule failes.

From whence I inferre,* 1.10 that this thing is sometimes reasonable, and sometimes unreasonable, but it is never necessary but in one case; and that is when the accessory is necessary and inseparable, either by reason of a na∣tural or positive conjunction. For some things are accessory by use and customes, some by laws and commandements, some by the nature of the thing. Now of the first two sorts the measures are contingent and altera∣ble: the laws sometimes declare a thing to be accessory, and at other times it is no so: and if by use or contract or custome a thing be accessory, it ceases to be so if the accessory be particularly excepted. As if I buy a house, it is by custome concluded that I intend the garden that is joyn'd to it; and he that sels a horse, sels his bridle: but if the garden be reserv'd, & the bridle be excepted, the rule is then of no use.

Now to apply this to the present inquiries.* 1.11 1. Because the body is not in the nature of the thing an inseparable, necessary accessory to the soul in spiritual actions and ministeries, but the soul can pray alone, and be chari∣table alone, and love God alone, and the body hath actions, and intentions, and interests which mingle not with that which the spiritual rulers are to govern; therefore it cannot be inferr'd that the body is subject in all things to them who govern souls.

But 2.* 1.12 It does follow and may by force of this rule be inferr'd that they who are to govern the religion and spiritual actions of the soul, can also govern the actions of the body which minister immediately and necessa∣rily to the necessary actions of the soul: & therefore because it is a duty that we communicate in the Communion of Saints, when that duty is actually

and of necessity to be done, the Bishop hath power to command the bodies of men to be present in Christian assemblies, according to the precept of the Apostle, Neglect not the assembling of your selves together.

And yet further,* 1.13 to come home to the present Rule, there are several degrees of necessitie, and several reasons of it. Some things are necessary for life, and some for health. Some are necessary for single Christians, some things are necessary for societies; some things are necessary in private, and some in publick; some things are for order, and some for precise duty; some things are absolutely, and some are but respectively and in order to certain ends necessary. The body is an accessory to the soul, atque eodem jure censendum, to be judg'd by the same laws, govern'd by the same persons, sub∣ject to the same sentence and conduct, not onely in things of absolute ne∣cessity, but even in things of great advantage; not onely in private necessity, which is always indispensable, but even in publick necessities of the Church, in which there is greater latitude and more liberty: and the reason is, because even these lesser degrees of necessity are requir'd of us by Divine Com∣mandement; and it is not onely commanded to us to doe that which is law∣ful, but that also which is of good report; not onely that we glorify God, but that our Brethren be edified. And in proportion to this, it is requir'd of the guides of souls that they give good account of them, but it is re∣quir'd of us also that we so comport our selves that they may doe it with joy:* 1.14 which cannot be suppos'd, if their power be kept within the bounds of a simply and indispensably necessary internal religion; it cannot be done with∣out prosperous circumstances and advantages of religion: in these therefore if spiritual guides have not power to give commands, they have not all that is necessary by all the kinds of necessity which God made.

But this Rule we see verified by authentic precedents.* 1.15 For the Apo∣stles at Jerusalem indeed thought fit to impose nothing but those necessary things which are specified in their decretal: but S. Paul us'd also this au∣thority by the measures of the present Rule, and commanded beyond the limits of absolute necessity, even that which he judg'd convenient; and ve∣rifies his authority in his Epistle to Philemon,* 1.16 I might be much bold in Christ to enjoyn thee that which is convenient: and this he actually did to the Corin∣thian Church, commanding that all things should be done decently and in order.

Now although it be true that in these things the Apostle had some advantages which the Bishops in succession have not;* 1.17 he had an infallible spirit, and what he call'd convenient was so indeed; and he had converted Philemon, he was his Father in Christ, and he was one of the pillars upon which Christ built the Church, and he was to lay the foundation for an everlasting building: yet because the instance to the Corinthian Church was such which was of a perpetual reason, and it would be for ever necessa∣ry that things should be done in the Church decently and in order, and the question of decency would for ever have variety and flux, succession and a relative uncertainty, it was necessary that of this there should be perpetual Judges and perpetual Dictators: and these can be no other but the Rulers of the Church, who have the same power as the Apostles had in this, though not so many advantages of power. When the Bishops judge truly concerning necessity, & such decencies and reasonablenesses as are next to ne∣cessity,

they can enjoyn them, onely they cannot judge so surely; and there∣fore although there may be more causes of laying aside their commands, yet it is never lawfull without cause.

But this is not to be extended to such decencies as are onely ornament,* 1.18 but is to be limited to such as onely rescue from confusion: the reason is, because the Prelates and spiritual guides cannot doe their duty, unlesse things be so orderly that there be no confusion, much lesse can they doe it with joy; and so far their power does extend: for although that is not re∣quired of the governours but of the people, that the Rulers office be done with joy; yet because it is required of the people, they sin if they hinder it; therefore the Rulers have power to enjoyn it. But if it can goe beyond this limit, then it can have no natural limit, but may extend to sumptuous∣nesse, to ornaments of Churches, to rich utensils, to splendor, to Majesty; for all that is decent enough, and in some circumstances very fit. But be∣cause this is too subject to abuse, and gives a secular po••er into the hands of Bishops, and an authority over mens estates and fortunes, and is not ne∣cessary for souls, and no part of spiritual government, it is more then Christ gave to his Ministers.

This also is to be added:* 1.19 that because this power is deriv'd to spiritual Rulers upon the account of reason and experience of things and the duty of the people, that the Rulers should be enabled to give an account of their charges with joy, therefore it is onely left to the people to doe it or not, under the pain of a sin; but they are not to incurre spiritual censures upon the stock of non-compliance in things not simply necessary or of essen∣tial duty. For to compel them to advantages will bring but little joy to the Ruler: he must secure the main duty whether they will or no; that him∣self is to look to, and therefore to use all the means God hath put into his hand; and for that he must look for his joy when he comes to give up his account: but that he himself should doe his duty with joy, that is with ad∣vantages, with ease, with comfort, being a duty wholly incumbent on the people and for their profit, if they will not comply, they sin; and it is not profitable for them,* 1.20 saith the Apostle, that is, they loose by it; but to this they are at no hand to be constrain'd, for that will destroy his joy as much as the letting it alone.

Beyond this the Bishop hath no authority to command what he can persuade by argument,* 1.21 he is to take care it be well and wisely, to the glory of God and the good of his Church, to the edification of all men that are interested, and the special comfort and support of the weak. The summe of which power is excellently summ'd up by S. Paul.* 1.22 For ye know what Commandements we gave you by the Lord Jesus. For this is the will of God, even your sanctification: That ye abstain from fornication…. that no man defraud his Brother. In these things the spiritual power is proper and com∣petent. But the Apostle addes, He therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man but God, who hath also given us his holy Spirit. That is, In those things which are certainly the laws of God the Bishop is to rule intirely according to the power given him. But because God hath not onely given his autho∣rity; but his spirit too, that is, he hath given him wisdome as well as pow∣er, it cannot be supposed to be for nothing: whatever he wisely orders, that is of necessary relation to the expresse command of God, or is so re∣quisite

for the doing of it, that it cannot be well done without it by any other instrument, nor by it self alone. In this it is to be supposed that the spirit of government which God hath given to his Church will sufficiently assist, and therefore does competently oblige: lesse then this the Spirit of God cannot be suppos'd to doe, if it does any thing beside giving and re∣vealing the expresse commandement and necessary duty.

Beyond these strict and close measures there is no doubt but the Spirit of God does give assistance:* 1.23 as the great experience of the Church, and the effects of government, and the wise rules of conduct, and the usefull Ca∣nons, and the decent Ceremonies, and the solemn rites, and the glorifica∣tions of God consequent to all this doe abundantly testify. But yet be∣yond this, the Bishops can directly give no laws that properly and imme∣diately bind the transgressors under sin: and my reasons are these.

1. Because we never find the Apostles using their Coercion upon any man but the expresse breakers of a Divine Commandement,* 1.24 or the pub∣lick disturbers of the peace of the Church and the establish'd necessary order.

2. Because even in those things which were so convenient that they had a power to make injunctions,* 1.25 yet the Apostles were very backward to use their authority of commanding; much lesse would they use severity, but intreaty.* 1.26 It was S. Paul's case to Philemon before mention'd; Though I might be much bold in Christ to enjoyn that which is convenient; yet for love's sake I rather intreat thee.

3. In those things where God had interpos'd no Command,* 1.27 though the rule they gave contain'd in it that which was fit and decent, yet if men would resist, they gently did admonish or reprove them, and let them alone. So S. Paul in case of the Corinthian men wearing long haire, If any man list to be contentious, we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God: that is, let him chuse; it is not well done, we leave him to his own liberty, but let him look to it.

4. If the Bishops power were extended further,* 1.28 it might extend to Tyranny, and there could be no limits beyond this prescrib'd, to keep him within the measures and sweetnesse of the government Evangelical: but if he pretend a Divine authority to goe further, he can be absolute and su∣preme in things of this life which doe not concern the Spirit, and so fall into Dynasty, as one anciently complain'd of the Bishop of Rome, and change the Father into a Prince, and the Church into an Empire.

But this hinders not but that the power of spiritual Rulers may yet extend to a further use,* 1.29 not by a direct power of command, or of giving laws, but by all the indirect and collateral ways of obligation, as of fame, consent, reputation of the man, the reverence of his person, and the opinion of his wisedome and sanctity, by voluntary submission, and for the avoiding scandal: when any of these causes of action or instruments of obligation doe intervene, the Bishop does not directly bind, but the people are bound: and their obligation from all these principles are reduc'd to two heads. The matter of scandal; in which case, under pain of sin they must obey in all

lawfull things, when by accident and the concurse of emergent causes it is scandalous to disobey. And the other is, Their own consent; for however it be procur'd fairly, if they once have consented, they are become a law unto themselves, and so they remain till this law suffers diminution as other laws doe that die: of which I am afterwards to give account.

There is one way more by which Ecclesiastical laws doe bind; but this is the matter of the next Rule.

Notes

• * 1.1

  5.
• * 1.2

  6.
• * 1.3

  7.
• * 1.4

  l. cum aurum. 19. §. perveni∣amus ff. de aur. & argent. leg.
• * 1.5

  8.
• * 1.6

  9.
• * 1.7

  11.
• * 1.8

  12.
• * 1.9

  c. cum con∣tingat. extr. de jurejur.
• * 1.10

  14.
• * 1.11

  15.
• * 1.12

  16.
• * 1.13

  17.
• * 1.14

  Hebr. 13. 17.
• * 1.15

  18.
• * 1.16

  Philem. 8. vers.
• * 1.17

  19.
• * 1.18

  20.
• * 1.19

  21.
• * 1.20

  Hebr. 13. 17.
• * 1.21

  22.
• * 1.22

  1 Thessal. 4. v. 2, 3, and 6.
• * 1.23

  23.
• * 1.24

  24.
• * 1.25

  25.
• * 1.26

  Philemon. 8, ••.
• * 1.27

  26.
• * 1.28

  27.
• * 1.29

  28.