Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

Question IV. Whether it be lawful by false signes,* 1.1 by actions and pretences of actions, to deceive others for any good end: and in what cases it is so.

To this question I answer in the words of Aquinas,* 1.2 because they are reasonable pious,* 1.3 Ad virtutem veritatis pertinet, ut quis talem se exhi∣beat exterius per signa exteriora qualis est; ea autem non solum sunt verba, sed etiam factae: and a little after, Non refert autem utrum aliquis menti∣atur verbo, vel quocunque alio facto, It is all one if a man lies, whether it be by word or by deed. A man may look a lie, and nod a lie, and smile a lie.

But in this there is some variety:* 1.4 For 1. all dissembling from an evil principle and to evil purposes is criminal. For thus Tertullian declaims bitterly against those Ladies who (saies he) being taught by the Apostate An∣gels oculos circumducto nigrore fucare,* 1.5 & genas mendacio ruboris inficere, & mutare adulterinis coloribus crinem, & expugnare omnem oris & capitis ve∣ritatem, besmear their eye-brows with a black semicircle, and stain their cheeks with a lying red, and change the colour of their hair into an adulterous pre∣tence, and drive away all the ingenuity and truth of their faces. And Clemens Alexandrinus is as severe against old men that with black-lead combes put a lie upon their heads; and so disgrace their old age, which ought to be relied upon, believ'd and reverenc'd for truth. And it was well said of Ar∣chidamus to a man of Chios who did stain his white hairs with black and the imagery of youth, the man was hardly to be believ'd, when he had a lie in his heart, and bore a lie upon his head. These things proceeding from pride and vanity, and ministring to lust, or carried on with scandal, are not onely against humility and sobriety and chastity and charity, but against truth too; because they are done with a purpose to deceive, and by deceit to serve those evil ends. To the same purpose was the fact of them of whom Dio Chrysostomus speaks,* 1.6 who knowing that men were in love with old Manuscripts, would put new ones into heaps of corn and make them look like old: such also are they who in Holland lately would exactly counterfeit old Meddals, to get a treble price beyond the value of the metal and the imagery. These things and all of the like nature are certainly unlawful, because they are against justice and charity.

2. But there are other kinds of counterfeits,* 1.7 such as are gildings of wood and brass, false stones, counterfeit diamonds, glass depicted like emeralds and rubies, a crust of marble drawn over a building of course stone; these are onely for beauty and ornament, and of themselves mini∣ster to no evil,* 1.8 but are pleasant and useful: now though to sell these images of beauty for real be a great cheat; yet to expose them to be seen as such, and every man be left to his liberty of thinking as he please, and being pleas'd as he can, is very innocent.

3. There is a third sort of lying or deceiving by signs not vocal:* 1.9 that is, the dissembling of a passion, such as that of which Seneca complains in the matter of Grief, which is the simplest of all passions; but pretended by some without truth to purposes not good. Sibi tristes non sunt, & clariùs cum audiuntur gemunt,* 1.10 & taciti quietique dum secretum est, cum

aliquos viderint in fletus novos excitantur. So did Gellia in the Epigram,

Amissum non flet cum sola est Gellia Patrem: Si quis ad est, jussae prosiliunt lachrymae.

They are full of tears in company, but in their retirements pleas'd well enough. Now things of this nature are indifferent; but are good or bad according to the cause or the design. Mourn for the dead, saith Ben-Sirach, and that a day or two, lest thou be evil spoken of. That end is honest; and there∣fore to mourn in solemnity is good, if we cannot mourn in passion: and the laws enjoyn to a man and woman respectively annum luctus, a year of solemn mourning; all which time it is not suppos'd the passion should be troublesome and afflictive. Thus we find David pretending madness be∣fore Achish the King of Gath; it was for his life: and we doe not find any of the ancient Doctors blaming the dissimulation.

4. But that which is here the principal inquiry is,* 1.11 whether signs not vocal, which have in them ambiguity, and may signify several things, may be us'd with a purpose to deceive. And to this the answer is the same with the former in the case of equivocation, with this onely difference; That as there is some more liberty in the use of equivocal words, then of a simple lie; so there is some more liberty yet in equivocal actions then in words, because there may be more reasons for such dubious actions then for dubious words, and they are not so near, so usual,* 1.12 so intended significations of our mind, nor ministeries of entercourse and society. But where they are taken so, they are to be governed by the same rules; save onely that a less necessity may be a sufficient legitimation of such dubi∣ous signs: concerning which, besides the analogy and proportion to the former rules, there is no other measure but the severities of a good and a prudent man taking into him the accounts of Christian simplicity and ingenuity.

I have onely one thing to adde in order to practice.* 1.13 There is a liberty in the forecited cases there where there is a necessity, and where there is a great charity. For in these cases it is true what S. Chrysostom saies, Frau∣dis quidem magna vis modo ne fraudulento animo fiat: quam ipsam tum ne fraudem quidem nominandam putaverim, verum Oeconomiam quandam po∣tius ac sapientiam artemque, quâ possis è mediis iisque imperviis desperatarum rerum angustiis difficultatibusque correctis & emendatis animi vitiit eva∣dere. There is a great use of artifices in our words and actions when we are hard put to it in desperate cases and extremest difficulties, and then these arts are not indeed deceptions, but just escapes. But yet this I say, that it is not safe to use all our liberty; because when it is practis'd freely, we oftentimes find our selves ill Judges of the necessity. And however it be, yet it is much more noble to suffer bravely then to escape from it by a doubtful way; 1. for the love and honour of simplicity, 2. for the en∣deavours of perfection, 3. for the danger of sin, 4. for the peril of scan∣dal. And it was bravely done of Augustus Caesar, who when he had pro∣mised ten thousand Sesterces to him that should bring Corocotta, a famous Spanish thief, alive into his presence; Corocotta himself came and deman∣ded the money, and had it, and he was spar'd besides: he escaped for his wit and confidence; but had the money pro fide Caes••••is, according to the faith and nobleness of Casars justice: for he might have made use of the ambiguity of his words to have kept the money, and hang'd the

thief; but he thought it Nobler to doe all that he could be thought to have intended by his words. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle,* 1.14 The brave and magnanimous man does not sneak, but speaks truth and is confident.

It cannot be denied what S. Clemens Alexandrinus said,* 1.15 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good man will for the good of his neighbour doe something more then he would doe willingly and of his own accord; yet when it is his own case, it is better to let goe his liberty then to run a hazard. Sarah did lie, and she was re∣proved by the Angel; Abraham did so too, saies Tertullian, Saram soro∣rem suam mentitus est, but he was reproved by Abimelech: Jacob did lie to his Father, but he is not commended for it; and Rachel did dissemble, but she died in childbirth, and it was occasioned by that, say the Jewish Do∣ctors: Simeon and Levi destroyed the Sichemites by a stratagem, but they troubled the house of Israel by it: Thamar deceived Judah, but she plai'd the harlot in deed as well as in words. And concerning those worthy per∣sons mentioned in Scripture who did lie or dissemble, the Christian Do∣ctors have been put to it to make apologies, and excuses, and justifications for them, and are not yet agreed how to doe it. S. Basil and S. Chryso∣stome are two examples of several proceedings. S. Basil alwaies bore his heart upon his hand, and shewed it to every one that was concerned. Saint Chrysostome used craft against the simple, and fraud against him that spoke all things in simplicity.* 1.16 Chrysostome was forced with laborious arts to ex∣cuse and justifie it, and did it hardly: But S. Basil had no scruple concerning his innocence; what he had concerning his prudence and safety does not belong to the present question.* 1.17 But of this last particular I have given larger accounts in a Discourse on purpose.

The conclusion is this, If a man speaks a direct down-right lie,* 1.18 he can very hardly be innocent: but if by intrigues of words and actions, per involucra verborum (as Cicero calls it) per orationem intortam (as the Comedy) by covers of words, and by crooked speeches, a man have enter∣course, he had need be very witty to be innocent according to the Hebrew proverb, If a man have wit enough to give cross and involved answers, let him use it well; if he knows not how to doe it well, let him hold his peace. It was but a sneaking evasion of S. Francis, when the pursuers after a mur∣derer asked if the man came that way; No, saith the Frier, thrusting his hand into his sleeve, he came not here. If a mans wit be not very ready and very clear, while he thinks himself wise, he may become a vain per∣son. The Devil no question hath a great wit, and a ready answer; yet when he was put to it at his Oracles, and durst not tell a down-right lie, and yet knew not what was truth many times, he was put to most pitifull shifts, and trifling equivocations, and arts of knavery; which when they were discovered by events contrary to the meaning which was obvious for the inquirers to understand it made him much more contemptible and ri∣diculous then if he had said nothing, or confess'd his ignorance. But he that does speak, and is bound to speak, must speak according to the mind of him with whom he does converse, that is, so to converse, that by our fault he be not deceived against his right, against justice or against charity, and therefore he had better in all things speak plainly: for truth is the easiest to be told; but no wit is sufficient for a crafty conversation.

Notes

• * 1.1

  42.
• * 1.2

  43.
• * 1.3

  ••. 2••. q. 3. art. 1.
• * 1.4

  44.
• * 1.5

  Lib. de discipl. & habitu. virg.
• * 1.6

  Orat. 21.
• * 1.7

  45.
• * 1.8

  Vide Senecam epist. 115.
• * 1.9

  46.
• * 1.10

  Epist. 99.
• * 1.11

  47.
• * 1.12

  Vide Aq••i∣nat. in 3. ••. dist. 38. art. 3. ad 5.
• * 1.13

  48.
• * 1.14

  Lib. 4. Eth. c. 7.
• * 1.15

  49.
• * 1.16

  Vide in fine li. 1. de Sacerd.
• * 1.17

  Serm. of Chri∣stian simpli∣city.
• * 1.18

  50.