Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

Question III. Whether it be lawfull to equivocate,* 1.1 or use words of doubtfull signification with a purpose to deceive, or knowing that they will deceive; and in what cases it is so.

To this I answer as to the former,* 1.2 Where it is lawfull to lye, it is law∣full to equivocate, which may be something less then a plain lye: but where it is not permitted to tell a lye, there the equivocation must be in∣nocent, that is, not deceiving, nor intended that it should. And this is that which the Hebrews call, corde & corde loqui, to speak dissemblingly, la∣biis dolosis, with lips of deceit. For it is remarkable, that corde & corde signifies diligence and sincerity, when it means work or labour; but it signifies falshood and craft, when it means speaking: for Nature hath given us two hands, and but one tongue; and therefore a duplicate in labour is a double diligence, but in talking it is but a double fraud. Tacitus observes of Tiberius, Verba ejus obscura, suspensa, perplexa, eluctantia, in speciem com∣posita, His words were obscure, broken, interrupted, perplex and intricate, stri∣ving and forc'd, and made for shew and pretences. Now if by artifices you deceive him that trusts you, and whom you ought not to deceive, it is but a lye dress'd in another way,* 1.3 and it is all one: For nec artificioso ingenio, nec simplici verbo oportet decipere quenquam, quia quolibet artis modo men∣tiatur. So that in solution of this question we are onely to consider what equivocal speeches may be us'd, that is, which of them are no lyes: for the rest, they are lawfull or unlawfull by the measures of the first question; for sometimes equivocation is a lye, and equally destructive of civil enter∣course. Duplex responsio habet effectum simplici•• silentii. You had as good not speak at all, as speak equivocally; for a double speech is as insignifi∣cant as a single silence.

1. It is lawfull upon a just cause of great charity or necessity to use in our answers and entercourses words of divers signification,* 1.4 though it does deceive him that asks. Thus Titius the Father of Caius hid his Fa∣ther in a Tub, and to the Cut-throats that inquired for him to bloody pur∣poses he answered Patren in doliolo latere: now that did not only signifie

a little Tub, but a Hill near Rome, where the villains did suspect him to be, and were so diverted. Thus we read of a Greek that in the like case hid his Brother under a wood-pile; and to the inquisitors answered that he did lie hid 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, somewhere in the wood. Now in these cases where there is no obligation to tell the truth, any man may use the covers of truth; especially when in this case it is not a lie: for an equivocation is like a dark-lanthorn; if I have just reason to hold the dark side to you, you are to look to it, not I. If Christian simplicity be not concerned in it, nor any other grace indirectly, certain it is that truth is not concerned: For, In ambiguo sermone non utrumque dicimus, sed duntaxat quod volumus, said Paulus the Lawyer, l. 3. ff. de rebus dubiis. Now that part of the ambigu∣ity which I intend it in, is true, I would never else use that way to save my conscience and to escape a lie; so that if nothing else be concerned, truth is safe. But then care also must be taken that he who hath right to be an∣swered, be not defeated without his own fault. For,

2. If I intend to deceive him,* 1.5 it must be such a person whom I have power to deceive; some one that is a child, or a mad-man, or an incom∣petent person to judge for his own good, and one that no other way will be brought to doe himself good, one that is willing, or justly so presumed. For unless I have power or right to deceive him, I must not intend to de∣ceive him by any act of mine directly.

3. If it be fit that he be deceived,* 1.6 though I have no right to doe it, let him deceive himself; it must be by his own act; to which I may in∣deed minister occasion by any fair and innocent means. It is fit that he who by violence and injury intends to doe mischief to innocent persons, be hindred from it; and there is much good done if an innocent be rescued, and no harm done to the Tyrant if he be diverted, and no wrong or in∣justice if he doe deceive himself. Thus if he runs into error by a just and prudent concealment of some truth; if he is apt to mistake my words out of a known and by me ••bserved weakness; if his malice is apt to make him turn all ambiguous words into his own sense that will deceive him; if I know he will listen to my whispers to another person, and watch my secret talk to others; I am not bound to say what will inform him, but what will become my entercourse with the other: In all these and the like cases, if I use my own liberty, I doe no man injury. I am not bound to speak words of single signification: if it be sufficient to express my meaning, if it be in the nature and use of the words apt to signifie my mind, and to speak that which is true, let him that stands by look to it; I doe all that I am oblig'd to doe by the interest of justice and truth. For in these cases, he that speaks does but minister occasion to him that is mistaken; like him that represents artificial sights before the eye, or as the rain-bow in the clouds is occasion of a popular error that it is full of colours.

4. But then this must be so us'd,* 1.7 that the amphibology or equivoca∣tion be not insolent and strange, but such as is usual in forms of witty speech. For then he who uses them does no more deceive his hearer, then he that speaks obscurely or profoundly is the cause of error in the ig∣norant people. Thus if Caius promise to pay to Regulus an hundred At∣tick drachmes; he is tied to doe it if he does owe it, else not: for if he owes none, he must pay none, and he did not promise to give him any

thing. For if a meaning be clearly contained in the word spoken, it may be made use of to any just and reasonable advantage; especially if that word ought or was likely to have been understood by the concerned hear∣er. But this may not be done in fraud and to the diminution of any mans rights. Asper buyes corn and linnen of Camillus who is newly come from Egypt: they agree together that Camillus shall receive ten talents; but that he shall give him as a free gift halfe of it back again; and call the ten talents the just price, and the telling it a just solution. If Asper sells his linnen by the proportion of the great price told over, he is a Cosener; and uses the words of price, and payment, and gift, fraudulently: the am∣phibologie might have been us'd to ends of justice and reason, but not of knavery and oppression.

5. And this must also be upon just cause.* 1.8 For if a Magistrate sends to inquire for Titius, and the officers ask an Titius sit domi, if he be at home: to him we may not answer, Titius non est domi, he does not eat at home; meaning the word est in a sense less usual, to deceive him in the more common, who ought not to be deceived at all: but to save a mans life from violence and injury it may be done. This way hath been some∣times used to vile purposes. Thus Cleomenes having made truce with his Enemies for thirty daies, us'd to plunder his Country in the night; and Labeo having agreed to give up half his Navy to Antiochus, cut his ships in pieces and made them good for nothing. The like stories are told of Alexander, of the Locrians, of Otho Moguntinus. But it was a barbarous thing of Pericles, who promised safety to the Enemy if he would lay aside his iron, that is, their arms, as all the world understood it, and as the na∣ture of the thing did signifie: when he had done so he fell upon the whole body of them and cut them in pieces, shewing for his excuse, the iron but∣tons that they had upon their Coats. Such frauds as these are intolerable in their event, and evil in their cause, and detested by all good and just men. To this purpose I remember a worthy story told by John Chokier, of a Spanish Governour of a Town in Millain who kept a Noble person prisoner with hard usage, and when his Lady came to petition for his liber∣ty, promised to deliver her Husband to her if she would let him lie with her. The poor woman being wearied with his temptation and the evil usage of her Husband, consents and suffers it. When the Governour had obtained his lust, he would also satisfie his anger too; and kills her Hus∣band, and to verifie his promise, gives her Husband to the Lady, but newly murdered. The Lady complains of this, and tells her sad story to Gonzaga the Spanish General: he finds it to be truth, and made the Lady this amends. He commands the Governour to marry the Lady, that by his estate she might be recompenced for the dishonour: and then, the same day causes the Governour to loose his head to pay for his dishonourable falshood and bloody lie. It was a justice worthy of a great Prince; and the reward was justly paied to such a cruel equivocation. This was subdolus congressus, a craftie treatie, quo nil turpius, said Antoninus the Emperor, nothing is ba∣ser and more dishonourable then it. Thus did Darius to the Noble Oebasus the Father of three brave Sons, and Xerxes to Pythius the Father of five; they kill'd what they promised to leave with the Father, adding to their cruelty the reproach and scorn of cosenage. A man hath right to use what words he will according to the received use; but he must not use them to evil purposes: and a man may goe a little from the more common

use to that which is rare, so it be within the signification of the word, pro∣vided there be just cause; that which hath good in it to some, and no in∣jury to any.

6. There is between lying and equivocation this only difference,* 1.9 that this may upon less necessity and upon more causes be permitted then ly∣ing. For provided that these measures now described, which are the ne∣gative measures of lying, be observed; if a man speaks doubtfull words and intends them in a true sense, he may use his liberty; alwayes provided that he use it with care, and to the reputation of Christian simplicity. In arts and sciences, in jest and entercourses of wit, in trial of understandings and mystical teachings, in prudent concealments and arts of secrecy, equi∣vocal words may be us'd with more freedome. Solvite Templum hoc, saies Christ, Dissolve this Temple, viz. of my body, and I will raise it up in three daies. So did that excellent Confessor in Eusebius,* 1.10 to Firmilianus asking of what Country he was, he answered, that Jerusalem was his Country; Seorsim apud animum suum ita Divinitus philosophatus, privately in his mind speaking Divine mysteries, saies the Historian. This was well and innocent, because an equivocal speech hath a light side as well as a dark: it is true as well as false, and therefore it is in its own nature innocent; and is only changed into a fault, when it is against justice and charity, under which simplicity is to be plac'd.

Under these measures are to be reduced those little equivocations which are us'd sometimes in craft,* 1.11 but most commonly in wit; such as are to answer by anagrams, so as to tell a true name but disguis'd by trans∣position of letters and syllables, or to give the signification of a name in other words. Thus if a man whose name is Dorotheus calls himself Theo∣dorus, for Nicolaus, Laonicus, for Demonicus, Nicodemus; it is an equi∣vocation or an art of deception, but such as may be legitimated by the cause: but if the inquiry be in a serious matter, the answer must be seri∣ous and material, true, and significative to the purposes of law, and justice, and society. And therefore if Nicodemus had been interrogated by Pilate in a serious cause, he might not have said his name was Demonicus; and the reason, is, because he might not have concealed it. But when it is law∣full to conceal it if we can, this is a just way of doing it; for it is not lie in it self, and can be made to doe or to minister to that good which is inten∣ded. Thus in the book of Tobit we find that the Angel Raphael called himself Azarias the son of Ananias, which indeed is the name of his office, or the Rebus, the meaning of his present imployment, that is, Auxilium Domini, Filius nubis Domini, The aid of the Lord, Son of the Lords cloud; meaning that he was sent from the Lord in a cloud or disguise to be an aid and a blessing to that religious family. And he that call'd Arsinoe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Juno's violet, kept all the letters of the name right, and complemented the Lady ingeniously. But these are better effects of wit then ministeries of justice; and therefore are not to be used but upon great reasons, and by the former measures, when the matter is of concernment.

Notes

• * 1.1

  33.
• * 1.2

  34.
• * 1.3

  S. Aug. de conflictu virt. & vitiorum.
• * 1.4

  35.
• * 1.5

  36.
• * 1.6

  37.
• * 1.7

  38.
• * 1.8

  39.
• * 1.9

  40.
• * 1.10

  8. l. Hist. c. 22.
• * 1.11

  41.