Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

Question I. Whether it can in any case be lawful to tell a lie.

To this I answer,* 1.1 that the Holy Scriptures of the Old & New Testa∣ment doe indefinitely and severely forbid lying.* 1.2 A righteous man hateth ly∣ing, saith Solomon; and Agur's prayer was, Remove from me vanity and lies. For the Lord will destroy them that speak lies. And our Blessed Saviour con∣demns it infinitely by declaring every lie to be of the Devil. When he speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own, for he is a lier and the Father of it. Lie not therefore one to another,* 1.3 saith S. Paul: For all liers shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone. Beyond these things no∣thing can be said for the condemnation of lying.

But then lying is to be understood to be something said or written to the hurt of our neighbour,* 1.4 which cannot be understood otherwise then to differ from the mind of him that speaks. Mendacium esse petulanter, aut cupiditate nocendi aliud loqui, seu gestu significare, & aliud sentire: so Me∣lanchthon: To lie is to deceive our neighbour to his hurt. For in this sense a lie is naturally and intrinsecally evil; that is, to speak a lie to our neigh∣bour is naturally evil. Not because it is different from an eternal truth, for every thing that differs from the Eternal truth is not therefore criminal for being spoken, that is, is not an evil lie: and a man may be a lier though he speaks that which does not differ from the Eternal truth; for sometimes a man may speak that which is truth, and yet be a lier at the same time in the same thing. For he does not speak truly because the thing is true; but he is a lier because he speaks it when he thinks it is false. That therefore is not the essence or formality of a lie. Vehementer errant qui tradunt orationis esse proprium significare verum necessarium, said Scaliger: A man may be a true man though he doe not alwaies speak truth. If he intends to profit and to instruct, to speak probably and usefully, to speak with a purpose to doe good & to doe no evil, though the words have not in them any necessary truth, yet they may be good words. Simonides and Plato say it is injustice and therefore evil: so does Cicero, and indeed so does the Holy Scripture, by including our neighbours right in our speaking truth; it is contra proximum, it is against our neighbour; for to himself no man can lie, and to God no man can lie, unless he be also an Atheistical person, and believes that God knows nothing that is hidden, and so is impi∣ous when he saies a lie. But a lie is an injury to our neighbour; who be∣cause he knows not the secret, is to be told that in which he is concerned, and he that deceives him abuses him.

For there is in mankind an universal contract implied in all their enter∣courses,* 1.5 and words being instituted to declare the mind, and for no other end, he that hears me speak hath a right in justice to be done him, that as far as I can what I speak be true; for else he by words does not know your mind,* 1.6 and then as good and better not speak at all. Humanae aures verba nostra talia judicant, qualia foris sonant. Divina vero judicia talia esse audi∣unt, qualia ex intimis proferuntur. Though God judges of our words by the heart, yet Man judges of the heart by the words; and therefore in justice we are bound to speak so as that our neighbour doe not loose his right

which by our speaking we give him to the truth that is in our heart. And of a lie thus defin'd, which is injurious to our neighbour so long as his right to truth remains,* 1.7 it is that S. Austin affirms it to be simply unlawful, and that it can in no case be permitted, Nisi forte regulas quasdam datu∣rus es quibus noverimus ubi oporteat mentiri, ubi non oporteat; by way of confidence and irony: he condemus it all, unless peradventure (sayes he) you are able to give us rules when a man may lie,* 1.8 and when he may not. Quod non est bonum, nunquam erit bonum, that which is not innocent in it self, can never be made so. But vitia non sunt quibus rectè uti licet; if it can in any case become good, it is not of its own nature evil: so that if a lye be unjust, it can never become lawfull; but if it can be separate from injustice, then it may be innocent. Here then I consider,

This right though it be regularly and commonly belonging to all men,* 1.9 yet it may be taken away by a Superior right supervening; or it may be lost, or it may be hindred, or it may cease upon a greater reason.

1. Therefore upon this account it was lawful for the Children of Israel to borrow Jewels of the Egyptians,* 1.10 which supposes a promise of restitution, though they intended not to pay them back again: God gave them com∣mandement so to spoil them, and the Egyptians were devested of their rights, and were to be us'd like enemies.

2. It is lawful to tell a lie to children or to mad-men,* 1.11 because they having no powers of judging, have no right to truth: but then the lie must be charitable and useful; because they are defended by the laws from injury, and therefore must not have a lie told them that can doe them mis∣chief. So that if a lie be told it must be such as is for their good; for though they have no right to truth, yet they have right to defence and immunity: and an injurious lie told to a child or mad-man is a sin, not because it de∣ceives him, but because it deceives him to his prejudice. Quintilian the great Master of children saies, Utilitatis eorum gratiâ multa fingimus, We feign many things to affright or allure Children to good, and from evil re∣spectively. And so doe Physitians to their Patients, abusing the fancies of hypochondriacal and disordered persons into a will of being cured. Some will doe nothing without a warrant; others are impatient of your converse unless you seem to believe them: and Physicians can never apply their remedies, unless they pretend warrants, or compliances, and use little arts of wit and cosenage. This and the like were so usual, so permitted to Phy∣sitians, that it grew to a Proverb, Mentiris ut medicus; which yet was al∣waies to be understood in the way of charity, and with honour to the pro∣fession. But this any Physitian may not doe, that is, not to every Patient: for if the man be wise and can chuse and can consider, he may not be cosen'd into his cure by the telling of a lie, because he is capable of reason, & there∣fore may chuse what he hath a mind to, and therefore to cosen him is to in∣jure him; & no man must commit a sin to doe a good turn to a man against his will. * And thus also in the case of Children: their Tutors or Pa∣rents may not tell them every lie; they may not teach them lies and make them confident in vanities;* 1.12 but for their good, govern them as they can be governed. Ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur, all the world con∣sents, when it is for their improvement. And to this is reduc'd the per∣mission of inventing a wittie fable, or telling a false story, to gain ground

upon him that believes a false opinion, and cannot any other way so easily be confuted.* 1.13 Thus when two Eutychian Bishops, who believing that the two natures of Christ made but one, did consequently believe that the Divi∣nity did die as well as the Humanity in the death of Christ, came to the Court of a Saracen Prince, he pretended great sorrow and conste••∣nation of mind at the receipt of some letters; into the contents where∣of when they with some curiosity inquired, the Prince with a seeming great sorrow told them he had receiv'd certain intelligence that the Archangel Gabriel was dead. They to comfort him told him certainly it could not be true; and for their parts they did believe it to be impossible. O Fathers, said the Prince, you doe not believe it to be impossible that an Archangel should, when you affirm that the Divinity did die. Such a fiction as this no wise man reproves; it is but like the supposing a false Proposition in dis∣putation, that upon that false supposition a true Conclusion may be erected.

3. It is lawful to tell a lie to our neighbour by consent,* 1.14 provided the end be innocent or pious. Thus S. Chrysostom and S. Hierom say that S. Peter suffer'd himself to be reprov'd by S. Paul before the Gentiles for too much compliance with the Jews: not that he did it seriously, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he acted a part by consent to establish Christian liberty amongst the Gentiles. I doe not consent to the instance, because S. Paul tels it to the Galatians as a solemn story and a direct narrative, adding withall dog∣matically, that S. Peter was to be blam'd: but the instance will serve rightly to illustrate this limitation of the Rule. But thus the parties in a warre may write exactly contrary to the truth; when they are understood to what purpose, and when it is by consent. Because he who hath the right to truth hath quitted it, and his communication does serve the ends of soci∣ety well enough, and his words, though they are not agreeable to his ordi∣nary mind, yet they are made to be so by particular institution and de∣signe. Thus in besieged places they write letters of confidence and great ostentation of the strengths which they have not; when their parties have consented that they should doe so for their just advantages.

4. To tell a lie for charity,* 1.15 to save a mans life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of a Prince, of an useful and a publick person, hath not onely been done in all times, but commended by great and wise and good men. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To tell a lie to save a life is no harm, said old Pisander. Thus the Egyptian midwives are commended be∣cause by their lie they sav'd the Israelitish infants. O magnum humanitatis ingenium! O pium pro salute mendacium! saies S. Austin of them: it was an excellent invention of kindness, and a pious lie for the safety of the inno∣cents: and S. Ambrose and S. Jerome commend them so, that they sup∣pos'd them to receive eternal rewards. The same was the case of Rahab; to whom it should seem that Phinehas, who was one of the spies, had given instruction and made in her fair dispositions to tell a lie for their conceal∣ment. For when she had hidden Caleb, Phinehas said to her, Ego sum Sacerdos, Sacerdotes verò, quippe Angelorum similes, si volunt, aspectabiles sunt; si nolunt, non cernuntur. But she made no use of that, but said directly they were gone away. Concerning which lie of hers S. Chry∣sostom cries out, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.16 O excellent lie! O worthy deceit of her that did not betray the Divine persons, but did retain piety! Thus we find

S. Felix telling a lie to save his life from the Heathen Inquisitors.

Felicem sitit impietas— Felicemque rogant, Felix ubi cernitur: & non Cernitur ipse,* 1.17 nec ipse vir est, cum sit propè, longè est. —persensit & ipse faventis Consilium Christi, ridensque rogantibus infit, Nescio Felicem quem quaeritis: ilicet illi Praetereunt ipsum; discedit at ille plateâ, Illudente canes Domino frustratus hiantes.

They ask'd where Felix was; himself answer'd, that he knew not Felix whom they look'd for: and yet no man finds fault with this escape. De∣ceptio & mendacium semper aliàs mala res, tunc tantum sunt usui quando pro remedio sunt amicis curandis, aut ad vitandum apud hostes periculum; they are the words of Celsus in Origen. A lie is otherwise evil, onely it is then useful when it is for remedy to cure the evils of our friends, or to avoid the evils from our enemies. The same almost with the expression of Clemens Alexandrinus, who allows 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to lie when it is a remedy.* 1.18 So Lucian amongst the Heathens, Qui cum usus postu∣lat mentiuntur, veniâ nimirum hi, imò laude plerique eorum digni sunt; quicunque vel hostes fefellerunt, vel ad salutem tali quopiam pharmaco usi sunt in necessitatibus: They are not onely to be excus'd or pardon'd, but to be commended, that lie, when they use it as a remedy or a medicine in the danger or necessities of our friends; where also the Scholiast does allows an officious lie.* 1.19 So we must use a lie, saies Cassian, quasi naturae ei insit hellebori, as a man uses hellebore: and he commends Archebius for deceiving some persons with a charitable lie. It is therefore no wonder if Pliny commends Arria the wife of Caecinna Paetus for so often lying to her sick husband in the con∣cealment of the death of their beloved boy;* 1.20 which she therefore hid lest the grief should extinguish her Husband. In short, S. Austin saies that all the Philosophers,* 1.21 as Plato, Xenophon, Lucian, the Lawyers, the Physicians, the Rhetoricians and Theologues did affirm that it was sometimes lawful to tell a lie; that is, when it did good and no evil: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Proclus, For Charity is better then truth, and to save a mans life is better then a true story. The Archbishop of Tyre (as I re∣member) tells a story, that a malicious Saracen had secretly defiled one of the Mosques or places of worship which the Turks have in Jerusalem. The fact was imputed to the Christians, who generally denying it, but having no credit with their enemies, were all presently drag'd to the place of exe∣cution. Amongst them there was young man pious and noble, who seeing all his brethren in a sad condition and himself equally involved, by an offi∣cious and a charitable lie took the fact upon himself, and confess'd himself alone to be the doer of it, and that the rest knew nothing of it. Himself indeed was put to death with exquisite torments, but he sav'd the lives of all the rest; who, I doubt not, believ'd that young man to have in heaven a great reward for his piety, and no reproof for his innocent and pious lie: for in memory of this noble act the Christians in Jerusalem once a year marched with palms in their hands into the City to perpetuate the memory of that deliverance.

5. Now this may be better admitted in case the charitable lye be told to him to whom the good accrues;* 1.22 for then there is a leave justly pre∣sumed, and he that receives the good is willing to receive it with the loss

of an useless or hurtfull truth, and therefore there is no injustice done: as he that takes his neighbour's goods, for which he hath reason to believe his neighbour willing, is no thief, nor the other a deceiver. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sayes Andronicus Rhodius, He does indeed deceive, but he is no deceiver; because not the cosening but the curing of his friend is the purpose of his false affirmative. And to this we suppose that every man is willing enough, and therefore not at all injur'd. And this reason was good in such chari∣table deceptions which are by implicit consent or leave justly presumed: so Darius Hystaspes in Herodotus, Ubi expedit mendacium dicere, dicatur; nam idem optamus, & qui mendacium dicimus, & qui veritatem. Every man is willing enough to be deceived into his own advantage; and there∣fore when it is so, in such things where the man is willing to receive advan∣tage, there is no harm done, if he be deceiv'd that he may not be undone. He that is in danger of drowning is willing enough to be pull'd out of the water, though by the ears, or the hair of his head; and we have reason to believe so in the present affair. Mendacium nemini noxium, sed alicui com∣modum, honestum esse, said Bishop Heliodorus in his Fair Ethiopian. He was indeed then writing a Romance, by which he intended to doe good and no harm, and therefore believ'd himself innocent. Upon this account the Apologues or Fables of Aesop, the Parables of wise men, and their dark sayings, the cases which Lawyers put, and the fictions of law, have their justification, Et prodesse solent, & delectare—They hurt no man, and doe good to every man; they doe him profit, and they doe him pleasure.

Exit in immensum foecunda licentia vatum, Obligat historicâ nec sua verba fide.* 1.23

Poets doe intend to teach, not to deceive, in their fictions, and therefore are allowed.

6. But if the lye be told to another for the preservation not of him∣self,* 1.24 but of a third person, then the case is more difficult, for here is no pre∣sumptive leave, but it is against the mind of the inquirer. Now concer∣ning this, though it be allowed by very many of the antient Doctours of the Church, and by the wisest amongst the Heathens, and hath in it a very great charity; yet I cannot see sufficient cause to allow it.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.25 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

It is at no hand good to tell a lye: but when a truth brings an intolerable evil, it is pardonable, but not commendable; so the Greek Tragedy: because it is of it self evil to lye to our neighbour. Not that every false propo∣sition spoken knowingly is a sin; but if it be spoken to deceive, and not to profit, it is spoken to the injury of him that hears, and is a sin be∣cause it is unjust, and therefore not to be done for any good; and it is in this very instance in which S. Paul was angry at them who intimated that he told a lye for a good end: it may not be done, when to doe it is unjust or injurious.* 1.26 I approve therefore the opinion of S. Austin, I am sure it was one of his opinions, for in this question he had more then one; Duo sunt genera mendaciorum in quibus non est magna culpa, sed tamen non sunt sine culpa, There are two sorts of lyes which have in them no great fault, but yet they are not innocent: the one is to lye in jest; which is therefore not per∣nicious, because it does not deceive, for it is taken but for a jest: the other is to

lye for the good of our neighbour; which therefore is the less, because it hath some∣thing in it of good will.* 1.27 And Tertullian is of the same opinion, who reckons this of necessitate mentiri, to lye in the time of need, amongst the sins of daily incursion, or of an unavoidable infirmity. And S. Austin discourses it very well;* 1.28 When it is ask'd whether a good man may lye or no, we ask not after him that belongs to Egypt, to Jericho, or to Babylon, or to the earthly Jerusalem which is in bondage with her children: but what is his office that belongs to the Mother of us all, that City that is from above? and then we an∣swer, that no lye is of the truth: but concerning the Citizens of this City it is written, that a lye was not found in their mouths. So that upon this ac∣count all those examples recorded in Scripture of great persons telling a lye in the time of the danger of themselves or others is no warrant, no ar∣gument of the lawfulness of it; for they were under a looser law, but we under a more perfect and more excellent: and yet they did not doe well, and if we imitate them we doe worse.

And therefore we find great examples of Christians and of Heathens,* 1.29 whose Charity was not cold, but their love of truth and righteousness was much warmer then in the former examples.* 1.30 S. Austin tels of Firmus Bishop of Tagasta, that when one who by evil chance had kill'd a man fled to him to be conceal'd from the avengers of blood; to the inquirers he answer'd, Nec mentiri se posse, nec hominem prodere, He could neither lye, nor yet betray the man. For which answer and refusal the Bishop being brought before the Emperour, as a reward both of his charity and his truth, he obtain'd pardon for the man. And it was a great thing which Probus tels of Epaminondas, and Plutarch of Aristides, that they were so great and severe lovers of truth, that they would not lye so much as in jest. Indeed that was very well: and it is of greater obligation to Christians, to whom not onely purity and simplicity, ingenuity and sincerity is commanded, but all vain talking is forbidden. But the case is not so clear in the matter of difference, when it happens between a great charity and an unconcerning truth. For who would not save his Father's life, or the life of his King, or of a good Bishop and a Guide of Souls, at the charge of a harmless lye, from the rage of Persecutors and Tyrants? God indeed in his providence hath so order'd the affairs of the world, that these cases seldome happen: but when any man is surpris'd or tried, unless he be sure that it is in that case a sin to tell a lye, he may be sure it is a very great sin to betray his Prince or Prelate, his Father or his Friend. Every man in that case would dispute hardly, rather then give up a good man to death. And if it be come to a dispute, and that it be doubtfull on either hand whether the lye in that case, or whether the betraying the man to death, be the sin, it is the safer way to determine for the charity then for the veracity; because in case it be a sin to give him up, it is much a greater sin then to tell such a lye: and then comes in the rule, Caret peccato quod ex duobus minus est. The lye is the less evil, and therefore it is no sin when it is chosen to avoid that which for ought we know is the greater. But this is upon supposition that the case is doubtfull. * To which also must be added, that it must also sup∣pose that it is just to save the man, or that we think it so: for to rescue a Malefactor, a Bandito, a Fugitive of law, hath in it no such obligation. But if it be just that the man be sav'd, that is a higher justice then the ob∣ligation of telling truth to the Persecutor; to whom it is as great charity, if from him we take the power of doing evil, as it is justice to rescue the

innocent. Now this, and the opinion of so many great men that allow it, and the favourable nature of the case, is enough at least to make this mat∣ter probable; and if there be a doubt, it is enough to establish it: the que∣stion being uncertain, is enough to make the practice certain.

And indeed if we consider things without the prejudice of easy and popular opinions, though it be said, that to tell truth is an act of justice; yet this is not true in all propositions, but in such truths onely which con∣cern a man for some real good to him, or for some imaginary good which hath no real evil. But when the telling of a truth will certainly be the cause of evil to a man, though he have right to truth, yet it must not be gi∣ven to him to his harm: it is like the giving to a mad-man his own sword; you had better give him a wooden dagger, though the other be his own. But in an unconcerning truth what interest can any man have that is worth preserving? What wrong is done to me if I be told that Alexander dyed upon the floor, and not upon a feather-bed? or that Pittacus his wife hurt her fingers when she threw down the table of meat before her husband's friends? Truth is justice when it does good, when it serves the end of wisedome, or advantage, or real pleasure, or something that ought or may be desir'd; and every truth is no more justice, then every restitution of a straw to the right owner is a duty. Be not over-righteous, sayes Salomon. In these things there is no question but the pretences of little justice ought to serve the great end of charity; and much rather if the truth will doe no good, and will doe hurt to him that inquires, and more to him who is inquir'd after. The Persecutor hath a right to truth, but no right to be undone; and therefore he is not wrong'd by that lye that saves him harm∣less in some measure, and his brother in more; and if he be not wrong'd, then no man is: and then the lye that so well serves Charity, is not against Justice; and unless every lye be intrinsecally evil and malicious, it hath in such cases no irregularity. And if it be objected, that we must not tell a lye for God, therefore much less for our Brother; I answer, that it does not follow: for God needs not a lye, but our Brother does: and besides this, there can no service be pretended to be done to God by a lye, but it must be in the matter of justice or religion, in both which cases a lye is nei∣ther to be told for God nor our Brother; but a real service may be done for our Brother by such a lye as sins neither against justice nor religion; in which case onely I say it may seem to be allowable.

But then from these premisses the truth in the instance of the Rule is established;* 1.31 for it is not lawfull for a guilty prisoner to say Not guilty, when he is justly interrogated. Christianum non mentiri etiamsi moriatur ex tormentis, said Clemens Alexandrinus, A Christian will not lye, though to escape death with torments:* 1.32 For the law sayes, Thou shalt not kill; and the law sayes, Thou shalt not lye: but the law it self does sometimes kill, but the law does never lye. For although it be said, that no man is bound to accuse himself, and indeed the laws of man doe not tie him to doe it: yet this hinders not the conclusion in this case; for in the present case the man is accused already, and he is not called to be his own accuser, but to confess the fact if he be justly accused by the law: for why does the Judge ask, but to be answer'd truly? For there being three wayes in law of pro∣ceeding to definitive sentence, 1. the notoreity of the fact, 2. the convi∣ction by witnesses, and 3. the confession of the party; in the destitution of the first, to prevent the trouble of the second, the law interrogates con∣cerning

the third; and it is as in the case of Joshuah and Achan, My son, give glory unto the Lord, and confess thy fault. It is true, it is a favourable case; and when a mans life is at stake, he hath brought himself into an evil necessity: but there is no excusing of a false denial, but it is certainly Cri∣minal, and nothing can excuse it, unless the law should give leave to such persons to say what they would, which cannot be suppos'd in any good Go∣vernment; for then trials of Criminal causes between the Judge and the Thief would be like a match at fencing, and it is infinitely confuted by those laws which use to examine by scourgings or torture; which whe∣ther it be lawfull or unlawfull, I doe not here determine, but I affirm to be a great testimony, that laws doe not love to be played withall, but when they ask soberly, intend to be answered truly.

This is also to be extended to the case of Advocates, who in a good cause must not use evil arts. For we must not tell a lie for God, and there∣fore not for the interest of any moral vertue, nor for the defence of righ∣teousness; for a cavil or an injurious lie is out of the way to justice, and she must not be directly wronged that she may be indirectly righted. In the civil law it is permitted, that to avoid abuses and the injurious craft of the opposite party, the advocate of the right may use all arts that are not lies and falsity; Nec videtur dolo fecisse qui fraudem excluserit, saies the law, l. Compater, § Titio, ff. de legat. secundo. He may be overthrown by art, so he be not by that which is false: sic ars deluditur arte. But in the case which the lawyers out of Baldus put, the question is evident. Agricola borrows of Sempronius five hundred pounds, and pays him at the day, but without witness: Sempronius sues him for the money: Agricola owes him none, but cannot prove the payment; but yet may not when he is particularly in∣terrogated, to save himself from injury, deny that ever the received any. He must confess the truth, though he pay the money again. Covaruvias affirms that he may in this case lawfully deny that ever he received any; because he is not indebted, he received none that remains in his hand: and to other purposes the Judge cannot question him; and if he does he is un∣just, and therefore Agricola is not tied to answer rightly. But this is not well said nor well considered. For the Judge being competent may re∣quire him to answer; and the intention of the question is not to know whether Agricola have paid the money yea or no; but whether he bor∣rowed it. For if he did, the Judge is afterward to inquire concerning the payment: and as Sempronius was tied to prove that, so is Agricola tied to prove this; and a lie is not to be confuted by a lie, nor the error of Agricola in not taking witnesses or an acquittance to be supplied by a direct denial of a truth. * But if Sempronius have lent Agricola 500 li. whereof he hath received 200 li. if the Judge aske whether he ows him that sum which Sempronius demands, he may indefinitely and without more pun∣ctuality deny the debt, that is, of 500 li. saying that he owes it not: and if the law be such that the confession of one part intitles him to the whole, he may deny the whole to be due, in case he have paid a part. But with these two Cautions, 1. That if he be ask'd concerning a part, he answer to that as justly as he answers to the whole: 2. That he do not make use of this subterfuge to defraud Sempronius of what is due debt, but only to defend himself from the undue demand. These cautions being observed, he hath liberty so to defend his cause, because majori summae negative pro∣latae minorem nec naturaliter nec civiliter inesse, say the lawyers. A man by denying the whole does not deny the part, though he that affirms the

whole affirms the part; and therefore this defence is just because it is true. * But now if in a just cause the Advocate or party may not tell a lie; I conclude that much less may he doe it in an unjust cause, and for the defence of wrong. But [much less] signifies nothing, for it may not at all be done in either; and in pure, perfect negatives there can be no degrees. But in artifices and crafty entercourses there is some difference; these may be used to defend a just cause that can no other way be defended; but they may not be used to promote an evil cause; because they of themselves though they be indifferent, yet not serving a good end but an evil, do there∣fore become evil. And therefore the Greek that denyed the depositum of his friend, and offered to swear at the Altar that he had restor'd it already, did not preserve his conscience and his oath by desiring his friend to hold the staffe in which he had secretly conveyed the money. It is true, he de∣livered it into his hand, desiring that he would hold it till he had sworn; but that artifice was a plain cosenage, and it was prettily discovered: For the injur'd person in indignation at the perjury smote the staff upon the ground, and broke it, and espied the money. But that made all right in∣deed, though against the intention of the perjurer. Such like arts as these must not be us'd to doe a mischief: if they doe charity and justice, if they have not something to ligitimate them, they have very much to excuse them.

7. It is lawfull to doe otherwise then we have said,* 1.33 when the doing is better then the saying: if the saying were ill, there is no scruple of it; for it ought not to be done, but the saying is to be repented of: not that the saying was a lie, for there is no way of making it good but by causing it to pass into a lie, that is, into vanity and nothing. But then, if the saying be less good, and the deed be contrary, and yet much better, the truth is not so much as the bounty; and there is no injustice in the lie, because there is charity in the action, and a sufficient leave presum'd to be given by him that is concerned. Thus the Emperor that said he would cut off every one that pissed against the wall, being afterwards appeased and perswaded to mercy towards them that had done amiss, he expounded his words con∣cerning dogs, and caused all the dogs in the Town to be kill'd. No man here was injur'd; and it had been an importune adhering to a truth, and a cruel verification of his word, to have prefer'd his word before the lives of so many Citizens.

8. It is not lawfull to tell a lie to save our fame;* 1.34 but we must rather accuse our selves then tell a lie, or commit any other sin. Nemo tenetur in∣famare se, is a rule universally admitted amongst the Casuists, No man is bound to discover his own shame. And upon this account they give leave to men to hide their sin, to leave their repentance imperfect, to tell a lie, to hazard the not doing of a known duty, to injure innocent persons. Thus when a man hath stolen goods, he is bound to restore, but not if it cannot be done without discovering his person, because no man is bound to dis∣grace himself. If an adulteress hath some children by her husband, others secretly by a stranger, she is bound not to suffer the legitimate to be injur'd by provisions for the other: this is true: but if she cannot prevent the in∣jury to the legitimate without discovering her self to her husband, Non tenetur, She is not bound to defame self. If her husband examine her con∣cerning it, she may hold her peace: but if that increases the suspicion, she

hath no way to escape but by denying it; for she is not oblig'd to betray or accuse her self. This is the doctrine of the Canonists and Masters of Conscience in the Church of Rome, which (as yet) are almost all that have written upon Cases.* 1.35 Navarre is the man whom I chuse for all the rest. Nemo tenetur restituere cum periculo famae consequentis virtutem moralem vel theologicam; non famae partae in aliis rebus praeclaris, ut ingenio, divitiis, No man is bound to make restitution with the hazard of his fame consequent to a moral or theological vertue; that is, if it will make him suspected not to be a good man: but if it will only hinder or hazard his reputation of wisdome or wealth or any thing of these natures, it hinders not. And again in the case of an adulteress,* 1.36 Peccavit, sed potest absolvi, licet taceat, & noceat patri putativo & haeredibus, quando timetur mors, vel amissio fa∣mae, &c. She hath sinn'd, but she may be absolved, though she hold her peace, and be injurious to the supposed Father, and wrong the heires; that is, if she be in peril of her life, or fears the loss of her fame. To save a mans credit, an honest man, to whom it would be a great shame to begg, videtur posse clancu∣lum necessaria surripere,* 1.37 may privately steale necessaries. So Diana. And if so, I do not doubt but he may also lie, and deny it to save his credit, if he be asked uncivilly concerning it. But this also the Doctors expresly af∣firm, that if Titius have disgrac'd Caius by punishing his secret shame to defame him, he is bound to make restitution of his good name, by deny∣ing what he said, that is, by telling of a lie, or by mental reservation; and that's all one, as I shall prove in the sequel. So Emonerius. Against these prodigies of doctrine I intend this paragraph. We must not commit a sin to save our life, much lesse to save our fame; and indeed nothing does more deserve infamy then to tell a lie, nothing disgraces a man more: and if a lie be an injustice, then no end can save it harmeless.

But then concerning our fame,* 1.38 we must rather let it goe, then let our duty goe.* 1.39 For though our fame is a tender part, and very valuable, yet our duty is more: although our fame is necessary for others, yet a good conscience is necessary to our selves: and he is cruel that neglects his own fame; but he is more cruel that neglects his own soul: and therefore we may expose our good name to goe as God shall please, 1. When we ask counsel and remedy for our soul. 2. To avoid the sin of pride, and punish the vanities of our spirit. 3. To exercise and increase the grace of humi∣lity. 4. In humiliation and penance for our sins, when our fame is not necessary to others, that is, when we are not eminent and publick persons. 5. When we are tied to any express duty which is indispensably necessary, as restitution of fame or goods, and yet cannot be done without the publi∣cation of our person and our shame. 6. When for our own greater good or for the publick interest we are commanded by a just and competent au∣thority. 7. And lastly, When we must either confess our sin or tell a lie, which is the thing now in question; for we must rather suffer shame then doe things worthy of shame, rather be ashamed before men then be a∣shamed before God, that is, rather be disgrac'd then damn'd: for nothing needs a lie but a sin to hide it, and by a lie a sin is made two.

9. It is not lawfull to tell a lie in humility,* 1.40 or the confession of sins and accusation of our selves.* 1.41 Cum humilitatis causâ mentiris, si non eras peccator antequam mentireris, mentiendo efficer is quod evitâras, said S. Austin. He that lies in humility, and calls himself a sinner in that wherein he was

innocent, hath made himself a sinner by his lying. And this was it which Abbat Zozimus wittily and piously replied; For when he said he was the greatest sinner,* 1.42 and the vilest of men, to him that reprov'd him for say∣ing so, and telling him that it was not truly said of him, because every one knew he serv'd God with great diligence and great sincerity, and therefore he ought to speak more truly of himself and more thankfully of God; Zozimus replied, You say very well, I ought to speak truth of my self & thankfully of God; but I am false and unthankful, but therefore I did say true, and not unthankfully. But we have truth enough to say of our selves to make us humble without saying what is false.* 1.43 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle; to deny the good things that are in us, or to make them less, is dissembling. All pride is a lie; but humi∣lity is truth: and therefore it is but a dissembling humility that lives upon the bread of deceit. Synesius Bp. of Ptolemais was a wise man and a great Philosopher. But when he was chosen Bshop he refus'd it passionately, & that his refusal might be accepted, declaim'd most bitterly against him∣self; that he was a man given to gaming, from which a Bishop should be free as God himself; that he did not believe that the world would ever perish; that he did not assent to the article of the resurrection of the dead; that being a Philosopher of the Stoical Sect, he was something given to lying; that he was not popular in his opinions, but humorous and morose, secret and resolute; that if he was forc'd to be a Bishop, he would then preach all his opinions. For all this Theophilus Bishop of Alexandria consecrated him Bishop, as knowing all this to be but stratagem and the arts of an odde phantastick humility.* 1.44 But it was ill done; and Synesius had this punish∣ment for his lying modesty, that he was believ'd by posterity to be so heathenish and unworthy, that that Church chose him Bishop onely upon hopes he would mend. So Evagrius and Nicephorus report.

10.* 1.45 In a just warre it is lawful to deceive the unjust enemy, but not to lie; that is, by stratagems and semblances of motions, by amuse∣ments and intrigues of action, by ambushes and wit, by simulation or dissimulation,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

by force or craft, openly or secretly, any way that you can, unless you promise the contrary: for it is in open warre, if the warre be just, lawful to doe justice upon the enemy all the waies we can; craft is but the facilitation of the force; and when it is a state of warre, there is nothing else to be look'd for. But if there be a treaty, or a contract, a promise or an agree∣ment in any thing, that is a state of peace so farre, and introduces a law; and then to tell a lie or to falsify does destroy peace and justice, and by breaking the law reduces things to the state of warre again.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.46

It is lawful to doe any thing to destroy your enemy; that is, so long as you profess hostility: and therefore if you tell a false tale to him to deceive him, when you are fighting against him, he is a fool if he believes you, for then you intend to destroy him; but you are not unjust, you are in a state of warre with him, and have no obligation upon you towards him. Thus Elisha told a lie to the Syrian army which came to apprehend him,* 1.47 This is not the City, and this is not the way: & this is approv'd and allowed by Plato and Xenophon, Homer and Pindar, Polybius and Thacydides, Plutarch and Lucian amongst the Greeks, Philo amongst the Jews; and S. Chrysostom amongst the Christi∣ans

saies,* 1.48 If you examine all the bravest Generals, you shall find their bravest trophies to be the production of fraud and craft. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and that they were more commended then such who did their work by fine force. Thus the causing false rumors to be spread amongst the enemies is an allowed stratagem in warre, neither ignoble nor unjust.* 1.49 Flaccus told that Aemilius had taken the enemies town, to dis∣hearten the party he fought against: and Quinctius the Consul caus'd it to be spread abroad that the enemies on the right wing were fled. By such arts it is very usual to bring consternation to the hostile party: and he whom you may lawfully kill, you may as well deceive him into it, as force him into it; you being no more oblig'd to tell him truth then to spare his life: for certainly of it self killing is as bad as lying; but when you have no obligation or law to the contrary, and have not bound your self to the con∣trary, you may doe either. But this is at no hand to be done in matters of treaty or promise, either explicite or implicite, as in parties, and truces; and therefore it was a foul stain upon Hannibal,* 1.50 that he professing open warre against the Romans did also profess it against faith and justice, keeping no word or promise if it was for his advantage to break it; and the Trojans were troubled in conscience at their fallacious conducting of their warrs, not by stratagem, but by breaking their oaths and Covenants,

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.51 &c

We fight with lying and breaking promises, which is unlawful to doe. For concerning this thing, that even in warre we are bound to keep faith & pro∣mise made to our enemies, it is certain & affirmed by almost all wise & good men of the world:* 1.52 Liquet etiam in bello fidem & justitiam servari oportere, nec ullum decorum oportere servari, si violetur fides, said S. Ambrose; and he proves it by the example of Joshuah, who kept his promise which the Gi∣beonites got fraudulently from him. And the same is the sentence of S. Au∣stin; fides quando promittitur, etiam hosti servanda est,* 1.53 contra quem bellum geritur: and therefore when Nebuchadnezzar had conquered Zedechiah, and taken him into protection and peace upon his word and promise of fide∣lity, because he afterwards did privately sollicite the King of Egypt to fight against the King, he was put to death with greatest cruelty. And this is not onely true between those who are publick enemies, forreiners and stran∣gers, and supreme in their respective dominions, which the law properly sig∣nifies under the word Hostes, l. quos nos, ff. de verborum signif. for this is without question; and therefore all men condemn those that violate Em∣bassadors, or that break the laws of truce; and every one blames Titus Labienus for wounding Commius of Arras under the colour of parlee:* 1.54 but Attilius Regulus is commended for refusing to give his voice in the Senate so long as he was not discharged of his oath made to the Carthaginians. But this is also true, and our word and faith is sacred, when it is pass'd to all sorts of enemies, to Rebels, to Thieves, to civil Adversaries, to con∣demned persons, to Fugitive servants, such as Spartacus, Eunus and Athe∣nio; and the reason of all is the same. Inter quos juris alicujus communio est, inter eos obligationem contrahi, They that are under the same law are equally bound; and whoever promise or treat, doe it at least by the law of Nature or Nations, which alike bind them who are free from any civil obligation. This is that which Triphoninus said, That if a thief intrusts any goods to the right owner, not knowing that they are his own, he is not oblig'd to restitution; but every man else is, if he have promis'd, because they are

none of his, and therefore he can be oblig'd to repay them: and for thieves and fugitives the people of Rome did treat with them, and send Embassa∣dors; and all that was bound upon them by that entercourse they kept religiously. And the same they did to condemned persons; as appears in that famous case of Caius Rabirius,* 1.55 who was question'd for killing L. Apu∣leius Saturninus against the publick faith given him by the people, when he and his companions fled to the Capitol for immunity and a guard against the sentence of death which he had deserv'd.

But all this is to be understood so, that the faith and word be given by him who hath power to verify it: but when A. Albinus made a peace with King Jugurtha, for which he had no commission, the Senate was not oblig'd to verify it; and Camillus the Dictator broke the peace which the Romans had foolishly made with the Gaules; and Scipio dissolv'd the con∣tract which Masinissa and Sophonisba made without his leave, who had the power. In this there is onely caution to be had that there be no combi∣nation to deceive or rescind what is found to be disadvantageous, nor ad∣vantages taken by the change of hands. For if the Romans finding relief come, made Camillus Dictator that they might by pretence of his com∣mand break the peace, they did dishonourably and false; but if he was Dictator before the peace, he had power, and he had reason. To this can be referr'd the case of two Italian Gentlemen. Guarino had injur'd Antonio de Imola; but confess'd his fault, ask'd pardon, made amends: and then Antonio swore his peace and his forgiveness, and that his hand should never be upon him; but in his heart bore him a secret grudge, and therefore smote him secretly, saying that Guarino was a Bandito, and therefore con∣demn'd by the laws. This is to make our promise the cover of a lie, and the laws to minister to crafty mischiefs. After a promise a man must not change his mind, and then make excuses. Renunciatio sui juris per poeni∣tentiam revocari non potest, saith the law, l. pactum, ff. de pact.

But deceiving the enemy by the stratagem of actions or words is not properly lying; for this suppose a conversation of law or peace, trust or promise explicite or implicite. A lie is the deceiving of a trust or confi∣dence, but in fighting there is none of that; it is like wrastling and fen∣cing, a design to make that part unarm'd where he may strike the surer: and of this S. Clemens of Alexandria affirms expressly concerning strata∣gems in warre,* 1.56 Haec omnia licebit efficere, vel persuadendo, vel cogendo, vel injuriam faciendo in iis ulciscendis quibus expedit, vel faciendo id quod justum est, vel mentiendo, vel vera dicendo, vel etiam simul utendo aliquibus eorum in eodem tempore. All these things it is lawful to bring to pass by per∣swasion, or by force, by doing injury or harm there where we are to doe revenge, by doing that which is just, or by telling that which is true, or by lying, or by doing any one or more of these together. Haec autem omnia, & quomodo opor∣teat uti unoquoque eorum, cum Graeci accepissent à Moyse, non parvam acce∣pere utilitatem, When the Greeks receiv'd all these things from Moyses, and how they were to use any one and every one of these, they received no small advantage.

In this case,* 1.57 all the prejudice which the Question is like to have, is in the meaning and evill sound of the word lying; which because it is so hate∣ful to God and man, casts a cloud upon any thing that it comes near: but lying (which S. Basil calls extremam malitiae lineam, the extremity of malice, which S. Ephrem calls the Rust of conversation) is indeed an enemy; but

in warre so it should be; onely in peace and contracts, and civil conversa∣tion, it is intolerable. In warre it is no lie, but an engine of warre, against which the enemy is to stand upon his guard: and if a man may falsify a blow, much more may he falsify a word; and no justice, no promise, no charity, no law restrains the stratagems in a just warre; they which may be destroy'd, may be deceiv'd, and they may be deceiv'd by false actions, may by false words, if there be no collateral obligation or law to the contrary. A just man,* 1.58 saith S. Austin, is to take care of nothing but that his warre be just; that is, by a just authority, and for a just reason. Cum autem justum bellum susce∣perit, utrùm apertâ, pugnâ, utrùm insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest, But if it be a just warre, it matters not as to the question of justice, whether he overcome by force or by deceit. Dolus & perfidia are extremely different —dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat? and,* 1.59 bonum esse dolum si quis ad∣versus hostem latronemve machinetur, said Ulpian, Craft against a thief or enemy is good; but not perfidiousness. Nullo discrimine virtutis ac doli prosperos omnes laudari debere bellorum eventus,* 1.60 said Ammianus Marcellinus. To bring warre to a happy end, you may use force or wit; but at no hand break a promise, or be treacherous.

He that desires to see more particulars to the same purpose,* 1.61 may, if he please, seea 1.62 Lipsius his politicks, andb 1.63 Adam Contzen, together with the excellent examples of great and wise personages in Polyaenus and Fron∣tinus.

11. But this is not to be extended to a licence of telling a lie of the enemy in behalf of our own country, for fame and reputation, for noises and triumph; and I remember that Poggius upon this account lost the repu∣tation of a good historian.

Dum patriam laudat, damnat dum Poggius hostem, Nec malus est civis,* 1.64 nece bonus historicus.

He was a good Citizen, but an ill historiographer, that commended all the actions of the Florentines, and undervalued their enemies.

12.* 1.65 Princes may not lie for the interests and advantages of Govern∣ment. Not in contracts, treaties, bargains, embassies and all the enter∣courses of peace and civil negotiation. For besides it is an argument of fear and infirmity to take sanctuary in the little subterfuges of craft when they are beaten from their own proper strengths, it is also a perfect destruction of government and the great bands of society and civil entercourse; and if they be us'd to fail, no man can be confident of that affirmative which ought to be venerable and sacred up to the height of religion; and therefore the Egyptian law press'd this affair well, Let all that break their word and oaths die for it; because they are loaden with a double iniquity, & pietatem in Deos violant, & fidem inter homines tollunt, maximum vinculum societatis, They destroy piety and reverence towards God, and faith amongst men, which is the great ligature of society. And if Princes doe falsify their word and lie, their neighbours can have no entercourse with them but by violence and warre, and their subjects none but fear and chance. For Prin∣ces to lie is the greatest undecency in the world: and therefore Diodorus Siculus tells that the Egyptian Princes us'd to wear a golden chain mix'd and distinguish'd with curious stones,* 1.66 and they call'd it Truth; meaning that nothing was a greater ornament to a Prince, nothing ought to be more sacred, or more remembred.

Bodinus saies otherwise,* 1.67 and that Princes and Judges have leave,* 1.68 be∣cause sometimes they have necessity to lie; and of the same opinion was Plato, provided it was done for the good of the people. But that which they mean is onely in affirmations and narratives, in adding confidences or producing fears, in making laws and establishing religions; such as was that of Numa; who when he had a mind to endear to the people those good laws which he had made, said that he receiv'd them from the Goddess Aegeria. This may be done against an enemy; and if it be for the good of the people, it hath in it charity and some shew of prudence, but not to the bravery and magnanimity of a Prince: but however it be in this, it can never be permitted to violate a promise or a treaty, nor yet to tell false in a treaty, for that is against peace and against justice. When there is in it no harm, but all good, as in order to perswade the people to a duty, or to their benefit, they in a matters of publick life being like children in the affairs of their private, that is, when their need and incapacity of being otherwise governed requires it, they may be us'd as they can, according to that of the Persians, Sapientes dicunt quod mendacium beneficium faciens melius est vero exitium parturiente, When a lie does charity, it is better then an uncharitable and pernicious truth: alwaies supposing, that the lie which serves charity be not against justice; but when it is in treaties, there a lie does not onely disgrace the sincerity of the prince that treates, but is of it self apt to hurt the other; and therefore at no hand to be admitted.

The next inquiry is concerning person Criminal,* 1.69 and so for others in proportion.

Notes

• * 1.1

  3.
• * 1.2

  Prov. 13. 5. 30. 8. Psal. 5. 7.
• * 1.3

  Col. 3. 9. Revel. 21. 8, 27.
• * 1.4

  4.
• * 1.5

  5.
• * 1.6

  S. Gregor. lib. 26. Moral. cap. 7.
• * 1.7

  Epist 8. ad Hieron.
• * 1.8

  Eurip. in Phoeniss. Lactant. 6. instit. 16.
• * 1.9

  6.
• * 1.10

  7.
• * 1.11

  8.
• * 1.12

  Luc••••.
• * 1.13

  Niceph. 16. c. 35.
• * 1.14

  9.
• * 1.15

  10.
• * 1.16

  Homil. 5. de poenitent.
• * 1.17

  Natali 5. S. Felicis.
• * 1.18

  In Philopseu.
• * 1.19

  Lib. 5. Constit. cap. 37.
• * 1.20

  Lib. 3. Epist. 16.
• * 1.21

  Quaest. 68. in Levit.
• * 1.22

  11.
• * 1.23

  Ovid. 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.24

  12.
• * 1.25

  Sophocl. in Creusa.
• * 1.26

  Caus. 22. qu. 2. c. Nequis.
• * 1.27

  Lib. de pudicit.
• * 1.28

  De mendacio, ad Consenti∣um.
• * 1.29

  13.
• * 1.30

  Lib. de men∣dac. cap. 13.
• * 1.31

  14.
• * 1.32

  Num. 16.
• * 1.33

  15.
• * 1.34

  16.
• * 1.35

  Habetur in compendio Navarri per Petr. Guivar. edit. Antverp. 1595. pag. 93.
• * 1.36

  Pagina 82.
• * 1.37

  Vide Compen. impress. Lugd. 1641. pag. 335.
• * 1.38

  17.
• * 1.39

  S. Aug. lib. de bono viduit. cap. 22.
• * 1.40

  18.
• * 1.41

  De verbi Apost.
• * 1.42

  Dorotheus doctr. 2. n. 11.
• * 1.43

  Eth. lib. 4. c. 7.
• * 1.44

  Evagr. lib. 1. c. 15. hist. Niceph. lib. 14 c. 55.
• * 1.45

  19.
• * 1.46

  Pindar.
• * 1.47

  2 Kings 6. 19.
• * 1.48

  Lib. 1. de Sa∣cerdotio.
• * 1.49

  Livius l. 3. 29.
• * 1.50

  Val••••. Max.
• * 1.51

  Iliad. 8.
• * 1.52

  De offic. l. 1. c. 29.
• * 1.53

  Epist. 1. ad Bonifac.
• * 1.54

  Hi••ius, Bell. Gallic. 8. c. 3. Cicero, lib. 3. Offic.
• * 1.55

  Vide Orat. Cicer pro C•• Rabirio. Appian. bel Civil. 1.
• * 1.56

  Stromat. l. 1. c. 13.
• * 1.57

  20.
• * 1.58

  Qu. 10, & 11. in Josu••.
• * 1.59

  Virg. L. 1. ff. de dolo male.
• * 1.60

  Lib. 17.
• * 1.61

  21.
• a 1.62

  5 Politic. c. 17.
• b 1.63

  Lib. 10. Pol. c. 38, & 46, 47.
• * 1.64

  Sanazar. 1. Epig.
• * 1.65

  22.
• * 1.66

  Lib. 2. Anti∣quit.
• * 1.67

  23.
• * 1.68

  Lib. 3. de rep.
• * 1.69

  24.