Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

RULE I. The Conscience is properly and directly, actively and passively, under pains of sin and punishment, obliged to obey the Laws of men.

THAT the Laws of God and Man are the great mea∣sures of right & wrong,* 1.1 of good and evil, of that which is to be followed and what is to be avoided in man∣ners of men, and the entercourses of societies, is infi∣nitely certain and universally confess'd. Since there∣fore Humane Laws are one moiety of the Rule and measure of Conscience, and that we are bound to obey our lawful Superiours in what they command, it is naturally consequent to this, that we acknowledge the conscience boun••, and that in Humane Laws as well as in Divine, though according to their several proportions, the conscience ought to be instructed. And indeed there is more need of Preachers in the matter of Divine Laws, and more need of wise and prudent Guides in the matter of Humane Laws. For the Laws of God are wiser and plainer, few and lasting, general and natural, per∣ceiv'd by necessity, and understood by the easiest notices of things; and therefore men have more need to be call'd upon to obey, then taught how; and therefore here the Preachers office is most necessary and most requir'd. But Humane Laws are sometime intricate by weakness, sometimes by de∣sign, sometimes by an unavoidable necessity; they are contingent, and remov'd farre from the experiences of most men; they are many and par∣ticular, difficult and transient, various in their provisions, and alterable by many parts and many ways: and yet because the conscience is all the way oblig'd, she hath greater need of being conducted then in the other, where every wise man can better be a guide in the little intrigues, and every child can walk in the plain way.

But our first inquiry is,* 1.2 Whether the conscience be oblig'd or no. For if Conscience be not, then nothing is concerned but Prudence, and care that a man be safe from the rods and axes: but then the world would quickly find that fear would be but a weak defence to her Laws; which force, or wit, or custome, or riches would so much enervate, or so often evacuate. And therefore the greatest Case of Conscience in this whole matter is, Whether it be a matter of Conscience as well as of Prudence and security to obey the Laws of Man. And this question is so dubious and unresolv'd, that Cajetan and Henricus de Gandavs did suppose it fit to be determin'd

by the Pope in Cathedra, as thinking it otherwise to be indeterminable. The reasons of doubting are these;

1. Because God onely is Lord of Consciences,* 1.3 he onely can discern the secret that is there, and he onely can punish there; and therefore to suppose any band upon conscience from Humane Laws, would be to devest God of his royalty: none but he who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the searcher of the heart and mind of man can give laws to it; for none else can take cogni∣sance, or give a compulsory.

2. The Conscience is seated in the understanding (as I have already* 1.4 prov'd,)* 1.5 but that is an imperious faculty that acknowledges no superiour but God; because he onely being infallible, he onely can instruct and in∣form it rightly, none else can have power over it. For the understanding hath a proper way of being rul'd. The will is rul'd by Empire, but the un∣derstanding by doctrine; that is govern'd by command, this by argument; the will by power, the understanding by truth: now because God onely is truth, and every man a liar, God onely can rule the understanding, which is the Court of Conscience.

3. To submit the conscience to any law or power of man,* 1.6 is to betray our Christian liberty: For Christ having set us free from all the bondage even of that Law which God himself made and gave to Moses, he having alleviated the burden of rites and ceremonies, and left the Jews at liberty to be governed as they pleas'd themselves, would not take off the laws of God to impose upon us the laws of Men; and there is no such thing as Christian liberty but a freedome from the law of Moses, and the law of carnal ordinances, and the laws of men; for that which the Preachers speak of, a liberty from sin, and from hell, and the grave, 1. This is ra∣ther a deliverance then a liberty, a rescue from an evil of another nature, not a state of freedome and ease. 2. As many men have order'd their Theology, we are so farre from having a liberty from sin, that they have left us nothing else but a liberty to sin: and indeed we have no liberty or freedome from sin as long as we are alive, but we are always in warre and contention, which is worse then death; and so many men are always captive under sin, and all men doe so often obey it, (and his servants we are to whom we doe obey) that we have little reason to boast of Christian liberty in that sense. 3. S. Paul using the word liberty, and speaking of the advantages of Christians in this, instances it onely in being freed from those ordinances of Moses, and the impositions which some Philosophers or some sects of men would bring upon the conscience. 4. Liberty from sin, or Christian liberty in this sense is nothing but a tropical expression, a me∣taphor and similitude, and therefore is not that real priviledge by which we were materially advantag'd upon the publication of the Gospel of Christ. The result of which considerations is, That all Christians are free men, servants of Christ, and of none else, it being an express Comman∣dement, and that strengthned with a reason,* 1.7 Ye are bought with a price, be ye not the servants of men; which at least must be understood of Consci∣ence, and the mind of men.

4. For granting it to be lawful for men to make Laws,* 1.8 yet that these Laws cannot bind the conscience it appears plainly in this; that whatever

Laws of the Church are made concerning any rite or ceremony, let it be never so necessary or fitting that they be obeyed, yet the things doe not become intrinsecally necessary, and therefore are not to be thought so, lest, expresly against the Commandement of our Blessed Saviour, we teach for doctrines the commandements of men. To keep Holidays may be very good, so that we observe them to the Lord; but he that thinks it neces∣sary and a direct duty, wrongs his own conscience: which demonstrates that Conscience is free when every thing else is bound. You may fast when you are commanded by your Superiour, but you must not think that fast∣ing is a part of the Divine Service; that is, though man commands fast∣ing, yet God does not: and then if man of himself does binde the consci∣ence, he hath a power equal to God, and can make Divine Commande∣ments: but if man cannot doe so, then the conscience is free, and not tied by humane Laws.

5. If humane Laws doe binde the conscience,* 1.9 then it is put into the power of man to save or damne his brother; not directly, but upon the consequence of his obedience or disobedience, which is all that is done by the Laws of God; and men shall have power to make more ways to the Devil, to make the strait way to heaven yet straiter, and the way to hell, which is already broad enough, yet wider and more receptive of miserable and perishing souls.

6. Christ is the Author and finisher of our faith,* 1.10 and so of every grace: that is, he onely can give it, and he onely can take it away. Since therefore that which makes a sin, destroys the grace, no humane authority can make an action to be a sin; because no humane power can dispose of grace or take it away.

7. In the instance of civil power and civil Laws the case is more cer∣tain,* 1.11 for this reason; because the civil power cannot remit sins, therefore neither can they bind to sin: and from hence it will follow, that supposing Ecclesiastical Laws doe bind the conscience, yet the civil cannot. But then as for the Ecclesiastical power and Laws, they also are as invalid upon another account, because the Church having no external compulsory, can onely bind in those things where God hath already bound; and therefore can make no Laws of her own, but what are already made by a higher power, and consequently cannot bind to sin, but there where the conscience is already bound by God. And if the Church should inflict her censures for any thing that were not of it self a sin against God, as for not paying the fees of the Spiritual Court, for a poor mans working for his living upon a Holiday, the world would cry out of her; which shews, that where God hath not bound the conscience, neither the Ecclesiastical nor the civil power can.

8. If humane Laws doe directly bind the conscience, then it is as great a sin to transgress a law of man, as to break a law of God; with our bare foot to touch the ground within the Octaves of Easter, as to call our brother fool; to eat flesh on Friday as great as to commit fornication: which con∣sequent because it is intolerable, so also is the opinion that inferres it. The conclusion is, In Christ Jesus there is neither high nor low; that is, Chri∣stian Religion hath no hand in this Heraldry of Secundum, sub, & supra; but whatsoever difference of person, of order, and of Government is

amongst us, is by agreement: it is, as S. Peter calls it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the ordinance of man; and for mans sake it is to be obeyed: but the consci∣ence is still at liberty where onely the commandement of man does inter∣vene.

This opinion is taught by Fernandus Vasquius a Spaniard,* 1.12 and he affirms that all the Gentlemen and common people of Spain (the Scholars onely excepted) are of this opinion: it was also taught by some of the Scholars of Calvin, and some Lutherans, by all the Anabaptists of Germany of late; and that upon the strength of the first, the third and fourth argu∣ment; and formerly by Jacobus Almain, and John Gerson, by Felinus, Cajetan, and Navarre, but they mean onely the civil Laws of Princes, upon the confidence of the sixth and something of the seventh argument; all which I have thrust forward as farre as the nature of the question would bear, and added some more: which I have done, not that these arguments ought to prevail, but that by the examination of them this great question may have right done it, by being rightly stated, and fully cleared.

First therefore to the main inquiry;* 1.13 it is certain as an article of faith, as necessary as any other rule of manners, that every Subject is bound to obey the just Laws of his lawful Superiour, not onely under fear of punish∣ment from man, but under pain of the Divine displeasure. 1. Because the power by which men make Laws is the power of God:* 1.14 By me Kings reign, and the Law-givers decree justice, says the Wisdome of God; that is, the Son of God, the Wisdome of the Father, to whom he hath given all power in heaven and earth, he it is by whom, that is, by whose power and wis∣dome, Kings reign. For this is the wisdome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which God possessed from the beginning. The Lxx reads it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, creavit, which God created from the beginning; and this word the Arrians make use of to their evil purposes, but very weakly and against the faith of the original, where it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Kanan possedit. This eternal Son of God, and the Wis∣dome of the Father, the King of Kings and the Lord of lords, is the ori∣ginal of all humane power, and this is nothing but a derivative from him. For power is given you of the Lord,* 1.15 and Soveraignty from the Highest; and ye are ministers of his Kingdome.* 1.16 And S. Paul expresly and dogmatically affirms, There is no power but from God: the powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. So that the Legislative or supreme power is not the servant of the people, but the Minister, the Trustee and Representative of God. 2. The power of the Sword is onely from God; for since no man is Lord of his own life, no man hath power to kill himself, neither hath he power to warrant any man else to doe it; for what he may not doe himself, he cannot commis∣sion and impower any one else to doe. Vindicta mea, saith God, Vengeance is mine, I will repay: and it is Gods sword with which the Magistrate strikes; and therefore Kings and Potentates are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gods deputies and ministring officials, in his name to be the avengers of his wrath:* 1.17 and as Christ said to Pilate, Thou couldest have no power unless it were given thee from above, may be said to all just humanes Powers, It is given them from above, not from beneath, from God, not from the people. The consequent of which is this, If it be God that strikes and pays vengeance by the hand of the Magistrate, then it is God who is offended when the law of the Magistrate is violated; for who∣ever strikes is the party injured; and the Magistrate being Gods Mini∣ster,

as he is the less principal in the justice done, so also in the injustice suffered. Dixit Deus quia Dii estis, It is God who hath said to the Magi∣strates that they are Gods; that is, in the place of God: by his authority they strike, and he is the injured person: and therefore he who is so smit∣ten by the sword of God, is a sinner against God, for he punishes none else. Patet culpa, ubi non latet poena. If God punishes, it is certain man hath sinn'd, said S.a 1.18 Austin, and S.b 1.19 Prosper. The one is the indication of the other.

But the thing is expresly affirmed by the Scripture;* 1.20 for having dog∣matically and fully signified that all humane just power is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they being the several expres∣sions of Solomon according to the Lxx, and of S. Paul in his own words, it is not content to leave us to find out the consequence of these, but lite∣rally affirms the main articles.* 1.21 So S. Peter, Be ye subject to every ordinance of man,* 1.22 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for the Lords sake; which S. Paul speaks yet more explicitely, Wherefore it is necessary that ye be subject, not onely for wrath, but also for conscience sake. Sicut Christo, as to Christ, so be obedient to your Ma∣sters, or temporal Lords; so the same Apostle: that is, by the same neces∣sity, for the same reason, to avoid the same punishment, to have the same reward, and by the force of the same Religion, and that you may not pre∣varicate the laws of God, or doe violence to your conscience. Nothing can adde light to these so clear words, they are bright as the Sun, certain as an article of faith, clear, easy and intelligible, according to the nature of universal Divine Commandements. S.c 1.23 Chrysostom and c 1.24Theodoret urging these precepts, say, that we are not to obey out of courtesie, but of duty; not out of liberality, but necessity; that is, according to S.c 1.25 Ambrose and S. Austin, the fearful pains of hell and eternal damnation attend them that disobey.d 1.26

And this whole matter is infinitely demonstrated in this one considera∣tion: The Laws of man doe so certainly bind the conscience, that they have a power of limiting and declaring, and making the particulars to be∣come the Laws of God. For though the Divine Law forbids murder, yet the Law of man declares concerning the particular, that it is, or it is not murder, and by such declaration, by such leave or prohibition respectively makes it so. In Spain if a wronged husband or father kill the deprehen∣ded adulteress, it is no murder; in England it is. For in Spain the husband or father is permitted to be Executioner, where notoreity is declared to be sufficient conviction: here they are not trusted with it; and the Judge and the Executioner are persons vastly remov'd. If a Lawe 1.27 forbids me to take my own goods from a Thief, it is theft to doe it, but it is no theft if the Law permitsf 1.28. It is incest for the Uncle to marry with his Niece: it is so where the Laws have made it so, but it is not so of it self, for it was not so always. Since therefore humane Laws can constitute an action in the habitude of a Divine Law, it is beyond all question, it does oblige the conscience.

2. This obligation is pass'd upon the conscience,* 1.29 and there is this ne∣cessity of obeying: not onely in case humane Laws be first given by God in thesi, or in hypothesi, that is, in words or in sense, in direct affirmation or just consequence, in substance or in analogy; but though the matter of the Law be in its own nature wholly indifferent before the sanction and con∣stitution.

The first conclusion I intended against the Anabaptist, and this second against Gerson, Almain, and the dissenting Sectaries: and of the truth of it we have an instance in the person of S. Paul, who by his Apo∣stolical authority gave an injunction which hath ever since been an Eccle∣siastical Canon; and yet he alone and not the Lord gave the word, That a believing wife or husband should not depart from their unbelieving correla∣tive,* 1.30 if he or she respectively desir'd to stay. It was a matter in which Christ had not at all interpos'd, but S. Paul made it a law to the Christian Churches; and whoever shall prevaricate it shall bear his burden. And indeed it were a vain thing to suppose that all humane Laws were derived from the law of Nature, or the Divine positive; or that those which were not so derived could not be good and reasonable, and that the authority binding them were incompetent. For whatsoever is derived from the law of God cannot by men admit variety, nor suffer diminution, or goe into desuetude, or be extinguish'd by abrogation: and then it would follow that no King could command any thing but what was necessary before he commanded it; and nothing could be a law to the Persians, but what also did oblige the Greeks; and nothing could bind in the 125 Olympiad, but what was decreed before the days of Semiramis; and there were no law but those of the Medes and Persians; and there could be no provisions made for new necessities, and the Government of Commonwealths could never be improved by experience, and all Law-givers were as wise at first as ever they could be. All which are such foolish consequences, that it must be granted, that whatever humane Power can justly ordain, or prudently, or necessarily, or probably, all that is bound upon the conscience of the Subject certainly and to all events as the Laws of God himself. And therefore Plato said well, That before the Law is made, men may judge of it, but after the sanction, not at all: that is, it is so indifferent in its nature, that it is fit to be considered and disputed; but when it is made a Law, there remains nothing but a necessary obedience. And to the same pur∣pose Aristotle largely discourses;* 1.31 for when he had divided the civil Law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the natural and the constituted, he says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Law that is not natural, but decreed by man, in the beginning it matters not whether it be made or no; but after it is made, it is a great matter whether it be kept or no. But this whole affair is put beyond all scruple by the words of the Apostle, Obey your Masters, not onely the good and gentle, but the morose and harsh; that is, not onely if what he com∣mands be in it self good and fitting, but if it be troublesome, and uneasy, and unnecessary; any thing, so it be not unlawful: for every thing that God hath not forbidden, can be bound upon conscience by a lawful Supe∣riour. Either therefore all humane Laws are nothing else but commenta∣ries on Scripture or the natural Law, or else are wholly unnecessary, as being nothing but repetitions of the Divine laws: and there can be no new law made; or if there can, it must bind the conscience: for all other things bind the conscience by themselves, and without humane constitu∣tion. If therefore any humane constitution, as such, can bind the consci∣ence, it must be of such instances which either are derivatives from the law of Nature, or of things which before the law did not bind at all, that is, of things which in their own nature are indifferent.

3.* 1.32 That humane Laws bind the conscience does not depend upon

the intention of the law-giver; for when the arrow is shot out of the bow, it will hit or miss by its own force and order, not by the intention of the Archer: and no law-giver can make a law with a purpose not to oblige the conscience. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth this question was much talk'd of, and little understood; and some discontented Recusants under the Go∣vernment of the Church of England had so talk'd the lawes themselves out of countenance, that the legislative power durst scarce own the proper obligation of an Ecclesiastical, or of a law relating to any thing of religion; insomuch that when the wisdome of the state thought fit to confirm the ancient lawes of Ecclesiastical fasts, they superadded this proviso, That if any one should affirm that these lawes were intended to bind the Consci∣ence, he should be punish'd like the spreaders of false newes: and the jeju∣nium Cecilianum, the Wednesday fast, was made without such obligation. Now this is plainly to them that understand it, a direct artifice to evacuate the whole law: for a law that is made without intention to bind the con∣science is no law at all; for besides that it is a plain giving leave to any man to break it that can doe it without observation, or can bribe the offi∣cers, or is bigger then the informers, or not easy to be punish'd, or that dwels alone, or that is himself a Minister of the law, besides this, I say, it is directly no law at all. For all humane power being deriv'd from God, and bound upon our consciences by his power, not by man, he that saies it shall not bind the Conscience, saies it shall be no law, it shall have no authority from God; and then it hath none at all: and if it be not tied upon the Conscience, then to break it is no sin, and then to keep it is no duty: so that a law without such an intention is a contradiction; it is a law which binds onely if we please, and we may obey when we have a mind to it; and to so much we were tied before the constitution. ** But then if by such a declaration it was meant that to keep such fasting-daies was no part of a direct Commandement of God, that is, God had not requir'd them by himself immediately, and so it was (abstracting from that law) no duty Evangelical, it had been below the wisdome of the contrivers of it; for no man pretends it, no man saies it, no man thinks it: and they might as well have declar'd that that law was none of the ten Commandements.

4. Though Humane lawes doe not bind the Conscience by the inten∣tion of the law-giver,* 1.33 but by the command of God, yet God does bind the law upon the Conscience according to the intention of the power that decrees it. For though a Father cannot command his Son to doe a lawful and fitting service, and by his intention make that the disobedient Son shall not sin against God, because he cannot make disobedience to be no sin▪ yet by intending less obligation in the law, he makes the crime imputable in a less degree; that is, the authority is the less despis'd, there is less evil consequent, the mischief is small, the inconvenience little. * And there∣fore the Doctors of the Canon law doe to very little purpose trouble this question with inquiries after signs, when the intention of the Law-giver is to bind to Mortal, when to Venial sins. For besides that the distinction it self is trifling according to their understanding of it (of which I have given a large account in a Discourse on purpose) and besides that the commands of Heathen Parents,* 1.34 and Masters, and Princes who knew nothing of that distinction (if it had been right) did nevertheless bind their Subjects to obe∣dience under pain of sin; besides these, I say, the law-giver does not at all make it a sin, or no sin: he onely intends it should be kept, and to that pur∣pose

binds it with penalties, and consequently and indirectly binds the Conscience: but God binds the Conscience properly and directly; for the law is Divine in respect of the power and authority, but Humane in respect of the matter and the instance: and that is the meaning of these words put into the Rule. The conscience of man is by Gods law properly and directly bound to obey the lawes of Men; not indirectly and by the consequence of some other duty, but by a Commandement and the pur∣posed solemn declaration of his will in this affair. But this I shall more fully explicate in my answer to the opposite arguments. Now because al∣though the law-givers intention does not directly make the disobedience to be sin or no sin, yet because indirectly it hath influence upon the action and the conscience of the subject, it is useful that I set down the Rules and Measures of the difference; and how we may guess (for it can be no more) at the distinct obligations which from the diversities of humane lawes are passed upon the Conscience.

Rules of distinction, or the measures by which we shall prudently conjecture at the gravity or lessening of the sin of disobedience to Humane Lawes.

1. He that breaks a law which is established upon great penalties,* 1.35 commits a great sin. Because it is regularly to be presumed that the su∣preme power puts much upon it, when he is so earnest for its observation. Rem quae culpâ caret, in damnum vocari non convenit, saith the Law, Cap. 2. de constit. If there be no fault there ought to be no punishment; they are rela∣tives, and correspond also in their very degree.* 1.36 Quis dubitaverit hoc esse sceleratius commissum quod est gravius vindicatum? saith S. Austin, If the punishment was more grievous, the wickedness also was the more intole∣rable: ut juxta mensuram delicti sit & plagarum modus: that's the measure of punitive justice, that the number of the stripes be according to the mea∣sure of the iniquity. And concerning those things where there is any doubt, the Subject is not to judge whether the law be very necessary or no; but to judge concerning the intention and mind of the Superior, and whether he thinks it very necessary: For he knowes best, and by his know∣ledg and his authority is the most competent Judge. This Rule hath no exception, unless it be evident that the punishment is impos'd for terror, and to affright men from doing that for which it is not very fit they should be severely punish'd: as if a Prince should under pain of death forbid the hunting of a hare; the greatness of the punishment neither makes nor de∣clares the fact more criminal then it is in its own nature under a law that forbids it under a smaller punishment. But if the case be doubtful, whether the law be of great purposes and design, the greatness of the punishment in a prudent and temperate government is the best exterior indication. But if the punishment be light & trifling, the offence is so too; for the legislative power can put no more weight upon it then it declares by punishment, but so much it does: and the Rule of Alfonsus à Castro is very useful here and in some other articles, Humana lex non magis gravat conscientias quam corpora. For Gods Law adding energy and Sanction to the constitutions of man, binds so far as the Prince or as the Prelate binds: and this is fully signified in the words and commission of Christ to his Church, Whatsoever ye shall bind on Earth,* 1.37 shall be bound in Heaven; for there our Blessed Lord constituting a Government in his Church, as already there was in the world,

though of another nature, and by compulsories external, and a proper juris∣diction (from which the Spiritual differs, as I shall explicate in the fourth chapter of this book) did promise to doe to them as to the Princes of the World; that is, verify their ministery of Lawes and Judgments. He in∣deed appointed other manners of coercion, and a distinct administration; but the power of giving lawes and judgments he gave then; and he gave it as firmly as to the greatest Kings: that is, as he commands Subjects to obey their Princes, so also to obey their Spiritual Superiors; as he will punish the rebellious and disobedient to Kings, so the disobedient to Bi∣shops, and to Apostolical Prelates; that is, according as every Superior can and intends to bind by his temporal or spiritual penalty, God will verify it and condemn the same person with an eternal. Since therefore Gods verification of humane lawes and judgments is after the Sanction and for it wholly, it must also be according to it. He that binds what man binds, binds so much and no more; as therefore man intends the obligation, so God obliges the Conscience.

2. If the matter of humane lawes be great in it self,* 1.38 to prevaricate those lawes gives a proportion of greatness to the crime. 1. But this sel∣dome happens but when a Divine law is complicated with the Civil; such as the prohibition of publick stewes, the lawes for keeping daies of religion, the Lords day, Christmas, Ascension, and the Incarnation, the preserving the persons of them who minister to Religion sacred, the immunity and intemeration of Holy things as well as holy persons, the matters of Sacri∣lege, Simony, keeping of vowes, together with all specifications and hu∣mane instances of Divine Commandements, as that Children should not marry without their Parents consent, that marriages should not be co••∣summate before they be published. 2. To these also are to be added such lawes which in their own nature contribute much to the publick security or advantage: as that men should not in a City fire their own houses, nor cut the damme of the Sea upon their own ground, that they should not in times of peace fire a Beacon, nor tell false and disheartning news to an army ready to joyn battel, nor make false Musters when the Enemy is near.

3. Though the matter of the lawes be in it self light and trifling,* 1.39 yet if by reason of some present appendages, and visible or probable conse∣quences it be great, the conscience is tied to obedience under a great crime. For a single souldier to fly from a battel is of it self no great matter, were it not for the evil example; but because it may affright the next man and that may scare the rank, and the rank may disorder the company, and so proceed to an intolerable mischief, therefore the sin is great by the pro∣portion to the evil it is likely and apt to produce. To carry corn abroad is no great matter of it self; but when the price is great and the plenty is little, the mischief it does by accident is the measure of the sin.

2. * Of the same consideration it is, when an action of it self light and impertinent is made the matter of a great scandal. To kneel or to stand at the Holy Communion hath been severally used in divers Churches Anci∣ent and Modern; but when a law is made that we shall kneel, and if I doe not kneel he that observes will think I doe no reverence to Christs body and blood, and by my example will learn to despise it, the Conscience is burden'd with the sin of irreverence something, but very greatly with the sin of scandal.

3. When the thing of it self is indifferent, and yet the Custome of it is pass'd into superstition, or causes horror, or some notorious evil effect, the lawes that prohibit any such thing doe bind the conscience to obey under the pain of being guilty of the great evil that is introduc'd by it. To light up candles by dead bodies is as harmless as any thing; but if it be prohibited for the avoiding of superstition to which it ministers in some weak persons, the disobedience hath its value not according to the action, but the evil intention to which it is suppos'd to contribute. Thus we find a title in the Canon law, de cadaveribus non exenterandis & in frusta concidendis ut ad alia loca transferantur:* 1.40 and it is forbidden under the pain of the greater excommunication, that bodies should be imbalmed, that is, unbowell'd and cut in pieces to be carried to other places of Sepulture remote from where they died. The thing in it self was innocent and warranted by the practice of whole nations, and had countenance from the examples of Jacob and Joseph; but it did light into the observation of people that thought it cruel, unnatural and inhumane, and there that opinion, not the nature of the action, gave the weight and value to the disobedience.

4. When an action in it self indifferent is by the law expounded to signify a sin, though in it self it doe not, nor in the heart of him that does it, the disobedience to that law is an act of that sin, or at least of a scandal relative to it. Thus if a civil law, were made to forbid women to goe in mens cloths, as presuming them that did so were incontinent and wanton, she that disobeyed that law was really to be judged wanton, because she would doe that which the law so expounded; and her crime was great, not according to the thing it self, but to the sense of the law; she despises her own reputation, does that thing which the law, by which the best judgments are made, judges to be incontinence, and therefore she is justly to be con∣demned as an incontinent: and upon this account there was a law made; and it is recited cap. si qua mulier, dist. 30. where women under pain of anathema are forbidden to appear in a mans habit; where the gloss addes, scil. ob malum finem, if it be for an evil end, it is a sin proportionate to that evil end: and therefore when the law declares beforehand, that it shall be judged to be a Ministery to that evil end, the action is that sin which is so adjudged, & the conscience bound accordingly. But this caution hath one limitation, viz. though the law expounds such an action to be incontinence, and therefore ordinarily it is to be judged; yet if it really be not so, but be done upon some great necessity or for some very good end, though till the publication & approbation of the cause, it be externally and legally dishonest, yet the con∣science is clear: because in an action that is indifferent, and condemn'd onely for a presumptive end, when that presumption fails in the particular, and the indifferent action serves really to a pious, a charitable, or a necessary end, the action is made good, and therefore the Conscience is disoblig'd. For that which is really so, prevails over that which is but presumed so. Thus we find that S. Euphrosyna liv'd long in a Monastery of men; and the Church which took cognisance of it, did, upon evidence of her piety and purity, after death declare her a Saint: and that S. Eugenia went in a mans habit [to avoid the persecutors of Christianity for a while] is told in the Menologion of the Greeks; and her memory as of a Virgin and Martyr is celebrated in the Greek Church upon Christmas eve. And when Nonnus the Bishop of Edessa had converted S. Pelagia, who from a common curtezan became a glorious Saint, after the suffering of most severe penances in the mount Olivet, she estrang'd her self from all probabilities of temptation from vain

men by living in a mans habit conceal'd all her life-time; and the Church keeps her memorial in honour upon the 8^th of October.

5. If the matter of humane Laws be in it self trifling and inconside∣rable, yet if it meets with a people where it is esteem'd a crime, and the laws forbid it upon that account of a publick dis-estimation, it is to be pre∣sumed that the laws doe condemn it equally to the publick fame; and therefore that the conscience is bound accordingly. Thus in the days of Clemens Alexandrinus the Christians thought it a very horrid thing to wear false hair; and

Calvo turpius est nihil comato,* 1.41

said Martial to Marinus, nothing is more deformed, nothing more unhand∣some. Now though it be not so in it self, yet when the hearts of men are generally against it, as it was then (though it be not so now) if any law had prohibited the wearing of Perrukes, the conscience had been greatly obliged, for the law did lay much upon it, even as much as all the evil of the publick infamy did amount to. Thus to break a fasting-day which by custome hath been observed in a Church, is a matter of small account; but if a law have forbidden it, and forbids it there where it is commonly ac∣counted a very high impiety, though of it self it be not so, yet under such a law in such circumstances it becomes so, and is to be valued accordingly. And upon this account are those words of S. Chrysostome to be understood, Adveniente tempore jejunii, etiamsi quis millies urgeat, & infinita cruciet; & cogat vinum delibare, aut aliquid aliud quod jejunii lege non est licitum gustare, patiendum potius esse, quam prohibitum tangere nutrimentum. It was accounted a great matter then to break an Ecclesiastical fast: and therefore when a law is supported by such an estimate, that law binds hea∣vily; and it will be a great sin to break it, unless there be a great cause to legitimate or excuse it. In such cases we must endure a great inconveni∣ence rather then disobey.

6. Though the matter be little, yet if the Legislative power hath a particular eye and value upon it, however it be expressed, if such a value be known or observed, the smalness of the matter is no argument of the smalness of the sin. Thus also in the foregoing instance of Ecclesiastical Fasts are those words of S. Basil to be understood, saying, Non minus crimen esse violare jejunium Ecclesiasticum, quam militi abjicere scutum in bello, aut stationem deserere. Ecclesiasticall Fasts in his time were the cogni∣sance of a Christian, his defence and guard; and therefore not to keep them was as if a Souldier did throw away his shield in a day of battel, or desert his station. So the Prelates of the Church did then understand it, so they intended it. When a trifle is made a mark of union, as to wear a branch in warre, when the Superiour sets his heart upon it; in this case the mind of the supreme becomes a law to his Subjects, in the former they become a law unto themselves. Sometimes a smal instance is made the trial of obedience; and the Superiour hath a great authority, but a little diocese, or a few Subjects, or small occasions to rule in; in these and the like cases, the smalness of the matter is not onely to be considered, but the interpretation and effort which the Superiour puts upon it. If he calls every such disobedience a contempt of his authority, and accounts it a dis∣solution of that community where he governs, or a great violence of or∣der; it is so in conscience, that is, to be valued beyond the matter. For he that takes a little piece of iron from an iron forge does no great harm; but if he takes it from a lock or a chain, he disorders the whole contexture.

4. When an Ecclesiastical punishment is superadded to a civil law,* 1.42 or a civil punishment to an Ecclesiastical law, it is to be presumed that the law∣giver puts much upon it, and therefore the conscience is obliged to obedi∣ence under a great sin. The reason is plain, because he can by no means better and more earnestly signify his purpose of obliging strongly then by using both the swords: he binds more strongly then all the terror of the civil punishment, who besides that, calls in the aids of Religion; and that Prelate is passionately desirous to secure obedience to his laws, when be∣sides the bands of God, he cals in to his help the cords of a man, and so se∣cures it by all means. And therefore whatsoever is decreed under pain of solemn excommunication is therefore ordinarily presumed to be of great band unto the conscience, not onely by force of the first Rule* 1.43, because it is a great punishment; but also because the civil power does verify that sentence, and inflicts some great temporal evil upon them that abide in contempt or disobedience to the orders and censures of the Church.

5. The preceptive or prohibitive words in humane Laws ordinarily are no sign of a greater obligation of the conscience;* 1.44 that is, when the words of strict command are the usual style of the Court, as it is both in Civil and Ecclesiastick Courts. * 1. But if some laws are published with severe clauses of command, and others on purpose and by design with lesser and the more gentle, then the case is evident that there is a difference to be made also by the conscience. And this is in particular made use of by the Franciscans in the observation of the Rule of their Order. For, in Clemen∣tina, Exivi de paradiso, § Cum autem, De verborum significatione, it is determin'd that that part of the Rule of S. Francis which is established by preceptive or prohibitive words shall oblige the Friers Minors under a great sin, the rest not; and this wholly upon the account of the different clauses of sanction and establishment. * 2. Another exception there is to this Rule, for when the preceptive or prohibitive clauses are reduplicated di∣rectly or by some solemn appendage, it is presumed that the conscience is highly bound. Such as are [We strictly charge and command, we command in the vertue of obedience, upon your duty and allegeance, upon my blessing, as you will answer it at the dreadful day of Judgement, upon your oath, and such like] And here the reason is plain, because the Superiour calls in to his aid the interest of some other vertue besides the obedience; as justice or vera∣city, hope or fear, the helps of God immediately, or a proper appeal to some other great tie of conscience.

6. However the laws were established,* 1.45 yet according as they goe off, or goe less, or fall into desuetude or disobligation, so the band of conscience grows less, till it be quite eas'd by abrogation; for the law binding by its establishment, and the conscience being bound by the life of the law, as the law dies the conscience is at ease: and by this Rule S. Paul largely proves the Christian Churches not to be obliged in conscience to observe the law of Moses, in the seventh Chapter to the Romanes.

7. The contempt of any law,* 1.46 be the matter never so trifling, be the Law-giver never so unconcerned, be the publick interest never so little, yet if it be law, and still in force, is a great sin, and lays a great load upon the conscience.* 1.47 Contemptus in omni specie mandatorum pari pondere gravis, & communiter damnabilis, saith S. Bernard, All contempt of laws, be the matter

little or great, is highly damnable;* 1.48 and the reason he subjoyns a while after, Convertit in crimen gravis rebellionis culpam levis transgressionis, Contempt makes the smallest transgression become a great rebellion. Because here it is not the violation of the law, but of the authority; not the decree, but the power is undervalued, and ever accuses the Law-giver of want of wisdome, or supposes him to have no power. This is that which in Leviticus is ex∣press'd by [Si spreveritis mandata mea,* 1.49 & anima vestra fastidierit judicia mea] a contemning the commandement, and that your soul hate and loath the judgements. Such a thing as this, is a deletery to the whole Law, and tears the knot that ties the mantle upon the Princes shoulders: and this is acknowledged even by them who believe that humane Laws doe not ob∣lige the conscience; for they confess that the conscience is at least bound so farre that the law be not despis'd. Now then besides that this Rule is established not onely by its own reason but by concession, there is this ad∣vantage to be made of it; That if the conscience be bound so farre that the law be not despis'd, then the conscience is bound so farre that the law be obeyed if it can; that is, that it be always obeyed, unless there be a competent and sufficient or probable reason to the contrary. And there∣fore it is remarkable that God calls the not obeying of his laws, a despising and loathing them in their hearts:* 1.50 Si judicia mea exhorruerit anima ve∣stra, ita ut non faciatis, If your soul so hate my judgements that ye doe them not; that is properly to despise them: and so it is in humane Laws; he that breaks them without cause despises them, for nothing else does make him not to obey.* 1.51 For this is a certain rule, Causlesly and contemptuously are all one. If therefore the adversaries in this Rule doe affirm that the con∣science is bound to obey, unless there be reason to the contrary, then we agree together, and both with truth; and if there be any difference after∣wards, it is onely in assigning what reasons and what causes are sufficient. But if they mean that the conscience is onely bound not to despise the law, but may break the law when there is no reason for it, and if she does, com∣mits no sin against God; then by despising the law they must mean some∣thing that no Grammar and no Lexicon ever understood, and that none despises the law but he that rails upon it, and reviles it, or reproaches the authority directly; for indirectly he reproaches the authority that despises the law, and he directly despises, that for no reason disobeys it: for if for no reason, then it is contempt, for else there can be no account given of the omission; and nothing is a greater contempt then to esteem the law so inconsiderable as to be less then nothing. He that thinks it unlawful hath a reason, real or imaginary: but he that thinks it lawful, and yet will not obey, and hath no reason why he will not, does despise it infinitely. Some suppose that to break a law frequently or customarily is contempt: But to this I assent not, because there may be a lasting reason why the law is by custome broken: indeed, if there be no reason, then the greater the custome is, the greater is the contempt; but if there be a reason, neither one omission nor twenty can be criminal. But in this particular I like well what is said by the Lawyers, Ex consuetudine indici prasumptionem contem∣ptus, licet ipsa contemptus non sit. It is a very great presumption that who∣ever frequently breaks the law does despise it: and upon him that does so, the burden of proving that he does not, by proving his reason, is incumbent.

These are the measures by which we shall account concerning the de∣grees of obligation of conscience to obey humane Laws.* 1.52 The use of them

is this, That besides they are helps to alleviate the scruples or the doubts of conscience concerning the greatness of a sin in this instance, and in pro∣portioning our repentance and amends; they are also of great use both in the judging concerning the reasons of disobeying, that is, whether the reason be weighty enough to outweigh the impress and intention of the law, and also of judging what inconvenience is to be suffer'd to preserve our obedience respectively to any law.

It now remains that for the confirmation of the truth and explication of the sense of this rule,* 1.53 the objections made be considered.

To the first I answer,* 1.54 That to suppose humane lawes to bind the Con∣science is so far from devesting God of his royalty, that it does very much establish it; for it is a part of his Royalty to bind the Conscience, and there∣fore he that saies, that God does bind the Conscience to obey humane laws, makes no intrenchment upon that. For although humane laws doe bind the Conscience, yet it is not by vertue or formal energy of the civil power, but by the authority and power of God; the King and the Bishop are but Christs deputies, and his power they exercise, by his power they rule, and to his Kingdome they minister. And therefore the civil power does not take cognizance of the Conscience, nor pretend a compulsory over it; but God does, and does exercise it when he punishes the Soul eternally for contempt and rebellion against the Princes of the people.

To the second,* 1.55 We are to consider, that when it is said that Humane lawes bind the Conscience, the meaning is, it ties us to duty, and we are guilty before God if we doe not obey man: and Conscience is not here taken in the physical or natural sense, for a practical understanding alone, but for the whole mind of man informed and commanded by God; in which mind one of the Principles or laws of God written there is, that we should obey them that have the Rule over us: but besides this, this whole argument is a plain paralogisme; for it supposes that because Humane laws are tied upon the Conscience, that they are tied by man, not by God; which is against the true state of the Question: therefore if Conscience were wholly a habit or an act, or the faculty of understanding, and consequently in this last case sub∣ject to God alone who is truth, yet the truth remains unharm'd, for it is not man that rules in the Conscience, but God who commands it to obey man, for fear of Gods displeasure. Humane laws are but the material part in this obligation; the authoritity and command of God give it life & force upon the Conscience: it is like the body prepar'd by the Father of the Country, into which God inspires a living and an operative principle.

To the third the answer is easy and short:* 1.56 for granting all that is said, it not being material to the present inquiry whether it be true or no; it is a part of Christian liberty that the Conscience be servant to none but Christ, and whatever be the matter of humane laws, if it be not also the matter of a Divine law, the Conscience is free from that matter of it self, because God being onely the Lord of Conscience, and he not having by his law established that matter, the Conscience is free as to that matter. But then when a just authority supervening hath made a law in that matter, though the Conscience was free from that matter, yet it is not free from that authority: not that the Conscience is a subject of that authority im∣mediately

and ultimately, but because God hath subjected it, and com∣manded it to obey.

Of Christian Liberty.

But for the fuller satisfaction of Conscience in this great article,* 1.57 it will not be amiss to give a full, but short account of the nature and preten∣ces of Christian liberty. In order to which S. Peter explicates this article most excellently, saying, Be subject to every ordinance of man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for the Lord, that is, for his Commandement, and for the interest of his Kingdome, * and his power and his glory:* 1.58 for it is a portion of his king∣dome,* 1.59 it is the deputation of his power;* 1.60 and he is glorified by our obe∣dience, when the princes of the world by seeing our ready subjection have no cause to speak evil of us; which was the very argument which the * 1.61 Apostle uses in this question. And therefore S. Peter; who in this inquiry takes notice of our liberty, gives express caution, that though we be free from many fetters and hard services, yet we should not pretend Christian liberty as a cover for sedition and rebellion and disobedience, which he signally calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, we render it maliciousness: and if it be us'd to express the effects and evil consequents, it is very well; but it relating here to the principle of the mischief, it is better rendred,* 1.62 Craftiness, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not making this Christian liberty a pretence and cover for your Craftiness: for they well knew the artifices of the Devil, and that he would endeavour to aliene the hearts of subjects from their Princes upon pretence of Christian liberty, and of heathen Princes from Christianity upon supposition it was no friend to government; and so it fel out in the Gnosticks and Valentinians: but against these evils the Apostles by the Spirit of God and the doctrine of the Gospel made ex∣cellent provisions. For as S. Peter so also S. Paul us'd the same caution in this article: for having press'd upon the Galatians to insist upon their Chri∣stian liberty, and not to be brought under the yoak of Moses, lest they should stumble at the name of liberty, he charges them not to abuse it, not to ex∣tend it beyond its proper limit, not to use it as an occasion to the flesh; and that it may be manifest where it was he intended to fix his rule, he instances in the matter of government, adding by way of explication, By love serve one another:* 1.63 that is, though you Christians be all free, yet there is a bond of charity, by which you are tied to the rules of government and service and subordination; in these things if you pretend your liberty, it will be but an occasion to the flesh, and a dishonour to the Spirit. For our liberty is not a Carnal liberty,* 1.64 but it is a spiritual. If a slave be called to Christianity, he is the Lords freed-man, but not Mans, he is still a ser∣vant and commanded to abide in it, if in that state he be called. And it is an excellent Rule which is given by Calvin in this particular,* 1.65 We ought to account that by Christian liberty there is nothing gotten to us before men, but onely before God. And it is a horrible folly which abuses some men, they think that they loose their liberty unless they get possession of it by doing against that part which is forbidden: not considering that if the matter be indifferent, then they may as well doe that which is by man commanded, as doe the contrary, they are as free to one as to the other; and there∣fore for civility, and for government, and for order, and for humanity sake, since they must use their liberty one way, let them doe it that way which

will at least please God as well, and Man better. And for their Christian liberty, that is in the Spirit, and they need no other testimony but the Con∣science it self: for the Conscience in this also is a thousand witnesses. And therefore truly and plainly the liberty that the Apostles speak of is but a freedome from the dominion of sin, and a freedome from the terrors and obligation of the Law: the first is a freedome of duty, the second a free∣dome of priviledge; the first is a Commandement, the second a state of advantage; that is but a working, this is completed; that is design'd by Christ, this already wrought, and is the effect of Christs death, while the other is the product of his Spirit, and the business of the Kingdome of Grace. But let us see what is the proper and explicite effect of all this.

1. It is true that we are freed from sin, that is, we are asserted into the liberty of grace and pardon; the band of sin is broken, and we may be rescued from the power and from the punishment of it: and what then? S. James answers this inquiry,* 1.66 Whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, must be a doer of the work, that is, of the righteousness evangelical; and this man shall be blessed in his deed. For it is Christ who hath set us free; but yet be servants of Christ: his Spirit hath made us free, and asserted us into the glorious liberty of the Sons of God;* 1.67 therefore we are deb∣ters, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh, but we must live a spiritual life, for to doe so is to persist in our liberty; it is entring upon that possession which God hath given us: but this is like the gift given to the sons of Israel; all the land of Canaan was their portion, but they were to fight for it, and win it by degrees; but it was long before they were in quiet possession, and so shall we when we are in the land of promise.

2. It is also true that we are freed from the curse of the law and the Spirit of bondage or servile fear, which was produc'd by the curses threat∣ned to every transgressor without the abatements of infirmity & the allow∣ances of repentance; and we are adopted into a liberty of the sons of God, we can cry Abba Father, and God will use us not with the severe rights of a Lord, but with the sweetest measures of a Fathers government. And what then? what is the effect of this liberty? By the Spirit of God we cry Abba Father, by him we have this liberty, therefore we must live in the Spirit: for though we be not under fear, yet we are under love; we are not under the curse of the Law, yet we are under the duty; not under the coercive power of the first covenant, yet under the directive power of the Eternal Commandement. For the Spirit of God makes us sons, yet none are sons but such as are led by the Spirit; and we are freed from the curse and condemnation of the law,* 1.68 but not unless we walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit.

3. It is also true that we are freed from the ceremonial law, the law of circumcision,* 1.69 of meats and drinks and carnal ordinances. And what then? use it charitably, and take heed lest this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak. Some there are that extend this to a liberty from all things that are indifferent, as meats and garments, and daies, and ceremonies and the like. Now if they mean that we are not bound to these things by any law of God under the Gospel, it is very true; that is, Christ gave us no Commandement concerning them. But if it be meant that these things are left so free that there can be no accidental and temporary obligation, rule or limit made concerning them, this is that I am now dis∣puting against. But that this is no part of Christian liberty purchas'd by the blood of Christ, is evident, because things in their nature indifferent, that

is, concerning which there was no Commandement given, were alwaies free, and to say otherwise were a contradiction in the terms; and no drop of Christs blood could so vainly fall as to purchase for us what was done already by the nature of the thing. He onely rescinded the Laws of Moses concerning the instances commanded there; that is, those which were not indifferent, as being positively commanded, he return'd to their own na∣ture, to be us'd in another dispensation, to be dispos'd of in another go∣vernment, in a distinct manner, to other purposes, or (as occasion should serve) to be wholly let alone. But although Christ broke the yoke of Moses, and so left the instances and matters there us'd to their own indif∣ference; yet he left it as indifferent to the Law-givers to make laws con∣cerning them; for he gave no commandement that they should always be left indifferent as to external usages. Under Moses they were tied upon the conscience by God himself, and therefore unchangeably during that whole period; but now they are left to a temporary transient use and ministery, to doe good, or to promote order, or to combine government: and if Go∣vernors had not a freedome to use them in government, as well as private persons to use them if they would in their own persons, Christian liberty had been made for Subjects, and denied to Christian Princes and Christian Priests.

4. There is yet another liberty called the liberty of glory,* 1.70 or the glorious liberty of the children of God; that is, the Redemption of our bodies from disease and pain, from death and corruption: but for this we must stay till the last adoption: For what Christ is by generation and proper inheri∣tance, that we shall be by adoption if we belong to him. Now of Christ in his Resurrection it was said,* 1.71 Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. That was the last generation or right of Sonship, to which when we are adopted we shall be partakers of the glory; but that was at Christs Re∣surrection, and this shall be in ours.

5. Now here being in the days of the Apostles so much talk of liberty, and that in so many instances, and (without question) made the subject of many Sermons, and much Table-talk, and many disputes, and us'd as an argument to perswade strangers, and to comfort the faithful, and the De∣vil being so ready to make use of any prepared lust, or mistake, or igno∣rance, or fancy; it could not be but many weak and many false persons did instantly dream of a temporal liberty, that Sons were free from the laws of Parents, Wives of Husbands, Servants of Masters, Subjects of Princes: the Apostles knowing how great a confusion this would be to all relations and states of men, and what an infinite reproach it would be to the Reli∣gion, stopt this avenue of mischief, and not onely dogmatically describ'd the duties of all inferiours, but took care also to doe it in those places where they had occasion to speak of Christian liberty, that there might be no pretence to doe evil. For Christianity neither could nor ought to have been received, if the Preachers of it had destroyed Governments. The effect of this discourse is plainly this, That Christian liberty does not warrant disobedience to humane Laws,* 1.72 or liberty from their obligation. Whereas therefore the Apostle says, Ye are bought with a price, be not ye the servants of men; it is not to be understood of the conscience or mind of men, as the objection affirms, but onely is an advice of prudence, to the purpose of the preceding words in the 21. verse, If thou mayest be made free, use it rather: that is, since it is more convenient for the advantages of Religion, and the service of Christ, by the price of whose blood you are

redeemed that ye may serve him all your days, therefore you who are free, be not easy to give or part with your liberty, but use your state of liberty for the advantage of the service of Christ; for that nothing else is meant, appears in the words he immediately subjoyns, Brethren, let every man wherein he is called,* 1.73 therein abide with God: that is, your being the ser∣vants of men is not inconsistent with your service of God, nor that servi∣tude incompossible with Christian liberty. But yet suppose that the in∣terpretation us'd in the objection be right, and that, Be not ye the servants of men, is to be understood of the conscience or mind of man; yet, save onely that it was not so intended by the Apostle, it can doe no harm to this Question: for the understanding and the mind may be free, when the hands are tied, and a man may have the liberty of opining and judging, when he may not have the liberty of acting, which is all is pretended to by the Empire of humane Laws. For as Origen excellently, This is no∣thing but an intellectual liberty, concerning which let a man contend in an intellectual and Evangelical manner, that is, by good arguments and the spirit of meekness, and there is no harm done. This is the whole summe of the doctrine of Christian liberty.* 1.74 Concerning which if any man desire to reade more words, and longer discourses, and some in∣trigues, he may please to see them in Driedo, who hath written three Books, and Belliolanus, who hath written twenty Books of Christian liberty.

To the fourth I have already answered both in the beginning and end of the answer to the former,* 1.75 and it proves nothing but what is granted. For to use the same instance; You may fast when you are commanded by your Superiour,* 1.76 but you must not think that fasting is a part of the Divine Service. It is true, it is no part of Divine Service, the fa∣sting of it self is not, but the fasting in obedi∣ence is. For though man commands fasting now, or so, and God does not, yet God com∣mands that we should obey those commands of men;* 1.77 and then the conscience is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the conscience of God, or toward God, it is his subject and servant, and his liegeman: and yet at the same time the law of man pretends not to rule the conscience immedi∣ately, and therefore the conscience is free, and may judge the thing of it self to be no Divine Commandement; but the will is not free, and the duty is bound upon that,* 1.78 when the understanding is at liberty. Errat enim si quis putat servitutem in totum hominem descendere; pars enim melior exce∣pta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt, & adscripta Dominis, mens sui juris est, said Seneca, and from him Aquinas. The whole man is not in subjection; the body indeed is under Lords and Laws, but the mind is free as aire.

To the fifth I answer,* 1.79 by denying the consequence of the argument. For though humane Laws doe bind the conscience, yet it follows not that it is put into the power of man to save or damne his brother; because hu∣mane Laws bind the conscience, but not by force of humane authority pre∣cisely, or in it self, but by virtue of the Divine Commandement: and therefore a Prince cannot make a law and threaten damnation to the brea∣kers of it, because he cannot inflict it; but he may say, that he that breaks it will sin against God, and God will inflict damnation upon the rebellious and disobedient. But then whereas it is objected that this makes the broad

way to hell broader, it is a meer scar-crow; for God onely can inlarge or streighten this way efficiently and formally; but objectivè & occasionaliter, by way of instance and occasion, by giving new laws to endear obedience in new instances when it is for the publick good, hath in it no inconvenience: every Minister of the Word and Sacraments▪ by every invitation of his people to a more strict Religion, does make the damnation of the disobedi∣ent greater, and by every check of conscience, and by every opinion of our own we become a law unto our selves, and make the way of our conversa∣tion narrower; and every offer of grace, and every call of the Spirit does adde moments to the eternal misery of them that doe resist; and yet it were not well to be without them, for fear of that accidental evil. For it is to be considered that these aids, and all good Laws are intended for good to us, and will bring good to us if we obey; but the very reward it self being offered, makes also our punishment just and reasonable if we refuse. Ex te tua perditio. The Law is not in fault, but the rebellious man ruines himself, who by occasion of the Law might have receiv'd an increase of glo∣ry if he had pleas'd.

To the sixth the answer is given in the premisses:* 1.80 Humane authority does not make the action of disobedience to be a sin. It makes that the not compliance of the Subject is disobedience; but it is the authority of God who makes disobedience to be a sin: and though no humane power can give or take grace away; yet we may remember that we our selves throw away Gods grace, or abuse it, or neglect it, when we will not make use of it to the purposes of humility, charity and obedience, all which are concerned in our subordination to the Laws.

The seventh objection hath two parts;* 1.81 the one concerns the civil power, the other the power Ecclesiastical. Concerning the civil, it is af∣firm'd to be unreasonable that the power which cannot remit sins should bind to sin; & therefore the civil power cannot bind the conscience, because it cannot remit the sin to which it binds. In which argument there are four terms, and therefore it is a perfect fallacy. For it is true that it is reason∣able that the power which binds should als•• loose: but that the civil power cannot loose in the same sense in which it can bind is false; for the civil power can untie that which it hath tied, unless by tying be meant ty∣ing to one thing, and loosing be meant of another. The civil power binds to obey; the same power can untie this band, by dispensing with the person or abrogating the Law. But when it is said, the civil power cannot remit the sin, therefore not bind to sin, it is a Sophism, because binding and loo∣sing doe not signify in the same manner. For it does but accidentally bind to sin, and in the same manner it does also ease the conscience: it makes the Law to which God binds the conscience; it takes off the Law, and from the conscience God takes off the obligation. But because it does not by it self bind the conscience, but occasions the conscience to be bound by God, therefore it hath nothing to doe to remit the sin, for that must be the act of God; but the Law can loose what it bound, and where it bound, and as it bound, that is, not the sin, but the subject matter, the instance and the occasion. *** But now concerning the Ecclesiastical power, the objection says that it hath no power to make Laws, but such as are in the matter already decreed by God; and therefore it does not bind but what God hath bound already; and consequently hath of it self no power to bind

the conscience. To this I answer, 1. that it is true, neither the Eccle∣siastical nor the Civil power does by its innate authority oblige the con∣science; but both powers can make Laws, to the observation of which God doth oblige conscience. 2. It is an error to say that the Ecclesiastick power cannot make laws in things not decreed by God. For the supreme Civil power is also Ecclesiastical if it be Christian, and hath a power in the external regiment of the Church; and therefore to make Laws in such parts and accidents of Government in which God hath left no special direction: and for the proper power of the Ecclesiasticks, that also extends beyond the giving commandements in matters of express duty commanded by God; as I shall make appear in its own place. 3. If it were granted that the Church could not make Laws in things not decreed by God, yet when God hath decreed the thing, the Church can make Laws concerning the order of the things, the measure and the manner, the number and the weight, the adjuncts and the circumstances; and that's a field large enough for her to make Laws to oblige the conscience. And therefore although it were ridiculous and contemptible, injurious and uncharitable for the Church to pass her greatest censures upon persons that transgress bono ani∣mo, or through unavoidable infirmity, in small inconsiderable instances, circumstances and unconcerning forms of law and unconsider'd ceremonies; yet the smallest thing may be plac'd so as to be of great concernment; and when these things accidentally become great, the censures of the Church may be prudently and charitably inflicted. But what power the Church hath in making Laws will afterwards be considered in its place; thus much was of present necessity for the answer of the objection.

To the last there might be many answers given.* 1.82 It may suffice that the argument is expresly false; for supposing that humane Laws doe di∣rectly bind the conscience, it does not follow that it is as great a sin to break the Laws of Man, as to violate the Laws of God: that it is a sin it does follow, but not that it is so great. For the law of God against idle words does oblige the conscience, but it does not therefore follow that it is as great a sin to talk idly as to kill a man. But this Sophism relies upon this false supposition, Th•••• all things that bind the conscience doe bind in the same degree, to the same measures of iniquity. For if they doe not, then humane Lawes may bind the conscience, and yet they may be broken at an easier rate then the Commandements of God. 2. But then I adde, that this is according to the subject matter, and the evil consequent of the action. For suppose a Prince oppressed by a Rebel party, as Pompey was by Caesar; Photinus that told the King of Egypt where he lay hid did a greater fault then if he had rail'd upon Pompey, expresly against the Commande∣ment, thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of the people. To open the secrets of a King may be a greater sin, and doe more mischief, and proceed from greater malice then to call my brother Fool. For a Souldier to desert his station may be a greater crime then to steal a shilling. 3. And yet it can∣not be denied, but that there is great difference between the Laws of God and the Laws of Man in their obligation. Concerning which, in order to many cases of conscience, it is fit that I give account.

The difference of Divine and Humane laws in their obligation.

1. The law of God binds the Conscience immediately,* 1.83 and by the right of God; the law of man binds the Conscience mediately, and by the interposition of the Divine authority: so that we must obey Man for Gods sake, and God for his own.

2. The laws of God bind the will and the understanding;* 1.84 that is, we are bound to obey, and bound to think them good. But humane laws meddle not with the understanding; for that's a Prince, and can be go∣verned as he can be perswaded, but subject to the empire of none but God: but the will is the subject of humane laws; not onely that the will be bound to command the inferior faculties and members to obey and doe the work of the law, but of it self precisely it is bound: for it is not enough that we doe the outward works, but the will must be of it self obedient. Whatsoever ye doe,* 1.85 doe it heartily, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, doe it from your very Soul; that is, cheerfully, willingly, without murmuring: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for ye doe it not to men, but to the Lord.

3. The Divine laws are lasting and perpetual;* 1.86 but humane laws cease to bind the conscience, by desuetude, by contraition, by contrary reason, by intolerable inconvenience, by dispensation, and lastly by abrogation.

4. Divine laws oblige the Conscience not only to an active obedience,* 1.87 but to activity and earnestness to doe them, to seek opportunities, to omit none to doe them presently. Humane laws oblige to an active obedience, but not to a spontaneous offer, and ultroneous seeking of opportunities. It may be a sin, it is alwaies an infirmity, to seek for excuses and dispensati∣ons in Divine laws; but it is lawful by all fair means to seek to be freed from the band of any humane law that is not of publick concernment, and is of private incommodity. A man may decline a burden of the law, or seek a priviledge and exemption. The Citizens of Rome were tied to keep guards in course, and doe other duties; but he that had three children, had a right of exemption; and he that hath none may lawfully desire and peti∣tion for the priviledge. The burden of a humane law may be thrust upon another, if it be done by just and charitable means; but in the laws of God every man must bear his own burden chusingly and delightfully.

5. Humane laws onely consider the outward action,* 1.88 not the secret opinion; you must obey Man, when at the same time without sin you may believe the law to be imprudent, or imperfect, or fit to be annull'd. But in the laws of God we must submit our most secret thoughts, and we must be sure so to obey humane laws, as we keep for God the prerogative of his: but though to God we must give account of our thoughts, yet humane laws meddle not with them at all. Cogitationis poenam nemo meretur, saith the law, ff. de poenis.

6. Humane laws oblige onely that they be not despis'd,* 1.89 that is, that they be not transgressed without a reasonable cause: but the laws of God must be obeyed in all cases; and there is no cause to break them, and there can be no necessity upon us to commit a sin. In the obedience to

humane laws we may suppose there was a weakness in the Sanction, they could not foresee the evil that was future, the inconveniences upon some men, the impossibilities of many, the intolerable burden upon others: and therefore although a reason is alwaies to be had when we doe not obey, and that a good one; yet the reason and the goodness of it is not to be the greatest and the best, or to be exacted according to the strictest mea∣sures of necessity alone. For though the laws of God bind to obedience without dispute, without diminution, without excuse, and in all necessities and accidents that can supervene; yet beyond that which is good, that which is equal and probable and profitable, humane laws doe not bind: but of this in the sequel.

7. He that despises the law of God,* 1.90 dies for it; and he that neglects it is accounted to despise it: the not doing it is by interpretation a con∣tempt of Gods law. He that despises humane laws, is also guilty before God: but he onely is accounted to despise it, that voluntarily and without reason disobeys. But he that out of the multitude of other affairs, or an incuriousness of Spirit, unknowingly or ignorantly neglects it by not thinking of it, is in most cases innocent before God; but is tied to submit to the punishment if he be requir'd and deprehended. This onely is to be added, that a geat and a dissolute negligence even in humane laws is so far from excusing the breach of the law, that it doubles the guilt: Dissoluta negligentia prope dolum est, saith the law, ff. mandati, l. fidejussor, & ff. de action. & obligat. l. 1. §. Is quoque. A great negligence is accounted malice.

8. Ignorance of the laws of God excuses no man,* 1.91 because it is suffici∣ently revealed to every man; and he is not onely bound to inquire much if there should be need, but there is also so clear a communication of them, that a little inquiry will serve the turn, and therefore no man is here ex∣cus'd by ignorance. But in the laws of man ignorance is easier pleaded, and does more excuse, and does unavoidably happen to many men in very many cases; and they are less bound to inquire, and a less matter makes the ignorance probable and quit from malice: of all which a prudent and a good man is to be the Judge.

9. When Divine and humane laws are oppos'd,* 1.92 these must alwaies yield to those; and without dispute God is to be obeyed rather then Man; and although we must obey Man for God, we must never obey Man against God: and therefore it was excellently counsell'd by Ben-Sirach, Let not the reverence of any man cause thee to sin.

10. As a consequent to the former,* 1.93 all the Ministers of Justice are bound to be more severe in exacting obedience to Gods laws then to their own in an equal or like matter; they must be easy in the matter of their own laws, and zealous for God: and this also does prove that where the effect, and the appendages and circumstances doe not alter it, it is in the whole a less sin to break a humane law then to break a Divine; that is, although both are sins, yet in the nature of the action it is of a less degree of crime to break the law of our superior then of our supreme, of Man then of God.

11. Divine laws are impos'd upon the people;* 1.94 but humane laws are impos'd indeed, but commonly by their consent, explicite or implicite, formal or interpretative, and without acceptation in a sweet regiment may indeed,* 1.95 but are not usually pass'd into the sanction and sacredness of laws. For the civil government is not absolute, and meer and supreme; but in some sense, and to some purposes, and in some degrees, limited, condi∣tional, precarious and mixt, full of need, and supported by them who are to be rul'd, who therefore are to be regarded.

12. Some adde this; the Divine laws bind both in publick and in pri∣vate, the humane in publick onely: that is, because humane laws take no cognisance of what is secret, therefore neither doe they of themselves bind in secret. But this although in speculation it hath some truth, yet when it is re∣duc'd to practice, the consideration is different. For though Mans laws know not what is in secret, & therefore cannot judge; yet God, that binds humane laws upon our consciences, knows the most secret breach of laws, and he jud∣ges and discerns. But this hath some difficulties in it, and many very material considerations,* 1.96 & therefore is to be distinctly handled in some of the follow∣ing pages. This onely for the present. When in private we can be excus'd or innocent before God; in that private, & in those circumstances humane laws oblige not. But Gods laws equally oblige both in publick and private, re∣spectively to the subject matter. Of themselves humane laws have nothing to doe with private actions; that is, neither with the obligation, nor the notice.

There are many other material differences between the laws of God and man,* 1.97 as to their obligation upon Conscience; which I shall afterwards explicate upon the occasion of particular rules. The great summe of all is this, so far as relates to Conscience; the law of God binds stronger, and in more cases then humane laws. A breach of a humane law is not so great a sin, nor is it so often a sin, as a breach of the Divine; the advantage ••oth in the extension and the intension being (as there is all reason it should) on the part of God; that God who is in all, may be above all.

Thus they differ,* 1.98 but in order to the verification of the Rule, it is to be remembred that in the main obligation of Conscience they doe agree. The Divine law places things in the order of vertue and vice; and the Sacraments are therefore good because they are appointed by Christ, our great Law-giver, and in the old law the eating of swines flesh was therefore evil because it was forbidden by the law of God. For all the goodness of Mans will consists in a conformity to the will of God, which is the great rule and measure of humane actions. And just so it is in humane laws according to their proportion and degree: when the law of the Church commands fasting, to doe so then is an act of temperance as well as o•• obe∣dience, and to disobey is gluttony; and to wear cloth of gold is luxury when the law commands us to wear plain broad cloth. To give great gifts at marriages and feasts may be magnificence; but if the law limits to a certain summe, to goe beyond is pride and prodigality. This is the work of God, though by the hands of Moses & Aaron: for it matters not by what means he effects his own purposes; by himself, or by his power admini∣stred by second causes.* 1.99 The summe is this, which I represent in the words of S. Gregory Nazianzen, Submittamus nos tum Deo, tum aliis, tum iis qui Imperium in terra gerunt: Deo quidem omnibus de causis; alii autem aliis propter charitatis foedus, principibus denique propter ordinem; publicaeque di∣sciplinae rationem. Let us submit our selves to God, to one another, and to

Princes: to God for all the reason in the world; to one another for charity's sake; to Princes for order's sake, and the account of publick Government. But if we refuse to obey Man, God will punish us; and if we refuse to obey God, even the Prince ought to punish us; and both promote the inte∣rests of the same Kingdome. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Justin Martyr,* 1.100 We pray you, O Kings and Princes, to punish them who are Christians onely in name, and doe not live according to the decrees of our Great Master: and then for their own interest this is his account, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 We worship God alone, but in other things we gladly serve and obey you,* 1.101 confessing you to be the Kings and Princes of the people. I con∣clude this in the words of S. Bernard, Sive Deus, sive homo mandatum quodcunque tradiderit, pari profecto obsequendum est cura, pari reverentia de∣ferendum, A law, whether given by God or by man, is to be observ'd by a like care and a like reverence; alike in the kind, but not in the degree.* 1.102

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  2.
• * 1.3

  3.
• * 1.4

  4.
• * 1.5

  Lib. 1. Rule. 1.
• * 1.6

  5.
• * 1.7

  1 Cor. 7. 23.
• * 1.8

  6.
• * 1.9

  7.
• * 1.10

  8.
• * 1.11

  9.
• * 1.12

  10.
• * 1.13

  11.
• * 1.14

  Prov. 8. 15.
• * 1.15

  Wisdom 6. 3, 4.
• * 1.16

  Rom. 13. 1, 2.
• * 1.17

  John 19. 11.
• a 1.18

  L. 2. retract. c. 9. & ep. 105. ad Sixtum.
• b 1.19

  Cap. 20. lib. contr. collato∣rem.
• * 1.20

  12.
• * 1.21

  1 Pet. 2. 13.
• * 1.22

  Rom. 13. 5.
• c 1.23

  In Rom. 13.
• c 1.24

  In Rom. 13.
• c 1.25

  In Rom. 13.
• d 1.26

  Ep. 54. ad Ma∣ced. Vide etiam S. Hieron. in c. 3. ad Titum.
• e 1.27

  Cap. placuit 16. q. 6. & in l. extat. ff. quod metus causa.
• f 1.28

  Gl. in cap. Jus gentium dist. 2. verbo Sedium. Capp. 1, 2, 23. q. 2. l. ait prae∣tor. §. si debi∣torem. ff. de his quae in fraud, Creditorum.
• * 1.29

  13.
• * 1.30

  1 Cor. 7. 12.
• * 1.31

  Lib. 5. Ethic. cap. 7.
• * 1.32

  14.
• * 1.33

  15.
• * 1.34

  Unum necessa∣rium Chap. 3. p. 101.
• * 1.35

  16.
• * 1.36

  Lib. 2. de Bap∣tis. c. 6.
• * 1.37

  John 20.
• * 1.38

  17.
• * 1.39

  18.
• * 1.40

  De Sepultur. cap. corripian∣tur. c. 25. q. 3. gl. ad verbum [Major.]
• * 1.41

  Lib. 10. ep. 83.
• * 1.42

  19.
• * 1.43

  Numb. 16.
• * 1.44

  20.
• * 1.45

  21.
• * 1.46

  22.
• * 1.47

  Lib. 1. de prae∣cept. & dispens. c. 11.
• * 1.48

  Cap. 12.
• * 1.49

  Lev. 26. 15.
• * 1.50

  Lev. 26. 15.
• * 1.51

  Gloss. in cap. Metropolita∣num 2. quaest. 7.
• * 1.52

  23.
• * 1.53

  24.
• * 1.54

  25.
• * 1.55

  26.
• * 1.56

  27.
• * 1.57

  28.
• * 1.58

  Isai. 33.
• * 1.59

  Luc. 1.
• * 1.60

  Apoc. 1. & cap. 19.
• * 1.61

  1 Pet. 2. 15.
• * 1.62

  See the Doct. and Pract. of Repent. chap. 4 p. 173.
• * 1.63

  Galat. 5. 13.
• * 1.64

  1 Cor. 7. 20. 21, 24.
• * 1.65

  Lib. 3. instir. cap. 19. § 10.
• * 1.66

  James 1. 25.
• * 1.67

  Rom. 8. 12.
• * 1.68

  Rom. 8. 1, & 14.
• * 1.69

  1 Cor. 8. 9.
• * 1.70

  Rom. 8. 22.
• * 1.71

  Acts 13. 33.
• * 1.72

  1 Cor. 7. 23.
• * 1.73

  Verse 24.
• * 1.74

  Vide etiam Francisci de Silvestris opus∣culum de E∣vangelica liber∣tate.
• * 1.75

  29.
• * 1.76

  If a man have but a right understanding that it is all one before God to eat flesh o•• egges, milk or fish; that to him it matters not whether you wear a red or a white garment in your times of solemn prayer; this is enough, says Calvin [lib. 3. cap. 19. §. 10. instit.] he need not tie himself to either, but if he does, his conscience is still free, though his action or choice be determined. And so it is though the law of his Superiour determines him.
• * 1.77

  1 Pet. 2. 19.
• * 1.78

  De benefic. 3. 2. 2 ae q. 104. art. 5.
• * 1.79

  30.
• * 1.80

  31.
• * 1.81

  32.
• * 1.82

  33.
• * 1.83

  34.
• * 1.84

  35.
• * 1.85

  Col. 3. 23.
• * 1.86

  36.
• * 1.87

  37.
• * 1.88

  38.
• * 1.89

  39.
• * 1.90

  40.
• * 1.91

  41.
• * 1.92

  42.
• * 1.93

  43.
• * 1.94

  44.
• * 1.95

  Vide Rule 6. of this chapter.
• * 1.96

  Rule 4. of this chapter.
• * 1.97

  45.
• * 1.98

  46.
• * 1.99

  Orat. 17.
• * 1.100

  Apolog. 2. pro Christ.
• * 1.101

  Lib. 1. de prae∣cept. & dispens. c. 11, 12.
• * 1.102

  Videat lector Latomi librum [de Ecclesia & legis humanae obligatione] & Claudium Carninum [de vi & potestate legum humanarum] Cajetanum verb▪ praeceptum, Navarrum, Card. Toletum de hac materia in libello de 7. peccatis mortal.