Ductor dubitantium, or, The rule of conscience in all her generall measures serving as a great instrument for the determination of cases of conscience : in four books / by Jeremy Taylor ...

DVCTOR DVBITANTIVM, OR The Rule of Conscience In all her generall measures; Serving as a great Instrument for the determination of CASES of CONSCIENCE.

The Second Volume, By JEREMY TAYLOR, D. D.

Romans 13. 5.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

Ecce agnus Dei gui tollit peccata Mundi

LONDON, printed for R Roiston at Y^e Angell in Iuy Iane. 1660.

OF HUMANE LAWS, THEIR OBLIGATION, AND RELAXATION: AND OF The collateral, indirect, and accidental Bands of CONSCIENCE.

The Third BOOK.

LONDON; Printed by J. Flesher for R. Royston. 1660.

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

CHAP. I. Of Humane Laws in general; and what Obligation they pass upon the Conscience.

RULE I. The Conscience is properly and directly, actively and passively, under pains of sin and punishment, obliged to obey the Laws of men.

THAT the Laws of God and Man are the great mea∣sures of right & wrong,* 1.1 of good and evil, of that which is to be followed and what is to be avoided in man∣ners of men, and the entercourses of societies, is infi∣nitely certain and universally confess'd. Since there∣fore Humane Laws are one moiety of the Rule and measure of Conscience, and that we are bound to obey our lawful Superiours in what they command, it is naturally consequent to this, that we acknowledge the conscience boun••, and that in Humane Laws as well as in Divine, though according to their several proportions, the conscience ought to be instructed. And indeed there is more need of Preachers in the matter of Divine Laws, and more need of wise and prudent Guides in the matter of Humane Laws. For the Laws of God are wiser and plainer, few and lasting, general and natural, per∣ceiv'd by necessity, and understood by the easiest notices of things; and therefore men have more need to be call'd upon to obey, then taught how; and therefore here the Preachers office is most necessary and most requir'd. But Humane Laws are sometime intricate by weakness, sometimes by de∣sign, sometimes by an unavoidable necessity; they are contingent, and remov'd farre from the experiences of most men; they are many and par∣ticular, difficult and transient, various in their provisions, and alterable by many parts and many ways: and yet because the conscience is all the way oblig'd, she hath greater need of being conducted then in the other, where every wise man can better be a guide in the little intrigues, and every child can walk in the plain way.

But our first inquiry is,* 1.2 Whether the conscience be oblig'd or no. For if Conscience be not, then nothing is concerned but Prudence, and care that a man be safe from the rods and axes: but then the world would quickly find that fear would be but a weak defence to her Laws; which force, or wit, or custome, or riches would so much enervate, or so often evacuate. And therefore the greatest Case of Conscience in this whole matter is, Whether it be a matter of Conscience as well as of Prudence and security to obey the Laws of Man. And this question is so dubious and unresolv'd, that Cajetan and Henricus de Gandavs did suppose it fit to be determin'd

by the Pope in Cathedra, as thinking it otherwise to be indeterminable. The reasons of doubting are these;

1. Because God onely is Lord of Consciences,* 1.3 he onely can discern the secret that is there, and he onely can punish there; and therefore to suppose any band upon conscience from Humane Laws, would be to devest God of his royalty: none but he who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the searcher of the heart and mind of man can give laws to it; for none else can take cogni∣sance, or give a compulsory.

2. The Conscience is seated in the understanding (as I have already* 1.4 prov'd,)* 1.5 but that is an imperious faculty that acknowledges no superiour but God; because he onely being infallible, he onely can instruct and in∣form it rightly, none else can have power over it. For the understanding hath a proper way of being rul'd. The will is rul'd by Empire, but the un∣derstanding by doctrine; that is govern'd by command, this by argument; the will by power, the understanding by truth: now because God onely is truth, and every man a liar, God onely can rule the understanding, which is the Court of Conscience.

3. To submit the conscience to any law or power of man,* 1.6 is to betray our Christian liberty: For Christ having set us free from all the bondage even of that Law which God himself made and gave to Moses, he having alleviated the burden of rites and ceremonies, and left the Jews at liberty to be governed as they pleas'd themselves, would not take off the laws of God to impose upon us the laws of Men; and there is no such thing as Christian liberty but a freedome from the law of Moses, and the law of carnal ordinances, and the laws of men; for that which the Preachers speak of, a liberty from sin, and from hell, and the grave, 1. This is ra∣ther a deliverance then a liberty, a rescue from an evil of another nature, not a state of freedome and ease. 2. As many men have order'd their Theology, we are so farre from having a liberty from sin, that they have left us nothing else but a liberty to sin: and indeed we have no liberty or freedome from sin as long as we are alive, but we are always in warre and contention, which is worse then death; and so many men are always captive under sin, and all men doe so often obey it, (and his servants we are to whom we doe obey) that we have little reason to boast of Christian liberty in that sense. 3. S. Paul using the word liberty, and speaking of the advantages of Christians in this, instances it onely in being freed from those ordinances of Moses, and the impositions which some Philosophers or some sects of men would bring upon the conscience. 4. Liberty from sin, or Christian liberty in this sense is nothing but a tropical expression, a me∣taphor and similitude, and therefore is not that real priviledge by which we were materially advantag'd upon the publication of the Gospel of Christ. The result of which considerations is, That all Christians are free men, servants of Christ, and of none else, it being an express Comman∣dement, and that strengthned with a reason,* 1.7 Ye are bought with a price, be ye not the servants of men; which at least must be understood of Consci∣ence, and the mind of men.

4. For granting it to be lawful for men to make Laws,* 1.8 yet that these Laws cannot bind the conscience it appears plainly in this; that whatever

Laws of the Church are made concerning any rite or ceremony, let it be never so necessary or fitting that they be obeyed, yet the things doe not become intrinsecally necessary, and therefore are not to be thought so, lest, expresly against the Commandement of our Blessed Saviour, we teach for doctrines the commandements of men. To keep Holidays may be very good, so that we observe them to the Lord; but he that thinks it neces∣sary and a direct duty, wrongs his own conscience: which demonstrates that Conscience is free when every thing else is bound. You may fast when you are commanded by your Superiour, but you must not think that fast∣ing is a part of the Divine Service; that is, though man commands fast∣ing, yet God does not: and then if man of himself does binde the consci∣ence, he hath a power equal to God, and can make Divine Commande∣ments: but if man cannot doe so, then the conscience is free, and not tied by humane Laws.

5. If humane Laws doe binde the conscience,* 1.9 then it is put into the power of man to save or damne his brother; not directly, but upon the consequence of his obedience or disobedience, which is all that is done by the Laws of God; and men shall have power to make more ways to the Devil, to make the strait way to heaven yet straiter, and the way to hell, which is already broad enough, yet wider and more receptive of miserable and perishing souls.

6. Christ is the Author and finisher of our faith,* 1.10 and so of every grace: that is, he onely can give it, and he onely can take it away. Since therefore that which makes a sin, destroys the grace, no humane authority can make an action to be a sin; because no humane power can dispose of grace or take it away.

7. In the instance of civil power and civil Laws the case is more cer∣tain,* 1.11 for this reason; because the civil power cannot remit sins, therefore neither can they bind to sin: and from hence it will follow, that supposing Ecclesiastical Laws doe bind the conscience, yet the civil cannot. But then as for the Ecclesiastical power and Laws, they also are as invalid upon another account, because the Church having no external compulsory, can onely bind in those things where God hath already bound; and therefore can make no Laws of her own, but what are already made by a higher power, and consequently cannot bind to sin, but there where the conscience is already bound by God. And if the Church should inflict her censures for any thing that were not of it self a sin against God, as for not paying the fees of the Spiritual Court, for a poor mans working for his living upon a Holiday, the world would cry out of her; which shews, that where God hath not bound the conscience, neither the Ecclesiastical nor the civil power can.

8. If humane Laws doe directly bind the conscience, then it is as great a sin to transgress a law of man, as to break a law of God; with our bare foot to touch the ground within the Octaves of Easter, as to call our brother fool; to eat flesh on Friday as great as to commit fornication: which con∣sequent because it is intolerable, so also is the opinion that inferres it. The conclusion is, In Christ Jesus there is neither high nor low; that is, Chri∣stian Religion hath no hand in this Heraldry of Secundum, sub, & supra; but whatsoever difference of person, of order, and of Government is

amongst us, is by agreement: it is, as S. Peter calls it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the ordinance of man; and for mans sake it is to be obeyed: but the consci∣ence is still at liberty where onely the commandement of man does inter∣vene.

This opinion is taught by Fernandus Vasquius a Spaniard,* 1.12 and he affirms that all the Gentlemen and common people of Spain (the Scholars onely excepted) are of this opinion: it was also taught by some of the Scholars of Calvin, and some Lutherans, by all the Anabaptists of Germany of late; and that upon the strength of the first, the third and fourth argu∣ment; and formerly by Jacobus Almain, and John Gerson, by Felinus, Cajetan, and Navarre, but they mean onely the civil Laws of Princes, upon the confidence of the sixth and something of the seventh argument; all which I have thrust forward as farre as the nature of the question would bear, and added some more: which I have done, not that these arguments ought to prevail, but that by the examination of them this great question may have right done it, by being rightly stated, and fully cleared.

First therefore to the main inquiry;* 1.13 it is certain as an article of faith, as necessary as any other rule of manners, that every Subject is bound to obey the just Laws of his lawful Superiour, not onely under fear of punish∣ment from man, but under pain of the Divine displeasure. 1. Because the power by which men make Laws is the power of God:* 1.14 By me Kings reign, and the Law-givers decree justice, says the Wisdome of God; that is, the Son of God, the Wisdome of the Father, to whom he hath given all power in heaven and earth, he it is by whom, that is, by whose power and wis∣dome, Kings reign. For this is the wisdome, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which God possessed from the beginning. The Lxx reads it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, creavit, which God created from the beginning; and this word the Arrians make use of to their evil purposes, but very weakly and against the faith of the original, where it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Kanan possedit. This eternal Son of God, and the Wis∣dome of the Father, the King of Kings and the Lord of lords, is the ori∣ginal of all humane power, and this is nothing but a derivative from him. For power is given you of the Lord,* 1.15 and Soveraignty from the Highest; and ye are ministers of his Kingdome.* 1.16 And S. Paul expresly and dogmatically affirms, There is no power but from God: the powers that be, are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. So that the Legislative or supreme power is not the servant of the people, but the Minister, the Trustee and Representative of God. 2. The power of the Sword is onely from God; for since no man is Lord of his own life, no man hath power to kill himself, neither hath he power to warrant any man else to doe it; for what he may not doe himself, he cannot commis∣sion and impower any one else to doe. Vindicta mea, saith God, Vengeance is mine, I will repay: and it is Gods sword with which the Magistrate strikes; and therefore Kings and Potentates are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gods deputies and ministring officials, in his name to be the avengers of his wrath:* 1.17 and as Christ said to Pilate, Thou couldest have no power unless it were given thee from above, may be said to all just humanes Powers, It is given them from above, not from beneath, from God, not from the people. The consequent of which is this, If it be God that strikes and pays vengeance by the hand of the Magistrate, then it is God who is offended when the law of the Magistrate is violated; for who∣ever strikes is the party injured; and the Magistrate being Gods Mini∣ster,

as he is the less principal in the justice done, so also in the injustice suffered. Dixit Deus quia Dii estis, It is God who hath said to the Magi∣strates that they are Gods; that is, in the place of God: by his authority they strike, and he is the injured person: and therefore he who is so smit∣ten by the sword of God, is a sinner against God, for he punishes none else. Patet culpa, ubi non latet poena. If God punishes, it is certain man hath sinn'd, said S.a 1.18 Austin, and S.b 1.19 Prosper. The one is the indication of the other.

But the thing is expresly affirmed by the Scripture;* 1.20 for having dog∣matically and fully signified that all humane just power is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they being the several expres∣sions of Solomon according to the Lxx, and of S. Paul in his own words, it is not content to leave us to find out the consequence of these, but lite∣rally affirms the main articles.* 1.21 So S. Peter, Be ye subject to every ordinance of man,* 1.22 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for the Lords sake; which S. Paul speaks yet more explicitely, Wherefore it is necessary that ye be subject, not onely for wrath, but also for conscience sake. Sicut Christo, as to Christ, so be obedient to your Ma∣sters, or temporal Lords; so the same Apostle: that is, by the same neces∣sity, for the same reason, to avoid the same punishment, to have the same reward, and by the force of the same Religion, and that you may not pre∣varicate the laws of God, or doe violence to your conscience. Nothing can adde light to these so clear words, they are bright as the Sun, certain as an article of faith, clear, easy and intelligible, according to the nature of universal Divine Commandements. S.c 1.23 Chrysostom and c 1.24Theodoret urging these precepts, say, that we are not to obey out of courtesie, but of duty; not out of liberality, but necessity; that is, according to S.c 1.25 Ambrose and S. Austin, the fearful pains of hell and eternal damnation attend them that disobey.d 1.26

And this whole matter is infinitely demonstrated in this one considera∣tion: The Laws of man doe so certainly bind the conscience, that they have a power of limiting and declaring, and making the particulars to be∣come the Laws of God. For though the Divine Law forbids murder, yet the Law of man declares concerning the particular, that it is, or it is not murder, and by such declaration, by such leave or prohibition respectively makes it so. In Spain if a wronged husband or father kill the deprehen∣ded adulteress, it is no murder; in England it is. For in Spain the husband or father is permitted to be Executioner, where notoreity is declared to be sufficient conviction: here they are not trusted with it; and the Judge and the Executioner are persons vastly remov'd. If a Lawe 1.27 forbids me to take my own goods from a Thief, it is theft to doe it, but it is no theft if the Law permitsf 1.28. It is incest for the Uncle to marry with his Niece: it is so where the Laws have made it so, but it is not so of it self, for it was not so always. Since therefore humane Laws can constitute an action in the habitude of a Divine Law, it is beyond all question, it does oblige the conscience.

2. This obligation is pass'd upon the conscience,* 1.29 and there is this ne∣cessity of obeying: not onely in case humane Laws be first given by God in thesi, or in hypothesi, that is, in words or in sense, in direct affirmation or just consequence, in substance or in analogy; but though the matter of the Law be in its own nature wholly indifferent before the sanction and con∣stitution.

The first conclusion I intended against the Anabaptist, and this second against Gerson, Almain, and the dissenting Sectaries: and of the truth of it we have an instance in the person of S. Paul, who by his Apo∣stolical authority gave an injunction which hath ever since been an Eccle∣siastical Canon; and yet he alone and not the Lord gave the word, That a believing wife or husband should not depart from their unbelieving correla∣tive,* 1.30 if he or she respectively desir'd to stay. It was a matter in which Christ had not at all interpos'd, but S. Paul made it a law to the Christian Churches; and whoever shall prevaricate it shall bear his burden. And indeed it were a vain thing to suppose that all humane Laws were derived from the law of Nature, or the Divine positive; or that those which were not so derived could not be good and reasonable, and that the authority binding them were incompetent. For whatsoever is derived from the law of God cannot by men admit variety, nor suffer diminution, or goe into desuetude, or be extinguish'd by abrogation: and then it would follow that no King could command any thing but what was necessary before he commanded it; and nothing could be a law to the Persians, but what also did oblige the Greeks; and nothing could bind in the 125 Olympiad, but what was decreed before the days of Semiramis; and there were no law but those of the Medes and Persians; and there could be no provisions made for new necessities, and the Government of Commonwealths could never be improved by experience, and all Law-givers were as wise at first as ever they could be. All which are such foolish consequences, that it must be granted, that whatever humane Power can justly ordain, or prudently, or necessarily, or probably, all that is bound upon the conscience of the Subject certainly and to all events as the Laws of God himself. And therefore Plato said well, That before the Law is made, men may judge of it, but after the sanction, not at all: that is, it is so indifferent in its nature, that it is fit to be considered and disputed; but when it is made a Law, there remains nothing but a necessary obedience. And to the same pur∣pose Aristotle largely discourses;* 1.31 for when he had divided the civil Law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the natural and the constituted, he says, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Law that is not natural, but decreed by man, in the beginning it matters not whether it be made or no; but after it is made, it is a great matter whether it be kept or no. But this whole affair is put beyond all scruple by the words of the Apostle, Obey your Masters, not onely the good and gentle, but the morose and harsh; that is, not onely if what he com∣mands be in it self good and fitting, but if it be troublesome, and uneasy, and unnecessary; any thing, so it be not unlawful: for every thing that God hath not forbidden, can be bound upon conscience by a lawful Supe∣riour. Either therefore all humane Laws are nothing else but commenta∣ries on Scripture or the natural Law, or else are wholly unnecessary, as being nothing but repetitions of the Divine laws: and there can be no new law made; or if there can, it must bind the conscience: for all other things bind the conscience by themselves, and without humane constitu∣tion. If therefore any humane constitution, as such, can bind the consci∣ence, it must be of such instances which either are derivatives from the law of Nature, or of things which before the law did not bind at all, that is, of things which in their own nature are indifferent.

3.* 1.32 That humane Laws bind the conscience does not depend upon

the intention of the law-giver; for when the arrow is shot out of the bow, it will hit or miss by its own force and order, not by the intention of the Archer: and no law-giver can make a law with a purpose not to oblige the conscience. In the reign of Queen Elizabeth this question was much talk'd of, and little understood; and some discontented Recusants under the Go∣vernment of the Church of England had so talk'd the lawes themselves out of countenance, that the legislative power durst scarce own the proper obligation of an Ecclesiastical, or of a law relating to any thing of religion; insomuch that when the wisdome of the state thought fit to confirm the ancient lawes of Ecclesiastical fasts, they superadded this proviso, That if any one should affirm that these lawes were intended to bind the Consci∣ence, he should be punish'd like the spreaders of false newes: and the jeju∣nium Cecilianum, the Wednesday fast, was made without such obligation. Now this is plainly to them that understand it, a direct artifice to evacuate the whole law: for a law that is made without intention to bind the con∣science is no law at all; for besides that it is a plain giving leave to any man to break it that can doe it without observation, or can bribe the offi∣cers, or is bigger then the informers, or not easy to be punish'd, or that dwels alone, or that is himself a Minister of the law, besides this, I say, it is directly no law at all. For all humane power being deriv'd from God, and bound upon our consciences by his power, not by man, he that saies it shall not bind the Conscience, saies it shall be no law, it shall have no authority from God; and then it hath none at all: and if it be not tied upon the Conscience, then to break it is no sin, and then to keep it is no duty: so that a law without such an intention is a contradiction; it is a law which binds onely if we please, and we may obey when we have a mind to it; and to so much we were tied before the constitution. ** But then if by such a declaration it was meant that to keep such fasting-daies was no part of a direct Commandement of God, that is, God had not requir'd them by himself immediately, and so it was (abstracting from that law) no duty Evangelical, it had been below the wisdome of the contrivers of it; for no man pretends it, no man saies it, no man thinks it: and they might as well have declar'd that that law was none of the ten Commandements.

4. Though Humane lawes doe not bind the Conscience by the inten∣tion of the law-giver,* 1.33 but by the command of God, yet God does bind the law upon the Conscience according to the intention of the power that decrees it. For though a Father cannot command his Son to doe a lawful and fitting service, and by his intention make that the disobedient Son shall not sin against God, because he cannot make disobedience to be no sin▪ yet by intending less obligation in the law, he makes the crime imputable in a less degree; that is, the authority is the less despis'd, there is less evil consequent, the mischief is small, the inconvenience little. * And there∣fore the Doctors of the Canon law doe to very little purpose trouble this question with inquiries after signs, when the intention of the Law-giver is to bind to Mortal, when to Venial sins. For besides that the distinction it self is trifling according to their understanding of it (of which I have given a large account in a Discourse on purpose) and besides that the commands of Heathen Parents,* 1.34 and Masters, and Princes who knew nothing of that distinction (if it had been right) did nevertheless bind their Subjects to obe∣dience under pain of sin; besides these, I say, the law-giver does not at all make it a sin, or no sin: he onely intends it should be kept, and to that pur∣pose

binds it with penalties, and consequently and indirectly binds the Conscience: but God binds the Conscience properly and directly; for the law is Divine in respect of the power and authority, but Humane in respect of the matter and the instance: and that is the meaning of these words put into the Rule. The conscience of man is by Gods law properly and directly bound to obey the lawes of Men; not indirectly and by the consequence of some other duty, but by a Commandement and the pur∣posed solemn declaration of his will in this affair. But this I shall more fully explicate in my answer to the opposite arguments. Now because al∣though the law-givers intention does not directly make the disobedience to be sin or no sin, yet because indirectly it hath influence upon the action and the conscience of the subject, it is useful that I set down the Rules and Measures of the difference; and how we may guess (for it can be no more) at the distinct obligations which from the diversities of humane lawes are passed upon the Conscience.

Rules of distinction, or the measures by which we shall prudently conjecture at the gravity or lessening of the sin of disobedience to Humane Lawes.

1. He that breaks a law which is established upon great penalties,* 1.35 commits a great sin. Because it is regularly to be presumed that the su∣preme power puts much upon it, when he is so earnest for its observation. Rem quae culpâ caret, in damnum vocari non convenit, saith the Law, Cap. 2. de constit. If there be no fault there ought to be no punishment; they are rela∣tives, and correspond also in their very degree.* 1.36 Quis dubitaverit hoc esse sceleratius commissum quod est gravius vindicatum? saith S. Austin, If the punishment was more grievous, the wickedness also was the more intole∣rable: ut juxta mensuram delicti sit & plagarum modus: that's the measure of punitive justice, that the number of the stripes be according to the mea∣sure of the iniquity. And concerning those things where there is any doubt, the Subject is not to judge whether the law be very necessary or no; but to judge concerning the intention and mind of the Superior, and whether he thinks it very necessary: For he knowes best, and by his know∣ledg and his authority is the most competent Judge. This Rule hath no exception, unless it be evident that the punishment is impos'd for terror, and to affright men from doing that for which it is not very fit they should be severely punish'd: as if a Prince should under pain of death forbid the hunting of a hare; the greatness of the punishment neither makes nor de∣clares the fact more criminal then it is in its own nature under a law that forbids it under a smaller punishment. But if the case be doubtful, whether the law be of great purposes and design, the greatness of the punishment in a prudent and temperate government is the best exterior indication. But if the punishment be light & trifling, the offence is so too; for the legislative power can put no more weight upon it then it declares by punishment, but so much it does: and the Rule of Alfonsus à Castro is very useful here and in some other articles, Humana lex non magis gravat conscientias quam corpora. For Gods Law adding energy and Sanction to the constitutions of man, binds so far as the Prince or as the Prelate binds: and this is fully signified in the words and commission of Christ to his Church, Whatsoever ye shall bind on Earth,* 1.37 shall be bound in Heaven; for there our Blessed Lord constituting a Government in his Church, as already there was in the world,

though of another nature, and by compulsories external, and a proper juris∣diction (from which the Spiritual differs, as I shall explicate in the fourth chapter of this book) did promise to doe to them as to the Princes of the World; that is, verify their ministery of Lawes and Judgments. He in∣deed appointed other manners of coercion, and a distinct administration; but the power of giving lawes and judgments he gave then; and he gave it as firmly as to the greatest Kings: that is, as he commands Subjects to obey their Princes, so also to obey their Spiritual Superiors; as he will punish the rebellious and disobedient to Kings, so the disobedient to Bi∣shops, and to Apostolical Prelates; that is, according as every Superior can and intends to bind by his temporal or spiritual penalty, God will verify it and condemn the same person with an eternal. Since therefore Gods verification of humane lawes and judgments is after the Sanction and for it wholly, it must also be according to it. He that binds what man binds, binds so much and no more; as therefore man intends the obligation, so God obliges the Conscience.

2. If the matter of humane lawes be great in it self,* 1.38 to prevaricate those lawes gives a proportion of greatness to the crime. 1. But this sel∣dome happens but when a Divine law is complicated with the Civil; such as the prohibition of publick stewes, the lawes for keeping daies of religion, the Lords day, Christmas, Ascension, and the Incarnation, the preserving the persons of them who minister to Religion sacred, the immunity and intemeration of Holy things as well as holy persons, the matters of Sacri∣lege, Simony, keeping of vowes, together with all specifications and hu∣mane instances of Divine Commandements, as that Children should not marry without their Parents consent, that marriages should not be co••∣summate before they be published. 2. To these also are to be added such lawes which in their own nature contribute much to the publick security or advantage: as that men should not in a City fire their own houses, nor cut the damme of the Sea upon their own ground, that they should not in times of peace fire a Beacon, nor tell false and disheartning news to an army ready to joyn battel, nor make false Musters when the Enemy is near.

3. Though the matter of the lawes be in it self light and trifling,* 1.39 yet if by reason of some present appendages, and visible or probable conse∣quences it be great, the conscience is tied to obedience under a great crime. For a single souldier to fly from a battel is of it self no great matter, were it not for the evil example; but because it may affright the next man and that may scare the rank, and the rank may disorder the company, and so proceed to an intolerable mischief, therefore the sin is great by the pro∣portion to the evil it is likely and apt to produce. To carry corn abroad is no great matter of it self; but when the price is great and the plenty is little, the mischief it does by accident is the measure of the sin.

2. * Of the same consideration it is, when an action of it self light and impertinent is made the matter of a great scandal. To kneel or to stand at the Holy Communion hath been severally used in divers Churches Anci∣ent and Modern; but when a law is made that we shall kneel, and if I doe not kneel he that observes will think I doe no reverence to Christs body and blood, and by my example will learn to despise it, the Conscience is burden'd with the sin of irreverence something, but very greatly with the sin of scandal.

3. When the thing of it self is indifferent, and yet the Custome of it is pass'd into superstition, or causes horror, or some notorious evil effect, the lawes that prohibit any such thing doe bind the conscience to obey under the pain of being guilty of the great evil that is introduc'd by it. To light up candles by dead bodies is as harmless as any thing; but if it be prohibited for the avoiding of superstition to which it ministers in some weak persons, the disobedience hath its value not according to the action, but the evil intention to which it is suppos'd to contribute. Thus we find a title in the Canon law, de cadaveribus non exenterandis & in frusta concidendis ut ad alia loca transferantur:* 1.40 and it is forbidden under the pain of the greater excommunication, that bodies should be imbalmed, that is, unbowell'd and cut in pieces to be carried to other places of Sepulture remote from where they died. The thing in it self was innocent and warranted by the practice of whole nations, and had countenance from the examples of Jacob and Joseph; but it did light into the observation of people that thought it cruel, unnatural and inhumane, and there that opinion, not the nature of the action, gave the weight and value to the disobedience.

4. When an action in it self indifferent is by the law expounded to signify a sin, though in it self it doe not, nor in the heart of him that does it, the disobedience to that law is an act of that sin, or at least of a scandal relative to it. Thus if a civil law, were made to forbid women to goe in mens cloths, as presuming them that did so were incontinent and wanton, she that disobeyed that law was really to be judged wanton, because she would doe that which the law so expounded; and her crime was great, not according to the thing it self, but to the sense of the law; she despises her own reputation, does that thing which the law, by which the best judgments are made, judges to be incontinence, and therefore she is justly to be con∣demned as an incontinent: and upon this account there was a law made; and it is recited cap. si qua mulier, dist. 30. where women under pain of anathema are forbidden to appear in a mans habit; where the gloss addes, scil. ob malum finem, if it be for an evil end, it is a sin proportionate to that evil end: and therefore when the law declares beforehand, that it shall be judged to be a Ministery to that evil end, the action is that sin which is so adjudged, & the conscience bound accordingly. But this caution hath one limitation, viz. though the law expounds such an action to be incontinence, and therefore ordinarily it is to be judged; yet if it really be not so, but be done upon some great necessity or for some very good end, though till the publication & approbation of the cause, it be externally and legally dishonest, yet the con∣science is clear: because in an action that is indifferent, and condemn'd onely for a presumptive end, when that presumption fails in the particular, and the indifferent action serves really to a pious, a charitable, or a necessary end, the action is made good, and therefore the Conscience is disoblig'd. For that which is really so, prevails over that which is but presumed so. Thus we find that S. Euphrosyna liv'd long in a Monastery of men; and the Church which took cognisance of it, did, upon evidence of her piety and purity, after death declare her a Saint: and that S. Eugenia went in a mans habit [to avoid the persecutors of Christianity for a while] is told in the Menologion of the Greeks; and her memory as of a Virgin and Martyr is celebrated in the Greek Church upon Christmas eve. And when Nonnus the Bishop of Edessa had converted S. Pelagia, who from a common curtezan became a glorious Saint, after the suffering of most severe penances in the mount Olivet, she estrang'd her self from all probabilities of temptation from vain

men by living in a mans habit conceal'd all her life-time; and the Church keeps her memorial in honour upon the 8^th of October.

5. If the matter of humane Laws be in it self trifling and inconside∣rable, yet if it meets with a people where it is esteem'd a crime, and the laws forbid it upon that account of a publick dis-estimation, it is to be pre∣sumed that the laws doe condemn it equally to the publick fame; and therefore that the conscience is bound accordingly. Thus in the days of Clemens Alexandrinus the Christians thought it a very horrid thing to wear false hair; and

Calvo turpius est nihil comato,* 1.41

said Martial to Marinus, nothing is more deformed, nothing more unhand∣some. Now though it be not so in it self, yet when the hearts of men are generally against it, as it was then (though it be not so now) if any law had prohibited the wearing of Perrukes, the conscience had been greatly obliged, for the law did lay much upon it, even as much as all the evil of the publick infamy did amount to. Thus to break a fasting-day which by custome hath been observed in a Church, is a matter of small account; but if a law have forbidden it, and forbids it there where it is commonly ac∣counted a very high impiety, though of it self it be not so, yet under such a law in such circumstances it becomes so, and is to be valued accordingly. And upon this account are those words of S. Chrysostome to be understood, Adveniente tempore jejunii, etiamsi quis millies urgeat, & infinita cruciet; & cogat vinum delibare, aut aliquid aliud quod jejunii lege non est licitum gustare, patiendum potius esse, quam prohibitum tangere nutrimentum. It was accounted a great matter then to break an Ecclesiastical fast: and therefore when a law is supported by such an estimate, that law binds hea∣vily; and it will be a great sin to break it, unless there be a great cause to legitimate or excuse it. In such cases we must endure a great inconveni∣ence rather then disobey.

6. Though the matter be little, yet if the Legislative power hath a particular eye and value upon it, however it be expressed, if such a value be known or observed, the smalness of the matter is no argument of the smalness of the sin. Thus also in the foregoing instance of Ecclesiastical Fasts are those words of S. Basil to be understood, saying, Non minus crimen esse violare jejunium Ecclesiasticum, quam militi abjicere scutum in bello, aut stationem deserere. Ecclesiasticall Fasts in his time were the cogni∣sance of a Christian, his defence and guard; and therefore not to keep them was as if a Souldier did throw away his shield in a day of battel, or desert his station. So the Prelates of the Church did then understand it, so they intended it. When a trifle is made a mark of union, as to wear a branch in warre, when the Superiour sets his heart upon it; in this case the mind of the supreme becomes a law to his Subjects, in the former they become a law unto themselves. Sometimes a smal instance is made the trial of obedience; and the Superiour hath a great authority, but a little diocese, or a few Subjects, or small occasions to rule in; in these and the like cases, the smalness of the matter is not onely to be considered, but the interpretation and effort which the Superiour puts upon it. If he calls every such disobedience a contempt of his authority, and accounts it a dis∣solution of that community where he governs, or a great violence of or∣der; it is so in conscience, that is, to be valued beyond the matter. For he that takes a little piece of iron from an iron forge does no great harm; but if he takes it from a lock or a chain, he disorders the whole contexture.

4. When an Ecclesiastical punishment is superadded to a civil law,* 1.42 or a civil punishment to an Ecclesiastical law, it is to be presumed that the law∣giver puts much upon it, and therefore the conscience is obliged to obedi∣ence under a great sin. The reason is plain, because he can by no means better and more earnestly signify his purpose of obliging strongly then by using both the swords: he binds more strongly then all the terror of the civil punishment, who besides that, calls in the aids of Religion; and that Prelate is passionately desirous to secure obedience to his laws, when be∣sides the bands of God, he cals in to his help the cords of a man, and so se∣cures it by all means. And therefore whatsoever is decreed under pain of solemn excommunication is therefore ordinarily presumed to be of great band unto the conscience, not onely by force of the first Rule* 1.43, because it is a great punishment; but also because the civil power does verify that sentence, and inflicts some great temporal evil upon them that abide in contempt or disobedience to the orders and censures of the Church.

5. The preceptive or prohibitive words in humane Laws ordinarily are no sign of a greater obligation of the conscience;* 1.44 that is, when the words of strict command are the usual style of the Court, as it is both in Civil and Ecclesiastick Courts. * 1. But if some laws are published with severe clauses of command, and others on purpose and by design with lesser and the more gentle, then the case is evident that there is a difference to be made also by the conscience. And this is in particular made use of by the Franciscans in the observation of the Rule of their Order. For, in Clemen∣tina, Exivi de paradiso, § Cum autem, De verborum significatione, it is determin'd that that part of the Rule of S. Francis which is established by preceptive or prohibitive words shall oblige the Friers Minors under a great sin, the rest not; and this wholly upon the account of the different clauses of sanction and establishment. * 2. Another exception there is to this Rule, for when the preceptive or prohibitive clauses are reduplicated di∣rectly or by some solemn appendage, it is presumed that the conscience is highly bound. Such as are [We strictly charge and command, we command in the vertue of obedience, upon your duty and allegeance, upon my blessing, as you will answer it at the dreadful day of Judgement, upon your oath, and such like] And here the reason is plain, because the Superiour calls in to his aid the interest of some other vertue besides the obedience; as justice or vera∣city, hope or fear, the helps of God immediately, or a proper appeal to some other great tie of conscience.

6. However the laws were established,* 1.45 yet according as they goe off, or goe less, or fall into desuetude or disobligation, so the band of conscience grows less, till it be quite eas'd by abrogation; for the law binding by its establishment, and the conscience being bound by the life of the law, as the law dies the conscience is at ease: and by this Rule S. Paul largely proves the Christian Churches not to be obliged in conscience to observe the law of Moses, in the seventh Chapter to the Romanes.

7. The contempt of any law,* 1.46 be the matter never so trifling, be the Law-giver never so unconcerned, be the publick interest never so little, yet if it be law, and still in force, is a great sin, and lays a great load upon the conscience.* 1.47 Contemptus in omni specie mandatorum pari pondere gravis, & communiter damnabilis, saith S. Bernard, All contempt of laws, be the matter

little or great, is highly damnable;* 1.48 and the reason he subjoyns a while after, Convertit in crimen gravis rebellionis culpam levis transgressionis, Contempt makes the smallest transgression become a great rebellion. Because here it is not the violation of the law, but of the authority; not the decree, but the power is undervalued, and ever accuses the Law-giver of want of wisdome, or supposes him to have no power. This is that which in Leviticus is ex∣press'd by [Si spreveritis mandata mea,* 1.49 & anima vestra fastidierit judicia mea] a contemning the commandement, and that your soul hate and loath the judgements. Such a thing as this, is a deletery to the whole Law, and tears the knot that ties the mantle upon the Princes shoulders: and this is acknowledged even by them who believe that humane Laws doe not ob∣lige the conscience; for they confess that the conscience is at least bound so farre that the law be not despis'd. Now then besides that this Rule is established not onely by its own reason but by concession, there is this ad∣vantage to be made of it; That if the conscience be bound so farre that the law be not despis'd, then the conscience is bound so farre that the law be obeyed if it can; that is, that it be always obeyed, unless there be a competent and sufficient or probable reason to the contrary. And there∣fore it is remarkable that God calls the not obeying of his laws, a despising and loathing them in their hearts:* 1.50 Si judicia mea exhorruerit anima ve∣stra, ita ut non faciatis, If your soul so hate my judgements that ye doe them not; that is properly to despise them: and so it is in humane Laws; he that breaks them without cause despises them, for nothing else does make him not to obey.* 1.51 For this is a certain rule, Causlesly and contemptuously are all one. If therefore the adversaries in this Rule doe affirm that the con∣science is bound to obey, unless there be reason to the contrary, then we agree together, and both with truth; and if there be any difference after∣wards, it is onely in assigning what reasons and what causes are sufficient. But if they mean that the conscience is onely bound not to despise the law, but may break the law when there is no reason for it, and if she does, com∣mits no sin against God; then by despising the law they must mean some∣thing that no Grammar and no Lexicon ever understood, and that none despises the law but he that rails upon it, and reviles it, or reproaches the authority directly; for indirectly he reproaches the authority that despises the law, and he directly despises, that for no reason disobeys it: for if for no reason, then it is contempt, for else there can be no account given of the omission; and nothing is a greater contempt then to esteem the law so inconsiderable as to be less then nothing. He that thinks it unlawful hath a reason, real or imaginary: but he that thinks it lawful, and yet will not obey, and hath no reason why he will not, does despise it infinitely. Some suppose that to break a law frequently or customarily is contempt: But to this I assent not, because there may be a lasting reason why the law is by custome broken: indeed, if there be no reason, then the greater the custome is, the greater is the contempt; but if there be a reason, neither one omission nor twenty can be criminal. But in this particular I like well what is said by the Lawyers, Ex consuetudine indici prasumptionem contem∣ptus, licet ipsa contemptus non sit. It is a very great presumption that who∣ever frequently breaks the law does despise it: and upon him that does so, the burden of proving that he does not, by proving his reason, is incumbent.

These are the measures by which we shall account concerning the de∣grees of obligation of conscience to obey humane Laws.* 1.52 The use of them

is this, That besides they are helps to alleviate the scruples or the doubts of conscience concerning the greatness of a sin in this instance, and in pro∣portioning our repentance and amends; they are also of great use both in the judging concerning the reasons of disobeying, that is, whether the reason be weighty enough to outweigh the impress and intention of the law, and also of judging what inconvenience is to be suffer'd to preserve our obedience respectively to any law.

It now remains that for the confirmation of the truth and explication of the sense of this rule,* 1.53 the objections made be considered.

To the first I answer,* 1.54 That to suppose humane lawes to bind the Con∣science is so far from devesting God of his royalty, that it does very much establish it; for it is a part of his Royalty to bind the Conscience, and there∣fore he that saies, that God does bind the Conscience to obey humane laws, makes no intrenchment upon that. For although humane laws doe bind the Conscience, yet it is not by vertue or formal energy of the civil power, but by the authority and power of God; the King and the Bishop are but Christs deputies, and his power they exercise, by his power they rule, and to his Kingdome they minister. And therefore the civil power does not take cognizance of the Conscience, nor pretend a compulsory over it; but God does, and does exercise it when he punishes the Soul eternally for contempt and rebellion against the Princes of the people.

To the second,* 1.55 We are to consider, that when it is said that Humane lawes bind the Conscience, the meaning is, it ties us to duty, and we are guilty before God if we doe not obey man: and Conscience is not here taken in the physical or natural sense, for a practical understanding alone, but for the whole mind of man informed and commanded by God; in which mind one of the Principles or laws of God written there is, that we should obey them that have the Rule over us: but besides this, this whole argument is a plain paralogisme; for it supposes that because Humane laws are tied upon the Conscience, that they are tied by man, not by God; which is against the true state of the Question: therefore if Conscience were wholly a habit or an act, or the faculty of understanding, and consequently in this last case sub∣ject to God alone who is truth, yet the truth remains unharm'd, for it is not man that rules in the Conscience, but God who commands it to obey man, for fear of Gods displeasure. Humane laws are but the material part in this obligation; the authoritity and command of God give it life & force upon the Conscience: it is like the body prepar'd by the Father of the Country, into which God inspires a living and an operative principle.

To the third the answer is easy and short:* 1.56 for granting all that is said, it not being material to the present inquiry whether it be true or no; it is a part of Christian liberty that the Conscience be servant to none but Christ, and whatever be the matter of humane laws, if it be not also the matter of a Divine law, the Conscience is free from that matter of it self, because God being onely the Lord of Conscience, and he not having by his law established that matter, the Conscience is free as to that matter. But then when a just authority supervening hath made a law in that matter, though the Conscience was free from that matter, yet it is not free from that authority: not that the Conscience is a subject of that authority im∣mediately

and ultimately, but because God hath subjected it, and com∣manded it to obey.

Of Christian Liberty.

But for the fuller satisfaction of Conscience in this great article,* 1.57 it will not be amiss to give a full, but short account of the nature and preten∣ces of Christian liberty. In order to which S. Peter explicates this article most excellently, saying, Be subject to every ordinance of man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for the Lord, that is, for his Commandement, and for the interest of his Kingdome, * and his power and his glory:* 1.58 for it is a portion of his king∣dome,* 1.59 it is the deputation of his power;* 1.60 and he is glorified by our obe∣dience, when the princes of the world by seeing our ready subjection have no cause to speak evil of us; which was the very argument which the * 1.61 Apostle uses in this question. And therefore S. Peter; who in this inquiry takes notice of our liberty, gives express caution, that though we be free from many fetters and hard services, yet we should not pretend Christian liberty as a cover for sedition and rebellion and disobedience, which he signally calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, we render it maliciousness: and if it be us'd to express the effects and evil consequents, it is very well; but it relating here to the principle of the mischief, it is better rendred,* 1.62 Craftiness, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not making this Christian liberty a pretence and cover for your Craftiness: for they well knew the artifices of the Devil, and that he would endeavour to aliene the hearts of subjects from their Princes upon pretence of Christian liberty, and of heathen Princes from Christianity upon supposition it was no friend to government; and so it fel out in the Gnosticks and Valentinians: but against these evils the Apostles by the Spirit of God and the doctrine of the Gospel made ex∣cellent provisions. For as S. Peter so also S. Paul us'd the same caution in this article: for having press'd upon the Galatians to insist upon their Chri∣stian liberty, and not to be brought under the yoak of Moses, lest they should stumble at the name of liberty, he charges them not to abuse it, not to ex∣tend it beyond its proper limit, not to use it as an occasion to the flesh; and that it may be manifest where it was he intended to fix his rule, he instances in the matter of government, adding by way of explication, By love serve one another:* 1.63 that is, though you Christians be all free, yet there is a bond of charity, by which you are tied to the rules of government and service and subordination; in these things if you pretend your liberty, it will be but an occasion to the flesh, and a dishonour to the Spirit. For our liberty is not a Carnal liberty,* 1.64 but it is a spiritual. If a slave be called to Christianity, he is the Lords freed-man, but not Mans, he is still a ser∣vant and commanded to abide in it, if in that state he be called. And it is an excellent Rule which is given by Calvin in this particular,* 1.65 We ought to account that by Christian liberty there is nothing gotten to us before men, but onely before God. And it is a horrible folly which abuses some men, they think that they loose their liberty unless they get possession of it by doing against that part which is forbidden: not considering that if the matter be indifferent, then they may as well doe that which is by man commanded, as doe the contrary, they are as free to one as to the other; and there∣fore for civility, and for government, and for order, and for humanity sake, since they must use their liberty one way, let them doe it that way which

will at least please God as well, and Man better. And for their Christian liberty, that is in the Spirit, and they need no other testimony but the Con∣science it self: for the Conscience in this also is a thousand witnesses. And therefore truly and plainly the liberty that the Apostles speak of is but a freedome from the dominion of sin, and a freedome from the terrors and obligation of the Law: the first is a freedome of duty, the second a free∣dome of priviledge; the first is a Commandement, the second a state of advantage; that is but a working, this is completed; that is design'd by Christ, this already wrought, and is the effect of Christs death, while the other is the product of his Spirit, and the business of the Kingdome of Grace. But let us see what is the proper and explicite effect of all this.

1. It is true that we are freed from sin, that is, we are asserted into the liberty of grace and pardon; the band of sin is broken, and we may be rescued from the power and from the punishment of it: and what then? S. James answers this inquiry,* 1.66 Whoso looketh into the perfect law of liberty, must be a doer of the work, that is, of the righteousness evangelical; and this man shall be blessed in his deed. For it is Christ who hath set us free; but yet be servants of Christ: his Spirit hath made us free, and asserted us into the glorious liberty of the Sons of God;* 1.67 therefore we are deb∣ters, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh, but we must live a spiritual life, for to doe so is to persist in our liberty; it is entring upon that possession which God hath given us: but this is like the gift given to the sons of Israel; all the land of Canaan was their portion, but they were to fight for it, and win it by degrees; but it was long before they were in quiet possession, and so shall we when we are in the land of promise.

2. It is also true that we are freed from the curse of the law and the Spirit of bondage or servile fear, which was produc'd by the curses threat∣ned to every transgressor without the abatements of infirmity & the allow∣ances of repentance; and we are adopted into a liberty of the sons of God, we can cry Abba Father, and God will use us not with the severe rights of a Lord, but with the sweetest measures of a Fathers government. And what then? what is the effect of this liberty? By the Spirit of God we cry Abba Father, by him we have this liberty, therefore we must live in the Spirit: for though we be not under fear, yet we are under love; we are not under the curse of the Law, yet we are under the duty; not under the coercive power of the first covenant, yet under the directive power of the Eternal Commandement. For the Spirit of God makes us sons, yet none are sons but such as are led by the Spirit; and we are freed from the curse and condemnation of the law,* 1.68 but not unless we walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit.

3. It is also true that we are freed from the ceremonial law, the law of circumcision,* 1.69 of meats and drinks and carnal ordinances. And what then? use it charitably, and take heed lest this liberty of yours become a stumbling-block to them that are weak. Some there are that extend this to a liberty from all things that are indifferent, as meats and garments, and daies, and ceremonies and the like. Now if they mean that we are not bound to these things by any law of God under the Gospel, it is very true; that is, Christ gave us no Commandement concerning them. But if it be meant that these things are left so free that there can be no accidental and temporary obligation, rule or limit made concerning them, this is that I am now dis∣puting against. But that this is no part of Christian liberty purchas'd by the blood of Christ, is evident, because things in their nature indifferent, that

is, concerning which there was no Commandement given, were alwaies free, and to say otherwise were a contradiction in the terms; and no drop of Christs blood could so vainly fall as to purchase for us what was done already by the nature of the thing. He onely rescinded the Laws of Moses concerning the instances commanded there; that is, those which were not indifferent, as being positively commanded, he return'd to their own na∣ture, to be us'd in another dispensation, to be dispos'd of in another go∣vernment, in a distinct manner, to other purposes, or (as occasion should serve) to be wholly let alone. But although Christ broke the yoke of Moses, and so left the instances and matters there us'd to their own indif∣ference; yet he left it as indifferent to the Law-givers to make laws con∣cerning them; for he gave no commandement that they should always be left indifferent as to external usages. Under Moses they were tied upon the conscience by God himself, and therefore unchangeably during that whole period; but now they are left to a temporary transient use and ministery, to doe good, or to promote order, or to combine government: and if Go∣vernors had not a freedome to use them in government, as well as private persons to use them if they would in their own persons, Christian liberty had been made for Subjects, and denied to Christian Princes and Christian Priests.

4. There is yet another liberty called the liberty of glory,* 1.70 or the glorious liberty of the children of God; that is, the Redemption of our bodies from disease and pain, from death and corruption: but for this we must stay till the last adoption: For what Christ is by generation and proper inheri∣tance, that we shall be by adoption if we belong to him. Now of Christ in his Resurrection it was said,* 1.71 Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. That was the last generation or right of Sonship, to which when we are adopted we shall be partakers of the glory; but that was at Christs Re∣surrection, and this shall be in ours.

5. Now here being in the days of the Apostles so much talk of liberty, and that in so many instances, and (without question) made the subject of many Sermons, and much Table-talk, and many disputes, and us'd as an argument to perswade strangers, and to comfort the faithful, and the De∣vil being so ready to make use of any prepared lust, or mistake, or igno∣rance, or fancy; it could not be but many weak and many false persons did instantly dream of a temporal liberty, that Sons were free from the laws of Parents, Wives of Husbands, Servants of Masters, Subjects of Princes: the Apostles knowing how great a confusion this would be to all relations and states of men, and what an infinite reproach it would be to the Reli∣gion, stopt this avenue of mischief, and not onely dogmatically describ'd the duties of all inferiours, but took care also to doe it in those places where they had occasion to speak of Christian liberty, that there might be no pretence to doe evil. For Christianity neither could nor ought to have been received, if the Preachers of it had destroyed Governments. The effect of this discourse is plainly this, That Christian liberty does not warrant disobedience to humane Laws,* 1.72 or liberty from their obligation. Whereas therefore the Apostle says, Ye are bought with a price, be not ye the servants of men; it is not to be understood of the conscience or mind of men, as the objection affirms, but onely is an advice of prudence, to the purpose of the preceding words in the 21. verse, If thou mayest be made free, use it rather: that is, since it is more convenient for the advantages of Religion, and the service of Christ, by the price of whose blood you are

redeemed that ye may serve him all your days, therefore you who are free, be not easy to give or part with your liberty, but use your state of liberty for the advantage of the service of Christ; for that nothing else is meant, appears in the words he immediately subjoyns, Brethren, let every man wherein he is called,* 1.73 therein abide with God: that is, your being the ser∣vants of men is not inconsistent with your service of God, nor that servi∣tude incompossible with Christian liberty. But yet suppose that the in∣terpretation us'd in the objection be right, and that, Be not ye the servants of men, is to be understood of the conscience or mind of man; yet, save onely that it was not so intended by the Apostle, it can doe no harm to this Question: for the understanding and the mind may be free, when the hands are tied, and a man may have the liberty of opining and judging, when he may not have the liberty of acting, which is all is pretended to by the Empire of humane Laws. For as Origen excellently, This is no∣thing but an intellectual liberty, concerning which let a man contend in an intellectual and Evangelical manner, that is, by good arguments and the spirit of meekness, and there is no harm done. This is the whole summe of the doctrine of Christian liberty.* 1.74 Concerning which if any man desire to reade more words, and longer discourses, and some in∣trigues, he may please to see them in Driedo, who hath written three Books, and Belliolanus, who hath written twenty Books of Christian liberty.

To the fourth I have already answered both in the beginning and end of the answer to the former,* 1.75 and it proves nothing but what is granted. For to use the same instance; You may fast when you are commanded by your Superiour,* 1.76 but you must not think that fasting is a part of the Divine Service. It is true, it is no part of Divine Service, the fa∣sting of it self is not, but the fasting in obedi∣ence is. For though man commands fasting now, or so, and God does not, yet God com∣mands that we should obey those commands of men;* 1.77 and then the conscience is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the conscience of God, or toward God, it is his subject and servant, and his liegeman: and yet at the same time the law of man pretends not to rule the conscience immedi∣ately, and therefore the conscience is free, and may judge the thing of it self to be no Divine Commandement; but the will is not free, and the duty is bound upon that,* 1.78 when the understanding is at liberty. Errat enim si quis putat servitutem in totum hominem descendere; pars enim melior exce∣pta est. Corpora obnoxia sunt, & adscripta Dominis, mens sui juris est, said Seneca, and from him Aquinas. The whole man is not in subjection; the body indeed is under Lords and Laws, but the mind is free as aire.

To the fifth I answer,* 1.79 by denying the consequence of the argument. For though humane Laws doe bind the conscience, yet it follows not that it is put into the power of man to save or damne his brother; because hu∣mane Laws bind the conscience, but not by force of humane authority pre∣cisely, or in it self, but by virtue of the Divine Commandement: and therefore a Prince cannot make a law and threaten damnation to the brea∣kers of it, because he cannot inflict it; but he may say, that he that breaks it will sin against God, and God will inflict damnation upon the rebellious and disobedient. But then whereas it is objected that this makes the broad

way to hell broader, it is a meer scar-crow; for God onely can inlarge or streighten this way efficiently and formally; but objectivè & occasionaliter, by way of instance and occasion, by giving new laws to endear obedience in new instances when it is for the publick good, hath in it no inconvenience: every Minister of the Word and Sacraments▪ by every invitation of his people to a more strict Religion, does make the damnation of the disobedi∣ent greater, and by every check of conscience, and by every opinion of our own we become a law unto our selves, and make the way of our conversa∣tion narrower; and every offer of grace, and every call of the Spirit does adde moments to the eternal misery of them that doe resist; and yet it were not well to be without them, for fear of that accidental evil. For it is to be considered that these aids, and all good Laws are intended for good to us, and will bring good to us if we obey; but the very reward it self being offered, makes also our punishment just and reasonable if we refuse. Ex te tua perditio. The Law is not in fault, but the rebellious man ruines himself, who by occasion of the Law might have receiv'd an increase of glo∣ry if he had pleas'd.

To the sixth the answer is given in the premisses:* 1.80 Humane authority does not make the action of disobedience to be a sin. It makes that the not compliance of the Subject is disobedience; but it is the authority of God who makes disobedience to be a sin: and though no humane power can give or take grace away; yet we may remember that we our selves throw away Gods grace, or abuse it, or neglect it, when we will not make use of it to the purposes of humility, charity and obedience, all which are concerned in our subordination to the Laws.

The seventh objection hath two parts;* 1.81 the one concerns the civil power, the other the power Ecclesiastical. Concerning the civil, it is af∣firm'd to be unreasonable that the power which cannot remit sins should bind to sin; & therefore the civil power cannot bind the conscience, because it cannot remit the sin to which it binds. In which argument there are four terms, and therefore it is a perfect fallacy. For it is true that it is reason∣able that the power which binds should als•• loose: but that the civil power cannot loose in the same sense in which it can bind is false; for the civil power can untie that which it hath tied, unless by tying be meant ty∣ing to one thing, and loosing be meant of another. The civil power binds to obey; the same power can untie this band, by dispensing with the person or abrogating the Law. But when it is said, the civil power cannot remit the sin, therefore not bind to sin, it is a Sophism, because binding and loo∣sing doe not signify in the same manner. For it does but accidentally bind to sin, and in the same manner it does also ease the conscience: it makes the Law to which God binds the conscience; it takes off the Law, and from the conscience God takes off the obligation. But because it does not by it self bind the conscience, but occasions the conscience to be bound by God, therefore it hath nothing to doe to remit the sin, for that must be the act of God; but the Law can loose what it bound, and where it bound, and as it bound, that is, not the sin, but the subject matter, the instance and the occasion. *** But now concerning the Ecclesiastical power, the objection says that it hath no power to make Laws, but such as are in the matter already decreed by God; and therefore it does not bind but what God hath bound already; and consequently hath of it self no power to bind

the conscience. To this I answer, 1. that it is true, neither the Eccle∣siastical nor the Civil power does by its innate authority oblige the con∣science; but both powers can make Laws, to the observation of which God doth oblige conscience. 2. It is an error to say that the Ecclesiastick power cannot make laws in things not decreed by God. For the supreme Civil power is also Ecclesiastical if it be Christian, and hath a power in the external regiment of the Church; and therefore to make Laws in such parts and accidents of Government in which God hath left no special direction: and for the proper power of the Ecclesiasticks, that also extends beyond the giving commandements in matters of express duty commanded by God; as I shall make appear in its own place. 3. If it were granted that the Church could not make Laws in things not decreed by God, yet when God hath decreed the thing, the Church can make Laws concerning the order of the things, the measure and the manner, the number and the weight, the adjuncts and the circumstances; and that's a field large enough for her to make Laws to oblige the conscience. And therefore although it were ridiculous and contemptible, injurious and uncharitable for the Church to pass her greatest censures upon persons that transgress bono ani∣mo, or through unavoidable infirmity, in small inconsiderable instances, circumstances and unconcerning forms of law and unconsider'd ceremonies; yet the smallest thing may be plac'd so as to be of great concernment; and when these things accidentally become great, the censures of the Church may be prudently and charitably inflicted. But what power the Church hath in making Laws will afterwards be considered in its place; thus much was of present necessity for the answer of the objection.

To the last there might be many answers given.* 1.82 It may suffice that the argument is expresly false; for supposing that humane Laws doe di∣rectly bind the conscience, it does not follow that it is as great a sin to break the Laws of Man, as to violate the Laws of God: that it is a sin it does follow, but not that it is so great. For the law of God against idle words does oblige the conscience, but it does not therefore follow that it is as great a sin to talk idly as to kill a man. But this Sophism relies upon this false supposition, Th•••• all things that bind the conscience doe bind in the same degree, to the same measures of iniquity. For if they doe not, then humane Lawes may bind the conscience, and yet they may be broken at an easier rate then the Commandements of God. 2. But then I adde, that this is according to the subject matter, and the evil consequent of the action. For suppose a Prince oppressed by a Rebel party, as Pompey was by Caesar; Photinus that told the King of Egypt where he lay hid did a greater fault then if he had rail'd upon Pompey, expresly against the Commande∣ment, thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of the people. To open the secrets of a King may be a greater sin, and doe more mischief, and proceed from greater malice then to call my brother Fool. For a Souldier to desert his station may be a greater crime then to steal a shilling. 3. And yet it can∣not be denied, but that there is great difference between the Laws of God and the Laws of Man in their obligation. Concerning which, in order to many cases of conscience, it is fit that I give account.

The difference of Divine and Humane laws in their obligation.

1. The law of God binds the Conscience immediately,* 1.83 and by the right of God; the law of man binds the Conscience mediately, and by the interposition of the Divine authority: so that we must obey Man for Gods sake, and God for his own.

2. The laws of God bind the will and the understanding;* 1.84 that is, we are bound to obey, and bound to think them good. But humane laws meddle not with the understanding; for that's a Prince, and can be go∣verned as he can be perswaded, but subject to the empire of none but God: but the will is the subject of humane laws; not onely that the will be bound to command the inferior faculties and members to obey and doe the work of the law, but of it self precisely it is bound: for it is not enough that we doe the outward works, but the will must be of it self obedient. Whatsoever ye doe,* 1.85 doe it heartily, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, doe it from your very Soul; that is, cheerfully, willingly, without murmuring: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for ye doe it not to men, but to the Lord.

3. The Divine laws are lasting and perpetual;* 1.86 but humane laws cease to bind the conscience, by desuetude, by contraition, by contrary reason, by intolerable inconvenience, by dispensation, and lastly by abrogation.

4. Divine laws oblige the Conscience not only to an active obedience,* 1.87 but to activity and earnestness to doe them, to seek opportunities, to omit none to doe them presently. Humane laws oblige to an active obedience, but not to a spontaneous offer, and ultroneous seeking of opportunities. It may be a sin, it is alwaies an infirmity, to seek for excuses and dispensati∣ons in Divine laws; but it is lawful by all fair means to seek to be freed from the band of any humane law that is not of publick concernment, and is of private incommodity. A man may decline a burden of the law, or seek a priviledge and exemption. The Citizens of Rome were tied to keep guards in course, and doe other duties; but he that had three children, had a right of exemption; and he that hath none may lawfully desire and peti∣tion for the priviledge. The burden of a humane law may be thrust upon another, if it be done by just and charitable means; but in the laws of God every man must bear his own burden chusingly and delightfully.

5. Humane laws onely consider the outward action,* 1.88 not the secret opinion; you must obey Man, when at the same time without sin you may believe the law to be imprudent, or imperfect, or fit to be annull'd. But in the laws of God we must submit our most secret thoughts, and we must be sure so to obey humane laws, as we keep for God the prerogative of his: but though to God we must give account of our thoughts, yet humane laws meddle not with them at all. Cogitationis poenam nemo meretur, saith the law, ff. de poenis.

6. Humane laws oblige onely that they be not despis'd,* 1.89 that is, that they be not transgressed without a reasonable cause: but the laws of God must be obeyed in all cases; and there is no cause to break them, and there can be no necessity upon us to commit a sin. In the obedience to

humane laws we may suppose there was a weakness in the Sanction, they could not foresee the evil that was future, the inconveniences upon some men, the impossibilities of many, the intolerable burden upon others: and therefore although a reason is alwaies to be had when we doe not obey, and that a good one; yet the reason and the goodness of it is not to be the greatest and the best, or to be exacted according to the strictest mea∣sures of necessity alone. For though the laws of God bind to obedience without dispute, without diminution, without excuse, and in all necessities and accidents that can supervene; yet beyond that which is good, that which is equal and probable and profitable, humane laws doe not bind: but of this in the sequel.

7. He that despises the law of God,* 1.90 dies for it; and he that neglects it is accounted to despise it: the not doing it is by interpretation a con∣tempt of Gods law. He that despises humane laws, is also guilty before God: but he onely is accounted to despise it, that voluntarily and without reason disobeys. But he that out of the multitude of other affairs, or an incuriousness of Spirit, unknowingly or ignorantly neglects it by not thinking of it, is in most cases innocent before God; but is tied to submit to the punishment if he be requir'd and deprehended. This onely is to be added, that a geat and a dissolute negligence even in humane laws is so far from excusing the breach of the law, that it doubles the guilt: Dissoluta negligentia prope dolum est, saith the law, ff. mandati, l. fidejussor, & ff. de action. & obligat. l. 1. §. Is quoque. A great negligence is accounted malice.

8. Ignorance of the laws of God excuses no man,* 1.91 because it is suffici∣ently revealed to every man; and he is not onely bound to inquire much if there should be need, but there is also so clear a communication of them, that a little inquiry will serve the turn, and therefore no man is here ex∣cus'd by ignorance. But in the laws of man ignorance is easier pleaded, and does more excuse, and does unavoidably happen to many men in very many cases; and they are less bound to inquire, and a less matter makes the ignorance probable and quit from malice: of all which a prudent and a good man is to be the Judge.

9. When Divine and humane laws are oppos'd,* 1.92 these must alwaies yield to those; and without dispute God is to be obeyed rather then Man; and although we must obey Man for God, we must never obey Man against God: and therefore it was excellently counsell'd by Ben-Sirach, Let not the reverence of any man cause thee to sin.

10. As a consequent to the former,* 1.93 all the Ministers of Justice are bound to be more severe in exacting obedience to Gods laws then to their own in an equal or like matter; they must be easy in the matter of their own laws, and zealous for God: and this also does prove that where the effect, and the appendages and circumstances doe not alter it, it is in the whole a less sin to break a humane law then to break a Divine; that is, although both are sins, yet in the nature of the action it is of a less degree of crime to break the law of our superior then of our supreme, of Man then of God.

11. Divine laws are impos'd upon the people;* 1.94 but humane laws are impos'd indeed, but commonly by their consent, explicite or implicite, formal or interpretative, and without acceptation in a sweet regiment may indeed,* 1.95 but are not usually pass'd into the sanction and sacredness of laws. For the civil government is not absolute, and meer and supreme; but in some sense, and to some purposes, and in some degrees, limited, condi∣tional, precarious and mixt, full of need, and supported by them who are to be rul'd, who therefore are to be regarded.

12. Some adde this; the Divine laws bind both in publick and in pri∣vate, the humane in publick onely: that is, because humane laws take no cognisance of what is secret, therefore neither doe they of themselves bind in secret. But this although in speculation it hath some truth, yet when it is re∣duc'd to practice, the consideration is different. For though Mans laws know not what is in secret, & therefore cannot judge; yet God, that binds humane laws upon our consciences, knows the most secret breach of laws, and he jud∣ges and discerns. But this hath some difficulties in it, and many very material considerations,* 1.96 & therefore is to be distinctly handled in some of the follow∣ing pages. This onely for the present. When in private we can be excus'd or innocent before God; in that private, & in those circumstances humane laws oblige not. But Gods laws equally oblige both in publick and private, re∣spectively to the subject matter. Of themselves humane laws have nothing to doe with private actions; that is, neither with the obligation, nor the notice.

There are many other material differences between the laws of God and man,* 1.97 as to their obligation upon Conscience; which I shall afterwards explicate upon the occasion of particular rules. The great summe of all is this, so far as relates to Conscience; the law of God binds stronger, and in more cases then humane laws. A breach of a humane law is not so great a sin, nor is it so often a sin, as a breach of the Divine; the advantage ••oth in the extension and the intension being (as there is all reason it should) on the part of God; that God who is in all, may be above all.

Thus they differ,* 1.98 but in order to the verification of the Rule, it is to be remembred that in the main obligation of Conscience they doe agree. The Divine law places things in the order of vertue and vice; and the Sacraments are therefore good because they are appointed by Christ, our great Law-giver, and in the old law the eating of swines flesh was therefore evil because it was forbidden by the law of God. For all the goodness of Mans will consists in a conformity to the will of God, which is the great rule and measure of humane actions. And just so it is in humane laws according to their proportion and degree: when the law of the Church commands fasting, to doe so then is an act of temperance as well as o•• obe∣dience, and to disobey is gluttony; and to wear cloth of gold is luxury when the law commands us to wear plain broad cloth. To give great gifts at marriages and feasts may be magnificence; but if the law limits to a certain summe, to goe beyond is pride and prodigality. This is the work of God, though by the hands of Moses & Aaron: for it matters not by what means he effects his own purposes; by himself, or by his power admini∣stred by second causes.* 1.99 The summe is this, which I represent in the words of S. Gregory Nazianzen, Submittamus nos tum Deo, tum aliis, tum iis qui Imperium in terra gerunt: Deo quidem omnibus de causis; alii autem aliis propter charitatis foedus, principibus denique propter ordinem; publicaeque di∣sciplinae rationem. Let us submit our selves to God, to one another, and to

Princes: to God for all the reason in the world; to one another for charity's sake; to Princes for order's sake, and the account of publick Government. But if we refuse to obey Man, God will punish us; and if we refuse to obey God, even the Prince ought to punish us; and both promote the inte∣rests of the same Kingdome. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Justin Martyr,* 1.100 We pray you, O Kings and Princes, to punish them who are Christians onely in name, and doe not live according to the decrees of our Great Master: and then for their own interest this is his account, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 We worship God alone, but in other things we gladly serve and obey you,* 1.101 confessing you to be the Kings and Princes of the people. I con∣clude this in the words of S. Bernard, Sive Deus, sive homo mandatum quodcunque tradiderit, pari profecto obsequendum est cura, pari reverentia de∣ferendum, A law, whether given by God or by man, is to be observ'd by a like care and a like reverence; alike in the kind, but not in the degree.* 1.102

RULE II. Humane laws doe not oblige the Conscience to an active obedience, when there is an imminent danger of death, or an intolerable, or very grie∣vous evil in the obedience.

THis Rule is to be understood to be true regularly and ordinarily,* 1.103 and in laws purely humane; that is, such which are not commentaries or de∣fensatives of a natural and a Divine law. For if the forbidden action have in it any thing that is intrinsecally evil, then the action must not be done, though to save our lives: for no sin ought to be the price of our life, and we ought not to exchange an eternal life for a temporal. Here our Blessed Saviour's words are plain, Fear not them which can kill the body; and what profit have you, if you gain the whole world and loose your own soule? and it is better to goe into life maimed and blind, then having two feet or two eyes to goe into hell fire; and God is to be obeyed rather then man; and he that would save his life shall loose it; and divers others to the same purpose. Now when any thing of this nature is the subject matter of a humane law directly, or if the violation of any thing of a Divine Commandement be the consequent of the breach of a humane law, then the humane law binds to its observation though with the loss of our lives.

But the question here is concerning meer humane laws established in an indifferent matter;* 1.104 and in this it is that the Rule affirms that humane laws doe not bind to their observation with the danger of life. The rea∣sons are these▪

1.* 1.105 Because the end of such laws is onely the good and convenience of the lives of the Citizens. Omnibus à natura bene informatis insitum esse ut

nemini parere velint,* 1.106 nisi utilitatis causa & legitimè imperanti, said Cicero, Nature her self teaches all wise men to obey Princes that govern by laws, and for the good of their Subjects. They therefore being wholly made to minister to the circumstances of life, must not by our lives be ministred unto; nothing being more unnatural and unreasonable then that a man should be tied to part with his life for his convenience onely. It is not worth it, it is like burning a mans house to rost his egges.

2. Eye for eye,* 1.107 and tooth for tooth, and all that a man hath he will give for his life: it is indeed the voice of nature and of this world, there is no capacity to receive any good when our life is gone; and therefore nothing of this world can make a man recompence for his life. That Law therefore that pretends to doe advantages to our life, if it shall also require our life for the securing such advantages, takes away more good then it pretends to give, and makes the substance less principal then the accessary.

3.* 1.108 If humane Laws doe admit of equity (as it is confessed by all men) there is no case so favourable as that of saving of our life: either then we are to suppose the Laws to be made of a rock, and to yeeld to nothing, but for ever to be a killing letter, and an instrument of the hardest bondage; or else at least to be so compliant as to yeeld to her Citizens in the case of life and death.

4. All humane power is given to man for his good,* 1.109 not for his hurt; for edification, not for destruction. But it very often happens, and it is so in most laws that are meerly humane, that the good of the particular law is not so great as the saving the life of one man; and if such laws should not yeeld to the perservation of so precious a life, it were a law made for evil and not for good, a snare and no defence, an enemy and no guardian or friend.

5. Necessity is the band,* 1.110 and necessity is the solution of a law. Ne∣cessitas facit licitum quod aliàs licitum non est, saith Alexander ad l. si ex toto, ff. de legibus. To the same purpose is that of Seneca, Necessitas, ma∣gnum humanae imbecillitatis patrocinium, quicquid cogit, excusat, Necessity makes every thing lawful to which it does compel. But of all necessities that is the greatest which is the safety of our lives, and a rescue from death: this case therefore is greater then the band of humane Laws.

6.* 1.111 The laws of God in precepts purely affirmative doe not oblige to an actual obedience in the danger of death. That is, in such positive laws of God which doe not involve a negative, of an intrinsick malice against a law of nature or of prime rectitude, the laws of God intend not to oblige, when death shall be the reward of him that does obey. Thus the Macca∣bees brake the rest of the Sabbath to defend themselves against their ene∣mies; and the Priests for the uses of Religion, and the Disciples of Christ to satisfy their hunger; and Christ was their Advocate. Thus David and his followers did eat the Shew-bread expresly against the commandement, but it was in his great need; and Christ also was his Advocate and defen∣ded the fact: and if a probable necessity, that is a great charity and re∣lief, which is but the avenue and the address of an extreme necessity, be a sufficient excuse from the actual observation of a law of God, positive and

affirmative, much more shall an extreme necessity excuse from such a law, and therefore yet more strongly does it conclude against the pressure of a humane law in such cases. And therefore the Church hath declared that the Ecclesiastical laws of fasting doe not oblige in case of sickness or old age, or journey and great lassitude, cap. consilium de observatione jejunii: and thus also no man is bound to goe to Church on a festival to hear Di∣vine Service when an enemy lies in wait to kill him: that is, the laws of the Church were intended for the good of the soul, and therefore not suf∣fer'd to doe hurt to the body; and as God affirms he will have mercy and not sacrifice, and therefore himself makes his own laws, that can yeeld at all, to yeeld to the occasions and calls of mercy: so does the Church in the imitation of God, whose laws and gentleness is our best measure; not that every little excuse and trifling pretence can excuse, but the danger of death, or sickness, or some very great evil reasonably fear'd; of which I shall by and by give an account.

Although the Rule thus understood be certain and evident for these reasons,* 1.112 yet there are some adversaria or seeming oppositions very fit to be considered; because although they doe not evacuate the intent of the Rule, yet they give limit and further explication to it.

1.* 1.113 Cajetan affirms every law that binds under pain of mortal sin, does also bind to obedience though death attend it; and his reason is, be∣cause we must rather die then commit a sin: and therefore let the instance be what it will, if it ties to obedience by obliging the conscience, it is a sin to disobey, and rather then sin we must chuse to die. 2. * And that no man should question the power of the Superiour in obliging to suffer death, we find by the practice and consent of all the world that Princes can call their Subjects to battel, and command their Officers upon dangerous ser∣vices, and the Souldiers are bound not to desert their station; and the Master of the Ship was oblig'd to put to Sea in a storm when Caesar bade him. 3. * For since the law is intended for a publick good, the private interest (be it never so great) is not to be put in ballance against it. And therefore as it is in the Laws of God, and in the confession of faith, the brave sons of Eleazar did suffer death with torments rather then eat swines flesh, and the Martyrs gave their lives in a willing sacrifice rather then de∣ny their faith: so in their proportion it must be in the laws of men, they must be kept up though we die for it. Melius est ut unus quàm Unitas, It is expedient that one man die for the people, one member for the whole body, rather one then the unity be dissolv'd, and the community ruin'd.

To these things I answer,* 1.114 first, that the proposition of Cajetan is not true in its latitude. For whatever binds to obedience under pain of sin, does not intend to bind to obedience with the loss of our life under sin. It is true that we must rather die then sin; but we doe not sin in not obeying, when he that obeys shall die for it; and that being the question ought not to be presum'd by any opponent in prejudice of truth or pro∣babilty. Humane laws bind to obedience, and Gods law annexes the pe∣nalty of sin; but then Gods law coming in to second mans law, seconds it but in what it would oblige. But humane Laws doe not intend, regularly and in all cases to be obeyed with the loss of life or limb; and when the Law does not sufficiently express such intention, we are to presume for

liberty and mercy. * Now that which follows is true in some sense; the publick is to be preferr'd before the private, and the supreme power can oblige the Subjects to suffer death or to venture their lives: but this cannot be in all cases. For if in all, then is the Magistrate the Lord of life and death, which is Gods peculiar; but if he could in no case, then he were not the minister of life and death, which is communicated to the Magistrate. The inquiry therefore now is, since regularly he cannot, and yet extraor∣dinarily the supreme power can tie on his laws upon our shoulders with the cords of death, in what cases this is true, and in what it fails.

1.* 1.115 When a Law is decreed by man with the appendage of a penalty of death for its sanction, it can bind to obedience though death be in it. For since the matter of the law is by the Legislative power valued at the price of our lives, and by accident the very keeping of it as well as the breaking is set at no less price, the evils of either side being equal, the presumption and advantage must be on the part of justice and the law, not for injustice, tyranny and disobedience. And so much the rather, because that the obe∣dience should cause death is but rare and accidental, not foreseen, but sel∣dome happening; but the law threatning death to the disobedient is a re∣gular, constant, observed, and declared provision: and therefore that which is for good, and regularly is established by the fear of death, is not to be put out of countenance by a contingent, rare and extraordinary fear, and which also is intended for evil; for which in this case there could be no provision, and therefore there ought to be no regard. But this holds onely in case that death on either side be equally certain; for if it be cer∣tain the obedient man shall die by the hand of a Tyrant, or an accident that is prepar'd, and it be likely he may escape from the hands of the law by con∣cealment, or by the relief of equity or charity, then the natural right of self-preservation will be his apology; this man despises not the law, but extricates himself as well as he can, and for a reason, which of all conside∣rations meerly humane is the greatest.

2.* 1.116 When the Tyrant power threatens death to obedient Subjects, for no other end but that the Subject should contemn the law, then the Supe∣riour can oblige us to obedience though we die for it. For it is in this as in those positive and affirmative laws of God, which although they yeeld to save the Subjects life, yet they will never yeeld in the corruption of the Subjects manners: that is, they yeeld in charity, but not to serve a Ty∣rants lust. And thus we understand the reason of the difference between the cession of the law of the Sabbath in the case of the Maccabees, and the not cession of the prohibition of swines-flesh in the case of the Jewish sub∣jects. For the fear of death was equal to them both: if the Princes did not fight upon the Sabbath, they should be cut in pieces; and if the Sub∣jects did not eat swines-flesh, they should die with torments. But they preserv'd themselves, and these did not, and both were innocent. The reason of the difference is plainly this; They that offer'd swines-flesh to these did it as enemies of the Religion; they that fought with those upon the Sabbath did it as enemies of the Nation, onely they would take advan∣tage by the prohibitions of the Religion. Now when death is threatned by the enemies of the Religion, it is with purpose to affront it, or destroy it; and therefore if the Mother and her seven sons had complied, it had been a renouncing of their faith and their religion, and a contempt of their

law; which could not be supposed in the other case of the Princes, not onely because both the Princes and the Army could not be supposed to be despisers of the law, but also because that very breaking of the law, was with fighting in the defence of the law and the whole Nation. And so it is in humane Laws: The sacredness of the Authority may be established with our life; and because to contemn them is always a sin, we must ra∣ther die then doe it, though the matter of it self be less and doe not require it. But this is also to be limited. For it is true that we must rather die then contemn the laws, but yet he that breaks them for no other reason then to save his life, is not a contemner of the law, for he hath great reason, and a great necessity; and therefore it is not contempt, but is to be presum'd the contrary, therefore this is to be understood, when

1. Either the law expresly commands we should die rather then break it. Or

2. Hath declar'd that in such circumstances to comply shall be a con∣tempt by interpretation. Or

3. When it is notorious that it is so intended by the Tyrant power: and

4. The Law-giver expresly requires our fortitude and resistance; for unless it be in such cases, though the law can bind, yet it does not. The summe is this; when death is likely to be the consequent of obedience by accident and the chance of things or the providence of God abstractly, then it is not to be expounded to be contempt. Because in such cases God tempts not. But when an enemy or a Tyrant power tempts with the fear of death, he does it in defiance of the law or the authority, and therefore here we must obey and die. And this distinction is very much to be regar∣ded. For if a Prince or an Ecclesiastick Superiour make a Law, it is to be presumed that they doe it not (for they have no interest to doe it) in despite of chance to binde to obedience in the danger of death: and therefore it is a rack of their power to extend it to such a case. But they may have in∣terest and publick necessity to exact this obedience when an opposite pow∣er threatens death, that they may destroy the Law.

3. The same also is the case of ¹ Scandal,* 1.117 or ² injury to Religion, or ³ the Confession of our faith, in all which cases we are oblig'd to die ra∣ther then break a positive law of God or Man. And this is that which S. Austin said, Satius est fame mori quam idolothytis vesci, It is better to di•• with hunger,* 1.118 then to save our lives by eating things sacrificed to idols. That is, when the so doing is an interpretative renunciation of our religion, or the laws of our Superiour forbidding it, or is a scandal to a weak brother. And this is it that S. Paul said, I will eat no flesh as long as the world stands rather then cause my brother to offend. But in this there is no difficulty.

4. Humane Laws bind to their observation though with the danger of death,* 1.119 when that danger is either expresly in the law, or in the matter and instance of it annexed to the obedience. Thus the supreme Power can command the Curates of souls to attend a Cure in the time of the Plague, ••o goe to Sea in a storm, to stand in a breach for the defence of the Army. For in these cases he that hath power to doe it, hath expresly commanded it; and to undergoe the danger of death is of the substance of the action and obedience, and is neither besides the intention nor the knowledge of the Law-giver: and therefore if the Law did not bind to obedience not∣withstanding the danger of death, it were no law at all. For to a Prince

commanding to goe to Sea in a storm, it is in vain to say it is a storm; and that Souldier is a fool that tells his General he is afraid to die, when he sends him upon an honourable service.

5. But all these cases are to be provided so that they be in gravi ma∣teria,* 1.120 that the cause be great, and the necessity urgent, and the publick good concerned, for mens lives are not to be jested away: and though Scipio Major had power to carry his three hundred brave fellows (that he so boasted of in Sicily) to the African warre, yet he had no power to com∣mand them to run up the neighbouring Tower and leap headlong into the Sea for bravery and to shew his power.

6. One thing more is to be added.* 1.121 In those cases in which humane Laws doe oblige even in the danger of death, they doe not oblige but for their whole portion; that is, when the whole end of the law is not de∣stroyed or hazarded by the disobedience, but that the caution and end of the law may be secur'd and observ'd in all or in the greatest part; a man may then by not observing the law, save his own life and be innocent. And this is the rule of Aquinas, and it is very reasonable, Quando est causa ra∣tionabilis, & non impeditur finis legis, not peccat mortaliter qui non obser∣vat legem, Upon a just cause a man may without a crime break a law, when by such transgression the end of the law is not hindred. As if a law be made that corn shall not be transported, because of an imminent famine, and for the preservation of the Citizens, if any man to save his life shall comply with an inevitable accident and necessity, and carry some abroad, his ne∣cessity is a just excuse, because he hath not destroyed the end of the law, since his proportion and lading causes no sensible detriment to the publick: and though every single man must not pretend that his single proportion will be no great matter (because that is not sufficient unless there be a great necessity to doe it;) yet when there is such a necessity, it will suffice that he did it not but upon a violent need, and what he did was not a destru∣ction to the end of the law; and his example cannot have any evil effect of it self; for other men cannot say, Why may not I as well as he? Un∣less the necessity be as exemplary as the action, and unless they be in the like evident danger of death, they cannot pretend to the like impunity. They that are in no danger may not, but he that is may, when the Sub∣jects safety can stand with the safety of the publick. For although the head may expose one member to loss and amputation to preserve the whole, yet when the whole can be safe without it, the member may pre∣serve it self and refuse to be cut off: and nothing is greater then the safety of a part, but the safety of the whole.

But the Rule affirms that not onely danger of death,* 1.122 but the avoy∣ding of a very grievous and intolerable evil is sufficient to excuse disobe∣dience to humane Laws from being a sin. But this is particularly to be con∣sidered in the following Rules.

RULE III. The Laws of our Superiour that are not just and good, doe not oblige the Conscience.

1. LAws are publick mischiefs if they bind to injustice; and therefore to establish any thing that is unjust or evil is against the nature of Laws, and the power of the Superiour, and the intendment of the Supreme. For God gives to no man power above or against himself.

Now a Law is unjust upon many defects.

1. If it be made by an incompetent person,* 1.123 that is, one who hath no authority. Cajus and Sejus were fellow-servants to Ruricanus. Cajus com∣mands Sejus to goe to plough. Sejus demands, quo jure? And he was in the right. Cajus was the wiser man, and he was the older, and better im∣ployed, but he was not his Lord.* 1.124 Par in parem imperium non habet, says the Law.

2. If it be made in an incompetent and undue matter.* 1.125 When Saul commanded the man of Amalek, Sta super me, & interfice me, Fall upon me and kill me; he was indeed a Prince, but in that matter he could make no law, and therefore was not to be obeyed. And the Ancients tell that when Mercury was accus'd for the murder of Argus, though he pleaded that he did it by the command of Jupiter, yet the Gods did not acquit him: and though Marc Anthony did worse for his own revenge to kill Cicero, yet Po∣thinus did ill too when he kill'd the brave Pompey, though at the command of his Master Ptolemy.

Antoni tamen est pejor quàm causa Pothini; Hic facinus Domino praestitit, ille sibi.

Anthony was infinitely to be condemn'd, and Pothinus not to be justified. And upon this account, every law made against Religion, or any thing of Divine sanction and commandement, is void, and cannot oblige the consci∣ence. To which purpose who please, may read an excellent discourse of S. Bernard in his seventh Epistle which is to Adam the Monk. Upon this account a Thief cannot begin a prescription against the right of the just owner, because his theft being against the law of God, cannot begin a just title by the laws of men. Thus although the laws* 1.126 permit a man to possess what by an unjust price or bargain he hath acquir'd, yet because this is un∣just and uncharitable to deceive his neighbour, the injurious person is bound to restore, and is not indemnified before God by any warranty from the contrary civil law: Ye shall not lie, saith our Lord God, nor deceive every one his neighbour:* 1.127 and let no man defraud or circumvent his neighbour in bargaining,* 1.128 saith S. Paul. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said the old Attick law, from the voice of nature; which Cicero well renders, tollendum esse ex re∣bus contrahendis omne mendacium, no lie must at all••be used in bargaining: and therefore the law of man to the contrary is invalid; though I suppose the civil Law intends onely to barre an action in the outward Court, but not to give warrant to the conscience.

3. Humane laws may be unjust when a just power in a competent matter passes on to excess,* 1.129 and goes beyond it's bounds. He that excom∣municates one that is not of his Diocess does not oblige the excommu∣nicate person by the sentence: and Pilate had nothing to doe with the Holy Jesus till Herod had sent him back to him; for to his jurisdiction he did belong. Thus if a Priest or a Bishop absolves a guilty person▪ he binds himself, but looses not the other. For no excess of power produces any effect of law, or tie upon the Conscience. And to this purpose is that Rule of the law,* 1.130 Sententia non à suo Judice lata, nulla est: which is excel∣lently rendred by S. Paul, What art thou, O man, who judgest another mans servant? Upon this account,* 1.131 all humane laws prescribing to the Consci∣ence, or giving bounds to the thoughts, are null. For in these things God onely is Judge, and all other Judicatories are incompetent: I say all other judicatories; for as for sentences declaratory of a Divine law, that is not under this restraint. But of that in it's own place.

4. Humane laws may be unjust,* 1.132 by a defect of the just and due end; that is, when the law does not contribute to the publick advantage, but wholly to his private who made the law. If the law be apt to minister to the publick good, whatever the private interest and design of the Prince be, it may spoil the man but not the law. If a Prince espying the luxury of feasts and garments make sumptuary laws, and impose fines upon the trans∣gressors, and does this onely to get the money, indeed he is not a good man; but so long as the law is good, it does oblige the Conscience. The enemies of the memory of K. Henry 8. of England pretend that he annull'd the Popes authority in England onely upon designs of lust and revenge. Sup∣pose this true; yet as long as he did good, though for evil ends, it is the worse for him, but not for us; but if the Prince does not, yet the law must intend the publick benefit: and that also is the duty of the Prince. Non prospectantes proprii jura commodi,* 1.133 sed consulentes patriae atque genti, said the Fathers of the eighth Council of Toledo. Kings must not look after their own profit, but make provisions for their country and their people. Offi∣cium est imperare, non regnum,* 1.134 To rule is not empire, but office, said Se∣neca; and therefore the Greeks call Kings 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Plutarch, that signifies persons appointed to take care and to defend the people.

Tu civem patremque geras,* 1.135 tu consule cunctis, Non tibi, nec tua te moveant sed publica damna.

Take care of the publick, not of thy particular, and let the common cala∣mity move thee most: and since the power it self is designed for the publick good,* 1.136 the laws must be so too. And therefore when the law saies that a law ought to be a common precept; that is, pro communi utilitate statutum, saies the gloss, that is, it must be for the common good. Conditur uti∣litatis gratiâ lex, saies Plato, every just law is made for the good of the people: and from him Marsilius Ficinus defines a law to be,* 1.137 a true manner of governing, which by profitable ways tends to the best end, that is, the pub∣lick good; and Isidore saies, Lex erit omne quod ratione constiterit, duntaxat quod religioni congruat, quod disciplinae conveniat, quod saluti proficiat,* 1.138 A law is that which agrees with reason, that is consonant to religion, and accords with discipline, and is profitable and does good. And therefore if a Prince make a law which is for his own profit, and not for the publick good, he is a Tyrant; and his laws have no sanction but fear, and noe tie at all upon the

Conscience. And this is the doctrine of Aristotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 A King and a Ty∣rant differ very much:* 1.139 A Tyrant considers his own profit; a King the profit of his people: and under this consideration comes that Prince that laies grie∣vous burthens upon his people. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Those that take great summs from them they ought not,* 1.140 and those which they ought not, as Ty∣rants, destroyers of Cities and robbers of Temples, we doe not call them Cove∣tous, but wicked, and impious, and unjust. And therefore they who doe such things by laws made on purpose, doe it by tyranny, and therefore not by law, or just authority, & consequently by none. In such cases we must suffer as it happens: but we may avoid the burden of the law, where we can peaceably and privately. For all such things as are against the good of the subjects, the law it self declares to be no law; that is, to be more then the superior hath right or leave to doe. Nulla juris actio aut benignitas patitur ut quae salubriter pro hominum utilitate introducuntur, ea nos duriore interpretatione contra ipsorum commodum producamus ad severitatem, saies the law, l. nulla, ff. de legibus: No law, no charity suffers us to make that by interpretation hard and against their profit, for whose profit it was first decreed by a salutary sanction. And therefore it is observable that all laws doe in∣finitely decline all harsh senses, and are ambitious of gentle and benign interpretations; which is in the whole world the greatest declaration that law-givers as they ought not, so they profess they doe not intend to grieve the subject by an unequal burden. It was a Princely saying of Trajan, when he put a sword upon the thigh of the Prefect of the Praetorian bands, Cape hunc, & si quidem rectè & ex utilitate omnium imperavero, pro me, sin aliter, contra me utere, Use this sword on my behalf if I govern rightly and to the publick benefit; if not, use it against me. That was too much, but his purpose was excellent; he knew it was his duty to rule by that measure onely; beyond that his power was incompetent. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that does not so, is a King by fortune,* 1.141 but indeed a Tyrant, and any thing rather then a King. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle, For he pursues his own, not his peoples good: and that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the stain of Monarchy, that is, plainly Tyranny. Tiberius said well, Dixi & nunc & saepe alias, P. C. bonum & salutarem principem, quem vos tanta & tam libera potestate instruxistis, Se∣natui servire debere, & universis civibus; saepe ac plerumque etiam singulis, neque id dixisse me poenitet. A good and a gentle Prince ought to serve the profit of his Nobility, his Senate and Citizens; not onely all but each single Citizen, as there is occasion: and therefore Rudolphus of Austria was very angry with his Guards for hindring petitioners to come to him; Let them come, saies he, for I was not made an Emperor to be shut up in a box. Sinite parv••los ad me venire saith our Bl. Lord, the King of Kings, and the Lord of Lords, Suffer my little ones to come unto me. But the reason and demonstration of all is contained in those words of Seneca, say∣ing a Prince should think with himself,* 1.142 Ego ex omnibus mortalibus placui electusque sum qui Deorum vice in terris fungerer, I am chosen from the heap of mortals to stand in the place of God, to doe as he does; that is, to doe all things justly, and to doe all things for the benefit of the people: now since the Prince hath his power from God, he can have no power to doe otherwise then God does. Admittere in animum totius reip. curam &

populi fata suscipere, & oblitum quodammodo sui, gentibus vivere; noctes omnes diesque perpeti solicitudinem, pro salute omnium cogitare. So Pliny describes the office of a Prince, to take care of the whole republick, to live to them not to himself; daies and nights to suffer anxiety in thinking for the profit and welfare of all. This is the limit of a Princes power so far as he relates to Conscience. For beyond this the Conscience is not bound. The body is, and we must suffer patiently the evil which we cannot deprecate; but laws that are made to purposes beyond these measures doe no waies oblige the Conscience. He is the Minister of God for thy good, saith S. Paul; otherwise he is not Gods Minister, and hath to other purposes none of Gods authority, and therefore cannot oblige the Conscience to an active obedience in such where his power is incompetent to command.

5. Thus,* 1.143 when a law by the change of things or cases is become an enemy to the common good, it is not to be observed, saith Aquinas; and he gives this instance: A law is made that in the time of sieges the gates of a City be alwaies kept shut; but the guards are not tied to obey this law, when the citizens fly thither from the danger of the enemy: and so in all equal cases, concerning which this is the Rule.

The Prince is to be presumed good and gentle;* 1.144 and if he be not so, he is to be suppos'd so, and made so at least by fiction of law: whatso∣ever therefore case does happen in which the Citizens are grieved, it is to be supposed that it is besides the intention of the law, and was not in the prevision of the Prince; but we are to rely upon this, That he who is good and gentle, and a Father of his Country, would, if he were here and observed this evil, untie the law, that he might not tie us to the evil: and because he is not here, but his will is here, the law with so much evil to us is not to be observed; for his leave to break it is to be presumed.

6. Hither is to be reduced the injustice of unequal distributions;* 1.145 such as is, a law forbidding beggers to goe from place to place to seek relief, when there is no relief at home; the law of commanding every village or parish to provide for their poor, which indeed is piously and charitably intended, but because when it is reduc'd to practice it falls heavily upon some, and others touch it not with the top of their fingers, the law which was good in thesi, proves unjust in hypothesi, and therefore does not oblige the Conscience; but they who are under it, may not onely seek relief by petition, but by avoiding it where they can piously and charitably, accor∣ding to the measures by and by to be described. For it is the voice of natural justice and reason, which S. Paul urges to his charges, not that there should be ease to one and burden to another: this is against equity, as having in it so great disproportionate inequality.

7. Lastly,* 1.146 of the same consideration it is, that in the making laws of burden, there be equality and proportion between the burden and the cause of the imposition; that the burden be not greater then the evil it intends to remedy, nor the remedy greater then the disease needs, nor yet greater then men can bare. For what is excessive in these case, is against the charity and justice of the Prince, and is matter of rapine and impiety, not of subsidy and prudent provisions: and therefore though it may oppress the subject, who hath no remedy but prayers and tears; yet the Conscience

is at liberty, and may procure remissions by any waies of peace and piety.

But in the reducing of this to practice,* 1.147 these cautions are to be ob∣served.

1. That though the conscience be free from all laws which are unjust upon any of these accounts, yet that the law be not disobeyed with the scandal and offence of others, it must be so done that none be taught to rebel, or evacuate the law upon pretences and little regards, nor that our duty and religion be evil spoken of, nor that the Superiour be made jea∣lous and suspicious. When our Blessed Saviour had proved himself free from tribute, and that in conscience he was not bound to pay it, yet that he might not give offence, he submitted to the imposition. And this cau∣tion is given by all the Doctors, who follow Bartholus in it, capite 1. de constitutionibus.

2. The inconvenience of the republick must not be trifling and con∣temptible,* 1.148 but so great as must in the judgement of good and prudent men be a sufficient cause of annulling the law, so great as must reasonably out∣weigh the evil of material disobedience. And therefore in the injustice of unequal distributions, and imposition of taxes, we are not to complain for every little pressure, nor yet to weigh the proportions in gold-scales; for it is a greater duty of charity that the Subject quietly bear a little load for peace sake and example and compliance, then it can be of duty in the Prince to make such exact, curious and Mathematical proportions.

3. The inconvenience and injutice must be certain,* 1.149 notorious, and re∣lied upon, before it can be made use of to the breach of a law. For it is no warranty to disobey, that I fancy the law to be unjust: & therefore in this case the best security we can have is, that either it be so declared by the voice of all men, or the more sober accents of the wise men, or be evident in it self according to the strictest measures; for where there is a doubt∣ful case, the presumption always is for obedience, not against it: for al∣though usually in doubts, the presumption is for liberty, yet that is either between private persons, or when the Superiour makes a doubt concerning his own laws, then he is to judge for liberty and ease; but in our own cases, and in dispute with a law, the presumption is on behalf of the law, because ordinarily that is the greates interest, and the greatest reason.

4. When there is a favourable case for breaking a law,* 1.150 if we have time and opportunity we must ask leave of the Superiour. Because as that does honour to the Superiour, and gives value to the law; so it is the greatest course of security, because it makes him Judge who onely can complain. But to this we are not oblig'd if the case be evident, or if the danger of evil be imminent and sudden, and there be no time or opportu∣nity to require it: In these cases a leave is to be presumed, or else it need not, for the law does not oblige.

5. This is to be practis'd onely when the law is against the publick good.* 1.151 For if it be still consistent with the publick interest, though it be against the good of a particular person, the law hath left a power of dispen∣sation in the appointed Ministers; but a private person may not so easily break the law, at least he is tied to other conditions, and more caution,

and a severer conduct; of which I am to give account in the Chapter of the Diminution of Laws. But for the present, the difference is onely in specu∣lation: for notwithstanding the personal inconvenience, the law does still bind the conscience of the Subjects in general; but if it be against the pub∣lick emolument, then the law ceases, and it does not oblige. In the first case the particular is to be relieved by a way of his own; of which I am afterwards to speak: but in this case the conscience is at liberty. Thus when the Church makes a law that upon a certain day the people shall meet in publick, and spend their day in fasting and prayer; it is a good law, and may be for the publick good, though Petronia and Abbatilla be with child and cannot fast: All are bound, but from these the yoke may be lif∣ted up for the present. But if a Church make a law that all the Clergy shall lose their livings and their office if they marry; here there is a mis∣chief to the publick, to a whole order of men; and the law cannot doe so much good accidentally, as it directly does mischief. And the confession of Suarez upon another occasion, but in this very instance, is remarkable, Custodiam virginitatis esse opus supererogationis, quod necessariam non habet conjunctionem cum fine publici commodi;* 1.152 & ergo non posse praecipi lege hu∣mana, That virginity should be kept is a work of supererogation, that hath no necessary conjunction with the end of any publick good; and therefore cannot be enjoyn'd by a humane law. Either then the law of the Church of Rome forbidding the Clergy to marry, does not tie them to be Virgins, but gives them leave to fornicate; or if it does tie them to a Virgins state, she makes a law which is not for the publick good, and therefore in which she hath no competent authority. This therefore is an unjust law, and does not oblige the conscience. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Polycarpus; We are taught to give to Princes and the powers set over us by God such honour and obedience as may not hurt us.

RULE IV. A law that is founded upon a false presumption, does not oblige the Conscience.

THE case is this;* 1.153 Francisco Biretti a Venetian Gentleman, full of amours, & us'd to vain and wanton addresses, courts Julia a Senators daughter, but with secret intent to abuse her and so to leave her. Marco Medici the Father of Julia by threats and harsh usages forces his daughter Julia to consent to a contract with Francisco: who perceiving himself surprised, and that the matter was pass'd further then he intended it, resolv'd to make the best of it, to make a contract, to lie with her, and so to leave her. He does so, surprises her in the careless hours of the day, and the nakedness of her soul, and with flatteries mingled with the affrighting name of her harsh Father, acts his intention, and then pursues it till he was weary of her, and then forsakes her. She complains, and desires remedy. The law declares their congress to be a marriage. But in the mean time Fran∣cisco pass'd into Sicily, and there married Antonia Peronetta a Sicilian La∣dy; her he lov'd, intended to make her his wife, and did so. Now the law presumes that after contract, their congress did declare a marriage, cap. Is qui fidem, and cap. Tua nos, de sponsal. for it supposes and presumes a con∣sent,

and yet withal says if there was no consent, it was no marriage. Here Francisco is condemn'd by the presumption, and reliev'd in conscience. For if he did not lie with her affectu maritali, but onely intended to abuse her, he was indeed extremely impious and unjust; but he made no marriage, for without mutual consent marriages are not made. Yet because of this, the law could no way judge but by outward significations, and ut pluri∣mùm, for the most part it is so that contract and congress doe effect as well as signify a marriage, the law did well to declare in the behalf of Ju∣liae: but Francisco, who knew that which the law could not know, was bound to make amends to Julia as well as he could, but to pursue the marriage of Anthonia and dwell with her. For the presumption upon which this law was founded was false; the congress did not prove a mar∣riage, for it was never intended: the presumption was probable, but fail'd in this instance, and therefore in this case did not oblige the conscience. Conscience is to be guided by presumptions when it hath no better guide; but when it hath a certain truth to guide it, it is better then the best pre∣sumption or probability. * Besides this, when a law is made upon a sup∣position, and relies upon that alone, in case that should fail, it is to be pre∣sum'd that the Law-giver does not intend to bind. When the men of Ae∣gina were at warre with the Athenians, they made it death by their law for any Athenian to be seen in their Country. But when Plato was made a slave and was carried thither by a storm, one of the Citizens sav'd his life by an artifice, and did it according to the intention of the law. For the law being founded upon a presumption that if an Athenian came thither, it was for evil to their Town, they could not suspect that Plato had such an evil intention, when they knew his case and his sad story; and therefore ought to judge him quit from the burden of that law. Dom. Joseph of Car∣reras a Spaniard walking one night in Sivil, was taken by the Alcalde, and found to have arms about him, against the Law; but carrying of him to prison they found at the end of that street a man newly murdered: the law presum'd him to be the murderer, as it does aptly suspect such persons who at unseasonable times walk arm'd: he was accus'd, but finding friends was acquitted for his life, but sentenc'd to maintain the widow and chil∣dren of the dead man. He knew himself innocent, and therefore was not bound in conscience to maintain her, because the law relying upon a false presumption, was a dead letter, and could not bind.

But that there be no error in the practice of this,* 1.154 we must distinguish of presumptions. One sort is in matter of fact, the other is upon presup∣position of dangers usually arising: that is of justice, this of caution. The examples which I have already brought are all meer and unmixt presum∣ptions of fact; in which cases the rule does hold without exception. But in presumptions of caution it is otherwise. The law does irritate and eva∣cuate the contracts of minors, because they being weak and indiscreet, it is presum'd that they doe it foolishly whatever they doe; and it is fit that the laws should be their defensatives against the evils of their ignorance. But now some minors under sixteen years of age are of a ripe wit, and competent judgement, and have craft enough to make a bargain, to consi∣der what they promise, and to beware of the artifices of evil men. But yet although the presumption of the law fails as to their particulars, yet their parents may annul their promises, their vows, and their professions, though the presumption of the law in their case doe fail. The reason of

the difference is this: In presumptions of fact, if the truth of the fact fails, the whole foundation of the law does fail; for the foundation is indivi∣sible, and the law had no other support; if any thing of it fails, it all fails. But in presumptions of caution, or of presupposition of danger which does usually happen, it is wholly otherwise; for though it does fail in some in∣stances, yet it is true in most, and that is sufficient to support a law, which looks after that which is most common, not after rare emergencies. And therefore the law in this case does not in proper speaking rely upon a pre∣sumption, but a certain judgement; for it is certainly true that it is so most commonly; and it is presum'd so of every particular: at least the law knows not how to distinguish them, and therefore is a just and a wise law, conducing to the publick benefit, and consequently is a good measure to the conscience.

Onely this caution is to be inserted,* 1.155 That if a minor make a contract, as if a young man under 16, or a maiden under 14 make a contract of mar∣riage, although this is not valid in law till their years of consent be com∣pleted; yet if they have a mature judgement otherwise then the law did presume them to have, they are tied in conscience to verify this contract, if all those conditions were observed which could make the act valid ••n the law of nature, because no civil law can evacuate a natural; and where they are naturally able, they are by their own act under that law naturally ob∣lig'd: but this, although it be an essential consideration as to conscience, yet it is wholly extrinsecal to this Rule.

But there is one distinction more of use to the explication of this Rule.* 1.156 Laws founded upon presumption are either laws of favour or laws of duty. Those that are made in favour may be made use of onely when that supposi∣tion upon which it is founded is really true, but must not be us'd to the pre∣judice of any, whether it be true or false. And of this nature, or reducible to it, is the case that Cicero de Oratore speaks of. A Roman Citizen supposing his onely son to be dead, declares a kinsman to be his heir. The son after∣wards appears; and by a true presumption that if his Father had suppos'd him living, he would not have disinherited him, is reliev'd against a false presumption which suppos'd him dead. And it hath left a stain upon the honour of Davids justice and friendship with Jonathan, that when he had listned to the false information of Ziba against his friends son Mephibosheth; and gave the land to the informer; he yet upon a right notice of the cause restor'd but half. For this cause, say the Doctors of the Jews, God divi∣ded his Kingdome, and gave the bigger half from his Grandchild Rehoboam to his servant. But if the laws be matter of duty, and enjoyn something that is good or useful to the publick, whether the presumption be right or wrong, they doe oblige: and the reason is, because the presumption, whe∣ther it was in fact or in caution, yet it was not the whole foundation of the law; or if it was alone built upon it at first, yet it is supported by other arguments strong enough to affirm the law. If a law were made in England, that whoever comes not to Divine Service in publick Churches should be punished by a mulct of 20 li. a moneth, the fine of Recusancy, upon a pre∣sumption that he that is absent is so indeed, this law were as much incum∣bent upon them that are not Recusants: for although the law was at first made upon that presumption, yet because otherwise it commands a very good act, which alone and without the presumption were a sufficient in∣ducement

to the law, the Conscience of those who are, and those who are not in the first presumption are equally oblig'd.

RULE V. Humane laws doe bind the Conscience to or from an act in secret, as well as in pubick.

SOme things are secret or private in their own nature,* 1.157 such as are onely the prerogative of God to judge of; as the word of the mind, the thoughts of the heart, the desires and repudiations of the affections, the inclinations and tendencies to an object, love and hatred, the pleasures or displeasures of the fancy, acts of judgment and understanding. These God onely knowes, and he onely punishes. * Others are secret, but yet they are such onely by accident, and for want of proof: and these also are more or less; for some are seen by one witness, and some by more; and they that are seen, either are brought to judgment, or not. Now according to the parts of these distinctions, this Rule is in several manners to be verified.

1. Those actions which were done in secret,* 1.158 but under the observation of a few, when they are brought to judgement change their nature, and be∣come publick, and therefore are equally under the power of the Law, as if they were done in the Market. For in the Law, that is called Notorious which is either declar'd in judgment, or prov'd by witnesses, or evident by the intuition of the fact. And that actions, in this sense at first secret, are subjicible to laws, is clear by the very examination of witnesses and the whole process of law. For the Judge takes notice of no other notoreity: if a Judge sees a thing done, he cannot punish it; he must witness it, and another punish it. All that is notorious to the Judge must first be secret, and then publick; that is made manifest or notorious by witnesses and sentences of Judges.

2. Some actions are secret,* 1.159 because they can be proved onely by one witness. Now it is true that in some cases one witness is sufficient, as in the case of treason; or in case of confession, for his own witness against himself is as good as ten thousand: when it is so, it is manifestum as before, and therefore the same thing is to be affirmed of it. But if it be secret, so that it cannot be competently proved, it is true that the law does not punish it, but it fain would; and therefore declares that the private action is a disobedience and transgression.

3. If the action be done wholly in secret,* 1.160 then indeed the criminal Judge takes no notice of it any more then a man abiding in the city does of his country house on fire before he knows of it; but as one is an unknown calamity to the man, so the other is an unknown transgression of the law. For that the thing is known or unknown it alters the case as to the punish∣ment, yet nothing at all as to the offence, the scandal onely excepted and the example. Now that the law does intend to forbid such actions, it ap∣pears by the acts of scrutiny, and the proceedings against such as come ac∣cidentally

to be discover'd. If a suspicion doe arise or any probability, any fame or rumor, the law begins her process, somewhere by torture, some∣where by examination upon oath, and sometimes gives sentence upon con∣jectures. Now if to this it be replied, that this is the beginning of publica∣tion, and the law proceeds onely in proportion to its being publick; I an∣swer, that it is true, she can proceed no otherwise: and therefore if the question here had been whether secret actions were punishable by humane laws, I should have answer'd otherwise, and so the lawyers dispute it: but here the inquiry being whether the Conscience be oblig'd, I am to say that the publication of it does not make it to be a sin; this reveals the action, & the law declares or makes it to be a sin; for a man is not hanged for theft unless he be discover'd, but if he be, then it is for his theft he is punished, not for his discovery. The consequent of which is this; that if the action be against the law, be it never so secret, it is a sin: and here is the advantage of the wisdome and Oeconomy of God in the verification of humane laws; he confirms the laws of men, and he binds in heaven what they bind on earth, and he also knows in earth what is done in the most secret corner, and judges accordingly.

4. But as for those things which are secret in their own nature,* 1.161 such which are not onely not known, but not cognoscible by humane laws and judicatories, the case is much more difficult, it being generally taught by Divines that no humane laws have power to prescribe internal acts; and consequently that whatever we think or wish, so we doe the thing that is commanded, the law of man is satisfied.

Question.

Whether humane laws can command or forbid inward acts.

But having as well as I could consider'd the secret of this thing,* 1.162 I rest finally upon this account. It being certain and confessed that the laws of Man have power to constitute actions of themselves indifferent, into the order of vertue and vice, making that to be incest which before the law was not, and that to be theft which in other countries is lawful, and so in other instances; if the law does change the action onely so as to make it meerly to be an instance of obedience or disobedience, then the law hath no power over internal actions: for man is not the Lord of Consciences and minds, and we are not tied to obey any man commanding an internal act; his judicatory here is not competent, his authority is not sufficient. For it serves no end of the publick, and it hath no judicatory, no cogni∣sance, and no interest: and it were as foolish as for a King to sit upon the strand and command the waters not to flow to his feet. * But if the law of man have chang'd an action not onely to an instance of obedience or dis∣obedience, but plac'd it also in the order of some other vertue or vice, as by changing it to incest, or adultery, or chastity, or temperance respectively, then the law of man hath power over the Conscience even in the most secret act; not directly, and by the energy of its own power, but indi∣rectly, collaterally, and by accident, by reason of the laws of God. The reason is plain: because it is not lawful to commit adultery, or murder, or incest in our heart; the law therefore that constitutes this action and makes

it to be murder, does consequently oblige the Conscience not so much as to desire it. Voluntus facti origo est, quae ne tunc quidem liberatur quum aliquae difficultas perpetrationem intercepit. Ipsa enim sibi imputatur, nec excusari poterit per illam perficiendi infelicitatem operata quod suum fuerat:* 1.163 so Tertul∣lian: The will is the original of action; and is not free'd when she is hindred from doing what she would. Her own act is imputed to her; for though no event succeeded, yet she did all her part. Thus in the Canon law Clementi••. 1. § verum de haereticis, the inquisitor of heretical pravity is excommunicate if either out of hatred or hope of gain he condemn the innocent, or for love and favour absolve the criminal: upon which the Gloss observes that the Superior can punish the sin of the heart, though it never proceed to action; and to this Gloss Panormitan and Adrianus doe consent. Now if it be objected that here is an action external complicated with the internal, and that the law proceeds against that, not against this; I answer, that it is certain the law cannot proceed to sentence against the internal, unless it be some way or in some degree publick: but that which I affirm is, that the law forbids the internal, or commands it, and that, in case the action be plac'd in the rank of vertue or vice distinct from the meer obedience or disobedience, and this is a pregnant instance of it; for the condemning the innocent is therefore the more forbidden and the more condemned because it is presum'd to proceed from hatred. And there∣fore Cato argued well in behalf of the Rhodians, against whom it was mov'd in the Senate that a warre should be made, because they had some little light conjectures that they were not well affected to them; and because some of the Rhodians had mov'd that they might help Perseus the King of Macedonia, in case peace could not be obtained for him: Cato made an oration in their behalf, affirming it to be unreasonable to punish them be∣cause they had a mind once to have made a warre. But this was therefore well said of Cato, because there was no proof that the Rhodians did intend it, and secretly or openly decree it. If they had intended it, it was penal, and when the intention had been prov'd, it might have been more reasonable to proceed to punish their breach of friendship. And this the Rhodians themselves confessed, that the Romans warr'd justly with Perseus for inten∣ding a warre against them; but he so intended it, that he did something towards it; but no City, no nation would destroy them who did nothing towards the evil which they secretly intended. Quis hoc statuit unquam, aut cui concedi sine summo omnium periculo potest, ut eum jure poterit occidere à quo metuisse se dicat ne ipse posterius occideretur? said Cicero; He indulges too much to his fear, and destroies the publick, that will kill any man whom he is pleas'd to fear, or say that he would first kill him. And the reason of that is, because there can be no sufficient proof of the secret thought, without it break forth at least into words and decrees and preparations. But Injuriam facit, qui facturus est, said Seneca. If it appears he was about to doe a mischief, he is guilty; his secret was criminal: and that is it which is punished as often as it can.

And this is more evident in the civil Law,* 1.164 l. si quis non dicam rapere, C. de Episcopis & Clericis. Where the very thought of ravishing a Virgin is punished. It is true, this thought was declared by the attempt or ad∣dress to it: but because it was not consummate, it is evident that humane Laws bind to more then to or from the external action. The law that pu∣nishes the criminal before he hath acted the evil, punishes the internal prin∣cipally:

for in the address & first preparations nothing is done but the dis∣covery of the thought; but when the thought is so discovered, & the action is not done, if the man be punished, it is not for the action, but for the thought. And to this purpose is that of Cicero in his Oration pro T. Annio Milone, Nisi fortè quia perfecta res non est, non fuit punienda: perinde quasi exitus rerum, non hominum consilia, legibus vindicentur. Minus dolendum fuit, re non perfecta, sed puniendum certè nihilo minus. Not to punish the fault be∣cause the mischief was not done is as much as to say, that the laws are not aven∣gers of evil purposes, but of evil events onely. Indeed if the mischief be not done, we grieve the less; but if it was but intended, we punish it never the less. And to this Seneca in his controversies gives testimony, Scelera quoque, quamvis citra exitum subsederunt, puniuntur. The same with that of Peri∣and••r, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not onely those that doe, but those that would sin are to be punished. And to this sense all those laws which punish the affection, though the effect follows not, are to be understood, as Cap. pro humani, §. Sacri, de homicidio l. 6. & l. quis∣quis, C. ad legem Juliam majestatis; & cap. 1. de schismaticis, §. omnem, l 6. & l. Fugitivus, ff. de verborum signif. l. Divus, ff. ad leg. Cornel. de Sicariis.

But this is also further manifest in the differences of chance-medly,* 1.165 man-slaughter, and wilful murder; where the action being wholly differenc'd by the thought of the heart, proves plainly that the thougts also are punish'd by humane Laws ever when they are manifest. And if the Divines and Lawyers would distinguish in this question the punishment from the crime, the Court external from the Court of Conscience, they would not erre in this article. For although a mans thoughts without some external action are not punished, because they are not known; yet they could not be punished when they are known, if they were not punishable and criminal in themselves even against the laws of man. And therefore when Ulpian had said,* 1.166 Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur: Accursius addes, Si statum in finibus cogitationis est. No man can be punished for his thought; that is, if it proceeds no further; for then it is known to none but God.

Upon this account we find sometimes in Laws,* 1.167 commands expresly enjoyning the internal action. Thus when the Council of Lateran had complained of some Clerks and Prelates that either wholly omitted their office, or said it negligently, it addes, Haec & similia sub poena suspensionis penitus inhibemus, districtè praecipientes in virtute obedientiae ut Divinum officium nocturnum pariter & diurnum, quantum eis dederit Deus, studiosè celebrent pariter & devoté: viz. that they say their office diligently and devoutly; which because it is an act of the heart as well as of the outward man,* 1.168 it gives a clear evidence in this inquiry. But above all is that Novel of Justinian, which the late Greek Books have brought to light, it ne∣ver having been noted by the Latine interpreters, in which the Emperour commanded that insolvent debtors who by misfortune, not by their crimes, were made poor, if they swore their insufficiency, were to be freed from all further trouble; and the Creditors that refus'd to obey the edict should pay ten pound of gold; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for their meer thought of doing otherwise should be put to death. I end this with the saying of the Jewish Doctors, Quicquid sapientes vetant palàm fieri, id etiam in pe∣netralibus vetitum est, Whatever the wise men forbid to be done in pub∣lick,

the same must be understood to be forbidden in your closet. It was the saying of Rabbi Bachai.

RULE VI. Humane Laws, before sufficient promulgation, doe not oblige the Conscience.

AS the faults of Subjects are not cognoscible without publication:* 1.169 so neither are the wills of Princes.* 1.170 Leges sacratissimae quae constringunt hominum vitas intelligi ab hominibus debent, says the Law, l. leges, C. de legib. & constit. But in this there is no difficulty: all that is made is in the assignation of the sufficiency of the promulgation. A Spanish Lawyer, Selva,* 1.171 and he alone, so farre as I have heard or read, affirms the very so∣lemn edition of it and declaration in the Court or Council to be sufficient. But as he speaks it wholly without reason, so he is to be rejected without farther trouble. Others require one proclamation in one or more places, according to the greatness of the Province or Jurisdiction; but it can ne∣ver be agreed positively how much is enough. Therefore so farre as our consciences can be concerned in it, these following propositions are certain, and they are sufficient.

1. It is not necessary that laws in their promulgation be so divulged,* 1.172 as that the notice of them reach every single subject. Not onely because in most laws all persons are not concerned, but also because it is morally impossible; I mean in a great Province, where the laws are commonly of greatest concern, and the promulgation more to be regarded and more di∣ligently endeavoured. For laws of men are not like the Sun, searching into all corners; but as the law it self is such as regards that thing which hap∣pens most commonly, so the promulgation is of a symbolical nature, and can arrive but to most persons.

2. In all Princely and sweet Governments there must be such a pub∣lication of laws as must be fit to minister to the publick necessity and the publick duty,* 1.173 that laws be no snares, but piously intended, prudently conducted, sufficiently communicated, and reasonably exacted with abate∣ment of all those deficiencies which are incident and unavoidable to man∣kind; so that if what be in Council judg'd sufficient for promulgation, doe not prove so in the event of things, and in the Province, the defect be put upon the insufficient publication, not upon the account of disobe∣dience.

3. Be the publication legally sufficient, or not sufficient,* 1.174 it is certain that the conscience is not tied by the law, till it be known. I doe not say but that the prevarication may be justly punish'd, because the law may be published as well as is morally possible, or prudently and civilly is requir'd, and yet some may inculpably be ignorant of it. But be it so or otherwise, it is impossible that they who know not of it can obey; and if they can∣not, they cannot be oblig'd: for that is no law, but madness, which obliges a man to that which is impossible.

4. The care and sufficiency of publication is wholly incumbent upon the Law-giver,* 1.175 not at all upon the Subject; that is, the Subject is not bound to seek after the law, but onely to see that he doe not turn his ear from it, or studiously decline it, or endeavour to be ignorant. For a law, though it be for good to the publick, yet to the particular being a restraint upon our natural or political liberty respectively, no man is bound to seek his own fetters, or put the burden upon his own neck, but to wear it well when it is imposed: but to refuse to hear is the first act of disobedience; but to hear is the first instance of obeying; therefore till he hath heard, he is oblig'd to nothing. This hath no limitation or exception but this. If the Subject hath heard there is a law, he is bound to inquire after it, for then it is sufficiently publish'd: the Law-giver hath done his duty. But before he hath heard, it is to him as if it were not; and that which is not cannot be numbred, cannot be accounted for. The first is sufficient to oblige him, he is bound because he knows, the will of the Law-giver hath bound him; but then he must inquire for his own sake, for otherwise he cannot perform his obligation.

5. Although as to conscience the former measures are certain,* 1.176 yet the Legislator hath power to declare when the promulgation is sufficient for the nullifying of all contracts intervening, or evacuating priviledges, and changing all exteriour events of law; because the being of all these de∣pends upon the will of the Prince and of his law. Onely when this is re∣duc'd to practice, in the matter of contracts, if they were valid by the law of nature, he that did contract is oblig'd to stand to it, if the other requires it; but if it be his own advantage, he is bound to quit it, if the other recedes and makes use of his advantage. For the law can tie him to suffer inconvenience for the publick interest, but not to doe any evil. Thus if Titius contract with Mavius to carry twenty Tun of wheat from Sicily to Rome, and before the contract a prohibition of such contracts was legally published, and yet he heard not of it; he is bound to obey it: but if Ma∣vius, who is like to be the gainer, stand upon his right of justice and natu∣ral consent, Titius must make him amends, but he must not transport the corn. But this is in case they be not both Subjects of the same Prince. And the reason of this is plain, because the stranger hath a natural right by justice and stipulation, but the Subject hath a law upon him; therefore the other is not tied to quit that, but the Subject must obey this: not to doe an injury, for no law can oblige him to that; but to suffer one that is tolerable and is outweighed by the publick advantage. But if they be both the Subjects of the same law, the law that forbids one to make the contract, does also by implication forbid the other to exact that which is illegal. So that although the law cannot disoblige Titius from verifying a contract that is valid in the law of nature; yet Mavins can remit his right, and the law can tie him to that.

This holds in all things where the parties can give consent to the in∣validating of the contract.* 1.177 But sometimes they cannot, and then the rule of conscience is, standum est juri naturali, whatever was ratified by nature and religion must remain for ever. The Council of Trent makes a saw that all clandestine marriages shall be null: she publishes the law, and declares it from a certain time to be valid. A poor Vine-dresser in the Valtoline hears nothing of it, but gets the daughter of his Master the Farmer with child

after contract per verba de praesenti. The law is urg'd upon him; the par∣ties are both threatned, and are in that fright willing to recede. But they were told by a prudent Confessor, that they could not consent to any such separation: and he told them truly. For in marriage there is a necessitude contracted by a law of nature, and not onely a mutual right transmitted to each other, but there is a band of Religion, a Sacramental tie, or relation that God hath joyn'd, and no man can put asunder. But until the contract is pass'd so farre as that it is become a marriage in the law and state of na∣ture, the prohibition ought to prevail upon them.

Lastly,* 1.178 in priviledges there is no difficulty, because the law is not bound to give any at all; and therefore many restrain them at any time, without giving a reason. Thus if a law were made that all illegitimate children that were born after the death of the Emperour Maximilian should be un∣capable of a Prebend or benefice in a Church; he that heard not of the law might justly be put out after solemne investiture. For no man is inju∣red, because he hath not a favour done him.

RULE VII. That a law should oblige the Conscience, does not depend upon the acceptation of the Law by the people.

THis Rule hath suffered great prejudice,* 1.179 not onely by the contrary opi∣nion of the Civilians and Canonists, who in very great numbers op∣pose it, but by all persons almost who live under Governments Democra∣tical, or doe not well consider the powers and consequents of government. But the case in short is this;

All Governments in the world did either begin right or wrong.* 1.180 If right, it was by Divine appointment, or by the multiplication of the po∣sterity of a Patriarch, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 increase of Paternal Government. This is the natural way, and this is founded upon natural reason, and a Divine Commandement. This hath in it no evil, and no question, and it is the just beginning of Monarchy, it produces no other Government.

But if the Government comes not this way,* 1.181 it comes in wrong. Ei∣ther from tumults, by necessity and evil experience being forc'd to per∣mit and establish an order and government; or directly by warre and vio∣lence; or else in the destitution of a Governour when all are left to them∣selves, and none hath power over them, they may doe what they list, and order things as they please, and part with as much power as they think fit, and keep some to themselves, and confound all politick principles, and di∣vide power, as two earnest disputants doe divide the truth when they have torn her in pieces, each part running away with that share that comes next his hand.

Now from these beginnings of Governments several Republicks and Principalities have been established;* 1.182 and when it hapned that any famous

government entred the wrong way, they became exemplary to others in their policy and in their principles, and made their actions become rules to others. Thus it was that the Roman people, keeping the legislative power in their own hands, made Kings and Consuls and officers at their pleasure, but their consent was alwaies demanded when a law was to be made, as is affirmed by Asconius Pedianus in orationem pro C. Cornelio, and by Budaeus and Zasius in l. 2. ff. de origine juris. These laws were made in a convocation of the people in thirty Courts, and were called Curiatae, as is affirm'd by Suetonius in Augusto, and in Cicero in his epistles to Lentulus: they were also called Populares by Cicero in his orations. Now this people so largely reigning over the world, and being exemplary by their wis∣dome and their laws, did easily transmit this licence unto the people of most Nations, who needed but little teaching to bridle the power of their Prin∣ces, to which they were but too much tempted by that libido regnandi, that lust of empire which possesses the greatest part of the world; and by their own strength, which they often made their Kings to feel, and would not lend to them in their needs but upon hard conditions. * Adde to all this, that many princes have been gentle and kind, and many wise, and would not put a bridle upon such an untam'd beast without their own con∣sent; not onely that they might obey more willingly, but lest they should not obey at all, as knowing it to be better that they should be rul'd as they please, then not at all.

—Libertatis servaveris umbram Si quicquid jubeare velis—

This phantastick liberty the people would seldome be without; and they must have what they were resolv'd on; for when they please, they are all Kings.

Upon the account of these and some other causes it is come to pass that in many places laws have their binding power onely by the consent of the people;* 1.183 in their tribes and Courts, or by their representatives, or by their manners and customes: and from hence from these sayings of some very wise men; Lex nullam vim obligandi habet nisi ex more;* 1.184 so Ari∣stotle: and, Leges promulgatione constitui, firmari autem usu, saies Gratian: and the civil law most expressly, Ipsae leges nullâ aliâ causâ nos tenent quam quod judicio populi receptae sunt, The reception and approbation of the people is the onely firmament and Sanction of the law. Now that the civil law saies it, it was ex more Romanorum; among the old Romans it alwaies was so: and Aristotle speaks at the rate of him who had been bred under the popular government of the Greeks, and therefore it is no wonder that any of them speaks so: but as for the words of Gratian, Laurentius and the Arch-Deacon expound them to mean that the laws receive from the use of the people firmitatem stabilitatis, non authoritatis; that is, de facto they are made more firm and lasting by the consent and manners of the people, but not de jure more obliging;* 1.185 according of that of Tertullian, Neque civis fideliter legi obsequitur ignorans quale sit quod ulciscitur lex. Nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam justitiae suae debet, sed eis à quibus obsequium expectat: caete∣rum suspecta lex est quae probari se non vult; improba autem si non probata dominetur. A Citizen does not faithfully obey that law (meaning of going to warre) who knows not what that is which is to be punish'd. For that a law is just is owing in part to him that is to obey it. That law is to be su∣spected

which will not indure a trial; but if being tried it be rejected, it cannot prevail without injustice.

Having now by this narrative laid open the secret and foundation of this opinion,* 1.186 and prevented the objections that can be made, the Rule is certain and easy. The consent of the people gives no authority to the law; & therefore is no way necessary to the Sanction and constitution, save onely to prevent violence, rebellion and disobedience. But because I am not writing rules of policy, but rules of consciēce, I am to say, that if the legislative power be in the Prince, that is, if he be supreme, he is to decree the law; but where∣ever the authority be, that authority is derived from God, and is onely less then him: and although a horse sometime cannot be ruled without stroak∣ings and meat and gentle usages, yet for all that his rider in his Master: and he that said, obey them that have the rule over you, and submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether to the King as to the su∣preme, &c. did not appoint the supreme to rule by a precarious power; and if he who hath authority makes a just law, either the people are bound to accept the law, or they despise the authority. And indeed it is a contra∣diction in the terms, that a law be impos'd, and yet that it be no law of it self; that is, that the effect of the cause should be a necessary condition in the cause it self; and that it's own work is nothing, unless what it does work give it force. It must be a law before they accept it, and if it be a law they are bound to accept it; and therefore their accepting cannot make it a law.

In popular governments the people have their suffrages in the legis∣lative;* 1.187 but then it is because they govern: but when they have not the legislative, he that hath it must not ask them leave to use it, when God hath given him power. They indeed who suppose Kings to be trustees and ministers of the people have some pretence (if they suppos'd true) to affirm the acceptation of the people to be necessary. But yet if they did suppose true, it were indeed a pretence but no more. For when the King is chosen, and is by the people (that I may use the expression of Tiberius) tantâ temque liberâ potestate instructus, invested with a Princely power, and the legislative; he, by himself or by his Senate, according to the constitu∣tion of the province, is to make the law, and to punish them that break it, and not to ask them if they will please to obey it. Lex institutir cum pro∣mulgatur, saies the Authentick: and therefore whosoever does not obey, whether it be a single person or a multitude, they sin against God; it is disobedience in a single person, and rebellion in the multitude. All which is true with the provisos of the former rules, that the laws be upon all their just accounts in all other things obligatory.

This Rule does also fail in all arbitrary conventions and precarious governments;* 1.188 in such which have no coercitive power but what is by vo∣luntary concession; such which can convene and dissolve at pleasure, as Colleges and Fraternities. For as they meet at pleasure, so they must be governed as they please; their power comes not from God, but from man; and their authority is equivocal.

Some insert one case here,* 1.189 saying that if a law be refus'd by the greater part of the people, then single ••••sons are excus'd, because it is to be sup∣pos'd that the Prince cares not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 single persons observe the law, since so

little will serve no interest. But if this were true, yet there is in it so much caution to be us'd, so many provisos, and so much probability to the con∣trary, that it were as good that it were not true; for it cannot give rest or peace to the Conscience. For 1. whether the Prince doe secretly give leave or no, is a presumption of infinite uncertainty. 2. The contrary may very well be suppos'd; for he that is troubled at the rebellion of many will not give leave to one to disobey. 3. If these few single persons doe sub∣mit, they become good examples, and are confessors for the reputation of the Kings wisdome and authority. 4. What is evil in the whole is so in every particular; because the people is but an aggregate body of single persons. 5. We must not follow a multitude to doe evil: and all rebellion is of that nature, that it is as the sin of witchcraft; and who would be a witch because all the Country is so? 6. He that partakes of other mens sins shall also partake of their punishment. Upon these accounts, I judge it very unsafe for any single person to resist a just law of a just superior, upon hope of escaping in the Croud.* 1.190 But this Rule is onely true when the law is just and good for publick profit and usefulness of the people. For if it be an unreasonable law, it binds not as a law, but as by promise and contract; that is, it does not bind by the sanction of the law, but the acceptation of the people. And so the ancient lawyers are to be understood; Lex praecepti tollitur,* 1.191 si moribus utentium non recipitur, The obligation of the law is taken off, unless it be receiv'd into the manners of the Subjects. But the instance tells in what sense this is true. The Pope and Council cannot command continence to a certain sort of persons after promotion against their wills; quia continentia est res quae potest persuaderi, imperari autem non, Because continence is a thing that may be perswaded, but not commanded. The matter of the law is to be order'd according to the measures of the third Rule; but supposing that, this Rule is certain.

RULE VIII. Humane laws of indifferent matter doe not oblige the Conscience of the Subjects out of the domi∣nions of the Superior.

EXtra territorium jus dicenti,* 1.192 non paretur, impune, is a famous saying in the Canon law,* 1.193 A man may safely disobey the law of his Prelate if he be out of the Diocess. And the reason is, because beyond his Diocess he hath no jurisdiction;* 1.194 and beyond his jurisdiction a Prince hath no power. Lex est jus proprium civitatis, saith the law; The law hath no power beyond it's own city. Thus anciently, in the Province of Canterbury the people did not fast upon S. Marks day; but if they were within the Province of York they were tied to the common law, or custome of the Church besides. Thus also it is in maritime places, especially in places of publick Trade and Merchandize: if the several Subjects should keep the several Laws of their own Princes, it would cause great confusion and disorder upon the place of Trade; and since it is certain that strangers must live by the laws of the Country where they sojourn, it is certain they are not tied to the laws of their own, because they may be contrary.

1. But this hath divers limitations.* 1.195 For 1. It does not hold in the substantial matters of religion, where the religions of the Country differ. It is not lawful for a Subject of England to goe to Mass in a forein Coun∣try; not onely upon supposition that the office is suspicious or to be blam'd by the measures of the Divine Law, but if the laws of our Coun∣try have upon other prudent and just considerations forbidden it. The sons of the Church of England professing under the government Episco∣pal may not lawfully communicate in the Huguenot Churches with them that believe Episcopacy to be Antichristian or unlawful, because this does relate to the evil and detriment of those laws and that government and that authority under which we still are tied. But in the ceremonial and ri∣tual part of religion, where the religion is the same, we are not tied abroad to our Country customes. A Subject of the Church of England may stand at the Holy Communion, or eat it in leavened bread, if he come into Protestant Countries that have any such custome: and the reason of this is, because the contrary would give scandal, to which our own laws nei∣ther doe nor can oblige abroad; and if any be offended at our different ce∣remonies at home, he must look to it, we are not concerned in any thing, but to obey our Superiour, and quietly to render a reason to our bre∣thren.

2. This Rule does not hold in such laws which are the specification of the Divine laws.* 1.196 Thus if a Subject of England should be in Spain, and there see his Daughter dishonoured, or his Wife consent to her shame, and take her in Adultery; he may not kill her, though in Spain it be law∣ful for them to doe it. The reason is, because she is not a Subject of Spain, but hath an habituall relation to England, and therefore it is Murder if it be done by an English Subject. Concerning all his own Subjects, the Prince of the Countrey and the Legislative is to give limits to the inde∣finite lawes of God; and the reason is that which S. Paul gives, because he who hath the rule over them is to give an account of their Souls. Every law therefore is to acquit or condemn herown Subjects: and therefore if a Spaniard does dishonour the bed of an English Subject in Spain, it is law∣full there to kill him; because his own Princes law condemns him, and gives leave to the injur'd person to be Executioner. All these particulars rely upon the same reason.

3. This Rule does not hold,* 1.197 when though the Subject be abroad, yet the action does relate to his own Country. Thus it is not lawful abroad to coyn or counterfeit the money of his Country, to rail upon his Prince, to prejudice his Subjects, to violate his honour, to disgrace his Nation, to betray the secrets and discover the Counsels of his Prince. Because the evil done out of the territory being an injury to them within, is as if it were done within. When the dispute was between the Athenians and Thebans about their confines, and the parties stood at a little distance, disputing and wrangling about the breadth of an acre of ground, Timo∣theus shoots an arrow and kills a young Theban Gentleman. The Thebans demand that Timotheus be put to death by the laws of Athens, as being their Subject: they refuse to doe so, but deliver Timotheus to the The∣bans, giving this reason, He shot the arrow within the Athenian limit, but it did the mischief within the territory of Thebes; and where the evil is done, there and by them let the criminal be punish'd. Being abroad is no

cuse in this case. If a Subject shoots an arrow into his own Country, though he bent his bow abroad, at home he shall find the string.

4. If the action be something to be done at home,* 1.198 the Subject abroad is bound to obey the summons of the law. When Henry the second of England commanded all Prelates and Curates to reside upon their Dio∣ceses and charges, Thomas Becket of Canterbury was bound in conscience, though he was in France, to repair to his Province at home. The summe of all is this, A law does not oblige beyond the proper territory, unless it relate to the good or evil of it. For then it is done at home to all real events of nature, and to all intents and purposes of law. For if the law be affirmative, commanding something to be done at home, at home this omis∣sion is a sin: Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea quae non facit,* 1.199 saith the Law, The omission is a sin there where the action ought to have been done. But if the Law be nagative, Qui facit quod fa∣cere non debet, non videtur facere id quod facere jussus est. He that does what he is forbidden to doe is answerable to him who hath power to com∣mand him to doe it.

This Rule thus explicated is firm;* 1.200 and is to be extended to exempt or priviledged places, according to that saying of the Lawyers, Locus ex∣emptus habetur pro extraneo, He that lives in an exempt place, lives abroad.

By the proportions of this Rule it is easy to answer concerning stran∣gers,* 1.201 whether they be bound by the Laws of the Nation where they pass or traffick. For in all things where they are not oblig'd by their own Prince, they are by the stranger, and that upon the same account; for if they who are abroad are not ordinarily bound by the Laws of their Coun∣try (except in the cases limited) it is because the jurisdiction and dominion of their Prince goes not beyond his own land; and in such cases the place is more then the person: but therefore it must goe so farre, and be the per∣son what he will, yet in the territory he is under the law of that Prince. He is made so by that place. It is Lex terrae, the Law of the land in which he is: and in the peace of that he shall have peace, as God said to the Jews concerning the land of their Captivity.

RULE IX. Obedience to Laws is to be paid according to what is commanded, not according to what is best.

WHen Lacon was fighting prosperously,* 1.202 and had prevail'd very farre upon his enemies,* 1.203 it happened that a retreat was sounded just as he was lifting up his hand to smite a considerable person; he turned his blow aside and went away, giving this reason to him that asked him why, It is better to obey then to kill an enemy. But when Crassus the Romane Gene∣ral sent to Athens to an Engineer a command to send him such a piece of timber towards the making of a battery, he sent him one which he sup∣pos'd was better; but his General caused him to be scourged for his di∣ligence: and Torquatus Manlius being Consul commanded his son not to fight that day with the Enemy, but he espying a great advantage fought and

beat him and won a glorious victory, for which he was crown'd with a tri∣umphant lawrel, but for his disobedience lost his head. It is not good to be wiser then the laws; and sometimes we understand not the secret rea∣son of the Princes command, or the obedience may be better then a good turn, or a better counsel; which is very often ill taken, unless it be re∣quir'd. Corrumpi atque dissolvi officium omne imperantis ratus si quis ad id quod facere jussus est, non obsequio debito, sed consilio non desiderato respon∣deat, said Crassus in A. Gellius.

Thus also it is in the observation of the Divine Commandements:* 1.204 when God hath declared his will, and limited our duty to circumstances and particulars, he will not be answered by doing that which we suppose is bet∣ter. We must not be running after Sermons, when we should be labouring to provide meat for our family: for besides that it is direct disobedience in the case now put, there is also an error in the whole affair; for that which we think is better then the Commandement, is not better: and this God declared in the case of Saul, Obedience is better then sacrifice. No work is better then that which God appoints.

3. This is to be understood so that it is not onely left to our liberty,* 1.205 but it is also rewardable, for the Subject to prevent a Commandement, and to excell the measures of the Law in the matter of a Commandement, when to doe so we know will be accepted, and is to the pleasure and use of the Prince. Thus Astyages preferr'd Chrysantas before Hystaspes, because he did not onely obey as Hystaspes did, but understood the mind of the Prince, and when he knew what would please him, did it of his own accord. But then this is upon the same account, it is obedience, onely it is early and it is forward.

This also is to be added,* 1.206 that if the choice of the Subject differing from the command of the Prince be very prosperous and of great benefit, the Prince does commonly ex post facto allow the deed; that is, he does not punish it. P. Crassus Mutius and T. Manlius did otherwise; but they were severe and great examples. But when it is not punish'd, it is not be∣cause it does not deserve it, but because it is pardon'd: for if it should mis∣carry, it would not escape vengeance: and therefore though the prospe∣rous event be lov'd, yet it came in at a wrong door, and the disobedience was criminal. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Masters are to command, but the province of servants is to obey, saith S. Chrysostome.

This Rule is to be understood according to the intention,* 1.207 not accor∣ding to the letter of the law; for if the intention of it be that which is better, it is evident that is to be done which is better in the intention, not that which is commanded in the letter. But of this in the Chapter of interpretation of Laws.

CHAP. II. Of Laws Penal and Tributary.

RULE. I. It is lawful for Christian Magistrates to make penal Laws, not onely pecuniary and of restraint, but of loss of member and life it self.

WHatsoever is neccessary is just;* 1.208 that is, that must be done which cannot be avoided: and therefore the power of the Magistrate in punishing the transgres∣sors of their laws of peace, and order, and interest, is infinitely just* 1.209; for without a coercitive power there can be no government, and without government there can be no communities of men; a herd of wolves is quieter and more at one then so many men, unless they all had one reason in them, or have one power over them. Ancus Rex primus Carcerem in Romano foro aedificavit, ad terrorem increscentis au∣daciae, says Livy. King Ancus seeing impiety grow bold, did erect a prison in the publick markets. When iniquity was like to grow great, then that was grown necessary. And it is observ'd that the Macedonians call Death 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from the Hebrew word DAN, which signifies a Judge, as intima∣ting that Judges are appointed to give sentences upon criminals in life and death.* 1.210 And therefore God takes upon himself the title of a King and a Judge,* 1.211 of a Lord and Governour; and gives to Kings and Judges the title of Gods, and to Bishops and Priests the style of Angels.

But here I will suppose that Magistracy is an ordinance of God,* 1.212 ha∣ving so many plain Scriptures for it; and it being by S. Paul affirmed, that he beareth not the sword in vain,* 1.213 and that they who have done evil ought to fear; and of himself he professed that if he had done ought worthy of death he did not refuse to die; and a caution given by S. Peter, that Christians should take care that they doe not suffer as malefactors: and it being made a note of hereticks that they are Traytors, that they are murmurers, that they despise dominion, that they speak evil of dignities; and that we are com∣manded to pray for Kings and all that are in authority, for this reason, be∣cause they are the appointed means that men should live a peaceable and a godly life; for piety, and peace, and plenty too depend upon good Go∣vernments: and therefore Apollo Pythius told the Lacedemonian Embassa∣dors that if they would not call home Plistonax their King from banish∣ment and restore him to his right, they should be forc'd to till their ground with a silver Plough; that is, they should have scarcity of corn in their own Cities, and be forc'd to buy their grain to relieve the famine of their Country: for so the event did expound the Oracle; they grew poor and

starv'd because they unjustly suffer'd their King to live in exile. Adde to these, that we are often commanded to obey them that have the rule over us; to be subject to every ordinance of man; that Rulers are not a terror to good works but to the evil, and many more to equal purposes.

Neither ought the precept of charity and forgiveness,* 1.214 which Christ so often, so earnestly, so severely presses, evacuate the power of Princes. For the precept of forgiving offendors does not hinder parents from cor∣recting their offending children; nor Masters from chastising their rebel∣lious servants; nor the Church from excommunicating them that walk disorderly: these things rely upon plain Scriptures, and upon neces∣sity, and experience; and they doe evince thus much without any further dispute, that some punishment may stand with the precept of forgiveness; or at least, if he who is injur'd may not punish without breach of charity, yet some one else may. And if it be permitted to the power of man to punish a criminal without breach of charity; the power of the Magistrate must be without all question; and that such a power can consist with cha∣rity there is no doubt, when we remember that the Apostles themselves and the primitive Churches did deliver great Criminals over to the power of Sathan to be buffeted, even to the destruction of the flesh, that their Souls might be sav'd in the day of the Lord. S Paul delivered Elymas to blindness, and S. Peter gave Ananias and Saphira to a corporal death.

But the great Case of Conscience is this.* 1.215 Although all punishments less then death may like paternal corrections consist with charity (for they may be disciplines and emendations) yet in death there is no amendment; and therefore to put a man to death flagrante crimine, before he hath mortified his sin, or made amends for it; that is, before it is pardon'd, and consequently to send him to hell, is the most against charity in the world, and therefore no man hath power to doe it: for God never gave to any man a power to dispense justice to the breach of charity; and that dispensation which sends a man to Hell, is not for edification, but for destruction.

To this I answer,* 1.216 1. That it is true that whatsoever is against cha∣rity is not the effect of justice; for both of them are but imitations and transcripts of the Divine attributes and perfections, which cannot be con∣trary to each other. But when the faults and disorders of mankind have intangled their own and the publick affairs, they may make that necessary to them, which in the first order and intention of things was not to be en∣dur'd. Thus we cut off a leg and an arm to save the whole body; and the publick magistrate, who is appointed to defend every mans rights, must pull an honest mans house to the ground to save a town or a street: and peace is so dear, so good, that for the confirming and perpetuity of it, he may commence a warre which were otherwise intolerable. If therefore any evil comes by such ministeries of justice, they who introduc'd the necessity must thanke themselves. For it is necessary it should be so; though it be but a suppositive and introduc'd necessity; onely he that in∣troduc'd it, is the cause of the evil; not he that is to give the best remedy that he hath.

2. No man is to answer for an accidental effect that is consequent to* 1.217

his duty. In omni dispositione attenditur quod principaliter agitur, saies the law, l. si quis nec causam, ff. si certum petatur. I am to look to what is principally design'd, not what accidentally can happen. If I obey God, it is no matter who is offended. If I see that my neighbour will envy me for doing good, and his eye will be evil because I am good, I am not to omit the good, for fear his Soule perish; when my good is rather apt to doe him good then evil: he is to answer for it, not I, for nothing that I doe makes him evil, he makes himself so by his own choice. There are many men that turn the grace of God into wantonness; and abuse the long suffering and patience of God, and turn that into occasions of sin which God meant for the opportunities and endearments of repentance; but if God should leave to be gracious to mankind in the same method, out of charity and compliance with the interest of the Souls of such miserable per∣sons, as they would be never the better, so the other parts of mankind would be infinitely the worse.

3. It is true that Charity is the duty of every Christian;* 1.218 but as all Chri∣stians are not to express it in the same manner, so there are some expressions of charity which may become some persons, and yet be the breach of anothers duty: and some may become our wishes which can never be re∣duc'd to act; and because that is all we can doe, it is all we are oblig'd to doe. When Vertagus was condemn'd to die for killing the brother of Aruntius Priscus; the poor Father of the condemned man came and beg'd for the life of his miserable son; but Priscus out of the love of his murder'd brother beg'd with the same importunity that he might not escape; and both their effects were the effects of charity. The charity of a Prelate and a Minister of religion is another thing then the charity of a Prince. A Mother signifies her love one way and a Father another; she by fond∣ness and tender usages, he by severe counsels and wise education; and when the Minister of religion takes care concerning the Soul of the poor con∣demn'd man, the Prince takes care that he shall doe no more mischief, and increase his sad account with God. The Prince and the Prelate are both of them Curates of Souls and Ministers of Godliness; but the Prince ministers by punishing the evil doer and rewarding the vertuous, and the Prelate by exhortation and doctrine, by reproof and by prayer, by Sacra∣ments and discipline, by the key of power and the key of knowledg. The effect of this consideration is this; that the magistrate by doing justice in the present case does not doe against charity; because he does minister to charity in the capacity and proper obligation of a Magistrate, when he does his own work, which being ordain'd for good and not for evil, the office is then most charitable and most proper for him, when he ministers to charity in his own way that God hath appointed him. By his justice he ministers to the publick Good, and that is his office of charity. That is his work; let others look to their share.

4. The cutting off of a Malefactor is some charity to his person,* 1.219 though a sad one; for besides that it prevents many evils, and forces him to a speedy recollection, and a summary repentance, and intense acts of ver∣tue by doubling his necessity; it does also cause him to make amends to the law; and that oftentimes stands him in great stead before the Tri∣bunal of Gods justice; paullum supplicii satis est Patri; God is sometimes pleas'd to accept of a small punishment for a great offence; and his anger

many times goes not beyond a temporal death, and the cutting off some years of his life.

5. That which concerns the Magistrate is,* 1.220 that he be just and chari∣table too. Justice of it self is never against charity; but some actions of suppos'd charity may be against justice. Therefore the Magistrate in that capacity is tied to no charity but the charity of justice, the mercies of the law; that is, that he abate of the rigor as much as he can, that he make provisions for the Soul of the criminal such as are fit for his need, that if he can delay, he doe not precipitate executions. In what is more, the su∣preme, the law-giver is to take care, and to give as much leave to the ministers of justice as can consist with the publick interest. For here it is that there is use of that proposition, that all men are not tied to all the exterior kinds and expressions of charity, but as they are determin'd acci∣dentally. It will not be suppos'd that the Judge is uncharitable if he doe not preach to the condemn'd criminal; or if he doe not give him money after sentence, or visit him in prison, or goe to pray with him at the block; these are not the portions of his duty: but as his justice requires him to condemne him; so his charity exacts of him as Judge nothing but the mercies of the law.

6. That which is necessary to be done,* 1.221 is not against any mans duty, or any precept of Christianity. Now that some sorts of persons should be put to death is so necessary, that if it were not done it would be certainly, directly and immediately a very great uncharitableness; and the Magistrate should even in this instance be more uncharitable then he can be suppos'd to be in putting the criminal to death. For a high-way thief and murderer if he be permitted does cut off many persons who little think of death; and such as are innocent as to the Common-wealth, are yet very guilty before God: for whose Souls and the space of whose repentance there is but very ill provision made, if they may live who shall send many Souls to hell, by murdering such persons who did not watch and stand in readiness against the sad day of their sudden arrest. If all such persons were to be free from afflictive punishments, the common-wealth would be no society of peace, but a direct state of warre, a state most contrary to governments; but if there were any other less then death, the gallies and the Mines, and the prisons would be nothing but nurseries of villains, which by their numbers would grow as dangerous as a herd of Wolves and Lions: and if ever they should break into a warre, like Spartacus and his rabble, who knows how many Souls should be sent to Hell for want of time to finish their re∣pentance?

7. If the condemn'd Criminal had never any time to repent,* 1.222 if he had never thrown away any opportunities of salvation, he had never come to that pass; and if he have, who is bound to give him as much as he will need? And if it be unlawful for a magistrate to put a criminal to death that hath not sufficiently repented, then no villain shall ever die by the pub∣lick hand of justice; and the worse the man is, the longer he shall live, and the better he shall escape: for in this case, if he resolves privately that he never will repent, he hath blunted the edge of the sword, and weakned the arme of justice for ever that she shall never strike.

8. God hath given a commission to Magistrates which they must not prevaricate:* 1.223 if therefore a Criminal falls under the rods and axes of the Consuls who are Gods Ministers for good to them that doe well, and for evil to them that doe evil; it is not the Magistrate who is to be blam'd, but the hand of God that is to be rever'd, who by this hand cuts him off, and it may be therefore thus cuts him off because he will give him no lon∣ger time. However the Magistrate is to look to his rule, not to rare, and accidental events; which are onely in the power of the Divine providence and in the will of the Man to prevent.

9. No man can say that a condemn'd Criminal that makes the best use of his time after sentence,* 1.224 or after his just fears of it, or after the appre∣hension of the probabilities of it, shall certainly be damn'd for want of more time. For as no man knows just how much time is necessary; so neither can he tell how deep the repentance of the Man is, nor yet how soon God will return to mercy. Therefore upon so great uncertainties, and the pre∣sumption and confidences relying upon such a secret, to omit a certain duty is no way allowable. It is true there are amongst some wise and pious per∣sons great fears in this case; but fear is very good when it is made use of to good purposes, to obstruct the course of sin, but not the course of justice. And some men fear in other cases very bad; which yet ought not to be made use of to preserve the lives of Murderers. Some fear that all Papists shall be damned, and some say that all Protestants are in as bad condition; and yet he that thinks so, would suppose the case too far extended if it might not be consistent, with charity to put (for examples sake) the gunpowder Traytors to death, till they had chang'd their religion. Whatsoever we fear, we are to give our brethren warning of it while it is time for them to consider; but these doubtful disputes must not be us'd as artifices to eva∣cuate the purposes and defensatives of laws. And since the Magistrates cannot know what the sentence of God concerning such persons shall be, they may hope well as readily as ill, and then there is no pretence to arrest the sentence beyond the prudent and charitable periods of the law.

10. No change in government,* 1.225 no alteration of laws, no publick sen∣tences are to be made or alter'd upon the account of any secret Counsel of God; but they are to proceed to issue upon the account of rules, and mea∣sures of choice, and upon that which is visible, or proved, that which is seen and heard, that which God commands and publick necessities require; for otherwise there can be no rule, no orderly proceedings, no use of wise discourses, but chance and fear and irregular contingencies must overrule all things.

11. The Magistrate gives sentence against Criminals for single acts,* 1.226 not for vitious habits; for concerning these he hath nothing to doe, and if the Criminal perish for these, it is onely chargeable upon his own account. But if by the hand of justice he dies for a single act; the shorter time that is usually allowed to those that are appointed to die may be so sufficient that if the Criminal make full use of it, his case is not so desperate, as that the objection can prevail: for if there be nothing else to hinder him, it may be very well; but if there be any thing else, that he and not the Magi∣strate was first to have considered; for himself knew of it, the Magistrate did not.

12. Every man that lives under government knows the conditions of it,* 1.227 those publick laws, and the manners of execution; and that he who is surpris'd in his sin by the Magistrate, shall be cut off like him who by a sudden sickness falls into the hands of God. It is a sudden death, which every man ought to have provided for; onely in this case it is more cer∣tain, and to be expected: and he that knows this to be his condition, if he will despise the danger,* 1.228 when he falls into it, cannot complain of the justice of the law, but of his own folly which neglected life, and chose death and swift destruction.

Though from these considerations it appears that the pretence of cha∣rity cannot evacuate that justice which hath given commission to all lawful Magistrates,* 1.229 and warrant to all capital sentences, and authority to all just warrs, in which it is more then probable many will be kill'd that are not very well prepared: yet this power of inflicting capital punishments must not be reduc'd to act in trifling instances, for the loss of a few shillings or for every disobedience to command; it must not be done, but in the great and unavoidable necessities of the Common-wealth. For every Magistrate is also a Man; and as he must not neglect the care and provisions of that, so neither the kindnesses and compassion of this. Nothing can make recom∣pence for the life of a man, but the life of a better, or the lives of many, or a great good of the whole community. But when any of these is at stake, it is fit the innocent be secur'd by the condemnation of the Criminal. And this was excellently disputed by Cicero in his argument against Calenus upon this very question.* 1.230 Hoc interest inter meam sententiam & tuam: ego nolo quenquam civem committere ut morte multandus sit; tu etiamsi commiserit, etiam conservandum putas. In corpore si quid ejusmodi est quod reliquo cor∣pori noceat, uri secarique patiamur, ut membrorum aliquod potius quam totum corpus intereat. Sic in Reip. corpore ut totum salvum sit, quicquid est pestife∣rum amputetur. Dura vox; multo illa durior: salvi sint improbi, deleantur innocentes, honesti, boni, tota Respublica. Cicero would have no Citizen de∣serve to die; but Calenus would have none die though he did deserve it. But Cicero though it reason that as in the body natural we cut off an arm to save the whole, so in the body politick we doe the same, that nothing remain alive that will make the other die. It is a hard sentence: it is true, but this is a harder. Let the wicked be safe; and let the innocent, the good, the just men, the whole common-wealth be destroyed.

This we see is natural reason,* 1.231 but it is more then so; it is also a na∣tural law,* 1.232 express'd and established by God himself. He that sheddeth mans blood, in man, or by man, shall his blood be shed: which words are further explicated by the Chaldee Paraphrast, Qui effuderit sanguinem hominis cum testibus, juxta sententiam Judicum sanguis ejus fundetur, He that sheds the blood of man with witnesses, his blood shall be shed by the sentence of the Judge. For the Majesty of the supreme Prince or Judge.

—justi Vim terroris habet, procul an propè, praesto vel absens: Semper terribilis, semper metuenda, suoque Plena vigore manet,* 1.233 nullique impunè premenda Creditur, & semper cunctis, & ubique timetur.

said Guntherus with greater truth then elegance: he hath the force of a just terror in all places, at all times, and upon all persons. And in pursuance

of this law all communities of men have comported themselves, as know∣ing themselves but Ministers of the Divine sentence; and that which is the voice of all the world is the voice of nature, and the voice of God. The summe of these things I give in the words of S. Austin. Non ipse occidit qui ministerium debet jubenti, sicut adminiculum gladius est utenti. Ideo ne∣quaquam contra hoc praeceptum fecerunt, quo dictum est, Non occides, qui Deo authore bella gesserunt, aut personam gerentes publicae potestatis, secundum ejus leges, hoc est, justissimae rationis imperium, sceleratos morte puniverunt. They who make just warrs, and those publick persons who according to the laws put malefactors to death, doe not break the Commandement which saies, Thou shalt not kill. For as the sword is not guilty of murder which is the instrument of just executions, so neither is the man that is the Minister of the Judge, nor the Judge who is the Minister of God; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, God Minister of revenge and anger: and by fear to restrain the malice of evil men, and to prevent mischief to the good, is the purpose of authority and the end of laws.* 1.234 So Isidore, Factae sunt leges ut earum metu humana coerceatur audacia, tutaque esset inter improbos inno∣centia, & in ipsis improbis formidato suplicio refraenaretur nocendi facultas. Fear is the beginning of wisdome, and fear is the extinction and remedy of folly; and therefore the laws take care by the greatest fear, the fear of death, to prevent or suppress the greatest wickedness.

RULE II. Penal laws doe sometimes oblige the guilty person to the suffering the punishment, even before the sentence and declaration of the Judge.

THat this is true concerning Divine Laws is without peradventure:* 1.235 not onely because the power of God is supreme, meer, absolute, and eternal, and consequently can oblige to what, and by what measure, and in what manner, and to what purposes he please; but also because we see it actually done in the laws and constitutions both Mosaical and Evangelical.

He that strake out an eye or tooth from a servant was bound to give him his liberty:* 1.236 that is,* 1.237 as his servant was a loser, so must he that caused it; the man lost his tooth, and the Master lost the man; he gains his li∣berty that lost an eye. Now that this was to be done by the Master himself without compulsion from the Judge, is therefore more then probable, be∣cause God who intended remedy to the injur'd servant had not provided it, if he left the matter to the Judge, to whom the servant could have no recourse without his Master please; and if he give him leave to goe, it is all one as doing of it himself, for he that gives leave that himself be com∣pell'd, first chuses the things, and call is in aid from abroad to secure the thing at home. But therefore God bound the conscience of the man, tying him under pain of his own displeasure that the remedy be given, and the pe∣nalty suffered and pai'd under the proper sentence of the obliged criminal.

To the same purpose was that law made for him that lies with a wo∣man in the days of her separation,* 1.238 he shall be unclean until the evening;

Now that this was not to be inflicted by the Judge, but that the guilty per∣son should himself be the executioner of the penalty, is therefore certain, because by another law concerning the same legal uncleanness it was de∣creed, that the fact shall be capital,* 1.239 that is, if it come before the Judge: of which I have already given account.

Thus also God imposed upon him that eat of the holy things unwit∣tingly,* 1.240 the burden of paying the like, & a fifth part besides for punishment of his negligence and want of caution.* 1.241 This himself was to bring, toge∣ther with the price of redemption or expiation. Now this being done against his will, might also be done without the observation of any other; and yet upon the discovery he was thus to act his own amends and pe∣nalty.

And indeed the very expence of Sacrifices,* 1.242 to the bringing of which the criminals were sentenc'd by the law, is sufficient demonstration of this inquiry; for it was no small burden to them, and diminution of their estates, to take long journeys, and bring fat beasts and burn them to the Lord; but to this they themselves were tied, without injunction from the Priest, or sentence from the Judge. And this appears, because they were tied to a distinct punishment if the matter fell into the Judges hand: they were in case of theft to restore four-fold:* 1.243 But if they had sinn'd in this instance or in any other that men commit, they were bound to come and confess it, and shall recompence the trespass with the principal thereof, and adde a fifth part to him against whom they have trespassed. This the Jews call confessionem super peccato singulari,* 1.244 a special confession of a sin; to which because the sinner was sentenc'd by the law, and had a lighter amends appointed him if he did it voluntary, but a much heavier if he came before the criminal Judge; it follows plainly that God tied these delinquents to a voluntary or spontaneous susception of their punishment. It was indeed an alleviation of their punishment; for the criminal was bound to confess (say the Jewish Doctors) and say when the beast goes to sacrifice, thinking as if he were going as the beast is, O Domine, ego reus sum mortis, ego commeruissem lapidari propter hoc peccatum, vel strangulari propter hanc praevaricationem, vel comburi propter hoc crimen, O Lord, I am guilty of death, I have deserv'd to be ston'd, or strangled, or burnt alive for this crime, according as the sin was: but his being the executioner of the Divine sentence in the lesser instance did prevent the more severe and in∣tolerable condemnation.

For indeed such is the mercy and dispensation of God:* 1.245 Gods law de∣crees evil to him that does evil: if we become executioners of the law of God and of his angry sentence, we prevent the greater anger of God; ac∣cording to that of S. Paul, judge your selves, brethren, that ye be not judged of the Lord. If we humble our selves, God will exalt us; if we smite, he will spare;* 1.246 if we repent, he will repent: but therefore in these cases be∣tween God and us it is so far from being a grievance, that we become executioners of the sentence decreed by law against us, that though it be an act of justice in God to oblige us to it, yet it is also a very great mercy. For as in the law of Moses, the spontaneous susception of the punishment did prevent the heavier hand of the Judge from falling on him; so in the Evangelical law, it prevents the intolerable hand of God. So that in

relation to the law of God it is an action of repentance; and repentance being a penal or punitive duty, he that was tied to bring in his own obla∣tion, to make his own amends, to confess willingly his sin, was in effect tied to nothing but to a voluntary repentance.

And thus it is also in some proportion in humane laws.* 1.247 For by these premisses thus much is gain'd, that to oblige the criminal to a spontaneous suffering of the punishment appointed by the laws of a just superior is not naturally unjust, and it is not alwaies intolerable, and it may be very reasonable, and it may be a design of mercy, or at least a very apt ministery of justice: and therefore there can be no reasonable objection against it, but that upon just account, and in just measures, and for great reason, and by the proportions of equity it may be done in humane laws.

For 1.* 1.248 Whatsoever is not against the law of Nature, nor the law of God, may be done or enjoyn'd to be done by the laws of Man; for the power of Magistrates is the next great thing to God and Nature. Now concerning this, we have security not onely from the foregoing instances, but from the law of Christ concerning divorce upon the instance of adul∣tery: the offending party looses his or her right respectively over the body of the other, and cannot lawfully demand conjugal rights. The in∣jurious person may begge for pardon and restitution; but is unjust if he require any thing as duty. The woman looses her rights of society, and the Man of superiority, in case they be adulterous; and if they doe not quit their former rights, and sit down under their own burden, and minister the sentence of God by their own hands, they sin anew: every such demand or act of dominion is iniquity and injustice, it is an act of an incompetent power, and therefore, under pain of a new sin, they must not act under it.

2. A man can inflict punishment upon himself.* 1.249 Thus Zacheus in expiation of his sins offer'd half his goods to the poor, and restitution fourfold; which was more then he did need; for if his confession and re∣stitution were spontaneous, he was tied onely to the principal, and the superaddition of a fifth part, as appears above. But he chose the punish∣ment, even so much as the Judge himself could have inflicted. Thus we read of a Bishop in the primitive ages of the Church who, quia semel tactu foemineo sorduerat, because he had once fallen into uncleanness, shut himself up in a voluntary prison for nine years together: and many we read of who out of the Spirit of penance liv'd lives of great austerity, using rudenesses to their bodies; by the pain of their bodies to expiate the sin of their Souls. Now whatsoever any man hath power to doe to himself; that the law hath power to command him; supposing a reason or a necessity in the law pro∣portionably great to the injunction, and to be of it self a sufficient cause of the suffering. It is true a man may doe it to himself to please his humor, or for vain-glory, or out of melancholy. I doe not say he does well in so doing; but that he hath power to doe it, without doing injury to any one: and if he does it to himself without cause, or without sufficient cause, he does no man wrong; he does no more then he hath power to doe, alwaies provided he keeps within the limits of the sixth Commandement. Now although the law pretends not to this power of doing it without reason, because all the power of the law is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in relation to others, in commutative and distributive justice, and publick and private charities; yet

the same authority which any man hath over himself in order to private ends, the law hath over him in order to the publick; because he is a part of the publick, and his own power over himself is in the publick, as every particular is in the universal. Nay the law hath a greater power then the man; for a man hath not power over his own life, which the law hath; so that whatever a man alone can doe, that the law can command him to doe: (except it be in such things which are wholly by God left in a mans power, and are subjected to no laws of man, and commanded by no law of God; as in the matter of single life, and other counsels Evangelical) the same things (I say) though not for the same reasons. If therefore the man can upon himself inflict an evil which he hath deserved, the law can com∣pel him, that is, she hath competent authority to doe it: and then he is bound in Conscience.

3. In matters favourable,* 1.250 and yet of great interest, we find that there are many events by the sentence of the law without the sentence of a Judge. Thus the right of Primogeniture is sufficient ordinarily to enter upon the inheritance without a solemn decree of Court; and if we consider the rea∣son of this, it will be of equal force in the present inquiry. For when mat∣ters are notorious, and the people willing, and it is every mans case, and there is a great necessity, and publick utility, it is sufficient when the rule is set; every man knowes his part, and his way, and Judges are not neces∣sary. But when men are to blame, and there are intrigues in causes, and men will snatch at what is none of their own, and they will not understand their duty, nor judge righteous judgements in things concerning themselves and their neighbours; it is necessary that there be Judges and Advocates and all the inferior Ministers of laws, that where the law is intricate, and men cannot judge and discern aright, or when they are interested and will not, the law may be interpreted, and their duty explained, and every man righted that otherwise would be wrong'd. The sentence of the Judge is but accidentally necessary: for the law saying that the eldest Son is heir to an intestate Father, the case is plain, and who is the eldest Son is no∣torious, and he is willing enough to enter upon the inheritance; and there∣fore besides the law in this case there needs no sentence of the Judge. Now the law is as plain in the condemnation of some crimes, and the assignation of some punishments. But because men are not willing to enter into punish∣ment, and they are not tied publickly to accuse themselves, therefore there are Judges to give sentence, and executioners appointed. And this is well enough in some cases: but because there are some cases in which it is necessary that the laws be obeyed in private as well as in publick, and yet without pe∣nalties a law is but a dead hand and a broken cord; the law annexes punish∣ments, but is forc'd to trust the sinning hand to be the smiter, because the private action cannot be publickly punish'd, because not brought before the Judge.

4. Besides this,* 1.251 there are some actions of so evil effect as to the pub∣lick, that for detestations sake they are to be condemn'd as soon as done, hated as soon as nam'd, strangled as soon as born; and when by such a sentence the act is represented so foul, the man stands more ready for re∣pentance, and himself is made the instrument. It is like a plain case in which any man may be allowed to be a Judge: for modesty's sake and for huma∣nity every man will condemn some sins; even though themselves be the

guilty persons. However the law takes the wisest course to give an univer∣sal sentence, that as the man is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so he may be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, self-accus'd, and self-condemn'd; and not to expect the contingent discovery, and the long deferred solemnities of law. Some sins goe before unto judgment, saies the Apostle, and some follow after: that is, some are condemn'd ipso jure by the law, and the man does ipso facto incurre the penalty; others stay for the sentence of the Judge.

5. In the Court of Conscience every man is his own accuser,* 1.252 and his own executioner; and every penitent man is a Judge upon himself: God trusts man with the infliction of punishments and hard sentences upon him∣self for sin; onely if man fails, God will judge him to worse purposes; and so does the law. And as the impenitent people favour themselves to their own harm, for they sin against God even in their very forbearing to pu∣nish and to kill the sin: so doe the impenitent disobey the law by not being their own executioners of wrath: but in both cases the Conscience is oblig'd,

The thing therefore is just, and reasonable, and useful.

Now for the reducing of this to practice,* 1.253 and stating the cases of Conscience for the subject, as I have already done for the law-giver, I am to shew,

1. In what cases the Conscience of the subjects can be bound to inflict penalties upon themselves without the sentence of the Judge.

2. By what signs we shall know when the law does intend so to bind; that is, when the sentence is given by the law, so that the sinner is ipso facto liable to punishment, and must voluntarily undergoe it.

In what cases the Criminal is to be his own executioner.

1. When to the execution of the punishment appointed by the law there is no action requir'd on the part of the guilty person,* 1.254 the conscience is bound to submit to that sentence, and by a voluntary or willing submis∣sion verify the sentence, such as are excommunication, suspension, irre∣gularity and the like. Thus if irregularity be ipso facto incurr'd, the offen∣ding person is bound in Conscience not to accept a benefice or execute an office to which by that censure he is made unhabile and unapt. If a law be made that whoever is a common swearer shall be ipso facto infamous, he that is guilty is bound in Conscience not to offer testimony in a cause of law; but to be his own Judge and executioner of that sentence. But this is not true in all cases, but with the provision of the following measures.

2. If the law imposes a penalty to be incurred ipso facto,* 1.255 yet if the penalty be moderate, equal and tolerable, the Conscience is oblig'd to a voluntary susception of it, before the sentence of the Judge, although the sentence be not privative, but executive; that is, though there be some∣thing to be acted by the guilty person upon himself. Thus if excommu∣nication be incurred ipso facto, he that is guilty of the fact deserving it, & is fallen into the sentence, is not onely bound to submit to those estrange∣ments

and separations, those alienations of society and avoidings which he finds from the duty of others, but if by chance he be in a stranger place where they know not of it, and begin Divine service, he is bound in Con∣science to goe away, to resign an Ecclesiastical benefice if he be possessed of one, and other things of the same necessity for the verification of the sen∣tence: and the reason is, because every act of Communion or office is in his case a rebelling against the sentence of the law, the verification of which depends upon himself as much as upon others: for every such person is like a man that hath the plague, all men that know it avoid him; but because all men doe not know it, he is bound in Conscience to avoid them, and in no case to run into their company, whether they know him, or know him not. Now because this does not oblige to all sorts of active executions of the sentence, the following measures are the limit of it.

3. The law does not oblige the guilty person to such active executi∣ons of the sentence which are meerly and intirely active;* 1.256 that is, which doe not include a negative, or something contrary to the passive obedience. Thus if a Traitor be sentenc'd to a confiscation of goods, & this be ipso jure incurred; the guilty person is not tied to carry all his goods to the pub∣lick treasure, but he is tied not to change, not to diminish, not to aliene, not to use them otherwise then the law permits; because if he doe any thing of these he does something against the sentence of the law, which in his case is rebellion and disobedience. He may be truly passive and perfectly obedient to the sentence of the law without hiring porters or wag∣gons to carry his goods away; and the custome of the law requires it not: but if he does aliene his goods he hath not so much as the passive obedience.

4. In punishments corporal the laws doe not proceed without the sentence of the Judge;* 1.257 except it be in the court of Conscience, which is voluntary and by choice. Thus no man is ipso jure condemn'd to be hang'd, or to be whipp'd, and no man is by any law bound to inflict such punishments on himself; because there is a natural abhorrency in such actions, and it is that odious part of the law which is so much against nature and natural affection that none but the vilest part of mankind are put to doe it unto others: & therefore because the laws doe enjoyn no such thing, the inquiry is needless, whether in such cases the Conscience be oblig'd. But this is wholly depending upon the manners of men, and the present humors of the world. Amongst some nations it was otherwise; and no question but it might be so, if by circumstances and the accidents of opinion and the conversation of the world the thing were not made intolerable. Plutarch tels of Teribasus,* 1.258 that being arrested by the officers of death he resisted with such a bravery as he us'd against the Kings enemies; but be∣ing told that they were sent by the King, he presently reached forth his hands and offer'd them to the Lictors to be bound. But this was no great matter, it was necessary, and he that is condemn'd to die by a just autho∣rity, ows to it at least so much that he resist not, that he goe to death when he is called, that he lie down under the axe when he is commanded: So did Stilico at the command of his son in law, Honorius the Emperour. It was more which was done by the Lithuanians under Vitoldus their King, who was brother to that Vladislaus famous for a memorable battel against the Turks; he commanded many to death, and they died without the

Hang-man's hand, being the executioners of their King's laws upon them∣selves. And Sabellicus tels,* 1.259 that the Ethiopians, when their King sent a Messenger with the Ensigns of Death, they presently went home and died by their own hands. And this was accounted among them so sacred an obligation, that when a young timorous person thought to have fled, his mother took her girdle and strangled him, lest he should dishonour his fa∣mily by disobeying the law out of fear of death. This was brave; but some men cannot be willing to dye, and few can well suffer it: but there∣fore it is hard that any one should be compelled to doe it to himself. Therefore the laws of Christendome are wise and gentle; and excepting that of the Lithuanian Prince, who is reported to have been a Tyrant, it is not enjoyned by any Prince or any law amongst us, that I know of. But this is not onely true in active executions, but in the passive penalties, which are very violent and extreme. Thus if a man were justly condemn'd to be immur'd and starv'd to death, he is tied to submit to it, as not to re∣bel, and by violence quit himself: but he is not tied so much as to the privative execution; that is, he is not bound to abstain from meat, if it be brought to him. Thus we find in story, of the pious Persian Lady, who to her Father condemn'd to death by starving gave her breasts to suck, and preserv'd his life; and he not at all made infamous by not dying; but had his life given as the reward of his Daughters piety.

5. Condemn'd persons are not tied to put themselves to death,* 1.260 or cut off a member with their own hands, or doe execution, by doing any action, or abstaining from doing any thing, when such doing or abstaining is the sufficient, or the principal, or the immediate killing or dismem∣bring. But to the under-ministeries they are ti'de, which cannot be done without them; that is, they are tied so far to act, as without which they cannot suffer: and this is to be extended even to the principal and imme∣diate act of killing, if they onely ordinarily can doe it. Thus a condemn'd Criminal is bound to go to execution, or suffer himself quietly to be car∣ried; to lie down under the Hangman's Axe, to ascend the Ladder: and it is a great undecency of dying, and directly criminal, which is frequent enough in France, and is reported of Marshal Biron, to fight with the Exe∣cutioner, to snatch the Weapons from the Souldiers, to force the Officers to kill him, as a wild Bull or Lion is kill'd. * But a condemn'd man is also tied to drink his poyson, if that be appointed him by law; for though this be the immediate act of killing, to which ordinarily condemn'd persons are not oblig'd, yet because it cannot well be done by an Executioner with∣out his consent, or extreme violence, the guilty person is bound to drink it: the reason is, because the law must be obeyed, and at least a passive obedience is to be given to the severest of her sentences; and the passive∣ness of a man is to be distinguish'd from the passiveness of a beast; that which cannot be avoided, must be born well: and therefore if a man be banished, he must go away, and not be dragg'd; and he that so resists the laws, that he forces her Ministers to hale the Criminal to death like an un∣willing Swine, deserves the burial of an Asse or Dog. But this alwayes must suppose the laws to be just, and the power competent; for else the suffering person may consider, whether the quiet submission to it be not a verification of the sentence, or of the authority, though even in such ca∣ses it is not the Hang-man that is unjust, or to be resisted, but the Judge or the laws; and therefore they are to be protested or de∣clar'd

against; for that is all which is left to be done by the oppressed person.

6. When the punishments are principally or meerly medicinal,* 1.261 the Conscience is bound to a voluntary execution of the sentence, if the law requires it. For then the laws are precepts of institution and discipline; and they are intended as mercies to the man, as well as to the publick; and of mercy every man may very well be Minister. It hath in it no un∣decency for a man to mingle his own severe potion, or let himself blood, or lance an Ulcer; and there is no more in the medicinal punishments of the law. Thus the laws can command us to fast, to wear sackcloth upon the bare skin, to go barefoot, to watch all night upon a solemnity of ex∣piation, to inflict disciplines, and the like; and for these we are to expect no other process but the sentence of the law, no Judge but our Con∣sciences, no Executioners but our selves. This relies upon the former rea∣sons, and the meer authority of the law, and the nature of the thing free from all objections.

7. All sentences of law which declare a fact to be void,* 1.262 or a charge and expences to be lost, or a priviledge to cease, are presently obligatory to the Conscience. Irrita prorsus ex nunc, & vacua nunciamus, is usual in the stile of laws: & sit ipso jure irritum & inane; & careat omni robore firmitatis, non obtineat vires; let it be of no force, let it not prevail, let it be void, let him want all priviledge, all honour, dominion, action, or pro∣fit. For these and the like words, say the Logicians, have the force of an universal sign, and doe distribute the Noun that is governed by the Verb; so they speak; that is, it signifies and hath force in every particular, and in every period of time; let it want force, that is, let it want all force, that is, be of no use at all; careat is as much as omnino, penitus, prorsus careat.

8. But these particulars suffer one limitation.* 1.263 A man is not bound to suffer the penalty of the law before the sentence of the Judge, though the fact be sentenc'd and condemn'd ipso jure, if the fact be made publick, and brought before the Judge: Because he taking it into his cognisance, re∣vokes the former obligation, by imposing a new; by changing the method of the law, and lessening the expectation. Thus by the laws Ecclesiastical, which were antiently of force in England, and are not yet repeal'd, Not••∣rius percussor Clerici, he that openly or manifestly strikes a Bishop or Priest, is ipso jure excommunicate; and to this sentence the guilty person is bound to submit: but in case he be brought before the Criminal Judge, and there be solemn process form'd, he may suspend his obedience to the law, because the Judge calls him to attend to the sentence of a man.

9. But yet this is also so to be understood to be true in all exceptis sententiis irritantibus,* 1.264 excepting sentences of the declaring actions to be null, or priviledges void. For in these cases, though the Judge doe take into his cognisance the particular fault, and give a declarative sentence of such a nullity and evacuation, yet the action does not begin to be null, or the priviledge to cease from the sentence of the Judge, but from the doing of the fault, and the sentence of the law: and therefore if a question arises, and the Judge declare in it, the nullity is onely confirm'd by the Judge, but it was so by the sentence of the law. Now the reason of the difference

in the case of nullities and evacuations from other cases, is, because that which is not, hath no effect, and can produce no action; and as a Citisen told the people of Athens, who upon the first news of Alexander's death would have rebelled, Stay (sayes he) make no hast; for if he be dead to day, he will be dead to marrow: So if the Judge declare that such an acti∣on was null, it was null all the way; if he sayes it be dead now as a pu∣nishment of the fault, it was dead as soon as the fault was done; for it died by the hand of the law, not by the hand of the Judge. In other things the limitation is to be observed.

10. And this also holds,* 1.265 in case that it be upon any account necessary that the Judge give a declarative sentence: for sometimes in regard of others, the Judge must declare such a person excommunicate, or depriv'd, or silenc'd, or infamous, that they also may avoid him, or doe their respe∣ctive duties. But although the guilty person be in conscience regularly ob∣lig'd before that declarative sentence, it being nothing but a publication of what was in being before; yet it being a favourable case, and the law not loving extremities and rigours of animadversion, it is to be presumed that the law gives leave to the guilty person to stay execution till publication. Because no man is bound directly to defame himself; which he will hazard to doe, if he executes the sentence upon himself before the Judge calls others into testimony and observation of the sentence. But though the sentence may upon favourable conditions be retarded, it must at no hand be evacuated. Therefore if the Judge meddle not, the man is left to the sentence of the law. And it is in all these particulars to be remembred, that the law is a mute Judge, and the Judge is a speaking law. It is the saying of Cicero;* 1.266 and from thence is to be concluded, that when the Judge hath spoken, he hath said no new thing, and he hath no new authority; and therefore if the law hath clearly spoken before, she hath as much au∣thority to bind where she intends to bind, as if she speaks by her Judges.

These considerations and this whole question is of great use in order to some parts of repentance,* 1.267 and particularly of restitution. For if a law be made, that if a Clerk within twelve months after the collation of a Parish-Church be not ordain'd a Priest, he shall ipso jure forfeit his Eccle∣siastical Benefice; if he does not submit to the sentence, and recede from his Parish, he is tied in Conscience to make restitution of all the after profits which he receives or consumes. So that it hath real effect upon Consciences, and the material occurrences of men.

But then for the reducing of it to practice,* 1.268 I am next to account by what signs we shall know when it is sententia lata à jure, when it is lata ab homine; when it is lata, and when ferenda; that is, when the Criminal is to attend the sentence of the Judge, and the solennities of law and execu∣tion by the appointed Officer; and when he is to doe it himself, by his own act or positive submission upon the sentence of the law.

Signs by which we may judge when the Criminal is condemn'd ipso facto.

The surest measures are these.* 1.269 Those laws contain sententiam latam,

and oblige the Criminal to a spontaneous susception of the punish∣ment, when 1. the law expresly affirms, that the guilty person does ipso facto incurre the sentence without further process, or sentence of the Judge.

2. When the law sayes,* 1.270 that the Transgressor shall be bound in con∣science to pay the fine, or suffer the punishment contain'd in the Sanction of the law: which thing because it is not usual in laws, lest I should seem to speak this to no purpose, I give an example out of the Spanish laws: for I finde in the laws of the Kingdome of Castile divers instances to this purpose;* 1.271 particularly, after the assignation of the Secretaries fee, ap∣pointing how much he may receive for the instruments of grace which he makes, it is added, Jurent quod observabunt eaquae in pracedenti capitulo ordinata sunt, & quod non accipient munera, & quod solvent poenas si in eas inciderint, ad quas ex nunc eos condemnamus, ità ut sint obligati in foro con∣scientiae ad solvendum eas, absque hoc quod sint ad illas condemnati. And the same also is a little after decreed concerning Judges and publick Notaries,* 1.272 that they take nothing beyond their allowed fees and salaries; and if they doe, they are to pay a certain fine. They are also to swear to observe that ordinance; and in case they doe not, that they will pay the fines to which the law does then sentence them, that they be bound in Con∣science to doe it without any further condemnation by the sentence of any man. Now the reason of this is, because the Conscience being intrusted and charg'd with the penalty, must suppose onely the duty and obligation of the man whose Conscience is charg'd. It were foolish to charge the Conscience, if the Conscience were not then intended to be bound to see to the execution: but that could not be, if the sentence of the Judge were to be expected; for that is a work of time, and will be done without troubling the Conscience. Therefore the Conscience being made the Sheriff or the Witness with the charge of execution, supposes the whole affair to be his own private duty.

3. In censures Ecclesiastical it hath sometimes been the usage of the Legislator to impose a penalty,* 1.273 adding, that donec satisfecerit, untill such or such a thing be done, the Criminal shall not be absolved: and this also is an indication that the sentence is made by the law, and is ipso facto incurred by the Delinquent, because it leaves a secret tie upon his Conscience ob∣liging him to doe it; which were needless, if the Criminal Judge were to be intrusted with it, for he is otherwise sufficiently intrusted with com∣pulsories to secure the executions. Of this nature is that Constitution of Innocentius 4. cap. Romana, §. procurationes, de censibus, lib. 6. describing the order for an Archbishop's visitation of his own, and the Dioceses of his Suffragan Bishops; forbidding severely him or any of his followers to receive a fee, bribe, reward, or present, qualitercunque offeratur, under what pretence soever it be offer'd, lest he be found to seek that which is his own, not that which is of Jesus Christ; adding, Quod si fuerit contrà prae∣sumptum, recipiens maledictionem incurrat, à qua nunquam nisi duplum re∣stituat liberetur, He that shall presume to doe otherwise, and receive any thing, shall incurre a curse, from which he shall never be absolved till he have resto∣red it two-fold. This relies upon the former reason.

4. Panormitan gives this rule,* 1.274 That when a sentence is set down in the law in words of the present or preter tense,* 1.275 it concludes the sentence to be ipso facto incurred; for whatsoever is ipso jure decreed, is ipso facto in∣curred: and of this decree, the present and past tenses (saies the Abbat) are sufficient indication. That is, if the words be damnatory; [as excommu∣nicamus, anathemate innodamus, we doe deprive him of all rights and offi∣ces, &c.] for if the Judge using the like words passes a sentence by virtue of those words, so does the law, there being the same reason, the same aurhority, the same purpose signified by the same form of words. But if the words be of the present or past time, and yet not immediately damnatory, they doe imply the sentence to be made afterwards; as decernimus, defi∣nivimus, declaramus, and the like. But if these words signify onely mini∣sterially, and not principally, that is, if they be joyned with other words in the present or past tense, then they declare the sentence past and ipso facto to be incurred; as declaramus eum privatum dominio bonorum; then the case is evident.

5. Of the same consideration it is when the sentence of the law is set down with the verb substantive Sum,* 1.276 of what tense soever, unless by a fu∣ture participle his nature be altered. Thus if a law saies, he that is absent from his parish, without just cause to be approved by his Bishop, above six moneths, est, or erit infamis, is or shall be infamous; the sentence is ipso jure lata, inferr'd by law, and ipso facto incurr'd; because the verb annexes the punishment to the fact without further process. But if the verb be annexed to a future participle the case is altered; the sentence is not to be undergone till the Judge have declared it. Now this relies upon the force of the words and the proper grammatical way of speaking, which is the best way of declaring the mind of a man, or the mind of the law; unless where it is confessed that the law-giver did not intend, or use to speak pro∣perly or by grammar,* 1.277 but by rude custome. This note I have in A. Gellius, Verbum esse & erit, quando per se ponuntur, habent atque retinent tempus suum; cum vero praeterito junguntur, vim temporis sui amittunt, & in prae∣teritum contendunt. If these words be not altered, they signify just by them∣selves; est or erit excommunicatus, or infamis, signifies the punishment to begin as soon as the fact is done: but est excommunicandus, that is a fu∣ture that relates to another time, and staies for the sentence of the Judge. But there must be something more to clear this. For if erit be the future tense, why shall it not as well signify sententiam ferendam, as est excommu∣nicandus; since the verb is to be left to his own time, as well as the present tense brought thither by a future participle? Therefore to this I adde, that when the verb or participle does signify the action or ministery of some other person besides the law and the Criminal, then it shews that the declaration of the Judge is to be expected; as in [est excommunicandus] that is, he is to be excommunicated, viz. by the sentence of his ordinary judge: but erit infamis, or erit excommunicatus, implies no mans action at all, but supposes the thing finish'd without any more to doe; and then comes in the rule of Nigidius in A. Gellius before spoken of. Infamis signifies pre∣sently, that is, he shall be so from the doing of the crime; and excommuni∣catus signifies present or past, and therefore by it the future tense shall be altered, and therefore the sentence presently incurred. But concerning this particular, who pleases to be Critical and curious in minutes may de∣light himself by seeing seventy five fallencies, and alterations of cases

by the variety of tenses expressed in words of law, in Tiraquel in his ex∣cellent and large commentaries in L. Si unquam, C. De revocandis donationi∣bus, in the interpretation of the word Revertatur. For my own part, I am content to assign such measures as are sure, plain, easy and intelligible. Nobis non licet esse tam disertis.

6. The sentence of the law does presently oblige the Conscience if it be expressed in adverbs of hasty or present time;* 1.278 such as are confestim, illico, extunc, extemplo, presently, forthwith, from thence forward, and the like: for those who appoint the punishment to be incurred without any in∣terval of time, in effect say that we are not to expect the dull and long pro∣tracted methods of Courts, and Judges, and commissions, and citations, and witnesses, and adjournments. Protinus, i. e. non expectato judiciorum ordine, say the Lawyers.

Protinus ad regem cursum detorquet Hiarbas.

Forthwith,* 1.279 that is, without the longer methods of the Court.

Nec mora, continuò matris praecepta facessit.

These words and their like have a present effect; and therefore doe signify a present obligation of Conscience. Concerning the signification of which and the like words it is hard to say whether we are to be guided by the Lawyers or by the Grammarians. The Lawyers are the best witnesses of sentences, and precedents, and the usages and customes of laws; and there∣fore can best tell how the laws are said to bind, and what sentences they are said to contain: and because by them we are to be judg'd in publick if questions doe arise, from them also we may take our rule in private. This seems reasonable: but on the other side, I find that Lawyers themselves say otherwise; and I have seen Tiraquel much blamed for quoting Bartholus, Baldus,* 1.280 and Salicetus for the signification of the word [Mox, by and by] which is of use in this present rule: because though they were great Lawyers, yet they were no good Grammarians; and therefore that in these cases, Era∣smus and Calepine, Valla and Linacre, Cicero and Terence, Priscian and Dona∣tus, were the most competent Judges. There is something on both sides which is to weigh down each other according as some other cosidera∣tion shall determine. But therefore as to the case of Conscience, I shall give a better and surer rule then either one or other, or both: and that is,

7. This being in matters of load and burden,* 1.281 by the consent of all men, the Conscience and the guilty person is to be favour'd as much as there can be cause for. Therefore whenever there is a dispute whether the sentence of the law must be incurr'd presently, or that the sentence of the Judge is to be expected; the presumption is alwaies to be for ease, and for liberty, and favourable senses. Burdens are not to be impos'd upon Con∣sciences without great evidence, and great necessity. If the Lawyers differ in their opinions concerning the sentence, whether it be already made, or is to be made by the Judge, let them first agree, and then let the Conscience doe as she sees reason. Thus if the word [Mox, by and by] be us'd in a sentence of law, because we find that in some very good Authors it signi∣fies with some interval of time,* 1.282 (as in Cicero, Discedo parumper à somniis, ad quae mox revertor;* 1.283 &, praeteriit villam meam Curio, jussitque mihi nun∣ciari se mox venturum;) therefore we may make use of it to our advantage, and suppose the Conscience of a delinquent at liberty from a spontaneous

execution of a sentence of law, if for that sentence he have no other sign, but that the word Mox is used in the law.* 1.284 In poenis benignior est interpre∣tatio facienda, In matters of punishment we are to take the easier part; and that is, to stay from being punish'd as long as we can: and in propor∣tion to this Panormitan gives this rule, When the words of the law signifiy the time past, or the time to come, we are to understand it in the more favoura∣ble sense; and that it includes the sentence of the Judge, before which the Criminal is not oblig'd. And to this very purpose the words of infinite and indefinite signification are to be expounded: and this answers many cases of Conscience, and brings peace in more; and the thing being reaso∣nable, peaceful, and consonant to the common opinion of the Lawyers, ought to pass for a just conclusion and determination of Conscience.

8. After all,* 1.285 as there is ease to the Criminal, so there must be care of the law; and therefore when a law imposes a punishment which would prove invalid, to no purpose and of no effect, unless it be of present force upon the committing of the fact, it is to be concluded, the law intends it for a sententia lata à jure, that it presently obliges the Conscience of the guilty person. The reason is, because it cannot be supposed that the law should doe a thing to no purpose, and therefore must intend so to oblige as that the sin be punished. If therefore to expect the sentence of the Judge would wholly evacuate the penalty, or make it insufficient to doe the pur∣pose and intention of the law; the sentence of the law must be suffered by the guilty person without the Judge. And this is true, however the words of law be used, whether in the past, present, or future time, whether simply or by reduplication, whether imperatively or infinitely: such are the penalties of infamy, irregularity, nullity of actions or contracts, especially if they be of such contracts which if they once prove valid, are so for ever, as in the contract of marriage. And therefore if a law be made that a man shall not marry her whom in her husbands life-time he had polluted; this must be suppos'd to be meant of nullifying the contract before it is consummate; that is, it is a sentence which the criminal must execute upon himself: for if he does not, but de facto marries the adulteress, and consummates the marriage, it will be too late to complain to the Judge; for he cannot annul the contract afterwards.

RULE III. Penalties impos'd by the Judge must be suffered and submitted to, but may not after such sentence be inflicted by the hands of the condemned.

THE first part of this Rule hath in it but little difficulty:* 1.286 for there is onely in it this variety; In all punishments that are tolerable, that is, all but death, dismembring, or intolerable and extremely disgraceful scourg∣ings, and grievous and sickly imprisonments, we owe not onely obedi∣ence to the laws, but reverence and honour; because whatsoever is less then these, may without sin, and without indecency, and without great violations of our Natural love and rights be inflicted and suffered.

But the other evils are such as are intolerable in civil and natural ac∣count;* 1.287 and every Creature declines death, and the addresses and prepara∣tions to it with so much earnestness, that it would be very unnatural and inhumane not to allow to condemn'd persons a civil and moral power of hating and declining death, and avoiding it in all means of natural capacity and opportunity. A man may, if he can, redeem his life with money, but he must not corrupt justice; a man may run from Prison if he can, but to doe it he must not kill the Gaoler; he may escape death, but he must not fight with the Ministers of justice; he may run away, but he must not break his word; that is, he may doe what is in his natural capacity to avoid these violences and extremities of nature, but nothing that is against a moral duty.* 1.288 Non peccat quisquam cum evitat supplicium, sed cum facit ali∣quid dignum supplicio; He that avoids his punishment sins not, provided that in so doing he act nothing else worthy of punishment. So S. Austin.

This relies also upon a tacit or implicit permission of law;* 1.289 for in sentences given by Judges, and to be executed by the Ministers of law, the condemn'd person is not commanded, nor yet trusted with the execu∣tion, and it is wholly committed to Ministers of purpose: and therefore the law supposes the condemn'd person infinitely unwilling, and layes bars, restraints, guards and observators upon him; from all which if he can escape, he hath done no more then what the law-giver suppos'd he was willing to doe, and from which he did not restrain him by laws, but by force. But if to fly from prison, or to decline any other sentence be ex∣presly forbidden in the law, or if it be against his promise, or if a distinct penalty be annexed to such escapings, then it is plain that the law intends to oblige the Conscience, for the law cannot punish what is no sin; it is in this case a transgression of the law, and therefore not lawfull. But because greater then death the law hath no punishment, it cannot but be lawfull for a condemn'd man to escape from prison if he can, because the law hath no punishment to establish a law against flying from prison after the sentence of death. And if it be said, that if a prisoner who flyes be taken, he hath more irons and more guards upon him, and worse usage in the prison, that is matter of caution, not punishment, at least not of law: for as for the Gaoler's spite and anger, his cruelty and revenge, himself alone is to give accounts.

But now for the other part of the Rule there is some more difficulty;* 1.290 which is caused by the great example of some great and little persons,* 1.291 who to prevent a death by the hand of their Enemies, with the additions of shame and torment,* 1.292 have laid violent hands upon themselves. So did Zeno and Chrysippus, Cleanthes and Empedocles, Euphrates the Philosopher and Demosthenes, Cato Uticensis and Porcius Latro, Aristarchus and Anaxa∣goras, Cornelius Rufus and Silius Italicus. The Indians esteem'd it the most glorious way of dying,* 1.293 as we find in* 1.294 Strabo,a 1.295 Olympiodorus, and b 1.296 Porphyry: and Eusebius tels, that most of the Germans did use to hang themselves. And amongst the Romans they that, out of shame of being in debt, or impatience of grief, kill'd themselves, might make their Wils, and after death they stood; manebant testamenta, pretium festinandi, saithc 1.297 Tacitus, that was the price of their making hast. Plato discoursing of this question, said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Peradventure a man must not doe violence to himself, for they say it is not

lawfull. Upon this, Olympiodorus discoursing on these words, reckons five cases in which the Stoicks held it lawfull to kill themselves. 1. For publick good. 2. For private necessity, to avoid a Tyrant's snare. 3. In cases of natural madness. 4. When the body is intolerably afflicted. 5. and lastly. In extreme poverty. And the Greeks commended a Pythagorean wo∣man, who being ask'd why she and her Sect did not eat beans, she said, she would rather eat them then tell: but being commanded by a Tyrant to eat them, she said, she would rather tell then eat them: but in fine she cut out her tongue, because she would neither tast nor tell. Thus Seneca tels of a Prisoner, that being to be expos'd to Beasts in the Theatre, he broke his neck in the spondels of the wheel upon which he was drawn to the spe∣ctacles; and of another that dyed by a pertinacious holding of his breath. But that of Sampson, and Saul, and Razis, are also brought into example; and are alledged to prove, that a man may a few hours or dayes hasten his death, if by so doing he takes the lighter part. S. Chrysostome tels of S. Pe∣lagia; Pelagia virgo quindecim annos nata sponte sibi necem maturavit. Parata quidem erat ad cruciatus tormentáque & omne suppliciorum genus per∣ferendum: sed metuebat tamen ne virginitatis coronam perderet: Being a Virgin of fifteen years of age, of her own accord she hastned death unto her self: she was indeed ready to have suffered all sorts of most exquisit torments, but she was not willing to lose the Crown of her Virginity. Upon which fact of hers he thus discourses, Hence you may perceive,* 1.298 that the lust of the wicked Hang-men struck fear into Pelagia, and therefore from their injurious lust the Maiden remov'd and snatch'd her self: for if she might have kept the Crown of her Virginity, and receive the Crown of Martyrdome besides, she would not have refus'd the Judgement-seat; but because it was altogether ne∣cessary to lose the one of them, she had a just cause by her own voluntary death to prevent so great an injury.* 1.299 And S. Ambrose writing to his Sister Mar∣cellina, expresly commends those Virgin-Martyrs, who, to prevent their ravishments, did hasten their death by voluntary precipices, or drowning; and particularly allows the fact of Pelagia.* 1.300 To which I adde also S. Hie∣rome, who though he gives express testimony to the Rule, yet he excepts the case of Chastity; Non est nostrum mortem arripere, sed illatam ab aliis libenter excipere: unde & in persecutionibus non licet propriâ perire manu, absque eo ubi castitas periclitatur, sed percutienti colla submittere, We must not snatch death with our own hands, but willingly receive it when it is impos'd by others: and therefore in persecutions we must not dye by our own hands, unless it be when our Chastity is in danger,

—heu quanto melius vel cade peractâ Parcere Romano potnit fortuna pudori?

in other cases we must lay down our necks under him that strikes. And this seems reasonable,* 1.301 because as the Emperour said, Viris bonis metum istum [pudicitiae amittendae] majorem esse debere quam ipsius mortis, He that fears to lose his Chastity, fears more justly then he that fears to lose his Life.

To this I answer,* 1.302 that the case is indeed very hard; and every one in this is apt not onely to excuse, but to magnifie the great and glorious minds of those who to preserve their honour despis'd their life. And therefore when the Moscovites broke into Livonia, and in their sacking of the City Wenden us'd all manner of cruelties and barbarous immanities to men and women, filling all the streets and houses with blood and lust; a

great many of the Citizens running to the Castle, blew up themselves with their Wives and Children, to prevent those horrours and shames of lust which they abhorred more then death.* 1.303 Now Laurentius Muller, who tels the story, sayes, that although the Preachers of Riga did in their Pul∣pits condemn this act of the Women and Maidens: yet the other Livoni∣ans and the Moscovites themselves did not onely account it sad and pi∣tiable, but excellent and admirable. And so the Author of the Books of Maccabees commends the fact of Razias as glorious and great: but yet this does not conclude it lawfull; for it is upon no account lawfull for a man of his own accord to kill himself.

S. Austin denies to him the praise of magnanimity; Magis enim mens infirma deprehenditur,* 1.304 quae ferre non potest duram corporis sui sanitatem, vel stultam vulgi opinionem, It is not greatness, but littleness of spirit, it is either impatience or pride,* 1.305 that makes a man kill himself to avoid trouble to his body, or dishonour to his name amongst fools. I suppose he had it from Josephus,* 1.306 who excellently and earnestly proves it to be cowardise to lay violent hands upon our selves; and both of them might have it from Aristotle, who will not allow it so much as to be brave and magnanimous for a man to kill himself for the avoiding of any evil,* 1.307 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To dye that we may avoid poverty, the torments of love, or any evil affliction what∣soever, is not the part of a valiant man, but of a coward.

Hostem cum fugeret, se Fannius ipse peremit. Hic rogo, non furor est, ne moriare mori?

Fannius being pursued by the Enemy, kill'd himself for fear. It may be cowardise to dye in some cases; and to dye to preserve our Chastity, is to sin to avoid a sin,* 1.308 like Fannius his case of fear,

—mortísque timorem Morte fugant, ultróque vocant venientia fata:

or as S. Chrysostome's expression is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To dye before the wound is given, and to leap into the sea for fear of shipwreck: It is to doe violence to our body to preserve it chast, to burn a Temple to prevent its being pro∣phan'd. And therefore it is no just excuse to say the Virgin-Martyrs did it lest they should lose their Crown of Virginity: for though I shall not urge the example of Abraham, who rather ventur'd his Wives Chastity then his own life; yet this I say, that she that loses it by violence is never the less a Virgin before God, but much more a Martyr. But then if any one can suppose it fit to be objected, that if they lost their Material Vir∣ginity, there was danger, lest while they were abus'd, they should also be tempted, and consent: I suppose it will be sufficient to answer, that a cer∣tain sin is not to be done to avoid an uncertain; and yet further, that this could not be considerable in the case of the Martyrs: for besides that it is suppos'd that they were infinitely fortified by the grace of God, their au∣stere ••••ves, and holy Habits, the rare discourses of their spiritual Guides, their expectations of particular Crowns, the great reputation and honour of Virgins, and the spirit of Chastity, which then very much prevail'd; besides all this, I say, they had then (particularly S. Pelagia, and the Vir∣gins which S. Ambrose speaks of, had then) the sentence of death not onely within them, but upon them; and the immediate torments which they expected after ravishments, were a very competent mortification for any

such fears. And therefore as we should call it cowardise or impatience for a man to kill himself that he may dye an easy death, and prevent the Hang∣man's more cruel hands; so it is a foolish and unreasonable caution, and a distrust of the sufficiency of the Divine grace, to rush violently to death▪ lest we should be dishonour'd or tempted in another instance: and it is not bravery, but want of courage; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.309 It is softnesse and effeminacy by death to flie the labours of a sadder accident, saies Aristotle. But be it this or not this, it is certain it is something as bad.

1. It is directly against the Commandement:* 1.310 and it is not for nothing that in all the Canonical books we find no precept, no permission from God, saith S.* 1.311 Austin, ut vel adipiscendae ipsius immortalitatis, vel ullius carendi, cavendíque mali causâ nobismet ipsis necem inferamus. Nam & prohibitos nos esse intelligendum est, ubi Lex ait, Non occides: That either for the gai∣ning of immortality it self, or for the avoiding of any evil we should kill our selves.* 1.312 It is something like this which Aristotle saies, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Those things which the decrees have appointed agreeable to vertue those are to goe for laws; as for example, The Law does not command any man to kill himself, and because the law does not command, therefore it does forbid: that is, because the law commands no man (though he be condemn'd) to kill himself, therefore the law for∣bids him to doe it to himself; the law will not make a man executioner even of her sentence, therefore she permits him not to execute his own. But S. Austin addes beyond this, For then we were forbidden to doe it, when God said, Thou shalt doe no Murder. And therefore it is observable that although God said, Thou shalt not bear false witnesse against thy Neighbour; yet he did not in this Commandement adde that clause of [contra proxi∣mum] nor in that of adultery; intimating that we must neither pollute nor destroy our own bodies any more then the body of our neighbour.

2. To prevent the hand of justice or of Tyranny in striking,* 1.313 is some∣times to prevent the hand of God in saving, and is an act of desperation against the hopes of a good man, and the goodness of God: for helpe may come in the interval. Caius the Emperor commanded some to be put to death, whom he presently after infinitely wish'd to have been alive; the hast of the Executioners destroyed the men, more then the rage of the Prince: and it is all one if the man himself be hasty. And Pontanus tells that when Angelus Ronconius was accus'd to Pope Nicolas the fifth that he had given way to Aversus whom the Popes forces had enclosed, and gave leave to him to pass over Tiber, the Pope commanded him to be proceeded against according to law; but when he rose in the morning, and told his Ministers he would more maturely consider the cause of Ronconius, they told him he was that very night put to death, which caus'd extreme grief to the Pope. Concerning a mans life all delay is little enough: and there∣fore for himself to hasten it is against prudence, and hope, and charity.

3. The argument of Lactantius is very good;* 1.314 Si homicida nefarius est qui hominis extinctor est, eidem sceleri obstrictus est qui se necat,* 1.315 If he that kills another is a wicked homicide, so also is he that kills himself. Nay he is worse, said S. Chrysostom. And this besides that it relies upon the

unlimited, indefinite Commandement, which must be understood univer∣sally but where God hath expresly set it limits; and though he hath given leave to publick Magistrates to doe it, who therefore are not under that Commandement, yet because he hath not given leave to our selves to doe it to our selves, therefore we are under the Commandement: besides this, I say, it relies also upon this reason, that our love to our selves is the mea∣sure of charity to our neighbours; and if we must not kill our neighbour because we must love him as our self, therefore neither must we kill our selves, for then we might also kill our neighbour, the reason and the mea∣sure, the standard and the proportion being taken away.

4. To put our selves to death without the Command of God or his lieutenant is impiety and rebellion against God;* 1.316 it is a desertion of our mi∣litary station, and a violation of the proprieties and peculiar rights of God, who only hath power over our lives, and gives it to whom he pleases: and to this purpose Cicero commends that saying of Pythagoras,* 1.317 nequis injussu Imperatoris, id est, Dei, de praesidio & statione vitae discedat; God is our General, and he hath commanded to us our abode and station, which till he call us off must not be deserted: and the same doctrine he recites out of Plato,* 1.318 Piis omnibus retinendum esse animum in custodia corporis, nec injussu ejus à quo ille est datus ex hominum vita migrandum esse, ne munus huma∣num assignatum à Deo defugisse videamur. The reason is very good: God gave us our soul and fixt it in the prison of the body, tying it there to a cer∣tain portion of work, and therefore we must not without his leave goe forth, lest we run from our work that God hath commanded us. Josephus saies it is like a servants running away from his Masters service: Et serv••s quidem fugientes ulcisci justum creditur, quamvis nequam Dominos fugerint; ipsi verò fugimus Deum & optimum Deum, impiè facere non videbimur? If servants flie from their cruel Masters they are justly punished; shall it not be accounted impiety to flie from our good God, our most gracious Master? And therefore Brutus condemn'd the fact of Cato his Father-in-law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It was neither manly nor pious to sink under his for∣tune, and to flie away from those evils which he ought to have born nobly. And therefore the Hebrews called dying, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a dismission: Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, said old Simeon; Nunc dimittis. When God gives us our pass, then we must goe, but we must not offer it an hour before: he that does otherwise is, 1. ungrateful to God, by de∣stroying the noblest of his works below; 2. impious, by running from his service;* 1.319 and 3. distrustful of his providence. Nisi Deus is, cujus hoc Tem∣plum est omne quod conspicis, istis te corporis custodiis liberaverit, in coelum aditus tibi patere non potest, said Cicero, Unlesse God open the gate for you, you can never pass from the prison of the body, and enter into Heaven. And the same is affirm'd by Hierocles,* 1.320 which I tell for the strangeness of it; for he was a Stoick, yet against the opinion of his Sect, he spake on the behalf of reason and religion: And this is the Christian sense,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.321

Said S. Gregory Nyssen, We must stand bound, till God untie us.

5. For a man to kill himself is against the law,* 1.322 and the voice, and the very prime inclination of Nature. Every thing will preserve it self: No man hateth his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, saith the Apostle:

and therefore generally all Nations, as taught by the voice of Nature, by the very first accents which she utters to all men, did abhor the laying vio∣lent hands upon our selves. When some of the old Romans hanged them∣selves to avoid the slavery that Tarquinius Superbus impos'd upon them of making publick draught-houses; he commanded the dead bodies to be cruci∣fied, saies Servius.* 1.323 So did Ptolemy to the body of Cleomenes who had killed himself; and Aristotle saies it was every where receiv'd, that the dead bo∣dies of self-murderers should be disgrac'd some way or other; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by denying them burial: that was the usual way. So did the Milesians to their maidens who hang'd themselves, they expos'd their bodies to a publick spectacle: and Strabo tells that the Indian Priests and wise men blam'd the fact of Calanus, and that they hated those hasty deaths of impatient or proud persons. Alieno scelere quam meo mori malo, said King Darius, I had rather die by the wickedness of another, then by my own.

6.* 1.324 Aristotle saies that they who kill themselves [hastening their own death before God or the publick commands them] are injurious to the Commonwealth; from whose service and profit they subtract themselves if they be innocent, and if they be criminal, they withdraw themselves from her justice:* 1.325 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that kills himself does wrong to the city; and is after death disgrac'd as an unjust person to the publick.

Now then to the examples and great precedents above mentioned I shall give this answer.* 1.326 1. That Sampson is by all means to be excus'd, be∣cause S. Paul accounts him in the Catalogue of Saints who died in faith; and therefore S. Austin saies he did it by a peculiar instinct and inspiration of the Spirit of God. But no man can tell whether he did or no: and there∣fore I like that better which Peter Martyr saies in this inquiry; He did pri∣marily and directly intend onely to kill the enemies of God, which was properly his work to which he was in his whole calling design'd by the Spirit of God; but that he died himself in the ruine was his suffering, but not his design; but like a Souldier fighting against his enemies at the com∣mand of his General undertakes the service though he knows he shall die for it. Thus doe the Mariners blow up themselves in a sea-fight when they can no otherwise destroy the enemy; they doe it as Ministers of justi••e, and by command; else they are not to be excused: and he that gives it must take care it be just and reasonable.* 1.327 Thus did the brave Eleazar Ha∣baran the brother of Judas Maccabaeus: he supposing their grand enemy Antiochus to be upon a tower'd Elephant goes under the beast and kills him, who with his fall crush'd the brave Prince to death; he intended not to kill himself, but to kill Antiochus he would venture himself or suffer death.

2. The fact of Saul is no just precedent,* 1.328 it looks like despaire: but the Hebrews say that it is not lawful for any man to die by his own hands, unless the prolongation of his life be a dishonour to God, and to a cause of religion; and upon this account they excuse both Saul and Sampson, for they knew that if they should fall or abide respectively in the hands of scorners, the dishonour of their persons would disparage the religion, and reach to God. So they. But this is not right: for we onely are to take care

of the laws of God, and of his glory in the waies of his own appointment; for extraordinaries and rare contingencies, let him alone, he will secure his own glory.

3. For Razias, Lipsius saies it is a question whether it was well or ill done;* 1.329 and who please to see it disputed may read Lucas Brugensis on one side and Nicolaus de Lyra upon the other. For my own part I at no hand believe it fit to be imitated; but concerning what brave and glorious per∣sons doe, and by what Spirit they acted, I am not willing to give hasty sentence: for there are many secrets which we know not; but we are to follow our Rule, and not to trust any Spirit of which we are not sure it is from God.

4. But of that which is most difficult I have already spoken something;* 1.330 but shall adde more: for it is a pitiable case that vertuous women, highly sensible of their honour, zealous for chastity, despisers of life, should not as well receive the reward of their suffering to preserve the interest of chastity, as of any other grace; especially since they chuse death rather then shame, and would not willingly chuse either, but being forc'd, run to death for sanctuary. It is true, it is much to be pitied; but that's all: ac per hoc & quae se occiderunt, ne quicquam hujusmodi paterentur, quis humanus affectus eis nollet ignosci? Every man (saies S. Austin) will pity, and be ready to excuse, or to wish pardon to such women who kill'd themselves to preserve their honour.* 1.331 Cicero tells of certain noble Virgins that threw themselves into pits to avoid the shame of their enemies lust: and S. Hie∣rom tels of seven Milesian Virgins, who, to prevent the rudeness of the Gaules that destroyed all Asia, laid violent hands upon themselves. The Greek Epigram mentions them with honour, but tells but of three:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.332 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

They chose a sad death before a mixture with the lustful blood of the Gala∣tians. And the Jews tell of a captive woman of their nation, who being in a ship and design'd to ravishment, ask'd her Husband if the bodies of them th••m that were drown'd in the sea should rise again: and when he had said they should, she leap'd into the Sea. And among the Christians that did so, there were many examples. Divers women of Antioch under Diocle∣tian; more under Chosroes the Persian; Sophronia under Maxentius; S. Pelagia before mention'd; and divers others. These persons had great Advocates; but I suppose it was upon the stock of pity and compassion that so much bravery should be thrown away upon a mistake: and therefore I find that S. Chrysostome, who commended this manner of death upon the account of chastity, yet is not constant to it, but blames it in his commen∣taries upon the Galatians:* 1.333 and the third Council of Orleans commanded that the oblations of them that died by the hands of justice should be received, Si tamen non ipsi sibi mortem probentur propriis manibus intulisse, alwaies provided that they did not prevent the hand of justice, that they did not lay violent hands upon themselves. I end this with the saying of Procopius,* 1.334 which is a just determination of the case in it self. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

A violent death, or a death hastned by our own hands, is a thing unprofitable, and full of foolish violence; and since it wants prudent counsel, it is by wise men judged to be but the image and hypocrisie of valour and magnanimity. To which he addes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, This also ought to be considered, that no man ought to be impious or ungratefull towards God. This is the definition of the case. But then as to the persons of them that did so, I have nothing to say but this, that they ought not to be drawn into example: but for the whole, it was modest and charitable which was decreed by the French Capitulars,* 1.335 Concerning him who hath kill'd himself, it is consider'd, that if any one out of pity or compassion will give alms for their souls (so was the custome of those times) let him give, and say prayers and psalms, but not celebrate the solemn sacrifice for them; quia incomprehensi∣bilia sunt judicia Dei, & profunditatem consilii ejus nemo potest investigare, Because the judgements of God are incomprehensible, and the depth of his coun∣sels no man can fathom. This was more gentle then that of Virgil,* 1.336

Proxima deinde tenent moesti loca qui sibi lethum Insontes peperere manu, lucémque perosi Projecere animas, quam vellent aethere in alto Nunc & pauperiem, & duros perferre labores.

He appointed a sad place in Hell for them that so cheaply out of impati∣ence, or to avoid a great trouble, threw away their souls. Fain would they now return to light, and joyfully would change their present state with all the labours and shames which they with hasty death so earnestly de∣clin'd. But he knew nothing of it, neither doe I, onely that it is not law∣full. But how they shall fare in the other World who upon such great ac∣counts are tempted, is one of God's secrets, which the Great Day will ma∣nifest. If any man will be pleased to see more against it, he may find it in a 1.337 S. Austin,b 1.338 Hegesippus,c 1.339 Nicephorus Blennidas,d 1.340 Heliodorus, and di∣vers others, well collected by Fabrot in his 5^th Exercitation.

RULE IV. He that hath suffered the punishment is not dis∣charg'd in Conscience, unless he also repent of the disobedience.

THis Rule is in effect the same with the first Rule of the first Chapter of this Book:* 1.341 but because it is usually discours'd of also under the head of Penal Laws, and there are many persons who, when they have broken the law, and have suffered punishment, think themselves dis∣charg'd, and because it ministers some particularities of its own, I have therefore chosen distinctly to consider it.

In this inquiry penal laws usually are distinguish'd into laws purely penal,* 1.342 and mix'd. 1. Laws purely penal are such which neither directly command, nor forbid, but impose a penalty upon him that does or omits an action respectively.* 1.343 So Moses to the Children of Israelxf, If a man shall steal an oxe or a sheep, and kill it or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one oxe, and four sheep for one. 2. A mix'd penal law is when with the

precept or prohibition the penalty is adjoyn'd: so said God, Ye shall not hurt the widow or the fatherless;* 1.344 if ye hurt them, they shall cry unto me, and I will hear their cry, and my fury shall be kindled, and I will strike you with the sword, and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless. And of the same nature is that Canon of the Council of Agatho,* 1.345 We doe by a special order com∣mand all secular persons to hear the whole Divine Service upon the Lord's Day, so that the people presume not to go forth before the blessing of the Priest: but if any man shall presume to doe so, let him be publickly punish'd by the Bishop. 3. Other laws are purely moral, that is, preceptive without any penalty. This distinction Silvester derides as childish, and of no use; but others de∣ride him: but whatever use it can be of to other purposes, it is of little in this. For whether the penalty be annexed or no, it obliges to penalty* 1.346; and therefore whether it be preceptive or no, it also obliges to duty: and we see it in ocular demonstration in divers of the Levitical and moral laws of God, which sometimes are set down in the stile of laws purely penal, and the same laws in other places are penal and prohibitive.

1. But why are punishments decreed in laws?* 1.347 are they for the obe∣dient, or for the disobedient? for good men, or for bad? Certainly, for them that doe not obey. Now they that obey not, doe well or ill, or it is indifferent whether they doe or no: if they doe well, they are to be re∣warded, and not punished; if the thing after the sanction be still indiffe∣rent, why shall he suffer evil that does none? But the case is plain, that in all just Governments the punishment is decreed in the laws, that the law may be obeyed; and unless it be equally good to the Prince that his Sub∣jects obey or be punish'd, that is, unless it be all one to him whether they be happy and advantaged, or miserable and punished, and that he cares not whether the subject receives the good or the evil of the law, it cannot be suppos'd that when the subject is punished, the law is satisfied in its first intention.

2. Adde to this,* 1.348 If suffering the punishment does satisfie the law, then the Subject is not tied to obey for Conscience sake, but onely for wrath, expresly against the Apostle; and then laws would quickly grow contemptible: for the great Flyes that break through the Cobweb-lawns of penal laws, would be both innocent and unconcerned; innocent, as not being tied in Conscience, and unconcerned, as having many defensatives against the fine.

3. The saying therefore of S. Austin hath justly prevail'd,* 1.349 Omnis poena si justa est,* 1.350 peccati poena est, & supplicium nominatur, Every penalty is relative to an offence, and is called punishment. And there can be no reason given why in laws there are differing punishments assign'd, but that they be proportionable to the greatness of the fault. It follows therefore, that whoever is oblig'd to suffer the punishment of the law, doe ask God's par∣don and the King's, for having done a sin by which onely he could be ob∣lig'd to punishment. Reatus or guilt, both in Divine laws and in humane, is an obligation to punishment: for reatus poenae and reatus culpae differ but as the right and left hand of a pillar; it is the same thing in several aspects and situations.* 1.351 And Lucius Neratius was a fool, and a vile person; and having an absurd humour of giving every man he met a box on the ear, he caused a servant to follow him with a bag of money, and caused him to pay

him whom he had smitten XXV Asses, a certain summe which was by the law of the XII Tables impos'd upon him that did an injury: but con∣sider'd not that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that while he was a base and a trifling fool for doing in∣jury to the Citizens.

This Rule hold▪ in all without exception:* 1.352 it seems indeed to fail in two cases, but it does not; onely the account of them will explicate and confirm the Rule.

1. In actions which are not sins, but undecencies,* 1.353 or unaptnesses to a state or office and action, the evils that are appendant to them are also but quasi poenae, half punishments: such as is the irregularity that is incurred by a Judge that gives sentence in a cause of Blood; he is incapable of entring into Holy Orders by the antient laws of the Church. A Butcher is made incapable of being of the Inquest of Life and Death: which incapacity is not directly a punishment, any more then it is a sin to be a Butcher; but certain persons are without their fault declar'd unfit for certain states o•• imployments. Now this confirms the Rule, for still the proportion is kept; and if it be but like a fault, the consequent of it is but like a punish∣ment. And if at any time these appendages are called punishments, it is by a Catachresis or an abuse of the word, and because of the similitude in the matter of it. So we say, the righteous are punished, that is, they suffer evil, for their own trial, or for the glory of God: and so it is in the Law, Sine culpa, nisi subsit causa, non est aliquis puniendus, No man is to be punished without his fault, unless there be cause for it: that is, no man is to suffer that evil, which in other cases is really a punishment, and in all cases looks like one. And from hence comes that known Rule, and by the same mea∣sure is to be understood, Etsi sine causa non potest infligi poena, potest tamen sine culpa. The word poena is taken improperly for any evil consequent or adjunct.

2. This seems to fail in laws that are conditional or conventional;* 1.354 such as are when the Prince hath no intention to forbid or command any thing, but gives leave to doe it, but not unless you pay a fine. Thus if a Prince commands that none shall wear Spanish cloth, or ride upon a Mule, or go with a Coach & six Horses, under the forfeiture of a certain sum; this sum is a punishment, and the action is a fault: but if the subjects shall ask leave to doe it, paying the sum, then it is a conditional or conventional law, and obliges not to obedience, but to pay the fine. For these laws are not prohibitive, but concessory; and there is no sign to distinguish them from others, but the words of the law, the interpretation of the Judges, and the allowed practice of the subjects.

Of the same consideration are all promises and vows and contracts* 1.355 which are made with a penalty annexed to the breakers. The interested person is first tied to keep his word: if he does not, he sins. But if he does sin he must therefore pay the penalty; and if he does not, he sins twice. Haud scio (saies Cicero) an satis sit eum qui lacesserit, injuriae suae poenitere.* 1.356 It is not enough for him to repent of the injustice, but he must also pay his fine; and yet that does not acquit him from the first fault, but pre∣vents a second. He that so contracts is twice obliged, and the later fault is paid by the penalty, and the first fault by repentance and that together.

RULE V. It is not lawfull for a guilty person to defend himself by calumny, or a lie, from the penalty of the law, though it be the sentence of death.

ALL the wisdome of Mankind hath ever been busy in finding out and adorning Truth,* 1.357 as being that in which we are to endeavour to be like God,* 1.358 who is Truth essentially: and therefore Pythagoras in Aelian did say, that the two greatest and most excellent works that God gave to Mankind to doe, are the pursuits of Truth and Charity; for these are ex∣cellencies for which God himself is glorious before Men and Angels. The Persian Magi say, that Oromagdes (so they called the greatest of their Gods) was in his body like light, and his soul was like truth; and that therefore by truth we are like to God, but by a lye we are made mortal (sayes Plato.)* 1.359 Veritas, quomodo Sol illuminans colores, & album & nigrum ostendit, qualis sit unusquisque eorum, sic ipsa quoque refellit omnem sermonis probabilitatem;* 1.360 merto à Graecis quoque acclamatum est, Principium magnae virtutis est Regina veritas, As the Sun gives light to us, and distinction to black and white, so does truth to speech; and therefore the Greeks did rightly affirm, that Truth is the beginning of the great Vertue, that is, of perfection, or vertue Heroical, said S. Clement.

This is true in all regards: but the question is,* 1.361 whether Truth can be practis'd at all times. For God speaks Truth because it is his nature, and he fears no man, and hath power directly to bring all his purposes to pass: but the affairs of men are full of intrigues, and their persons of in∣firmity, and their understandings of deception, and they have ends to serve which are just, and good, and necessary; and yet they cannot be ser∣ved by truth, but sometimes by errour and deception. And therefore the Antients described Pan, who was the son of Mercury, their God of speech, with the upper part like a man, and the lower part like a beast, rough, hai∣ry and deformed; not onely to signifie truth and falshood, and that truth is smooth, even and beauteous, and a lye is rough, ugly, deformed, and cloven-footed, (quia mendacii multiplex divortium, sayes one) but to represent, that in our superiour faculties, and our intercourse with the power above us, we must speak truth, but that in our conversation with men below it is necessary sometimes by a lye to advantage charity, by losing of a truth to save a life. Here then is the inquiry,

1. Whether it can in any case be lawfull to tell a lye.

2. Whether it be lawfull to use restrictions and mental reservations, so that what we speak, of it self is false, but joyned to something within is truth.

3. Whether and in what cases it is lawfull to equivocate, or use words of doubtfull signification with a purpose to deceive, or knowing that they will deceive.

4. Whether it be lawfull by actions and pretences of actions to de∣ceive others for any end; and in what cases it is so.

Question I. Whether it can in any case be lawful to tell a lie.

To this I answer,* 1.362 that the Holy Scriptures of the Old & New Testa∣ment doe indefinitely and severely forbid lying.* 1.363 A righteous man hateth ly∣ing, saith Solomon; and Agur's prayer was, Remove from me vanity and lies. For the Lord will destroy them that speak lies. And our Blessed Saviour con∣demns it infinitely by declaring every lie to be of the Devil. When he speaketh a lie he speaketh of his own, for he is a lier and the Father of it. Lie not therefore one to another,* 1.364 saith S. Paul: For all liers shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone. Beyond these things no∣thing can be said for the condemnation of lying.

But then lying is to be understood to be something said or written to the hurt of our neighbour,* 1.365 which cannot be understood otherwise then to differ from the mind of him that speaks. Mendacium esse petulanter, aut cupiditate nocendi aliud loqui, seu gestu significare, & aliud sentire: so Me∣lanchthon: To lie is to deceive our neighbour to his hurt. For in this sense a lie is naturally and intrinsecally evil; that is, to speak a lie to our neigh∣bour is naturally evil. Not because it is different from an eternal truth, for every thing that differs from the Eternal truth is not therefore criminal for being spoken, that is, is not an evil lie: and a man may be a lier though he speaks that which does not differ from the Eternal truth; for sometimes a man may speak that which is truth, and yet be a lier at the same time in the same thing. For he does not speak truly because the thing is true; but he is a lier because he speaks it when he thinks it is false. That therefore is not the essence or formality of a lie. Vehementer errant qui tradunt orationis esse proprium significare verum necessarium, said Scaliger: A man may be a true man though he doe not alwaies speak truth. If he intends to profit and to instruct, to speak probably and usefully, to speak with a purpose to doe good & to doe no evil, though the words have not in them any necessary truth, yet they may be good words. Simonides and Plato say it is injustice and therefore evil: so does Cicero, and indeed so does the Holy Scripture, by including our neighbours right in our speaking truth; it is contra proximum, it is against our neighbour; for to himself no man can lie, and to God no man can lie, unless he be also an Atheistical person, and believes that God knows nothing that is hidden, and so is impi∣ous when he saies a lie. But a lie is an injury to our neighbour; who be∣cause he knows not the secret, is to be told that in which he is concerned, and he that deceives him abuses him.

For there is in mankind an universal contract implied in all their enter∣courses,* 1.366 and words being instituted to declare the mind, and for no other end, he that hears me speak hath a right in justice to be done him, that as far as I can what I speak be true; for else he by words does not know your mind,* 1.367 and then as good and better not speak at all. Humanae aures verba nostra talia judicant, qualia foris sonant. Divina vero judicia talia esse audi∣unt, qualia ex intimis proferuntur. Though God judges of our words by the heart, yet Man judges of the heart by the words; and therefore in justice we are bound to speak so as that our neighbour doe not loose his right

which by our speaking we give him to the truth that is in our heart. And of a lie thus defin'd, which is injurious to our neighbour so long as his right to truth remains,* 1.368 it is that S. Austin affirms it to be simply unlawful, and that it can in no case be permitted, Nisi forte regulas quasdam datu∣rus es quibus noverimus ubi oporteat mentiri, ubi non oporteat; by way of confidence and irony: he condemus it all, unless peradventure (sayes he) you are able to give us rules when a man may lie,* 1.369 and when he may not. Quod non est bonum, nunquam erit bonum, that which is not innocent in it self, can never be made so. But vitia non sunt quibus rectè uti licet; if it can in any case become good, it is not of its own nature evil: so that if a lye be unjust, it can never become lawfull; but if it can be separate from injustice, then it may be innocent. Here then I consider,

This right though it be regularly and commonly belonging to all men,* 1.370 yet it may be taken away by a Superior right supervening; or it may be lost, or it may be hindred, or it may cease upon a greater reason.

1. Therefore upon this account it was lawful for the Children of Israel to borrow Jewels of the Egyptians,* 1.371 which supposes a promise of restitution, though they intended not to pay them back again: God gave them com∣mandement so to spoil them, and the Egyptians were devested of their rights, and were to be us'd like enemies.

2. It is lawful to tell a lie to children or to mad-men,* 1.372 because they having no powers of judging, have no right to truth: but then the lie must be charitable and useful; because they are defended by the laws from injury, and therefore must not have a lie told them that can doe them mis∣chief. So that if a lie be told it must be such as is for their good; for though they have no right to truth, yet they have right to defence and immunity: and an injurious lie told to a child or mad-man is a sin, not because it de∣ceives him, but because it deceives him to his prejudice. Quintilian the great Master of children saies, Utilitatis eorum gratiâ multa fingimus, We feign many things to affright or allure Children to good, and from evil re∣spectively. And so doe Physitians to their Patients, abusing the fancies of hypochondriacal and disordered persons into a will of being cured. Some will doe nothing without a warrant; others are impatient of your converse unless you seem to believe them: and Physicians can never apply their remedies, unless they pretend warrants, or compliances, and use little arts of wit and cosenage. This and the like were so usual, so permitted to Phy∣sitians, that it grew to a Proverb, Mentiris ut medicus; which yet was al∣waies to be understood in the way of charity, and with honour to the pro∣fession. But this any Physitian may not doe, that is, not to every Patient: for if the man be wise and can chuse and can consider, he may not be cosen'd into his cure by the telling of a lie, because he is capable of reason, & there∣fore may chuse what he hath a mind to, and therefore to cosen him is to in∣jure him; & no man must commit a sin to doe a good turn to a man against his will. * And thus also in the case of Children: their Tutors or Pa∣rents may not tell them every lie; they may not teach them lies and make them confident in vanities;* 1.373 but for their good, govern them as they can be governed. Ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur, all the world con∣sents, when it is for their improvement. And to this is reduc'd the per∣mission of inventing a wittie fable, or telling a false story, to gain ground

upon him that believes a false opinion, and cannot any other way so easily be confuted.* 1.374 Thus when two Eutychian Bishops, who believing that the two natures of Christ made but one, did consequently believe that the Divi∣nity did die as well as the Humanity in the death of Christ, came to the Court of a Saracen Prince, he pretended great sorrow and conste••∣nation of mind at the receipt of some letters; into the contents where∣of when they with some curiosity inquired, the Prince with a seeming great sorrow told them he had receiv'd certain intelligence that the Archangel Gabriel was dead. They to comfort him told him certainly it could not be true; and for their parts they did believe it to be impossible. O Fathers, said the Prince, you doe not believe it to be impossible that an Archangel should, when you affirm that the Divinity did die. Such a fiction as this no wise man reproves; it is but like the supposing a false Proposition in dis∣putation, that upon that false supposition a true Conclusion may be erected.

3. It is lawful to tell a lie to our neighbour by consent,* 1.375 provided the end be innocent or pious. Thus S. Chrysostom and S. Hierom say that S. Peter suffer'd himself to be reprov'd by S. Paul before the Gentiles for too much compliance with the Jews: not that he did it seriously, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he acted a part by consent to establish Christian liberty amongst the Gentiles. I doe not consent to the instance, because S. Paul tels it to the Galatians as a solemn story and a direct narrative, adding withall dog∣matically, that S. Peter was to be blam'd: but the instance will serve rightly to illustrate this limitation of the Rule. But thus the parties in a warre may write exactly contrary to the truth; when they are understood to what purpose, and when it is by consent. Because he who hath the right to truth hath quitted it, and his communication does serve the ends of soci∣ety well enough, and his words, though they are not agreeable to his ordi∣nary mind, yet they are made to be so by particular institution and de∣signe. Thus in besieged places they write letters of confidence and great ostentation of the strengths which they have not; when their parties have consented that they should doe so for their just advantages.

4. To tell a lie for charity,* 1.376 to save a mans life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of a Prince, of an useful and a publick person, hath not onely been done in all times, but commended by great and wise and good men. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To tell a lie to save a life is no harm, said old Pisander. Thus the Egyptian midwives are commended be∣cause by their lie they sav'd the Israelitish infants. O magnum humanitatis ingenium! O pium pro salute mendacium! saies S. Austin of them: it was an excellent invention of kindness, and a pious lie for the safety of the inno∣cents: and S. Ambrose and S. Jerome commend them so, that they sup∣pos'd them to receive eternal rewards. The same was the case of Rahab; to whom it should seem that Phinehas, who was one of the spies, had given instruction and made in her fair dispositions to tell a lie for their conceal∣ment. For when she had hidden Caleb, Phinehas said to her, Ego sum Sacerdos, Sacerdotes verò, quippe Angelorum similes, si volunt, aspectabiles sunt; si nolunt, non cernuntur. But she made no use of that, but said directly they were gone away. Concerning which lie of hers S. Chry∣sostom cries out, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.377 O excellent lie! O worthy deceit of her that did not betray the Divine persons, but did retain piety! Thus we find

S. Felix telling a lie to save his life from the Heathen Inquisitors.

Felicem sitit impietas— Felicemque rogant, Felix ubi cernitur: & non Cernitur ipse,* 1.378 nec ipse vir est, cum sit propè, longè est. —persensit & ipse faventis Consilium Christi, ridensque rogantibus infit, Nescio Felicem quem quaeritis: ilicet illi Praetereunt ipsum; discedit at ille plateâ, Illudente canes Domino frustratus hiantes.

They ask'd where Felix was; himself answer'd, that he knew not Felix whom they look'd for: and yet no man finds fault with this escape. De∣ceptio & mendacium semper aliàs mala res, tunc tantum sunt usui quando pro remedio sunt amicis curandis, aut ad vitandum apud hostes periculum; they are the words of Celsus in Origen. A lie is otherwise evil, onely it is then useful when it is for remedy to cure the evils of our friends, or to avoid the evils from our enemies. The same almost with the expression of Clemens Alexandrinus, who allows 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to lie when it is a remedy.* 1.379 So Lucian amongst the Heathens, Qui cum usus postu∣lat mentiuntur, veniâ nimirum hi, imò laude plerique eorum digni sunt; quicunque vel hostes fefellerunt, vel ad salutem tali quopiam pharmaco usi sunt in necessitatibus: They are not onely to be excus'd or pardon'd, but to be commended, that lie, when they use it as a remedy or a medicine in the danger or necessities of our friends; where also the Scholiast does allows an officious lie.* 1.380 So we must use a lie, saies Cassian, quasi naturae ei insit hellebori, as a man uses hellebore: and he commends Archebius for deceiving some persons with a charitable lie. It is therefore no wonder if Pliny commends Arria the wife of Caecinna Paetus for so often lying to her sick husband in the con∣cealment of the death of their beloved boy;* 1.381 which she therefore hid lest the grief should extinguish her Husband. In short, S. Austin saies that all the Philosophers,* 1.382 as Plato, Xenophon, Lucian, the Lawyers, the Physicians, the Rhetoricians and Theologues did affirm that it was sometimes lawful to tell a lie; that is, when it did good and no evil: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Proclus, For Charity is better then truth, and to save a mans life is better then a true story. The Archbishop of Tyre (as I re∣member) tells a story, that a malicious Saracen had secretly defiled one of the Mosques or places of worship which the Turks have in Jerusalem. The fact was imputed to the Christians, who generally denying it, but having no credit with their enemies, were all presently drag'd to the place of exe∣cution. Amongst them there was young man pious and noble, who seeing all his brethren in a sad condition and himself equally involved, by an offi∣cious and a charitable lie took the fact upon himself, and confess'd himself alone to be the doer of it, and that the rest knew nothing of it. Himself indeed was put to death with exquisite torments, but he sav'd the lives of all the rest; who, I doubt not, believ'd that young man to have in heaven a great reward for his piety, and no reproof for his innocent and pious lie: for in memory of this noble act the Christians in Jerusalem once a year marched with palms in their hands into the City to perpetuate the memory of that deliverance.

5. Now this may be better admitted in case the charitable lye be told to him to whom the good accrues;* 1.383 for then there is a leave justly pre∣sumed, and he that receives the good is willing to receive it with the loss

of an useless or hurtfull truth, and therefore there is no injustice done: as he that takes his neighbour's goods, for which he hath reason to believe his neighbour willing, is no thief, nor the other a deceiver. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sayes Andronicus Rhodius, He does indeed deceive, but he is no deceiver; because not the cosening but the curing of his friend is the purpose of his false affirmative. And to this we suppose that every man is willing enough, and therefore not at all injur'd. And this reason was good in such chari∣table deceptions which are by implicit consent or leave justly presumed: so Darius Hystaspes in Herodotus, Ubi expedit mendacium dicere, dicatur; nam idem optamus, & qui mendacium dicimus, & qui veritatem. Every man is willing enough to be deceived into his own advantage; and there∣fore when it is so, in such things where the man is willing to receive advan∣tage, there is no harm done, if he be deceiv'd that he may not be undone. He that is in danger of drowning is willing enough to be pull'd out of the water, though by the ears, or the hair of his head; and we have reason to believe so in the present affair. Mendacium nemini noxium, sed alicui com∣modum, honestum esse, said Bishop Heliodorus in his Fair Ethiopian. He was indeed then writing a Romance, by which he intended to doe good and no harm, and therefore believ'd himself innocent. Upon this account the Apologues or Fables of Aesop, the Parables of wise men, and their dark sayings, the cases which Lawyers put, and the fictions of law, have their justification, Et prodesse solent, & delectare—They hurt no man, and doe good to every man; they doe him profit, and they doe him pleasure.

Exit in immensum foecunda licentia vatum, Obligat historicâ nec sua verba fide.* 1.384

Poets doe intend to teach, not to deceive, in their fictions, and therefore are allowed.

6. But if the lye be told to another for the preservation not of him∣self,* 1.385 but of a third person, then the case is more difficult, for here is no pre∣sumptive leave, but it is against the mind of the inquirer. Now concer∣ning this, though it be allowed by very many of the antient Doctours of the Church, and by the wisest amongst the Heathens, and hath in it a very great charity; yet I cannot see sufficient cause to allow it.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.386 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

It is at no hand good to tell a lye: but when a truth brings an intolerable evil, it is pardonable, but not commendable; so the Greek Tragedy: because it is of it self evil to lye to our neighbour. Not that every false propo∣sition spoken knowingly is a sin; but if it be spoken to deceive, and not to profit, it is spoken to the injury of him that hears, and is a sin be∣cause it is unjust, and therefore not to be done for any good; and it is in this very instance in which S. Paul was angry at them who intimated that he told a lye for a good end: it may not be done, when to doe it is unjust or injurious.* 1.387 I approve therefore the opinion of S. Austin, I am sure it was one of his opinions, for in this question he had more then one; Duo sunt genera mendaciorum in quibus non est magna culpa, sed tamen non sunt sine culpa, There are two sorts of lyes which have in them no great fault, but yet they are not innocent: the one is to lye in jest; which is therefore not per∣nicious, because it does not deceive, for it is taken but for a jest: the other is to

lye for the good of our neighbour; which therefore is the less, because it hath some∣thing in it of good will.* 1.388 And Tertullian is of the same opinion, who reckons this of necessitate mentiri, to lye in the time of need, amongst the sins of daily incursion, or of an unavoidable infirmity. And S. Austin discourses it very well;* 1.389 When it is ask'd whether a good man may lye or no, we ask not after him that belongs to Egypt, to Jericho, or to Babylon, or to the earthly Jerusalem which is in bondage with her children: but what is his office that belongs to the Mother of us all, that City that is from above? and then we an∣swer, that no lye is of the truth: but concerning the Citizens of this City it is written, that a lye was not found in their mouths. So that upon this ac∣count all those examples recorded in Scripture of great persons telling a lye in the time of the danger of themselves or others is no warrant, no ar∣gument of the lawfulness of it; for they were under a looser law, but we under a more perfect and more excellent: and yet they did not doe well, and if we imitate them we doe worse.

And therefore we find great examples of Christians and of Heathens,* 1.390 whose Charity was not cold, but their love of truth and righteousness was much warmer then in the former examples.* 1.391 S. Austin tels of Firmus Bishop of Tagasta, that when one who by evil chance had kill'd a man fled to him to be conceal'd from the avengers of blood; to the inquirers he answer'd, Nec mentiri se posse, nec hominem prodere, He could neither lye, nor yet betray the man. For which answer and refusal the Bishop being brought before the Emperour, as a reward both of his charity and his truth, he obtain'd pardon for the man. And it was a great thing which Probus tels of Epaminondas, and Plutarch of Aristides, that they were so great and severe lovers of truth, that they would not lye so much as in jest. Indeed that was very well: and it is of greater obligation to Christians, to whom not onely purity and simplicity, ingenuity and sincerity is commanded, but all vain talking is forbidden. But the case is not so clear in the matter of difference, when it happens between a great charity and an unconcerning truth. For who would not save his Father's life, or the life of his King, or of a good Bishop and a Guide of Souls, at the charge of a harmless lye, from the rage of Persecutors and Tyrants? God indeed in his providence hath so order'd the affairs of the world, that these cases seldome happen: but when any man is surpris'd or tried, unless he be sure that it is in that case a sin to tell a lye, he may be sure it is a very great sin to betray his Prince or Prelate, his Father or his Friend. Every man in that case would dispute hardly, rather then give up a good man to death. And if it be come to a dispute, and that it be doubtfull on either hand whether the lye in that case, or whether the betraying the man to death, be the sin, it is the safer way to determine for the charity then for the veracity; because in case it be a sin to give him up, it is much a greater sin then to tell such a lye: and then comes in the rule, Caret peccato quod ex duobus minus est. The lye is the less evil, and therefore it is no sin when it is chosen to avoid that which for ought we know is the greater. But this is upon supposition that the case is doubtfull. * To which also must be added, that it must also sup∣pose that it is just to save the man, or that we think it so: for to rescue a Malefactor, a Bandito, a Fugitive of law, hath in it no such obligation. But if it be just that the man be sav'd, that is a higher justice then the ob∣ligation of telling truth to the Persecutor; to whom it is as great charity, if from him we take the power of doing evil, as it is justice to rescue the

innocent. Now this, and the opinion of so many great men that allow it, and the favourable nature of the case, is enough at least to make this mat∣ter probable; and if there be a doubt, it is enough to establish it: the que∣stion being uncertain, is enough to make the practice certain.

And indeed if we consider things without the prejudice of easy and popular opinions, though it be said, that to tell truth is an act of justice; yet this is not true in all propositions, but in such truths onely which con∣cern a man for some real good to him, or for some imaginary good which hath no real evil. But when the telling of a truth will certainly be the cause of evil to a man, though he have right to truth, yet it must not be gi∣ven to him to his harm: it is like the giving to a mad-man his own sword; you had better give him a wooden dagger, though the other be his own. But in an unconcerning truth what interest can any man have that is worth preserving? What wrong is done to me if I be told that Alexander dyed upon the floor, and not upon a feather-bed? or that Pittacus his wife hurt her fingers when she threw down the table of meat before her husband's friends? Truth is justice when it does good, when it serves the end of wisedome, or advantage, or real pleasure, or something that ought or may be desir'd; and every truth is no more justice, then every restitution of a straw to the right owner is a duty. Be not over-righteous, sayes Salomon. In these things there is no question but the pretences of little justice ought to serve the great end of charity; and much rather if the truth will doe no good, and will doe hurt to him that inquires, and more to him who is inquir'd after. The Persecutor hath a right to truth, but no right to be undone; and therefore he is not wrong'd by that lye that saves him harm∣less in some measure, and his brother in more; and if he be not wrong'd, then no man is: and then the lye that so well serves Charity, is not against Justice; and unless every lye be intrinsecally evil and malicious, it hath in such cases no irregularity. And if it be objected, that we must not tell a lye for God, therefore much less for our Brother; I answer, that it does not follow: for God needs not a lye, but our Brother does: and besides this, there can no service be pretended to be done to God by a lye, but it must be in the matter of justice or religion, in both which cases a lye is nei∣ther to be told for God nor our Brother; but a real service may be done for our Brother by such a lye as sins neither against justice nor religion; in which case onely I say it may seem to be allowable.

But then from these premisses the truth in the instance of the Rule is established;* 1.392 for it is not lawfull for a guilty prisoner to say Not guilty, when he is justly interrogated. Christianum non mentiri etiamsi moriatur ex tormentis, said Clemens Alexandrinus, A Christian will not lye, though to escape death with torments:* 1.393 For the law sayes, Thou shalt not kill; and the law sayes, Thou shalt not lye: but the law it self does sometimes kill, but the law does never lye. For although it be said, that no man is bound to accuse himself, and indeed the laws of man doe not tie him to doe it: yet this hinders not the conclusion in this case; for in the present case the man is accused already, and he is not called to be his own accuser, but to confess the fact if he be justly accused by the law: for why does the Judge ask, but to be answer'd truly? For there being three wayes in law of pro∣ceeding to definitive sentence, 1. the notoreity of the fact, 2. the convi∣ction by witnesses, and 3. the confession of the party; in the destitution of the first, to prevent the trouble of the second, the law interrogates con∣cerning

the third; and it is as in the case of Joshuah and Achan, My son, give glory unto the Lord, and confess thy fault. It is true, it is a favourable case; and when a mans life is at stake, he hath brought himself into an evil necessity: but there is no excusing of a false denial, but it is certainly Cri∣minal, and nothing can excuse it, unless the law should give leave to such persons to say what they would, which cannot be suppos'd in any good Go∣vernment; for then trials of Criminal causes between the Judge and the Thief would be like a match at fencing, and it is infinitely confuted by those laws which use to examine by scourgings or torture; which whe∣ther it be lawfull or unlawfull, I doe not here determine, but I affirm to be a great testimony, that laws doe not love to be played withall, but when they ask soberly, intend to be answered truly.

This is also to be extended to the case of Advocates, who in a good cause must not use evil arts. For we must not tell a lie for God, and there∣fore not for the interest of any moral vertue, nor for the defence of righ∣teousness; for a cavil or an injurious lie is out of the way to justice, and she must not be directly wronged that she may be indirectly righted. In the civil law it is permitted, that to avoid abuses and the injurious craft of the opposite party, the advocate of the right may use all arts that are not lies and falsity; Nec videtur dolo fecisse qui fraudem excluserit, saies the law, l. Compater, § Titio, ff. de legat. secundo. He may be overthrown by art, so he be not by that which is false: sic ars deluditur arte. But in the case which the lawyers out of Baldus put, the question is evident. Agricola borrows of Sempronius five hundred pounds, and pays him at the day, but without witness: Sempronius sues him for the money: Agricola owes him none, but cannot prove the payment; but yet may not when he is particularly in∣terrogated, to save himself from injury, deny that ever the received any. He must confess the truth, though he pay the money again. Covaruvias affirms that he may in this case lawfully deny that ever he received any; because he is not indebted, he received none that remains in his hand: and to other purposes the Judge cannot question him; and if he does he is un∣just, and therefore Agricola is not tied to answer rightly. But this is not well said nor well considered. For the Judge being competent may re∣quire him to answer; and the intention of the question is not to know whether Agricola have paid the money yea or no; but whether he bor∣rowed it. For if he did, the Judge is afterward to inquire concerning the payment: and as Sempronius was tied to prove that, so is Agricola tied to prove this; and a lie is not to be confuted by a lie, nor the error of Agricola in not taking witnesses or an acquittance to be supplied by a direct denial of a truth. * But if Sempronius have lent Agricola 500 li. whereof he hath received 200 li. if the Judge aske whether he ows him that sum which Sempronius demands, he may indefinitely and without more pun∣ctuality deny the debt, that is, of 500 li. saying that he owes it not: and if the law be such that the confession of one part intitles him to the whole, he may deny the whole to be due, in case he have paid a part. But with these two Cautions, 1. That if he be ask'd concerning a part, he answer to that as justly as he answers to the whole: 2. That he do not make use of this subterfuge to defraud Sempronius of what is due debt, but only to defend himself from the undue demand. These cautions being observed, he hath liberty so to defend his cause, because majori summae negative pro∣latae minorem nec naturaliter nec civiliter inesse, say the lawyers. A man by denying the whole does not deny the part, though he that affirms the

whole affirms the part; and therefore this defence is just because it is true. * But now if in a just cause the Advocate or party may not tell a lie; I conclude that much less may he doe it in an unjust cause, and for the defence of wrong. But [much less] signifies nothing, for it may not at all be done in either; and in pure, perfect negatives there can be no degrees. But in artifices and crafty entercourses there is some difference; these may be used to defend a just cause that can no other way be defended; but they may not be used to promote an evil cause; because they of themselves though they be indifferent, yet not serving a good end but an evil, do there∣fore become evil. And therefore the Greek that denyed the depositum of his friend, and offered to swear at the Altar that he had restor'd it already, did not preserve his conscience and his oath by desiring his friend to hold the staffe in which he had secretly conveyed the money. It is true, he de∣livered it into his hand, desiring that he would hold it till he had sworn; but that artifice was a plain cosenage, and it was prettily discovered: For the injur'd person in indignation at the perjury smote the staff upon the ground, and broke it, and espied the money. But that made all right in∣deed, though against the intention of the perjurer. Such like arts as these must not be us'd to doe a mischief: if they doe charity and justice, if they have not something to ligitimate them, they have very much to excuse them.

7. It is lawfull to doe otherwise then we have said,* 1.394 when the doing is better then the saying: if the saying were ill, there is no scruple of it; for it ought not to be done, but the saying is to be repented of: not that the saying was a lie, for there is no way of making it good but by causing it to pass into a lie, that is, into vanity and nothing. But then, if the saying be less good, and the deed be contrary, and yet much better, the truth is not so much as the bounty; and there is no injustice in the lie, because there is charity in the action, and a sufficient leave presum'd to be given by him that is concerned. Thus the Emperor that said he would cut off every one that pissed against the wall, being afterwards appeased and perswaded to mercy towards them that had done amiss, he expounded his words con∣cerning dogs, and caused all the dogs in the Town to be kill'd. No man here was injur'd; and it had been an importune adhering to a truth, and a cruel verification of his word, to have prefer'd his word before the lives of so many Citizens.

8. It is not lawfull to tell a lie to save our fame;* 1.395 but we must rather accuse our selves then tell a lie, or commit any other sin. Nemo tenetur in∣famare se, is a rule universally admitted amongst the Casuists, No man is bound to discover his own shame. And upon this account they give leave to men to hide their sin, to leave their repentance imperfect, to tell a lie, to hazard the not doing of a known duty, to injure innocent persons. Thus when a man hath stolen goods, he is bound to restore, but not if it cannot be done without discovering his person, because no man is bound to dis∣grace himself. If an adulteress hath some children by her husband, others secretly by a stranger, she is bound not to suffer the legitimate to be injur'd by provisions for the other: this is true: but if she cannot prevent the in∣jury to the legitimate without discovering her self to her husband, Non tenetur, She is not bound to defame self. If her husband examine her con∣cerning it, she may hold her peace: but if that increases the suspicion, she

hath no way to escape but by denying it; for she is not oblig'd to betray or accuse her self. This is the doctrine of the Canonists and Masters of Conscience in the Church of Rome, which (as yet) are almost all that have written upon Cases.* 1.396 Navarre is the man whom I chuse for all the rest. Nemo tenetur restituere cum periculo famae consequentis virtutem moralem vel theologicam; non famae partae in aliis rebus praeclaris, ut ingenio, divitiis, No man is bound to make restitution with the hazard of his fame consequent to a moral or theological vertue; that is, if it will make him suspected not to be a good man: but if it will only hinder or hazard his reputation of wisdome or wealth or any thing of these natures, it hinders not. And again in the case of an adulteress,* 1.397 Peccavit, sed potest absolvi, licet taceat, & noceat patri putativo & haeredibus, quando timetur mors, vel amissio fa∣mae, &c. She hath sinn'd, but she may be absolved, though she hold her peace, and be injurious to the supposed Father, and wrong the heires; that is, if she be in peril of her life, or fears the loss of her fame. To save a mans credit, an honest man, to whom it would be a great shame to begg, videtur posse clancu∣lum necessaria surripere,* 1.398 may privately steale necessaries. So Diana. And if so, I do not doubt but he may also lie, and deny it to save his credit, if he be asked uncivilly concerning it. But this also the Doctors expresly af∣firm, that if Titius have disgrac'd Caius by punishing his secret shame to defame him, he is bound to make restitution of his good name, by deny∣ing what he said, that is, by telling of a lie, or by mental reservation; and that's all one, as I shall prove in the sequel. So Emonerius. Against these prodigies of doctrine I intend this paragraph. We must not commit a sin to save our life, much lesse to save our fame; and indeed nothing does more deserve infamy then to tell a lie, nothing disgraces a man more: and if a lie be an injustice, then no end can save it harmeless.

But then concerning our fame,* 1.399 we must rather let it goe, then let our duty goe.* 1.400 For though our fame is a tender part, and very valuable, yet our duty is more: although our fame is necessary for others, yet a good conscience is necessary to our selves: and he is cruel that neglects his own fame; but he is more cruel that neglects his own soul: and therefore we may expose our good name to goe as God shall please, 1. When we ask counsel and remedy for our soul. 2. To avoid the sin of pride, and punish the vanities of our spirit. 3. To exercise and increase the grace of humi∣lity. 4. In humiliation and penance for our sins, when our fame is not necessary to others, that is, when we are not eminent and publick persons. 5. When we are tied to any express duty which is indispensably necessary, as restitution of fame or goods, and yet cannot be done without the publi∣cation of our person and our shame. 6. When for our own greater good or for the publick interest we are commanded by a just and competent au∣thority. 7. And lastly, When we must either confess our sin or tell a lie, which is the thing now in question; for we must rather suffer shame then doe things worthy of shame, rather be ashamed before men then be a∣shamed before God, that is, rather be disgrac'd then damn'd: for nothing needs a lie but a sin to hide it, and by a lie a sin is made two.

9. It is not lawfull to tell a lie in humility,* 1.401 or the confession of sins and accusation of our selves.* 1.402 Cum humilitatis causâ mentiris, si non eras peccator antequam mentireris, mentiendo efficer is quod evitâras, said S. Austin. He that lies in humility, and calls himself a sinner in that wherein he was

innocent, hath made himself a sinner by his lying. And this was it which Abbat Zozimus wittily and piously replied; For when he said he was the greatest sinner,* 1.403 and the vilest of men, to him that reprov'd him for say∣ing so, and telling him that it was not truly said of him, because every one knew he serv'd God with great diligence and great sincerity, and therefore he ought to speak more truly of himself and more thankfully of God; Zozimus replied, You say very well, I ought to speak truth of my self & thankfully of God; but I am false and unthankful, but therefore I did say true, and not unthankfully. But we have truth enough to say of our selves to make us humble without saying what is false.* 1.404 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle; to deny the good things that are in us, or to make them less, is dissembling. All pride is a lie; but humi∣lity is truth: and therefore it is but a dissembling humility that lives upon the bread of deceit. Synesius Bp. of Ptolemais was a wise man and a great Philosopher. But when he was chosen Bshop he refus'd it passionately, & that his refusal might be accepted, declaim'd most bitterly against him∣self; that he was a man given to gaming, from which a Bishop should be free as God himself; that he did not believe that the world would ever perish; that he did not assent to the article of the resurrection of the dead; that being a Philosopher of the Stoical Sect, he was something given to lying; that he was not popular in his opinions, but humorous and morose, secret and resolute; that if he was forc'd to be a Bishop, he would then preach all his opinions. For all this Theophilus Bishop of Alexandria consecrated him Bishop, as knowing all this to be but stratagem and the arts of an odde phantastick humility.* 1.405 But it was ill done; and Synesius had this punish∣ment for his lying modesty, that he was believ'd by posterity to be so heathenish and unworthy, that that Church chose him Bishop onely upon hopes he would mend. So Evagrius and Nicephorus report.

10.* 1.406 In a just warre it is lawful to deceive the unjust enemy, but not to lie; that is, by stratagems and semblances of motions, by amuse∣ments and intrigues of action, by ambushes and wit, by simulation or dissimulation,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

by force or craft, openly or secretly, any way that you can, unless you promise the contrary: for it is in open warre, if the warre be just, lawful to doe justice upon the enemy all the waies we can; craft is but the facilitation of the force; and when it is a state of warre, there is nothing else to be look'd for. But if there be a treaty, or a contract, a promise or an agree∣ment in any thing, that is a state of peace so farre, and introduces a law; and then to tell a lie or to falsify does destroy peace and justice, and by breaking the law reduces things to the state of warre again.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.407

It is lawful to doe any thing to destroy your enemy; that is, so long as you profess hostility: and therefore if you tell a false tale to him to deceive him, when you are fighting against him, he is a fool if he believes you, for then you intend to destroy him; but you are not unjust, you are in a state of warre with him, and have no obligation upon you towards him. Thus Elisha told a lie to the Syrian army which came to apprehend him,* 1.408 This is not the City, and this is not the way: & this is approv'd and allowed by Plato and Xenophon, Homer and Pindar, Polybius and Thacydides, Plutarch and Lucian amongst the Greeks, Philo amongst the Jews; and S. Chrysostom amongst the Christi∣ans

saies,* 1.409 If you examine all the bravest Generals, you shall find their bravest trophies to be the production of fraud and craft. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and that they were more commended then such who did their work by fine force. Thus the causing false rumors to be spread amongst the enemies is an allowed stratagem in warre, neither ignoble nor unjust.* 1.410 Flaccus told that Aemilius had taken the enemies town, to dis∣hearten the party he fought against: and Quinctius the Consul caus'd it to be spread abroad that the enemies on the right wing were fled. By such arts it is very usual to bring consternation to the hostile party: and he whom you may lawfully kill, you may as well deceive him into it, as force him into it; you being no more oblig'd to tell him truth then to spare his life: for certainly of it self killing is as bad as lying; but when you have no obligation or law to the contrary, and have not bound your self to the con∣trary, you may doe either. But this is at no hand to be done in matters of treaty or promise, either explicite or implicite, as in parties, and truces; and therefore it was a foul stain upon Hannibal,* 1.411 that he professing open warre against the Romans did also profess it against faith and justice, keeping no word or promise if it was for his advantage to break it; and the Trojans were troubled in conscience at their fallacious conducting of their warrs, not by stratagem, but by breaking their oaths and Covenants,

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.412 &c

We fight with lying and breaking promises, which is unlawful to doe. For concerning this thing, that even in warre we are bound to keep faith & pro∣mise made to our enemies, it is certain & affirmed by almost all wise & good men of the world:* 1.413 Liquet etiam in bello fidem & justitiam servari oportere, nec ullum decorum oportere servari, si violetur fides, said S. Ambrose; and he proves it by the example of Joshuah, who kept his promise which the Gi∣beonites got fraudulently from him. And the same is the sentence of S. Au∣stin; fides quando promittitur, etiam hosti servanda est,* 1.414 contra quem bellum geritur: and therefore when Nebuchadnezzar had conquered Zedechiah, and taken him into protection and peace upon his word and promise of fide∣lity, because he afterwards did privately sollicite the King of Egypt to fight against the King, he was put to death with greatest cruelty. And this is not onely true between those who are publick enemies, forreiners and stran∣gers, and supreme in their respective dominions, which the law properly sig∣nifies under the word Hostes, l. quos nos, ff. de verborum signif. for this is without question; and therefore all men condemn those that violate Em∣bassadors, or that break the laws of truce; and every one blames Titus Labienus for wounding Commius of Arras under the colour of parlee:* 1.415 but Attilius Regulus is commended for refusing to give his voice in the Senate so long as he was not discharged of his oath made to the Carthaginians. But this is also true, and our word and faith is sacred, when it is pass'd to all sorts of enemies, to Rebels, to Thieves, to civil Adversaries, to con∣demned persons, to Fugitive servants, such as Spartacus, Eunus and Athe∣nio; and the reason of all is the same. Inter quos juris alicujus communio est, inter eos obligationem contrahi, They that are under the same law are equally bound; and whoever promise or treat, doe it at least by the law of Nature or Nations, which alike bind them who are free from any civil obligation. This is that which Triphoninus said, That if a thief intrusts any goods to the right owner, not knowing that they are his own, he is not oblig'd to restitution; but every man else is, if he have promis'd, because they are

none of his, and therefore he can be oblig'd to repay them: and for thieves and fugitives the people of Rome did treat with them, and send Embassa∣dors; and all that was bound upon them by that entercourse they kept religiously. And the same they did to condemned persons; as appears in that famous case of Caius Rabirius,* 1.416 who was question'd for killing L. Apu∣leius Saturninus against the publick faith given him by the people, when he and his companions fled to the Capitol for immunity and a guard against the sentence of death which he had deserv'd.

But all this is to be understood so, that the faith and word be given by him who hath power to verify it: but when A. Albinus made a peace with King Jugurtha, for which he had no commission, the Senate was not oblig'd to verify it; and Camillus the Dictator broke the peace which the Romans had foolishly made with the Gaules; and Scipio dissolv'd the con∣tract which Masinissa and Sophonisba made without his leave, who had the power. In this there is onely caution to be had that there be no combi∣nation to deceive or rescind what is found to be disadvantageous, nor ad∣vantages taken by the change of hands. For if the Romans finding relief come, made Camillus Dictator that they might by pretence of his com∣mand break the peace, they did dishonourably and false; but if he was Dictator before the peace, he had power, and he had reason. To this can be referr'd the case of two Italian Gentlemen. Guarino had injur'd Antonio de Imola; but confess'd his fault, ask'd pardon, made amends: and then Antonio swore his peace and his forgiveness, and that his hand should never be upon him; but in his heart bore him a secret grudge, and therefore smote him secretly, saying that Guarino was a Bandito, and therefore con∣demn'd by the laws. This is to make our promise the cover of a lie, and the laws to minister to crafty mischiefs. After a promise a man must not change his mind, and then make excuses. Renunciatio sui juris per poeni∣tentiam revocari non potest, saith the law, l. pactum, ff. de pact.

But deceiving the enemy by the stratagem of actions or words is not properly lying; for this suppose a conversation of law or peace, trust or promise explicite or implicite. A lie is the deceiving of a trust or confi∣dence, but in fighting there is none of that; it is like wrastling and fen∣cing, a design to make that part unarm'd where he may strike the surer: and of this S. Clemens of Alexandria affirms expressly concerning strata∣gems in warre,* 1.417 Haec omnia licebit efficere, vel persuadendo, vel cogendo, vel injuriam faciendo in iis ulciscendis quibus expedit, vel faciendo id quod justum est, vel mentiendo, vel vera dicendo, vel etiam simul utendo aliquibus eorum in eodem tempore. All these things it is lawful to bring to pass by per∣swasion, or by force, by doing injury or harm there where we are to doe revenge, by doing that which is just, or by telling that which is true, or by lying, or by doing any one or more of these together. Haec autem omnia, & quomodo opor∣teat uti unoquoque eorum, cum Graeci accepissent à Moyse, non parvam acce∣pere utilitatem, When the Greeks receiv'd all these things from Moyses, and how they were to use any one and every one of these, they received no small advantage.

In this case,* 1.418 all the prejudice which the Question is like to have, is in the meaning and evill sound of the word lying; which because it is so hate∣ful to God and man, casts a cloud upon any thing that it comes near: but lying (which S. Basil calls extremam malitiae lineam, the extremity of malice, which S. Ephrem calls the Rust of conversation) is indeed an enemy; but

in warre so it should be; onely in peace and contracts, and civil conversa∣tion, it is intolerable. In warre it is no lie, but an engine of warre, against which the enemy is to stand upon his guard: and if a man may falsify a blow, much more may he falsify a word; and no justice, no promise, no charity, no law restrains the stratagems in a just warre; they which may be destroy'd, may be deceiv'd, and they may be deceiv'd by false actions, may by false words, if there be no collateral obligation or law to the contrary. A just man,* 1.419 saith S. Austin, is to take care of nothing but that his warre be just; that is, by a just authority, and for a just reason. Cum autem justum bellum susce∣perit, utrùm apertâ, pugnâ, utrùm insidiis vincat, nihil ad justitiam interest, But if it be a just warre, it matters not as to the question of justice, whether he overcome by force or by deceit. Dolus & perfidia are extremely different —dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat? and,* 1.420 bonum esse dolum si quis ad∣versus hostem latronemve machinetur, said Ulpian, Craft against a thief or enemy is good; but not perfidiousness. Nullo discrimine virtutis ac doli prosperos omnes laudari debere bellorum eventus,* 1.421 said Ammianus Marcellinus. To bring warre to a happy end, you may use force or wit; but at no hand break a promise, or be treacherous.

He that desires to see more particulars to the same purpose,* 1.422 may, if he please, seea 1.423 Lipsius his politicks, andb 1.424 Adam Contzen, together with the excellent examples of great and wise personages in Polyaenus and Fron∣tinus.

11. But this is not to be extended to a licence of telling a lie of the enemy in behalf of our own country, for fame and reputation, for noises and triumph; and I remember that Poggius upon this account lost the repu∣tation of a good historian.

Dum patriam laudat, damnat dum Poggius hostem, Nec malus est civis,* 1.425 nece bonus historicus.

He was a good Citizen, but an ill historiographer, that commended all the actions of the Florentines, and undervalued their enemies.

12.* 1.426 Princes may not lie for the interests and advantages of Govern∣ment. Not in contracts, treaties, bargains, embassies and all the enter∣courses of peace and civil negotiation. For besides it is an argument of fear and infirmity to take sanctuary in the little subterfuges of craft when they are beaten from their own proper strengths, it is also a perfect destruction of government and the great bands of society and civil entercourse; and if they be us'd to fail, no man can be confident of that affirmative which ought to be venerable and sacred up to the height of religion; and therefore the Egyptian law press'd this affair well, Let all that break their word and oaths die for it; because they are loaden with a double iniquity, & pietatem in Deos violant, & fidem inter homines tollunt, maximum vinculum societatis, They destroy piety and reverence towards God, and faith amongst men, which is the great ligature of society. And if Princes doe falsify their word and lie, their neighbours can have no entercourse with them but by violence and warre, and their subjects none but fear and chance. For Prin∣ces to lie is the greatest undecency in the world: and therefore Diodorus Siculus tells that the Egyptian Princes us'd to wear a golden chain mix'd and distinguish'd with curious stones,* 1.427 and they call'd it Truth; meaning that nothing was a greater ornament to a Prince, nothing ought to be more sacred, or more remembred.

Bodinus saies otherwise,* 1.428 and that Princes and Judges have leave,* 1.429 be∣cause sometimes they have necessity to lie; and of the same opinion was Plato, provided it was done for the good of the people. But that which they mean is onely in affirmations and narratives, in adding confidences or producing fears, in making laws and establishing religions; such as was that of Numa; who when he had a mind to endear to the people those good laws which he had made, said that he receiv'd them from the Goddess Aegeria. This may be done against an enemy; and if it be for the good of the people, it hath in it charity and some shew of prudence, but not to the bravery and magnanimity of a Prince: but however it be in this, it can never be permitted to violate a promise or a treaty, nor yet to tell false in a treaty, for that is against peace and against justice. When there is in it no harm, but all good, as in order to perswade the people to a duty, or to their benefit, they in a matters of publick life being like children in the affairs of their private, that is, when their need and incapacity of being otherwise governed requires it, they may be us'd as they can, according to that of the Persians, Sapientes dicunt quod mendacium beneficium faciens melius est vero exitium parturiente, When a lie does charity, it is better then an uncharitable and pernicious truth: alwaies supposing, that the lie which serves charity be not against justice; but when it is in treaties, there a lie does not onely disgrace the sincerity of the prince that treates, but is of it self apt to hurt the other; and therefore at no hand to be admitted.

The next inquiry is concerning person Criminal,* 1.430 and so for others in proportion.

Question II. Whether it be lawful to use restrictions and mental reservations, so that what we utter is false, but joyned to something within does integrate a truth, and make up a true answer.

To this I answer,* 1.431 That this hath no distinct consideration of it's own; but whether a mental reservation makes that to be true which would otherwise be a lie. For if it be still a lie, a criminal person may no more speak half truths then whole lies; for that which is but the half of a true propo∣sition, either signifies nothing, or is directly a lie. And upon this suppo∣sition, this question is just to be governed by the measures of the first; and in the same cases in which it is lawful to tell a lie, in the same cases it is law∣full to use a mental reservation: for that which is lawful without it, is also lawful with it; and the mental reservation does not save it harm∣less, if it be still a lie. That therefore is the question, Whether he that speaks a lie, and thinks the other part which makes it a true proposition, speaks truth yea or no.

The case is this.* 1.432 When Campian was taken in England, he gave out that his name was Butler: the Magistrate inquires, and is so answered: he gives him his oath, and he swears that his name is so; so much he said: but he added withall to himself, secretly, [It is my name that I have bor∣rowed, or my name for this time] But that was not the question; for he was ask'd that he might be known, and he answer'd that he might not be known. And he might as well have said, that is my name, and have added

in his thought, not at all, or, Hoc est nomen meum, and in mind have added, falsum; and then the case would have been too plain, and too con∣temptibly ridiculous: like the Sycophant in Plautus, Advenio ex Selencia, Macedonia, Asia atque Arabia: this was a lye; but he turn'd aside and spake softly, quas ego neque oculis neque pedibus unquam usurpavi meis, and so he made up the matter; but he was a lyar still: for let the whole be true, yet he speaks but half, and by that half deceives. All that he sayes is a lye, for the contradictory of it is true; and it is concerning his answer, and the saying, that the question is. It is not inquired whether the man think a lye, but whether he speaks one; and not what it is to himself, for no man can lye to himself, but what this is to him that asks, for to him he lyes. And suppose a man should write a proposition, and think the rest, to make it true, would not all the world say he wrote a lye? What it is in writing, it is in speaking; that which he speaks in the present case is a lye, and for that he is condemn'd. For if the words are a lye with∣out a mental reservation, then they are so with it; for this does not alter the words, nor the meaning of the words, nor the purpose of him that speaks them.

And indeed this whole affair is infinitely unreasonable;* 1.433 and the think∣ing one thing, and speaking it otherwise, is so far from making it to be true, that therefore it is a lye, because the words are not according to what is in our mind; and it is a perverting the very end and institution of words, and evacuates the purpose of laws, and the end of oaths, making them not to be the end of questions, and the benefit of society, and all humane in∣tercourse, and makes that none but fools can lye, none can lye but they which cannot dissemble, that is, they which cannot think one thing and speak another, they which cannot so much as think what is true, or what words would make it true. Certain it is, the Devil need not ever tell a lye, and yet serve all his ends. And besides all this, such a person gives the scandal of a lye, and produces the effect of a lye, and does intend the end of a lye, and it is the material part of a lye; onely what the man ows to justice, he payes with thinking.

But then I consider further,* 1.434 If the words spoken be of themselves a lye, and therefore he thinks it necessary by a secret supply of thought to new-mould it into truth; to what purpose is that done? that it may be no lye to himself? or that it may be no lye before him to whom he speaks it? As for himself, he is not concerned in it, but onely that he speak truth; but the other is: and if it be a lye without that supplement, (for therefore he supplyes it secretly) then till it be supplyed and made up to him before whom he speaks it, it is a lye to him, to whom it ought to be a truth. If the man be bound to speak truth to the Magistrate, let him doe it; but if he be not obliged, let him tell a direct lye, for this supplement is but a confessing in conscience that it is a lye; and therefore there is no need of such a dissembling artifice; there is more ingenuity in saying that they are not tied to tell truth: but he that tels a lye, and by his mental reservation sayes he tels a truth, tels two lyes, one practical, and the other in theory; one to the Magistrate, and the other to himself.

I doe not say that in all cases it is unlawfull to use mentall reservati∣ons,* 1.435 even in craftiness and escape. 1. S. Gregory hath a case in which he

affirms it lawfull,* 1.436 Tyrannorum versutiam atque saevitiam quandoque esse piâ fraude deludendam, & objicienda eis quae credant, ut nocendi aditum non in∣veniant, To prevent and elude the craft and cruelty of Tyrants, they must sometimes be deluded by a pious cosenage; and something must be impos'd upon their credulity, that their wayes of mischief may be obstructed. And then he addes, this is to be done so, ut caveatur culpa mendacii; quod tunc bene per∣ficitur, cum illud fit quod asseritur, sed quod sit sic dicitur, ut celetur; quia ex parte dicitur, & ex parte reticetur: when there is nothing told that is false, but yet the matter is hid, because it is not all spoken. Indeed this is one kind of innocent doing it; but this is lawfull to be done without great necessity, even for a probable reason: it is nothing but a concealing of some part of the truth, and a discovery of another part, even of so much as will serve our turn. But.

2. Restrictions conditional are lawfull to be us'd in our entercourses:* 1.437 that is, the affirmation or negation, the threatning or promising of a thing may be cum tacita conditione, with a condition concealed; when that con∣cealment is not intended for a snare, but is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, unusual dispensa∣tion, and is competently presumed, supposed or understood. Thus God commanded Jonah to preach against Nineveh, Yet fourty dayes and Nine∣veh shall be destroyed; meaning, unless they did repent. Thus we may say, I will to morrow distribute my alms, and will give you a part, mean∣ing, if you will come for it. So for affirmations: The Physician sayes to his Patient, [you are but a dead man;] that is, unless some extraordi∣nary blessing happen: [you are in no danger;] meaning, if you will use the remedies prescribed. But in all these cases the condition must not be insolent, undiscerned, contrary to reasonable expectations, impossible▪ or next to impossible: for if it be such which cannot be understood, the reser∣vation is a snare, and the whole entercourse is a deception and a lye.

3. If the reservation be not purely mental,* 1.438 but is understood by ac∣cidents and circumstances, it is lawfull. The Shepherd of Cremona that was ask'd concerning the Flock he kept, whether those were his Sheep or no, answered confidently, that they were; meaning secretly, not his own possession, but his own charge, and not his Neighbour Morone's Flock. He said true, though his thought made up the integrity of his true propo∣sition, because it was not doubted, and he was not ask'd concerning the possession, as not being a likely man to be so wealthy. So the guide whom you ask upon the road, tels, you cannot goe out of your way, meaning, if you follow your plain directions, and be not wilfull, or care∣less, or asleep; and yet he sayes truth, though he speaks but half, be∣cause he deceives none, and is understood by all. Thus the Prophet Isaiah said to Hezekiah when he was sick,* 1.439 Thou shalt dye and not live; meaning, that the force of the disease is such as to be mortal, and so it stands in the order of Nature: and when afterwards he brought a more comfortable message, he was not thought a lyar in the first, because they understood his meaning, and the case came to be alter'd upon a higher account.

4. When things are true in several sense,* 1.440 the not explicating in what sense I mean the words is not a criminal reservation. Thus ou•• Blessed Saviour affirmed, that himself did not know the precise day when himself should come to judge the World; that is, as S. Austin, and

generally the Christian Doctors say,* 1.441 as Man he did not know it, though be∣ing God he did know all things. But 1. this liberty is not to be us'd by in∣feriours, but by superiours onely; 2. not by those that are interrogated, but by them which speak voluntarily; 3. not by those which speak of duty, but which speak of grace and kindness: Because superiours, and the voluntary speakers, and they which out of kindness speak, are tied to no laws in this particular, but the measures of their own good will; and the degrees of their kindness, of their instruction, of their communication, are wholly arbitrary: but the inferiours, the examined, the speakers out of duty and obligation, are tied to answer by other mens measures, by their exigencies, demands, understandings, and purposes; and therefore must not doe any thing whereby that truth which they have right and inte∣rest to enquire after, may be hindred. The conclusion is this, in the words of S. Gregory,* 1.442 Sapientia justorum est, nil per ostensionem fingere, sensum ver∣bis aperire, The wisedome of just men is to make no pretences for deception, but by words to open the secret of their heart.

Question III. Whether it be lawfull to equivocate,* 1.443 or use words of doubtfull signification with a purpose to deceive, or knowing that they will deceive; and in what cases it is so.

To this I answer as to the former,* 1.444 Where it is lawfull to lye, it is law∣full to equivocate, which may be something less then a plain lye: but where it is not permitted to tell a lye, there the equivocation must be in∣nocent, that is, not deceiving, nor intended that it should. And this is that which the Hebrews call, corde & corde loqui, to speak dissemblingly, la∣biis dolosis, with lips of deceit. For it is remarkable, that corde & corde signifies diligence and sincerity, when it means work or labour; but it signifies falshood and craft, when it means speaking: for Nature hath given us two hands, and but one tongue; and therefore a duplicate in labour is a double diligence, but in talking it is but a double fraud. Tacitus observes of Tiberius, Verba ejus obscura, suspensa, perplexa, eluctantia, in speciem com∣posita, His words were obscure, broken, interrupted, perplex and intricate, stri∣ving and forc'd, and made for shew and pretences. Now if by artifices you deceive him that trusts you, and whom you ought not to deceive, it is but a lye dress'd in another way,* 1.445 and it is all one: For nec artificioso ingenio, nec simplici verbo oportet decipere quenquam, quia quolibet artis modo men∣tiatur. So that in solution of this question we are onely to consider what equivocal speeches may be us'd, that is, which of them are no lyes: for the rest, they are lawfull or unlawfull by the measures of the first question; for sometimes equivocation is a lye, and equally destructive of civil enter∣course. Duplex responsio habet effectum simplici•• silentii. You had as good not speak at all, as speak equivocally; for a double speech is as insignifi∣cant as a single silence.

1. It is lawfull upon a just cause of great charity or necessity to use in our answers and entercourses words of divers signification,* 1.446 though it does deceive him that asks. Thus Titius the Father of Caius hid his Fa∣ther in a Tub, and to the Cut-throats that inquired for him to bloody pur∣poses he answered Patren in doliolo latere: now that did not only signifie

a little Tub, but a Hill near Rome, where the villains did suspect him to be, and were so diverted. Thus we read of a Greek that in the like case hid his Brother under a wood-pile; and to the inquisitors answered that he did lie hid 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, somewhere in the wood. Now in these cases where there is no obligation to tell the truth, any man may use the covers of truth; especially when in this case it is not a lie: for an equivocation is like a dark-lanthorn; if I have just reason to hold the dark side to you, you are to look to it, not I. If Christian simplicity be not concerned in it, nor any other grace indirectly, certain it is that truth is not concerned: For, In ambiguo sermone non utrumque dicimus, sed duntaxat quod volumus, said Paulus the Lawyer, l. 3. ff. de rebus dubiis. Now that part of the ambigu∣ity which I intend it in, is true, I would never else use that way to save my conscience and to escape a lie; so that if nothing else be concerned, truth is safe. But then care also must be taken that he who hath right to be an∣swered, be not defeated without his own fault. For,

2. If I intend to deceive him,* 1.447 it must be such a person whom I have power to deceive; some one that is a child, or a mad-man, or an incom∣petent person to judge for his own good, and one that no other way will be brought to doe himself good, one that is willing, or justly so presumed. For unless I have power or right to deceive him, I must not intend to de∣ceive him by any act of mine directly.

3. If it be fit that he be deceived,* 1.448 though I have no right to doe it, let him deceive himself; it must be by his own act; to which I may in∣deed minister occasion by any fair and innocent means. It is fit that he who by violence and injury intends to doe mischief to innocent persons, be hindred from it; and there is much good done if an innocent be rescued, and no harm done to the Tyrant if he be diverted, and no wrong or in∣justice if he doe deceive himself. Thus if he runs into error by a just and prudent concealment of some truth; if he is apt to mistake my words out of a known and by me ••bserved weakness; if his malice is apt to make him turn all ambiguous words into his own sense that will deceive him; if I know he will listen to my whispers to another person, and watch my secret talk to others; I am not bound to say what will inform him, but what will become my entercourse with the other: In all these and the like cases, if I use my own liberty, I doe no man injury. I am not bound to speak words of single signification: if it be sufficient to express my meaning, if it be in the nature and use of the words apt to signifie my mind, and to speak that which is true, let him that stands by look to it; I doe all that I am oblig'd to doe by the interest of justice and truth. For in these cases, he that speaks does but minister occasion to him that is mistaken; like him that represents artificial sights before the eye, or as the rain-bow in the clouds is occasion of a popular error that it is full of colours.

4. But then this must be so us'd,* 1.449 that the amphibology or equivoca∣tion be not insolent and strange, but such as is usual in forms of witty speech. For then he who uses them does no more deceive his hearer, then he that speaks obscurely or profoundly is the cause of error in the ig∣norant people. Thus if Caius promise to pay to Regulus an hundred At∣tick drachmes; he is tied to doe it if he does owe it, else not: for if he owes none, he must pay none, and he did not promise to give him any

thing. For if a meaning be clearly contained in the word spoken, it may be made use of to any just and reasonable advantage; especially if that word ought or was likely to have been understood by the concerned hear∣er. But this may not be done in fraud and to the diminution of any mans rights. Asper buyes corn and linnen of Camillus who is newly come from Egypt: they agree together that Camillus shall receive ten talents; but that he shall give him as a free gift halfe of it back again; and call the ten talents the just price, and the telling it a just solution. If Asper sells his linnen by the proportion of the great price told over, he is a Cosener; and uses the words of price, and payment, and gift, fraudulently: the am∣phibologie might have been us'd to ends of justice and reason, but not of knavery and oppression.

5. And this must also be upon just cause.* 1.450 For if a Magistrate sends to inquire for Titius, and the officers ask an Titius sit domi, if he be at home: to him we may not answer, Titius non est domi, he does not eat at home; meaning the word est in a sense less usual, to deceive him in the more common, who ought not to be deceived at all: but to save a mans life from violence and injury it may be done. This way hath been some∣times used to vile purposes. Thus Cleomenes having made truce with his Enemies for thirty daies, us'd to plunder his Country in the night; and Labeo having agreed to give up half his Navy to Antiochus, cut his ships in pieces and made them good for nothing. The like stories are told of Alexander, of the Locrians, of Otho Moguntinus. But it was a barbarous thing of Pericles, who promised safety to the Enemy if he would lay aside his iron, that is, their arms, as all the world understood it, and as the na∣ture of the thing did signifie: when he had done so he fell upon the whole body of them and cut them in pieces, shewing for his excuse, the iron but∣tons that they had upon their Coats. Such frauds as these are intolerable in their event, and evil in their cause, and detested by all good and just men. To this purpose I remember a worthy story told by John Chokier, of a Spanish Governour of a Town in Millain who kept a Noble person prisoner with hard usage, and when his Lady came to petition for his liber∣ty, promised to deliver her Husband to her if she would let him lie with her. The poor woman being wearied with his temptation and the evil usage of her Husband, consents and suffers it. When the Governour had obtained his lust, he would also satisfie his anger too; and kills her Hus∣band, and to verifie his promise, gives her Husband to the Lady, but newly murdered. The Lady complains of this, and tells her sad story to Gonzaga the Spanish General: he finds it to be truth, and made the Lady this amends. He commands the Governour to marry the Lady, that by his estate she might be recompenced for the dishonour: and then, the same day causes the Governour to loose his head to pay for his dishonourable falshood and bloody lie. It was a justice worthy of a great Prince; and the reward was justly paied to such a cruel equivocation. This was subdolus congressus, a craftie treatie, quo nil turpius, said Antoninus the Emperor, nothing is ba∣ser and more dishonourable then it. Thus did Darius to the Noble Oebasus the Father of three brave Sons, and Xerxes to Pythius the Father of five; they kill'd what they promised to leave with the Father, adding to their cruelty the reproach and scorn of cosenage. A man hath right to use what words he will according to the received use; but he must not use them to evil purposes: and a man may goe a little from the more common

use to that which is rare, so it be within the signification of the word, pro∣vided there be just cause; that which hath good in it to some, and no in∣jury to any.

6. There is between lying and equivocation this only difference,* 1.451 that this may upon less necessity and upon more causes be permitted then ly∣ing. For provided that these measures now described, which are the ne∣gative measures of lying, be observed; if a man speaks doubtfull words and intends them in a true sense, he may use his liberty; alwayes provided that he use it with care, and to the reputation of Christian simplicity. In arts and sciences, in jest and entercourses of wit, in trial of understandings and mystical teachings, in prudent concealments and arts of secrecy, equi∣vocal words may be us'd with more freedome. Solvite Templum hoc, saies Christ, Dissolve this Temple, viz. of my body, and I will raise it up in three daies. So did that excellent Confessor in Eusebius,* 1.452 to Firmilianus asking of what Country he was, he answered, that Jerusalem was his Country; Seorsim apud animum suum ita Divinitus philosophatus, privately in his mind speaking Divine mysteries, saies the Historian. This was well and innocent, because an equivocal speech hath a light side as well as a dark: it is true as well as false, and therefore it is in its own nature innocent; and is only changed into a fault, when it is against justice and charity, under which simplicity is to be plac'd.

Under these measures are to be reduced those little equivocations which are us'd sometimes in craft,* 1.453 but most commonly in wit; such as are to answer by anagrams, so as to tell a true name but disguis'd by trans∣position of letters and syllables, or to give the signification of a name in other words. Thus if a man whose name is Dorotheus calls himself Theo∣dorus, for Nicolaus, Laonicus, for Demonicus, Nicodemus; it is an equi∣vocation or an art of deception, but such as may be legitimated by the cause: but if the inquiry be in a serious matter, the answer must be seri∣ous and material, true, and significative to the purposes of law, and justice, and society. And therefore if Nicodemus had been interrogated by Pilate in a serious cause, he might not have said his name was Demonicus; and the reason, is, because he might not have concealed it. But when it is law∣full to conceal it if we can, this is a just way of doing it; for it is not lie in it self, and can be made to doe or to minister to that good which is inten∣ded. Thus in the book of Tobit we find that the Angel Raphael called himself Azarias the son of Ananias, which indeed is the name of his office, or the Rebus, the meaning of his present imployment, that is, Auxilium Domini, Filius nubis Domini, The aid of the Lord, Son of the Lords cloud; meaning that he was sent from the Lord in a cloud or disguise to be an aid and a blessing to that religious family. And he that call'd Arsinoe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Juno's violet, kept all the letters of the name right, and complemented the Lady ingeniously. But these are better effects of wit then ministeries of justice; and therefore are not to be used but upon great reasons, and by the former measures, when the matter is of concernment.

Question IV. Whether it be lawful by false signes,* 1.454 by actions and pretences of actions, to deceive others for any good end: and in what cases it is so.

To this question I answer in the words of Aquinas,* 1.455 because they are reasonable pious,* 1.456 Ad virtutem veritatis pertinet, ut quis talem se exhi∣beat exterius per signa exteriora qualis est; ea autem non solum sunt verba, sed etiam factae: and a little after, Non refert autem utrum aliquis menti∣atur verbo, vel quocunque alio facto, It is all one if a man lies, whether it be by word or by deed. A man may look a lie, and nod a lie, and smile a lie.

But in this there is some variety:* 1.457 For 1. all dissembling from an evil principle and to evil purposes is criminal. For thus Tertullian declaims bitterly against those Ladies who (saies he) being taught by the Apostate An∣gels oculos circumducto nigrore fucare,* 1.458 & genas mendacio ruboris inficere, & mutare adulterinis coloribus crinem, & expugnare omnem oris & capitis ve∣ritatem, besmear their eye-brows with a black semicircle, and stain their cheeks with a lying red, and change the colour of their hair into an adulterous pre∣tence, and drive away all the ingenuity and truth of their faces. And Clemens Alexandrinus is as severe against old men that with black-lead combes put a lie upon their heads; and so disgrace their old age, which ought to be relied upon, believ'd and reverenc'd for truth. And it was well said of Ar∣chidamus to a man of Chios who did stain his white hairs with black and the imagery of youth, the man was hardly to be believ'd, when he had a lie in his heart, and bore a lie upon his head. These things proceeding from pride and vanity, and ministring to lust, or carried on with scandal, are not onely against humility and sobriety and chastity and charity, but against truth too; because they are done with a purpose to deceive, and by deceit to serve those evil ends. To the same purpose was the fact of them of whom Dio Chrysostomus speaks,* 1.459 who knowing that men were in love with old Manuscripts, would put new ones into heaps of corn and make them look like old: such also are they who in Holland lately would exactly counterfeit old Meddals, to get a treble price beyond the value of the metal and the imagery. These things and all of the like nature are certainly unlawful, because they are against justice and charity.

2. But there are other kinds of counterfeits,* 1.460 such as are gildings of wood and brass, false stones, counterfeit diamonds, glass depicted like emeralds and rubies, a crust of marble drawn over a building of course stone; these are onely for beauty and ornament, and of themselves mini∣ster to no evil,* 1.461 but are pleasant and useful: now though to sell these images of beauty for real be a great cheat; yet to expose them to be seen as such, and every man be left to his liberty of thinking as he please, and being pleas'd as he can, is very innocent.

3. There is a third sort of lying or deceiving by signs not vocal:* 1.462 that is, the dissembling of a passion, such as that of which Seneca complains in the matter of Grief, which is the simplest of all passions; but pretended by some without truth to purposes not good. Sibi tristes non sunt, & clariùs cum audiuntur gemunt,* 1.463 & taciti quietique dum secretum est, cum

aliquos viderint in fletus novos excitantur. So did Gellia in the Epigram,

Amissum non flet cum sola est Gellia Patrem: Si quis ad est, jussae prosiliunt lachrymae.

They are full of tears in company, but in their retirements pleas'd well enough. Now things of this nature are indifferent; but are good or bad according to the cause or the design. Mourn for the dead, saith Ben-Sirach, and that a day or two, lest thou be evil spoken of. That end is honest; and there∣fore to mourn in solemnity is good, if we cannot mourn in passion: and the laws enjoyn to a man and woman respectively annum luctus, a year of solemn mourning; all which time it is not suppos'd the passion should be troublesome and afflictive. Thus we find David pretending madness be∣fore Achish the King of Gath; it was for his life: and we doe not find any of the ancient Doctors blaming the dissimulation.

4. But that which is here the principal inquiry is,* 1.464 whether signs not vocal, which have in them ambiguity, and may signify several things, may be us'd with a purpose to deceive. And to this the answer is the same with the former in the case of equivocation, with this onely difference; That as there is some more liberty in the use of equivocal words, then of a simple lie; so there is some more liberty yet in equivocal actions then in words, because there may be more reasons for such dubious actions then for dubious words, and they are not so near, so usual,* 1.465 so intended significations of our mind, nor ministeries of entercourse and society. But where they are taken so, they are to be governed by the same rules; save onely that a less necessity may be a sufficient legitimation of such dubi∣ous signs: concerning which, besides the analogy and proportion to the former rules, there is no other measure but the severities of a good and a prudent man taking into him the accounts of Christian simplicity and ingenuity.

I have onely one thing to adde in order to practice.* 1.466 There is a liberty in the forecited cases there where there is a necessity, and where there is a great charity. For in these cases it is true what S. Chrysostom saies, Frau∣dis quidem magna vis modo ne fraudulento animo fiat: quam ipsam tum ne fraudem quidem nominandam putaverim, verum Oeconomiam quandam po∣tius ac sapientiam artemque, quâ possis è mediis iisque imperviis desperatarum rerum angustiis difficultatibusque correctis & emendatis animi vitiit eva∣dere. There is a great use of artifices in our words and actions when we are hard put to it in desperate cases and extremest difficulties, and then these arts are not indeed deceptions, but just escapes. But yet this I say, that it is not safe to use all our liberty; because when it is practis'd freely, we oftentimes find our selves ill Judges of the necessity. And however it be, yet it is much more noble to suffer bravely then to escape from it by a doubtful way; 1. for the love and honour of simplicity, 2. for the en∣deavours of perfection, 3. for the danger of sin, 4. for the peril of scan∣dal. And it was bravely done of Augustus Caesar, who when he had pro∣mised ten thousand Sesterces to him that should bring Corocotta, a famous Spanish thief, alive into his presence; Corocotta himself came and deman∣ded the money, and had it, and he was spar'd besides: he escaped for his wit and confidence; but had the money pro fide Caes••••is, according to the faith and nobleness of Casars justice: for he might have made use of the ambiguity of his words to have kept the money, and hang'd the

thief; but he thought it Nobler to doe all that he could be thought to have intended by his words. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle,* 1.467 The brave and magnanimous man does not sneak, but speaks truth and is confident.

It cannot be denied what S. Clemens Alexandrinus said,* 1.468 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good man will for the good of his neighbour doe something more then he would doe willingly and of his own accord; yet when it is his own case, it is better to let goe his liberty then to run a hazard. Sarah did lie, and she was re∣proved by the Angel; Abraham did so too, saies Tertullian, Saram soro∣rem suam mentitus est, but he was reproved by Abimelech: Jacob did lie to his Father, but he is not commended for it; and Rachel did dissemble, but she died in childbirth, and it was occasioned by that, say the Jewish Do∣ctors: Simeon and Levi destroyed the Sichemites by a stratagem, but they troubled the house of Israel by it: Thamar deceived Judah, but she plai'd the harlot in deed as well as in words. And concerning those worthy per∣sons mentioned in Scripture who did lie or dissemble, the Christian Do∣ctors have been put to it to make apologies, and excuses, and justifications for them, and are not yet agreed how to doe it. S. Basil and S. Chryso∣stome are two examples of several proceedings. S. Basil alwaies bore his heart upon his hand, and shewed it to every one that was concerned. Saint Chrysostome used craft against the simple, and fraud against him that spoke all things in simplicity.* 1.469 Chrysostome was forced with laborious arts to ex∣cuse and justifie it, and did it hardly: But S. Basil had no scruple concerning his innocence; what he had concerning his prudence and safety does not belong to the present question.* 1.470 But of this last particular I have given larger accounts in a Discourse on purpose.

The conclusion is this, If a man speaks a direct down-right lie,* 1.471 he can very hardly be innocent: but if by intrigues of words and actions, per involucra verborum (as Cicero calls it) per orationem intortam (as the Comedy) by covers of words, and by crooked speeches, a man have enter∣course, he had need be very witty to be innocent according to the Hebrew proverb, If a man have wit enough to give cross and involved answers, let him use it well; if he knows not how to doe it well, let him hold his peace. It was but a sneaking evasion of S. Francis, when the pursuers after a mur∣derer asked if the man came that way; No, saith the Frier, thrusting his hand into his sleeve, he came not here. If a mans wit be not very ready and very clear, while he thinks himself wise, he may become a vain per∣son. The Devil no question hath a great wit, and a ready answer; yet when he was put to it at his Oracles, and durst not tell a down-right lie, and yet knew not what was truth many times, he was put to most pitifull shifts, and trifling equivocations, and arts of knavery; which when they were discovered by events contrary to the meaning which was obvious for the inquirers to understand it made him much more contemptible and ri∣diculous then if he had said nothing, or confess'd his ignorance. But he that does speak, and is bound to speak, must speak according to the mind of him with whom he does converse, that is, so to converse, that by our fault he be not deceived against his right, against justice or against charity, and therefore he had better in all things speak plainly: for truth is the easiest to be told; but no wit is sufficient for a crafty conversation.

RULE VI. It is not lawfull for private Christians without publick authority to punish Malefactors, but they may require it of the Magistrate in some cases.

IN the law of Nature it was permitted:* 1.472 but as the world grew older, and better experienc'd, and better instructed, it became unlawfull and forbidden; in some places sooner, in some places later. The Ephori among the Lacedaemonians might kill Criminals extrajudicially; and Nico∣laus of Damascus relates, that amongst the Umbrians every man was the re∣venger of his own injuries: for till by laws men were defended, they by revenges and retaliation might drive away the injury as far as was neces∣sary. But because when a man is in pain and grief he strikes unjustly and unequally, and judges incompetently, laws were made to restrain the first licence, and to put it into the hands of Princes onely, because they being common Fathers to their people, were most likely to doe justice equally and wisely. Iccirco enim judiciorum vigor jurisque publici tutela videtur in medio constituta, ne quisquam sibiipsi permittere valeat ultionem, said Hono∣rius and Theodosius, That no man might avenge himself, Laws and Judges and Tribunals were appointed for publick justice.

But for this,* 1.473 provisions at first could not be made so generally, but that some cases would happen, and some gaps be left open, which every man must stop, and provide for as well as he could. Thus we find that Phinehas, when he saw God was angry with the Sons of Israel about the matter of Moab, himself, to divert the anger that was already gone forth, smote Zimri, a Prince among the Simeonites, and his fair Mistris in his arms, and kill'd them in their Crimes. From his example many Zelots amongst the Jew took liberty to kill a man that sinn'd apparently. So Mattathias kill'd a Jew that offer'd sacrifice according to the manner of the Greeks; and the People kill'd three hundred of their Countrymen upon the like account. But this quickly grew into excess and irregularity; and there∣fore when our Blessed Lord was zealous for the honour of the Temple, he went no further but to use a little Whip to affright them from their prophaneness.

And yet in some cases God permitted private persons to be Execu∣tioners;* 1.474 as in case a Jew tempted his Child,* 1.475 or Brother, or Neighbour to Idolatry, the tempted person might kill him without delating him to the Judge: and in a cause of Blood, the next of kin might kill the Man-slayer if he overtook him before he took Sanctuary. But here the cases were such that the private person was not Judge, but by leave from God was Executioner upon the notoreity of the fact: for although for a dead per∣son his nearest relation might with his own hand take vengeance; yet if himself was wounded, he might not, but by the sentence of the Judge, say

the Doctors of the Jews; because he ought not to be Judge where he could hardly be moderate.

In the Sea,* 1.476 and in desart places, where there can be no appeals to Judges, every man is Executioner of the sentence of the law of Nations. Thus we find that Julius Caesar pursued the Pirats in the Mediter∣ranean and Adriatick Seas; and because the Proconsul would not, he gather'd a sudden Navy and overtook them, and hang'd them upon the main-yards of their own Vessels. Thus the wild Arabs and Circassian Thieves, that live in vast places, and under no Government, being publick Enemies of Mankind, and under no laws, nor treaties or communications of peace, may be kill'd by every one that is injur'd and spoil'd by them, when he can doe it. To this agrees that of Tertullian, In publicos hostes omnis homo miles est; and that of Democritus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that kils a thief and a robber with his own hand, or by command, or by consent, is innocent,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

But this is to be understood of the permission in the law of Nature.

For in Christianity men are not easily permitted to touch blood;* 1.477 not hastily to intermeddle in the causes of blood; not to give sentence for the effusion of it: these things are to be done with caution, and a slow motion, and after a loud call, and upon a great necessity, because there are two great impediments: the one is the duty of Mercy, which is greatly re∣quir'd and severely exacted of every Disciple of Christ; and the other is, that there is a Soul at stake when blood is to be shed, and then they are told, that as they judge they shall be judged, as they measure it shall be measured to them again. And therefore Criminal Judges have a tender imployment, and very unsafe, unless they have the guards of a just Au∣thority, and a great mercy, and an unavoidable necessity, and publick uti∣lity, and the fear of God alwayes before their eyes, and a great wisedome to conduct their greatest dangers.

That which remains and is permitted in Christianity is,* 1.478 1. The pu∣nishment of reprehension, of which every wise and good man may be judge and minister: for as S. Cyprian said that every Bishop is a Bishop of the Catholick Church, that is, whereever he chance to be, he must not suffer a Soul to perish if he can help it, but hath right every where to minister to the necessities of Souls, who are otherwise destitute, and every where to pray in private, to bless, to absolve dying persons, to supply the defects of a widow and desolate Church; so every good man hath power to punish a base and vicious person by severe and wise animadversions of reproof. For a wise man is never a private man (said Cicero;) and Nasica, and Cato, and Fabius, and Lollius were in authority like perpetual Consuls, alwayes in power over a vicious man.

2. It is not against the laws of Christianity,* 1.479 that Parents, and Tutors, and Masters, and Governors should punish Criminals, that is, such as are subject to them, and by such punishments as are permitted by law, and by such measures as are agreeable to the just and charitable ends* 1.480 of their re∣spective

governments, and by the analogy and proportions of Christian mercy and clemency: in the execution of which punishments there need no other laws be given but what are dictated by the mind of a charitable, dispassionate and a good man. But then in these Governments there is more liberty then in any other but the supreme: for a personal injury done to a Father or a Tutor may be punish'd by the Father or Tutor respectively, and so also it may by the Supreme power, Cum dignitas authoritasque ejus in quem est peccatum tuenda est, ne praetermissa animadversio contemptum ejus pariat, & honorem levet, said Taurus the Philosopher in A. Gellius. An injury done to a Superiour is a contempt of his authority as well as injuri∣ous to his person; and if it be not punish'd, will soon disorder the superio∣rity. But then this must be wholly for emendation; and though anger may be the instrument, yet charity must be both the measure and the end.

3. When the law hath pass'd a sentence,* 1.481 and given leave to any sub∣ject to be executioner, he that is injur'd may doe it. But this is to be un∣derstood in one case onely that concerns the Subject, and one that concerns the Prince. 1. For if the Prince commands that whoever finds such a person shall smite him to death if he can, every man is bound to it, if the law be just: as in the case of Treason, or deserting their military sta∣tion, it hath sometimes been decreed. In reos Majestatis, against Traitors every man is a Souldier, sayes Tertullian, who affirms it also concerning all publick Enemies. 2. The other case, which relates to the advantage of the Subject, is, when the execution of the publick sentence is necessary to be done speedily for the prevention of future mischiefs. Thus Justinian gave leave to every man to kill the Souldiers that came to plunder; for in that case there was no staying for solemnities of law, and the proceedings and method of Courts;* 1.482 Melius enim est occurrere in tempore quam post exitū vindicare. Vestram igitur vobis permittimus ultionem, & quod serum est pu∣nire judicio, subjugamus edicto, ut nullus parcat militi, cui obviare telo opor∣teat ut latroni. This which the law cals a revenge is but a meer defence, it is a taking the mischief before it be intolerable; and therefore this will be the more out of question: for certainly if some punishments are law∣full, all necessary defences are much more; this onely excepted, that the degree of this is excessive and uncharitable, and therefore ought not to be done, but in those cases where the evil likely to be suffer'd by the inno¦cent is intolerable, as if the plunder be the undoing of a man and his family, and will cause them to perish, or to be extremely miserable; and therefor•• Ulpian said well, Furem nocturnum si quis occiderit, ità demum impunè fe∣ret, si parcere ei sine periculo suo non poterit, Though the law permits a man to kill a Night-thief, yet he may not doe it if he can secure himsel•• without it: but when to spare the Thief will be his own undoing, the•• he may. For it is true which was said of old,

Res omnes conditae famulantur vitae humanae;

And again,

Nobilissimum est quod orbis habet humana vita.

Nothing is fit to be put in ballance to the life of man; and therefore when a man's life and a man's goods are compar'd abstractly, these are extremely out-weighed by that: and therefore for little and tolerable losses it were well if the laws would appoint lesser punishments then Death. But when it is consider'd, that a great loss makes a man and all his family live a mi∣serable life, and men willingly venture their lives to save such great por∣tions,

the laws that put such thieves to death are very justifiable. And it is observable that when God in Moses law appointed a mulct of money upon thieves, it was supposed to be in such robberies where the thief was able to restore four-fold. Adde to this, that if our laws did provide that stollen goods should be restored, they would less need to give leave to the true man to kill the thief. But now that he is the more likely to be undone, because no restitution is to be made him, he may in the case of such great spoilings be better allowed to be the executioner of the sentence of the law to prevent his ruine, and to defend his right. But it were much better if he would not at all use this liberty.

4. But when the evil is past if the law permits the execution of her sentence to the injur'd person;* 1.483 it is to be supposed that there is onely an indulgence to the grief of him that is wrong'd, and therefore if he kills the injurious man, he is indemnified in law, but not quitted in Con∣science. Thus when the Civil law of old, L. Gracchus C. ad legem Juliam, de Adulteriis, and at this day the Spanish laws permit the wronged Hus∣band to kill the adulterer, it is lawful; that is, it is not against justice, and therefore the law cannot punish it: but because it is extremely against charity, his Confessor ought not to absolve him without repentance and amends; for the Gospel does not approve it. The reason is, because if the injury be done, the execution is meerly revenge, without the mixture of any good thing to legitimate it. Now if the law does it by her ministers, it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an example, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as De∣mosthenes his expression is) that others may be afraid, & not be tempted by impunity. But if the man does it by his private hand, there is in it less of observation and exemplarity; or if there were not, yet there were less intended; and therefore the private executing hand is not so innocent: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.484 saith the Apostle, we must not avenge our selves: this can hardly be reconcil'd with such executions. There is onely this allay in it, that if the wronged husband can no other way prevent his dishonour and his wives sin or continuance in it, if the law permits it to him, it may be suppos'd to be done for prevention, not for revenge; and if it be so, as it is suppos'd, it hath many degrees of excuse, and some of lawful, but nothing commendable; for nothing can reconcile it to charity, because (as I observed before) there is a soul in the way which ought strangely much to be regarded. Nay there are two Souls: for it was rarely said by Py∣thagoras, as Iamblichus relates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it is better to suffer the injury then to kill the man: For after death there shall be a judgment; he that did the wrong shall be punish'd, and he that spar'd him shall be rewarded.

5. But if the Criminal be of so desperate an impiety that he seems incorrigible,* 1.485 and of a long time hath seem'd so (for that is the best way to prove him so) then it is lawful for a private hand to be executioner of the publick sentence; but he that is injur'd ought not to doe it. Not that it is murder, or directly unlawful in the precise action: but that it can hardly be quitted from revenge; and it will be hard for any man to be so good as not to have just cause to suspect himself, if he be so bad, upon the meer permissions of law to thrust his hand into his brothers heart. Other persons may doe it out of zeal or love of their countries good. The Civil law gave leave exercendae publicae ultionis adversus latrones, desertoresque

militiae, of executing the anger of the law against fugitive souldiers, and com∣mon robbers: he that had not been robbed by them might better doe it then he that had: for it being permitted pro quiete communi, for the publick peace, he is a good patriot that honestly and justly ministers to that end alone; but he that hath suffer'd by them, had need be an Angel, if he does not spoil that good end by the mixture of revenge; and if he be an Angel he will find a better imployment then to kill a man where it is not commanded, and where it is not necessary.

6. Some affirm that Princes are never to be reckoned to be private persons,* 1.486 when they proceed according to the sentence and meaning of the law, though they doe proceed brevi manu, as the style of the law is; and doe not proceed by the methods and solemnities of law by reason of disabi∣lity to doe it. Thus if a man grow too hard for the laws, the Prince must send Souldiers to him, not Serjeants, if the case be notorious and it be a publick sentence: and the Lord Mayor of London did strike Wat Tyler, though he was not convicted in law, nor sentenc'd by the Judges. Upon this account the King of France offered to defend the killing of the duke of Guise: concerning which I cannot give accounts, because there might be in it many secrets which I know not. But if there wanted nothing but solem∣nities of law, and there wanted power to suppress him by open force, and that it was just and necessary that he should die, and by law he was guilty of it, if there was any thing wanting which should have been done, he that died was the cause of it, and therefore to him it was to be imputed. But supposing what these men affirm to be true; (concerning which I shall affirm nothing) yet this is very rarely to be practis'd, because it is sel∣dome lawful, if ever it be, and not without the concurrence of very many particulars, and is very easily abused to extreme evil purposes; as in that intolerable and inhumane massacre of Paris, which all generations of the world shall speak of with horror and the greatest detestation. But concerning the thing it self that which the lawyers say is this, Generale edictum accedente facti evidentiâ habet vim latae sententiae, when a law is clear, and the fact is evident, the sentence is already past: and therefore some of them are apt to say, To doe the same thing in a chamber is not murder, if it be justice when it is done upon a scaffold; for the same demerit in the criminal and the same power in the Supreme is an equal cause and warranty of the execution. And since it is cheaper to imploy a Physitian then an army, and there is less prejudice done to the publick by such a course, since the State of Venice kills upon suspicion, and there are some things known which cannot be proved, and cannot be suffer'd, and since we see that solemnities of law, like thin aprons, discover more shame sometimes then they hide, and give more scandal then they remove; these men are more confident then I am: for they dare warrant this course which I dare not. But he that will adventure upon this, must take care that it be done 1. by a competent authority, 2. upon a just cause, 3. for a great necessity, 4. according to the intent and meaning of the law; 5. it must be in summo & mero Imperio, by one that is absolute and supreme; 6. it must be upon notoreity of fact, 7. when there is no scruple of law, 8. and if after all this there be no scruple in conscience, 9. nor yet any other means of secu∣ring the publick, 10. and the thing have in it as great charity to the pub∣lick, as there is in it justice to the particular, 11. and that the warre be not justum bellum, that is, between supreme powers, 12. nor yet any treaty,

or promise, faith or covenant to the contrary between the supreme and the inferior offending; 13. nor yet there be a scandal of greater mischief then can be procured by the unsolemn proceeding; 14. nor is done refragante judicio procerum, & sententiis juris prudentum, against the earnest advice of prudent and grave persons, which if it happen will arrest the resolution, and give check and consideration to the Conscience: then it is supposed by many that there may be reason enough to forbear what cannot be us'd, that is, the solemnities of law, which are the methods of peace, not to be expected in a state or time of warre. And by this time it will be so hard to doe it justly, that it will be better to let it alone. For after all these cautions and proviso's, it is not permitted to assasinate or privately to murder the Criminal, but to proceed by open force or by avowed man∣ners of justice, though they be not solemn, and the common waies of peace; that is, they must be owned in publick, and asserted by law, either ante∣cedently or ex post-facto. An example of the first way is frequently seen in in France; where the fugitives of law are proceeded against in their ab∣sence, and executed in effigie; and in the states of Italy against the Banniti: and of the second way examples have been seen in the Manifesto's of some Princes when they have been put to such extrajudicial and private waies of animadversion. But these things happen not but in such places where Princes are more absolute, and less Christian, or that the Subject trans∣gresses by power.

7. Upon the like account it hath in some ages of Christianity it self,* 1.487 but in many ages of Gentilisme, been permitted that by single duel men prove their innocence, and oppress the supposed Criminal:

—puróque pióque duello Quaerendas res censeo—

said one of the Roman Senators to Ancus Martius. Now concerning this I shall not need to say much; because now long since all Christian Princes and States, & all Churches and Ecclesiastical persons have condemned it as a grievous crime, upon these two accounts: 1. Because it is a tempting God by waies which he hath never allowed, it is a lottery that he never gave warrant to: and upon this account it was that Pope Nicolas the first forbad the Em∣peror Lotharius to try his wives suspected chastity by the combat of two champions,* 1.488 cùm hoc & hujusmodi sectantes, Deum solummodo tentare vi∣deantur; and to the same purpose Pope Celestine and some others did forbid it 2. Because the innocent person is expos'd to equal danger with the Cri∣minal, and hath been oftentimes oppress'd; as it happened in the case of William Ca••ur an armourer in Fleetstreet, who being by his servant John David falsely accused of treason, was yet slain in Smithfield by his perjur'd adversary: and then the people have accepted the event as a divine testi∣mony, which in this case being to a lie and to the false part, must needs be infinitely dishonourable to God. But if it were not for these and some other evil appendages, and if the innocent person were sure to prevail, and the law made the private hand the minister of Justice, who onely can tell the secret, and therefore is the surest Judge, there is no peradventure it might as well be done by that hand as by any other. But this cannot be reduc'd to practice at all; but in the whole conjunction of affairs is highly criminal and intole∣rable. In Spain we find that a duel was permitted between two eminent persons [los infantes de lara, the Spaniards call them] onely upon the ac∣cusation of an injury done to some Ladies, the daughters of Rodrigo de

Bibar; and the victory was gain'd by him that was innocent: and another by the men of Zamora in the case of the death of King Sanctus; and quick∣ly they found advocates and defenders. And Vasquius affirms it may as well be permitted by law, as that an injur'd Husband should kill the adulterer. But besides the reasons formerly alledged against such private executions of an uncertain sentence; because they have no foundation in justice or charity, neither in publick or private good, they are deservedly banished from all Christian Countries.

But this is to be understood onely of Judiciall Duels,* 1.489 whether Crimi∣nal or Civil; for as for Duell extrajudiciall and private, it is so Unjust, so Uncharitable, and so Unreasonable, so much against all Laws of God and Man, so infinitely against the piety of him that survives it, so infinitely against the hopes of him that dies in it, that nothing can excuse it: but even Duels which are permitted by laws, ought not to be so, and are not permitted by religion; excepting onely when the Duel is a compendium of war, and is designed to doe justice, and to prevent the greater issues of blood.

Thus the Romans and Albans determin'd their wars by the fight of three Champions of each side;* 1.490 and the Curiatii being subdued by Hora∣tius Cocles, the City Alba came into subjection to Rome. David and Go∣liah fought for their respective Countries; but the Duel did not deter∣mine it directly, but onely discourag'd the conquer'd party. Upon the same account Clodoveus the first Christian King of France offer'd to fight with Alaricus Prince of the West Goths; nobilissimo pari fortunam utrius∣que gentis decretum in,* 1.491 said Paulus Aemilius: and Guicciardine tells that when the French and Italian armies were ready to joyn battel, the fortune of the day was committed to thirteen Champions on either part.* 1.492 Cambden reports that when the Saxons and Danes grew weary of the so great effu∣sion of blood caused by their daily wars, misso in compendium bello, utrius∣que gentis fata Edmundo Anglorum & Canuto Danorum Regibus commissa fuerunt, qui singulari certamine de summa Imperii in hac insula depugna∣runt. Edmund and Canutus fought in a little Island by Gloucester, and drew the war into a compendium, and sav'd the lives of their Subjects by hazar∣ding their own. William Duke of Normandy offer'd this to Harold before the battail in Sussex: And King John of England to Lewis of France, by deputed Champions. And Richard the second of England challenged Charles the sixth of France concerning the title of the French Crown. And Pope Martin allowed the Duel between Charles of Anjou and Peter of Ar∣ragon to determine the question concerning the Kingdome of Sicily. These indeed are great Examples, and are then onely just when the wa•• is just, and on that side onely on which it is just.* 1.493 Haec est necessitas quae bellum justificat (saith Baldus) cum ad bellum extremo loco confugitur, When the war is necessary and the case is extreme, the necessity makes it just, when the contrary evil is intolerable: and when things are come to this pass, then it is true what Bodinus saies, Non interest quo numero adversus hostes decernatur, It matters not by how few the war be ended. Such a Duel is a just war,* 1.494 as all war antiently was called a Duel,

Graecia Barbariae lento collisa duello,

All Greece and Barbary fought a duell; it is duarum partium congressus, the contention of two armies as well as two single persons: and that the words

are synonyma we find in Varroa 1.495, Festusb 1.496, Plautusc 1.497, and P. Merulad 1.498; but concerning the thing it self, who please to see more instances and prece∣dents, more arguments and verifications of it, may at his leisure find many particulars in Frisiuse 1.499, Ayalaf 1.500, Bocerusg 1.501, Alciath 1.502, Bodinusi 1.503, Beutherk 1.504, and Albericus Gentilisl 1.505.

I have now described the prohibitions of private executions, together with the cases in which they have been or may be permitted. The next Question is upon the latter part of the Rule.

Whether it be lawfull for a Christian to require of the Magistrate that his offending Brother may be punished.

If the injur'd person be design'd onely to punishment 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.506 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, out of anger and a desire to be re∣veng'd, there is no question but it is infinitely Unlawfull. Render not evil for evil, and divers other prohibitive words of our Blessed Lord, cannot mean lesse then the forbidding of revenge, though obtain'd and desir'd from the hand of justice; for although the Magistrate is bound to doe it, if re∣quir'd, yet he that requires for vengeance sake is of an Unchristian spirit: and this was observed by Dion in Plutarch, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, To receive & re∣quire amends from the law is more just then that injury against which ju∣stice is required; but it proceeds from the same weak principle; and there∣fore it is fit for none but fools and weak persons:

—quippe minuti Semper & infirmi est animi exiguíque voluptas* 1.507 Ultio: continuò sic collige, quod vindictâ Nemo magis gaudet quam femina—

or rather it becomes not such persons; for nothing can become them but to leave their folly and to grow wiser; for it is caecus & irrationalis furor, as Lactantius calls it, inhumanum verbum est, saith Seneca, it is unreaso∣nable, and inhumane, and brutish: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said the Jews of Alexan∣dria, We are not delighted in taking revenge against our Enemies, because by the laws of God we are taught to have compassion on men. And therefore is this much more to be observed in Christianity, where we are all members one of another, united to Christ our head; and therefore we should com∣port our selves as members of the same body: concerning which Cassiodore saies prettily,* 1.508 Quod si manus una casu aliquo fortè laedat alteram, illa quae laesa est non repercutit, nec se erigit in vindictam, If one hand strikes the other, it is not stricken again, neither doth the other think to be reveng'd; as knowing it was too much that one was smitten.

2. It is lawfull for a Christian to require of the Magistrate to punish him that is injurious,* 1.509 if he justly fears a future and intolerable evil; for then it is but a calling to the law for a just defence, without which the Magistrate should bear the sword in vain. Clemens Alexandrinus defines 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or punishment (meaning that which is just, and in some cases reasonable to be requir'd) to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

a return of evil (not for the vexing of the injurious, but) for the re∣lief or commodity of the complainer. But if it be that which Aristotle defin'd it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, f••r the satisfaction of him that pu∣nishes, that is, that he may have the pleasure of revenge, then it is intole∣rable. And therefore it must be alwaies provided that this appeal respect the future onely, and not that which is past; for that is revenge, and this is caution and defence.

3. In all repetitions of our rights which are permitted to Christians be∣fore Christian Judges,* 1.510 it is not lawfull for Christians to take any thing for amends beyond the reall losse or diminution of good: for that is a re∣tribution of evil, which at no hand is permitted to a Christian. The Jews might receive four-fold, Christians must be content with simple restitution of their loss and reall dammages.

4. Christians must not go to law but upon very great cause;* 1.511 and there∣fore some of the Heathens, Musonius, Maximus Tyrius, and others, would not allow 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, any amends at law for reproachfull or disgracefull words. And the Christians, who neither were nor ought to be behind them, desir'd not their Calumniators to be punished. So Justin Martyr, We will not those to be punished who doe calumniate us. Their own perverse∣ness and ignorance of good things is enough already of calamity. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, A Christian is commanded by Christ our new Law-giver not to be revenged, no not a little. Abstinere à litibus etiam plusquam licet, said Cicero, We must abstain from suits of law, even far beyond our convenience: and in the Primitive Church they took all honest things for Commandements, and therefore did not think it lawfull at all to go to law; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Justin Martyr of them,* 1.512 They doe not go to law with them that rob them. But that it is lawful, the publick necessities are a sufficient argument; and yet men for want of charity make more necessities then needs: for if charity be preserv'd according to its worthiest measures, there would be no suits of law, but what are not to be avoided; that is, there would be none for revenge, but some for remedy and relief. And this was that which* 1.513 Mu∣sonius said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It is not ingenuous to be running to law upon every provocation though by reall injury: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Pythago∣ras, A wise man will neither revile his neighbour, nor sue him that does. For Good men (said Metellus Numidicus) will sooner take an injury then return one: and if we read the Sermon of Maximus Tyrius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉;* 1.514 whether it may be permitted to a good man to return evil to the injurious? it will soon put us either to shame, or at least to consider whether there be no command in our religion, of suffering inju∣ries, of patience, of longanimity, of forgiveness, of doing good for evil; and whether there be not rewards great enough to make amends for all our losses, and to reward all our charity; and whether the things of this world cannot possibly be despised by a Christian; and whether peace and for∣givenesse doe not make us more like to God and to the Holy Jesus. Cer∣tainly if a Christian be reproach'd, rail'd at, spoil'd, beaten, mutilated, or in danger of death, if he bears it patiently and charitably, he may better say it then Achilles did in Homer,

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

I hope for this charity to be rewarded by God himself. If a man have relations, and necessities, and obligations by other collateral duties, he must in some cases, and in many more he may defend his goods by the protection of laws, and his life and limbs; but in no case may he go to law to vex his Neigh∣bour: and because all law-suits are vexatious, he may not go to law, un∣less to drive away an injury that is intolerable, and that is much greater then that which is brought upon the other.

5. When a Christian does appeal to Christian Judges for caution,* 1.515 or for repetition of his right, he must doe it without arts of vexation, but with the least trouble he can; being unwilling his Neighbour should suffer any evil for what he hath done. Omnia priùs tentanda quam bello experiun∣dum. He must trie all waies before he go to this; and when he is in this, he must doe it with as little collateral trouble to his adversary at law as he can. To this belongs that of Ulpian, Non improbat praetor factum ejus qui tanti habuit re carere, ne propter eam saepiùs litigaret. Haec enim verecunda cogitatio ejus qui lites exsecratur non est vituperanda. A man must be mo∣dest and charitable in his necessary suits at law; not too ready, not too greedy, not passionate, not revengeful: seeking to repair himself when he must needs, but not delighting in the breaches made upon his Neighbour.

In order to this,* 1.516 it would prevent many evils, and determine many Cases of Conscience, or make them easie and few, if evil and rapacious Advo∣cates that make a trade, not to minister to justice, but to heap up riches for themselves, were not permitted in Common-wealths to plead in behalf of vitious persons and manifest oppressors, and in causes notoriously un∣just. Galeatius Sforza Duke of Millain being told of a witty Lawyer that was of evil imployment, a patron of any thing for money, imploying his wit to very evil purposes, sent for him, and told him that he owed his Painter a hundred Crowns, and was not willing to pay him; and therefore asked him if he would defend his cause in case the Painter should require his money at law. The Advocate promised him largely, and would war∣rant his cause; which when the Duke heard from his own mouth, he cau∣sed him to be hang'd. The action was severe, but strangely exemplary. I have nothing to doe with it, because I am not writing Politics, but Cases and Rules of Conscience: but I have mention'd it as a great reproof of all that which makes Causes & Suits of Law to be numerous; which is a great sign of corruption of manners, if not of laws, in any place; but amongst Christians it is a very great state of evil. And therefore Charles the ninth of France made an edict that whosoever began a suit at law should pay into the Finances two Crowns; which if his cause were just he should lose, if it were unjust the law would sufficiently punish him besides: but even upon a just cause to go to law, is not the commendation of Christian justice, much lesse of charity, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Then charity is best preser∣ved amongst Citizens, not when there are most decisions, of causes, but when the suits are fewest.

RULE VII. It is not lawfull to punish one for the offence of a∣nother; meerly, and wholly.

QUod tute intristi, tibi comedendum est,* 1.517 said the Comedy, As you knead, so you must eat; and he that eats sowre grapes, his teeth only shall be set on edge. This is the voice of Nature, of God, of rightrea∣son, and all the laws, and all the sentences of all the wise men in the world; and needs no farther argument to prove it. But there are in it some ca∣ses which need explication. 1. Concerning persons conjunct by Con∣tract; 2. In persons conjunct by Nature; 3. In them which are conjunct by the society of Crime. For in all these one in punished for the fault of another; but how far this can be just and lawfull, are usefull inquiries in order to the conduct of Conscience.

1. The first inquiry is concerning persons conjunct in Contract;* 1.518 such as are Pledges in War, Sureties for Debt, Undertakers for appearance, and the like. Concerning Pledges in War, it hath been sometimes pra∣ctised in warlike Nations, to put them to death when their parties have broke their promise. The Thessalians kill'd 250, the Romans 300 of the Volsci; and this they might doe by the law of Nations: that is, with∣out infamy and reproach, or any supposed injustice: they did practise it on either side. But the thing it self is not lawfull by the law of God and Nature, unless the Pledges be equally guilty of the Crime. When Re∣gulus was sent to Rome to get an exchange of prisoners, and himself upon his promise was engaged to release them, or to return himself; when he perswaded the Romans not to release the African prisoners, the Cartha∣ginians had reason to account him guilty as his Country. But when the Pledges are not, it is against the law of Nature to put to death the inno∣cent. For either the Pledges are violently sent in caution against their wills, or with them. If against, then the wrong is apparent, and the in∣justice notorious. If with their will, it is to be considered, it is beyond their power; for, nemo membrorum suorum Dominus videtur, saith the law, l. liber ff. ad legem Aquiliam: and therefore it is that in Criminal causes, where Corporal punishment is inflicted, no man is permitted to be Surety for another, but in Civil causes he may; because no Surety may lawful∣ly be put to death for the Principal, as is noted by the Gloss in cap. Cum homo 23. q. 5. The reason is plain; He that is Surety for another can engage nothing of which he is not the Lord, and over which he hath no power; and therefore he cannot lay his body, his life, or limb, at stake. No man hath power to engage his soul for the soul of another, that is, so as to pay his soul in case of forfeiture to acquit another; for it is not his, it is ano∣thers; it is his who hath purchased it and is Lord over it, that is Christ: and so is our body redeemed by the blood of Christ,* 1.519 For ye are bought with a price, therefore glorifie God in your body and in your spirit, which are God's, saith the Apostle. Now this is so to be understood, not that one man may not feel the calamity which the sin of another can bring upon him; but that the law cannot inflict Corporal punishment upon any relative, so as the

Criminall shall escape, and the law be satisfied, as if the offending person had suffered. If a Father be a Traytor, the law may justly put him to death though the wife will die with sorrow. But the law cannot put the wife to death, or the son, and let the husband goe free. One relative may acci∣dentally come into the society of anothers punishment, not only if they be partners of the Crime, but though one be innocent; but one cannot pay it for the other and acquit him. This I say is to be understood in Corporal punishments.

But in Pecuniary punishments the Case is otherwise.* 1.520 For a man is Lord of his money, and may give it away, and therefore may oblige it; and he that is Surety for anothers debt, gives or lends it to him that is prin∣cipally obliged; and therefore it is just to take it, and the Surety hath power to doe it. But by the way it is observable, that the Surety can only oblige his money, or himself to the payment of his money: but when the Creditors had power to torment the insolvent Debtors, no man could give himself a Surety directly for that torment; but by making himself a Debtor, he did by consequence make himself Criminal if he did not pay, and so might with as much justice be tormented as the principal Debtor.

But the whole business is unreasonable as to this instance,* 1.521 and there∣fore the inquiry is soon at an end, and the case of conscience wholly diffe∣rent; for in this particular it is not only unlawfull to punish the Surety with Corporal punishment, but even the Principal that is insolvent is to be let alone. If he fell into poverty by his prodigality, the law may punish that as she please; or if he intends to defraud the Creditor, he may be pu∣nished, or constrained to pay: but if he fall into poverty 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Justinian's expression is, by unavoidable accident, not by impious courses, it is against justice and charity to put him to trouble.

Concerning which,* 1.522 though it be not pertinent to this rule, but here on∣ly very well occasioned, I shall give this short account, that at once I may be wholy quit of this particular. * In the laws of the XII Tables it was permitted to Creditors to imprison, to torment, to put their insolvent Debtors to death; and if they were many of them they might cut the body in pieces, and every man goe away with his share. Nihil profecto im∣mitius, nihil immanius,* 1.523 saies A. Gellius, nisi, ut reipsâ apparet, eo consilio tanta immanitas poenae denuntiata est, ne ad eam unquam perveniretur. It was an intolerable and cruel justice, and only therefore published in so great a terror, that it might never be put in execution: and indeed, as he observes, it was never practised.

But addici nunc & vinciri multos videmus,* 1.524 saith he; that was the next Cruelty: The Debtors were sold and all their goods; even Kings, subject to the Roman Empire, were with their Crowns and Purple, their Scepter and Royal Ensignes, published by the Crier, and made slaves to pay their debts. The King of Cyprus was so used, as Cicero in his oration pro Sextio sadly complains. The dividing the body of the Debtor was chang'd into the dividing of his goods; but this also was hatefull and com∣plained of by wise and good men. Si funus id habendum sit quò non amici conveniant ad exequias cohonestandas, sed bonorum emptores ut Carnifices

ad reliquias vitae lacerandas ac distrahendas,* 1.525 said Cicero: and Manlius most worthily, seeing a Roman led to prison like a slave for debt, cried out, Tum verò ego nequicquam hâc dextrâ Capitolium arcémque servaverim, si civem commilitonémque meum tanquam Gallis victoribus captum in servi∣tutem ac vincula duci videam. To what purpose did I save the Capitol, if a citizen and my fellow-souldier shall for debt be made a slave as if he were taken prisoner by the Gaules? and therefore he paid the debt and dismiss'd the prisoner.

But because this was cruel and inhumane,* 1.526 when Paetilius and Papirius were Consuls, a law was made that all the goods and possessions of the Debtors should be obnoxious to the Creditors, but not his body; but yet so that the Debtors did work for their Creditors, but not in chains: and this lasted till the lex Julia decreed (in Augustus his time) that the insol∣vent Debtors might quit all their goods, but neither suffer chains, nor sla∣very, nor doe labour for their Creditors: but the benefit of this law ex∣tended not to prodigal and vain persons,* 1.527 but to those only qui vi majore aliquâ fortunis evertebantur, (that was their word) who were undone by any great violence, by shipwrack, or fire, or any accident unavoidable. For as for others, they were delivered to the Capital Triumvirat and punished ad Columnam Meniam, that is, whipped extremely; and this continued un∣til the time of Gratian the Emperor,* 1.528 who decreed that such Debtors who were not eversi per vim majorem, should not receive any benefit by quit∣ting all their goods; but if they were less then their debt,* 1.529 ad redditionem debitae quantitatis congruâ atque dignissimâ suppliciorum acerbitate cogantur, they should be compelled by torment to pay a due proportion: and in this there might be severity; but it had in it very much of Justice. But for the other part of it, of the intire cession of goods, and that the insolvent mi∣serable Debtor should be exposed to starving, this had neither charity in it nor justice; and therefore after much complaining, and attempts of ease, it was wholly taken away by the Emperors, Constantine, Gratian, and Justi∣nian, Novel. 135.* 1.530 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is infinitely unjust that he who is fallen into poverty without his fault should be constrained to live a shamefull life, without his daily bread, and the necessary provisions for his back: and then it was ordered that if the Debtor did ejurare bonam copiam, that is, swear that he had not goods suf∣ficient to pay the debt, he should be free.

This was made into a law long before the time of Gratian;* 1.531 when Sylla was Dictator, Popilius demanded it, and it was decreed. But Tyrants usually make good laws, and after they are dead are so hated, that even their good laws are sometimes the less regarded: and so it happened in this particular;* 1.532 in so much that Cicero spake against L. Flaccus for desi∣ring to have Sylla's laws confirmed. But it soon expired through the power of the rich usurers,* 1.533 as we finde by the complaint of C. Manlius in Salust; and even so long as the lex Popilia did prevail, yet they had ar••s to elude it: for though they could not bind the Debtors in publick prisons, yet they would detain them in their own houses; and though it was a great and an illegal violence, yet the poore mans case is last of all heard, and commonly the Advocates and Judges have something else to doe.

This is a perfect narrative of this affair;* 1.534 in all which it is apparent that wise and good men did infinitely condemn the cruel and unjust usage of insolvent Debtors who were per vim majorem eversi, not poor by vice, but misfortune and the Divine providence. The violence and the injury is against natural justice and humanity, or that natural pity which God hath plac'd in the bowels of mankinde; as appears by the endeavours of the wiser Romans to correct the cruelty of Creditors. But the Debtors, though by degrees eased, yet were not righted till Christianity made the laws, and saw justice and mercy done. S. Ambrose complain'd most bit∣terly of the Creditors in his time;* 1.535 Vidi ego pauperem duci dum cogeretur solvere quod non habebat; trahi ad carcerem quia vinum deesset ad mensam potentis; deducere in auctionem filios suos ut ad tempus poenam differre pos∣sit: inventum fortè aliquem qui in illa necessitate subveniret, &c. I have seen a poor man compell'd to pay what he had not to pay; and drag'd to prison because his creditor had not wine enough to drink; and to deferre his punish∣ment a while,* 1.536 forc'd to sell his sons at an outcry. Grandis culpa est, (saith he) si te sciente fidelis egeat, si scias eum sine sumptu esse, fame laborare, & non adjuves; si sit in carcere, & poenis & suppliciis propter debitum aliquod justus excrucietur. It is a great fault, if when you know it, you suffer a faithfull man to want meat and provisions; if a just or good man be in prison, and in chains or torments for debt. Now if persons not interested in the debt might not suffer such a thing to be and abide, much less might any Christian doe such a thing. If every man that could, was bound to take off the evil; it is certain it was infinitely unlawfull to inflict or to lay it on: and therefore the remains of this barbarity and inhumanity amongst us does so little argue Christianity to be amongst us, that it plainly proves that our Religion hath not prevailed so far upon us as to take off our in∣humanity.

Of the same nature is that barbarous custome of arresting dead bo∣dies,* 1.537 and denying them the natural rights of burial till a debt be paid. Ascelinus Fitz-Arthur arrested the body of William Duke of Normandy, Conqueror of England,* 1.538 upon something a like account. But S. Ambrose blames such unnatural cruelty, and derides the folly of it; Quoties vidi à foeneratoribus teneri defunctos pro pignore, & negari tumulum dum foenus ex∣poscitur? Quibus ego acquiescens dixi, Tenete reum vestrum, & ne possit elabi, domum ducite; claudite in cubiculo isto carnificibus duriores: quo∣niam quem vos tenetis, carcer non suscipit, exactor absolvit; To them who seiz'd on dead bodies for their debt, I call'd out, Hold fast your Debtor, carry him home lest he run away, O ye that are more cruel then Hang-men. But of this sufficient: for whatsoever is against the law of Nature, to have nam'd it is to have reprov'd it. Onely there is one case in which if dead bodies be arrested for debt, I cannot so much complain of it; and that is in the Customes of France, where they never imprison any alive for a Debt, un∣less he be expresly condemn'd to it by the sentence of the Judge, or con∣tracted upon those terms with the Creditor: but when the man is dead they lay their claim, because they cannot hurt the man. This I finde in Gaspar Beatius, who cites these Verses for it out of Johannes Girardus, no ill Poet, but a good Lawyer.

Heus principes, duodecim Tabulae inopem crudeliter Quae debitorem dissecant,

Aut jura, mores publici, Quae carceribus illum miserè Et opprimunt & enecant, Nimis mihi, nimis displicent; Qui Gallum habuit mos bonus Idem & verus probabitur Nimis mihi cuique & bono, Quo Creditores debita Petant sibi post funera.

But I suppose he might speak this in jest, to represent the lenity of French∣men in not casting their Debtors into prison. But if a Debtor should, as Argiropilus, jesting at his death, make his rich friends the heirs of all his debts, it would spoil the jest.

Now I return to the other inquiries of the Rule.

The second inquiry is concerning persons conjunct by nature;* 1.539 whe∣ther (for example sake) Sons or Nephews can be punish'd for the faults and offences of their Fathers and Grand-fathers. Concerning this, I find Paulus the Lawyer and Baldus speaking exact Antinomies. For Baldus in l. id quod pauperibus, qu. 9. C. de Episcopis & Clericis, affirms, Haeredem te∣neri ad poenam ad quam defunctus fuerat condemnatus, The heir of his father inherits his father's punishment: but Paulus in l. si poena, ff. de poenis, sayes expresly, Haeredem non teneri ad poenam defuncti, The heir is not bound to suffer the punishment of the dead. * But they are both in the right: for the Heir is not tied to suffer the corporal punishment to which his Father was condemn'd, because his Father had no dominion over his Son's body or his own; but over his goods he hath, and therefore can transmit these with their proper burthen: and therefore the Heir is liable to pay the Fine to which his Father was sentenc'd, and to pay his Father's debts, and is liable to the same compulsion, with this onely caution, that if the Father be under torment or imprisonment for insolvency, the Son be no way ob∣lig'd to that; because whether the insolvency of the Father be by his fault or his misfortune, still the Son is not oblig'd: for as he is not bound by his Father's personal fault to suffer personal punishment, so neither for his mis∣fortune can he be oblig'd beyond the suffering of a descending poverty. If his Father was insolvent by his Crime, the punishment was to go no fur∣ther then the fault, and therefore no torment was intail'd: but if he were insolvent by misfortune, neither the Father nor the Son for that could de∣serve any further evil; and if the Father transmitted no goods, no advan∣tage to the Son, there is no reason he should transmit a burthen: Nemo fiat deterior per quem melior factus non est, sayes the Law. And therefore S. Ambrose complain'd of a sad sight he saw;* 1.540 Vidi ego miserabile spectacu∣lum, Liberos pro Paterno debito in auctionem deduci, & teneri calamitatis hae∣redes, qui non essent participes successionis, & hoc tam immane flagitium non erubescere Creditorem, I have seen Sons sold Slaves for their Fathers debt, from whom they were never like to receive an Inheritance; and which is yet more strange, the Creditors were not asham'd of the impious Cruelty. But this is a rul'd case both in Divinity and Law. Nunquam unus pro alio potest poena corporis puniri,* 1.541 said Alexander of Hales, and Thomas Aquinas, No man can suffer corporal punishment in the place of another: the same with that in the law, l. Crimen ff. de poenis.* 1.542 And therefore of all things in the world, conjunction of Nature, which should be a means of endearment, and the most profitable communications, ought not to be an instrument of the

communication of evil. Unius factum alteri qui nihil fecit non nocet, l. de pupillo, 5. § si plurium. ff. Nov. op. nunt. And again, Peccata suos teneant autores, nec ulterius progrediatur metus, quam reperiutur delictum, l. Sanci∣mus, 22. C. de poenis. But it is expresly instanc'd in this matter of successi∣on, Unusquisque ex suo admisso poenae subjiciatur, nec alieni criminis successor teneatur, The Son may succeed in his Father's burthens and misfortunes, but not in his crimes or corporal punishments. l. crimen, ff. eod.

And this is the measure of the third inquiry.* 1.543 For they who are con∣junct in crime, are equally obnoxious to punishment; and therefore if one be punish'd for the fault of another, it is just to him that is punish'd, and mercy to them that are spar'd. For when all are criminal, all are liable to punishment,* 1.544 and sometimes all doe suffer. So did the Campanian Legion that rebell'd at Rhegium, and possess'd the Town for ten years; they suf∣fer'd every man,* 1.545 four thousand heads paid for it. So did the ninth Legion under Julius, and the tenth Legion under Augustus, every man was pu∣nish'd. For the rule of the law is, Quod à pluribus pro indiviso commis∣sum est, singulos in solidum obligat, l. semper, § 2. ff. Quod vi aut cl. & l. item Mela, § 2. ff. ad legem Aquiliam. When every man consents to the whole crime, every man is wholly criminal. If ten thieves carry away a load of iron, every man is tied to the punishment of the whole. * But sometimes onely the Principals are punish'd.* 1.546 Thus at Capua seventy Princes of the Senate were put to death for rebelling against the Romans, and three hun∣dred of the Nobility were imprison'd, and two hundred twenty five of the Sorani. And this way is often taken by Princes, and wise Generals, and Republicks,* 1.547 ut unde culpa orta esset ibi poena confisteret. And C. Decimus was heard with great applause, when in the case of the Rhodians he af∣firm'd, that the fault was not in the People, but in their Principals and In∣cendiaries; meaning, it was not so in the People as in their Leaders. And in Tumults it often happens as it did at Ephesus, when S. Paul had almost been torn in pieces with the People: the greater part knew not why they were come together, but all were in the Tumult; and in such cases it is justice that one be punish'd for many, a few for all: and therefore S. Am∣brose did highly reprove Theodosius the Emperour for killing 7000 of the Thessalonians for a tumultuary rescuing a Criminal from the hand of the Magistrate, and killing the Governour and some great Officers in the se∣dition. * Sometimes the Criminals were decimated by lot, as appears in a 1.548 Polybius,b 1.549 Tacitus,c 1.550 Plutarch,d 1.551 Appian,e 1.552 Dio,f 1.553 Julius Capitolinus, who also mentions a centesimation. And the reason of this equity Cicero well discourses in his Oration pro Cluentio, ut metus, viz. ad omnes, poena ad pau∣cos perveniret, That some may be punish'd, and all may be made to fear: for the Souldiers being made to fear the bigger fear of their Generals, would ne∣ver fear the less fear of the Enemy, who does not strike so surely as the Exe∣cutioner; and therefore they might afterwards become good Men and good Citizens. But because in publick offences the cases may be different, they are by this measure reduc'd to reason.

If the tumult or war be by the command of Magistrates,* 1.554 the People are to be affrighted, or admonish'd, but the Commanders onely are to be punish'd. Ne alieni admissi poenam luant quos nulla contingit culpa, l. ult. ff. de bon. Damnat. For the People are soon commanded by him that stands next above them. And therefore since to obey is like a duty,

it is not easily to be reckon'd to a real crime, and the greatest punish∣ment.

But if the fault be done by the People without authority or excuse,* 1.555 but just as fire burns a house by chance, or water breaks a dam by its meer weight, then it is to be considered whether the Criminals be many or few: if few, they may all be punished without breach of equity, upon the ac∣count of the rule of the law, Quae poena delictis imposita est, si plures deli∣querint, à singulis in solidum debetur, l. item Mela, ff. ad leg. Aquil. But if many were in the crime, then the rule of equity and the gentleness of the law is to take place, ut poenae interpretatione potius molliantur, quam exa∣sperentur, leg. poen. ff. de poenis, a few should be punish'd for all the rest, ut supersint quos peccasse poeniteat. For it is of great avail for the publick in∣terest, that as some be cut off, so some should remain alive, that they may repent. And in this sense is that of Lucan,

—quicquid multis peccatur inultum est.

Besides that it is evil to the Commonwealth to lose so many Subjects, it is also sometimes dangerous;

—sed illos Defendit numerus junctaeque umbone phalanges.

The determination of these two particulars I learn from Cicero in his Ora∣tion pro Flacco, Vobis autem est confitendum, si consiliis Principum vestrae ci∣vitates reguntur, non multitudinis temeritate, optimatum consilio bellum ab istis civitatibus cum populo Romano esse susceptum. If the Nobles govern your Cities, then the Nobles made the war, and the People are innocent. Sin ille tum motus est temeritate imperitorum excitatus, patimini me delicta vulgi à publica causa separare, But if the Rabble did the fault, the City is not to be punish'd; it is not a publick offence. Multitudo peccavit, sed non Universitas. For a Rabble does not make a City, a People, or a Re∣publick: for to make this, it must be coetus qui jure aliquo continetur, l. metum. § animadvertendum. ff. quod met. caus. a multitude under govern∣ment, and a legal head.

But if both the Magistrates and the People be in the offence,* 1.556 culpa est penes paucos concitores vulgi, said C. Decimus; it is better that the Ring-leaders and the Boutefeus should lye at stake, and feel the severity, while the other are instructed and preserved by the gentleness of laws and Princes.

There are some other questions and cases of Conscience concerning penal laws; but they can with more propriety be handled under other titles, and therefore I shall refer them to their several places. But for the like∣ness of the matter I have here subjoyned some Rules concerning the measures and obligations of Conscience in the matter and laws of Tribute.

Of Laws of Tribute. RULE VIII. The laws of Tribute are moral laws, and not penal, except it be by accident; and therefore doe ob∣lige the Conscience to an active obedience.

HIm to whom we pay tribute,* 1.557 we owe obedience to. It is S. Pauls argu∣ment to prove that we ought to obey the powers that are set over us, because to them we pay tribute;* 1.558 which tribute is not introduc'd by Ty∣ranny, but is part of that Oeconomy by which God governs the world, by his Deputies and lieutenants, the Kings and Princes of the earth. Nec qui∣es gentium sine armis, nec arma sine stipendiis, nec stipendia sine tributis haberi possunt, said Tacitus. No peace without laws; no laws without a coercitive power; no power without guards and souldiers;* 1.559 no guards without pay: and that the souldiery may be paid, and the laws reverenc'd, and the power fear'd, and every mans right be secur'd, it is necessary that there be tribute. Ut sit ornamentum pacis, subsidium belli & nervus reip. tributum est pecunia populo imperata quae tributim à singulis proportione cen∣sûs exigebatur, said Varro. But besides this, the very paying tribute is the sign and publication of our subjection. It is a giving him that which is his own:* 1.560 for he that coyns the money, hath the power of the law, and this from the custome of the world for many ages. The Persians first imprinted the figure of their Prince upon their money, after them the Greeks: hence were those names of coin, the Darics, and Philippics; for the money having the impress and figure of the Prince, the name & the value from the Prince, is a seisure and solemn investiture in the government of that people: and our Blessed Lord was pleased from hence to argue that therefore they ought to pay tribute to Caesar; because what way soever he came first to it, Christ does not there dispute, but he was over them, and he protected them in peace, righted their causes, reliev'd their oppressions, stamped their money, gave value to that, and protection to them, and therefore they were bound to pay their tribute. It was res Caesaris, as he was pleas'd to call it, the things of Caesar; it was due to him for the publick ministery of justice: and this is also urged by S. Paul, for they are Gods ministers, watching for this very thing, that is, for your good; and therefore are to be maintained according to the dignity of that ministration.

Now as we owe tribute to whom we owe obedience;* 1.561 so we owe obe∣dience to whom we owe tribute: that is, if he have authority to exact tri∣bute, we are bound in Conscience to pay it. It is a law as much obliging the Conscience as any other. Numus or Nummus from Numa, say the Roman Criticks; because King Numa first stamp'd money amongst them. But I suppose it is from a Greek fountain, Numus and Numisma from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.562 and that saies Aristotle is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from the law: for he that stamps money, gives the law; and amongst others, and for the defence of

all laws, this law of paying money to him by way of Tribute is obli∣gatory.

And the case does not differ by what name soever it be impos'd;* 1.563 vectigal, tributum, census, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, were the words amongst the Greeks and Latines, and did signifie portions of money paid from lands, from merchandise, for heads, excisum quid, something that is cut off from the whole, for the preservation of the rest; that's excise money: but what∣ever the words be, S. Paul reckons them all to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, due debt;* 1.564 and thefore 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 saith our Blessed Lord, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith S. Paul, restore,* 1.565 or pay it; it is a debt due by the ordinance of God. It is all but tribute; even the census or pole-money is tribute: so it is called by Ulpian, l. 3 ff. de Censibus, tributum capitis, the tribute of the head. The same use of the word I have observed out of Ammianus and Tertullian. This I the rather note, that I might represent the obligation to be all one by the law of God, though the imposition be odious and of ill name amongst the people, accor∣ding to that saying of Tertullian,* 1.566 Si agri tributo onusti viliores, hominum capita stipendio censa ignobiliora, Fields under contribution are cheaper, and men under a tax are more ignoble. Angaria is another sort of tribute; an imposition of work and upon the labours of the Subject. It is indeed the worst and the most vexatious; but it is species tributi, a kind of tribute, and due by the laws of religion, where it is due by the laws of the nation: and therefore those persons are very regardless of their eternal interest, who think it lawful prize whatever they can take from the Custome-house; whereas the paying of tribute is an instance of that obedience which is due to them that are set over us, not onely for wrath, but also for Conscience sake, and S. Paul never uses the word Conscience, but when it is the con∣cern of a soul.* 1.567 It is S. Ambrose his observation, who also uses this argu∣ment, Magnum quidem est & spiritale documentum, quo Christiani viri sub∣limioribus potestatibus docentur esse subjecti, ne quis constitutionem terreni Regis putet esse solvendam. Si enim censum Dei filius solvit, quis tu tantus es qui non putes esse solvendum? It is a great and a spiritual doctrine that Christians be subject to the higher powers. For if Christ paid tribute, what art thou, how great, how mighty, that thou thinkest thou art not oblig'd?

RULE IX. The laws of Tribute have the same conditions, causes, powers, and measures with other laws of Government.

THis Rule requires that* 1.568 the authority be supreme, that the cause be just, that the end be publick, that the good be general, that the people receive advantage. Which is to eb understood of tribute which is not

penal, nor compensatory. For sometimes Tributes are impos'd upon a conquer'd peoplea 1.569 as fetters upon a fugitive, to load him that he run away no more; or to make amends for the charges of a war. If they were in fault, they must bear the punishment; if they did the evil, they must suffer the evil; that at the charge of the conquer'd themselves also shall enjoy peace. So Petilius said to the Gaules,b 1.570 Nos, quanquam toties lacessiti, jure victoriae id solùm vobis addidimus quo pacem tueremur, You have provok'd us, and we have conquer'd you; and yet have onely impos'd the punish∣ment of so much tribute on you, that at your charge we will keep the peace, So concerning the Greeksc 1.571 Cicero affirms that they ought to pay some part of their fruits that at their own expences they be restrain'd from undoing themselves by Civil wars.

But then this is at the mercy and good will of the Conquerour;* 1.572 for the tribute he imposes upon them as punishment, he is so the Lord of it, that however he dispose of it, it must be truly paid. And the same is the case of a tribute impos'd by way of fine upon a City or Society: the Supreme power is not bound to dispense that in publick uses; and if he does not, yet the Subject is not at liberty in his Conscience whether he will pay it or no. For in this case it is not a law of manners but of Empire; and is a private perquisite of the Prince, as the Prince himself can be a private person: which because it cannot be in any full sense or acceptation of a law, but in nature onely, so neither can the tribute be of so private emolument, but it will at least indirectly doe advantage to the Publick.

In other tributes,* 1.573 such which are legall, publick, and universall, the tri∣bute must be proportion'd to the necessity and cause of it; it must be im∣ployed in that end to which it was impos'd and paid, (for that is a part of commutative justice) it must be equally laid; that is, as far as it can be pru∣dently done, supposing the unavoidable errors in publick affairs in which so many particulars are to be considered (for this is a part of distributive justice:) and where there is a defailance in these, I mean a constant and no∣torious, there the Conscience is disoblig'd (as far as the excess and in∣justice reaches) just as it is from the obedience to other laws that are un∣just; of which I have given account, * in the third Rule of the first Chapter of this Book. But this I say is true in such tributes as are of publick and common use. For those which are for the expences and per∣sonall use of the Prince, if he spends them well or ill, the Subject is not con∣cerned; but onely that he pay it according to the law and custome. In these the Supreme power is a Supreme Lord, in the other he is but a su∣preme Steward and Dispenser.

As the laws of tribute have their originall and their obligation,* 1.574 so they have their dissolution as other laws have, with this onely difference, that the laws of tribute, when the reason ceases, if they be continued by cu∣stome, are still obliging to the Subject,d 1.575 it being reason enough that the Supreme power hath an advantage by it, which cannot be so personall but that it will, like the brightness of the Sun, reflect light and heat upon the Subject.

Lastly,* 1.576 in the levying and imposing tribute, by the voice of most men, those things usually are excepted which are spent in our personall necessi∣ties. Whatsoever is for negotiation may pay, but not what is to be eaten and drank. This tribute nevertheless is paid in Spain, for it is that which they call, Alcavala; and in Portugal, where it is called Sisa. I suppose it is the same with the Excise in England and the Low Countries; and yet is much spoken against for these reasons, 1. Because it is too greàt an indi∣cation or likeness to slavery, and an uningenuous subjection to pay tribute for our meat and drink and the necessaries of life; it is every day a com∣pounding for our life, as if we were condemn'd persons, and were to live at a price, or die with hunger, unless by our money we buy our reprieve. 2. The other reason of the complaint made against this, is because by this means the poor and he that hath the greatest charge of children, and he that is the most hospitable to strangers and to the poor, shall pay the most, who yet of all men ought most to be eased. And upon these or the like reasons the Civil Law impos'd Gabels onely upon Merchandises for trade and gain and pleasure.* 1.577 And of this opinion are generally all the Canonists and most of the Civilians, and very many Divines: but when Scholars come to dispute the interest of Princes and the measures of their gain or necessities, they speak some things prettily, but to no great purpose. In these and all other Cases of this nature, Kings and Princes will doe what they please; and it is fit they should, let us talk what we will, alwaies provi∣ded, that they remember they are to answer to God for their whole Go∣vernment, and how they should be enabled to make this answer with joy, they are to consult with the laws of God, and of the land, and with their Subjects learned in them both: and that, above all men, Princes consider not alwaies what they may doe, but what is good; and very often, what is best. * This onely. Tribute upon meat and drink is not of it self unjust; but it is commonly made so: for whether the tribute be paid onely by the Merchant, as in Castile and England, or by the Merchant and him that spends them for his need, and not for his gain, as in Portugal; yet still the poor man is the most burden'd in such cases: for the Merchant will sell the dearer, and then the evil falls upon the poor housekeeper, contrary to the intention of all good Princes; which if they will take care to pre∣vent, I know nothing to hinder them, but that by the same rules which they observe in making other laws they may take their liberty in this.

RULE X. Tribute, and Customes which are due, are to be paid whether they be demanded or no.

THis is but the result of the former discourses.* 1.578 For if a tribute be just, it is due debt, and to be paid as any other: and humane laws doe not onely make the paying tribute to be necessary in the vertue of obedi∣ence, for then unless the law expressed that it ought to be paid, though it be not particularly demanded, the subject not demanded were free; but the laws place this obedience in the form and matter of its proper kind of vertue, it is justice to pay it, and that must not be omitted at all; for our duty is not to depend upon the diligence of other men; and if the Ministers

of the Prince be negligent, yet we must not be unjust. This is true in Sub∣jects and Natives; but strangers are free, unless they be requir'd to pay: alwaies supposing, that they go in publick waies and with open address. For it is presumed that they are ignorant inculpably in the laws of the Countrey, and they are less oblig'd; but therefore these defects are to be supplied by the care of them that are interested. But if they know it al∣ready, they are oblig'd as the Natives according to the laws, and must not pretend ignorance, in fraud and cosenage.

But this also is to be understood of customes and tributes which are just.* 1.579 In which number those which are of an immemorial time and long use ever are to be presumed. Those which are newly impos'd, may better be considered whether they be or no, because they want that approbation which is given to the old. But whatsoever are unjust, doe not oblige to payment; and the Merchant may use all just waies of escape, and conceal∣ment. He may not lie, nor forswear, nor deny them to be there when they are there, and he is ask'd; but he may hide them, or go into secret waies: and if he be discover'd, he must suffer as they please, but his conscience is free.

He that paies not tribute upon pretence that it is unjust,* 1.580 that is, it is im∣pos'd by an incompetent authority, or in an undue manner, or unjust mea∣sure, must be sure that it is unjust, and not onely think so. For if he be deceiv'd, he does not erre with a good Conscience, unless he use all the di∣ligence and ingenuous inquiries that he can. His ignorance must not, and cannot innocently prejudice the Princes rights. If therefore he inquire well and wisely, unless the injustice be very clear and certain, he will at most but doubt concerning it; and if he does, the surer way is to pay it: but if he does not doubt, but is fully persuaded of the injustice, if he thinks true, he is innocent; but if he thinks amiss, he is not onely guilty of a culpable ignorance, but of a criminall injustice.

If the Subject does doubt,* 1.581 the presumption is for the advantage of the Prince, because he is the better person, and publick, and he is rather to be secur'd then the private and the inferiour. And therefore I wonder at those Lawyers and Divines that say otherwise, upon pretence that in dubiis me∣lior est conditio possidentis, The possessor is to be preferr'd in doubtfull cases. For supposing this, yet the Prince is in the possession of law, and the Sub∣ject in possession of fact: the Prince is in possession of an actual right and law of demanding it, and therefore his condition is to be preferr'd. For in the practice of paying tribute, it is not sufficient cause of omitting to pay it, that the Subject doubts whether it be, or is not sure that it is just. For unless he be sure it is unjust it is sure that he is bound to pay. And therefore in this case, let no Merchant trust his own judgment, but the sentence of a wise spiritual Guide, or of Councel learned in the laws.

One thing onely I advertise in order to practice:* 1.582 let no man think that because some subjects farm the Customs, and that the portion which is conceal'd does not lessen the incomes of the Prince, therefore it may be lawfull to hide from them all which they can hide. For the Farmer hath what he gets in the right of the Prince, and in his own right he hath no∣thing from the Subject, but from his Supreme; who therefore is bound to

defend that right, and to complain of that wrong: and the husbandmen in the Gospel who denied to pay to the Stewards of the King the fruits of the vineyard which in their Kings right were demanded of them, were thrown into outer darkness.

But then,* 1.583 as S. John Baptist gave counsel, the Tribute-men and Farmers must exact no more then is appointed them; nor yet in cruell and vexatious manners, nor with the exactest and utmost measures, but with such mode∣ration as may be far from rapine. Tributorum & Fisci nunquam mala causa nisi sub bono principe, was an old saying, Whatsoever was demanded by the Tribute-Gatherers, it was all justice, whether it were right or wrong, un∣less the Prince were gentle and good. But the Vulture-like greediness and unconscionable, unchristian and avaritious proceedings which are too fre∣quent amongst such men, have made the name of Exactors and* 1.584 Publicans so infinitely, so intolerably hatefull.

Curandum in primis, ne magna injuria fiat.* 1.585 Fortibus & miseris tollas licet omne quod usquam est Auri atque argenti, scutum gladiúmque relinques Et jacula & galeam, spoliatis arma supersunt.

It is not good to provoke the valiant by making them poor and miserable; for they that have not a cloak may have a sword: and by how much you make them the less considerable in peace, they are the more dangerous in war. And therefore covetous Princes are to themselves the greatest ene∣mies, excepting onely their more covetous Exactors.

CHAP. III. Of Kings, Princes, and all Supreme civil powers; and their Laws in special.

RULE I. The Supreme power in every Republick is univer∣sal, absolute, and unlimited.

THAT in every Common-wealth there is a Supreme power is without all question:* 1.586 There is no government without superiority; and where there is a Superior, there is a Su∣preme; for he is so that hath none above him. It matters not whether this Supreme power be subjected in one or many, whether it be parted or united: the consideration of these is material as to the goodness or badness of a Government, but no∣thing to the power and absoluteness of it, nothing to the present Rule. And therefore it is but a weak and useless distinction when we speak of Kings and Princes, (by them meaning the Supreme Power) to say that some are absolute, some are limited in their power. For it is true that some Princes are so; but then they are not the Supreme power. It is a contra∣diction to say that the Supreme power is limited, or restrain'd; for that which restrains it is Superior to it, and therefore the other is not Supreme. And therefore Albericus Gentilis said well, That he doubted concerning the Kings of France and Spaine, whether they were Supreme Princes, be∣cause in the affairs of Religion they are subject to the Pope. He that hath the Supreme power is onely under God; and to inquire concerning a King, whether he be tied to laws or conditions, is not properly an inquiry after his power, but after the exercise and dispensation of it. For though he may not alwaies use it, yet the Supreme power alwaies is absolute and un∣limited, and can doe what he please. The difference of a Tyrant and a King or a gentle Prince being onely this, that a Tyrant uses his absolute power unreasonably and unjustly and ordinarily; but a King uses it not but in cases extraordinary, for just and good ends: and if the Prince does not, some else must, who in that case is the Supreme. Sometimes the Con∣suls, sometimes the Dictators, sometimes the Senate did doe extraordina∣ry acts of power; but still they who did it had the Supreme power: and that is necessary, and inseparable from Government, that, I mean, which is Supreme: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Greeks call it; Majestatem, the Latins: and be it in whom, or in how many it happens, that power can doe every thing of Government, and disposes of all things in or∣der to it, and is accountable to no man. For suppose a King that hath power of the Militia, and his Senate of making laws, and his people by their Committees of raising money; this power of making war, and laws,

and levies is the Supreme power, and is that which can doe all things: and although one be accountable for moneys, & the other subject to laws, and two of them under the power of the sword, yet this is but the Majesty or Supremacy parted, and whether well or ill, I dispute not, yet when it is parted and when it is united, it is supreme, and it is all. That Government which Aristotle calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, seems (saies he) to be a Kingdome but yet subject to laws, but is not the Mistress of all; and this is true in many European Govern∣ments: but there is another government where the Governour is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Lord of all, and but one person; that's the perfect Monarchy: which although it be incomparably the best, and like to that by which God governs the world, the first in the whole kind of Government, and therefore the measure of the rest, yet that is no greater power then is in every kind of Government; for be it where it will, somewhere or other in all Government there must be a Supreme power, and that power is absolute and unlimited. Now this being thus stated, the Rule is clear, and the Jews exprest it by an odde device of theirs: for when their King died they tied his thumb so in the palm of his hand, that the wrinkles of the fist should, in a manner that might be fancied, represent 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifies Almighty; to denote that he was God's Vicegerent, and under him had the whole power of Government. He had had in his hand a power like to the power of God, but the other hand was open and had let it go.

Now that this is true is apparent by all the same reasons by which the necessity of Government is proved.* 1.587 It is necessary that it should be so; for there are some states of things for which nothing can provide but this absoluta potestas, Supreme and unlimited power; as at Rome when the Gauls had almost possessed themselves of all, and in many cases of their appointing Dictators, and in sudden invasions, and in the inundation of tumults, and in all cases where laws are disabled to speak or act. Ne res pub∣lica aliquid detrimenti patiatur, That the publick should by all means be preserved, in the greatest necessity they can have, and that is the great end of power; and either the Common-wealth is like a helpless Orphan ex∣posed to chance and violence, and left without guards, or else she hath so much power as to use all means for her safety. If she have not a right to doe all that she naturally can, and is naturally necessary, she is deficient in the great end of Government; and therefore it must be certain she hath absolute power: now whereever this is subjected, there it is habitually, there it is alwaies. I do not say it is alwaies there where it is sometimes actually administred; but there it is habitually from whence it is concredi∣ted actually, and put into delegation and ministery: and this is the power that can doe all things of government; and because it is supreme, and it is so alwaies, it cannot be at any time less in judgment, because it is greater in power; that is, it is accountable to no man whatsoever it does.

Qui Rex est, Regem, Maxime, non habeat.

This Supreme power is commonly expressed by Potestas Regia,* 1.588 or Kingly Power, or power Imperial; though when the Emperour was Lord of the world, to be a King in most places went much less: but because most Kings have been and are Supreme in their own Dominions, (and they alwaies are so, and are so acknowledged, to whom their subjects are

bound by the oaths of allegeance, and supremacy) by this word we com∣monly mean the Supremacy or the Majesty. So Suetonius speaking of Caligula, saies he was very near speciem Principatus in Regnum convertere, to change the Government into a Kingdome, that is, to make it absolute and supreme: and this distinction Piso us'd concerning Germanicus, Principis Romanorum, non Parthorum Regis esse filium, meaning that the Parthian Kings were absolute, but the Roman Princes ruled with the Senate: and Caesar tells that Vercingetorix was put to death because he being but the Prince of the Gaules affected the Kingdome. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.589 So Dion described the power of a King, for that which they understood to be the Supreme power.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

So the people in Aeschylus spake to their King,* 1.590 Thou art our City, our Com∣monwealth, above all Judicatories, thy Throne is sacred and immur'd as an Altar, and by thy suffrage, by thy own Will thou governest all things. This is the Jus Regium, this the Supreme power can doe, it can be no less then this in its own nature and appointment. So the power is described by The∣ophilus,* 1.591 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He hath given to the King all power over the people. So it is described by Livy, Reges non liberi so∣lum impedimentis omnibus, sed Domini rerum temporúmque, trahunt consiliis cuncta, non sequuntur, Kings are not only free from all lets and incum∣brances, but are Lords of times and things, they by their counsels draw all things after them, but follow not. The Greeks call this Supremacy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a power to rule without danger of being call'd to account by men; S. Ambrose calls it, Non ullis ad poenam vocari legibus, tutos im∣perii potestate, a power that is safe in its own circles, and can by no laws be call'd to punishment: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that's Galens word, It is the chief or prime principality.

—Toto liber in orbe Solus Caesar erit—

The King alone is free; all others are under Compulsories and Judges. But S. Peters phrase is better then all of them, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The King is the most eminent, the Defender of all, and above all; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Suidas. The King or the Supreme hath the power of defence, the power of the Sword, and that commands all the rest: for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it signifies to be more then Conqueror. So the Grammarians.

But in order to Conscience, Kings and Princes,* 1.592 I mean all Supreme powers, must distinguish potestatem Imperii ab officio Imperantis; that is to be considered by Subjects, and this by Princes. Supreme Princes alwaies have an absolute power, but they may not alwaies use it. He that hath a Sword by him is not alwaies tied to use it, and he must cut his meat with a Knife. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle; It is a Kingdome when it is by rule and measure, but if it be unlimited it is a Tyranny: that is, when affaires are capable of a law and order, the Supreme power must so conduct them, He must goe in that path where they stand; but if they grow wild and

irregular, he must goe out of his way to fetch them in again.

But then it is also to be considered that the absolute power of the Prince is but an absolute power of government,* 1.593 not of possession; it is a power of doing right, but not a power of doing wrong: and at the worst is but a power of doing private violences for the security of the publick. This power is excellently express'd in the Tables of the Royal law writ∣ten to Vespasian; Uti quaecunque ex usu reipublicae Majestate Divinarum, Humanarum, publicarum, privatarúmque rerum esse censebit, ei agere, fa∣cere, jus potestásque sit, uti Augusto fuit. Augustus Caesar was the most absolute Prince that ever rul'd the Roman people; to him was granted, saith Alciat,* 1.594 to be free from laws, and all the necessity of laws, to be obnoxi∣ous to no law written, and to have all the power of Kings: and yet all that power was but to doe every thing which he should esteem to be usefull to the publick, and according to the Majesty of religion and all humane rights publick and private. And therefore he is Princeps Regni, but not Domi∣nus, a Prince, not a Lord; and the distinction is very material. For to be Lord, signifies more then the Supreme power of Government. Qui pri∣mi fuerunt Romae Principes, etsi poterant videri reverâ Domini, vitabant tamen valdè Domini Nomen, veluti contumeliam ac maledictum: non vita∣turi si esset Nomen solius honoris,* 1.595 aut moderatae potestatis, saith Suetonius. The first Princes of Rome esteemed it a disgrace to be called Lords, because it was not a name of meer honour, or of a moderate power; for if it had, they would not have declined it: but it means an absolute power to dispose of all lives and all possessions; which is beyond the power of the King or Prince. He that is a King rules over a free people, but a Lord rules over slaves. Tacitus, according to the popular humor of the Romans, supposed the power of a King to be too great a violation of liberty; but Domination or Lording it was intolerable.* 1.596 Principatus & libertas res sunt dissociabiles; magis tamen sunt dissociabiles libertas & dominatio; for to be the absolute Lord cannot consist either with freedome or propriety: and therefore Ovid prefers Augustus before Romulus in this very instance, for speaking to Romulus of Augustus, he saies,

Tu Domini nomen, Principis ille tenet.

Augustus is a Prince, a gentle Governour; Romulus was a Lord, that is, something that no man loves, but every man serves and fears. This power is well expressed by S. Peters word of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a power not ministring to good, nor conducted by moderation.

Maximum hoc regni bonum rati, Quod facta Domini cogitur populus sui Tam ferre quam laudare—

When the people must suffer the will of their Imperious Lord and must commend it, that is, be a slave in their persons and their labours, their pos∣sessions and their understandings: that is more then a Prince or a gentle Lord will doe; for then the word is good, when the Man is gentle, and the Power is moderate. But that which I intend to say is this, that the Su∣preme power of Government is at no hand a Supreme power, or an Ar∣bitrary disposer of life and fortunes; but according to law, or according to extreme necessity which is the greatest law of all. In the sense of Honour and of Moderate power the King is a Lord, but not in this sense of law. Qui pleno jure Dominus est, alienandi, dissipandi, disperdendi jus habet, saith the law, l. 7. C. de relig. l. sed etsi, lege 25. §. consuluit, ff. de haered. petit.

By a Lord is meant he that hath power to dispose of the goods of the Vassals: and this a King or Prince hath not. This is not the Supreme power of Government. A King is not the Lord of his Kingdome, of the territories of his Subjects, quia dominium in solidum non possit esse duo∣rum, saith Cujacius, There cannot be two absolute Lords of the same land; The right owner is the Lord, not the right King. Aliter reipublicae sunt agri, aliter privatorum. Num quid dubium est, quin servus cum pecu∣lio Domini sit? dat tamen Domino suo munus. Non enim ideo nihil habet servus, quia nihil est habiturus, si Dominus illum habere noluerit, said one; The servant is within his Lords peculiar, but yet he can make a present to his Lord. If his Lord please, the servant shall have nothing; but yet it follows not, that therefore he is possess'd of nothing. Now if this be true in Slaves, much more infinitely more is it in free Subjects; for otherwise are my lands my own,* 1.597 otherwise they are the Princes. Jure civili omnia Re∣gis sunt, (saith Seneca;) & tamen illa quorum ad Regem pertinet universa pos∣sessio, in singulos Dominos descripta sunt, By the law all things are the King's; but even those things are divided into peculiars, and have private Lords. It is all the Princes lands, and he receives the tribute, and he re∣ceives the service and the duty of them all; but the Lords receive the rents. The Athenians and the Thebans fight concerning the bounds of their terri∣tory; & at the same time Polyaenus & Thysias are at law about dividing their shepherds walks in the same place.* 1.598 Sub optimo Rege, omnia Rex Imperio possidet, singuli dominio, The King governs all, but the Subjects possess all their own: for so Livy might buy his own Books of Dorus; they were Dorus his Books, and Livy's too: and when a Lord receives his rent, the Tenant may call the lands his own. Some things are mine by possession, some by use; some by title, some by incumbency; one is the Author, and another is the Buyer; one is an Artificer, and another the Merchant of the same thing; and the King hath the power, but his Subjects have the propriety.* 1.599 Caesar omnia habet; fiscus ejus privata tantum ac sua: & universa in Imperio ejus sunt, in patrimonio propria. That's the sum of this inquiry. The King hath all, and yet he hath something of his own in his peculiar, and so have the Subjects.

The effect of this consideration is this;* 1.600 That the Supreme power must defend every mans right, but must usurp no mans. He may use every mans peculiar for the publick necessity, and in just and necessary Govern∣ment, but no otherwise; and what is out of any peculiar expended for the publick defence, must out of the general right be repaied for the pri∣vate amends.* 1.601 Verum etsi nostra tempore necessitatis patriae conferre debea∣mus, tamen jure naturae congruit ut communis salus, communis utilitas, com∣mune periculum, non unius duntaxat aut alterius, sed communibus impensis, jacturis, periculísque comparetur, said Cicero. A King is to govern all things; but to possess nothing but what is his own. Only concerning the necessity, if the question be, who shall be Judge; it is certain that it ought to be so notorious that every man might judge; but he who is to provide against it, is certainly the only competent person, and hath the authority. For he that is to stand against the sudden need, ought to espy it. But if ever there be a dispute who shall judge of the Necessity, it is certain, the Necessity is not extreme; and if it be not, yet it ought to be pro∣vided against when it is intolerable. Ahab had no right to take Naboths Vineyard; but if the Syrian army had invaded Israel, Ahab might have

put a Garrison in it, or destroyed the Vines, to have sav'd or serv'd his Army.

And to this sense Lyra expounds the Jus Regium,* 1.602 the right of the King,* 1.603 describ'd by Samuel to the People of Israel: for (saith he) there is a double right; the one in the dayes of necessity, and then all things are in his power so far as can truly serve that publick necessity: but when that necessity is over, that right is useless, and is intolerable. And by this means the different opinions of the Jewish Doctors may be reconcil'd. Rabbi Jose sayes, that whatsoever is here set down, it was lawfull for the King to doe. R. Juda sayes, that this description was onely to affright the People from persisting in their desire of a King. Both might say true; for that it was not lawfull in ordinary Government to take the peculiar of the Subject, appears clearly in the case of Naboth. But that in extraordi∣nary it is just, needs no other argument but because it is necessary: and it appears also in the case of David and Nabal, upon whom David would have done violence, because he sent him not Provisions for his Army out of his own peculiar. But it is considerable, that this Royal power describ'd by Samuel is no more then what is necessary to be habitually inherent in all Supreme powers; this is potestas imperantis; he may licitè facere in tem∣pore necessitatis, legitimè semper, In time of need he may use it lawfully, but alwayes legitimately, that is, if he does, he onely abuses his power, but it is his own power which he abuses:* 1.604 for when Moses describ'd the usage and manner of a King, he did it by the measures of peace and piety, and the laws of natural justice and equity, with the superfetation of some positive constitutions which God commanded for that King, as part of the Judicial Law. But when Samuel describ'd the manner of their King, he describ'd the whole power in ordinary and extraordinary; the power, I say, but not the office▪ Moses describ'd the office, but not the power.

I adde to this another consideration;* 1.605 That whether all that the He∣brew King did or might doe was warranted by God or no, it matters not to us. For if it be no more then the necessary requisites of Supreme power to be us'd in time onely of necessity, we need not fear that this pre∣cedent can injure the rights of any People: but if there were in it some∣thing more then was good, it was certainly a peculiar of that People, who desir'd a King to rule over them as the neighbour Nations had; right or wrong they stood not upon that; and therefore Samuel describ'd to them what that was which they requir'd. It was no warranty to the King to doe so, but to the People to suffer it: but if it was ill, it was their own desire; for so the neighbour Kings did govern, using too much of their power, and too little of their duty and office. And therefore God was angry with his People, not that they desir'd a King; for God gave them three things in charge, say the Rabbins, which they should doe when they came into the Land of Promise, That they should blot out the name of Amalek, that they should chuse a King, that they should build a Temple. Therefore the chusing of a King was not it that offended God, but that they should desire that a King should reign over them in the manner as the Gentiles had: For they thought (saith Josephus) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that all would be well if they had the same form of Government as the Nations had. Now their neighbour Nations were go∣vern'd

the most tyrannically, and the People serv'd the most sl••vishly in the whole World.

—dociles servire Sabaeos,

The Sabeans (sayes Claudian) were apt to serve: dociles ••erilem ferre ma∣num Syros & Parthos, & omnes qui aut ad Orientem aut ad Meridiem sunt barbaros,* 1.606 said Julian, All the Syrians and Parthians, and all the Nations of the East and South, were us'd to slavery; cont••ntos sub Regibus vivere Dominos imitantibus, their Kings were absolute Lords of possessions as well as of tribute and government; and the People were ple••s'd to have it so: and the Israelites would follow their example. Ecce in hoc errarnat (sayes a Jewish Doctor) quod Israelitarum conditio non est. 〈…〉〈…〉 Rex aliquis pro sua voluntate, ut Imperatores Gentilium, qui sanctum populis suis leges, quascunque animis concipiunt. Their errour was in 〈…〉〈…〉 a King as the Gentiles had; for their condition would not 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it that their King should make laws according to his own will and humour, as did their neighbour Kings, who were proud and barbarous, and counted easi∣ness of access a lessening of Majestie, and would be bound by no measures but their own will: and therefore said God to Samuel, They have not re∣jected thee, but me; that is, they would have a King, not such as I have commanded in my law, but such as they see among their Neighbours, who make laws themselves without me. And therefore although God comman∣ded Samuel to hearken to them, and make them a King; yet by terrours, like those on Mount Sinai, he first made them confess their fault, and therefore to submit to a King of God's chusing, who should reign by God's law.

So that it is to no purpose that this place hath been so tortur'd by In∣terpreters,* 1.607 and pull'd in pieces by disputation; while they contend on one side, that this was a description of the King's power, on the other, that it was a prediction of matter of fact: for it was neither one nor the other alone, but a description of the manner of the Heathen Kings; and a repre∣sentment of what it was which they ask'd, and what was like to be the ef∣fect of that power which they desir'd God would set over them: but the question of the extent and liberties of the Supreme power is no way con∣cerned in it. For it matters not what the Eastern and Southern Kings did; for they did that in ordinary, which is not to be done but in cases extra∣ordinary; they did that for pleasure, which was not to be done but for ne∣cessity. But as to the thing it self; Nothing can be more certain, but that 1. In all Republicks, somewhere or other, there is a Supreme power. 2. That this power can doe all things of Government; so that nothing is so great, but if it be necessary, it is just, and can be done: for if there were any time, and any case in which evil may happen, and no provisions may be made for it, in that case, and at that time it is an Anarchy, there is no Government at all. 3. That this Supreme power, being a power of Go∣vernment, must also be a Conservator and great Minister of Justice; and therefore must suppose every man's right to be distinct, and separate, and firm: and by consequence, that he hath nothing to doe with mens pro∣priety, but to defend them in peace, and use them in war so as is necessary, that is, so as is unavoidable; according to that saying of Maimonides, Po∣testatem habet Rex ordinandi mundum juxta id quod praesens hora postulat. There are some sudden accidents against which there are no regular pro∣visions in laws; but to provide for them at the instant by extraregular

means, is within the power of the supreme. But in all this whole question the saying of Baldus is the best measure of the consciences of Princes: Clausula de plenitudine potestatis semper intelligitur de potestate bona & lau∣dabili,* 1.608 The plenitude of power of all things in the world ought the least to be fear'd, because it never is to be us'd but for the greatest good.

Upon the occasion of this discourse the Lawyers sometimes dispute,

Whether it be lawful,* 1.609 and in the power of the Supreme Prince or Ma∣gistrate, to aliene or lessen his princely rights, or to give away any parts of his Kingdome.

But to this the answer is easy.* 1.610 For 1. whatsoever is their right by just conquest, or is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in their private possession, they may aliene as any private person may his lands. Thus Solomon gave the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 twenty cities (which his Father in law the King of Egypt had conquer'd and given him with his wife in dowry, and which himself had won) to Hiram▪ Alexander gave all his Kingdomes to his Princes that serv'd him in his warrs. Attalus gave Asia to the people of Rome; Nicomedes gave Bithynia: the Father of Mithridates had Paphlagonia by gift: & in England it was said that Edward the Confessor gave England by Will to the bastard of Normandie: and divers of our Kings did in their Wills at least recommend a successor; Edward the sixth did, but it came to nothing. But when the Donor or the Donee respectively can make it good, then it holds in law, and not otherwise; for questions of this nature us'd to be determin'd by the sword, and not by discourses.

2. But yet this is certain,* 1.611 that where the Princes are trustees of the people, and elective, or where the right of succession is in a family by law or immemorial time, no Prince can prejudice his Heir, or the people that trusted him. Nothing is here to be done without consent, not onely be∣cause the alienation cannot be verified against consent [in which case Charles the sixth of France desir'd his will might be confirm'd by the No∣bles; and the King of Macedonia went up and down to all the cities to recom∣mend to them Antigonus whom he desir'd to make a king:] but because in these cases, though Kings have the supreme power, yet they have it not pleno jure, by a fulness of dominion. It may be as Aristotle calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a full, supreme, absolute and intire principality; yet by not being in full and intire private possession it is by all rights to be administred, but without wrong cannot be alien'd. Hottoman will by no means admit that in any case a Kingdome can be alien'd:* 1.612 because it is the case of persons as well as of things; and they cannot be dispos'd of like slaves or beasts. But he consider'd not that sub∣jection to Princes can best stand with personal liberty; and this cannot well be secur'd without that: for where there is no civil government, every man that is stronger can make me a slave; but by the power of a Prince I am defended in my liberty: and Hottomans objection must needs be invalid, unless there be no liberty but where there is no go∣vernment.

RULE II. The Supreme power is superior to the Civil laws, but not wholly free from them.

THis Rule hath been thrust into great difficulty by the interests and mistakes of Princes and Subjects respectively.* 1.613 For it hath been disputed whether Princes be free or no from the laws of their kingdome; and things of this nature when they once are question'd, are held more pertinaciously, and desir'd more greedily, and possess'd suspiciously, and conducted with jealousy, and look'd upon with envy or indignation. For the Prince, if it be but disputable, will yet conclude for his own interest; and it is argument enough for him that it is so, because it is not certain that it is not so. And the subjects will upon the same account suppose the Prince bound to his laws, because they know nothing to the contrary; and therefore they presume for the authority of the laws, as the Prince does for the immunity of his person. But then because it is question'd, the Prince, lest he loose it quite, will hold the faster; and the people will snatch at it more impotently, lest they be slaves for ever. And therefore disputations in this case are not prudent or safe; but precepts, and sermons, and great examples, and the sayings of wise men, and positive affirmations in those particulars that be manifest.

Princeps legibus solutus est,* 1.614 said Justinian, The Prince is not tied to laws:* 1.615 for it seems impossible that he that hath power over the law, he that gave it being, and can give it a grave, should be less then that which hath no greatness but what it borrows from him. Indeed if the Prince had devested himself of his power when he made the law, he had been sub∣ject to it; but then he could have no power to abrogate it: which because it is inseparable from the legislative power, it follows that the life of the law is in continual dependance from, and therefore in minority and under him; and therefore the lawyers have a proverbial verse,

Non est Rex legi, sed lex obnoxia Regi.

For a law without a compulsory power is nothing but good counsel at the best; and the supreme power cannot be compell'd: for he will not compel himself, he cannot; he may be willing, but he can never force himself; and to the supreme no man is superior, and therefore none else can compel him: therefore the Divines use to say, and so doe the Lawyers too, that Kings are subject to the directive power of the laws. The distinction I acknowledge, but believe it here to be to no purpose: for laws have no such power, and a directive power is no power; for if it can onely direct, it is not a law, for a law obliges, and does not onely direct: and as for the meer matter of counsel, the Prince need not be at the charge of a law for that, his Counsellors, his Bishops, his Lawyers, his friends can doe that without a law. The same thing is usually said concerning just men. Justis lex non est posita, saith the Apostle, The law is not made for the righteous, but for the wicked: that is, the compulsory of laws is not at all designed for them that obey without compulsion. Not but that the just are under the power of laws, and the laws were made to command them the parti∣culars and the instances of obedience; and if they prevaricate, they shall

feel it. But they are so willing to obey, and so love government and the vertues commanded by the laws, that the laws are of no use to good and just men, but to direct them to what is requir'd of them; and so they are under that which is improperly call'd the Directive power of laws; but Princes are not so. The Supreme power may if he will obey; so may the just man: but this man must obey or he shall be punished, but not so the Prince. The laws of themselves may direct the Prince; but it is because he will have it so: but they direct the just, because they have authority to command, and to punish, onely that the just will not let it come so far. It is but a shadow of liberty to say I am not under the compulsion, but the di∣rection of laws: for such persons if they will not be directed shall be com∣pell'd, and it is better to be willing then unwilling; for call it what you will, you are commanded to doe it, and you must obey. Now this being the case of the just subject, and not the case of the Supreme power, whether just or unjust, it is clear that the Prince or supreme power is not subject to any power of the laws; the law is no Commandement to the Prince, and whatsoever is nothing but counsel, is no law.

And yet on the other side we find good Princes saying otherwise;* 1.616 and they who are apt enough to advance their own power, yet confessing their power to be less then the law, that is, that themselves are bound to keep it: so said the Emperour, C. de legib. & constit. l. 4. Digna vox est Majestatis regnantis, legibus alligatum se Principem profiteri, It is a voice worthy of the Majesty of a Prince, to profess himself tied to his laws. Patere legem quam tu ipse tuleris, said the wise man; Suffer the law which thou thy self hast made: the same with that of Pittacus,

Pareto legi quisquis legem sanxeris.

And the equity of this, besides that it is apparent, is also given in the law, l. 1. ff. de pactis. Nihil tam humanae fidei consentaneum est, quam ea quae pla∣cuerunt servari. If they have pleas'd the Prince in the sanction, let them also please him in the observation, for that's agreeable to the faith and in∣genuity of worthy persons.

These things are but seemingly oppos'd,* 1.617 for both parts are true, and are to be reconcil'd by the following measures.

1. The Supreme power is not under the fear of the laws,* 1.618 but is to love the vertue and order that is there commanded. For there is a neces∣sity introduc'd by publick honesty as well as by fear. And therefore the Greek Lawyers in their Commentaries upon that of the Institutions, that the Prince is free from laws, expound it to be meant of penal law; that is, they cannot be punish'd for prevaricating, or for not keeping them: and Decianus said the same thing, Non quia iniqua liceant, sed quod non timore poena, sed amore justitiae: It is no more lawful for Princes to doe un∣just things, then for their subjects; but they are invited to doe worthy things, not because they are to fear the punishment of laws, but because they must love justice; and there is that necessity for them to doe so, that there is of being great and honour'd. The laws of honesty, of fame and reputa∣tion, which amongst all good men are the guards of vertue, must endear it also to Kings: so Claudian to Theodosius,

Tu licet extremoslatè dominere per Indos, Te Medus, te mollis Arabs, te Ceres adorent;

Si metuis, si prava cupis, si duceris irâ, Servitii patiêre jugum, tolerabis iniquas Interius leges: tunc omnia jure tenebis Cum poteris Rex esse tui: proclivior usus In pejora datur, suadetque licentia luxum, Illecebrisque effraena favet: tunc vivere castè Asperius, cum prompta Venus; tunc durius irae Consulimus, cum poena patet: sed comprime mentem, Nec tibi quod liceat, sed quod fecisse decebit, Occurrat, mentemque domet respectus honesti.

A King is not to consider the greatness of his power, but of his duty; and not reckon upon his impunity, but his reputation* 1.619; and because he does not fear the publick rods and axes, let him respect publick honesty: so Ac∣cursius affirms, Principem, etsi legibus solutus sit, honestatis tamen necessitate omnino teneri oportere: and this is the sentence of Decius and most Law∣yers. But Honestas non videtur inferre necessitatem, say the Lawyers. This does not make it simply necessary; but it perswades vehemently, and upon Princes whose honour is both conscience and interest too, it differs but little from it. For it makes that they ought to doe what is fit. But in Kings it is true what Muscornus Cyprius saies,* 1.620 Verbum illud [debet] non coac∣tionem, sed rationalem quandam persuasionem denotare videtur. It is their duty, and they ought to doe it; and that signifies every thing but com∣pulsion. However a Prince is onely free from one compulsory which is upon his subjects: but is under many which touch not them. God en∣joyns him a greater duty,* 1.621 and exacts it with greater severity, and will punish their delinquencies more sharply: potentes potenter, saith the Wisdome of Solomon, mighty men shall be mightily tormented; and Tophet is prepared for the King. * Kings have a greater need in their affairs then the small fortunes of their subjects; and therefore have need of a greater piety to secure so great a providence. They have more to loose, and therefore need a bigger caution to secure it; they have more at stake to endear obedience: and since a King is but one person, and is strong onely by the obedience of his subjects, and that obedience is secur'd onely by love, and that love can no way be obtain••d but by beneficence and justice; if he breaks these secu∣rities, he may have cause to consider that of Tacitus, Princeps unus est civium & senatus consensui impar, that one man against a multitude is nothing; and that the Senate and the people are stronger, and need not fear him alone, but he alone may have cause to fear all them together* 1.622; and that the sins of a Prince are often punished by the sins of the people. He can consider that he is to govern a multitude whom nothing can unite but an Almighty power; that they are as contingent in their love and hatred, as chance it self; that no fortune in a King is moderate; that when it declines it oftentimes runs to extremity; that he seldome hears truth, never meets with a bold and a wise reprover; that he hath many flatterers, and but few friends; that he hath great powers of doing evil, and tempta∣tions and opportunities alwaies ready; that his very being superiour to laws leaves his Spirit infinitely unguarded and spoil'd of one of the greatest securities of vertue; that impunity is a state of danger; that when vertue is left onely under a Counsel and cold recommendation, and is not made necessary by laws, he had need have a great and a mighty vertue to make it necessary by love and choice; and that such perfect vertues are but rarely obtain'd, and after a long practice; that fear is the beginning of wisdome;

and therefore Princes are very much to seek in this particular, because they have nothing to begin with; and to chuse vertue for love is not usual with beginners, but is the consummation of the most perfect: so that we may well pray, God help poor Kings, who if they doe vertuously must needs be infinitely dear to God, because it is so extremely difficult to be so, and nothing can make them so but two conjugations of miracles; the excel∣lencies of the Spirit of God, and the Spirit of a King. So that it is no pri∣viledge to Kings that they are above the power of their laws; it is their objection, and the evil of their state. Only it is necessary to others that these should dwell in danger: and as for their obedience to laws, it is not bound upon them by the same cord that ties the Subject, but by ano∣ther; it is not necessary for the same reasons, but it is by a greater ne∣cessity.

2. But then these supreme Compulsories being wholly conducted by the hand and providence of God,* 1.623 doe plainly tell us that the supreme Power is obliged to all the laws of God, to the laws of Nature and Christianity. A King hath no power to govern but according to Gods laws. For if he does, though he have no Compulsorie below, yet above there are enough, and to Gods laws the greatest Power on Earth is intirely subordinate. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The law is the supreme King of all, said Pindar. The same is also said by Chrysippus, by Aristotle,* 1.624 and divers others: and Plato affirms that destruction is immi∣nent upon that City where the Magistrate governs the law, and not the law the Magistrate: and again, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Prince that rules not by laws is nothing but a grievance to his Subjects. But that these great Persons mean the laws of God and Nature is explicitly plain in Plutarch,* 1.625 who having affirmed that the law must rule the Prince, adds by way of explanation, that it be that Jaw, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not which is written in books or tables, but the law of reason that alwaies dwells within; that law that alwaies is his guard, and never suffers the soul to be without a guide, that is the law that is superior to Princes. Some little instances of particulars of this law were decreed by Servius Tullus King of the Romans; of which Tacitus saies, praecipuus Servius Tullus sanctor le∣gum suit, queis etiam Reges obtemperarent; he made laws of that Nature that even Kings themselves should obey them. For as

Regum timendorum in proprios greges,

So it is as true,

Reges in ipsos imperium est Jovis;

As the people are Subjects of the Prince, so is the Prince of God; they must obey their King, and their King must obey God: Concerning whose Law it was said to Domitian by Apollonius Tyanaeus,* 1.626 Haec mihi dicta sint de legibus, quas si tibi imperare non putaveris, ipse non imperabiis, If thou doest not think these laws ought to rule over thee, thou shalt not rule at all.

Upon this account a Prince may not command his Subjects to fight in an unjust cause,* 1.627 according to that saying of S. Hierom,* 1.628 Cum Dominus carnis à Domino Spiritús adversum imperat, non est obediendum; We must not obey the Rulers of this world, the Lords of our flesh, when they com∣mand any thing contrary to the laws of the God and Lord of all Spirits.

The commands of Princes must be, as Tertullian saies, intra limites discipli∣nae, within the bounds of our religion; and therefore the Athenians laugh'd at Stratocles for desiring them to make a law that whatsoever pleas'd King Demetrius should be the measure of piety to the Gods, and of justice a∣mongst Men. Gods law is the measure of the Princes power; not his will the measure of that: and therefore the Jews that were Souldiers under Alexander could by no tortures be compell'd to assist in the building of the temple of Belus in Babylon; and the Thebaean legion under Julian the A∣postate refused not to fight for their Prince against the Barbarians, and they refused not to die, but they refused to be executioners of the Martyrs that died in the cause of Christianity.

But this is to be practised that the Princes just laws be not neglected upon the arrest of every fancy or foolish opinion.* 1.629 If it be certain that it is against the law of God, then we are safe in our disobedience. Idcirco Romanas leges contemnimus,* 1.630 ut jussa Divina servemus, said Sylvanus the Martyr, Because we are sure these Roman laws are against the Comman∣dements of God, we easily despise them. But if we be not sure, but are in doubt whether the laws be just or no, we are to presume for the laws, and against our own fears. For nothing is at all of advantage due to the laws, if we preferre before them any opinion of our own which we confess uncer∣tain; and although we are not to doe any thing of which we doubt, yet in a doubt we are to obey laws, because there is a doubt on both sides: and as we fear the thing is unjust, so we have reason to fear the evil of disobedi∣ence, for we are sure that is evil; and therefore we are to change the specu∣lative doubt into an active judgment, and a practical resolution, and of two doubts take the surer part, and that is to obey; because in such cases the evil, if there be any, is to be imputed to him that commands, not to him that obeys, who is not the Judge of his Prince, but his Servant. Servus herilis imperii non Censor est, sed Minister, said Seneca. They that are un∣der authority are to obey, not to dispute. But of this I have given an ac∣count already in the first Book, Chap. 5. Rule 6.

3. But then concerning the civil laws of his Country we are to distin∣guish;* 1.631 for some concern the People only, and some concern the Prince only, and some are common to both. Those that concern the People are such as require tribute, and labours, and manners of trade, their habits and dwelling. In these and all such the people are obliged and not the Prince: for the duties are either relative and concern their part only of the relation; or else by the nature of the things themselves doe point out their duty, & in these things there is no question. For not the King but the people are to pay tribute, & the Kings lands are free, if they be in his own possession.

4. But there are some laws which concern the Prince alone,* 1.632 as all acts of grace, and ease to the people; all that he hath been pleased to promise, the forms and laws of Government, and to whatsoever himself hath con∣sented, by all those laws he is bound; because in such cases as these it is true what Pliny said to Trajan in his Panegyric, In nostris, simili religione, ipse te legibus subjecisti, Caesar, quas nemo Principi scripsit; sed tu nihil amplius vis tibi licere quam nobis. The Prince had not a law imposed upon him, but he became a law unto himself; and when he hath bound himself there is the same necessity upon him as upon his Subjects.

5. Other laws yet doe concern both Prince and people;* 1.633 such as are all contracts and bargains. Licet serviant aedes meae, ei tamen cum quo agitur non serviunt, quantum enim ad eum pertinet, liberas aedes habeo. l. 4. S•• serv. vind. Although my house is bound to serve the publick necessity, yet in respect of him that contracts with me, my house is free. So also it is in the acquisition of new rights, the repetition of the old, and generally in all those things that are established by the law of Nature, or doe concern him personally, and not in the capacity of a King.* 1.634 Thus saith the law, In imperfecto testamento nec Imperatorem haereditatem vendicare posse saepe constitutum est, The Prince cannot be heir if the testament of the dead man be illegal. Sometimes and in some places, it may be, fewer witnesses will serve in the Princes case then in another mans, but then it is because fewer in his case are required by law; but still the law is his measure as well as of his Subjects.

6. The great laws of the Kingdome doe oblige all Princes,* 1.635 though they be supreme. Such were those which were called the laws of the Medes and Persians; whose Princes, although they were the most abso∣lute and supreme, yet they were inferiour to those laws, as appears in the Book of Daniel. These are by way of eminence call'd Leges Regni, the Kingdomes laws. Such are the Golden Bull of the Empire; the law Salic and the Pragmatical Sanction in France; the Magna Charta and the Peti∣tion of Right in England; and in other Countryes the like, as who please may particularly for Spain see in Mariana.* 1.636 This is confess'd by all, and it relies upon natural justice, the Prince having consented to it; it is either sponsio Principis, or conditio regnandi; he was admitted either upon that condition, or with it.

7. Whatsoever the Prince hath sworn to,* 1.637 to all that he is oblig'd not onely as a single Person, but as King: for though he be above the laws, yet he is not above himself, nor above his oath, because he is under God; and he cannot dispense with his oath or promise in those circumstances and cases in which he is bound. And therefore although the Prince is above the laws, that is, in cases extraordinary and priviledg'd cases, and the mat∣ter of penalties; yet he is so under all the laws of the Kingdome to which he hath sworn, that although he cannot be punish'd by them, yet he sins if he breaks them. Not that the law does binde him, for it cannot binde without a compulsory; and against him the law hath no such power: but yet he is bound to the law, though not by it; the obligation comes not from the law, but from other causes, from his promise, his oath, his con∣tract, his religion, his reputation, his fear, his hopes, his interest, and espe∣cially from God himself. For it is carefully to be observed in this parti∣cular, that though a promise gives a man right to the thing which is pro∣mised, it does not alwayes give him a right over the person. A King is like him that promises a thing under a curse; if he fails, the injur'd per∣son is not to curse him, or to inflict the curse upon him, but that is to be permitted to God alone. And therefore if a King swears to his People to make no law without their consent, he is bound to perform his word; but if he does not, God, and not they are to punish the perjury. The King's promise, or cession, or acts of grace doe never lessen or part his power, but they tie his person. An Act of Parliament in England, if it be made with a clause of perpetuity, that if an act should be made to rescind it it should be void, that first Act of it self is invalid. Clausulae deroganti si derogetur,

valet ut posterius testamentum, ita posterior constitutio, say the Lawyers, Concerning which Cicero hath written an excellent epistle to Atticus, lib. 3. epist. ad Attic. epist. 24. It is as if a man should make a Will to annull all future Wils of his own; it shews indeed that he had then a mind to have that to be his standing will: but how if his mind change? Constan∣tine made a law, that Widows and Orphans should not be cited to the Em∣perour's Court for judgement, or compelled to come, though he himself should command them: but yet if he did command them, that first rescript stood for nothing. Antiochus the third commanded the Magistrates not to obey him if he commanded any thing against the laws: but if he should command any such thing, it were not safe for them to urge himself against himself. The Roman Emperour bade his Officer use his Sword against him if he broke the laws: but this gave him no power over his Prince in case he had gone against the laws; it is nothing but a confident promise, and an obligation of his honour and his conscience, of which God alone is the Superiour and the Guardian.

The custome of supreme Princes swearing to govern by laws was very antient:* 1.638 we finde an example of it amongst the Gothish Kings in Cassio∣dore;* 1.639 amongst the late Greek Emperours in Zonaras and Cedrenus. Ana∣stasius the Emperour sware to observe the decrees of the Council of Chal∣cedon; Adrian the Emperour sware that he would never punish a Senator but by the sentence of the Senate; and Trajan having promised to rule with justice and clemency, consecrated his head and right hand to the anger of the Gods if he broke his word: and Plutarch tels, that the Kings of the Cossari sware to the Epirots, that they would govern according to the laws. And indeed abstracting from the oath and promise, Kings are bound by na∣tural justice and equity to doe so: for they are not Kings unless they go∣vern; and they cannot expect obedience, unless they tell the measures by which they will be obeyed; and these measures cannot be any thing but laws, which are at first the will of the Prince; and when they are publish'd to the People, then they are laws, but not till they be established by re∣wards and punishments, which are the portion of the People good and bad. Now this is the natural way of all good Government, there is no other; and to govern otherwise is as unnatural as to give Children meat at their ears, and hold looking-glasses at their elbows that they may see their face. If Kings be not bound to govern their People by their laws, why are they made? by what else can they be governed? by the will of the Prince? The laws are so; onely he hath declar'd his will, and made it certain and regular, and such as wise men can walk by, that the Prince may not govern as Fools govern, or as a Lion does, by chance, and violence, and unreasonable passions. Ea quae placuerunt, servanda, saith the law, l. 1. ff. de pactis. If this had not been the will of the Prince, it had been no law; but being his will, let it be stood to: when the reason alters, let his will doe so too, and the law be chang'd, that the measures of right and wrong, of obedience and disobedience may be known.

We have seen how Kings are bound;* 1.640 the next inquiry is, how they are freed, and how they are superiour to laws. Antonius Augustinus sayes, that by the Lex Regia, or the Jus Regium, Kings, that is, the Supreme power,* 1.641 are onely freed from some laws: and this he gathers from the words of the Royal law written to Vespasian, Uti quibus legibus ne Augu∣stus

teneretur, iis Vespasianus solutus esset: quaeque ex quaque lege Augustum facere oportuit, ea omnia Vespasiano facere liceat, Where Augustus Caesar was free, Vespasian should be free: but those things which Augustus ought to doe, all those Vespasian might. The word liceat in his case was modestly put in; not but that oportuit had been the better word to express his obli∣gation, as well as the duty of Augustus: but it was therefore chosen to re∣present that to be expected from him, but could not be exacted; it was his duty, but no compulsion lay near him: but certain it was, that the power of the People being devolv'd upon him (for it had been a popular Govern∣ment) as the People were bound to the laws which themselves have made, so was the Prince. The People were, for there was none else to keep them: but therefore so was the Prince, for he had but the same power which the People formerly had when they were Supreme. But then that they were tied but to some laws, and not to others, is very true: but so, that he was tied to all those laws which were intended to oblige him di∣rectly, and indirectly to all the rest, that is, to govern the People by their measures onely.

But now if we inquire from what laws they were freed,* 1.642 and what is the right of a King or the Supreme power more then of the People: I answer,

1. It consists in that which we in England call The King's Prerogative; in the Civil Law the Lex Regia, or Vespasian's Tables; by the Jews 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the statute or proper appointment of the King: the par∣ticulars of which are either described in the respective laws of every People, or are in their customes, or else is a power of doing every thing that he please that is not against the laws and customes of his People, without giving a reason. Cum lege antiquâ, quae Regia nuncupatur,* 1.643 omne jus omnísque potestas populi Romani in Imperatoriam translata sunt potestatem, saith the law. Amongst the Romans that was the Jus Regium, that the Prince could doe all that ever the People could: now what that was, we find in Dionysius, by the concession of Romulus, Populus Magistratus creanto, leges sciscunto, bella decernunto, The People might create Magistrates, make laws, and decree peace and war. That is the Right of Kings, or the Su∣preme power.* 1.644 Guntherus hath summ'd them up from the laws and cu∣stomes of the Empire, and some antient Italian Governments.

Ac primum Ligures, super hoc à Rege rogati, Vectigal prorsus, cudendae jura monetae, Cumque molendinis telonia, flumina, pontes, Id quoque quod* 1.645 Fodrum vulgari nomine dicunt, Et capitolicium certo sub tempore censum: Haec Ligures sacro tribuerunt omnia fisco. Haec & siqua pari fuerunt obnoxia juri, Praelati, proceres, missísque potentibus urbes Libera Romano reliquerunt omnia regno.

But the Jus Regium, what it is in the consent of Nations, who please may see in Aristotle's Politicks lib. 3, & 4. in Polybius lib. 6. Herodotus in Eu∣terpe, in Halicarnassaus lib. 4, 5, 7. in Valerius Maximus l. 7. in Orat. quâ suadet concordiam patrum & plebis in fin. in Tacitus 4. Annal. in Suetonius in Tiberio c. 30. in Dion. lib. 53. and in the later Politicks, Fabius Al∣bergatus, Zimara, Bodinus, Aretinus, and generally in the Commentators upon Aristotle.

2.* 1.646 It consists in the King's immunity from obligation to some so∣lemnities of law to which his Subjects are oblig'd. Ratum esse actum, etiamsi actio non habeat plenam rectitudinem, dum jus non desit, say the Lawyers.* 1.647 Of which nature is that for which Aeneas Sylvius, afterwards Pope Pius the second, laugh'd at Henry the sixth of England, that his Publick Instruments had no Test but his own, and he wrote Teste meipso, Witness our self: in which the King doth imitate the King of Kings, of whom S. Austin sayes,* 1.648 Testem se dicit futurum, quia in judicio suo non indi∣get testibus. He swears by himself, because he hath none greater; and is his own witness, because he needs no other: and it is enough that a King sayes it, because his word ought to be great and venerable, as his Power and his Majestie. And it was not onely in the matter of coercion, but of solemnities,* 1.649 true which Justinian said, Omnibus à nobis dictis Imperatoris excipiatur fortuna, cui & ipsas Deus leges subjecit, The fortune of the Em∣perour is to be excepted from the edge and from the forms of laws, because God himself hath made the laws subject to the Emperour.

3. The King is therefore solutus legibus,* 1.650 or free from laws, because he can give pardon to a Criminal condemn'd: for the Supreme power is not bound to his own laws so, but that upon just cause he can interpose be∣tween the sentence and the execution. This the Stoicks allowed not to any wise man, as supposing it to be against justice; and to remit due punish∣ment, is to doe what he ought not: for what is due is just, and what is a∣gainst that is unjust. All which is very true, but nothing to the purpose. For it is true, that it is but just that Offenders should be punish'd; it is due, that is, they are oblig'd to suffer it; poena debita ex parte reorum, it is their debt, not the Kings; they are oblig'd, not he: and yet it is just in him to take it, that is, he may: but he is not oblig'd in all cases to doe it. And in this also he is an Imitator of the Oeconomy of God, who, according to that of Lactantius, legem cum poneret non utique sibi ademit omnem pote∣statem, sed habet ignoscendi licentiam, God and the Vicegerent of God when they make laws have not exauctorated themselves: but as that law is an efflux of their authority, so it still remains within the same authority that they can pardon Offenders. Thus David pardon'd Shimei and Joab, and would fain have pardon'd Absalom, if the hand of Joab had not been too quick for him. And this cannot be denied to the Supreme power, be∣cause the exercise of this is one of the greatest vertues of a Prince: which was well observ'd by Pericles on his death-bed, when his weeping Friends about him praised, some of them his Eloquence, some his Courage, some his Victories, lifting up his head a little, Et quid hoc est? (saith he) aut par∣va aut fortuita laudatis: at illud maximum omittitis, quod mea opera nemo pullam vestem sumperit. That he had no publick executions, that no man was put to wear Blacks for his Friends, was a clemency greater then all the praises of Eloquence, or a prosperous fortune.

—Quisquis est placidè potens Dominusque vitae,* 1.651 servat innocuas manus, Et incrucentum mitis Imperium regit, Animoque parcit, longa permensus diu Permensus aevi spatia, vel Coelum petit, Vel laeta felix nemoris Elysii loca.

But all the World commends Clemency, the gentle hand of a Prince,* 1.652 his un∣willingness to kill, his readiness to save: for, Principi non minus turpia multa

supplicia, quam Medico funera, Many executions are as great a dishonour in a Princes reign, as many funerals in a Physitians practice: and therefore Cassiodore saies that a good and a gentle Prince will sometimes pass the limits of equity that he may serve the ends of clemency;* 1.653 quando sola est misericordia cui omnes virtutes cedere honorabiliter non recusant, for to mercy all other vertues count it honour to give place. And this Charls the 5^th and Maximi∣lian the second signified by their devise of an Eagle pearching upon a thun∣derbolt, with an Olive in her beak: and Nerva and Antoninus Pius im∣press'd upon their money a thunderbolt upon a pillow; to signify that vindicative justice ought to sleep sometimes. * Now certainly this being so great an excellency in a Prince, is not greater then his power. Imperatori licet revocare sententiam, & reum mortis absolvere, & ipsi ignoscere; quia non est subjectus legibus qui habet in potestate leges terrae, saith S. Austin. The Emperor, who can make laws, is not subject to laws, or so tied to them but that he may revoke his sentence and pardon a Criminal.

This I say is part of his Royalty;* 1.654 but is onely then to be practis'd when it can consist with the ends of government, that is, when the pub∣lick interest can be preserv'd, and the private injury some other way re∣compenc'd. These indeed are the general measures not of the Princes power, but of his exercising this power justly.

1. When the Criminal is a worthy person and can be beneficial to the Republick.* 1.655 Thus in the Low Countries a pardon in ordinary cases of felony is granted of course to him that can prove he hath invented some new art: and one lately sav'd his life by finding out a way exactly to coun∣terfeit old medals.

2. If the person hath already deserv'd well of the publick.* 1.656 Thus Horatius Cocles was spar'd though he kill'd his sister, because he got honour and liberty and safety and dominion to Rome by killing the three brothers, the Curatii: and Solomon spar'd the life of Abiathar the High Priest, be∣cause he bore the Ark before David,* 1.657 and was afflicted in all his troubles. *

3. When the Criminal can be amended,* 1.658 & the case is hugely pitiable, and the fact not of greatest malignity. Thus oftentimes we see young men pardon'd, and the first fault lightly punish'd; and because young Caesar was in the flower of his youth and a Princely boy, Sylla was more easily prevail'd with for his pardon.

4. If the fault be private,* 1.659 and not brought to publick courts, it is easily pardon'd, though delated by a private information, Conquiri ad ju∣dicium necesse non fuit: some things when they are made publick cannot be dismiss'd, but are not to be inquir'd after. It was the advice of Cicero to his Brother Quintus concerning a certain Criminal.

But all this is upon supposition that the crime be not of greatest mis∣chief,* 1.660 or foulest scandal and reproach; for if it be, nothing can be taken in exchange for it; a great vertue cannot make compensation for a very great crime: and this is particularly true of Treason, of which those words of Bartolus are to be understood, De offensionibus erga dominum non est com∣pensatio ad servitia eidem impensa, The services done to a Lord cannot make

satisfaction for a conspiracy against him. And therefore the Romans caus'd Manlius Capitolinus to be thrown headlong from that rock from whence he had thrown the Gauls when he sav'd the city. He produc'd the spoils of thirty enemies, forty donatives from Generals, two civic crowns, eight murals; yet all would not save his life and get his pardon. But yet in these things the supreme power is so free from laws that it does these things irre∣gularly; Clementiam liberum habere arbitrium, said Seneca, Clemency hath a great liberty, and a free choice: but they are oblig'd onely to see that the publick be not prejudic'd, and that every private interest be secur'd by causing amends to be made to the injur'd person where it can; and then it is true of every supreme Prince which Seneca advis'd Nero often to remem∣ber, Occidere contra legem nemo potest; servare nemo praeter me, No man at all can put a man to death against the law; and none can save except the Prince.

4. The supreme power is above the laws,* 1.661 * because he can dispense, * he can interpret them, * and he can abrogate them, * he can in time of ne∣cessity govern by the laws of reason without any written law, * and he is the Judge of the necessity. Thus the Kings of Israel had power over the judicial laws, though of the Divine sanction. For God forbad that the corps of a Malefactor should hang after sun-set upon the accursed tree; but yet Maimonides saies that the King suspendit & relinquit suspensos diebus multis, he hangs them and leaves them hanging for many daies; when it is necessary by such terror to affright the growing impiety of wicked men; that is, when the case was such that the laws were capable of equity or in∣terpretation. For this was not meerly an effect of his power, but of his reason too. It was a custome among the Jews to condemn but one person in one day, unless they were in the same crime, as the adulterer and the adul∣teress; but the King might condemn many at once when it was for the interest of justice and the republick. Thus their King could by the pre∣rogative of his Majesty proceed summarily, sit in judgment alone without assessors, condemn upon the testimony of one, and by the confession of the party; which the Sanhedrim might not doe, but were tied to acquit him that confess'd the fact. Add to these,* 1.662 the Supreme can in some cases be Judge and witness; that is, can himself condemn a criminal for what him∣self onely saw him doe. He can also be Judge in his own case; as if he be injur'd, rail'd upon, defrauded, or the like: all which are powers above the law, and here were to be nam'd for the understanding of the present Rule; but how they are to be conducted is of distinct and special consideration, and to be reserved to their proper places. I end this whole inquiry with that of Statius,

—quid enim terrisque poloque Parendi sine lege manet? vice cuncta geruntur. Alternisque premunt propriis sub Regibus omnis Terra: premit felix Regum diademata Roma: Hanc ducibus fraenare datum, mox crescit in illos Imperium Superis—

There is nothing in the earth but is under a law and tied to obedience: all the earth are under Kings, and the Kings are under the Romans, and the Romans under their Princes, and their Princes under God; who rules them by his own laws, and binds them to rule by their Countries laws, and ties them to doe justice, and is pleased when they shew mercy. But as they are

to doe justice by the sentence of the laws, so they must not shew mercy against law; for even the prerogative of Kings is by law, and Kings are so far above their laws, as the laws themselves have given leave. For even the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the remission of the rigor of the law, the very Chancery and ease of laws is by law established.

RULE III. It is not lawfull for Subjects to rebel, or to take up arms against the supreme Power of the Nation, upon any pretence whatsoever.

WHen Nehemiah was deputed by Artaxerxes to be Governour of Ju∣daea,* 1.663 and had commission to rebuild Jerusalem and the Temple, the neighbour Kings that opposed him were enemies to Artaxerxes, because Ne∣hemiah was lieutenant to the King. He that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me, saith our Blessed Saviour. Senatus faciem secum attulerat, aucto∣ritatem reipublicae, said Cicero of one that was deputed and sent from the Senate. He had the gravity of the Senate and the authority of the Com∣monwealth. Now this being true of the supreme Power in every Go∣vernment, that it is potestas Dei vicaria, it is the Minister of God, appoin∣ted by him, set in his place, invested with a ray of his Majesty, intrusted with no Power but his, representing none but him, having received the Sword from his hand, the Power of life and death from his warranty; it must needs follow that he who lifts up his hand against that supreme Person or Authority that God hath appointed over him is impious against God and fights against him. This the Apostle expresly affirms, and there needs no more words to prove the Rule, He that resists, resists the ordinance of God *. He does not say, he that does not obey is disobedient to God, for that is not true. Sometimes it is necessary not to obey, as it hapned to the captive Jews under Nabuchodonosor, and to the Apostles under their Princes; they could not obey God and them too: and then the case of Conscience was soon resolved. But they that could not obey, could die; they could goe into the fire, suffer scourgings and imprisonments, that was their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, their great Sanctuary; which in behalf of the Christians Gregory Nazi∣anzen thus expresses, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I have but one remedy against all my evils, one way to victory, thanks be to Christ, I can die for him: that's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to obey where they can, and where they cannot to be sure to lie down under the burden which they cannot carry. For though in some cases it is lawfull not to obey, yet in all cases it is ne∣cessary not to resist.

I do not know any proposition in the world clearer and more certain in Christianity then this Rule,* 1.664 and therefore cannot recount any greater instance of humane infirmity then that some wise men should be abus'd in∣to a contrary perswasion. But I see that interest and passion are alwaies the greatest arguments, where they are admitted. But I have an ill task to write Cases of Conscience, if such things as these shall be hard to be

perswaded: for there are very few things in which any man is to hope for half so much conviction as in this article lies before him in every topick; and if I should determine no cases but upon such mighty terms as can be afforded in this question, and are given, and yet we prevail not, I must ne∣ver hope to doe any service to any interest of wisedome or peace, of justice or religion. And therefore I am clearly of opinion that no man who can think it lawful to fight against the supreme power of his Nation, can be fit to read Cases of Conscience; for nothing can ever satisfie him whose Con∣science is armour of proof against the plain and easy demonstrations of this question. But this question is of the same nature as all clear and neces∣sary truths, never obscure but when it is disputed; certain to all men and evident if they will use their own eyes; but if they call for glasses of them that make a trade of it, it may chance not to prove so. But I will speak of it with all easiness and simplicity.

1. The Scripture is plain,* 1.665 Curse not the King, no not in thy thought: and,* 1.666 I counsel thee to keep the Kings Commandement, and that in regard of the oath of God—for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him. Where the word of a King is,* 1.667 there is power, and who may say unto him, What does thou? Against him there is no rising up. There are many more excellent words in the Old Testa∣ment to this purpose; but nothing can be plainer then these dogmatically to establish the doctrine of the Rule. No man can question him; no man may rise up against him; he hath power, he hath all power; we are by the law or the oath of God bound to keep his Commandement; and after all, we must not reproach him in our secret thoughts. No man needs this last precept but he that thinks the King is an evil man, or hath done wrong: but suppose he have, or that he is suppos'd to have, yet Curse him not, Doe not slight him,* 1.668 so it is in the Hebrew; Regi ne detrahas, so it is in the Vulgar Latine, Disparage not the King: but the Chaldee paraphrase addes, Even in thy Conscience, in the secrets of thy heart speak not evil of the King, and in the closets of the chambers of thy house speak, not evil of the wise man; for the Angel Raziel does every day from heaven cry out upon the mount of Horeb, and his voice passes into all the world: and Eliahu, the great Priest, flies in the aire of heaven like a winged Eagle, and tells the words which are spoken in corners by all the inhabitants of the earth. By the way I onely ob∣serve this, that we are forbidden to speak evil of the rich or the mighty man, the wise man, so the Chaldee calls him, that is, the Princely men of the world, the Magistrates and Nobles, whom S. Peter calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Captains or rulers sent by the King: of these we must say no evil in our private houses, lest a bird of the aire, lest that which hath wings, that is, lest the Angel that attends us orders it so as to pass into publication; for the government of the other world reaches strangely even to us, and we speak not a word in vain, but by the Divine providence it is dispos'd to purposes that we understand not. But when he speaks of the King or the supreme, whom S. Peter calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, then it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, call him not accursed in thy heart, not so much as in thy thought; which because it is only perceiv'd by God who is the searcher of the heart, it shews plainly that as Angels take care of the rich and the wise, the mighty and the Nobles, so Kings are the peculiar care of God, who is the King of Kings and the Lord of Lords. But then (to leave all curiosities) if we may not speak or think reproachfully of the King, we may not doe that which

is more and that which is worse: and I think there needs no more to be said. But it is as clear all the way.

In the New Testament,* 1.669 sufficient are the excellent words of our Blessed Saviour, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not to resist evil, that is, not to stand against it, not to oppose evil to evil; which obliges all Christians that at least without the magistrate they cause no return of evil to the offending person; that no man be his own avenger, for vengeance belongs to God, and he hath delegated that to none but to the supreme Magistrate, who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gods minister to be a revenger of wrath under him. Now if no man must pay evil to his brother that hath injur'd him but by the hand of the supreme power, how can it be possible that it can be lawful to render evil for evil to the supreme power it self? by whose hands shall that be done? by none but by his Superior, who is God alone, who will take care to punish evil Kings sufficiently: onely we must not doe it; we must not pray him to doe it; for that is expressly against the words of Solomon, that's cursing the King in our thought, and not at all to be done. But besides this there are many more things spoken by our Blessed Lord to determine us in this affair. Render to Cesar the things that are Cesars; and to Pilate Christ said, Thou shouldest have no power over me unless it were gi∣ven thee from above; meaning that Cesars power, whose Deputy Pilate was, was deriv'd from God, and consequently that, except God, none is greater upon Earth then Cesar: and again, If my Kingdome were of this world, my servants would fight for me; which plainly enough confirms the power of the Militia in the supreme Magistrate, Christ leaving it where he found it.

But that there may be no dispute concerning these things,* 1.670 the Apo∣stles, who are expounders of the words of Christ and the meaning of his Spirit, tell us plainly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to be subject 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to supreme powers; the same with S. Peter's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to the King as to the Supreme, that is to the King, if he be a King indeed, if he be the supreme; to be subject to these powers, and not to resist, for these reasons. 1. Because this supreme power is ordain'd of God: 2. Because he that resists, resists God whose minister the Prince is: 3. Because God hath arm'd the powers which he ordain'd with a sword of power and revenge: 4. Because it is for our good that we submit to him; for he is Gods mi∣nister for good, that is, for the publick good, under which thine is compre∣hended: 5. Because it is necessary; the necessity being apparent in the na∣ture of the thing and in the Commandement of God: 6. Because God hath bound our Conscience to it: 7. He hath tied this band upon us with fear also: and 8. lastly, because whoever does not obey where he may lawfully, and whosoever does in any case resist, shall receive damnation to himself both here and hereafter; here upon the stock of fear, hereafter upon the account of conscience; for both for fear and for Conscience we must obey in good things and lawful, & we must not resist in any. For indefinitely we are commanded not to resist, without any distinction reservation of case; and Ubi lex non distinguit, nemo distinguere debet. He that will goe about to be wiser then the law, in equity will not be better then a fool. This therefore is the summe of S. Pauls discourse, Rom. 13. per totum.

S. Paul was the Doctor of the Gentiles,* 1.671 S. Peter of the Jews: and therefore this doctrine is sufficiently con••ign'd to all the world: for S. Peter

hath preach'd this doctrine as largely as S. Paul,* 1.672 Submit your selves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord, that is, for his sake, upon his Commande∣ment and for his honour; these ordinances being Gods ordinances, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they are ordain'd by God, all of them, the King principally, his cap∣tains & officers which he hath sent, in the next place. But him and his Mini∣sters we must receive & honour and obey, & submit to them; for it is Gods case & his Ministers; God & his Ministers & Lieutenants, the King & his. He that despises him whom the King sends, despises the King; and he that despi∣ses him whom God sends or makes his deputy, despises God. Submit there∣fore, for it is the will of God; Submit, for this is well-doing; Submit, for so we shall put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: Meaning that since the enemies of Christ are apt to speak evil things of you, glad would they be if they had cause to accuse you for not being obedient to government; and some are ignorant and foolishly pretend the liberty and priviledges of Saints against the interests of obedience; the mouths of these men must be stopp'd, and you must submit to Kings, that you may please God and confute the ad∣versaries. Now the specification of this great duty and the particular case of Conscience follows; Fear God, Honour the King: Servants be obedient to your Masters; not onely to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for this is thank-worthy: and this is full to the question in hand. For the general precept which S. Peter gave is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, submit to every ordinance, to the King, to his Magistrates or deputies & captains, and lastly submit to the lowest of all dominions, even servants to their masters; not onely to the good and gentle, but to the morose and harsh. Now if so to inferiour masters, whose dominion is no greater then their interest, & their interest is no greater then their price, and is still under the power of Kings; much more to Kings or to the supreme power. * And indeed even subjection to Kings is the gentlest and most eligible kind of service. Then would my servants fight, said Christ, meaning it of the sub∣jects of his Kingdome: and Livy cals populum Romanum servientem cum sub Regibus esset, they did serve their Kings. * And indeed as the Go∣vernments of the world then were, Kings were most absolute, and the people intirely subject, and far from liberty: and therefore this of servants might very well be a specification and a particular of their duty to Kings & Captains; and whether it were or no, it is for the former argument [from the less to the greater affirmatively] infinitely certain that the same duty is due to Kings though harsh and cruel: for indeed there were then none else; Nero was the supreme, and he was none of the best that ever wore purple.

It were very easy to draw forth more arguments from Scripture to this purpose;* 1.673 but I forbear to name more then this abundance which is contain'd in these now cited: but I shall not omit to observe that the Apo∣stles did make use of that argument which I urg'd out of Solomon, that we are not to speak evil of the King; from whence the unlawfulness of resisting is unanswerably concluded:* 1.674 for S. Jude giving the character of the worst of men and the basest of hereticks, reckons up in the bill of their particulars, that they despise dominion and speak evil of dignities; which as it is an infal∣lible mark of an evil person, so it is a using of a Prince worse then S. Michael the Archangel durst use the Devil; against whom, because he was a Spirit of an higher order, though foully changed, he durst not bring a railing accusation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a judgment or accusation with blasphemy in it: for all evil language of our Superior is no better then blasphemy;

He did blaspheme God and the King, was the crime pretended against Naboth.

If from the plain words of Scripture we descend to the doctrine and practices of the Church of God,* 1.675 we shall find that all Christians when they were most of all tempted, when they were persecuted and oppress'd, kill'd and tormented, spoil'd of their goods, and cruelly and despitefully us'd, not onely did not rebel when they had power and numbers, but profess'd it to be unlawful. But this I shall draw into a compendium; because it being but matter of fact, and the matter in Scripture being so plain that it needs no interpretation, the practice and doctrine of the Church, which is usually the best commentary, is now but of little use in a case so plain. But this also is as plain it self, and without any variety, dissent or interruption, universally agreed upon, universally practis'd and taught, that let the powers set over us be what they will, we must suffer it, and never right our selves. Tertul∣lian boasts with confidence, that when Pescennius Niger in Syria, and Clo∣dius Albinus in France and Britanny rebell'd against Septimius Severus a bloody and cruel Emperour, and pretended piety and publick good, yet none of the Christians joyn'd with either. The Theban legion in the 18^th year of Diocletian suffer'd themselves to be cut in pieces every man, six thousand six hundred sixty and six in number, by Maximianus the Empe∣rour; no man in that great advantage of number and order and provo∣cation lifting up their hands,* 1.676 except it were in prayer: of these Venantius For∣tunatus hath left this Memorial,

Queis positis gladiis sunt arma è dogmate Pauli, Nomine pro Christi dulcius esse mori. Pectore belligero poterant qui vincere ferro Invitant jugulis vulnera chara suis.

They laid down their weapons and lift up their arms; they prayed and died in order: and this they did according to the doctrine of S. Paul. But when Julian was Emperour, an apostate from his religion, a great perse∣cutor of the Christians,* 1.677 and who by his cruelty (as Nazianzen observes) brought the commonwealth it self in danger, though his army did most consist of Christians, yet they had arms for him, but none against him, save onely that by prayers and tears they diverted many of his damnable coun∣sels and designs. But the particulars are too many to recite what might be very pertinent to this question from Antiquity. I shall therefore serve the interest of it as to this topick by pointing out the writings of the ancient Doctors where they have given testimony to this great article of our reli∣gion, which who please may find in S. Clement constit. l. 7. c. 17. S. Irenaeus lib. 5. Advers. haeres. c. 20. Justin Martyr, Apolog. 2. ad Antonin. Imperato∣rem, Tertullian ad Scapulam, & Apolog. adv. Gent. cap. 30. S. Cyprian ad Demetrianum, Hosius apud Athanas. ad solitariam vitam agentes, Liberius ibid. S. Hilary ad Imperat. Constantium, S. Athanasius ad Antioch. quaest. 55. & Apolog. ad Constant. vide etiam factum Basilii in Monodia Nazianz. inter opuscula Basilii, Nazianzen. 2. orat. contr. Julian. Optatus Milevitanus lib. 3. contr. Parmen. S. Chrysostom. orat. 2. ad pop. Antioch. tom. 6. edit. Savil. * 1.678 S. Ambrose Epist. 33. ad Marcellinam, S. Cyril. in Evang. Johan. l. 12. c. 36. S. Hieron. comment. in 2. Dan. S. Augustin. lib. 4. de civit. Dei, c. 33. & lib. 5. c. 21. & in Psalm. 124.* 1.679 Anastasius P. epist. unic. ad Anastasium Imper. Symmachus P. ad eundem Anast. Imp. Leo P. ad Leonem Imperat. & epist. 13. ad Pulcheriam, S. Gregor. Mag. Epist. l. 7. ep. 1.

After him succeeded (Sabinianus being interpos'd for one year onely) Boniface the third,* 1.680 who obtain'd of Phocas to be called universal Bishop: since when periit virtus Imperatorum, periit pietas Pontificum, saies one, the Kings lost their strength and the Bishops lost their piety; yet in the descending ages God wanted not many worthy persons to give testimonies to this great truth and duty. Such were Stephen the sixth apud Baronium tom. 10. A. D. 885. n. 11. Gregorius Turonensis hist. lib. 5. cap. 1. Concil. Toletan. 5. can. 2. & Concilium Toletan. 6. c. 14. Fulgentius parallel. ad Thrasimundum Regem, Damascen. parallel. 1. c. 21. V. Bede, lib. 4. expos. in Samuel. Leo 4. cap. de capitulis, dist. 15. S. Bernard epist. 221. to Lewis le Gros: vide etiam epist. Walthrami Epis. Nanumberg. quae habetur in appendice Mariani Scoti.

Now it is very observable that in the succession of about six Ages,* 1.681 in which the Holy Doctors of the Church gave such clear testimony of the necessity of obeying even the worst Princes, and many thousands of holy Christians sealed it with their blood, there was no opposition to it; and none of any reputation, no man of learning did any thing against the interest or the honour of Princes, excepting onely (so far as I have observed) Lu∣cifer Calaritanus, who indeed spake rude and unbeseeming words of Constan∣tius the Arrian Emperor; but that he may lessen nothing of the universal consent to this doctrine,* 1.682 S. Ambrose does lessen very much of his reputation, saying that through he was with the true believers banished for religion, yet he separated himself from their Communion. But in the next period, I mean after Gregory the Great, it was not unusual for the Bishops of Rome to stirre up subjects to rebel against their Princes, and from them came the first great declension and debauchery of the glory of Christian loyalty and subjection to their Princes; witness those sad stories of P. Gregory the seventh, P. Urban and Paschal, who stirred up the Emperors Son against the Father. I speak it to this purpose, because it produc'd an excellent epistle from the Church-men of Liege in behalf of the Emperor and of their Bishop, who with his Chapter was excommunicated for adhering to his loyalty, and Robert Earl of Flanders commanded by the Pope to destroy him and all his Priests. But in behalf of Princes & the duty of subjection to them many ex∣cellent things were spoken, divers judgments of God fearfully falling upon rebellious people are recited, not onely in that Epistle of the Clergy of Liege, but in the life of Henry the 4^th,* 1.683 Emperor, in fasciculo rerum sciend. published at Colen. From all these Fathers and Ancient Authors now cited, magnum mundo documentum datum est (that I may use the words of the Author of the book last cited) a great instruction and caution is given to the whole world that no man rise up against his Prince. For all these Authors give clear and abundant testimony to these truths, That the power of the supreme Ma∣gistrate is immediately from God, * That it is subject to God alone, * That by him alone it is to be judged, * That he is the governor of all things and persons within his dominions, * That whosoever speaks reproachfully of him cannot be innocent, * That he that lifts up his hand against him strikes at the face of God, * That God hath confounded such persons that against the laws of God, and their own oaths, and the natural bonds of fidelity, have attempted to spoil their supreme Lords, That Herman and Egbert that did so were confounded for so doing, as though they had never been, That Ru∣dolphus had his hand cut off and felt divers other of the divine judgments for this impiety. And this being the constant universal doctrine of the Church of God for 1200. years, and this derived from the plain, the ex∣press,

the frequent sayings and Commandements of God in the Old and New Testament, declared by his Prophets and Apostles, and by his most holy Son himself, nothing can with greater certainty determine and conduct our Conscience then this Rule. For the confirmation of which I remember S. Bernard tells a pretty little story, in a Sermon upon these words of Christ, I am the Vine: Bene quidam Rex cùm percussus humanâ sagittâ, &c. It was well said of a King who being wounded with a barbed arrow, they that were about him desired he would suffer himself to be bound till the head were cut out, because the least motion irregular would endanger his life; he an∣swer'd, Regem ligari nullo modo decet, A King must at no hand be bound; let the King be ever safe, but let his power be at liberty. I end this topick with the words of S. Austin and of the sixth Councel of Toledo,* 1.684 Non tri∣buamus dandi regni atque imperii potestatem nisi vero Deo, Let us attribute the power of giving the right of empire to none but to the true God alone. Ille unus verus Deus qui nec judicio nec adjutorio deserit genus humanum, quando velit & quantum voluit Romanis regnum dedit: qui dedit Assyriis, vel etiam Persis; qui Mario, ipse Caio Caesari; qui Augusto, ipse & Neroni; qui Ve∣spasiano, vel Patri vel Filio, suavissimis Imperatoribus, ipse & Domitiano crudelissimo; & ne per singulos ire necesse sit, qui Constantino Christiano, ipse Apostatae Juliano. Hoc planè Deus Unus verus regit, & gubernat ut placet. The one true God, who never leavs mankind destitute of right and help, hath given a kingdome to the Romans, as long as he please and as much as he please. He that gave the supreme power to the Assyrians, he also gave it to the Persians. He that gave it to Marius a common Plebeian, gave it to Caius Caesar who was a Princely person. The same authority he gave to Nero that he gave to Augustus; he gave as much power and Authority to the most cruel Domitian as he gave to Vespasian and to Titus the gentlest and the sweetest Princes; and to be short, he gave the Authority to Constantine the Chri∣stian, and the same afterwards to Julian the Apostate: for this great affaire he rules and governs as he please.

But all this is no more then what natural and necessary reason does teach all the world:* 1.685 Hanc Deus & melior litem natura diremit. For this which I have alleaged from the Fathers is properly a religious reason. It is Gods power which is in the supreme Magistrate, whether he be good or bad: therefore whoever rebels against him, rebels against the power and dispen∣sation of God; and to this there is nothing reasonable to be oppos'd. But then that which I am now to say is deriv'd to us by the reason that every man carries about him, by the very law of Nature.

Naturam vero appello legem Omnipotentis Supremique Patris, quam prima ab origine rerum Cunctis imposuit rebus, jussitque teneri Inviolabiter.—

By the law of Nature I mean the prime law of God which he unalterably impos'd upon all men in their first Creation, that by reason and wise dis∣courses they should govern themselves in order to that end which is per∣fective of humane nature and society. The law of nature is the law of God which is reasonable and necessary to nature: now by this law or necessary reason we find it very fit that we should devest our selves of the practice and exercise of some rights and liberties which naturally we have. So Ari∣stotle observes,* 1.686 Homines adductos ratione multa praeter mores & naturam agere, si aliter agi melius esse sibi persuaserint, Men doe somethings against

their natural inclination, if by natural reason they find it best to doe so. Now Nature having permitted every man to defend himself as well as he can against violence, did by an early experience quickly perceive that few men had power enough to doe it against every violent man; and therefore they drew into societies, gather'd their strength, and it was put into the hands of them who by a joyn'd strength could, and by promise and interest and duty would doe it: and by this means the societies had peace, and might live quietly. Now the natural consequent is this, that if all our power is united and intrusted to one head, we must not keep it in our hands. If the supreme power be the avenger, we must not meddle; if he be Judge, we must submit, for else we are never the nearer to peace. For when we were so many single persons we were alwaies in warre, but by unity and government we come to peace: therefore whatever we could doe alone, we having put into the common stock, our natural right of de∣fence is in the publick hand, and there it must remain for ever; and we are to be defended by the laws, and they onely are now the ministeries of peace. This is S. Pauls argument, I exhort that prayers and supplications be made for all men;* 1.687 for Kings and all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and a peaceable life in all godliness and honesty: plainly implying that the security and peace of societies depends upon the power and authority of Kings and persons in eminency and trust: for none must make warre but he that does it for all mens interest; and therefore it is peace with all that are under government: but then that which is designed to keep peace must feel to warre from them whom it is designed to keep in peace, that they may not feel the evils of warre. It government be necessary, it is ne∣cessary that we should obey it; if we must obey it, we must not judge it; if we must not judge it, we may not endeavour to punish it: and there is nothing in the world a greater destruction to it's own ends, then the resist∣ing or rebelling against government; because if we be above it, how are we subjects? if subjects, how are we it's Judges? if no Judges, how can we be avengers? if no avengers, why are we not quiet and patient? If we be not above, we are below; and therefore there let us abide: but if we be above, then we are the supreme power; and then it is all one. That which is said all this while concerns the subjects, and not the Supreme, to whom by our natural necessities, by a general contract of mankind, by the law of nations, by the command of God, and by the civil laws of all republicks the subject is bound,* 1.688 and does owe obedience and maintenance, and honour and peace. Generale pactum est societatis humanae obedire Regibus suis, said S. Austin, It is a covenant that all mankind have agreed in, to be obedient to their Kings.

But all this is true:* 1.689 but since Kings are for defence and Justice, for good and not for evil, for edification and not for destruction, good Kings must be obeyed; but what if they be evil and unjust, cruel and unreasonable enemies of their people, and enemies of mankind?

This is that I have been saying all this while,* 1.690 that let him be what he will, if he be the supreme, he is superior to me, and I have nothing to doe, but something to suffer; let God take care, if he please, I shall be quickly remedied, till then I must doe as well as I can. For if there be any case in which the subjects may resist, who shall be Judge of that case? can this case be evident and notorious? and does it alwaies consist in indivisibili? If it does not, then many things are like it, and who can secure that the sub∣jects shall judge right? For if they were infallible, yet who will engage that

they will not doe amiss? what warrantly have we against the ambition and the passion and the interest of the reformers of supreme powers? And is it not better to suffer inconvenience from one then from every one that please? But if you allow one case, you must allow as many as can be reduc'd to it; and who is not witty enough against Governours, to find excuses enough to bring them down?

2. What remedy is there is case the supreme power be ill administred?* 1.691 will not any remedy bring greater evils then the particular injustices which are complain'd of? It was well said of Xenophon, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that opposes his Gene∣ral and Prince,* 1.692 opposes his own safety. For consider, what order can be in a family, if the boys rule their Fathers and rebel against their command? How shall the sick be cur'd, if they resist the advice and prescriptions of the Physicians? And they that sail are like to suffer shipwrack, if the Boat swain and the Swabbers and the boys shall contradict the Master. So it is impossible that there can be safety in a common-wealth, if they who are appointed to obey shall offer to rule. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, For by nature it is necessary and profitable and order'd accordingly, that one should rule and the rest should be obedient.

And therefore these wild cases are not to be pretended against that which natural reason and natural necessity have established.* 1.693 We cannot suppose a King that should endeavour to destroy his Kingdome. We may as well suppose a Father to kill his children, and that therefore in some cases it may be lawful for children to rebel against their Fathers, turn them out of doors, &, as they see occasion, cut their throats that the inheritance may be theirs. Whom can we suppose worse then Julian, then Domitian, then Nero? and yet these Princes were obeyed, and did never proceed to the extremity of such desperate hostilities: Nay Nero, as bad as he was, yet when he was kill'd, was quickly miss'd; for in a few moneths three Princes succeeded him, and there was more blood of the Citizens spilt in those few moneths then in Nero's fourteen year. And who please both for their plea∣sure and their instruction to read the Encomium of Nero written by the in∣comparable Cardan, shall find that the worst of Princes doe much more good then they doe harm. But, semper Corpori grave est Caput, the head alwaies akes, and is a burden to the shoulders, and we complain much of every little disorder. Put case a Prince by injustice doe violence to some of his subjects, what then? Qui unum, qui plures occidit, non tamen reip. laesae reus est, sed caedis, said Seneca, It is not the killing of some Citizens that de∣stroyes the Commonwealth: and there are not many Princes that proceed so far as to doe open and profess'd wrong to the lives of their subjects; but many subjects have done violence, open and apparent, to the lives of their Princes, and yet the subjects are aptest to complain. Quis Princeps apud nos regnavit è Vi••ecomitum aut Sfortiadum familia quem non aliquis Civis noster etiam sine causa, sed solâ ambitione, ferro aggressus sit? pauci certè, Which of our Princes of such and such a family hath not been set upon to be murder'd by some of their Subjects, without cause, but meekly out of am∣bition? very few. And he that reads Hector Boethius his history of Scotland may say as much as Cardan, and for a longer time. Every man complains of Kings and Governours; we love them not, and then every little thing makes him a Tyrant: but it is in this case as in the case of women (saies

Albericus Gentilis) we cannot be without them, and yet we are not pleas'd when we are tied to them. * If any such thing could happen that a King had a mind to destroy his people, by whom should he doe it? He alone can hardly doe it; and he could hardly arm his people against themselves. But what should he get by it? he cannot be so unreasonable: but suppose it, what then? Oppression will make a wise man mad (saith Solomon) and there are some temptations bigger then a mans strength; and this would be one of them, and the people would be vext into the sin of rebellion; and then it may be, God would cut him off, and punish the people; and here would be calamity enough in this whole entercourse, but nothing lawful. For we have nothing dearer to us then our lives and our religion; but in both these cases we find whole armies of Christians dying quietly, and suffering persecution without murmur. * But it cannot be done, it cannot easily be suppos'd that an evil Prince should be otherwise then one that is cruel and unjust, and this to fall upon some persons: for let him be lustfull, he shall not ravish the Common-wealth; and if he be bloody, his sword cannot cut off very great numbers; and if he be covetous, he will not take away all mens estates: but if a warre be made against him, these evils will be very much more universal; for the worst of Princes that ever was hath obliged a great many, and some will follow him out of duty, some for fear, some for honour, and some for hopes; and then as there is no subject that complains of wrong but he hath under the government receiv'd more right then wrong, so there is none that goes to doe himself right, (if that be all he intends, and not covetous and ambitious designs) but in the forcing it he will find more wrong then right.

3. But I demand, Are there no persons from whom if we receive wrong we must not be avenged of them?* 1.694 To a Christian it had been a more reasonable inquiry, whether there be any persons of whom we may be aven∣ged. Certainly there are none of whom we may be avenged without the aid or leave of the publick power. But what if our Father doe us wrong? may we strike him? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to bear our Fathers unjust wrath was one of the precepts the young man of Eretria had learnt of Zeno: and what then if we be injur'd by the publick Father? Magno animo Regis, velut parentis contumeliam tulit; it was said of Lysimachus: & ut parentum sa••∣vitiam sic Patriae patiendo ac ferendo leniendam esse, said Livy. If we must bear with our Fathers,* 1.695 so also with our Princes. Vi regere Patriam aut Parentes, quanquam & possis, & delicta corrigas, importunum est, said Sallust, Though it were in your power, though you might reform some evils, yet to rule your Parents or your Prince by force is not reasonable. And it was an excellent saying which Cicero had from Plato.* 1.696 Tantum contendere in rep. oportet quantum probare tuis civibus possis, vim neque parenti neque patriae afferri oportere. Id enim Plato jubet, quem ego vehementer sequor: & qui hanc causam sibi fuisse ait reipublicae non attingendae, quod cum offendisset populum Atheniensem propè jam desipientem senectute, cumque eum nec per∣suadendo nec cogendo regi posse vidisset, cum persunderi posse dissideret, cogi f•••• esse non arbitraretur, To contend and fight in a Common-wealth can never be approved by the Citizens: strive so much as you can justify: but you must offer force neither to your parents nor to your country, that is the supreme go∣vernment of your Country. And when Plato saw the people of Athens almost doating with age, he despair'd of prevailing upon them by perswasion; but yet to compel them by force he concluded to be impious. But can any man loose

by patience? hath it no reward? or is there no degrees of Counsel in it? that is, Is not some patience acceptable though it be not necessary? shall it have no reward, if it be more then we are bound to? If it shall be rewarded, though it be greater then is simply necessary, then it is certain, that what∣ever we suffer under evil Princes, to be quiet and peaceable is infinitely better then to resist: For that shall have a good reward; this seldome misses an ill one. But if there be no counsel, no degree of uncommanded patience, then all patience is necessary; for it is certain none is sinne: for Christ was glorified by suffering the greatest injuries, and his Martyrs have trodden the same way of the Cross; and so must we if God calls us to it, if we will be his Disciples.

4. But again I consider,* 1.697 Does every subject that is a wicked man forfeit the right in his estate, otherwise then law appoints? Is dominion founded in grace? or is it founded in law and labour, in succession and pur∣chase? And is it not so in Princes? with this onely difference, that their rights of government are derived from God immediately; for none but he can give a power of life and death: can therefore any one take away what they did not give? or can a supreme Prince loose it by vice, who did not get it by vertue, but by gift from God? If a law were made to devest the Prince of his power in case of ill government, then he were not the man I mean, he is not supreme but subordinate, and did rule precariously, that is as long as his superior judges will give him leave. But for the supreme he is sacred and immured, just as the utmost orbs of heaven are uncircum∣scrib'd; not that they are positively infinite, but because there is nothing beyond them: so is the supreme Magistrate, nothing is above him but God: and therefore in his case we may use the words of Livy, si quis adversus ea fecisset, nihil ultrà quam improbè factum adjecit lex, If he does any thing against reason and justice, there is no more to be said but that it was ill done. * But if he does not doe his duty, that's no warranty for me not to doe mine; and if obedience and patience be a duty, then the one is as necessary, and the other is more necessary when he does not doe what he ought. * And after all, the supreme power in every Christian republick hath no power to kill a subject without law, nor to spoil him of his goods. Therefore nei∣ther can a subject kill or exauthorate the supreme at all; for there is no law to doe it: and if he be the supreme power, he is also law-giver, and therefore will make no such law against himself; and if he did, he were neither wise nor just.

Either then stop all pretences,* 1.698 or admit all. If you admit any case in which the subjects may fight against their Prince, you must admit every case that he will pretend who is the judge of one. But because Govern∣ment is by God appointed to remedy the intolerable evils of confusion and the violence and tyranny of every strong villane, we must keep our selves there; for if we take the sword, or the power, or the legislation, or the Judicature, or the impunity from the Supreme, we return to that state of evil from whence we were brought by government. For certain it is, all the personal mischiefs and injustices done by an evil Prince are infinitely more tolerable then the disorders of a violent remedy against him. If there be not a derniere resort, or a last appeal fixt somewhere, mischiefs will be infinite; but the evils that come from that one place will soon be numbred, and easier suffered and cur'd.

It were easie to adde here the sentences of the wise heathen to this very purpose;* 1.699 for though religion speakes loudest in this article, yet na∣ture her self is vocal enough: but I have remark'd some already occasional∣ly, to the same sense with that of Tacitus, Imperatores bonos voto expeten∣dos, qualescunque tolerandos: So the wiser Romans at last had learnt their duty. The same also was the sentence of the Greeks;

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.700

We must patiently suffer the follies of our Rulers. So did the Persians,

—quamvis crudelibus,* 1.701 aequè Paretur Dominis,

Though the Lords be cruel, yet you must obey them as well as the gentle. But I am weary of so long telling a plain story. He that is not determined by these things, I suppose will desire to see no more. But if he does, he may please to see many more particulars in Barclay, in Grotius, in Monsieur de la Noüe, in Albericus Gentilis, in Scipio Gentilis, in Bishop Bilson, in Petrus Gregori∣us & Bodinus. I conclude, many supreme Princes have laid aside their kingdomes, and have exchang'd them for honour and religion; and many subjects have laid aside their supreme Princes or Magistrates, and have exchanged them for liberty and justice. But the one got, and the other lost. They had real advantages; and these had words in present, and re∣pentance in reversion.

RULE IV. The Supreme Civil Power is also Supreme Gover∣nour over all persons and in all causes Ecclesias∣tical.

IF this Rule were not of great necessity for the conduct of Conscience,* 1.702 as being a measure of determining all questions concerning the Sanction of and obedience to all Ecclesiastical lawes, the duty of Bishops and Priests to their Princes, the necessity of their paying tribute, and discharging the burdens and relieving the necessities of the Republick, I should have been unwilling to have medled with it; because it hath so fierce opposition from the bigots of two parties, the Guelphs and the Gibellines, from Rome and from Scotland, from S. Peter and S. Andrew, the Papist and the Pres∣byterian: and they have plac'd all their great interest and their greatest passions upon this question, and use not to be very kind to any man that shall at all oppose them.

2. From the Church of Rome we have many learned men,* 1.703 servants of the Pope, who affirm that all Government•• Ecclesiastical belongs to him; that he onely can make lawes of Religion, that in that he hath a compul∣sory over Kings, who are his subjects, dependant upon him, by him to be commanded in matters of religion; to which all temporalties are so subordinate, that if not directly, (as some of them say) yet indirectly, as most of them say, in ordine ad Spirituale bonum, for the good of the Church

and of religion he can dispose of them. The great defenders of this doctrine area 1.704 Bellarmine andb 1.705 Baronius,c 1.706 Harding andd 1.707 Eudaemon Johannes, e 1.708 Fevardentius andf 1.709 Mariana,g 1.710 Boucher andh 1.711 Ficklerus,i 1.712 Alexander Carerius andk 1.713 D. Marta,l 1.714 Doleman, and generally the Jesuits, and all the Ca∣nonists.

On the other side,* 1.715 the Presbytery pretends mightily to the scepter of Jesus Christ, as the Pope does to the Keyes of S. Peter, and they will have all Kings submit to that; as there is all the reason in the world they should: but by this scepter of Christ they mean their own classical meetings, and the Government that themselves have set up the other day; to which the first inventer of it was at first forc'd pitifully to beg suffrages of allowance, and that it might be endur'd; but as ill weeds use to doe, it quickly grew up to that height, that like the Bramble it would be King, and all the birds and beasts must come under the shadow of it. The great Masters of this invention after Calvin arem 1.716 Beza,n 1.717 Cartwright,o 1.718 Lambertus Danaeus,p 1.719 Gellius Snecanus,q 1.720 Guil. Bucanus,r 1.721 Hermannus Renecherus,s 1.722 Buchanan,t 1.723 Chri∣stopher Goodman,u 1.724 Brutus Celta,w 1.725 Francisc. Hottoman, the Author of the Book called Speculum tyrannidis Philippi Regis,x 1.726 and the Dialogues of Phi∣ladelphus: and if any one would see more of these, he may find enough of them in the writings of that Excellent and Prudent Prelate D^r Bancroft Archbishop of Canterbury.

Concerning the pretences of the Church of Rome,* 1.727 they are as inva∣lid as can be wish••t. For although there are some overtures of Scripture made, as Tibi dabo claves, and Ecce duo gladii, and Pasce oves, which are strange arguments to considering persons to prove the Pope superiour to Kings, (and concerning them I shall not need to use any argument, but set down the words of the Bishop of Maestricht in an excellent oration of his recorded by Aventine.* 1.728 Ambitiosi & superbi sunt qui illud Domini Dei∣que nostri elogium, Quodcunque solveris super terram, &c. & quodcunque li∣gaveris erit ligatum, &c. perfrictâ fronte interpretando adulterant, suae libi∣dini servire cogunt, & nobis ceu pueris, & omnium rerum imperitis, astu illu∣dere student, They that expound such words of Christ to serve their pride or lust of Empire are impudent, and think us to be fools and children, and fit to be cosen'd and fool'd out of our senses:) yet these were made no use of to any such purpose for many Ages after the Apostles death; and there∣fore upon wiser accounts they cause this great article to rely upon some prudential motives, and some great precedents and examples. The parti∣culars I shall consider in the following numbers: but that which here lies in my way is their great boast of the fact of Pope Zachary deposing Childeric King of France in the year 750, and appointing Pepin the Kings Marshall to be King in his Room. Upon the warranty of this Example Gregory the 7^th endeavour'd to justify his proceedings against the Emperour Henry 4^th.* 1.729 Bellarmine will not endure with patience to hear that any one did this feat but the Pope onely; and on all hands they contend mightily that it was he, and not the Nobles and people of France. They indeed were willing but they had no authority, therefore they appeal'd to him as the Ordinary Judge; and he declared for Pepin, and God declared for that Judgement that it was according to his will: for the event was blessed, Pepin was pros∣perous, and his son Charles the Great grew a mighty Prince, and France a

potent Empire, and Religion and the Church had great increment and more advantages then before or since.

But when men judge of actions by the events,* 1.730 they onely shew them∣selves willing to be cosen'd by prosperity, and that they will endure nothing that hath affliction with it; but so they become advocates for the greatest villanies, because they could never come to their greatnesse if they were unprosperous. And therefore there is no judging of lawful or unlawful by the event, till the last event be tried: and at the day of our death and at the day of Judgement, the event of things is the best argument and the best trial of right and wrong. But besides this, the folly of these men is infi∣nitely seen in this very instance. For it is no wonder that the Church of Rome was prosperous and did thrive upon that change: Pepin and Pope Zachary helped one another and divided the spoil; and Pepin and Charles having no warranty and reputation in that treasonable surprize of the Crown of France, but what they had from the opinion the world then had of the Bishop of Rome, it concern'd Charles to advance the Papacy, that the Papacy might support him. But by all that is before him in this world, a man knows not whether he be worthy of love or hatred, saith Solomon; and a mans fortune is seen in his children: and therefore if the Popes servants would look a little further then their own advantages, they might have consider'd what is observed by Paulus Aemilius and Beneventus of Imola, that in the days of Charles the Great, who was son to Pepin, the Empire was divided; (which was the curse in which God punish'd Solomon in the person of Rehoboam) that his son Ludovicus Pius was serv'd just as his Grand∣father serv'd his Master the King, for his son Lotharius did most unnatu∣rally rebel against him, depos'd him and thrust him into a cloister; and that he himself felt the judgement of God, for himself also was depos'd, and succeeded to by Lewis the second, who was prosperous in nothing, but in every undertaking the wind blew in his face. His son was Ludovicus nihili, so they call'd him; a cypher of a King, and stood for nothing. He indeed left an heire to the Crown: but he also was a man that had no heart, and his son had no head; for Charles the Bald was an extreme pitiful coward, and Charles le gross was a fool. After these succeeded Arnulph, who was eaten up with lice, the sad disease of Herod; and in his son Lewis the fourth that race was quite extinguish'd. And now if we judge of things by the event, have we not great reason even upon this account to suspect the fact of Zachary, (though it was not his authority, but his consent and his con∣federacy with the Rebel) to be extremely displeasing to Almighty God, when there was not one of his line but went away with a share of the Di∣vine anger? But such reasonings as these concern none but them who feel them; they may suspect the thing, and better examine their confidences when they feel any extraordinary evils, which most commonly are the con∣sequents of a great sin and a mighty displeasure. But others are to doe as they should have done at first, goe by rule, and not venture upon the thing to see what will become of it. * Being now quit of this by which they have made so much noise; all their other little arguments will soon melt away when they come to be handled.

But as for the other pretenders (viz.* 1.731 those of the Presbytery,) to a power superior to Kings in Ecclesiastical Government; they have not yet proved themselves to have received from Christ any power at all, to go∣vern

in his Church; and therefore much lesse by virtue of any such power to rule over Kings. I doe therefore suppose these Gentlemen not much concerned in this question, because they are uncapable of making claime; not onely because Religion is no pretence to Regalities, and that Spiritual power is of a nature wholly different from the power of Kings; but because if the Spiritual were to be above the Temporal, yet even then they are not the better. For they have not onely none of that Spiritual power which can pretend to Government, but it does not yet appear that they have any at all: and this relies upon the infinite demonstrations of Episcopal Govern∣ment and power; which being one of the words and works of Christ, must needs be as firme as heaven and earth. But if they be concern'd, they will be concluded.

And first in general,* 1.732 it is necessary that the supreme power of Kings or States should be governors in Religion, or else they are but half Kings at the best,* 1.733 for the affaires of Religion are one half of the interest of man∣kind: and therefore the laws of the XII Tables made provision for religion as well as for the publick interest.

Jus triplex tabulae quod ter sanxêre quanternae Sacrum,* 1.734 Privatum, & populi commune quod usquam est.

And this is so naturally and unalterably entail'd upon the supreme power, that when Attalus the King of the Pergamenians made the people of Rome his Heire with these words onely, Populus Rom. bonorum meorum haeres esto, Let the people of Rome be Heire of all my goods; by [His goods] they under∣stood, Divina Humanáque,* 1.735 publica & privata, saith Eutropius, & Florus, all power in things publick and private, Humane and Divine. For since Reli∣gion is that great intercourse between God and us, it is impossible to deny to him who stands next to God the care of that by which we approach nearest to him;* 1.736 and this I learn'd from Justine. Jure ille à Diis proximus habetur per quem Deorum Majestas vindicatur, He is rightly plac'd next un∣der God, by whom the Majesty of God is asserted. And therefore the Chri∣stians must alter their style, and no more say that the Prince is homo à Deo secundus, & solo Deo minor, (which are the words of Tertullian) next to God, and onely lesse then him, if between God and the Prince there is all that great distance and interval of the Government of Religion. He is the best and greatest person that rules the best and greatest interest: and it was rightly observed of S. Paul concerning controversies civil, for money or land,* 1.737 Set them to judge who are least esteemed amongst you; for that is of the least concerne: but he that is Judge of life and death, that is, the Gover∣nour of bodies, and he that governs the greatest affaires of souls, he indeed ought to be of highest estimation. Bishops and Priests are the great Mini∣sters of Religion, but Kings are the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the great Rulers and Governours of it. And this is easy to distinguish. For as the Kings Judges and Coun∣cel learned in the Law minister law to the people, yet the King is the supreme judge in law; and the Kings Captains and souldiers fight his bat∣tels, and yet he is summus Imperator, and the power of the Militia is his: so it is in religion, it must be ministred by persons ordained to the service, but govern'd by himself: He is not supreme unlesse he have all the power of Government.

2. The care of religion must needs belong to the supreme Magistrate,* 1.738 because religion is the great instrument of political happinesse: ad magnas Reip.* 1.739 utilitates retinetur religio in civitatibus, saith Cicero; and unlesse he have power to manage and conduct it, and to take care it be rightly ordered, the supreme power hath not sufficient to defend his charges. If the Prince cannot conduct his Religion, he is a supreme Prince just as if he had not the militia; or as if he were Judge of right but not of wrong; or as if he could reward but not punish; or as if he had cognisance but of one half of the causes of his people; or as if he could rule at land but not at sea, or by night but not by day. But how if an enemy comes with a fleet against him, will he send a Brigade of horse to take a squadron of ships? The case is just the same; for if God breaks in upon a Nation for the evil administration of religion, how shall the Prince defend his people or answer to God for them? And this is no inconsiderable necessity: For besices that justice and charity, and temperance and chastity, and doing good and avoiding evil are parts of religion, and yet great material parts of government and the laws, the experience of mankind and natural reason teaches us that nothing is so great a security or ruine to a State as the well or ill administration of Religion.

Dii multa neglecti dederunt Hesperiae mala luctuose:* 1.740

and Cicero,* 1.741 Omnia prospera eveniunt colentibus deos, adversa spernentibus, The people that have care of Religion are prosperous, but unhappy when they are irreligious.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.742 saith Euripides; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.743

Religion is the band of families, and a strong foundation to Common∣wealths. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so Plutarch; it is the ligature of all communities, and the firmament of lawes: the same with that of Synesius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, First let religion be setled, because it is the strong Base and columne upon which a Kingdome does relie. And of this we have God himself a witnesse: Seek the Kingdome of heaven and the righte∣ousnesse thereof in the first place, and all these things [that is the necessaries of the world and of this life] shall be added. For so saith the Apostle, Piety is profitable to all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come. And to this that of Homer rarely accords,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

The sense of which is well enough rendred by that of Justinian,* 1.744 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that he would take care concerning Ecclesiastical government or the affaires of religion; for if this be kept in peace, all the whole republick will be prosperously administred, reliqua nobis exuberabit politia. So it is rendred by one of our Saxon Kings. The very trees will bring their fruit in due season, and the sea will give her fish, and the earth shall give her increase, when Kings take care of justice and religion.* 1.745 By religion Princes increase their Empire. So† 1.746 Cicero affirmes

of the Romans, non calliditate ac robore, sed pietate ac religione omnes gentes nationesque superavisse, They overcame all the Nations not by force or craft, but by piety and religion. To which purpose is that of Valerius Maximus, Non dubitaverunt sacris Imperia servire: ita se rerum humanarum futura regimen existimantia si Divinae potentiae bene atque constanter essent famulata, The Greatest Empires made no scruple of ministring to Religion, as believing that then they should most prosperously prevaile in the Governments of the world, if they well and constantly did service to the Divine Almighty power. Now this is not to be understood as if it meant that if a King were a good man and personally religious it would procure blessings for him and his people; though that be true in some proportion of events: but it signi∣fies that they should be religious Kings, that is, as such take care to defend, to promote, to conduct and to govern it to advantages and for the honour of God. And this observation is made by S. Austin in his epistle to Boni∣facius. How doe Kings serve the Lord in fear, but by forbidding and by a re∣ligious severity punishing those things which are done against the Lords Com∣mandements? For otherwise does he serve him as a Man, otherwise as a King. As a man he serves him by living faithfully: But as a King he serves him by establishing laws, commanding righteousnesse, and forbidding the con∣trary. So did Hezekiah serve God by destroying the Groves and the idol Tem∣ples, and all those things which were built against the Commands of God. In the like manner King Josiah did serve God: and the King of Nineveh serv'd him by compelling all the city to serve the Lord. Thus King Darius serv'd God by delivering the idol to Daniel to be broken, and casting his enemies into the Lions den: and Nebuchadnezzar serv'd him by forbidding by a terrible law all his subjects to blaspheme. For in this, Kings serve the Lord as Kings, when they doe those things for his service which they cannot doe but as Kings. Now if religion be the great interest, the preserver, the enlarger of King∣domes, it ought to be governed by the hands of these whose office it is to enlarge or to preserve them. For if the instrument be conducted by other hands, the event shall depend upon them, and then they, not Kings, shall be answerable for the felicity or infelicity of their Nations. And it was rarely well said of Plutarch,* 1.747 that a city might be as well built in the aire, without earth to stand upon, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as a republick can either be constituted or pre∣served without the support of religion. That supreme power therefore that hath no government of religion is defective in a necessary part of it's life and constitution.

3. The supremacy and conduct of religion is necessary to the supreme power,* 1.748 because without it he cannot in many cases govern his people. For besides that religion is the greatest band or laws, and conscience is the greatest endearment of obedience,* 1.749 and a security for Princes in closets and retirements, and his best guard a∣gainst treasons; it is also that by which the common peo∣ple can be carried to any great or good or evil designe. And therefore Livy observes of Numa, that to establish his Government he first setled religion, as supposing that nothing is more powerful to lead the people gently, or to drive them furiously, then to imprint in them the fear of God, or to scare them with religion. And there∣fore the Prince cannot rule without it: He is but the

shadow of a King and the servant of his Priests; and if they rule religion, they may also rule him. And that for two great causes.

1.* 1.750 Because the propositions and opinions of religion have and are di∣rectly intended to have great influence upon the whole life and all the actions of mankind. For how if the Ministers of religion preach the Stoi∣cal fate, and that all things that come to pass are unalterably predetermin'd, who need to care how he serves God, or how he serves his Prince? Sueto∣nius saies of Tiberius, that he was religionis negligentior, quippe persua∣sionis plenus cuncta fato agi, careless of religion, because he was fully perswa∣ded that all things came by destiny. To what purpose are laws or punish∣ments, rewards and dignities, prisons and axes, rods and Lictors, when it is injustice to punish a criminal for being unavoidably miserable? and then all government is at an end when there can be no vertue nor vice, no justice nor injustice: for what is alike necessary, is equally just. But upon some such account as this Plato said that they are not to be suffered in a Common-wealth who said that God is the Author of evil. * And what are likely to be the effects of that perswasion which is a great ingredient in the reli∣gion of some men, [That Dominion is founded in grace; that evil Princes may be deposed; that hereticks may be excommunicated, and their sub∣jects absolved from the oath of their allegiance; that faith is not to be kept with hereticks; that it is lawful to tell a lie before a Magistrate, pro∣vided we think up the truth; that Kings are but executioners of the de∣crees of the Presbytery; that all things ought to be in common?] By such propositions as these it is easy to overthrow the state of any Common-wealth; and how shall the Prince help himself, if he have not power to forbid these and the like dangerous doctrines? A Common-wealth fram'd well by laws and a wise administration, can by any one of these be fram'd anew and overturn'd. It is therefore necessary that the Prince hold one end of this staff, lest himself be smitten on the head.

2.* 1.751 The other great cause is this, Because religion hath great influ∣ence upon persons as well as actions; and if a false religion be set on foot, a religion that does not come from God, a religion that onely pretends God, but fears him not, they that conduct it can lead on the people to the most desperate villanies and machinations. We read in the life of Henry the third of England,* 1.752 that when he had promis'd any thing to his Nobility that he had no mind to perform, he would presently send to the Pope for a Bull of dispensation, and suppos'd himself acquitted: and who could suf∣fer such a religion that destroyed the being of contracts and societies, or bear the evils consequent to such a religion? And of the same nature, but something worse in the instance,* 1.753 is that which Arnaldus Ferronius tels of, that the Roman Lawyers answer'd to Ferdinandus Davalus, that at the com∣mand of the Pope he might take up arms against the Emperour Charls the fifth, his Prince, without any guilt of Treason. And it was yet very much worse which was done and said by the Pope John 22. against the Emperor Lewis the 4. Quod si nobis obtemperare detrectaverit,* 1.754 Patriarchis, Episcopis, cunctis Sacerdotibus, Principibus, Civitatibus imperamus ut eundem deserant, ac nobis parere cogant, Patriarchs and Princes, Bishops and Priests were not onely allowed, but commanded to forsake their Emperour, & to compel him to obey the Bishop of Rome. By these and much more it appears, the evil Ministers of a false religion have great powers of doing what they please:

Nam faciunt animos humiles formidine Divûm, Depressosque premunt ad terram—

They make the people absolute slaves, and lift them up again with bold∣ness to doe mischief. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Plu∣tarch, The rude people are easy and apt to superstition:* 1.755 and when they are in, they are ready for any violence. Superstitione qui est imbutus quietus esse non potest, said Cicero: they cannot be quiet when they have got a wild proposition by the end. And this is too much verified by the histories of almost all nations: for there is none but hath smarted deeply by the factions and hypocrisies of Religion.* 1.756 The Priests of Jupiter in the Island of Meroe did often send the people to kill their Kings. Eunus a Roman slave arm'd 60000 men upon pretence of a religious extasy and inspiration. Maricus in France did the like: so did an Egyptian in the time of Claudius the Emperor,* 1.757 mention'd by Josephus, who led after him 30000. men against the Romans. The two false Christs, the one in the time of Vespa∣sian, the other under Hadrian, prevailed to the extreme ruine of their mise∣rable country-men. Leo & the Turkish Annals tell us strange events & over∣throws of Government brought to pass by the arts of religion in the hands of Elmahel and Chemin Mennal in Africa: the first taking the Kingdome of Morocco from Abraham their King, together with his life; the other forcing the King of Fesse to yield unto him the Kingdome of Temesna. In Asia Shacoculis of the Persian Sect by his religion arm'd great numbers of men, and in three great battails overthrew the Turkish power, and put to hazard all their Empire.

They that knew none of these stories did know others like them,* 1.758 and at least knew the force of religion to effect what changes pleased them who had the conduct of it; and therefore all wise Princes, ancient and modern, took care to prevent the evil by such remedies and arts of government as were in their hands. Three remedies were found out; two by men, and one by God.

1.* 1.759 The ancient governments of the world kept themselves and their people the religion of their nation, that which did comply with their government, that which they were sure would cause no disturbance, as be∣ing that which was a part of the Government, was bred up with it, and was her younger sister; but of forraigne rights and strange and new religions they were infinitely impatient: by the prohibition and exclusion of which by their civil laws, as the supreme power secur'd the interest and peace of the republick, so it gave demonstration that the civil power was supreme also in the religion. Upon this account we find that Aristotle and A••axagoras were accused; Socrates and Protagoras were condemn'd, for holding opinions and teaching contrary to the religion of their country, and it was usual with the Athenians so to proceed:* 1.760 so Josephus writes of them, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they did severely punish any man that speak but a word against the religion established by law. The Scythians also put Anacharsis to death for celebra∣ting the feast of Bacchus by the Graecian rights—For these nations ac∣counted their country gods to be entertain'd and endear'd by their coun∣try religion, and that they were displeas'd with any new ceremonies. * But this thing was most remarkable in the state of Rome.* 1.761 For this was one of the charges which they gave to the Aediles, Ne qui nisi Romani Dii neque

alio more quam patrio colerentur. And Marcus Aemilius recited a Decree to this purpose,* 1.762 Ne quis in publico sacrove loco novo aut externo ritu sacrificaret. And this they made a solemn business of, saith Livy, quoties Patrum Avo∣rumque aetate negotium Magistratibus datum est ut sacra externa fieri vetarent, In the daies of our Ancestors they often made laws forbidding any stranger rites; but commanded that onely their own country gods should be wor∣shipped, and that after their country manner. For this was enjoyned in the laws of the XII. Tables, Nemo separatim Deos cabessit. No man must have a religion of his own, but that which is appointed by laws. And upon this stock Claudius banished the Jews from Rome, and quite extinguish'd the superstition of the Druides, which Augustus Caesar had so often prohibi∣ted. But most full to this purpose is the Narrative which Dio makes of the counsel which Mecaenas gave to young Octavian, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Worship God alwaies and every where according to your Country Customs, and compel others so to doe: but hate and punish the bringers in of strange religions; because they who bring in new Deities and formes of worship, they persuade men to receive other laws, and make leagues, Covenants, factions and confederacies.

And therefore to prevent innovations in religion,* 1.763 the Romans often inquir'd after those who had books of strange religions, and when they found any they burn'd them;* 1.764 as we find in Livy and Suetonius. They would not suffer the rites of religion to be publickly disputed: and Augustus would not have the Causes of the Rites of Ceres heard in open Court. And when Ptolemy of Egypt was press'd to hear the Controversy between the Jewes and the Samaritans concerning the Antiquity of their Religion, he would not admit any such dispute, till the Advocates would undertake their cause to be just upon the pain of death, so that they who were overcome in the cause should die for it; and that they should use no argu∣ments but those which were taken from the received laws of their Coun∣try, the law of Moses:* 1.765 they did so, and the advocates of the Samaritan party being overcome were put to death. For they knew that to introduce a new religion with fiercenesse and zeal would cause disturbances and com∣motions in the Common-wealth; and none are so sharp, so dangerous and intestine as those which are stirred by religion. Pro aris & focis is the great∣est of all contentions, for their Countrey religion and their Countrey dwel∣lings: for their Altars and their hearths even old women and children will car∣ry clubs and scalding water.* 1.766 This caution therefore was also observ'd by Christian Princes. Justinian gave in charge to the Proconsul of Palaestine to prevent all popular tumults which from many causes use to disturb the Pro∣vince, tum verò maximè ex diversitate religionum….quandoquidem ut mul∣tos illic tumultus existere cernimus, neque leves horum eventus: but especi∣ally those that proceed from diversities of religion; for this begets many tu∣mults, and these usually sit very heavy upon the Common-wealth: the changes of religion being most commonly the most desperate paroxysmes that can happen in a sickly state. Which Leontinus Bp. of Antioch express'd pret∣tily by an Emblem; for stroaking of his old white head, he said, When this snow is dissolv'd, a great deal of dirty weather would follow: meaning when the old religion should be question'd and discountenanc'd, the new

religions would bring nothing but trouble and unquietnesse.

This course of forbidding new religions is certainly very prudent,* 1.767 & infinitely just and pious. Not that it is lawful for a Prince to persecute the religion of any other Nation, or the private opinion of any one within his owne; but that he suffer none to be superinduc'd to his owne to the danger of peace and publick tranquillity. The persuasions of religion are not to be compell'd: but the disturbances by religion are to be restrained by the laws. And if any change upon just reason is to be made, let it be made by authority of the supreme: ut respublica salva sit; that he may take care that peace and blessings may not goe away to give place to a new probleme. When it is in the Princes hands he can make it to comply with the publick laws, which he then does best of all when he makes it to become a law it self. But against the law no man is to be permitted to bring in new reli∣gions, excepting him onely who can change the law, and secure the peace. Beyond this no compulsion is to be us'd in religion:* 1.768 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said S. Clemens Alexandrinus, All religion must enter by exhortation; for it is intended to beget a desire in our mind that is of the same cognation, a desire of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.* 1.769 The same with that of Theodoricus King of the Romans, Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat invitus: and Theobaldus writing to the Emperor Ju∣stinian argued well,* 1.770 Since God himself is pleas'd to permit many religions, we dare not by force impose any one; for we remember to have read that we must sacrifice to God with a willing mind, not by the command of any one that compels. And therefore the old Romans, the Greeks, the Scythians, although they would admit no new religion amongst their own people, would permit to every Nation to retain their own; by this practice of theirs declaring that religion is not to be forc'd abroad, nor chang'd at home, but that it was by the supreme power of the Republick to be conducted so as to comply with the interest of the Commonwealth. This was the first remedy against the evils of religious pretences; which by being con∣ducted in the hands of the Civil power shews that to be supreme even in the Questions of Religion.

2. The other which was found out by Men,* 1.771 is that they did take the priesthood into the hands of the supreme civil power; and then they were sure that all was safe.* 1.772 The Egyptians chose their priests out of their Schools of learning, and their Kings out of their Colledges of Priests. The Kings of Aritia, a place not far from Alba, were also priests of Diana: The same is reported of the priests of Bellona, that they were the Kings of Cappodocia, saith Hirtius; and the priests of Pantheon were supreme Judges of all causes, and conductors of all their warres. The Kings of Persia were alwayes consecrated to be Princes of the ceremonies, so was the King of Lacedaemon: and at this day the Kings of Malabar are also Bra∣menes or priests; and it was a law amongst the Romans, Sacrorum omnium potestas sub Regibus esto, The power of religion and all holy things was to be under their Kings:* 1.773 and Virgil ever brings in his Prince Aeneas as president of the sacrifical rites; and of something to the same purpose Ovid makes mention,* 1.774

Utque ea nunc certa est, ita Rex placare Superna Numina lanigerae conjuge debet ovis.

The King with the sacrifice of a Ram was to appease the Gods.* 1.775 So did Romu∣lus and Numa; Romulus auspiciis, Numa sacris constitutis fundamenta jecerunt Romanae civitatis, said Cicero: they built Rome, and religion was the foundati∣on of the city. And the same custome descended with the succeeding Kings, as Dionysius Halicarnassaeus reports, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, They had the government of all sacrifices and holy rites, and whatsoever was to be done to the Holy Gods, was done by them.

When afterwards they separated the priesthood from the civil power,* 1.776 they appointed a sacrificing King to take care of the rites, but they kept him from all intermedling with civil affaires; he might beare no office in the Common-wealth,* 1.777 nor have any imployment in the army, nor make an oration to the people, nor meddle with publick affaires: and yet be∣sides this caution, the supreme Magistrate was Pontifex Maximus; and al∣though he did not usually handle the rites,* 1.778 yet when he pleas'd he made laws concerning the Religion,* 1.779 and punish'd the Augurs, and the Vestal virgins, and was superior to the Rex sacrorum, and the whole College of priests.

But when the Common-wealth was changed into Monarchy,* 1.780 Augustus annexed the great Pontificate to the Imperial dignity, and it descended even to the Christian Emperors, who because it was an honourary title, and was nothing but a power of disposing religion, they at first refus'd it not: but upon this account it was that Tacitus said of the Roman Emperor,* 1.781 nunc Deûm munere summum Pontificem summum hominum esse, The greatest priest is also the greatest Prince. * Now this device of theirs would indeed doe their businesse, but it was more then was needfull. For though it were certain that religion in the hands of the supreme Magistrate should never disturb the publick; yet it might be as sure if the Ministery were in other hands, and the Empire and conduct of it in their own. And that was Gods way.

3. For God hath instrusted Kings with the care of the Church,* 1.782 with the custody of both the Tables of his Law, with the defence of all the per∣sons of his Empire; and their charge is to preserve their people in all god∣linesse and honesty, in peace and in tranquillity: and how this can be done without the supreme care and Government of religion is not easie to be un∣derstood.

4. But this appears in that Kings, that is, the supreme power of every Nation, are vicegerents of Christ,* 1.783 who is Head of the Church, and Heire of all things;* 1.784 He ruleth with a rod of iron; He is Prince of the Kings of the earth; The onely potentate, King of Kings and Lord of lords; To him is given all power in Heaven and Earth,* 1.785 and by him Kings reigne.* 1.786 So S. Athanasius,* 1.787 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Christ taking his throne hath translated it & given it to holy Christi∣an Kings to return them back to the house of Jacob. The Fathers of the Council of Ariminum writing to Constantius the Arrian Emperor, say to him, that by Christ he had his Empire given him; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, By him thou

art appointed to reigne over all the world. And upon this account Liberius gave him this advice, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Fight not against him who hath given thee this Empire; and in stead of thanksgivings, pay him not with dishonour. For the Prince being an Arrian and denying the Divinity of Christ, did dis∣honour the Prince of the Kings of the earth, who had deserved better at his hands. The consequent of this consideration is this, If Christ as the su∣preme King does rule his Church, and in this kingdome hath deputed the kings of the earth, and his vicars they are, then they are immediately under him in the Government of Christs Church. For Christ in Heaven is both King and Priest. As King he reigns over all the world for the glory of his Father and the good of his elect; as Priest he intercedes for all mankind, and particularly for them who shall be heires of Salvation. Now in both these relations he hath on earth deputed certain persons to administer and to imitate his kingdome and priesthood respectively. For he governs all the world, but he does it by his Angel Ministers, and by Kings his depu∣ties. He officiates in his priesthood himself, and in this he hath no deputy; for he intercedes for us continually: but he hath appointed an order of holy and consecrated persons to imitate the offices of this priesthood, to minister the blessings of it to the people, to represent the death of the Crosse, to preach pardon of sins to the penitent, to reconcile lapsed and returning sin∣ners, that is, to minister to the people all the blessings which he by the office of priesthood procures in Heaven for us. Now it is certain that he hath made deputies of his Kingdome; for all power being given to him as the great King, there can be no Government upon earth but what he appoints. The Government is upon his shoulders, and all the earth is his inheritance, and therefore from him all just Government is deriv'd. Now it being manifest that he is the fountain of all Kingly power, it is also as manifest that all this power is delegated to the Kings of the earth; for by me Kings reigne, saith the wisdome of God, and it is one of his most glori∣ous appellatives, that he is Prince of the Kings of the earth; and it is as cer∣tain that none of this kingly power was given to the ministers of religion, but expressly denied to them. The Kings of Nations exercise dominion; that's their province: but it shall not be so amongst you: But he that is greatest amongst you let him be your minister. That's your state, you are ministers of the kingdome to other purposes, in other manners; you doe your work by serving, by humility, by charity, by labours and compliance, by gentle treatments and the gentlest exhortations; nothing of a King is to be in you,* 1.788 but the care: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for to joyne the kingdome and the priest∣hood Evangelical is to joyne in one band things of the most differing nature: for the name of Kings hath power and constraint, Rods and axes; the name of priests and Apostles hath in it nothing but gentle manners and holy ministeries. Kings can compel; the ministers of religion must intreat. They can kill; but at the most these can but rebuke sharply. These can cut off from spiritual communion, and deny to give them mysteries that will hurt the wicked and the indispos'd; but they can cut them off from life it self. Kings justly seek honours, wealth and dignity, and it is al∣lowed them by laws and by necessity, and by their reason: But priests must not seek their owne, but only the things of Jesus Christ. They must indeed be maintain'd; the oxe cannot labour if his mouth be musled: but though this be his maintenance it must be no part of his reward. Our bles∣sed

Saviours word is rendred by S. Matthew by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.789 The Kings of the people doe rule Imperiously. This very word is also us'd by S. Peter, and forbidden to the elders of the Church, and to it is oppos'd 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to feed the flock like shepherds. The manner of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 us'd by S. Paul, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 us'd by S. Matthew and S. Peter, the exercising dominion is compulsion, and great riches: this is also forbidden to the Clergy, they must not doe any thing 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not for profit to themselves, not with violence or imposing necessity upon others. The Ministers of religion are very considerable in this Kingdome of Christ, to promote and to advance it by holy preachings and holy ministrations: but it is true which was solemnly declar'd in Babylon to the prince of the Captives, officium ipsi non potestatem injungi, et ab eo die incipiendum ipsi servire omnibus; their eminency is nothing but an eminency of service, it is the greatest ministery in the kingdome, but hath in it the least of Empire. But of this I shall have occasion to give a fuller account. For the present, that which the present argument intends to perswade is, that the Ministers of religion are onely officers under Christs priesthood, but subjects in his kingdome, which is administred by Angels and Christian princes in all the Imperial, in the defensive and coactive parts and powers of it. The Christi∣an King or supreme magistrate can doe every thing 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Comatenus said, onely except the sacred Ministeries: which is the same which was said by the famous Bishop of Corduba, Hosius in Athanasius; Neque igitur fas est nobis interris Imperium tenere, neque tu sacrorum et thymi∣amatum habes potestatem, Imperator, hoc est jus adolendi. The good Bishop was speaking of the fact of Ozias, who though he had power over the priests, yet had nothing to do to meddle with the rites of priesthood: It is not law∣ful for us to meddle with Empire or the rights of Government; nor for thee, O Emperour, with the rites of incense. The summe is this, If Christ by his kingly power governs his Church, and Christian Kings are his Deputies, then they also are the Supreme under Christ of the whole Government of the Church.

5. So that now I shall not need to make use of the precedents of the Old Testament,* 1.790 nor recite how David order'd the courses of the Levites, the use of the bow in the Quire, the solemnities of publick service, nor how Solomon put Abiathar from the High-priesthood, nor how Jehu, nor Hezekiah, nor Josiah reform'd religion, pull'd down Idols, burnt the groves, destroyed the worship of Baal, reduc'd the religion of the God of Israel. This indeed is an excellent argument, because it was a time in which God gave his Priests more secular eminency and external advan∣tages then ever he did since, and also because Christ chang'd nothing in the kingdomes of the earth; he left them as he found them, onely he intended to make them ministers and portions of his kingdome; and that they should live privately, and govern publickly by his measures, that is, by the justice and mercy Evangelical. But this argument I was the more willing to touch upon because the Church of England much relies upon it in this question, and excommunicates those who deny the Supreme civil power to have the same authority in causes Ecclesiastical, which the pious Kings of the Hebrews had over the Synagogue: But I find the ancient Doctors of the Church pressing much upon the former medium, That Christ hath specially intrusted his Church to Christian Princes. For,

6. Christ shall call Christian Kings to account for souls.* 1.791 Cognoscant Principes seculi Deo se debere rationem reddere propter Ecclesiam quam à Christo tuendam suscipiunt. Nam sive, augeatur pax & disciplina Eccle∣siae per fideles Principes, sive solvatur, ille ab eis rationem exigit qui eorum potestati suam Ecclesiam credidit,* 1.792 said Isidore Hispalensis. Let the Princes of the world know that they must give an account to God for the Church which they have received from Christ into their Protection. For whether the peace and Discipline of the Church be encreased by faithful Princes, or whether it be dissolv'd, he who hath intrusted his Church to their power will exact an ac∣count from them. And therefore P. Leo to Leo the Emperor gave this adver∣tisement,* 1.793 Debes incunctanter advertere Regiam potestatem tibi non solum ad mundi regimen, sed maximè ad Ecclesiae praesidium esse collatam, You must di∣ligently remember that the supreme power is given to you not onely for the government of the world, but especially for the safety and defence of the Church. Now this defence not being onely the defence of guards, but of lawe; not onely of persons, but especially of Religion, must needs inferre that Kings have something more to doe in the Church then the Court of Guards hath: he defends his subjects in the service of God; he defends and pro∣motes this service; he is not to defend them if they disserve Christ, but to punish them, and of this he is Judge and Exactor: and therefore this de∣fence declares his right and Empire. Ex quo Imperatores facti sunt Chri∣stiani res Ecclesiae ab ipsis dependisse: so Socrates expresses this question. Ever since the Emperors became Christian the affaires of the Church have de∣pended upon them. They did so before, but they did not look after them: they had the power from Christ, but they wanted his grace: they owed duty to him, but they paied it not, because they had no love for him. And therefore Christ took what care he pleas'd, and supported it in persecution, and made it grow in despite of opposition: and when this he had done long enough to prove that the religion came from God, that it lost nothing by persecution, but that his servants loved him and died for him, then he cal∣led the Princes into the house of Jacob, and taught them how to admini∣ster his power to the purposes of his own designement. Hence come those expressions us'd often by Antiquity concerning Kings, calling them Vicarios Dei, verae religionis Rectores, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Deputies of God, Governours of true Religion, the Captains and Conductors of faith and God∣linesse; ad quorum curam,* 1.794 de qua Deo rationem reddituri erant, res illa maximè pertinebat, For to their care Religion and the Church did belong, and con∣cerning that care they were to give an account to God.

Now if we descend to a consideration of the particular charges and offices of Kings in relation to the Church,* 1.795 it will not onely be a mighty ve∣rification of the Rule, but also will minister to the determination of many cases of Conscience concerning Kings and concerning the whole order Ec∣clesiastical. This I shall doe in the following Rules, which are but appen∣dices to this.

RULE V. Kings have a legislative power in the affaires of Re∣ligion and the Church.

THis is expressely taught by S. Austin.* 1.796 In hoc Reges sicut eis divinitus praecipitur Deo serviunt in quantum Reges sunt,* 1.797 si in suo regno bona jubeant, mala prohibeant, non solùm quae pertinent ad humanam societatem, verùm etiam quae pertinent ad Divinam religionem, In this Kings in that capacity serve God according to the Divine Commandement, if in their respe∣ctive kingdomes they command good things and forbid evil, not onely in rela∣tion to humane society, but in order to religion.

The least part of this power is to permit the free exercise of it,* 1.798 and to remove all impediments, and to give it advantages of free assemblies, and competent maintenances and just rewards and publick encouragements. So Cyrus and Darius gave leave and guards and rescripts, warranty and provi∣sions and command to the Jewes of the Captivity to build the Temple. So Constantine and Licinius did to the Christians to practise their religion. Thus Hezekiah and some other pious Kings of the Hebrews took away the offences of the people, the brazen serpent, the groves and images, the altar of Bethel, and the idolatrous services. And of these things there is little question; for the Christian Princes by their Authority shut up the Temples of the Heathen Gods.

That which is yet more considerable is,* 1.799 that by punishments they compel their Subjects to serve God and keep his Commandements. That which was observed of the Primitive Christians, that they tied themselves by oaths and Covenants to serve God, to doe justice, not to commit a∣dultery, to hurt no man by word or deed, to doe good to every man they could, to assemble together to worship Christ, that Christian Princes are to secure by laws, that what men will not doe by choice, they may whether they will or no; and this not onely in things relating to publick peace and the interest of the Republick, but in the immediate matters of religion: such as are laws against swearing, against Blasphemy, against drunkennesse and fornication and the like, in which the interest of souls is concerned, but not the interest of publick peace. Hoc jubent Imperatores quod jubet Christus; and it is a great service to Christ that the fear of men be superadded; be∣cause to wicked persons and such for whom the severity of laws was made, it often prevailes more then the fear of God.

But that which is more then all this is,* 1.800 that besides those things in which God hath declar'd his will, the things of the Church, which are di∣rectly under no Commandement of God, are under the supreme power of Christian Princes. I need no other testimony for this but the laws them∣selves which they made, and to which Bishops and Priests were obedient and profess'd that they ought to be so. And this we find in the instance

of divers Popes who in their epistles gave command to their Clergy to ob∣serve such laws which themselves had received from Imperial edicts. For there are divers laws which are by Gratian thrust into his collection which were the laws of Christian Princes. The Canon Judicantem. 13. q. 5. ex∣pressing the office of a Judge in the Cognisance of causes, attributed by Gratian to Pope Eleutherius, was a law made by the Emperor Constantine, l. 1. C. de Judic. C. Theodos. and so was that which was attributed to P. Fabian against accusers, Can. si quis iratus: it is in the Theodosian Code and was made by the same Prince. The Canons which goe under the names ofa 1.801 Sixtus andb 1.802 Adrian and Fabian before cited of the same title were made by Gratian the sonne of Valentinian the Elder:c 1.803 who also made the rescripts for restitution of Church-goods taken from Bishops when they were forc'd from their Sees, attributed to Pope Caius and Pope John. Theodosius the Emperour made the Canon qui ratione* 1.804 for order in accusations, which yet is attributed to Pope Damasus, but is in the Theodosian Code: for thus the Popes easily became law-givers when they adopted into the Canon the laws of their Princes, which by their authority prevail'd beyond the memory of their first makers. The Canon Consanguineos,* 1.805 for separation of mar∣riage within the prohibited degrees, was not the Popes, but made by Theo∣dosius, as it is thought, at the instance of S. Ambrose: and Valentinian made the Canon Privilegia for confirmation of the privileges of the Church,* 1.806 which goes under the Name of Anacletus. I could reckon divers others, for indeed the volume of the Decrees is full of such constitutions which the Christian Emperors made, but they were either assumed by the Popes or imputed to them. But that the Popes as Ecclesiastics had no authority to make laws of Ecclesiastical affaires, but that the Emperors had, was suffi∣ciently acknowledged by Pope Honorius.* 1.807 Imperator Justinianus decrevit ut Canones Patrum vim legum habere oporteat, That the Canons of the Fathers became a law in the Church, was by the constitution of the Emperor Justinian. For that was all the end both of the labours of warre and the Counsels of peace, ut veram Dei cultum orbis nostri plebs devota custodiat, said Theodosius and Honorius in their letters to Marcellinus: that our people may devoutly follow the true worship of God.

Upon this account we find that Constantine,* 1.808 Anastasius and Justinian made laws concerning the expence and rites of sepulture. Gratian, Valen∣tinian and Theodosius forbad dead corps to be interred within the memo∣rials of Martyrs and Apostles. Honorius appointed the Number of Deanes in the Metropolis, and the Immunities of every Church. Leo and Anthemius forbad alienation of Church-lands. But what should I instance in parti∣culars? they that know not this are wholly strangers to the Civil law, par∣ticularly the first book of the Code, the Authentics, the Capitulars of the French Princes, the laws of the Goths and Vandals, and indeed of all the Christian Princes of the world. But the first titles of the Code, De summa Trinitate & fide Catholica, De sacrosanctis Ecclesiis, De Episcopis & Cle∣ricis, De Episcopali Audientia, De haereticis, Manichaeis, Samaritis, De Apostatis, and divers other are witnesses beyond exception. * Now in this there is no exception of matter. For whatsoever is under Govern∣ment is also under the laws of Princes:* 1.809 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Justinian. Nothing comes amisse to the Prince, every thing is under the Royal cognisance. Constantine made laws concerning festivals, and appointed what labours might and what might not be done upon the Lords

day;* 1.810 and so did Leo the Emperour. Valentinian the Elder made a law that no Clergy-man should receive an inheritance by the will or gift of widdows and orphans, unlesse they were of the Kindred. S.† 1.811 Ambrose complains heavily of the law,* 1.812 and so does S.* 1.813 Hierome, but confesses it was just, and pro∣cur'd by the avarice of some Clergy-men who under cover of religion made a prey of the widdows. But this Decree was sent to Pope Damasus and publickly read in the Churches of Rome. And Honorius the Emperor made a law concerning the election of the Pope. Which two last instances I reckon to be very great, because at Rome now-a-daies they are intolerable.

But if all these laws were made by Emperors onely by force,* 1.814 against right & justice, & beyond their just power, then we are never the nearer for this argument:* 1.815 & that it is so, Baronius is bold to affirm, who upon this title blames Justinian for medling with the affaires of the Church: for Quid Imperatori cum Ecclesia? what hath the Emperor to doe with the Church? we know who said it. And therefore a Synod at Rome under Symmachus abrogated a law made by Basilius a Deputy of King Odoacer in an assembly of Ecclesiastical persons, in the vacancy of the See Apostolick, upon the death of Simplicius. Now the law was a good law, it forbad the alienation of the goods of the Church; yet because it was a law made by a laick, they thought fit to annul it.

To these things I answer,* 1.816 that it matters not what Baronius says against Justinian,* 1.817 for Pope Hadrian the 4^th, who is much more to be credited, commends him, & propounds him as a great Example imitable by all Princes: and it was not Justinian alone, but very many other Princes both before and after Justinian: and therefore to ask what hath the Emperour to doe with the Church? might become Donatus (whose saying it was, and whom S. Austin confuted for saying so) but it becomes not any man that loves truth and order.* 1.818 As for the Roman Synod under Symmachus, the matter was this. He would needs make himself head of a Synod without the Bishop, (for he was lately dead) and made a law with an Anathema for the Sanction, and would have it passe not for the law of the Prince, but for a law of the Church; which because the Ecclesiastics had no reason to accept for such, when it was not so, they did annul it: talem legem viribus carere, nec posse in∣ter Ecclesiastica ullo modo censeri, said Eulalius the Bp. of Syracuse in that Sy∣nod. * But that this makes nothing against the Prince his power of making laws, appears by the great submission which even the Bishops of Rome them∣selves made to the Imperial laws, even when they lik'd them, and when they lik'd them not. I instanc'd before in Damasus causing the law of Valen∣tinian against Clergy-men receiving inheritances from widdows to be read in all the Churches of Rome. Pope Boniface consented to the law which Honorius the Emperor made about the election of the Pope, and was so far from repudiating an Ecclesiastical law made by the Prince, that he intreated him to make it. But that which is most material to this inquiry is, the obe∣dience of S. Gregory the great to Mauritius the Emperor,* 1.819 who made a law that no Souldier should turn Monk without his leave. This S. Gregory esteem'd to be an impious law, he modestly admonished the Emperour of the irreligion of it. But Maurice neverthelesse commanded him to pub∣lish the law. The good Bishop knew his duty, obeyed the Prince, sent it up and down the Empire, and grave this account of it: Utrobique quae debui exolvi, qui Imperatori obedientiam prabui, & pro Deo quod sensi minimè

tacui, I have done both my dutyes, I have declar'd my mind for God, and have paid my duty and obedience to the Emperour. Legibus tuis ipsi quoque pa∣rent Religionis Antistities,* 1.820 said Pope Gelasius to Anastasius the Emperor. Even the Bishops, the Ministers of Religion, obey thy laws. Now this is not for decency onely, & upon prudent considerations, but upon necessity and by the Divine authority: cognoscentes Imperium tibi supernâ dispositione colla∣tum, as knowing that the Empire is given to thee by God. And therefore the great Prelates of the Church, when they desir'd a good law for the Churches advantage should be made, they presently address'd themselves to the Em∣peror, as to him who alone had the legislative power. I have already in∣stanc'd in pope Boniface intreating Honorius to make a law concerning the election of the Pope. Sergius also Patriarch of Constantinople petition'd the Emperor Heraclius to publish a pragmatic sanction that no man should be admitted into the Clergy but into a dead place. * These things are so plain,* 1.821 that I may justly use the words of the Fathers of the 6^th Council of Toledo, speaking of Chintillanus their King, Nefas est in dubium deducere ejus potestatem cui omnium gubernatio superno constat delegata judicio, It is impiety to call in question his power, to whom the Government of all is certain∣ly deputed by the Divine Judgement. I therefore conclude this particular with the excellent words of Cardinal Cusanus.* 1.822 It becomes not any man to say that the most sacred Emperors, who for the good of the Republick did make many constitutions concerning the election of Bishops, collation of benefices, ob∣servation of religions, did erre. Nay, we have read that the Pope of Rome hath intreated them that they would publish laws concerning Divine worship, & for the publick good, and against sinners of the Clergy. And lest peradventure it be said that the strength of all these Constitutions did depend upon the appro∣bation of the Authority Apostolical or Synodical [viz. of the Pope or Council] I will not insist upon this: although (let me say this) I have read and collected fourscore and six chapters of Ecclesiastical Rules of the Antient Emperors, which were to no purpose to insert here, and many other of Charles the Great and his successors, in which many dispositions or appointments are to be found concerning the Pope of Rome, and all Patriarchs, and the conservation of Bi∣shops and others; and yet I never read that ever any Pope was ask'd to approve those laws, or if his approbation did intervene, that upon that account the laws did bind. But it is read that some Popes of Rome have confess'd that they had those Imperial laws in veneration. And this thing is so true and so publick∣ly known, that the French Embassadors openly told it in the Council of Trent, that the Kings of France, by the Example of Constantine, Theodo∣sius, Valentinian, Justinian and other Christian Emperors, made many laws concerning holy things, and that these did not onely not displease the Roman Bishops, but they put many of them into their Canons: that the chiefest Authors of these laws, Charles the Great and Lewis the ninth, they thought worthy to be Canonis'd and declar'd Saints, and that the Bi∣shops of France and the whole order Ecclesiastical have piously rul'd and govern'd the Gallican Church by the prescript of those Ecclesiastical laws which their Kings had made.

RULE VI. The Supreme Civil Power hath a power of Coercion of every person in the whole Order Ecclesiasti∣cal.

HE that sayes all must be subject,* 1.823 need not instance in particulars, and say that Titius and Sempronius, and the village Curate, and the Bishop of the Diocese must be subject. But yet because of the pretences of some, the Fathers of the Church have found it necessary to say, that even Eccle∣siastics must be subject;* 1.824 and that they are a part of the all. So S. Chrysostome explicating the words of S. Paul, saith [But Paul gives us those reasons which command us of duty to obey the powers; shewing that these things are commanded to all, not to Seculars only, but to Priests and Monks: which he shewes in the very beginning, when he saith, Let every soule be subject to the supereminent powers; although thou beest an Apostle, or an Evangelist, or a Prophet. For this obedience or subjection (be sure) will not destroy thy piety. That S. Chrysostom here speaks of secular powers is evident in the whole Homily, and it appears also in the words here reported; for he sayes that even an Apostle must be subject, who because he hath no Superior Ecclesiastical must be subject (if at all) to the Secular, or Supreme Civil power. And this place is so understood by S. Irenaeus lib. 1. cap. 24. S. Basil in Constit. monast. cap. 22. S. Ambrose upon this place, and S. Austin lib. de Catech. rud. c. 21. and contr. Parmen. l. 1. c. 7. who expressely derides those that expound the [higher powers of S. Paul] by Ecclesiastical ho∣nours.

But this thing is evident by notoreity of fact.* 1.825 Theodoret tells of Euse∣bius Bishop of Samosata,* 1.826 that when the Imperial edict of banishing him from his See, and sending him into Thrace, was brought by a messenger in the twilight, he charg'd him to say nothing, lest the people should tear the officer in pieces. But the Bishop according to his custome went to evening prayer; and then with one servant, with a book and a pillow went to the water side, took a boat and pass'd over to Zeugma. The people having soon miss'd their Bishop, followed him, found him out, would fain have brought him back; but he refus'd, and told them is was the precept of the Apostle, to be obedient to the higher powers: and upon that he rested, and they return'd. And the same was the submission, and the same was the reason of S. Athanasius, as appears in his Apology to Constantius the Arrian Emperor;* 1.827 and the same subjection was professed by Justin Martyr to Antoninus the Emperor, Nos solum Deum adoramus, et vobis in rebus aliis laeti inservimus, Imperatores ac Principes hominum profitentes, We onely worship God, in other things we chearfully serve you, as professing you to be Emperors and the Princes of mankind. Ego quidem jussioni subjectus, said S. Gregory to Mauritius, I am subject to command: and then it is cer∣tain, he was subject to punishment in case he disobeyed the command. Ad hoc potestas super omnes homines Dominorum meorum pietati coelitus data est.* 1.828 He had no more immunity then any man else, for from heaven a power is

given to the Prince over all men.* 1.829 The effect of this instance and these words of Gregory is acknowledged by Espencaeus, Gregorius Magnus agnoscebat Imperatoribus concessum esse dominari Sacerdotibus, Gregory the Great ac∣knowledged that to the Emperors it was granted to rule over the Priests.* 1.830 And the same was affirmed by Pope Honorius,* 1.831 Sancta Ecclesia legum saecularium non respuit famulatum quae aequitatis & justitiae vestigia imitantur, The Holy Church refuses not to obey secular lawes that are equal and just.

But I undertook to evidence the truth of this Rule by matter of fact and authentic precedents.* 1.832 Constantine received the Libells which the Bishops at Nice had prepar'd one against another. He told them indeed that it was more fit for them to judge him,* 1.833 then he them, and therefore he burn'd the papers;* 1.834 but this signified nothing but that it was a shame to them whose office was to reprove all sinners,* 1.835 to accuse one another of crimes be∣fore their Prince. But that this was nothing but a modest redargution of them appears, because he did upon their condemnation of Arrius banish him,* 1.836 and recalled him without their absolution of him.* 1.837 He banish'd Euse∣bius and Theognis, whom the Council had depos'd, and took cognisance of the cause between Athanasius and the Bishops his accusers;* 1.838 that it might appear what he had said to the Prelates at Nice was but a modest reproof or a civil complement, for it was protestatio contra factum. If he said that, he said one thing and did another. * His son Constantius caus'd Stephen Bishop of Antioch to be convened in the palace upon the law de vi publica, and the lex Cornelia de sicariis. His lay-Judges heard him, found him guilty, and commanded the Bishops to depose him from his Bishoprick and expel him out of the Church. His brother Constans heard Narcissus of Cilicia, Marcus the Syrian, Theodore of Thrace and Maris of Chalcedon against Athanasius and Paul Bishop of Constantiople.* 1.839 Valentinian the Emperor set a fine upon the head of Chronopius the Bishop,* 1.840 and inflicted divers punishments upon the Bishops Ursicinus,* 1.841 Ruffus, Ursus and Gaudentius for making schismes to the disturbance of the publick peace. Gratian the Emperor depos'd Instantius, Salvianus and Priscillian from their bishopris and banish'd them, and after∣wards recall'd them.* 1.842 Arcadius the Emperour heard S. Chrysostom's cause and banish'd him; and Pope Innocent, who found fault because he gave wrong Judgment, yet blam'd him not for usurping of a right to judge him. Theodosius the yonger imprison'd Bishop Memnon and S. Cyril of Alexan∣dria. Indeed the Prince was misinform'd by John of Antioch; but when by the Great Ephesine council, he was rightly instructed, he condemn'd John of Antioch, and afterwards released the two Bishops at the great & passionate * 1.843 petition and importunity of the Council of Ephesus. And when Ibas Bishop of Edessa had excommunicated some priests of his Diocese, they ap∣peal'd to the Emperor and were heard. Theodoric King of Italy receiv'd ac∣cusations against Pope Symmachus, and sent Altinus a Bishop to be the visitor of that See, and afterwards remitted the matter to a synod. Justinus the Emperor gave judgment upon Dorotheus Bishop of Thessalonica for sedition and homicide. Justinian banish'd Julian the Bishop of Halicarnassus, Se∣verus Bishop of Antioch, Peter of Apamea and Zoaras a Priest: but he also judged the cause of Pope Sylverius for certain treasonable letters; and re∣called him from banishment, but so that he should not be restor'd to his See, unlesse he were found innocent of the accusation.

I could reckon very many more instances to the same purpose,* 1.844 but these are as good as more; especially being but particulars of that power and just consequence of that authority which I have prov'd by the lawes of God and the confessions of the Church to be inherent in the Supreme power.* 1.845 I summe up this with the words of Balsamo. Quia statutum est nullum per alium injuriâ afficiendum, ipse Patriarcha ab Imperatore, qui Ecclesiae habet potestatis scientiam, judicabitur forte ut sacrilegus, vel malè de fide sentiens, vel alicujus criminis reus: Hoc enim judicialiter actum vidimus diversis tempori∣bus, Because it is commanded that one man should not injure another, the Patri∣arch himself shall be judged of the Emperor, who hath cognisance over the power of the Church peradventure for sacrilege, or for heresy, or for the guilt of any o∣ther crime; for we have divers times seen such judicial processes. And to the same purpose the seventh Canon of the first Council of Matiscon subjects the Clergy to the secular Judge in the causes of theft, witchcraft and murder; and the Council of Toledo which is cited c. filiis 16. q. 7. does the like in the matter of robbery or cosenage. For either Clergy-men are not sub∣jects, or they are bound by the lawes of their Prince. If they be not subjects, how come they free? If they be subjects, where is their privilege? or is the Spiritual calling of a nature so disparate and estrang'd from the Commonwealth, that it is no part of it? or is it better then the Secular? The questions are worthy inquiring after; but the decision of them will take off many prejudices from this great measure of Conscience, concer∣ning the fountain of humane lawes and Judicatories.

But upon a closer view of the particulars it will be found that the whole matter is a mistake;* 1.846 a false consequence drawn from a true estimate of religion: For all men grant that religion is the greatest excellency, that our soules are the biggest interest, that all our wealth is best imployed when it is spent in Gods service, that all things must yield to our duty to God: These are all very true, as every thing else is when it is truly un∣derstood; but what then? Therefore the ministers of religion are to be preferred before the ministers of policy? Well, suppose that, for it is true that every thing is best in it's own place and time. But what? therefore the ministers of religion are superior to Princes, whose Government & care, whose office and imployment is meerly temporall? That will not follow; nor this, Therefore the ministers of religion are in all things better; nor this, Therefore they are in nothing inferior; nor this, Therefore they are not sub∣ject to Civil Government, and civil punishments. But these things must be considered apart.

I. Question. In what sense the service of God is to be preferr'd before every thing else.

To this I answer,* 1.847 1. That if the service of God be taken in a sense oppos'd to any other thing which is not the service of God, there is no per∣adventure but it is to be preferred before every thing; for the question is no more then this, whether we ought to serve God, or not to serve him. For if that which is not Gods service comes in competition with that which is, if the first be preferr'd, God is directly despis'd.

2. If by the service of God is meant the vertue of religion express'd in externall action,* 1.848 as saying our Prayers, receiving the holy Sacrament, visiting Churches, sitting at the memorials of Martyrs, contemplation, fasting, silence, solitude, and the like, then it is as certain that the service of God in this sense is to be preferred before many things, but not before all things; not before many things of our ordinary life, not before many things of civil society. For to keep a holy-day is a part of the service of God, but not to be preferred before bodily labour in our trade, if that la∣bour be necessary for the feeding our family with daily bread. Contemplati∣on is an excellent part of the Divine service; but charitable actions are more useful. To heare a good Sermon is good; but to snatch even an oxe out of a pit is to be preferr'd before it. This our Blessed Saviour taught us in those excellent words, I will have mercy and not sacrifice. For not onely the precise vertue of religion is the Divine service, though by propriety it hath obtain'd the name: but the doing all our duties, the works of our calling, all charitable ministeries, all useful trades, all the graces of the spirit ex∣pressed in actions and obedience, is the service of God, and of one it can∣not be said, it is better then another; for they shall all be requir'd in their season. For,

3. It is one thing to inquire which is in it self more excellent,* 1.849 and an∣other thing to ask which we are to chuse; one thing to say this is to be pre∣ferr'd in estimation, and another to say this is to be preferr'd in practice. Ec∣stasies and raptures and conversing with blessed spirits are certainly actions and passions respectively of greater eminency then dressing the sores of poor boyes in Hospitals; and yet he that does this, serves Christ and does good, while he that followes after the others may fall into the delusions of the Devil. That which is best in it self is not best for me: it is best for the best state, but not for the state of men who dwell in imperfection. Strong meat is better then milk, but this is best for babes; and therefore he would but ill consult to the good of his child who, because it is a princely boy, would feed him with bief and venison, wild boare and the juice of great fishes. Certainly a Jewel is better then a piece of frize; and Gold is a more noble and perfect substance then barly: and yet frize and barly doe in their season more good then gold and Jewels, and are therefore much more eligible. For every thing is to be accounted of in it's own place and scene of eminency: the eye loves one best, and the tongue and pa∣late, the throat and stomack love the other. But the understanding which considers both gives the value according to the degree of usefulnesse, and to the end of it's ministery. Now though our understanding can consider things in their own perfections, and proportion honour and value to them; yet that which is better then honour, love and desire, union and fruition are due to those things most, which it may be we honour least. And there∣fore there are some parts of the service of God which are like meat and cloths, and some which are like gold and Jewels; we value and admire these, but we are to chuse the other: that is, we preferre one in discourse, and the other in use; we give better words to one, and better usages to the other. And therefore those parts of the Divine service which are most necessary, and doe most good to mankind, are to be chosen before those that look more splendidly, and in themselves import more perfection. The foundation of a house is better then the roof, though the roof be gilded; and that part of the service of God which serves the needs of mankind

most, is to be chosen before those which adorn him better: so that actions of high and precise religion may be the excellencies and perfections of a humane soul; but the offices of civil governours, their keeping men in peace and justice, their affrighting them from vile impieties, may doe much more good to mankind, and more glory to God in the whole event of things.

4. But then if it be inquir'd whether is better,* 1.850 Prayers or Government, a Pulpit or a Court of Judicature; I am to answer that they are both best in their time. The Pulpit rules on Sundays, the Court of Judicature all the week after. The Pulpit guides the Court, and the Court gives laws to the Pulpit. The Pulpit gives counsel to this, and this gives commands to that. But there is this difference, if the Pulpit says amisse we are not bound by it: but if the Court judges ill, we may complain, but we must submit. But then to inquire which is better, when they are both the servants of God, is to make a faction in the house of Unity; and as there can be no good end served in it, so there can be no good ground of reason or revelation by which it can be determin'd.

5. If the question at last be,* 1.851 whether is to be preferr'd, the service of God, that is, an act of religion, or an act of civil life; I answer, that ordi∣narily religion is to be preferr'd, when there can be a question reasonably ask'd which is to be chosen. That is, if it be indifferent as to the person, there is no indifference in the thing: for the religious act does more honour to God and more good to us. But it is because that where our life and time is empty of other duties, then and there is the time and proper season of religion. But if it be not indifferent to the man, but an act of life or civil calling be in it's season and appointment, then this is to be preferr'd be∣fore that.

6. Lastly,* 1.852 it is to be observed, that there are seasons ordinary and ex∣traordinary in our services of God. Every thing in it's season is to be pre∣ferr'd: and therefore upon Festivals we are to goe to Church and to publick offices, upon other days to follow the works of our calling: and so prefer both in their time. But sometimes these ordinary seasons are invaded by extraordinary necessities, and then that must prevail which is most neces∣sary in it's season, and the other must give place. Now because this hap∣pens often in the needs of our life, and not very often in the needs of Re∣ligion, therefore in cases of Natural or Political necessities, the things of the Commonwealth are to be preferr'd before the things of the Church; that is, the service of God in charity before the service of God in the ver∣tue of external religion: and the reason is, because this can stay, and the o∣ther cannot; and this can be supplied with the internall, that is, the religion of the heart, but that cannot be supplied with the charity of the heart.

Question II. Which are to be preferr'd, and which are better, things Spiritual or things temporal?

To this the Patrons of Ecclesiastic Monarchy give a ready answer out of S. Gregory Nazianzen,* 1.853 speaking to the Presidents.* 1.854 Nam vos quoque po∣testati meae meisque subselliis lex Christi subjicit. Imperium enim ipsi quoque gerimus, addo etiam praestantius ac perfectius; nisi verò aequum est spiritum carni fasces submittere, & coelestia terrenis cedere, The law of Christ hath subjected you also that are civil Magistrates to my chaire. For we also have an Empire, yea a better and more perfect then yours, unlesse it be reasonable that the Spirit should submit to the Flesh, and heavenly things give place to earthly. For temporal things belong to the body, and spiritual things to the soul: by how much therefore the soul is above the body, by so much spiritual things are above the temporal. For a temporal end is and ought to be subordinate to a spiritual; because temporal felicity is not the last end of man, but spiritual and eternal: this therefore being the greatest, ought to be ministred to by the cession of the temporal.

To this I answer,* 1.855 that temporal things ought to yield to spiritual, if by spiritual things be meant the glory of God, and the good of souls, but not to every thing that is spiritual. For though it be a spiritual imploy∣ment to serve God in the communion of Saints, and the life of a man be a temporal thing; yet a man is not bound to lose his life to goe to publick churches, but for his own souls salvation, for the promotion of religion and the honour of God he is. A man is very much better then a beast; yet the life of a beast is better then the superfluous hair of a mans beard. The honour and reverent usage of Churches is a spiritual concern and a matter of religion; and yet when an army is hard put to it, they may defend them∣selves by the walls and strength, and preserve their lives with an usage of the Church, which was never intended by the patron that built it, or the Bishop that consecrated it. When temporal life and eternal are compar'd, when the honour of God or the advantage of a man are set in opposition, when the salvation of a soul and the profit of trade are confronted, there is no peradventure but the temporal must give way to the spiritual. But when a temporal necessity and a spirituall advantage are compar'd, the advantage in the nature of the thing is overballanc'd by the degree of the necessity, and the greatnesse of the end: and it is better to sell the chalices of the Church, and minister to religion in glasse or wood, then to suffer a man to starve at the foot of the Altar. The consequent of this consideration is this, That although spiri••••al things are better then temporal, yet not every thing of spiritual nature or relation is to be preferr'd before all temporals.

2. Another consideration is this,* 1.856 that there is difference also in the de∣grees and measures of cession or yielding. Temporal things must yield, that is, we must so order our affaires that by them we serve God; our money must goe forth in justice and charity, our time must yield up portions to re∣ligion, our persons must decline no labour for Gods service, and if ever there comes a contest between our duty and our profit, or our ease, or our

advantage, we must by the losse of these secure our gaines and our interest in that. But this preferment of one before another does not consist in giving to one secular advantages before the other, temporal honours, and precedences in processions, in escutcheons and atchievements, but in doing the duty of that which is incumbent, and making the other minister to that which is more necessary. He that preferres religion before the world is not tied to bestow more money upon his chappel then upon his house. If God had chosen him one place of residence, and a Temple for his house and for the religion of the Nation, as he did among the Jews, there had been a great decency & duty of doing so upon many accounts; for then the question had been between religion and irreligion, zeal and contempt, love of God and neglect; and then the determination had been easy. But now since the whole end of internal Religion can be serv'd by giving to places of religion that adornment which may make the ministeries decent and fitted, and of advantage; beyond this, when we come to a dispute between that which is in order to a spiritual end, and that which serves a temporal, more things are to come into consideration besides the dignity of the relation.

3. For it is yet further to be observed,* 1.857 that when it is said that all temporal things are subordinate to our Spiritual ends, the meaning is, that all the actions of our life, all that we are, and all that we have, must be directed actually or habitually to the great end of man, the glorification of God and the salvation of our souls; because God hath ordain'd this whole life in order to that; and therefore in the generality it is true that all tem∣poral things are to minister to spiritual. But then this is to be added, that temporal things are not ordain'd to minister to spiritual intermedial things, such, I mean, which are not directly and in circumstances necessary. I must serve God with my substance; therefore I must by my substance contribute to the just and appointed ministeries of religion: but it does not follow, that if the Church multiply Priests unnecessarily, and God hath multi∣plied my children naturally, that therefore I must let my children want to feed the numerous company of them that can minister spiritual things. The whole is subordinate to the whole, that is all our temporalities are given us to serve God with: but then they are given us also to serve our own needs that we may serve God; but they are not any other ways subordi∣nate, but to enable us to serve him, not to serve the particular spiritual end, unlesse it be by accident, that is, not unlesse we cannot serve God without it.

4. For temporal things and spiritual things have both the same super∣natural end,* 1.858 that is, Gods glory and eternal felicity. And sometimes they severally tend to this end, and then they are to goe their own ways, and not to minister and be subordinate to each other. But sometimes they are to combine and to cooperate, and then temporal things must serve spiritual, and spiritual must serve the temporal. For example. The Temporal or Civil power hath for it's end publick tranquillity, that men may serve God in all Godlinesse and honesty. The Ecclesiastical power hath the same end: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Isi∣dore Pelusiot. I shall not now consider the whole effect of this truth, but in order to the present say, that since both temporal and spiritual things mi∣nister to the same end, that is, salvation of mankind, they are distinct me∣thods

or instruments to that end, and of themselves are not in subordina∣tion to one another; but as temporal things must serve spiritual when there is need, so must spiritual serve the temporal when they require it: The temporal power must defend religion, and religion must minister to the publick peace. The Prince must give advantages to the Ministers of reli∣gion; and the Ministers of religion must pray for the Princes armies, his prosperity, his honour, and by preachings and holy arts must give bridles to the subjects, keeping them in duty by the means of Conscience. The Prince by laws and fear makes men just and temperate, chast and peaceable: The Priest does but the same thing by the word of his proper ministery. He that does it most effectually is the most happy: but he that will goe a∣bout to compare which does it most, and therefore is to be preferr'd, shall then hope to doe it prosperously when he can tell which side of the Aequi∣noctial hath most starres, or whether have most drops of water, the Nor∣thern or the Southern seas. The summe of this consideration is this, that although temporal things in their latitude are to serve spiritual ends, mea∣ning the great end of the perfection of our Spirits: yet so must the inter∣medial spiritual things serve the same great end; but the intermedial tempo∣ral and the intermedial spiritual are not subordinate to one another, unless it be by accident, and that may and often does happen on either side.

But I must adde one thing more for explication;* 1.859 and that is, that though all things of the world are to minister to the great end of souls, and consequently are subordinate to that great end; yet it is (that I may use S. Pauls expression in another case) by reason of him that hath put all things under it: for this subordination is not natural, or by the nature of the thing, but by the wise Oeconomy and disposition of God; who having ap∣pointed that all things shall be sanctified by the word of God and prayer, that Natural powers shall be heightened by grace, and shall passe into supernatu∣ral, and this world into another, hath by his own positive order dispos'd of temporal things and powers beyond their own intention. But otherwise, temporal things have an ultimate end of their own, terminating all their na∣tural intention and design. Thus the end of the Mariners art is not the sal∣vation of the souls of them that sail with him, but the safe landing of their persons and goods at the port: and he that makes statues hath for his end a perfect image. Indeed the man may have another end, to get reputation, to maintain his family, to breed up his children in the nurture and admoni∣tion of the Lord, and at last the salvation of his own soul, by doing things honest and profitable: but though these may be the ends of the man, yet they are not the ends of his Art; and therefore his Art hath no natural sub∣ordination, because it hath no natural order to Eternal salvation. And this is the case of many Temporal things, especially Arts, offices, entercourses and Governments. Therefore supposing all that is said in the objection, that temporal felicity is not the last end of man, but spiritual and eternal, yet though it be not the end of a man, it may be the end of humane Go∣vernment; and by not being in a natural order to spiritual ends, though spi∣ritual be a better thing, yet it follows not that it ought to take place of that, upon the account of its being better in another kind. The body indeed is subordinate to the soul, because it hath all its motion and operation and life from the soul, and in a natural conjunction and essential Union is it's appointed instrument: but Temporal things and Spiritual are not so con∣joyned, and doe not naturally, but by accident minister to each other; and

therefore are made subject to each other alternately, when they are called to such accidental or supernatural Ministrations.

Question III. Whether are to be preferr'd, Spiritual or Temporal persons?

How Spiritual things are to be preferr'd before Temporal I have al∣ready accounted;* 1.860 but it is a consideration distinct from that, whether Spiri∣tual persons be to be preferr'd before Temporal. For from things to persons it will not follow: and he that hath a better art is not always the better man; and he that is imployed in the best concernments, hath not always the ad∣vantage of profession. There was a time in Rome when the Physicians were but servants, and had not the liberty of Romans; but certainly it is a better trade then fighting: and yet then the souldiers were accounted the greater men. Herod the Sophister had a sonne that was a fool and could never learn the Alphabet, but he had two and twenty slaves that were wise fellows; but the Master was the better man. But when the question is con∣cerning the honour and dignity of persons, we are to remember that honor est in honorante: many men deserve honour that have the least of it, and it is as it is put upon us by others. To be honour'd is to have something put to them, it is nothing of their own. Therefore in this question there are two things to be ask'd: the one is, what Spiritual persons deserve; the other is, what is given them. They may deserve more then they have, or they may have more then they deserve; but whether either or neither happens, He that honours himself, his honour is nothing; but he is honourable whom God or the King honours: and therefore spiritual persons ought to receive much, but to challenge none; and above all things ought not to enter into comparison with them from whom all temporal honour is deriv'd. But when the question is concerning the prelation of Secular or Ecclesiastic per∣sons, the best answer is given to it, When they strive to preferre one another in giving honour to each other. But I remember that the legates at Trent were horribly put to it to place the Orators of the Kings of France and Spain, who would both goe first: they at last found an expedient, and they did both goe first, and both were preferr'd in several positions. So is the spi∣ritual person and the civil, they are both best, but the honour of one is tem∣poral, and the honour of the other is spiritual; or rather, one is properly called Honour, and the other, Reverence. Honour the King, Reverence his Priests. But this Question is not properly a question of right, but of duty: and the spiritual man must not call for it, but the other must pay it. And it is something a sad consideration to think that all the Questions of the preference and comparison of spiritual and temporal persons doe end in covetousnesse and ambition, to which spiritual eminency, let it be never so great, was never intended to minister. For the honour due to spiritual per∣sons for their spiritual relation is a spiritual honour, and that though it be never so great cannot well be compar'd with temporal; for it is a great ho∣nour in another kind: but whatsoever temporal honours are given to them, are then well given when they are done in love to religion; and are then well taken when the advantage passes on to the good of souls, and does not sully the Spiritual man with spiritual pride, or temporal vanity. Socrates complains that the Bishops of Alexandria and of Rome were fallen into

Empire, or Dominion. That's none of the preference proper to a spiritual man. He is then honor'd, when his person is had in reverend and venera∣ble esteem, when his counsel is ask'd, when his example is observ'd and followed, when he is defended by laws and Princes, when he is rescued from beggery and contempt, when he is enabled to doe his duty with advantages, when he can verify his Ecclesiastical power, when he can vindicate religion from oppression, and lastly, when his person which is the relative of reli∣gion receives those advantages which as a man he needs, and which can adorne him as such a man. But if he disputes for any other honour, so much is his due as is given him by Christian Princes or Commonwealths, and no more; and he will gain the more by making no further question. Christ gave his Apostles power abundantly, but the greatest honour he gave them was to suffer for his Name; and of this he promised they should want nothing: but when Kings became nursing Fathers of the Church, and she suck'd the breasts of Queens & princely women, then the Spiritual per∣son & guides of souls had temporal honours heap'd on them, as the offerings were made for the Tabernacle, more then was sufficient. For it quickly rose into excesse, and then the persons of the Prelates fell into secular affe∣ctions, and grew hated and envied and oppos'd. Ammianus Marcellinus giving an account of that horrible sedition raised in Rome in the contest be∣tween Damasus and Ursicinus about the Papacy, says he wonders not that the Prelates did so earnestly contend for the Bishoprick of Rome, cum id adepti, futuri sint ita securi, ut ditentur oblationibus Matronarum, proce∣dantque vehiculis insidentes, circumspecte vestiti, epulas curantes profusas, adeo ut eorum convivia Regales superent mensas, Because when they have ob∣tained it, they are safe and warm, full with the oblations of the good women, and are carried in their caroches, and are neatly habited, and splendidly feasted, and themselves keep Tables beyond the profusenesse of Kings. Now although Bishops are Men, and Religion it self is serv'd by men who have bodies and secular apprehensions, and therefore does need secular advantages; yet this belongs to them as Men, not as Spiritual. It is just as if you should call the General of an Army Holy Father, and beg his blessing, and set him in the chiefest place of the Quire, and pray him to preach upon the greatest Festivals of the year, and run in multitudes to hear him speak. These are the proper honours of spiritual persons; and the splendor of the world is the appendage of secular atchievements: whatsoever is necessary for their persons in order to the advantages of religion is very fit to be given by Princes to the Bishops, who will certainly modestly entertain it, & by pious conduct transfer it to the glory of Christ and the good of souls. But this is none of the Honour that Christ invested their Holy order with: They have an honour and a blessednesse which none but themselves can take from them. The Rosary of Christian graces is the tiar of their head, and their office is their dignity, and humility is their splendour, and zeal is their Conquest, and patience is their Eminence, and they are made illustrious by bringing peace, and promoting holinesse, and comforting the afflicted, and relieving the poor, and making men and women useful to the publick, and charitable in their ministeries, and wise unto salvation. This is that which was spoken by God in the Prophet Isaiah,* 1.861 Since thou wast precious in my sight thou hast been honourable. And this was observed by the Pagan, who being surpris'd with the secular splendor of the Roman Bishops lik'd it not, but said that there was another way for them to be truly happy: Esse pote∣rant beati revera, si magnitudine urbis despectâ quam vitiis opponunt, ad

imitationem Antistitum quorundam provincialium viverent, quos tenuitas edendi potandique parcissimè, vilitas etiam indumentorum, & supercilia hu∣mum spectantia, perpetuo Numini verisque ejus cultoribus ut puros commen∣dant & verecundos. They are the words of Ammianus Marcellinus whom I lately mentioned. The Roman Bishops might indeed be truly happy, if they despising the splendors of the city would live as some Bishops in the Provinces, whom their temperate and spare diet, their plain habit and their humble car∣riage represent to God and all God's servants as persons pure and modest. But then if this discourse have any thing of reason, piety or truth in it, it must needs be infinitly certain that spiritual persons are to be preferr'd before the temporal in spiritual honours, but not in temporal regards; they have no∣thing to doe with them by virtue of their order or their office: what they have to their Persons by the favour of Princes and Nobles is of another consideration, and so this question is chang'd into an advice, and best ends in a Sermon or Declamation.

Question IV. Whether the Eminency of the spiritual calling, and the consequent prelation of spiritual persons, can exempt them from secular coercion, and make them superior to Princes.

In what senses Bishops have any superiority over Princes I shall after∣wards explain:* 1.862 Now the question is concerning secular superiority, and im∣munity from the temporal sword of Princes. Now to this, I suppose, what I have already said may be able to give an answer. For the spiritual order gives no temporal power at all; and therefore if all temporal power be in the supreme Civil Magistrate, all men that can deserve to feel the edge of the sword are subject to it. For what? Had Archimedes reason to take it ill of the Romans for not sending for him and making him General in the Syracusan warre, because he was a better Geometrician then any of all their Senate? Lewis the eleventh of France had a servant who was an excellent surgeon, and an excellent barber, and dress'd his gout tenderly, and had the ordering of his feet and his face, and did him many good offices. But the wise Prince was too fond when for these qualities he made him gover∣nour of his Counsels. Every good quality, and every eminence of Art, and every worthy imployment hath an end and designe of it's own, and that end and the proportions to it are to be the measure of the usage of those persons which are appointed to minister to it. Now it is certain that spiri∣tual persons are appointed Ministers of the best and most perfective end of mankind, but to say that this gives them a title to other Ministeries which are appointed to other ends, hath as little in it of reason as it hath of reve∣lation. But I shall not dispute this over again, but shall suppose it suffici∣ent to adde those authorities which must needs be competent in this affair, as being of Ecclesiastic persons, who had no reason, nor were they willing, to despise their own just advantages, any more then to usurp what was unjust.

When Origen complain'd of the fastuousnesse and vanity of some Ecclesiastics in his time,* 1.863 they were bad enough, but had not come to a pre∣tence of ruling over Kings upon the stock of Spiritual prelation: but he

was troubled that some had quit their proper excellency, consisting in the multitude of spiritual gifts, their unwearied diligence in the care of souls, their dangers, their patience, their humility, and their dyings for Christ. Et haec nos docet sermo Divinus (saith he) The word of God teaches us these things. But we either not understanding the Divine will set down in Scri∣ptures, or despising what Christ to such purposes recommended to us, are such that we seem to exceed the pride even of the evil Princes of the world: and we doe not onely seek for guards to goe before us like Kings, but are terrible to the poor, and of difficult accesse, and behave our selves towards those who ad∣dresse themselves to intercede for some thing or some person, that we are more cruel then Tyrants, and the secular Lords of their subjects. And in some Churches you may see (especially in the Churches of the greatest cities) the chief of the Christian people neither affable to others, nor suffering others to be free in their entercourses with them. These things are out of the way of the Ecclesiastics, for these things cannot consist with piety and humility, and the proper imployments of such persons who gain'd the world by ces∣sion, and got victory over whole Kingdomes by trampling upon Devils, and being trampled upon by men. Bishops should be like the Symbols of the Blessed Sacrament, which although for the ornament of religion and for our sakes and because we would fain have opportunity to signify our love to Christ, we minister in silver and gold, yet the symbols themselves remain the same plain and pure bread and wine, and altered onely by prayers, and by spiritual consecration, and a relative holinesse. But he were a strange superstitious fool who, because the Sacramental bread and wine are much better then all the Tables and viands of Princes and all the spoils of Nature, will think it fit to mingle sugar and the choicest spices of Arabia with the bread, and amber-griece and powder of pearl and the spirit of gold with the chalice. These are no fit honours to the H. Sacrament: the symbols of which are spoil'd when they are forc'd off from the simpli∣city and purity of their institution and designe. So it is with spiritual per∣sons: their office is spiritual, and their relation is holy, and their honours are symbolical. For their own sakes, Princes and good people must cause de∣cent and honourable ministeries and accommodations to be provided for them; but still they must remain in their own humility and meeknesse and piety, and not pretend to dignities heterogeneal, and Eminences secular, because their spiritual imployment is very excellent. It was S. Gregory Nazianzen's wish,* 1.864 that there were in the Church 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Neither precedency of Episcopal Sees, nor any Eminency of one place above another, nor any Tyrannical or pompous provisions and solennities, that we might be distinguished onely by our vertue. Now if prelation by order and Ecclesia∣stical Oeconomy amongst the Bishops was of so ill effect, so little necessary, and so greatly inconvenient that the good Bishop wished there we••e no such thing; there is little reason to doubt, but he would have infinitely condemned all pretensions of a power over civil governments. But the Bishops of Rome were not at that time gone so far. The Archimandrites of Constantinople,* 1.865 complaining against the Eutychians, write to Pope Agapetus, that if they be still permitted [licenter omnia accedent, non contra Ecclesia∣sticos solos, sed etiam contra ipsum piissimum Imperatorem, nostrum & vestrum honorabile caput] They will doe insolencies not onely to the Ecclesiastics, but also to our most pious Emperor, who is the honourable head both of you and us. * This power of headship or supremacy over the whole order Ecclesiastical

was acknowledged in the Church for about a thousand years: for besides the apparent practice and approbation of it, which I brought in the former pages,* 1.866 we find that the Emperour Henry the second did deprive Widgerus of the Arch-Bishoprick of Ravenna, and depos'd Gregory the sixth from the Papacy.

And therefore we find that those ancient Prelates that call'd upon Princes to pay reverence to them,* 1.867 and an acknowledgment of that Autho∣rity which Christ intrusted in their hands, accounted them wholly to be distinct things, and not at all invading each others limits. For Christ by making them Christians did not make them lesse to be Princes: and Chri∣stian Emperors could not goe lesse then the heathens; they were certainly no loosers by their baptisme. For it had been a strange argument for Syl∣vester to have us'd to Constantine, S^r, give up your self a Disciple to the most Holy Jesus, and you shall have a crown hereafter, and here also you shall still reign over all but me and my Clergy; to us indeed you must be subject, and by us you must be governed, but the Crown Imperial shall be greater then every thing, our Mitres onely excepted. If this had been the state of the question, I wonder by what argument could the Prince have been perswaded to become Christian: when it was so obvious for him to say, that Sylvester had reason to move him to preach Christ, since he got so much temporal advantage by it, but that he could see little reason why himself should loose and Sylvester get, and become a Disciple of Christ to be made a Minor and a Pupil to the Bishop. And indeed it would have been a strange Sermon that preaches humility to Emperors & dominion to Bishops. But their sermons when they were at the highest were of another nature. De humanis rebus judicare permissum, est, non praeesse Divinis. So P.* 1.868 Gelasius declares the limit of the Imperial and priestly power: Of all things belonging to this world the Emperor is to judge; but not to be the president or chief Minister of holy rites. Gelasius spake it upon occasion, because Anastasius the Emperor did unnecessarily interpose in the absolu∣tion of Peter Bishops of Alexandria. This Pope Gelasius suppos'd was of ano∣ther nature, and not relative to the things of this world, and therefore not of Imperial cognisance. But all the things of this world belong to him. And if all things of this world, then all persons of this world. For circa actiones propriè versatur Imperium, say the Lawyers, Rule and Empire and all power of judicature is principally concerning actions; but actions are done by persons, who therefore are subject to government. And upon this 〈…〉〈…〉 vile thing, Regis haec auribus intimare non differant, Let him without delay be accused unto the King.* 1.869 And Lambert the Emperour about the year of our Lord 900 having some contest with the Pope, propounded this first ar∣ticle in a Synod at Ravenna, If any Roman of the Clergy or the Senate, of what order soever, shall either voluntarily or by compulsion appeal to the Impe∣rial Majesty, let no man presume to contradict him:—untill the Emperor by himself or his Missives shall deliberate concerning their persons and their

causes.* 1.870 Thus we find Pope Leo the 4^th submitting himself to Lotharius the Emperour, and promising obedience: and to Ludovicus he professes that if he have done amisse he will amend it according to his sentence, or the judge∣ment of his Deputies. Upon the consideration of these and many other particulars Gratian,* 1.871 though unwillingly, confesses that in civil causes a Clergy-man is to be conven'd before the civil Judge: and although a little after he does a little praevaricate in the matter of criminal causes, yet it was too late; for he had said it before, Regum est corporalem irrogare poenam, Kings have the power of inflicting corporal punishments: and therefore if a Clerk were guilty in a criminal cause, the secular Judge had power over him, said the Fathers of the first Council of Matiscon, cap. 7. But it matters not much, for a greater then Gratian said it in his own case before the civil power, If I have done any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: they are the words of S. Paul.

Question V. Whether is to be obeyed, the Prince or the Bishop, if they happen to command contrary things?

To this I answer,* 1.872 that it is already determin'd that the Emperour is to be obeyed against the will of the Bishop. For so it was in the case of Mauritius and S. Gregory; for the Bishop was fain to publish the Princes Edict which yet he believ'd to be impious. It was also most evident in S. Athanasius of Alexandria, S. Gregory of Nazianzum, S. Chrysostom of Constantinople, Eusebius of Samosata, who by injustice were commanded to leave their Dioceses.

But this is to be understood in actions which can by Empire and com∣mand be chang'd into good or bad respectively:* 1.873 because such actions are most properly the subject of humane laws. For in what God hath ex∣pressely commanded or forbidden, the Civil or Ecclesiastical power is onely concerned to serve the interest of the Divine Commandement, to promote or to hinder good and evil respectively. But whatsoever is left undetermi∣ned by God, that the supreme power can determine: and in such things if there could be too supreme powers, the government were Monstrous, and there could be no obedience; for no man can serve two Masters. Now the 〈…〉〈…〉 against the Canons of the Church; but then we are to follow the civil law, because the power is by the law of Nature supreme and Imperial. The matter of the Civil power and Ecclesiastical is so wholly differing, that there where either hath to doe it cannot contradict the other; but if they invade the rights of one another, then the question grows hard. But the solution is this;

If the Bishop invades the rights of the Civil power he is not at all to be obeyed,* 1.874 for he hath nothing to doe there. But if the Civil power in∣vades the rights of the Bishop, then they are either such rights which are his by positive laws and humane concession, or such which by Divine ap∣pointment are his due.

All those which are the Bishops right by positive laws may by the same power be rescinded by which they were granted;* 1.875 and therefore if a King makes a law against the rights of the Church, and the Bishop protests against that law, the King and not the Bishop must prevail. For Neminem sibi imperare posse, & neminem sibi legem dicere, à qua mutatâ voluntate ne∣queat recedere, say the Lawyers. A man may change his will as long as he lives; and the supreme will can never be hindred: for summum ejus esse Imperium qui ordinario juri derogare valeat is a rule in law, He that is the supreme can derogate by his power from an ordinary right, viz. by making a contrary law.

But if they be the rights of Bishops and the Ministers of Religion by Divine appointment,* 1.876 then the Bishops command is to prevail, cum condi∣tione crucis; that is, so as the subject must submit to the Princes anger, and suffer for what he cannot doe, according to that of S. Austin, Imperatores cum in errore sunt, pro errore contra veritatem leges dant, per quas justi & probantur & coronantur, non faciendo quod illi jubent, quia Deus prohibet, Mistaken Princes make ill laws; but by them good men are tried and crown'd, by not doing what God hath forbidden them. This is much more modestly express'd then that responsory in the Roman Breviary, speaking of the Apostles, Isti sunt triumphatores & amici Dei, qui contemnentes jussae Prin∣cipum meruerunt praemia aeterna,* 1.877 They have deserved eternal rewards by de∣spising the commands of Princes. The expression is hard; for though their impious laws are not to be obeyed, yet indefinitely it is not safe to say, their commands are to be despis'd. And none ever lesse despis'd the laws then they who, because they could not obey them against God, yet obeyed them against themselves; by suffering death at their command, when they might not suffer a sinne.

But then this also suffers diminution.* 1.878 For if the Ecclesiastical power in such things where their authority is proper and competent and Divine, give any negative or prohibitive precepts, they may and they must be obeyed intirely; because every negative is indivisible, and hath neither parts nor time: and in this they are but proclaimers of the Divine Command∣ment, which if it be negative it can never be lawful to doe against it. But in positive instances of commandement, though from Divine Authority, (for that's the limit of the Ecclesiastical power and authority) if the King commands one thing and the Bishop another, they are severally to be regarded according to the several cases. For the rule is this, That all ex∣ternal actions are under the command of the Civil power in order to the publick government: and if they were not, the Civil power were not suf∣ficiently provided for the acquiring the end of it's institution: and then it would follow that either the civil authority were not from God (expresse∣ly against S. Paul) or else all that God made were not good, as being defe∣ctive from the end of it's creation (expressely against Moses, and indeed against the honour of God.) Now because external actions are also in or∣der

to religion internal, it happens that the Spiritual power hath acciden∣tally power over them. Here then is the issue of this inquiry: when an external action is necessary to the publick service, and yet in order to reli∣gion at the same time, the positive commands of the Spiritual superior must yield to the positive commands of the supreme Civil power. For that which hath a direct power is to bepreferr'd before that which hath but an indirect power. Thus it is a divine precept that we should not neglect the assembling of our selves together. Upon the warranty of this, the Guides of souls have power to command their flocks to meet at the Di∣vine service; and they are tied to obey. But if at the same time the Prince hath given command that those persons or some of those who are com∣manded to be at the Divine Offices, be present on the guards, or the de∣fence of the city walls, they are bound to obey the Prince, and not the Priest at that time. * For besides the former reason, when external actions are appointed by competent Authority, they are cloth'd with circumstan∣ces with which actions commanded by God, and in which Ecclesiastics have competent Authority, are not invested: and amongst these circum∣stances, time and place are the principal. And therefore it follows that in external actions the command of the Prince is always to be preferred be∣fore the command of the Church; because this may stay, and that cannot: This is not by God determin'd to time and place, but that is by the Prince; and therefore by doing that now, and letting this alone till another time, both ends can be serv'd: and it were a strange peevishnesse of Govern∣ment (besides the unreasonablenesse of it) to crosse the Prince to shew our power, when both may stand, and both may be obeyed; if they did not croud at the same narrow dore together, there is time enough for them to goe out one after another; and by a little more time, there will be a great deal of more room. I have heard that when King James the 6^th of Scot∣land was wooing the Danish Lady, he commanded the Provost of Edenburgh and the Townsmen upon a certain day to feast the Denmark Embassadors, and to shew all the bravery of their Town and all the splendor they could: of which when the Presbytery had notice, they to crosse the King pro∣claim'd a fast to be kept in the Town upon that very day. But the Towns∣men according to their duty obeyed the King: and the Presbytery might have consider'd that it was no zeal for God that the Fast was indicted upon that day; but God might have been as well serv'd by the Tuesday fast as by the Monday. Thus if the Ecclesiastic power hath admitted a person to Ecclesiastical Ministeries or Religions, if the supreme Civil power re∣quires his service, or if he be needed for the publick good, he may com∣mand him from thence, unlesse there be something collaterally to hinder; as if the Prince have sworn the contrary, or that the person requir'd have abjur'd it by the Princes leave: but supposing him onely bound by the Ec∣clesiastical power, the supreme Civil power is to prevail over it, as being the lord of persons and actions external. An instance of this was given by Mauritius the Emperour forbidding his souldiers to turn Monks with∣out his leave, though the law was made sore against the mind of S. Grego∣ry who was the Bishop of Rome. And thus* 1.879 Casimire King of Poland was taken from his gown, and invested with a Royal Mantle; and divers Monks have been recalled into the imployments of armies, or publick Counsels, or publick Governments.

But this also is to be understood with this provision.* 1.880 The supreme Civil power hath dominion over external actions, so as to govern them for time and place and other circumstances. He can forbid sermons at such a time; he can forbid fasts or publick solennities and meetings when he please, and when it is for the interests of government: and concerning any accident or circumstance and manner he can give laws, and he must be obeyed. But he cannot give laws prohibiting the thing it self, out of ha∣tred or in persecution of the religion: for then the Ecclesiastic power is to command not onely the thing, but the circumstances too. For the thing it self, it is plain; because it is a Divine Commandement, and to this the Spi∣ritual power must minister, and no Civil power can hinder us from obeying God: and therefore the Apostles made no scruple of preaching Christ pub∣lickly, though they were forbidden it under great penalties. But then for the circumstances, they also in this case fall under the Ecclesiastical power. If the Prince would permit the thing, he might dispose of the accidents; for then he is not against God, and uses his right about external actions. But if he forbids the thing, they that are to take care that God be obeyed must then invest the actions with circumstances; for they cannot be at all, unlesse they be in time and place; and therefore by a consequent of their power over the thing they can dispose the other, because the circumstances are not forbidden by the Prince, but the thing, which being commanded by God & not being to be done at all but in circumstances, they that must take care of the Principal must, in that case, take care also of the accessory. Thus we find the Bishops in the Primitive Church indicting of Fasts, proclaiming assemblies, calling Synods, gathering Synaxes: for they knew they were ob∣liged to see that all that should be done which was necessary for the salva∣tion of souls and instruction of lives by preaching, and for the stabiliment of the Church by assemblies and communions. Now the doing of these things was necessary, and for the doing of these they were ready to die; for that passive obedience was all which they did owe to those laws which forbad them under pain of death: for it was necessary those things should be done, it was not necessary they should live. But when the supreme Ci∣vil power is Christian and does not forbid the thing, there is no danger that God shall not be obeyed by the Prince his changing and disposing the cir∣cumstances of the thing; and therefore there can be no reason why the Prince should be disobeyed, commanding nothing against God, and govern∣ing in that where his authority is competent. Thus if the supreme Civil power should command that the Bishops of his Kingdome should not or∣dain any persons that had been souldiers or of mean trades to be Priests, nor consecrate any Knight to be a Bishop; though the Bishops should desire it ve∣ry passionately, they have no power to command or doe what the Civil pow∣er hath forbidden. But if the supreme should say there should be no Bishops at all, and no ordination of Ministers of Religion according to the laws of Jesus Christ, then the question is not whether the supreme Civil power or the Ecclesiastical is to be obeyed, but whether Man or God: and in that case if the Bishops doe not ordain, if they doe not take care to continue a succession in the Church of God, they are to answer for one of the great∣est neglects of duty of which man-kind is capable; alwaies suppos'd that the order of Bishops is necessary to the Church, and that ordination of Priests by Bishops is of Apostolical institution, and that there is no Univo∣cal generation of Church-Ministers but by the same hands which began the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 succession, and hath continued it for almost seventeen ages in the

Church. Of which I am not now to interpose my sentence, but to answer the case of Conscience relying upon the supposition. This onely I am to adde, that supposing this to be necessary, yet it is to be done cum conditione cru∣cis, with submission to the anger of the laws if they have put on unjust ar∣mour; and to be done with peaceablenesse, and all the arts of humility and gentlenesse, petition and wise remonstrances.

* But there is yet one reserve of caution to be us'd in this case. If the Civil power and the Spiritual differ in this particular, the spiritual must yield so long, and forbear to doe what is forbidden by their lawfull supreme, untill it be certain that to forbear longer is to neglect their duty, and to displease God. If the duty or if the succession can be any way supplied, so that the interest of religion be not destroyed, then cession or forbearance is their duty. And therefore if the King of Portugal should forbid conse∣crations of Bishops in his Kingdome not for a time, but for ever, the Bi∣shops were bound to obey, if they could be supplied from other Churches, or if it were not necessary that God should have a Church in Portugal, or if without Bishops there could be a Church. But if they be sure that the Bishops are the head of Ecclesiastical Union, and therefore the conservators of Being; and if the remaining Prelates are convinc'd that God hath re∣quir'd it of them to continue a Church in Portugal (as it is certain that by many regards they are determined there to serve Gods Church, and to provide for souls and for the religion of their charges) and if they could be no otherwise supplied with Ecclesiastical persons of the order and ordinati∣on Apostolical, as if other Churches would not ordain Bishops or Priests for them but upon sinful conditions, and violation of their Consciences: then the Spiritual power is to doe their duty, and the supreme Civil power is to doe their pleasure; and the worst that can come is the crown of Mar∣tyrdome, which whosoever gets will be no looser. And therefore I cannot without indignation consider it, that the Pope of Rome, who pretends to be a great Father of Christians, should not onely neglect but refuse to make ordinations and consecrations in that Church: which if their Prince should doe, the Bishops ought to supply it by their care; and therefore when the Prince desires it, as it is infinite dishonour to the Bishop of Rome to neglect or refuse, in compliance with the temporal interest of the King of Spain, so it is the duty of the Bishops of Portugal to obey their Prince. But I have nothing to doe to meddle with any mans interest, much lesse that of Princes: onely the scene of this case of Conscience happens now to lie in Portugal, and the consideration of it was usefull in the determination of this present question.

But this Question hath an appendent branch which is also fit to be consider'd.* 1.881 What if the Civil laws and the Ecclesiastical be contrary? as it happens in divers particulars; as if the Prince be a heretick, an Arrian or Macedonian, and happens to forbid the invocation of the Holy Ghost, or giving Divine honours to the Son of God, and the Church hath alwayes done it, and always commanded it. What is to be done in this case? This instance makes the answer easy: for in matters of Faith it is certain the Au∣thority and laws of God have made the determination; and therefore in these and the like the Church is bound to doe and to believe and to pro∣fesse according to the commandement of God. But how if the Prince does not forbid the internal duty (for in that his authority is incompetent) but commands onely that there should be no prayers to the Holy Ghost

put into the publick Liturgies of the Church; to this the answer is cer∣tain, That though in all externals the supreme Civil power is to be obeyed, yet the spiritual power in such cases is tied to confesse the faith which the Prince would discountenance, and to take care that their charges should plentifully supply in all their private devotions what is not permitted to them in publick. And the reason of this is not that they are tied to doe any thing in opposition or scandal to the Prince; but that they are in duty and charity to provide lest the publick discouragement and alteration of the circumstance of the duty, doe not lessen the duty internal and essential: and therefore they are to put so much more to the private, that they may prevent the diminution which is likely to come upon the private duty from the publick prohibition.

But there are some Civil laws which are oppos'd to Ecclesiastical,* 1.882 not by contrariety of sanction and command hinc inde, but by contrariety of declaration or permission respectively. Thus if the Ecclesiastical laws have forbidden marriage in a certain Degree, and the Civil power hath per∣mitted it, then the subject may more safely obey the power Ecclesiastical; because by so doing he avoids the offending of religious persons, and yet disobeys no command of the Prince; for no Civil power usually commands a man to marry in a certain Degree: and therefore when he is at liberty from the Civil law, which in this case gives him no command, and he is not at liberty from the Ecclesiastical law, which hath made a prohibition, he must obey the Church; which if it had no power over him, could have made no law, and if it have a power, it must be obeyed; for in the present case there is nothing to hinder it. So it is in such things which are per∣mitted for the hardnesse of mens hearts or the publick necessity. The per∣mission of the Prince is no absolution from the authority of the Church. Supposing Usury to be unlawfull, as it is certain many kinds and instances of it are highly criminal, yet the Civil laws permit it, and the Church for∣bids it. In this case the Canons are to be preferr'd. For though it be per∣mitted, yet by the laws no man is compell'd to be an Usurer; and therefore he must pay that reverence and obedience which is otherwise due to them that have the rule over them in the conduct of their souls.

* The case is alike in those laws where the Civil power onely gives impunity,* 1.883 but no warranty. As in such cases when laws indulge to a mans weaknesse and grief; as when it permits him to kill any man that creeps in at his windows, or demands his purse of him on the high way, or to kill his adulterous wife if he surprises her in the sin: If the Civil power promises impunity, and does not intend to change the action from unlawfull to law∣full, as in some cases it does, in some it cannot; then if there be any laws of the Church to the contrary, they passe an obligation upon the con∣science, notwithstanding the Civil impunity. And there is great reason for this. For since the affairs of the world have in them varieties and perplexities besides, it happens that in some cases men know not how to govern by the strictest measures of religion, because all men will not doe their duty upon that account; and therefore laws are not made [ut in Pla∣tonis republica, but as in faece Romuli] with exact and purest measures, but in compliance and by necessity, not always as well as they should, but as well as they may: and therefore the Civil power is forc'd sometimes to con∣nive at what it does not approve. But yet these persons are to be gover∣ned

by conscience; and therefore it is necessary that that part of the pub∣lick Government which is to conduct our consciences more immediately should give a bridle to that liberty which, by being in some regards neces∣sary, would if totally permitted become intolerable. And therefore the spiritual power puts a little myrrhe into their wine, and supplies that defect which in the intrigues of humane affaires we bring upon our selves by making unnatural necessities.

But then if it be inquir'd,* 1.884 whether it be lawfull for the spiritual power by spiritual Censures to punish those actions which the Civil power per∣mits; I answer, that the Church makes laws either by her declarative and direct power, or by a reductive and indirect power: that is, she makes laws in matters expressely commanded by God or forbidden, or else in such things which have proportion, similitudes and analogies to the Divine laws. In the first she is the declarer of Gods will, and hath a direct power. In the second she hath a judgement of discretion, and is the best Judge of Fit and Decent. If the Church declares an act to be against Gods com∣mandement, or bound upon us by essential duty, in that case, unlesse there be error evident and notorious, she is intirely to be obeyed: and therefore the refractary and the disobedient she may easily coerce and punish by her censures, according as she sees it agreeable and conducing to Gods glory and the good of souls, although the Civil power permits the fact for neces∣sity or great advantages. And the reason is, because as the Civil power serves the ends of the republick by impunity and permission, so there is another end to be serv'd which is more considerable, that is, the service of God and the interest of souls, to which she is to minister by laws and pu∣nishments, by exhortations and the argument of rewards: and as every power of Gods appointment is sufficient for it's own end, so it must doe it's own portion of duty for which so competent provisions are made. And therefore the Spiritual power may in this case punish what the Civil power punishes not. * With this onely Caution, if the Civil power does not forbid the Church to use her Censures in such a particular case: for if it does, it is to be presumed that such Ecclesiastical coercion would hinder the Civil power from acquiring the end of it's laws, which the Ecclesiastical never ought to doe; because although her censures are very usefull to the ends of the spiritual power, yet they are not absolutely necessary, God having by so many other ways provided for souls, that the Church is suffi∣ciently instructed with means of saving souls though she never draw her sword. But the Civil power hath not so many advantages.

But if the lawes of Church are made onely by her Reductive and in∣direct power,* 1.885 that is, if they be such that her authority is not founded upon the expresse law of God, but upon the judgment of discretion, and there∣fore her laws are concerning decencies and usefulnesses and pious advan∣tages, in this case the Church is not easily to proceed to Censures, unlesse it be certain that there is no disservice nor displeasure done to the Civil power. For it will look too like peevishnesse to crosse the Civil laws, where it is apparent there is no necessity, and no warranty from a Divine commandement. The Church would not have her laws oppos'd or dis∣countenanc'd upon little regards; and therefore neither must she without great necessity doe that which will cause some diminution to the Civil laws, at least by interpretation.

And after all this,* 1.886 if it happens that the Civil power and the Eccle∣siastical command things contrary, there is a fault somewhere, and there is nothing to be done but to inquire on which side God is; for if he be not on the Churches side by a direct law in the matter, he is not on the Chur∣ches side for her relation, but on the Kings side for his authority.

From the matter of the former Question arises another like it.

Question VI. Whether in the Civil affaires and causes of the Ecclesiastical power and persons the presumption ought to lie for the King, or for the Church.

This Question must suppose the case to be dibious,* 1.887 and the matter equal on both sides as to the subject matter; for else there needs to be no question, but judgment must be according to the merit of the cause: and it must suppose also that neither of them will yield, but use their own right; for if either did, themselves would make an end of the question: but when both are in pretence, and the pretence is equal in the matter and the argu∣ment, and that the cause is to be determined by favour and privilege, whe∣ther is to be preferr'd? I doe not ask which is to be preferr'd in law; for in that question, the laws and customes of a people are the rule of deter∣mination: but whether there be in conscience any advantage of presumpti∣on due to either.

To this I answer,* 1.888 that in the most pious ages of the Church the pre∣sumption was ever esteemed to lie for the Church when the Princes were Christians: and when the question is of piety not of authority, of charity not of Empire, it is therefore fit to be given to the Church, 1. Because if the Civil power takes it to it self, it is a Judge and a party too. 2. Be∣cause whatever external rights the Church hath, she hath them by the do∣nation, or at least enjoyes them by the concession of the supreme Civil pow∣er, who in this case by cession doe confirm at least, and at most but enlarge their donative. 3. Because the spiritual power is under the Kings protecti∣on, and hath an equal case with that of widows and orphans. It is a pious cause, it is the cause of the poor and the unarmed. 4. The King is better able to bear the losse, and therefore it is a case of equity. 5. The Church is a relative of God and the Minister of Religion, and therefore the advan∣tage being given to the Church, the honour is done to God; and then on the Kings side it would be an act of religion and devotion. 6. If the Civil power being judge prefers the Ecclesiastics in the presumption, it is certain there is no wrong done, and none hath cause to complain: but if it be against the Ecclesiastics the case is not so evident, and justice is not so secur'd, and charity not at all done.

And if it be thought that this determination is fit to be given by a Church-man;* 1.889 though it be no objection while it is true and reasonable, yet I endeavour'd to speak exactly to truth, and for the advantage of the Civil power, though the question is decided for the Ecclesiastics. For in such cases, as the Ecclesiastics will have advantage if they in dubious cases never

wil contend, of the Civil power will ever have the better of it if in these cases they resolve never to prevail.

Although these inquiries have carried me a little further then the first intention of the Rule,* 1.890 yet they were greatly Relative to it. But I shall recal my Reader to the sense and duty of it by the words of S. Gregory, who sayes that Christus Imperatori & omnia tribuit,* 1.891 & dominari eum non solùm militibus, sed etiam Sacerdotibus concessit, Christ hath both given all things to the Emperour, but a power of dominion not onely over the souldiers, but even over the Priests themselves. And that great wise disposer of all things in Heaven and Earth, who makes twins in the little continent of their Mo∣thers Wombe to lie at ease and peace, and the Eccentric motions of the Orbes, and the regular and irregular progressions of the starres, not to crosse or hinder one another, and in all the variety of humane actions, cases and contingencies, hath so wisely dispos'd his laws that no contradiction of chance can infer a contradiction of duty, and it can never be necessary to sin, but on one hand or other it may for ever be avoided; cannot be supposed to have appointed two powers in the hands of his servants to fight against or to resist each other: but as good is never contrary to good, nor truth to truth, so neither can those powers which are ordain'd for good. And therefore where the powers are distinct they are imployed upon several matters; and where they converse about the same matter, as in external actions and persons they doe, there one is subject to the other, and there∣fore can never be against it.

RULE VII. The supreme Civil power hath jurisdiction in causes not onely Ecclesiastical, but internal and spiritual.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 said Aristotle,* 1.892 Of things belonging to God the King is the Governour.* 1.893 Therefore besides that the supreme Civil power is to govern all persons and all actions and ministeries which are di∣rectly external, it is to be considered that actions internal, as they can be made publick, have also influence upon the persons and lives, he fortunes and communities of Men; and therefore either are so far forth to be go∣nerned by them who are governours of men in their lives and fortunes, in their societies and persons, that they may doe good to them, or at least doe no hurt.

Therefore as the supreme Princes and Magistrates have in several ages of the Church indulg'd to Ecclesiastics a power of Civil government,* 1.894 pri∣vileges and defensatives in ordine ad spiritualia, that is, to enable them with the help of the Civil power to advance the interests of religion and the spiritual men, which by evil men is apt to be despis'd, as all the threat∣nings of the Gospell and the terrors of death and the horrible affright∣ments of the day of Judgement are: so God hath given to the supreme Civil power authority over all publick religion in ordine ad bonum tempo∣rale. Princes and States did the other, but God did this. That was well,

very well; but this is necessary, and that was not. The reason of both is this, Because no external accident can hinder the intentions of God in the effects of religion and the event of souls. Religion thrives as well in a storm and in persecution as in sun-shine. God had more summer friends un∣der Constantine, but possibly as many true ones under Diocletian; or if he had not, it was mens fault, their weaknesse, not their necessity. But the Civil interest can be really hindered by the intervening of new doctrines and false manners of worship: and the common-wealth if it be destroyed hath no recompence in eternity: and therefore God hath not call'd them happy when they are troubled, and hath not bidden them to suffer rebelli∣on, or to rejoice when men speak evil of dignities, and he hath not told them that great is their reward in heaven; but the whole purpose and pro∣per end of the government being for temporal felicity, though that tem∣poral felicity is by the wisdome of God made to minister to the eternal, the government expires in this world, & shall never return to look for recom∣pence for it's sufferings. But every single Man shall; and though tempo∣ral power can be taken from Princes, yet a mans religion cannot be taken from him: and therefore God hath given to Princes a supreme power for the ordering of religion in order to the common-wealth, without which it had not had sufficient power to preserve it self; but he hath not given to Ecclesiastics a power over Princes in matter of government in order to spiri∣tual things, 1. because though spiritual things may receive advantage by such powers if they had them, yet they may doe as much harm as good, and have done so very often, and may doe so again. 2. Because God hath ap∣pointed to spiritual persons spiritual instruments sufficient to the end of that appointment. 3. Because he hath also established another Oeconomy for religion, the way of the crosse, and the beaten way of humility, and the defensatives of mortification, and the guards of self-denial, and the provi∣sions of contentednesse, and the whole spiritual armour, and prayers and teares, and promises, and his holy spirit, and these are infinitely sufficient to doe Gods work, and they are infinitely the better way. 4. Because religi∣on being a spiritual thing can stand alone, as the soul can by it self subsist: and secular violence can no more destroy faith, or the spiritual and true wor∣ship of God, then a sword can kill the understanding. 5. Because if God had given a temporal power to Ecclesiastics in order to a spiritual end, then he had set up two supremes in the same affairs, which could never agree but by the cession of one; that is, the two supremes could never agree but by making one of them not to be supreme.

And the world hath seen this last particular verified by many sad ex∣periments.* 1.895 For when the Roman Emperours residing in the East gave great powers and trusts to the Patriarchs of the West, by their Spiri∣tual sword they began to hew at the head of gold, and lop off many Roy∣alties from the Imperial stock. And Leo Iconomachus for breaking down the images of Saints felt their power, for they suffered not the people to pay him tribute in Italy, threatning to interdict them the use of Sacra∣ments and publick devotions if they did. But as soon as ever they began by spiritual power to intermeddle in secular affairs, they quickly pulled the Western Empire from the East, and in a convenient time lessened and weakned that of the West. For Pope John the third combin'd with Be∣engarius and Adalbar his son against the Emperor Otho the great, and they must pretend themselves to be Kings of Italy. Pope John the 18^th made

a league with Crescentius, and stirred up the people against Otho the third. Pope Benedict the ninth excited Peter of Hungary to pretend to the Empire, onely to hinder Henry surnamed Niger from entring into Italy to repeat his rights. And all the world knows what Gregory the 7^th did to Henry the fourth; how he first caused Rodulph of Suevia, and afterwards Ecbert of Saxony to fight against him: and here their great quarrel was about the power of chusing the Pope. Then they fell out about the collation of Bi∣shoprics; for which cause Pope Gelasius the XII^th caus'd the Arch-Bishop of Mentz to rebel against Henry the 5^th; and there the Pope got the better of him, and by the aid of his Norman forces which he had in Sicily beat him into compliance. Then they fell out about some fees of the Empire; and Innocent the second raised up Roger the Norman against Lotharius the XII. about the Dutchy of Poüille: and S. Bernard being made Umpire in the Quarrel, the Pope got a share in Bavaria, for whoever lost, signior Papa, like the butlers box, was sure to get, by the advantage of his supreme con∣duct of religion which by this time he got into his hands.

And now he improv'd it providently.* 1.896 For the same Innocent stirred up Guelphus Duke of Bavaria against Conrade the third; and thence sprang that dismal and bloudy faction between the Guelphs and Ghibellins. But what should I reckon more?* 1.897 I must transcribe the Annals of Germa∣ny to enumerate the hostilities of the Roman Bishops against the Emperors their lords, when they got the conduct and Civil government of religious affairs into their power. Frederic Barbarossa, Henry the sixth, his brother Philip, Frederic the second, Henry the seventh, Frederic of Austria, Lewis of Bavaria, Sigismond, Frederic the third, felt the power of a temporal sword in a religious scabbard: and this was so certain, so constant a mis∣chief, that when the Pope had excommunicated eight Emperors, and made the temporal sword cut off them whom the spiritual sword had struck at, the Emperors grew afraid. And Radulph of Haspurg when he was chosen Emperor durst not goe into Italy, which he called the Lions denne, because the entrance was fair, but few returning footsteps were espied. And it grew to be a proverb,* 1.898 saith Guicciardine, Proprium est Ecclesiae odisse Caesares, The Church hates Caesar; and the event was that which Carion complained of, Sceleribus Pontificum hoc Imperium languefactum est, By the wickednesse of the Bishops of Rome the Roman Empire is fallen into decay.

These instances are more then enough to prove that if Religion be go∣verned* 1.899 by any hand with which the Civil power hath nothing to doe, it may come to passe that the Civil power shall have no hands at all, or they shall be in bands. The consequence of these is this, That if the supreme Civil power be sufficient to preserve it self, it can provide against the evil use of the spiritual sword, and consequently can conduct all religion that can by evil men be abus'd, so as to keep it harmlesse. If by excommunica∣tions the Bishop can disturb the Civil interest, the Civil power can hold his hands that he shall not strike with it, or if he does, can take out the tempo∣ral sting, that it shall not venome and fester. If by strange doctrines the Ecclesiastics can aliene the hearts of subjects from their duty, the Civil power can forbid those doctrines to be preach'd. If the Canons of the Church be seditious or peevish or apt for trouble, the Civil power can command them to be rescinded, or may refuse to verify them, and make them into laws. But that we may not trust our own

reason onely, I shall instance in the particulars of jurisdiction, and give evident probation of them from the authority of the best ages of the Church.

And first in general,* 1.900 that Kings or the supreme Civil power is by God made an Overseer, a Ruler, a carefull Father, a Governour, a Protector and Provider for his Church, is evident in the Scriptures, and the doctrine of the Primitive ages of the Church. Nutritii & patres Ecclesiae is their appel∣lative which we are taught from Scripture, Nursing Fathers of the Church. Pastores; that's the word God us'd of Cyrus the Persian, Cyrus my shepherd: and when the Spirit of God by David calls to Kings and Princes of the earth to kisse the Son lest he be angry, it intends that as Kings they should use their power and Empire in those things in which the Son will be worshipp'd by the children of men. For besides the natural and first end of government, which is temporal felicity, of which I have already spoken, there is also a supernatural, the eternal felicity of souls; and to this Civil government does minister by the Oeconomy and designe of God: and therefore it was well said of Ammianus,* 1.901 Nihil aliud est Im∣perium (ut sapientes definiunt) nisi cura salutis alienae. It is true in both senses; Empire is nothing else (as wise men define it) but a power of doing good by taking care for the salvation of others. To doe them good here, and to cause them to doe themselves good hereafter, is the end of all go∣vernment.* 1.902 And the reason of it is well expressed by the Emperor Theo∣dosius Junior to S. Cyril, Quandoquidem ut vera religio justâ actione perfici∣tur, ita & Respublicautriusque ope nixa florescit, As true religion is per∣fected by justice, so by religion and justice the republick does flourish; and therefore he addes, Deus opt. Max. pietatis & justae actionis quoddam quasi vin∣culum nos esse voluerit, The Emperor is by the Divine appointment the common band of justice and religion.

In pursuance of this truth,* 1.903 Eusebius tels that Constantine the Great was wont to say to the Bishops concerning himself,* 1.904 Vos intra Ecclesiam, ego extra Ecclesiam à Deo Episcopus constitutus sum, You within the ••hurch walls and I without, but both of us are appointed by God to be Bishops or Overseers of his Saints and servants. And in the edict of Valentinian and Martian, which approves the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, they are both called Inclyti Pontifices, illustrious Bishops: and the Emperor Leo 3. in his Epistle to Gregory the Bishop of Rome sayes of himself 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I am both a King and a priest; meaning in office, not in order, in go∣vernment, not in ministeries. These and such like words are often us'd in the Letters enterchang'd between the Princes and the Bishops in the Anci∣ent Church, of which that of Leo the Roman Bishop concerning the French Capitulars is remarkable, writing to Lotharius. De capitulis vel praeceptis Imperialibus vestris vestrorum Pontificum praedecessorum irrefragabiliter cu∣stodiendis & conservandis, quantum valuimus & valemus in Christo propitio, & nunc & in aevum nos conservaturos modis omnibus profitemur. It was a direct Oath of supremacy. Concerning the Capitulars or Imperial precepts given by you and your predecessors who were Bishops, (viz. in their power and care over Churches) we through the assistance of Christ promise as much as we are able to keep and to conserve them for ever. The limit of which pow∣er is well explicated by S. Austin in these words,* 1.905 Quando Imperatores ve∣ritatem tenent, pro ipsa veritate contra errorem jubent; quod quisquis con∣tempserit,

ipse sibi judicium acquirit, When the Emperors are Christians and right believers, they make laws for the truth and against false doctrines; which laws whosoever shall despise, gets damnation to himself.

For if we consider that famous saying of Optatus,* 1.906 that Ecclesia est in republica, non respublica in Ecclesia, The Church is in the common-wealth, not the common-wealth in the Church, and the Church is not a distinct state and order of men, but the common-wealth turn'd Christian, that is better in∣structed, more holy, greater lovers of God, and taught in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus; it is not to be imagin'd, that the Emperors or supreme governours should have the lesse care and rule over it by how much the more it belongs to God. This fancy first invaded the servants when they turn'd Christians; they thought their Masters had then lesse to doe with them. The Apostle tels them as in the case of Onesimus, that it is true, they ought to love them better, but the other were not the lesse to be obe∣dient; onely there was this gotten by it, that the servants were to doe the same service for the Lords sake, which before they did for the laws. But it is a strange folly to imagine that because a man hath chang'd his opinion he hath therefore chang'd his relation; and if it were so, he that is weary of his Master, may soon change his service by going to another Tutor. Re∣ligion establishes all natural and political relations, and changes none but the spiritual; and the same Prince that governs his people in the time of the plague is to govern them when they are cur'd; and the Physician that cur'd them hath got no dominion over them, onely in regimine salutis he is principal, he is to govern their health. The cases as to this are parallel between the soul and the body.* 1.907 And therefore the Emperor Constans de∣clar'd his power and his duty too, de omnibus curam agere & intendere quae respiciunt ad utilitatem Christianissimae nostrae reipublicae, to take care and to intend all things which regard the advantage of our most Christian common-wealth: and Aimonius tels of King Clodovaeus, that in one of the Councils* 1.908 of Africa held at Clupea he described his office and duty by these two sum∣maries, publicis rebus consultores advocare, & ea quae Dei & sanctorum ejus sunt disponere; to consult about publick affaires of the common-wealth, and to dispose of those things which belong to God and to his saints.

But the consideration of the particulars will be more useful in this in∣quiry,* 1.909 and first

The supreme Civil power hath authority to convene and to dissolve all synods Ecclesiastical.

This appears 1. in that all the first Councils of the Church after the* 1.910 Emperors were Christian were convocated by their Authority. The Coun∣cil of Nice was called by Constantine, as is affirmed bya 1.911 Eusebius,b 1.912 Ruffi∣nus,c 1.913 Sozomen andd 1.914 Theodoret: and when the Eusebians had persuaded Con∣stantine to call a council at Tyre against Athanasius, the Prince understanding their craft and violence calld them from Tyre to Constantinople* 1.915: and by the same Emperour there was another Council called at Arles. The Coun∣cil at Sardica in Illyria was conven'd by the authority of the Emperours Constans and Constantius, as the Fathers of that Synod themselves wrote in their letters to the Egyptians and Africans:* 1.916 and Liberius the Bishop of

Rome with many other Bishops of Italy joyn'd in petition to Constantius to convocate a Council at Aquileia;* 1.917 not to suffer them to doe it, but that he would, for to him they knew it onely did belong. Theodosius the Em∣peror called the second general Council at Constantinople; as Socrates, So∣zomen and Nicephorus relate: and the Fathers of the Council* 1.918 write in their Synodical constitutions, with this expression added, ea quae acta sunt in sancto Concilio ad Tuam referimus Pietatem, whatsoever was done in that Synod was wholly referr'd and submitted to the Princes piety. The great Ephesin Council, which was the third Oecumenical, was conven'd by Theodosius Ju∣nior, exproprio munere & officio,* 1.919 & ex animi sui deliberatione, so himself affirms, out of his own free choice, according to his office and his duty. But his rescript by which he conven'd the Council is a most admirable letter, and contains in it a full testimony of the truth of this whole Rule, and does excellently enumerate and imply all the parts of the Imperial jurisdi∣ction in causes of religion.* 1.920 The summe of which are in the preface of that rescript in these words, Our common-wealth depends upon piety [or religion] towards God, and between them both there is great cognation and society; for they agree together, and grow by the increase of one another: so that true re∣ligion does shine by the study of justice, and the common-wealth is assisted by them both. We therefore being plac'd in the Kingdome by God, having receiv'd from him the care both of the Religion and the prosperity of the subject, we have hitherto endeavour'd by our care and by our forces to keep in perpetual union: and for the safety of the republic we are intent to the profit of our sub∣jects, and diligently watch for the conservation of true religion; but especially we strive that they may live holily, as becomes holy persons, taking care, as it befits us, even of both (for it is impossible we should take good care of one if we neglect the other.) But above the rest, we are carefull that the Ecclesiasti∣cal state may remain firm, so as is fit to relate to God, and to be in our time, and may have tranquillity by the consent of all men, and may be quiet by the peace of the Ecclesiastic affaires; and that true religion may be kept unrepro∣vable, and the lives of the inferior Clergy and the Bishops may be free from blame. This is the summe of his duty, and the limit of his power, and the in∣tention of his Government. And to these purposes he call'd a Council, threat∣ning punishment to any Prelate who was called if he neglected to come. If the Emperour took more upon him then belong'd to him, he was near a good Tutour that could well have reprov'd him, the Fathers of the Ephesin Council; but if he took upon him but what was just, this testimo∣ny alone is sufficient in this whole question. But he ended not so, but short∣ly after called another Council in the same place,* 1.921 against the will of Pope Leo, who yet was forc'd to send his Deputies to be assistant at it. But that Council had an ill end: and to repair the wounds made to truth by it, Pope Leo petition'd the Emperor for another to be held in Italy. But the Empe∣ror was then not much in love with Councils, having been so lately deceived by one; and therefore put it off, and died: and his successor Martianus cal∣led one at Nice, but changing his mind had it kept in Chalcedon. I shall proceed no further in particular, but account it sufficient what Cardinal Cu∣sanus acknowledges. Sciendum est quod in universalibus octo Conciliis sem∣per invenio Imperatores & Judices suos cum senatu primatum habuisse. For this is more then the mere power of calling them;* 1.922 for that he might doe upon many accounts: but the Emperors and his Judges and Council always had the primacy in the eight general Councils.

As the Emperors did convene,* 1.923 so they did dismisse the Ecclesiastical conventions; as appears in the acts of the Ephesin Council, where the Fa∣thers petition the Emperor, that he would free them from that place, and give them leave to wait upon him to see his face,* 1.924 or at least he would dis∣misse them and send them home to their own Churches. The same peti∣tion was made by the Bishops at Ariminum to the Emperor Constantius, and by the Fathers at the Council of Chalcedon* 1.925 to Martianus. But these things did never please the Italians after their Patriarch began to set up for Ecclesiastical Monarchy, and they, as soon as they could, and even before their just opportunities, would be endeavouring to lessen the Imperial pow∣er and to take it into their own hands. But this is one of the things that grew to an intolerable mischief; and was not onely against the practice of the best ages, and against the just rights of Emperors, but against the do∣ctrine of the Church.

For S. Hierom reproving Ruffinus,* 1.926 who had quoted the authority of some Synod,* 1.927 I know not where, S. Hierome confutes him, by this argu∣ment, Quis Imperator jusserit hanc Synodum congregari? There was no such Synod, for you cannot tell by what Emperors command it was con∣ven'd. To this purpose there was an excellent Epistle written by certain Bishops of Istria to Mauritius the Emperour, enumerating from the records of the Church the convention of Ecclesiastical Councils to have been wholly by the Emperors disposition;* 1.928 in which also they dogmatically af∣firm, Semper Deus praesentiâ Christianorum Principum contentiones Eccle∣siasticas sedare dignatur, God does always vouchsafe to appease Church-quarrels by the presence of Christian Emperors: meaning that by their authority the Conciliary definitions pass'd into laws. But who please to see more parti∣culars relating to this inquiry, may be filled with the fight of them in the whole third book of William Ranchin his Review of the Council of Trent.

The supreme Civil power hath a power of external Judgement in causes of Faith.

This relies upon the former reasons,* 1.929 That since propositions of reli∣gion and doctrines of Theology have so great influence upon the lives of men, upon peace and justice, upon duty and obedience, it is necessary that the supreme Civil power should determine what doctrines are to be taught the people, and what to be forbidden. The Princes are to tell what reli∣gions are to be permitted and what not: and we find a law of Justinian for∣bidding anathematisms to be pronounced against the Jewish Hellenists;* 1.930 for the Emperors did not onely permit false religions by impunity, but made laws even for the ordering their assemblies, making Ecclesiastical laws for enemies of true religion: so necessary it is for Princes to govern all religion and pretences of religion within their Nations. This we find in the Civil law, in the title of the Code de Judaeis, in many instances. A law was made by Justinian also that none should be admitted into the Jewish Syna∣gogues that denied Angels, or the Resurrection, or the day of Judgment. Thus the Civil power took away the Churches from the Maximianistae, be∣cause they were an under sect of the Donatists condemn'd by their supe∣riors. But then that the Christian Princes did this and might doe this

and much more in the articles of true religion, is evident by many instances and great reason.

There is a title in the first book of the Code,* 1.931 Ne sacrosanctum bap∣tisma iteretur,* 1.932 against the Anabaptists. C••arles the Great made a decree against the worshipping of Images, and gave sentence against the second Nicene Council in that particular: and Sozomen reports that Constantine cut off unprofitable questions, to prevent schismes in the Church; which example our Kings of England have imitated by forbidding publick prea∣chers or Divines in schools to meddle in the curious questions of Predesti∣nation. Thus the publick laws of a Nation often declare who are and who are not heretics: and by an Act of Parliament in England they onely are judged heretics who for such were condemn'd by the four general Councils. Upon this account many Princes have forbidden publick disputations in matters of religion: to this purpose there was a law of Leo and Anthemius, l. qui in Mon. C. de Episc. & Clericis; and Andronicus the Emperor hearing some Bishops disputing with some subtilty upon those words [my Father is greater then I] threatned to throw them into the river,* 1.933 if they would not leave such dangerous disputations. Heraclius the Emperor forbad any of those nice words concerning Christ to be used: some did use to say that in Christ there was a single energy, some said there was a double; but the Emperor determin'd the question well, and bad them hold their peace and speak of neither: for, as Sisinnius said to Theodosius, disputando de sacris accen∣di tantùm contentionem, there is nothing got by disputations but strife and contention: and therefore Princes are the best Moderators of Church-mens quarrels, because Princes are bound to keep the peace. And consonantly to this Isidore spake well,* 1.934 Sanè per regnum terrenum coeleste regnum profi∣cit, ut qui intra Ecclesiam positi contra fidem & disciplinam Ecclesiae agunt, rigore principum conterantur, apsamque disciplinam quam Ecclesiae humilitas exercere non praevalet, cervicibus superborum potestas principalis imponat. The Civil power advances the interests of the heavenly Kingdome by punishing them who sin against the faith and discipline of the Church; if they be intra Ecclesiam, within the Church, their faith and manners both are subject to the secular judgment.

But not onely so,* 1.935 but they are to take care to secure & promote the in∣terest of truth: for though, as S. Paul sayes, doubtful disputations doe engender strife, yet we must contend earnestly for the faith; with zeal, but yet with meeknesse too: and therefore that matters of faith and doctrines of good life be established, it is part of the Princes du∣ty to take care.* 1.936 According to which we find that when a rumour was spread that brought Pope Pelagius into suspi∣cion of heresy, King Childebert sent Rufinus to him to require him either to recite and professe the Tome of S. Leo in which there was a good con∣fession of faith, or else that he should doe the same thing in his own words. Pope Pelagius sent this answer: Sata∣gendum est ut pro auferendo suspicionis scandalo obsequium confessionis nostrae

Regibus ministremus,* 1.937 quibus etiam nos subditos esse sacrae Scripturae praeci∣piunt, We must take care that for the avoiding suspicion we exhibit to Kings the duty of our confession: For to them the holy Scriptures command even us to be obedient. And not onely for the Faith of Bishops and even of Popes, but for their Manners also Kings were to take care, and did it accordingly. Justinian made laws that Bishops should not play at dice, nor be present at publick spectacles; and he said of himself, maximam habere se sollicitudi∣nem circa vera Dei dogmata,* 1.938 & circa Sacerdotum honestatem, that his greatest care was about the true doctrines of God, and the good lives of Bishops.

I doe not intend by this,* 1.939 that whatsoever article is by Princes allowed is therefore to be accounted a part of true religion; for that is more then we can justify of a definition made by a Synod of Bishops: but that they are to take care that true doctrine be established; that they that are bound to doe so must be suppos'd competent Judges what is true doctrine, else they guide their subjects, and some body else rules them, and then who is the Prince? By what meanes and in what manner the Civil-power is to doe this I am to set down in the next Rule; but here the question is of the pow∣er, not of the manner of exercising it: and the answer is, that this power of judging for themselves and for their people is part of their right; that no article of religion can become a law unlesse it be decreed by God, or by the Prince; that the Bishops declaration is a good indication of the law of God, but that the Princes sanction makes it also become a law of the Common-wealth: that the Prince may be deceived in an article of religion is as true as that he may be deceiv'd in a question of right, and a point of law; yet his determination hath authority, even when a better proposi∣tion wants it: that error must serve the ends of peace, till by the doctrines of the wiser Ecclesiastics the Prince being better informed, can by truth serve it better.

RULE VIII. The supreme Civil power is to govern in Causes Ec∣clesiastical by the meanes and measures of Christ's institution, that is, by the assistance and ministeries of Ecclesiastical persons.

KIngs are supreme Judges of the Law;* 1.940 for cujus est loqui ejus est interpre∣tari, He that speaks, best knows his own meaning: and the law-giver is certainly his own best interpreter. But in cases where there is doubt, the supreme Civil power speaks by them whose profession it is to under∣stand the laws. And so it is in religion. The King is to study the law of God; nec hoc illi dictum ut totus ab alieno ore pendeat, ipsequi à se nihil dijudicet,* 1.941 said that learned Prelate of Winchester, not that he should wholly depend in religion upon the sentences of others, but be able of himself to judge. But where there is difficulty, and that it be fit that the difficulty be resol∣ved, there the supreme Civil power is to receive the aid of the Ecclesiastic, from whose mouth the people are to require the law, and whose lips by their

office and designation are to preserve knowledge. The Doctors of the Jews tell that when Jephthah had made a rash vow, he might have been re∣leas'd if he had pleas'd: For if a horse had first met him, he had not been bound to have offer'd it to God; but it must have been sold, and a sacrifice be bought with the price; and much more must a man or a woman have been redeem'd. But because Jephthah was a Prince in Israel, he would not goe to Phinehas the high Priest to have had his vow interpreted, commu∣ted, or released. Neither would Phinehas goe to him, because he was not to offer his help till it was implor'd. Phinehas did not goe to Jephthah, for he had no need, he had no businesse: and Jephthah would not goe to Phinehas, because he was the better man. In the mean time the Virgin died, or, as some say, was kill'd by her Father: but both Prince and Priest were punished, Jephthah with a palsy, and Phinehas was depriv'd of the Spirit of God. For when the Prince needs the Priest he must consult him; and whether he consults him or no, the Priest must take care that no evil be done by the Prince, or suffer'd by him for want of Counsel.

But the Princes office of providing for religion,* 1.942 and his manner of doing it in cases of difficulty are rarely well discours'd of by Theodosius the younger in a letter of his to S. Cyril, of which I have formerly mentioned some portions….. Pietatis doctrinam in sacra Synodo in utramque partem ven∣tilatam eatenus obtinere volumus quatenus veritati & rationi consentaneum esse judicabitur, The doctrine of godlinesse shall be discuss'd in the sacred Council, and it shall prevail or passe into a law so far as shall be judg••d a∣greeable to truth and reason. Where the Emperour gives the examination of it to the Bishops to whose office and calling it does belong: but the judg∣ment of it and the sanction are the right of the Emperor, who would see the Decrees should be established if they were true and reasonable. The judgement I say was the Emperors, but in his judgement he would be ad∣vised, taught and established by his Bishops. Sed nec eam doctrinam indis∣cussam patiemur; cui dijudicandae eos praefici oportet qui sacerdotiis ubivis gen∣tium praesident, per quos & nos quoque in veritatis sententia stabilimur, & magis magisque identidem stabiliemur, That doctrine that is in question we will not suffer to escape examination; but those shall be presidents of the judg∣ment who in every Nation are the appointed Bishops, by whom we also our selves are confirmed in the true Religion, and hope every day to be more and more established.

When the supreme power hath call'd in the aid and office of the Ec∣clesiastic,* 1.943 good Princes use to verify their acts accordingly, to establish their sentences, to punish the convict, to exterminate heretics and suppresse their doctrines. Thus Honorius and Arcadius the Emperors by an Edict repres∣sed Pelagius and Caelestius whom the Bishops had condemn'd; Constantine after the sentence of the Nicene Fathers against Arius, banish'd him. Theo∣dosius the Elder having diligently conferr'd with the Orthodox Bishops, and heard patiently what the others could say,* 1.944 by a law forbad them to have publick assemblies who denied the Consubstantiality of the Son with the Father. Per Consilium Sacerdotum & Optimatum ordinavimus, constitui∣mus, & diximus; it was the style of King Pepin in the Council of Soissons. And of this nature the instances are very numerous. For semper studium fuit Orthodoxis & piis Imperatoribus pro tempore exortas haereses per con∣gregationem religiosissimorum Archiepiscoporum amputare, & rectâ fide sin∣cerè

praedicata in pace sanctam Dei Ecclesiam custodire,* 1.945 said Theodorus Silen∣tiarius. All the pious and orthodox Emperors did use this instrument and manner of proceeding, for the cutting off heresies, and the sincere pub∣lication of the faith, and the conservation of the Church in peace.

But that this manner of Empire may not prejudice the right of Em∣pire,* 1.946 it is to be observed that in these things the Emperors us'd their own liberty, which prov'd plainly they us'd nothing but their own right. For sometimes they gave toleration to differing Sects, sometimes they gave none; sometimes they were govern'd by zeal, and sometimes by gentle Counsels, onely they would be carefull that the disputes should not break the publick peace: but for their punishing Recusants and Schismatics they us'd their liberty; so we find in the Acts of the great Ephesin Council, that Theodosius the 2^d resolv'd of one, but not upon the other. At vero sive illi veniam impetraturi sint qui à Patribus victi discedent, sive non, nos sanè civitates simul & Ecclesias conturbari nequaquam sinemus, Whether those who are convict of heresy by the Fathers shall be pardon'd yea or no, yet we will be sure not to suffer the Repu••lick or the Churches to be disturbed.

This I observe now in opposition to those bold pretences of the Court of Rome,* 1.947 and of the Presbytery, that esteem Princes bound to execute their decrees, and account them but great ministers and servants of their sentences. Now if this be true, then Princes must confirm all that the Clergy decrees: If all, then the supreme Prince hath lesse then the meanest of the people, not so much as a judgement of discretion; or if he have, it is worse, for he must not use his discretion for the doing of his duty, but must by an implicite faith and a blind brutish obedience obey his Masters of the Consistory or Assembly. But if he be not bound to confirm all, then I suppose he may chuse which he will, and which he will not: and if so, it is well enough; for then the supreme judgment and the last resort is to the Prince, not to his Clercs. And that Princes are but Executioners of the Clergyes sentences is so far from being true, that we find Theodosius refusing to confirm the Acts of the great Ephesin Council: for having been informed (though falsely) that affaires were carried ill,* 1.948 he command∣ed the Bishops to resume the question of the Nestorians: for their acts of condemnation against them he made null, and commanded them to judge it over again, and that till they had done so, they should not stirre to their Bishopricks. The ministery was the Bishops all the way, but the external judgement and the legislative was the Princes.* 1.949 So Charles the Great re∣form'd the Church, Episcopos congregavi, &c. I convocated the Bishops to counsel me how Gods law and Christian religion should be recover'd. There∣fore by the counsel of my Religions Prelates and my Nobles we have appointed Bishops in every City, and Boniface their Archbishop, and appoint that a Synod shall be held every year, that in our presence the canonical decrees and the rights of the Church may be restor'd, and Christian religion may be reformed. But because this must be evident as a consequent of all the former discourses upon this question; it will be sufficient now to summe it up with the testi∣mony of S. Austin writing to Emeritus the Donatist.* 1.950 Nam & terrenae po∣testates cum schismaticos persequuntur eâ regulâ se defendunt, quia dicit Apostolus, Qui potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit…. Non enim frustra gla∣dium portat, When the Civil power punishes Schismatics they have a warrant from an Apostolical Rule, which sayes, He that resists, resists the ordinance of

God: For they bear not the sword in vain. It is not therefore by a commis∣sion or a command from the Church that they punish Schismatics, but [con∣stituunt adversus vos pro sua sollicitudine ac potestate quod volunt] they decree what they please against them according to their own care and their own power.

So that when it is said that Princes are to govern their Churches by the consent and advice of their Bishops,* 1.951 it is meant not de jure stricto, but de bono & laudabili: It is fit that they doe so, it is the way of Christs or∣dinary appointment; He that heareth you heareth me: and to them a command is given,* 1.952 to feed all the flock of Christ. In pursuance of which it was a fa∣mous rescript of Valentinian the first, cited by S. Ambrose, In causa fidei vel Ecclesiastici alicujus ordinis eum judicare debere qui nec munere impar sit, nec jure dissimilis. These are the words of the rescript: that is, he would that Bishops should judge of Bishops; and that in causes of faith or the Church their ministery should be us'd, whose persons by reason of the like imploy∣ment were most competent to be put in delegation. But to the same pur∣pose more of these favourable Edicts were made in behalf of the Church by Theodosius and Valentinian the second,* 1.953 by Arcadius, Honorius and Justi∣nian: and indeed besides that it is reasonable in all cases, it is necessary in very many; because Bishops and Priests are the most knowing in spiritual affaires, and therefore most fit to be counsellors to the Prince, who often∣times hath no great skill, though he have supreme authority. I remem∣ber that when Gellius the Praetor was sent Proconsul into Greece,* 1.954 he observ'd that the Scholars at Athens did perpetually wrangle and erect schools against schools, and divided their philosophy into Sects; and therefore sending for them, persuaded them to live quietly and peaceably, and to put their que∣stions to reference or umpirage, and in it offerr'd his own assistance: but the Scholars laught at his confident offer to be a moderator in things he un∣derstood no more then his spurres did. He might have made them keep the peace, and at the same time make use of their wit and his own autho∣rity. And although there may happen a case in which Princes may, and a case in which they must refuse to confirm the synodical decrees, sentences and judgements of Ecclesiastics: yet unlesse they doe with great reason & upon competent necessity, they cannot doe it without great scandal, and sometimes great impiety. But of this I shall discourse in the next Chapter. For the present, I was to assert the rights of Princes, and to establish the proper foundation of humane laws; that the Conscience may build upon a rock, and not trust to that which stands upon sand, and trust to nothing.

I have been the larger upon these things because the adversaries are great and many,* 1.955 and the pretences and the challenges high, and their oppo∣sition great and intricate, and their affrightments large; for they use some∣thing to perswade and something to scare the conscience. Such is that bold saying of Pope Leo the x^th,* 1.956 A jure tam Divino quam humano laicis potestas nulla in Ecclesiasticas personas attributa est, Both by Divine and humane laws Ecclesiastics are free from all secular power. But fierce and terrible are the words of the Extravagant Unam sanctam. Porro subesse Romano Pontifici omnem humanam creaturam declaramus, dicimus, definimus & pronuncia∣mus omnino esse de necessitate salutis, That every man should be subject to the Bishop of Rome, we define, we say, we declare and pronounce to be alto∣gether necessary to salvation. This indeed is high; but how vain withal

and trifling and unreasonable I have sufficiently evidenc'd. So that now the conscience may firmly rely upon the foundation of humane laws, and by them she is to be conducted not onely in Civil affaires, but in Ecclesiasti∣cal, that is, in religion as well as justice: and there is nothing that can pre∣judice their authority, unlesse they decree against a law of God; of which because Ecclesiastical persons are the preachers and expositors by ordinary Divine appointment, Princes must hear Bishops, and Bishops must obey Princes: or because audire & obaudire to hear and to obey have great affini∣ty, I chuse to end this with the expression of Abbot Berengar almost 1100 years agoe,* 1.957 Sciendum est quod nec Catholicae fidei nec Christianae contrarium est legi, si ad honorem regni & sacerdotii Rex Pontifici & Pontifex obediat Regi, It is neither against the Catholic faith nor the Christian law that the Prince obey the Bishop, and the Bishop obey the Prince: the first is an obedience of piety, and the later of duty; the one is justice, and the other is religion.

CHAP. IV. Of the power of the Church in canons and censures, with their obligations and powers over the conscience.

RULE I. The whole power which Christ hath left in ordina∣ry to his Church is merely spiritual.

THat there are great things spoken by the Doctors of the Primitive Church of the Ecclesiastical or spiritual power is every where evident,* 1.958 and that there are many expressions which prefer it above the secular; all which I shall represent in stead of others in the words of S. Chrysostom, because of them all he was the most eloquent, and likeliest in the fair∣est imagery to describe the powers of his Order.* 1.959 Others are the limits of the Kingdome, others of the Priesthood; for this is greater then that: and you must not estimate it by the purple and the gold. The King hath allotted to him the things of this world to be administred; but the right of Priesthood descendeth from above: Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven. To the King is committed what is here below; to me, that is to the Bishop, things celestial. The bodies are intrusted to Princes, but the souls to Bishops. The King remits the guilt of bodies, but the Bishop the guilt of sinnes. The Prince compels, the Bishop exhorts. He governs by necessity, but we by counsel; he hath sensible armour, but we spiritual weapons; he wageth warre against the Barbarians, but we against the Devil. Here then is a greater principality. For which cause the King submits himself to the Priests hand, and every where in the Old Testament the Priests did anoint Kings. Where by the way,

though it be not exactly true that the Kings of Israel and Judah were al∣ways anointed by Priests,* 1.960 but sometimes by Prophets who were no Priests, as in the case of Jehu yet supposing all that, the discourse is true enough, and the spiritual power in relation to a nobler object is in that regard bet∣ter then the temporal; and therefore is in spiritual account in order to a spi∣ritual end above that which serves the lesse excellent. But the effect of this discourse is, that Kings are subject to Bishops just as the Princes of Israel were to those that anointed them; that is, they came under their hands for unction, and consecration, and blessing, and counsel, and the rites of sacrifice. And all this is very true; and this is all that was or could be intended by S. Chrysostom, or those other eminent lights of the Primitive Church, who set their Order upon a candlestic, and made it illustrious by the advantage of comparison. The advantages are wholly spiritual, the excel∣lencies are spiritual, the operations are spiritual, and the effects are spiri∣tual; the office is spiritual, and so is all the power. But because the persons of the men in whom this spiritual power is subjected are temporal as well as Princes, and so are all their civil actions, therefore whatever eminence they have for their spiritual imployment, it gives them no temporal advan∣tage; that comes in upon another stock: but for the spiritual it is as much as it is pretended; but then it is no more.

For it is purely spiritual.* 1.961 Where any thing of temporal is mingled with it, it is not greater in that, but subject to the temporal power. With∣out this there could never be peace: and where the jurisdiction of two Courts doe enterfere, there is perpetual wranglings. But God having or∣dain'd two powers hath made them both best; and yet so that both of them are inferior: but because it is in differing powers, they both rule in peace, and both obey with pleasure. How the Ecclesiastic state is subject to the Civil I have largely accounted: Now I am to describe the eminencies, pow∣ers, advantages and legislations of the spiritual: concerning which we shall have the best light if we rightly understand the nature and quality of the power.

As my Father sent me,* 1.962 so send I you, said Christ to his Apostles. Now it is plain how the Father was pleas'd to send his Son; with humility and miracles, with a low fortune and a great designe, with poverty and pow∣er, with fulnesse of the spirit and excellency of wisdome. That was the manner. The end was, the redemption of Man, the conquering of the De∣vil, the preaching of the Gospel, the foundation of the Church, the instru∣ction of faith, the baptizing Converts, the reformation of manners, the extirpation of sinne. This was the intire end, and that was the just man∣ner in which Christ was sent into the world: And since his Apostles & their successors were to pursue the same ends and no other, they were furnished with the same power: and Christ gave them the Holy Ghost, and gave them commandement and power to teach all Nations, to baptise them, to bind and to loose, to minister his body and his bloud, to exhort and to reprove, to comfort and to cure, to make spiritual separations of the vile from the precious. This is the summe of all the Commissions they had from Christ.

This power and these commissions were wholly Ministerial without domination,* 1.963 without proper jurisdiction, that is, without coaction; it being

wholly against the designe of the religion, that it should be forc'd; and it being far remov'd from persons, so dispos'd, so imployed, so instructed to doe it. And therefore one of the requisites of a Bishop is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He must be no striker: he had no armes put into his hand to that pur∣pose; the Ecclesiastic state being furnished with authority, but no power, that is authoritate suadendi, non jubendi potestate (that I may use the expres∣sion in Tacitus) an authority to persuade and to rebuke, but no power to command, as the word is us'd in the sense of secular dominion.

Concerning which that the thing be rightly understood,* 1.964 we must first truly understand the word.* 1.965 Accursius defines Jurisdiction to be potestatem de publico introductam cum necessitate juris dicendi & aequitatis statuendae, A publick power of doing right and equity. It is potestas ad jus dicendum, so Muscornus Cyprins, A power of giving sentence in causes between party and party. But we shall best understand the meaning of Jurisdictio by that place of Cicero.* 1.966 Quid ergo istius in jure dicendo libidinem demonstrem? Quis vestrum non ex urbana jurisdictione cognovit? Quis unquam isto Prae∣tore Chelidone invitâ lege agere potuit? Judices citari jubet: jubet citari Heraclium: citatur reus Sopatrus: Stenium citari jubet: atque ut aliquando de rebus ab isto cognitis, judicatis, & de judicibus datis desistamus dicere, &c. From which words it is plain, that jurisdiction is a power of magistracy to summon the parties, to hear their cause, and to give sentence. And there∣fore in Suetonius we often find these expressions, Imperatorem jus dixisse, cognovisse, judicasse, The Emperor took cognisance, did judge, did give sen∣tence, that is, did exercise jurisdiction. Empire is always included under jurisdiction; and it is divided into a cognition of capital and pecuniary causes, as appears plainly in the title of the Code De jurisdictione, which handles both causes: and Asconius Paedianus in his argument upon the 4^th action against Verres proves expressely that Capital actions are part of ju∣risdiction. To which purpose is that of Suctonius in the life of Augustus; Dixit autem jus non diligentiâ modo summâ sed & lenitate,* 1.967 siquidem mani∣festi parricidii reum, ne culleo insueretur, quod non nisi confessi afficiebantur hâc poenâ, &c. But of this there is no question. Now of jurisdiction thus un∣derstood, it is evident that the Ecclesiastic state hath no right derived to them from Christ, that is, no power to punish any man corporally, or to compel them to answer in criminal causes; they have no power of the sword, no restraint upon the body: but having care of souls, which cannot be govern'd by force, they are to govern as souls can be governed, that is by arguments and reason, by fear and hope, by preaching of rewards and punishments, and all the ways of the noblest government, that is, by wis∣dome and by the ways of God.

This appears in the Apostles description of their own office & power.* 1.968 What is Paul and what is Apollo,* 1.969 but Ministers by whom ye believed? Mini∣sters of Christ,* 1.970 stewards of the Mysteries of Christ: to us is committed the word of reconciliation;* 1.971 we are Embassadors for Christ;* 1.972 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 we are not lords over the flock; but as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christs stead to be reconcil'd to God.* 1.973 Thus Christ set them over the hous∣hold, not to strike the servants, but to give them their meat in due season; that is, as Optatus expresses it, to minister the food of Gods word and Sa∣craments to the servants of the family.* 1.974 Nolite vobis majestatis dominium vindicare; nam si ita est, vindicent sibi & ministri qui m••nsae dominicae famu∣lantur,

ut pro humanitaete exhibita ab invitatis gratulatio eis referatur….Est ergo in universis servientibus non dominium sed ministerium. Therefore esteem not your selves to have any thing but the ministery and service, nothing of dominion. And indeed we need challenge no more: It is ho∣nour enough to serve such a Prince, to wait at such a table, to be stewards of such a family, to minister such food. This service is perfect freedome; and that is more then can be said of the greatest temporal dominion in the world.* 1.975 Principes Ecclesiae fiunt ut serviant minoribus suis, & ministrent eis quaecunque acceperunt à Christo. The same with the words of Christ, He that is greatest amongst you, let him be your minister. For the honours in Christian religion at the first look indeed like dignities;* 1.976 but indeed they are not divers honours, but divers services: as it seems to be an honour to the eye that it enlightens the whole body, but it is not it's honour, but it's ministery; so it is amongst the Saints; it is not his honour, but his act. And so is the Apostle∣ship thought to be a great dignity, but it is not so; but it is his ministery. For So S. Paul sayes,* 1.977 If I preach the Gospel it is no glory to me: for necessity is laid upon me, and woe is unto me if I doe not preach the Gospel: for if I doe it willingly, I have a reward; but if unwillingly, there's nothing but a stew∣ardship intrusted to me. The consequent of this discourse is this in the words of the same Father, Quicunque desiderat primatum in terra inve∣niet confusionem in coelo, Whosoever desires primacy (meaning amongst the Ecclesiastics, and by vertue of their order and office) upon earth, shall find confusion in Heaven.

But this is most expressely and clearly taught by the Fathers of the Church.* 1.978 so S. Gregory Nazianzen,* 1.979 He that is set over others (speaking of Bishops) laying behind him every sin, must proceed in godlinesse, so that by the example of his spiritual growth he may draw others unto vertue, especi∣ally by that form of humility which was deliver'd to us by the Lord. Non enim oportet vi vel necessitate constringere, sed ratione & vitae exemplis sua∣derc, For no man is to be constrained by force or by necessity, but persuaded by reason and good examples.* 1.980 And thus S. Hierome distinguishes the Eccle∣siastical power from the Regal. Ille nolentibus praeest, hic volentibus: ille terrore subjicit, hic servituti donatur: ille corpora custodit ad mortem, hic animas servat ad vitam. The King governs whither men will or no, the Bishop none but the willing. He subdues them by terror, but the Bishop is but the servant of the peoples souls. The King keeps bodies reserv'd for death, but the Bishop takes care of souls that they may live eternally. Upon this ac∣count S. Chrysostom considers the great difficulty there is in the discharge of the Episcopal office,* 1.981 and affirms it to be more troublesome then that of Kings; as much as the rage of the sea in a tempest is greater then the cur∣lings of a troubled River: and he gives this reason for it, Quoniam illic plures sunt qui adjuvant, eo quod ligibus ac mandatis omnia peraguntur: hic verò nihil tale, neque enim licet ex authoritate praecipere, Because there are more helpers in the secular government; for all things are transacted by laws and by commandements: but here (meaning in the Ecclesiastic state) there is no such thing; for it is lawfull, but we have no authority to command any thing. For* 1.982 In potestate subjectorum est obedire vel non. They are not domestics, they are not properly subjects, but obedientiam habentes in sua ipsorum potestate, they have their obedience in their own power: they may if they will, and they shall have a good reward; but if they will not, they may chuse. For with this power and upon these termes the Holy Ghost hath

made them overseers, to feed, not to rule, the Church of God, that is, not to rule by Empire, but by persuasion. And this is intimated by the Epistle to the Hebrew••s Obey them that are set over you,* 1.983 and submit your selves; for they watch for your souls: that they may doe it with joy, not with grief; for that is unprofitable for you. That is, Submit your selves to your spiritual Rulers cheerfully and willingly: if you doe not, they can have no comfort in their ministery; it will grieve them to find you refractary, and you will be the loosers by it, for their grief will doe you no profit. Now if these Rulers had a power of coercion, he could quickly make them willing, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the anguish would fall upon the disobedient. The same pre∣cept is in the Epistle to the Thessalonians, where the words doe themselves expound the nature of the government,* 1.984 We beseech you, brethren, to know them which labour amongst you and are over you in the Lord, and admonish you, and to esteem them very high in love for their works sake. And imme∣diately after he calls them in partem sollicitudinis, into a participation of this rule,* 1.985 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, We beseech you, brethren, to admonish, or to warne, to reprove them that are unruly. That is, you must help us in our government: we are over you to admonish you, but you must admonish one another: that will help our work forward when you are willing. But they which are over you must be highly esteemed, not for their dignity, but for their works sake, not in fear, but in love; for they are over you not by Empire, but by discourses, not by laws, but by exhortation. And cer∣tainly this is the best government in the world; that the people of God sit populus voluntarius should serve God with reason and choice, with love and pleasure and eternity of satisfaction. And this is observed also by S. Chrysostom. The Princes of this world (saith he) are so much inferior to this spiritual power, by how much it is better to rule over the wills of men then over their bodies: and that's the state of Ecclesiastical government, concer∣ning which who please to see much more, may with pleasure read it in S. Chrysostom in his first Homily upon the Epistle to Titus, and the 11^th Ho∣mily upon the Epistle to the Ephesians, and in his second book of Priest∣hood.

Now against this it will not be sufficient to oppose any precedents of government under the Old Testament.* 1.986 He there that did not obey the word of the High Priest was to die the death;* 1.987 for they had 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a true proper formal jurisdiction given them by God: and when Moses sate in judgement, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Philo, the Priests were his assessors; and Judaeis sacerdotii honos firmamentum potentiae erat, the honour of the Jewish priesthood was a great establishment to the power of the Nation, saith Tacitus. For the Priest were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Bishops, and Judges of controversies, and by the law appointed to inflict punishment upon crimi∣nals, said Josephus.* 1.988 But in the Gospel there was no such thing. The Jewish excommunications were acts of power and a mixt Empire; ours are securities to the sound part, and cautions against offenders. Their preach∣ings were decrees sometimes; ours can be but exhortations and arguments to persuade and invite consent.

But neither can it be denied but that the Apostles did sometimes acti∣ons of a delegate jurisdiction.* 1.989 Thus S. Peter gave sentence of death against Ananias and Sapphira; S. Paul inflicted blindnesse upon Elymas the Sorce∣rer, and deliver'd Hymenaus and Alexander and the incestuous Corinthian

to be buffeted by Satan; and S. John threatned to doe the like to Di••∣trephes. That this was extraordinary appears by the manners of animad∣version, which were by miracle and immediate Divine judgment; for those which were delivered to Satan were given up to be corporally tor∣mented by some grievous sicknesse or violence of an evil spirit, asa 1.990 S. Chry∣sostom,b 1.991 S. Ambrose, S. Hierom, and divers others of the Fathers doe af∣firm. But therefore this was an act of Divine jurisdiction, not of Aposto∣lical: It was a miraculous verification of their Divine mission, seldome us'd, not by ordinary emission of power, but by an extraordinary spirit: for so S. Paul threatned some criminals in the Church of Corinth,* 1.992 that if he did come he would not spare them: but it was because they made it ne∣cessary by their undervaluing of his person and ministery. Since ye doe so, since ye doe look for a signe and proof of Christ speaking in me, you shall have it. It is not S. Pauls ordinary power, nor his own extraordinary, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an experiment of Christ's power, who was pleas'd to minister it by S. Paul, as well as by any other Apostle: something like those words of our Blessed Saviour, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a signe; and the signe of the Prophet Jonas shall be given them. But then there was great necessity, and some prodigious examples were to be made to produce the fear of God and the reverence of religion, that the mean∣nesse and poverty of the Ministers might not expose the institution to con∣tempt: and because the religion was destitute of all temporal coercion, and the Civil power put on armor not for it but against it, therefore God took the matter into his own hand, and by judgments from heaven verified the preachings Apostolical. Thus when the Corinthians did use the Lord's Supper unworthily God punished them with sicknesse and with death,* 1.993 as the Apostle himself tells them: for to denounce them after and to pro∣nounce them before were equal actions of ministery, but equally no parts of jurisdiction. This way continued in the Church, though in very infre∣quent examples, till the Emperors became Christians, and by laws and tem∣poral coercions came to second the word of Ecclesiastical Ministery. For S. Cyprian tells of some persons who being afflicted with evil spirits were cur'd at their baptisme, who afterwards upon their apostasy from the faith were afflicted again, and again fell into the power of the Devil:* 1.994 Recedente siquidem disciplina recessit & gratia; when they forsook Christ, himself took the matter into his own hand, and was not wanting by an act of his own jurisdiction to declare that he was their Lord, and would be honour'd by them or upon them.

And this was the rod that S. Paul threatned to the Schismatical Corin∣thians;* 1.995 not any emanation of the ordinary power of ministery, but a mira∣culous consignation of it: for these things (as S. Chrysostom observes) S. Paul calls signa Apostolatus mei,* 1.996 the signes of his Apostleship wrought among them in signes and miracles and powers: this was effected in healing the sick, and in striking the refractary with the rod of God; in giving fight to the blind, and making them blind that would not see; in raising the dead to life, and causing them to die that would not live the life of righteousnesse. But this was not done 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not by any power of their own, but by that power to which they onely ministred, by the power of Christ who (blessed be his holy Name for it) keeps this power onely in his own hands. In these their power was no more a power of jurisdiction then Elias had, who, as S. James said, prayed that it might and prayed that it might not rain;

and call'd for fire from heaven. And just so the Apostles being mov'd by an extraordinary spirit did, when the spirit saw cause, minister to the Divine judgment. But that was not their work; they were sent of another errand, and were intrusted with other powers.

But after all this,* 1.997 it is certain that there were in the Church some images and similitudes of jurisdiction in their spiritual government. The soul is not, cannot be, properly subject to any jurisdiction but that of God. For jurisdiction is the effect of legislation, and is in the mixt Empire as the other is in the mere. Now none can give laws to souls but God; he onely is Lord of wills and understandings; and therefore none can give judgment or restraint to souls but God. But as by preaching the Ecclesiastic state does imitate the legislation of God; so by the power of the Keyes she does imi∣tate his jurisdiction. For it is to be observed that by the Sermons of the Gospel the Ecclesiastics give laws to the Church, that is, they declare the laws of God; and by the use of the Keyes they also declare the Divine jurisdiction: for as the Church can make no law of Divine worship or Di∣vine propositions, of faith or manners, but what she hath received from Christ and his Apostles; so neither can she exercise any judgment but the judgment of God. To that she ministers by threatnings and denunciati∣ons, by comforts and absolutions, as she ministers to the legislative of God by preaching and publishing, by exhortation and command.

For there is an Empire in preaching;* 1.998 there is a power of Command which the Bishops and Ministers of the Church of God must exercise. To this purpose S. Chrysostom discourses excellently,* 1.999 There are some things which need teaching, some which need commanding: if therefore you invert the or∣der, and had rather command where it is necessary for you to teach, you are ri∣diculous; and as bad if you goe about to teach where you rather should com∣mand. That men should doe no evil, you need not teach, but to forbid it with the force of a great authority: and so you must command them that they should not give heed to Jewish fables: But if you would have them give their goods to the poor, or keep their virgin, here you have need of doctrine and exhorta∣tion. Therefore the Apostle said both, Command and teach…..Thus you see that a Bishop must not onely teach, but sometimes it is necessary that he should command. * But then this being a doctrinal precept, or commanding by the force of a clear and confessed doctrine, hath in it no other Empire but that it is a Commanding in the Name of God, and means this onely, that some things are so clear and obvious, so necessary and confess'd, that he who neglects them is condemn'd by himself; he need not be taught, but onely commanded to doe his duty: but if he will not, God, who gave him the law, hath also jurisdiction over him: and to this also the Church does minister; for the Bishop commands him in Gods Name, and if he will not, he can punish him in Gods Name, that is, he can denounce Gods judg∣ments against him; and that's our ministerial jurisdiction: he can declare him to be out of the way of salvation, and unworthy to receive the holy mysteries and pledges of salvation. This is our coercion.

But the use of the Keyes does differ from proper jurisdiction in this great thing,* 1.1000 That if the Keyes be rightly us'd they doe bind or loose respectively; but if they erre, they doe nothing upon the subject, they neither bind nor loose. Now in proper jurisdiction it is otherwise: for, right or wrong, if a man be condemn'd he shall die for it; and if he be

hang'd he is hang'd. But the Church gives nothing but the sentence of God, and tells upon what termes God will or will not pardon. If the Priest minister rightly and judge according to the will and laws of God, the sub∣ject shall find that sentence made good in heaven by the real events of the other world, which the Priest pronounces here upon earth. But if the Priest be deceived, he is deceiv'd for himself and for no body else; he alters nothing of the state of the soul by his quick absolution, or his unreasona∣ble binding. For it is not true here which the Lawyers say of humane Ju∣risdictions, Quod Judex errans pronunciavit, ob authoritatem jus dicentis transit in rem judicatam. The Priest hath no such authority, though the Civil power have. The error of the Judge does not make the sentence in∣valid; his authority prevails above his error: but in the other it is the case of souls, and therefore is conducted by God onely as to all real and material events, and depends not upon the weaknesse and fallibilities of men. And therefore the power of remitting sins given to the Church, is nothing but an authority to minister that pardon which God gives by Je∣sus Christ. The Church pardons sins as the Levitical Priest did cleanse the lepers, said S. Hierom; that is, he did discern whether they were clean or no, and so restor'd them to the congregation: but apud Deum non sententia Sacerdotum, sed reorum vita quaeritur, God regards not the sentence of the Priest, but the life of the penitent. For the Priest, aliquid est ad ministran∣dum ac dispensandum verbum ac sacramenta, ad mundandum autem & justi∣ficandum non est aliquid; is something as to the ministery and dispensation of the word and sacraments, but nothing as to the purifying and justification of a sinner: for none works that in the inward man but he who created the whole man. They are the words of S. Austin. This therefore is but verbum re∣conciliationis; the word of reconcilation is intrusted to us: but we properly give no pardon, and therefore inflict no punishment.

Indeed the power of the Keyes is by a Metaphor chang'd into a sword,* 1.1001 and S. Pauls wish [I would they were even cut off that trouble you] seems to be the warrant; and by excommunications evil persons are cut off from the congregation of the Lord. And it is true that the Ecclesiastical authori∣ty is a power of jurisdiction, just as Excommunication is a sword. But so is the word of God, sharper then a two edged sword; and so is a severe re∣proof, it cuts to teh bone. Nec censorium stylum, cujus mucronem multis remediis majores nostri retuderunt, aeque posthac atque illum gladium Dicta∣torium pertimescamus,* 1.1002 said Cicero. The Censors tongue was a sword, but our Ancestors sometimes did not feel it smart; and we fear it not so much as the sword of the Dictators. But how little there is of proper jurisdi∣ction in Excommunication we can demonstrate but by too good an argu∣ment. For suppose Julian robbing of a Church, striking the Bishop, dis∣gracing the religion, doing any thing for which he is ipso facto excommu∣nicate: tell him of the penalty he incurs, cite him before the Bishop, de∣nounce it in the Church; what have you done to him that shall compel him to doe his duty? Suppose he will not stay from the Church, that he will goe to another, to a strange country, or that he despises all this. Have you made him afraid? have you troubled him? have you griev'd him? have you done that which shall make him doe so no more? But Julian was about to re∣nounce Christianity, and thinks it all a Fable. Or suppose lesse then that: suppose a man that keeps a concubine, and knowing that he sins, and yet resolves not to quit the sin, he abstains from the communion and the pub∣lick

service of the Church; if the Bishop admonishes him to leave the partner of his sin, how if he will not? By what compulsory can the Ec∣clesiastic state enforce him? If you threaten to drive him from the Com∣munion, he hath prevented you; he never comes at it. If from prayers, you doe him a kindnesse; for he loves them not. If from Sermons, then he will enjoy his lust without controlment. What can the Church doe in this case? But suppose yet once more, that a violent hand shall pull down the whole Episcopal order, what shall the Church doe then? will she ex∣communicate the men that doe it? They say the order it self is Antichri∣stian; and can they fear to be excommunicated by them? And who fears to be excommunicated by the Presbytery that believes them to be a dead hand and can effect nothing? And in the summe of affaires, onely the obstinate and the incorrigible are to be proceeded against by that extreme remedy. And to them who need that extreme it is no remedy: for they that need it, care not for it: & what compulsion then can this be? If it be any thing really effective, let it be persuaded to them that shall deserve it; for it must work wholly by opinion, and can affright them onely who are taught to be afraid of it. It can onely doe effort upon them who are willing to be good in the way of the Church: for it is a spiritual punishment; and there∣fore operates onely upon the spirit, that is upon the will and understand∣ing, which can have no coercion: so that in effect it compels them who are willing to be compell'd, that is, it does not compel at all, and therefore is but improperly an act of Jurisdiction.

For that which the Ecclesiastics can doe,* 1.1003 is a suspension of their own act, not any power over the actions of other men: and therefore is but an use of their own liberty, not an exercise of jurisdiction. He does the same thing in Sacraments as he does in preaching: In both he declares the guilty person to be out of the way to heaven, to be obnoxious to the Divine an∣ger, to be a debtor of repentance; and refusing to baptize an evil Catechu∣men, or to communicate an ill-living Christian, does but say the same thing: he speaks in one by signes, and in the other he signifies by words. If he denies to give him the Holy Communion, he tels him he is not in the state of grace and the Divine favour, he tels him that he hath no commu∣nion with Christ; and therefore by denying the Symbols sayes that truth which by his Sermons he publishes. All the effect and real event is pro∣duc'd by the sin of the man; and the Minister of religion tells him as God's messenger what he hath done to himself, and what will come upon him from God. This is judicium, non jurisdictio, a judging, not a jurisdiction; a judging a man worthy or unworthy; which does not suppose a superiority of jurisdiction, but equals doe it to their equals, though in this the Clergy hath a superiority, and an authority from God to doe so.

Adde to this,* 1.1004 that the other effects of Excommunication are not any force or impression upon the Delinquent, but are the caution and duty of the Church, or sanior pars of them that are innocent; for it is a command to them to abstain from the society of the criminal: for to him it is no di∣rect obligation; indirectly it is, as I have already affirm'd and shall after∣wards discourse.

This discourse cannot lessen the power and authority of the Church;* 1.1005 it onely explicates the nature of it, because it is useful to many cases of

conscience, and does rightly establish the foundation of this great measure of conscience, [Ecclesiastical laws] and it addes grandeur to it. For it is in the Ecclesiastical government as it was in the Judaical before they had a King. They had no King of their own, but God was their King; and he did exercise Jurisdiction, and appointed Judges over them, and wrought miracles for their punishment or their escape respectively: and so it is in the Church; Christ our head keeps the spiritual regality and the jurisdi∣ction in his own hands, but sends us to minister it according to his laws; which if we doe, they who are found criminals cannot indeed be smitten by us, but they shall be smitten by God: and therefore Christ said the same thing to his Missionaries as God did to Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but me, said God; and, He that despiseth you, despiseth me, said Christ. And now, although Kings have the sword in their own hand, and can smite the disobedient; yet we cannot: but God will smite them that are disobedient to the Church: and that's worse for them that feel it, and better for them that are but threatned; for it is true, that by repentance they may escape that which is threatned by the Church, which in the Common-wealth they can∣not: but these that feel it are in a worse condition; for it is a fearfull thing to fall into the hands of the living God; and, who can dwell with the Everlasting burnings? For our God is a consuming fire.

RULE II. The Church hath power to make laws and to give Commands obliging the conscience, that is, tying the subjects to obedience under the penalty of committing sin, or of incurring the Divine dis∣pleasure.

BY the Church it is certain I must first mean the Church Catholick,* 1.1006 or all the Governours of the Christian assemblies in the world: because if it be in a part it is in the whole; and if it be neither in a part nor in the whole, it is no where. But yet because the whole Catholick Church, that is, all the Governours of Churches (for if we speak of the Church making laws, we must mean the governing part of the Church) did never meet since the days of the Apostles, who being few and united and absolute and supreme could then doe what could never be done since: it is necessary for the reducing this Rule to practise, that the legislation and the power of commanding be subjected in some more particular subject; and therefore I shall instance in the least. By the Church, I mean every particular Church joyn'd to the head of Union; and by the particular Church, I mean the An∣gel of that Church,* 1.1007 the Bishop; according to that saying of S. Cyprian, Scire debes Episcopum in Ecclesia esse, & Ecclesiam in Episcopo, The Bishop is in the Church, and the Church in the Bishop: that is, he is in the Church as the head is part of the body, and the Church is in him as in their representative, and all their power is ministred by his hand, and their interest promoted by him; and he is the hand of God and the hand of the people; this lifted up, and that let down; this in the ministery of prayers, and that in the mi∣nistery

of blessings.* 1.1008 And therefore S. Chrysostome expounding those words of Christ, Tell it unto the Church, says that they mean, tell it to the Bishop of the Church, who is to minister food and Discipline to the congregation.

Now all the power of commanding and making Ecclesiastical laws,* 1.1009 that is, laws of Religion, is wholly in the Pastors and Bishops in the supreme order of Ecclesiastics. If there be two orders of Divine institu∣tion, it is certain that one is the superior; and therefore one onely is to rule in eminency, and the other can rule but in minority and substitution: and that which is appointed to rule is the superior. Now the case then is clear as to the present purpose: the Presbyters were under Bishops, and might be accused before them and rebuk'd by them; we see it plain in the case of Timothy and Titus, to whom S. Paul gave rules of Court, and measures of taking cognisance of causes brought before them. There was plainly the judging order and the judged: The Elders or Presbyters were judged; over them were Overseers plac'd. Par in parem potestatem non habet. Since therefore a judicatory was plac'd in the Church, though it was a spiritual onely and without temporal coercion, yet it had a just au∣thority; and therefore must suppose a distinction in the Clergy of superior and inferior. Now because there can be no union political without govern∣ment, and the government which was appointed was that of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the ruling Clergy, it follows that the Bishop being the head of spiri∣tual union in the first institution of the Church, every society of Christi∣ans is reckoned one by the unity of the Bishop; and therefore that society of a Bishop and his parish is the least indeed, but it is a Christian Common-wealth. Now the practice Apostolical and Primitive administring this power by one and one in every Church, where there were many Presby∣ters, it must be evident that he who was superior to the Presbyters was to rule in every congregation; and because there was none superior to him by Divine or Apostolical appointment, all the legislative or commanding power in the Church is founded in the Episcopal order, and therefore that one Bishop hath in his own charge a legislative or power of command; and therefore much more when many Bishops meet together. A Diocese is the least circuit of government, but it is an intire body subject to distinct commands; that is, every Diocese hath one set over them in the Lord, to whom the people are by the commands of Jesus Christ tied to give obe∣dience.

Whether the Diocese be little or great,* 1.1010 allowed or disallowed, in City or in Country, divided into parishes or not divided, under Metropo∣litans or not under, of many Churches or but one, it matters not: where there is a Bishop and a congregation there is a Diocese, and there is a power of commanding and a necessity of obeying, intra limites disciplina, within that pale in which they have warranty and power to govern and to give commandements. As for parishes in the late sense of the word, that is, the charge of a single Presbyter, it is no body politic of Apostolical or Di∣vine appointment: for the Presbyters were called in partem sollicitudinis into the help of the Ministery; but they had no cure of souls, save onely by delegation & special and temporary appointment, for some whole ages in the Church: and therefore the Governing and the Commanding Autho∣rity cannot be extended to Parishes and to their Curates which are of late

date, and received no power from Christ but that of Ministery, which is also conveyed by the Bishops hands. But then because above the Bishop there is no appointment in the whole religion, it is necessary that the legis∣lative be established in him: if we goe higher we can never come to a society of Apostolical or Divine institution in the Church, because between the whole Catholick Church, either in diffusion or representation, and a single Diocese, all the intermedial unions, as of Metropolitans, Primates, Patri∣archs, Councils Provincial or Oecumenical, are by consent and positive and humane institution, but they directly estabish no Divine Government. This onely is properly such. And though this can suffer alteration as to the administration of it, yet the proper seat of the authority is the Bishop, by virtue of his order. Whether the Bishop of Rome receiv'd the power into himself alone, and so conveyes it to all other Bishops, is not material to our present inquiry; for that is a question of the manner of receiving it, not of the power when it is receiv'd. I shall in order to other purposes discover the unreasonablenesse of that fond pretence and novelty. But that which I say is, that those persons who by Christs appointment to or by the Apostles were authoris'd to govern the Church, are the heads of Christian societies, and every such society is a distinct government; and that this cannot be the division of parishes, because that division was later then the authority: and though this be true also of Dioceses as they are now divided, yet that di∣vision being but accidental to the charge, and the charge being an appoin∣ted relation, that which is accidental and superinduc'd cannot prejudice the nature and institution of it, but that a Bishop and his charge more or lesse is an intire society or Common-wealth, as much as the thing can be; that is, according to the nature and capacity of the subject matter, it is an intire government, and Prelate and people make the parts of the inte∣gral constitution.

To the verification therefore of the power thus subjected,* 1.1011 all those titles of eminency and superior office recorded in Scripture doe aptly mi∣nister: as that they are called Pastors, and Rulers, and Praepositi, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Bishops or Overseers of the Church: He that hears them, hears Christ, who hath sent them as himself was sent. Upon the account of these the first rulers of Churches in Scripture did give laws to their people, and threatned the disobedient not onely by the force of their extraordinary power, but by the effects of their ordinary ministery. The particular instances of command I shall enumerate when I give account in what things they have power to make laws; but these words of power were sufficient warrant, and were like seals to their Commissions and Monitors of their duty. But so the Rulers of the Church did practise their power, and taught the necessity of obedience.

To this purpose are those words of S. Clement to S. James the Bro∣ther of our Lord;* 1.1012 These things,* 1.1013 most dear Brother, I have received from the mouth of holy Peter, who gave the commands, and I have endeavour'd to shew them to thee, that thou mayest command them all to be kept inviolate, because Ecclesiastical affaires ought not to be done carelesly but with diligence. There∣fore let no man think that without danger he can neglect these precepts, or dis∣semble them; quia in judicio Dei ignis aeterni tormenta sustinebit qui Eccle∣siastica decreta neglexerit, because in the judgment of God he shall suffer the torments of an Eternal fire who shall neglect the decrees of the Church. But

he that shall hear thee as the Minister of Christ commanded, shall receive glo∣ry: But he that shall not hear thee, or rather the Lord speaking by thee, shall receive to himself damnation.

S. Ignatius is very frequent and expresse in this particular.* 1.1014 Be sub∣ject to the Bishop as to the Lord.* 1.1015 For he watches for your souls as he that must give an account to God. For it is necessary that you doe nothing without the Bishop. For he that is disobedient to Bishops, will be altogether without God, impious,* 1.1016 and a despiser of Christ, and a disparager of his ordinance. And again, It is fit that you obey your Bishop, and in nothing to contradict him. For he that does, despises not him that is visible, but in him despises the invisible God, who cannot be despis'd of any one. For the Bishop hath not his promotion from men, but from God.

Tertullian speaking of the power and judicatory of the Church,* 1.1017 saith,* 1.1018 Ibidem etiam exhortationes, castigationes & censura Divina; nam & judica∣tur magno cum pondere, ut apud certos de Dei conspectu, There are exhorta∣tions, chastisements and a Divine censure; for the judgment of the Church is with great weight and efficacy, because it is amongst them who are certain that they shall appear before God: and it is the greatest forerunning of the great Judgment, if any one sins so that he be banished from the communion of pray∣ers, assemblies and all holy entercourse.

To which if we adde the words of S. Cyprian,* 1.1019 we shall find not onely the power and authority warranted, but the subject of the power declar'd to be the Bishop.* 1.1020 Since there are such and so great and many other exam∣ples and precedents by which the Authority of the Bishop and his power is established by Divine ordinance, what sort of men doe you suppose them to be who, being enemies of Bishops and rebels against the Catholic Church, are not affrighted with the threatning of God admonishing them, nor yet with the re∣venge of the future judgment? For heresies have arisen and schisms com∣menc'd from no other cause then this, that men doe not obey [the Bishop] the Priest of God: neither doe they consider that there is in the Church for a time a Judge in the stead of Christ, to whom if all the Brethren would obey accor∣ding to the Commands of God, no man would move any thing against a college of Bishops; no man would after the Divine judgment is pass'd, after the suf∣frage of the people, and the judgment of the Bishops his assessors, make himself a judge not of the Bishop, but indeed of God himself; no man would divide the Unity of the Church; no man by a self-pleasure and pride would make a new heresy apart by himself.

I onely adde the testimony of S. Hierom,* 1.1021 it being in a clear case as to the thing it self; and the difficulty being onely in the measures, the manner and instances of obedience.* 1.1022 Episcopus vester cui Ecclesiae commissum est re∣gimen, &c. Your Bishop to whom the government of the Church is committed, whom God hath plac'd as the surveyor of his vineyard, the shepherd of the sheep, the director of the flock, the leader of the people both in the city and the country in which ye live, let him nourish you with a singular care, and feed you with the meat of holy doctrine, and in the presence of God take especial care of your souls: let all men devoutly and with an even mind as to God obey him to whom all the city is committed.

But because I have given a larger account of this duty in general, in * 1.1023 a Discourse on purpose, I shall more properly consider in what particular cases the conscience is, or is not, bound to obey the Church-governours.

RULE III. The Church hath power to make laws in all things of necessary duty, by a direct power and a Divine authority.

SAint Ignatius discoursing of the Bishops power,* 1.1024 commands subjection to him in so large and comprehensive termes, that they seem to put an end to all further inquiries in this rule of conscience, by making all inquiries to be uselesse;* 1.1025 because an obedience universal is due. Necesse est ut quicquid facitis,* 1.1026 nihil sine Episcopo tentetis, & in nullo illi refragari: And again, Nec quicquam videatur vobis consentaneum quod sit praeter illius judicium; quod enim tale est, Deo inimicum est. It is necessary that whatsoever ye doe, ye doe nothing without the Bishop; that ye be obedient to him, and be refractary against him in nothing: Neither let any thing please you that is besides his judgment; for whatsoever is so is an enemy to God. The same also he re∣peats in other places,* 1.1027 and gives it in command to other Churches. But this is too general to guide any man, and therefore of it self requires a limit: and therefore himself does explicate it in his letter to the Church of Smyrna. Sine Episcopo nemo quicquam faciat eorum quae ad Ecclesiam spe∣ctant, Without the Bishop let no man doe any thing of that which belongs to the Church; that is, whatsoever is intrusted to the Bishops charge, the conduct of souls, the duties of religion, the commandements of God, the Sacra∣ments of the religion, the Orders of the Divine institution, the interior actions of grace, and the external which are of necessary ministery and re∣lation to them, are under the Discipline and legislation of the Church. For in these things onely his charge, and therefore in these things onely his authority does lie.

Thus the Bishop hath power to command his subject or parishioner to put away his concubine;* 1.1028 and if he does not, he not onely sins by unclean∣nesse, but by disobedience too. For the authority of the Church being spi∣ritual, it hath power over the spirit, and introduces guilt upon the soul if it be disobeyed. So that it is but folly and ignorance to think the Bishop hath no power, because he is to command onely in those things where God hath commanded already. For though he is God's Minister and commands not by his own will, but by God's, yet he hath the authority of God given to him to doe that: and besides that it is not reasonable to think that God would give the Church-Rulers his authority for trifling and needlesse pur∣poses; it is also evident in the thing it self, that it is of great effect, be∣cause even in these things he is the voice of God, and judges in the place of God, and affrights sinners with the accents of his displeasure, and upon this account brings a burden upon the disobedient which was not brought upon him before the command and sentence of the Church.

Whatsoever therefore the Bishop commands us as from God,* 1.1029 in that his power and legislation is properly exercised: and it is absolutely to be obeyed without any other condition or reserve, but that it be indeed the will and commandement of God.* 1.1030 So S. Bernard, Quicquid vice Dei prae∣latus homo praecipit, quod non sit tamen certum displicere Deo, haud secus omnino recipiendum est ac si praecipiat ipse Deus, Whatsoever the Prelate in the stead of God commands, provided you are certain it does not displease God, it must be receiv'd as if God himself commanded it. For what difference is it whether God by himself, or by men his Ministers, or by his ministring An∣gels make his will and pleasure known unto us? Where it is observable that he does not give leave to disobey if we question whether it be God's will or no; for if it be a question, the presumption is for the authority imposing it: and in that case, though it be a doubt in theory, yet that must not hin∣der the practical obedience; because it is as certain that our lawfull superi∣or hath power to command us to obey when we are not certain of the thing, as it is certain that it is a sin if we doe it in a doubting conscience by our own authority. For the authority of God in the hand of a Prelate is warrant enough to determine us when we know nothing to the contrary, though our own will is not. If we have a doubting conscience, we have no∣thing (while the doubt remains) to oppose against it but our will, and that is not sufficient, but a Divine authority is. Now although in the present case it does not work to the clearing of the material doubt, yet it does operate to the clearing of the duty: and therefore S. Bernard said well [quod non sit tamen certum displicere Deo] unlesse you are sure, that is, be fully per∣suaded, you displease God in obeying the Bishop, it is certain you doe dis∣please God by disobeying him.

For it is a part of our obedience not to judge his sentence,* 1.1031 that is, not to give judgment against him in a question of difficulty, but to stand to his sentence.* 1.1032 Credas tibi salutare quicquid ille praeceperit; nec de Majorum sen∣tentia judices, cujus officii est obedire & implere quae jussa sunt, said S. Hie∣rom in a like case. It is your part to obey, and to doe what is commanded, and not to judge your judges, but to believe all that to be good which your Prelate commands you; meaning when his command is instanc'd in the matter of the Divine Commandement. In things that are plain and easy, every man can be a Judge, because indeed their needs none, for there is no question: but in things of difficulty, and where evidently God is not dis∣honour'd, it is very much our duty to obey the Church.

Thus the Church hath power to command us to be devout in our prayers,* 1.1033 to be charitable to our Brother, to forgive our enemy, to be hearti∣ly reconcil'd to him, to instruct the ignorant, to follow holinesse, and to doe justice, and to be at peace with all men; and he that obeys not, does walk disorderly, and may be us'd accordingly with all the power the Church hath intrusted to her, according to the merit of the cause: but it is certain he sins with a double iniquity that refuses Gods Commandement and the precept of his spiritual superior; for in these things every Minister can ex∣hort, but the Bishop can command, that is, he binds the Commandement of God by a new obligation and under a distinct sin, the sin of disobe∣dience.

RULE IV. The Church hath power to make laws in such things which are helps and apt ministeries and advan∣tages of necessary duty.

This Rule is expressely taught by S. Basil:* 1.1034 Necessariò ea nos in memo∣riam debemus redigere quae dicta sunt ab Apostolo,* 1.1035 Prophetias nolite spernere…. Ex his autem intelligitur quod si quid nobis imperatum est quod idem sit cum mandato Domini, aut adjuvet, illud tanquam voluntas Dei studiosius dili∣gentiusque à nobis suscipi debet, We must remember what the Apostle said, Despise not prophesyings. But if any thing be commanded us which is all one with the command of God, or may help it, it ought to be undertaken by us with diligence and study as if it were the will of God. Thus if our Bishop in his precepts and sermons of chastity command that the women goe not to the publick spectacles, where are represented such things which would make Cato blush, and Tuccia have looser thoughts, they are bound in Conscience to abstain from those impure societies; and not onely from the lust, but from the danger. For in vain is it that God should intrust the souls of the peo∣ple to spiritual Rulers, and give them wisdome to doe it, and command∣ment to doe it with diligence, and gifts of the Holy Spirit to enable them to doe it with advantage, if the people were not tied in duty to decline those places and causes where and whence they doe usually perish.

And in pursuance of the Episcopal authority in the like instances it was that S. Chrysostom held his pastoral staffe over the disobedient:* 1.1036 for the Church had declar'd that in the holy time of Lent the people should live austerely, and therefore he told them at that time especially that they should not goe to the publick shews and theatres; and to the disobedient he addes this threatning,* 1.1037 Sciant omnes his criminibus obnoxii, si post hanc nostram admonitionem in ea negligentia manserint, non toleraturos nos, sed legibus Ecclesiasticis usuros, & magnâ austeritate docturos ne talia posthac negligant, n••ve tanto contemptu Divina audiant eloquia, Let all that are guilty of such crimes know that if after this admonition they persist in this neglect, we will not suffer it, but use the laws of the Church against them, and shall teach them with great austerity that hereafter they doe not hear the Divine Sermons with so great contempt.

Upon the same account the Church in her Sermons of repentance does usually,* 1.1038 and hath authority to enjoyn actions of internal and external signifi∣cations and ministeries of repentance. In the Primitive Church the Bishops did indict fasting-dayes, and publick Letanies and processions or solemn sup∣plications and prayers to be us'd in the times of publick danger and neces∣sity.* 1.1039 This we find in Tertullian, Episcopi universae plebi mandare jejunia assolent, non dico de industria stipium conferendarum, ut vestrae capturae est, sed interdum & ex aliqua sollicitudinis Ecclesiasticae causa, The Bishops are wont to command fasting dayes to all the people, not for secular ends, but

for Ecclesiastical necessity and advantage. For when God hath established an office and ministery, it is certain he made it sufficient to acquire all the ends of it' s designation: since therefore the government even of internal actions and a body or society of men must suppose external acts, ministeries, circumstances and significations, no man can from without govern that which is within, unlesse he have power to govern that without which the internal act cannot be done in publick, in union and society.

And here comes in that Rule of the law,* 1.1040 The Accessory follows the na∣ture of the Principal; which hath been so infinitely mistaken and abus'd by the pretences of Romanists and Presbytery for the establishing an Empire Ecclesiastical in things belonging to themselves, not to God. For the soul being the principal and the body it's instrument, they hence argue that they to whom the souls are committed, have therefore a right to govern the body, because it is accessory to the soul; and if the body, then also the acces∣sories of the body, actions, circumstances, time, wealth, lands and houses; in order to the spiritual good of the soul: which proposition because it is intolerable, it can never be the product of Truth, and therefore must be de∣riv'd from a false understanding of this true rule of the lawyers. But because in it's true meaning it serves to conduct many, and particularly this rule of Conscience, it is necessary that we know the true meaning of it.

The Rule [The Accessory followes the nature of the Principal] explicated.

Therefore for the understanding of it so far as can be in order to our design,* 1.1041 it is to be inquir'd, how we shall know which is the principal and which is the accessory? 2. In what sense the accessory must follow the na∣ture of the principal.

1. That which is principal to one purpose,* 1.1042 is but the accessory to ano∣ther sometimes. If Titius hires my land and builds a house upon it, the house is but the accessory, because it came after my land was in possession. But if Titius buyes my house standing upon my own land, he buyes the land too; for the land is but the accessory, and the house is the principal: because the house being the purchase, it cannot be at all but upon a foundation, and therefore the ground is the accessory, and after the house in the intention of the buyer. Villa fundum quaerat, it is sometimes true; but ordinarily, Fundus quaerit villam.

2. That which is of greatest value is not always the principal,* 1.1043 but sometimes is the accessory. The picture of Apollo upon a laurel board is much more precious then the wood, and yet if Apelles should take Lucian's wood and draw the picture. Lucian will make bold with the board, and consequently carry away the picture. A jewel set in gold is much better then the gold, but yet the gold is the principal, because it was put there to illustrate and to adorn the gold;* 1.1044 according to that of Ulpian, Semper cum quaerimus quid cui cedat, illud spectamus, quid cujus rei ornanda causâ adhi∣betur. And therefore if Caius dying leave me in legacy his black-cloth suit, I shall also receive the diamond-buttons that adorn it: because these were

plac'd there to adorn it; and therefore are the accessory, because they are usu minores, and wholly set there for the ministery of the other. Quod adhibetur alterius rei causâ; that is principal for whose sake the other was sent or put. And therefore it is no good argument to conclude that the body is the accessory, because the soul is more noble. Cedent gemmal phialis vel lancibus inclusae auro argentove. The soul is indeed a jewel set in gold; but is therefore an accessory to the body in some cases. He that buyes the body of a slave, hath right to all the ministeries of the soul; and the man is bound to serve his Master with a ready mind and a good will; and the soul is a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the body. The body is first, and the soul comes afterwards to give it life and motion.

3. When two substances concurre to the constitution or integrity of a third,* 1.1045 one is not the accessory to the other. The eye is not the accessory to the head, nor the foot to the leg, nor the hand to the arme; for that onely is an accessory, quod alterius rei causâ adhibetur aut accedit: If it comes in accidentally and be wholly for the others sake, then it is an acces∣sory. Thus order and decency and circumstances of time and place are for the ministeries and ornament of religion, and therefore are acces∣sories. The outward act is the lesse principal and an accessory to the in∣ward, for to the inward it wholly ministers; and consequently he that dis∣poses of one may also govern the other, because the lesse principal is inclu∣ded in the more, and the lesse and the more have not two administrations, because they have but one use. But the soul and the body are two distinct substances of differing ministrations, acting to several and sometimes to contrary purposes; they are parts of the same man, a better and a worse, but not a principal and accessory, unlesse it be by accident and in some uses and to some purposes; and then sometimes one sometimes the other is the principal. Concerning which the Rule is this.

4. Those things which of themselves are not,* 1.1046 but by accident may be made accessories to a principal, are then to be esteem'd to be so when they actually and wholly are joyn'd in use to the principal, and serve the end of the principal, but have none of their own. Thus when the soul prays pas∣sionately, if the lips move without a deliberate act of understanding, but obeying the fancy, the body in that case is purely the accessory. I say in that case: for if the body receive a command to other purposes, as to attend upon the Prince at the same time when the soul prays, in that case they are both principals; and neither of them is accessory to the other. And there∣fore although it will follow that when the body ministers to the action of the soul wholly, and hath no distinct work & office of its own in that action, he that commands the soul, can also command the body; for they are in that ministery but as one: yet it will not follow that when the body is not 〈…〉〈…〉 have also an absolute and irrespective nature, operation or designe, it

cannot be governed in any thing of this, because of it's relative nature and conjunction in the other; for there it is not accessory. For it is the nature of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The conjunct cause or reason, when it is there, the work will follow: but when it is away, there will be no event, says the Philosopher.

6. It is not enough to make a thing to be accessory,* 1.1047 that it is design'd for the use and ministery of another that is principal; but it must be actu∣ally applied: for till then it is but a potential accessory, which gives no right, and changes no nature, and produces no effect. Bridles and saddles are made to be us'd with horses: but he that buyes all the horses in a faire cannot claim all the saddles and bridles which are in the same faire to be sold; because they are not yet become the accessories, but are onely design'd to be so. It is intended that the body should minister to the soul in matters of religion; but because it ministers also to other actions of the soul, he that rules the soul does not by consequence rule the body, unlesse it be actually applied, and be conjunct with the soul in the ministeries of religion.

2. These may be sufficient to declare so much of the nature of acces∣sories as is of use in our present questions.* 1.1048 The next inquiry is, what is the meaning of these words, [The accessory [follows the nature] of the principal.] For it cannot be meant that whatsoever is said of one may be said of the other; or whatsoever may be done to one, may be done to the other. The Rulers of souls have power to excommunicate or to cut them off from the body of the Church, which is the greatest spiritual power, and is after it's own manner a spiritual death. Now suppose the body be an accessory to the soul, it will not follow that he that can cut the soul off from the Church, can cut the body also off from the Common∣wealth. But the meaning is, that duplici & diverso jure censeri non debent, they who are joyn'd in one action are to have one judgment, though accor∣ding to their respective measures. If the soul does well, so does the body ministring to the soul. If it be good to pray, it is good to appoint times and places to pray in, because without time and place you cannot pray: If time and place be contingent and irregular, so are our prayers; if our pray∣ers be solemn and fixt, so must they. And thus also it is in matter of Go∣vernment. If the Bishop is to guide the devotion of the soul, he can also give rules to the body in all that which it ministers to that action of the soul; and when they two make one compleat action by way of principal and accessory, they are the same one intire subject of government. But this is to be extended no further. This passes not to the distinct actions or mini∣steries of the body; but is confin'd to that in which it is, and so long as it is one agent with the soul: neither can it passe to warrant any other im∣pression upon the body, but that it be commanded and conducted in the 〈…〉〈…〉 the Curator bonorum; and the Physician that gives physic to the body, and

conducts the regiment of health, is not Master of his wardrobe: and the Epigram derided Herod the Empiric,

Clinicus Herodes trullam subduxerat aegro: Deprensus dixit, Stulte, quid ergo bibis?

because when he came to take away his patients sicknesse, he took away his plate. If the principal act be confirm'd by an accessory oath, though the principal act prove null and invalid in law, yet the man is tied by the re∣maining oath. A man cannot offer to God an indifferent action or thing. And therefore he that promises to God to walk three turns every day, hath done nothing; the act is null, and he is not obliged to pay that to God: but if an oath did supervene, that must stand,* 1.1049 though the principal of it self be null; because every oath that can without sin be kept, must stand. The alienation of a Minors lands is rescinded by law, yet the obligation and caution of the Tutor for the accessory verification of the principal sale will stand: because there is a reason that separates the accessory from the prin∣cipal, and the law intending to rescind the translation of the Dominion, not to rescind the contract, leaves the principal loose, and the accessory bound. This is also thus in actions principal and accessory, which the law cals per∣sonales & hypothecarias. Maevius dies and divides his estate between Lucius and Lucullus; but he was indebted 20 talents, and for caution had ingag'd some jewels. Lucius payes his five talents, and Lucullus payes foure of the other: the personal action of Lucius is dissolv'd, but the accessory is not; for till Lucullus his personal or principal be taken off, the accessory and cau∣tionary remaines upon them both: and this also hath a particular reason, and so have all those cases in which this Rule failes.

From whence I inferre,* 1.1050 that this thing is sometimes reasonable, and sometimes unreasonable, but it is never necessary but in one case; and that is when the accessory is necessary and inseparable, either by reason of a na∣tural or positive conjunction. For some things are accessory by use and customes, some by laws and commandements, some by the nature of the thing. Now of the first two sorts the measures are contingent and altera∣ble: the laws sometimes declare a thing to be accessory, and at other times it is no so: and if by use or contract or custome a thing be accessory, it ceases to be so if the accessory be particularly excepted. As if I buy a house, it is by custome concluded that I intend the garden that is joyn'd to it; and he that sels a horse, sels his bridle: but if the garden be reserv'd, & the bridle be excepted, the rule is then of no use.

Now to apply this to the present inquiries.* 1.1051 1. Because the body is not in the nature of the thing an inseparable, necessary accessory to the soul in spiritual actions and ministeries, but the soul can pray alone, and be chari∣table alone, and love God alone, and the body hath actions, and intentions, and interests which mingle not with that which the spiritual rulers are to govern; therefore it cannot be inferr'd that the body is subject in all things to them who govern souls.

But 2.* 1.1052 It does follow and may by force of this rule be inferr'd that they who are to govern the religion and spiritual actions of the soul, can also govern the actions of the body which minister immediately and necessa∣rily to the necessary actions of the soul: & therefore because it is a duty that we communicate in the Communion of Saints, when that duty is actually

and of necessity to be done, the Bishop hath power to command the bodies of men to be present in Christian assemblies, according to the precept of the Apostle, Neglect not the assembling of your selves together.

And yet further,* 1.1053 to come home to the present Rule, there are several degrees of necessitie, and several reasons of it. Some things are necessary for life, and some for health. Some are necessary for single Christians, some things are necessary for societies; some things are necessary in private, and some in publick; some things are for order, and some for precise duty; some things are absolutely, and some are but respectively and in order to certain ends necessary. The body is an accessory to the soul, atque eodem jure censendum, to be judg'd by the same laws, govern'd by the same persons, sub∣ject to the same sentence and conduct, not onely in things of absolute ne∣cessity, but even in things of great advantage; not onely in private necessity, which is always indispensable, but even in publick necessities of the Church, in which there is greater latitude and more liberty: and the reason is, because even these lesser degrees of necessity are requir'd of us by Divine Com∣mandement; and it is not onely commanded to us to doe that which is law∣ful, but that also which is of good report; not onely that we glorify God, but that our Brethren be edified. And in proportion to this, it is requir'd of the guides of souls that they give good account of them, but it is re∣quir'd of us also that we so comport our selves that they may doe it with joy:* 1.1054 which cannot be suppos'd, if their power be kept within the bounds of a simply and indispensably necessary internal religion; it cannot be done with∣out prosperous circumstances and advantages of religion: in these therefore if spiritual guides have not power to give commands, they have not all that is necessary by all the kinds of necessity which God made.

But this Rule we see verified by authentic precedents.* 1.1055 For the Apo∣stles at Jerusalem indeed thought fit to impose nothing but those necessary things which are specified in their decretal: but S. Paul us'd also this au∣thority by the measures of the present Rule, and commanded beyond the limits of absolute necessity, even that which he judg'd convenient; and ve∣rifies his authority in his Epistle to Philemon,* 1.1056 I might be much bold in Christ to enjoyn thee that which is convenient: and this he actually did to the Corin∣thian Church, commanding that all things should be done decently and in order.

Now although it be true that in these things the Apostle had some advantages which the Bishops in succession have not;* 1.1057 he had an infallible spirit, and what he call'd convenient was so indeed; and he had converted Philemon, he was his Father in Christ, and he was one of the pillars upon which Christ built the Church, and he was to lay the foundation for an everlasting building: yet because the instance to the Corinthian Church was such which was of a perpetual reason, and it would be for ever necessa∣ry that things should be done in the Church decently and in order, and the question of decency would for ever have variety and flux, succession and a relative uncertainty, it was necessary that of this there should be perpetual Judges and perpetual Dictators: and these can be no other but the Rulers of the Church, who have the same power as the Apostles had in this, though not so many advantages of power. When the Bishops judge truly concerning necessity, & such decencies and reasonablenesses as are next to ne∣cessity,

they can enjoyn them, onely they cannot judge so surely; and there∣fore although there may be more causes of laying aside their commands, yet it is never lawfull without cause.

But this is not to be extended to such decencies as are onely ornament,* 1.1058 but is to be limited to such as onely rescue from confusion: the reason is, because the Prelates and spiritual guides cannot doe their duty, unlesse things be so orderly that there be no confusion, much lesse can they doe it with joy; and so far their power does extend: for although that is not re∣quired of the governours but of the people, that the Rulers office be done with joy; yet because it is required of the people, they sin if they hinder it; therefore the Rulers have power to enjoyn it. But if it can goe beyond this limit, then it can have no natural limit, but may extend to sumptuous∣nesse, to ornaments of Churches, to rich utensils, to splendor, to Majesty; for all that is decent enough, and in some circumstances very fit. But be∣cause this is too subject to abuse, and gives a secular po••er into the hands of Bishops, and an authority over mens estates and fortunes, and is not ne∣cessary for souls, and no part of spiritual government, it is more then Christ gave to his Ministers.

This also is to be added:* 1.1059 that because this power is deriv'd to spiritual Rulers upon the account of reason and experience of things and the duty of the people, that the Rulers should be enabled to give an account of their charges with joy, therefore it is onely left to the people to doe it or not, under the pain of a sin; but they are not to incurre spiritual censures upon the stock of non-compliance in things not simply necessary or of essen∣tial duty. For to compel them to advantages will bring but little joy to the Ruler: he must secure the main duty whether they will or no; that him∣self is to look to, and therefore to use all the means God hath put into his hand; and for that he must look for his joy when he comes to give up his account: but that he himself should doe his duty with joy, that is with ad∣vantages, with ease, with comfort, being a duty wholly incumbent on the people and for their profit, if they will not comply, they sin; and it is not profitable for them,* 1.1060 saith the Apostle, that is, they loose by it; but to this they are at no hand to be constrain'd, for that will destroy his joy as much as the letting it alone.

Beyond this the Bishop hath no authority to command what he can persuade by argument,* 1.1061 he is to take care it be well and wisely, to the glory of God and the good of his Church, to the edification of all men that are interested, and the special comfort and support of the weak. The summe of which power is excellently summ'd up by S. Paul.* 1.1062 For ye know what Commandements we gave you by the Lord Jesus. For this is the will of God, even your sanctification: That ye abstain from fornication…. that no man defraud his Brother. In these things the spiritual power is proper and com∣petent. But the Apostle addes, He therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man but God, who hath also given us his holy Spirit. That is, In those things which are certainly the laws of God the Bishop is to rule intirely according to the power given him. But because God hath not onely given his autho∣rity; but his spirit too, that is, he hath given him wisdome as well as pow∣er, it cannot be supposed to be for nothing: whatever he wisely orders, that is of necessary relation to the expresse command of God, or is so re∣quisite

for the doing of it, that it cannot be well done without it by any other instrument, nor by it self alone. In this it is to be supposed that the spirit of government which God hath given to his Church will sufficiently assist, and therefore does competently oblige: lesse then this the Spirit of God cannot be suppos'd to doe, if it does any thing beside giving and re∣vealing the expresse commandement and necessary duty.

Beyond these strict and close measures there is no doubt but the Spirit of God does give assistance:* 1.1063 as the great experience of the Church, and the effects of government, and the wise rules of conduct, and the usefull Ca∣nons, and the decent Ceremonies, and the solemn rites, and the glorifica∣tions of God consequent to all this doe abundantly testify. But yet be∣yond this, the Bishops can directly give no laws that properly and imme∣diately bind the transgressors under sin: and my reasons are these.

1. Because we never find the Apostles using their Coercion upon any man but the expresse breakers of a Divine Commandement,* 1.1064 or the pub∣lick disturbers of the peace of the Church and the establish'd necessary order.

2. Because even in those things which were so convenient that they had a power to make injunctions,* 1.1065 yet the Apostles were very backward to use their authority of commanding; much lesse would they use severity, but intreaty.* 1.1066 It was S. Paul's case to Philemon before mention'd; Though I might be much bold in Christ to enjoyn that which is convenient; yet for love's sake I rather intreat thee.

3. In those things where God had interpos'd no Command,* 1.1067 though the rule they gave contain'd in it that which was fit and decent, yet if men would resist, they gently did admonish or reprove them, and let them alone. So S. Paul in case of the Corinthian men wearing long haire, If any man list to be contentious, we have no such custome, nor the Churches of God: that is, let him chuse; it is not well done, we leave him to his own liberty, but let him look to it.

4. If the Bishops power were extended further,* 1.1068 it might extend to Tyranny, and there could be no limits beyond this prescrib'd, to keep him within the measures and sweetnesse of the government Evangelical: but if he pretend a Divine authority to goe further, he can be absolute and su∣preme in things of this life which doe not concern the Spirit, and so fall into Dynasty, as one anciently complain'd of the Bishop of Rome, and change the Father into a Prince, and the Church into an Empire.

But this hinders not but that the power of spiritual Rulers may yet extend to a further use,* 1.1069 not by a direct power of command, or of giving laws, but by all the indirect and collateral ways of obligation, as of fame, consent, reputation of the man, the reverence of his person, and the opinion of his wisedome and sanctity, by voluntary submission, and for the avoiding scandal: when any of these causes of action or instruments of obligation doe intervene, the Bishop does not directly bind, but the people are bound: and their obligation from all these principles are reduc'd to two heads. The matter of scandal; in which case, under pain of sin they must obey in all

lawfull things, when by accident and the concurse of emergent causes it is scandalous to disobey. And the other is, Their own consent; for however it be procur'd fairly, if they once have consented, they are become a law unto themselves, and so they remain till this law suffers diminution as other laws doe that die: of which I am afterwards to give account.

There is one way more by which Ecclesiastical laws doe bind; but this is the matter of the next Rule.

RULE V. When the Canons or Rules of Ecclesiastical Rulers are confirmed by the supreme Civil power, they oblige the Conscience by a double obligation.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1070 say the Greek Lawyers. The power of making laws, viz. of determining things not commanded by God, or of punishing prevarications against Gods laws or their own, is granted to Kings. And therefore as secular Princes did use to indict or permit the in∣diction of Synods of Bishops; so when they saw cause, they confirm'd the sentences of Bishops and pass'd them into laws. Before the Princes were Christian, the Church was governed by their spiritual guides, who had au∣thority from God in all that was necessary, and of great conveniency next to necessity; and in other things they had it from the people, from necessi∣ty and from good will, by hope and fear, by the sense of their own needs, and the comfort of their own advantages. It was populus voluntarius, the people came with free-will-offerings, and were at first govern'd by love as much as now they need to be by fear and smart. But God was never wanting to his Church, but made provisions in all cases and in all times. Of that which was necessary Christ left in his Ministers a power of govern∣ment: and in that which was not primely necessary, but emergently and contingently came to be useful and fit, he onely left in his Ministers a power to perswade; but he gave them an excellent spirit of wisedome and holi∣nesse by which they did prevail, and to the people the spirit of love and obedience: and these together were strength enough to restrain the disobe∣dient. For as in the Creation there was Light before the Sun, that we might learn that the Sun was not the fountain of light, but God: so there was a government in the Church even before the Princes were Christians, that the support and ornament of Gods Church might be owned as an ef∣flux of the Divine power, and not the kindnesse of Princes. But yet as when the Light was gathered and put into the body of the Sun, we after∣wards deriv'd our light from him, and account him the Prince of all the bodies of light: so when the government external of all things was drawn into the hands of Princes becoming Christians, to them the Church owes the heat and the warmth, the light and the splendor, the life of her laws, and the being of all her great advantages of maintenance and govern∣ment. At first the Church was indeed in the Common-wealth, but was reckoned no part of it, but as enemies and outlaws, were persecuted with intolerable violence; but when the Princes of the Common-wealth be∣came

servants of Christ, they were also nurses of the Church, and then it became a principal part of the Republick, and was car'd for by all her laws.

For this first way was not like to last long;* 1.1071 for good manners soon corrupt, and a precarious authority, though wise and holy, useful and con∣sented to, was not stable as the firmament of laws that could compel: and yet it became necessary by new introduc'd necessities that there should be rules and measures given in things relating to the Church, concerning which God himself had given no commandement; as concerning order in Synods and conventions Ecclesiastical, the division of Ecclesiastical charges, the appointment of under-ministeries in the Church, the dispensation of re∣venues, the determination of causes and difficulties in manners of speaking or acting, and whatsoever was not matter of faith or a Divine Command∣ment: in all that new necessities did every day arise, and the people were weary of obeying, and the Prelates might presse too hard in their gover∣ning, or might be suppos'd to doe so when they did not, and the peoples wearinesse might make them complain of an easy load; and it was not possible well to govern long by the consent of the people who are to be governed. It pleased God to raise up a help that should hold for ever, and when the Princes became Christian and took care of all this, that is, of all the external regiment of the Church, of all that was not of spiritual nature and immediate necessary relation to it, then the Ecclesiastical laws were advised by Bishops and commanded by Kings; they were but Rules and Canons in the hands of the spiritual order, but laws made by the secular power. And now these things are not questions of the power of the Cler∣gy, but a matter of obedience to Kings and Princes.

These Canons before the Princes were Christian were no laws further then the people did consent;* 1.1072 and therefore none but the men of good will, the pious and the religious children of the Church did obey: but now that Princes have set the Crosse upon their Imperial globes and scepters, even the wicked must obey; all are tied by all manner of ties, and all can be compelled that need it. These Ecclesiastical laws so established the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Edicts, orders, and golden bulls, commanding or making into laws the sentences and rules of Synods. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that's the effect and produ∣ction of Bishops in their conventions; that is, they have jus pronunciandi quid sanctum, quid non, a right of pronouncing what is for Gods glory and the interests of religion, and what not: but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the establish∣ment and the command belong to Princes. The Synod hath a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or a right of judging, but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or confirmation of it into a law belongs to the Civil power. So we find in a Synodal Epistle de non avellendis episcopis à sua Metropoli, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some such thing as this hath been found done by the decree or judgement of a Synod, but established by after-judgement of the King. To the same sense are those words of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 applied to the Bi∣shops Canons, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to the Kings Edict upon them; and there∣fore the Emperors and Princes were said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1073 to put the seal of their authority to the decrees of the Fathers.† 1.1074

For it was never known in the Primitive Church that ever any Ec∣clesiastical* 1.1075 law did oblige the Catholick Church unlesse the secular Prince

did establish it. The Nicene Canons became laws by the Rescript of the Emperor Constantine, says Sozomen. He wrote an Epistle and com∣manded that all Churches should keep Easter by the Canon of the Nicene Fathers, and made it capital to keep any of the books of Arius. * When the Council of Constantinople was finish'd the Fathers wrote to the Emperor Theodosius, and petition'd ut edicto Pietatis tuae confirmetur Synodi sententia, that he would be pleased to confirm the sentence of the Council by his Edict: ut quemadmodum literis quibus nos vocabas Ecclesiam honorasti, ita etiam de∣creta communibus suffragiis tandem facta sigillo tuo confirmes. The Emperor had done them favour and honour in calling them together, and they peti∣tioned he would also confirm what they had agreed upon, and by his seal make it authentic. The confirmation of the Canons and Decrees of the great Ephesin Council by the Emperor is to be seen at the end of the Acts of the Synod: and Marcian the Emperor wrote to Palladius his Prefect a letter in which he testifies that he made the Decrees of the Council of Chalcedon to become laws. For having forbidden any person to make as∣semblies and orations of religion in publick, he addes this reason, Nam & in∣juriam facit reverendissimae Synodi judicio, si quis semel judicata ac rectè disposita revolvere & publicè disputare contenderit; cùm ea quae nunc de Chri∣stiana fide à Sacerdotibus qui Chalcedone convenerunt per nostra praecepta statuta sunt, &c. For he does injury to the judgement of the most reverend Synod, if he shall unravel and dispute the things which were there judged and rightly disposed; since those things appointed by the Bishops met at Chalcedon concerning Christian faith were commanded by us; or were appointed by our Commandement…. Nam in contemptores hujus legis poena non de••rit, They that despise this law shall be punished. Thus also the Fathers of the fifth General Synod petition'd Justinian to confirm and establish their Canons into a law, in the same form which was sent to Theodosius by the Bishops of the General Council at Constantinople before mention'd.* 1.1076 The same Prince also published a Novel in which he commands vim legum obtinere Ecclesia∣sticos Canones à quatuor Synodis, Nicena, Constantinopolitana prima, Ephesina prima & Chalcedonensi expositos & confirmatos; that all the laws which were made or confirm'd by the four first General Councils should have the force of laws: that is, all their own Canons and those of Ancyra, Gangra, Antioch & Laodicea, which were then adopted into the Code of the Univer∣sal Church, though they were but Provincial in their original.

So that now upon this account the Ecclesiastical laws are as obligato∣ry to the conscience as those which are made in a Civil matter;* 1.1077 and there is no difference but in the matter onely: but for that there will be some ad∣vantage; for as the Civil power hath authority in Ecclesiastical matters, so the spiritual power hath a share in the legislative: the matter is handled by the Ecclesiastics, and the law is established by the secular. And therefore if it be thought that the cognisance of these things is not proper for seculars, those that think so may be satisfied that the Bishops have judged the thing already; and they that think the Bishops have no power of making the law, may learn to obey, because the Prince hath by his legislative established it. So one hand helps another, and both are lift up to God, but will fall heavy upon the disobedient.

§. 2. Of CENSURES Ecclesiastical.

I have given the general measures of the Legislative power of the Ec∣clesiastical state: next to this I am to account concerning their Coerci∣tive §. 2. and then return to the inquiries after the more particular sub∣jects of this power §. 3. and their particular laws and their obligations upon the conscience in external order §. 4. and in matters of faith §. 5.

RULE VI. Kings and Princes are by the ties of Religion, not of power, oblig'd to keep the laws of the Church.

THe laws of the Church I have already divided into such which she makes by a Divine authority,* 1.1078 such which concern our essential duty, in which she hath power to command and rule in her appointed manner; and into those which are external, political and contingent, such which Princes if they please make up into laws, but the spiritual power cannot. In the first sort, Kings and Princes are as much tied to obedience as the meanest Christian subject. For the King, though he be supreme in government Political, yet his soul is of Christs fold, and to be conducted by a proper shepherd. It is no contradiction that the same person should be supreme, and yet obey in another regard in which he is not supreme. The Captain that fights in a ship commands the souldiers in chief, but himself obeyes the Master; and the safety of the souldiers depends upon them both: for they are distinct powers in order to distinct purposes. For Kings must give an account for Bishops that they live well in the political capacity, and Bishops for Kings in their spiritual; and therefore they must obey each o∣ther: and we find that persons of greatest honour in the days of peace, serve under Captains and Generals in the time of warre; and when The∣mistius, an excellent Philosopher, who from his chair did rule and dictate wise things, and give laws to the understandings of his Auditors, and was admir'd by his Prince, was by the Emperor Constantius advanc'd to a pre∣fecture, in an excellent Epigram he says to himself, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Now ascend downwards, for thou hast already descended upwards. The same dignity is above and below in several regards. But in this there is no difficulty, because the souls of Princes are of equal regard, and under the same laws of God, and to be cleans'd and nourish'd by the same Sacraments, and tied to the same duty by the Commandements of God as any of the people; in this there is no difference.

But in matters not of necessary duty,* 1.1079 not expressely required by God's law and the necessary, unavoidable, immediate consequents of it, there be∣ing no laws but what themselves have made, they are no otherwise ob∣lig'd then by their own civil laws, of which I have already given account. This thing is particularly noted by Balsamo upon the 16^th Canon of the Council of Carthage, who affirms that by the reason of the power given to

Princes from God they are subject neither to their laws nor Canons. And of this latter he gives this instance, That although by the XII^th Canon of the Council of Chalcedon it was decreed that no city should for the future acquire the title of a Metropolis; yet after this Justinianea prima was made an Archiepiscopal seat and had Metropolitical rights, to the diminu∣tion of the former rights of Thessalonica: but Balsamo instances in divers others. There was an ancient Canon of great celebrity in the Church, that every city should have a proper Bishop: but the Bishops of Isauropolis and Tolma besides their own, had others; so had the Bishops of Lichfield and of Bath in England: they had other cities under their jurisdiction which had no Bishops in propriety. For if Kings did give limit to their Dio∣ceses they might divide again, and give a new limit; since it is not in Kings as it is in people. The power that goes from the people is like water slipt from their hands, it returns no more, and does not abide in the first place of it's efflux; but when an act of power passes from the King, any depu∣tation or trust, any act of grace or delegation of jurisdiction, it is like heat passing from the fire, it warms abroad, but the heat still dwells at home. It is no more the lesse, then the Sun is for the emission of it's beams of light.

And this is apparent in all the privileges and concessions made to the Church,* 1.1080 which are as revocable as their duty is alterable. For Princes are so far from being oblig'd to perpetuate such rights which themselves have indulg'd, that it is a rul'd case, and the Greek Fathers sometimes make use of it to this very purpose,* 1.1081 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If a King hath given a gift, he may recal it in case the beneficiary proves ingratefull. The same with that in the feu∣dal laws of the Lombards, Feudum amittit qui feudum sciens inficiatur. If he wittingly denies the fee, or refuses homage, he looses it. But this depends upon the reasons of the second Rule in the third Chapter of this Book.

But although in strict right the Kings laws oblige him not,* 1.1082 yet be∣cause de bono & laudabili he is in the senses above explicated oblig'd to his civil laws, therefore much more is he tied to the observations and Canons of the Church, as being specifications of religion, instances of love to God, significations of some internal duty, or outer guards to piety, great exam∣ples to the people, and honours to the Church of Christ, and that which above all external things will enable the Rulers and guides of souls to ren∣der their account with joy; and the King shall never so well promote the interests of religion by any thing, as by being himself subject to the religi∣on: for who will murmure at those laws which the King himself weares in a phylactery upon his forehead and his wrists? Facere rectè cives suos princeps optimus faciendo docet; cumque sit Imperio Maximus, exemplo major est, said Velleius Paterculus. This is most of all true in religion, whose laws look too like policy when they are established onely by pe∣nalties, but they are accounted religion when they are made sacred by ex∣ample. To which purpose is that of Tacitus,* 1.1083 Obsequium in Principem & aemulandi amor validiora quam poena ex legibus. It is duty to our Prince, and it is our honour to imitate the example of the Prince; and these pre∣vail more then penalties. Haec enim conditio principum, ut quicquid faciant, praecipere videantur,* 1.1084 says Quintilian. Their example is the best law.

Sic agitur censura, & sic exempla parantur, Si Judex, alios quod jubet, ipse facit.

So laws and judgements and good manners are best established, when by the examples of Kings and supreme Judges they are made sacred.

Adde to this, that the laws of religion have most of them the warran∣ty of some internal grace or other, and are to be reckoned in the retinue and relation of that vertue, and therefore cannot in many instances be broken without some straining of our duty to God, which is by the wise∣dome and choice of men determin'd in such an instance to such a specifica∣tion. But this is to be understood onely in such laws which are the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 outerguards, the exercises of internal religion, not in the garments and adornments of the relatives and appendages of religion. If a Prince despises the Festival of the Church, nothing but a competent reason will excuse him from being or at least from seeming irreligious. And in what∣soever instance he hath made or consented to laws of religion, if by them he can suppose the people may serve and please God, he is much more ob∣lig'd then they; not by the duty of obedience, for he owes none, but by the vertue of religion: for besides that his soul must live or die by grea∣ter measures and exactions of those vertues which bring the people unto heaven, every action of his that deserves an ill report, it is but scandal in the lesser people, but to him it is infamy. For the Kings Escutcheon is blazon'd otherwise then that of his subjects: the Gentry by metals, the Nobility by precious stones, but Kings by planets. For in a King there is nothing moderate.* 1.1085 Cavere debet qualem famam habeat, qui qualemcunque meruerit, magnam habiturus est, said Seneca. His fame, let it be good or bad, it will certainly be very great.

The summe is this:* 1.1086 Kings are so tied to their own Ecclesiastical laws, that they must take care they be not despis'd by their example, that the re∣ligion design'd by them be promoted, that that part of the Common∣wealth which most secures to them obedience and peace, and procures them the most and greatest blessings, be not discouraged or disadvantag'd: but they are not so tied that every act of omission is imputable to them, though it have no other cause but the use of his liberty; for in this his duty differs from that of his subjects: for obedience which the subject owes is a part of justice, and that hath no degrees, but consists in an indivisible point where it can be practis'd, and where it can be understood; for he is unjust that does one act of injustice. But religion hath a latitude of signification and instances, and a man may be very religious who yet does not keep a Saints day where by obedience he is not bound; which is the case of Kings. Therefore what Seneca said of the cares of Kings, may be said of the external observations of the laws of religion, Remissum aliquando animum habebit, nunquam solutum, He may remit something of the strict obser∣vance, but he must never esteem himself wholly quit.

But this is to be understood onely in externals and rituals;* 1.1087 concerning which one said excellently, Pleraque ex iis magis ad morem quam ad rem per∣tinent, They are nothing of the substance of religion, but onely appen∣dages, and manner, and circumstances: and therefore; Sapiens servabit ea tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata, A wise man will observe rituals because they are commanded by laws, not that they are pleasing to God. They are the words of Seneca quoted by S. Austin.* 1.1088 Since therefore these

are wholly matter of obedience, Kings are free, save onely when they be∣come bound collaterally and accidentally. But in matters of essential du∣ty, the King hath equally with his subjects no liberty, but much more di∣rect duty, and many more accidental obligations. The whole affaire is well enough express'd by Cicero,* 1.1089 Religioni parendum est: nec patrius mos contu∣maciter repudiandus. The Prince must obey religion, and he must not de∣spise the customes and the manners of his Country; that is, in the better words of our Blessed Saviour, These things they ought to doe, and not [wholly] to leave the other undone.

But the liberty of Princes in these Ecclesiastial laws of order,* 1.1090 and circumstance, and ritual observances is very apparent in the practice of the Hebrew Kings, who yet possess'd this liberty, that even in the rituals of the Divine ordinance they sometimes did dispense. Thus David eat the shew-bread;* 1.1091 and Hezekiah permitted some that were unclean to eat the passeover, otherwise then it was written: onely Hezekiah prayed to God not to impute it to them, and gave them way: and under his reigne the Levites did kill the sacrifice twice, which was onely lawfull for the Priests to doe.* 1.1092 But it was a favourable case, because the Priests were but few, and the sacrifices were very numerous: and if it be (as the Greek expression is) lawfull 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to loose a litle of the exactnesse of the rituals of the Divine appointment, it is certain where the man is the law-giver, he can much more use the liberty. But it is not good to doe all that is lawfull.

RULE VII. It is not lawful for the Ecclesiastical power to excom∣municate Christian Princes, or the supreme Civil power.

IN the sentence &* 1.1093 penalty of the lesser excommunication as it is us'd in the Church there are three portions of evil. In one the Bishop is the au∣thor or minister, in the other the people, and in the third the Prince. The first is a denying to minister the holy mysteries. The other is a withdrawing from the communion and conversation of such a person: which although it be done most of all in the greater excommunication, yet it is done also in some proportion in the lesse, for emendation of the erring brother; not for extermination, as appeares in the Apostolical precept given to the Church of Thessalonica, 2 Thessal. 3. v. 6, and v. 14, 15. And the last is, the super∣vening temporal punishments by which Princes use to verify the just sen∣tences of the Church against refractary Criminals.

Concerning the last,* 1.1094 it is certain it wholly is owing to the power and favour of the Prince; who by that favour is not suppos'd to lay violent hands upon himself, who if he did, could quickly take them off again: however the Church inflicts not them by her own authority, but by that of the Prince, who will not, like the tree in the Fable, lend a stick to the

hatchet, to be hewen down or hurt by it afterwards.

But then concerning that part which is inflicted by the people,* 1.1095 which is abstinence from the society of the offender till he repent and make a∣mends and get his pardon, it is infinitely certain the Church cannot inflict that on Kings; because it is destructive of the duty which the people owe to their Prince, and of the rights which the Prince hath from God inde∣p••ondently from the religion.

Besides this,* 1.1096 nothing ought to be done to the dishonour of the supreme power, to whose happy government fame is almost as necessary as power: and the imposing upon them disgracefull penalties is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a note of dishonour and blasphemy; for they are to esteem their King as a heathen and a publican, from whose society they are to estrange themselves as from a pestilence. Invisum semel principem seu bene seu malè facta premunt, saith Tacitus. If he once fall into such a calamity and dishonour, whether he doe well or ill afterwards, it shall be evil to him.

And yet further,* 1.1097 the power of assemblies and publick meetings is wholly by the laws and permission of Kings; and nothing is more unrea∣sonable then that any man should interdict Kings from publick meetings by whom himself hath leave to meet publickly. And therefore we find Imperial laws making provisions in this very particular, and so far from being subject to any thing of this nature, that the Emperors gave orders and strict measures to the Bishops when they should, and whom they should or should not separate from Churches and Communions; as is to be seen l. 30. Cod. de Episc. & Clericis and in the 123. Novel of Justinian. For even in those actions of Bishops in which themselves have liberty & Divine authority, yet the supreme Civil power hath external jurisdiction. Thus Mauritius the Emperor commanded Gregory the Great, Bishop of Rome, to communicate with John of Constantinople; and anciently in France the Princes were wont to compell the Clergy to officiate; and when the Pope had interdicted the kingdome of England, the King compelled the Priests and Bishops to open their Churches: so it is in Holland, and so in Venice, and so in all places where Kings know their power and their interest and their duty.

For if excommunication be onely an act of caution and prudence,* 1.1098 it is very great prudence not to involve Kings in it, lest they be provok'd by the evil usages of the Church; and if it be nothing else, certainly it cannot be necessary to be done at all. But if it be an act of external juris∣diction, it derives from Kings, and therefore they are not under it but over it: for no coercion in the hands of man ought to touch those who are re∣serv'd onely for the judgement of God. Apud serenissimum Regem opus est exhortatione potius quam increpatione, consilio quam praeceptis, doctrina quam virga, said Hildebertus the Bishop. The King is to be exhorted, not reproved; counselled, not commanded; and to him not a rod, but doctrine is to be us'd: and Ivo Bishop of Chartres* 1.1099 said the same thing. Kings if they abuse their power are not to be provok'd; but in case they refuse the ad∣monition of Bishops, they are to be left to the Divine judgement; where they will be punish'd the more severely, by how much they were the lesse obnoxious to humane monitions. So Gregorius Turonensis, Si tu excesseris,

quis te corripiet? Si autem nolueris, quis te damnabit, nisi is qui se pronun∣ciat esse Justitiam? He spake to King Chilperic. If thou beest exorbitant, who shall correct thee? If thou refusest, who shall condemn thee, but he onely who is the Everlasting Righteousnesse? For if S. Paul gave in charge to Ti∣mothy that each person should receive an impression and emanation from the Pastoral charge according to his quality, and commanded that he should not rebuke an Elder, but intreat him as a Father;* 1.1100 much lesse would he have permitted any to have punish'd the Father of the Country and his own su∣perior, and him who is lesse then none but God, and by whom himself can rule others in external actions, and who in these very administrations is su∣perior, and can give laws, and inflict penalties, and is judge and the remedy of all abuses.

And if concerning this inquiry we consult the doctrine and practices of the Fathers in the Primitive and Ancient Churches,* 1.1101 we shall find that they never durst think of excommunicating Kings. They had no power, no right to doe it.* 1.1102 Nam Sacerdotis tantum est arguere, & liberam prae∣stare admonitionem, saith S. Chrysostom, Priests can onely reprove and argue, and give a free admonition: and therefore the first supreme Prince that ever was excommunicated by a Bishop, was Henry the Emperor by Pope Hildebrand.

But against this that I say now the Doctors of the Church of Rome make a mighty out-cry,* 1.1103 saying that Philip the first Christian Emperor was excommunicate and thrust amongst the penitents;* 1.1104 that Babylas the Bishop of Antioch thrust the Emperor Decius with his hands against his breast from the doors of the Church;* 1.1105 that Athanasius excommunicated the Pre∣fect of Libya,* 1.1106 and S. Basil commanded in his Diocese that he should be a∣voided;* 1.1107 that S. Ambrose did excommunicate the Emperor Theodosius;* 1.1108 that S. Chrysostom forbad Eudoxia the Emperesse to enter into the Church doors;* 1.1109 that Innocentius excommunicated Arcadius;* 1.1110 so did Synesius to An∣dronicus the Prefect, S. Austin to Bonifacius, Pope Symmachus to Anastasius the Emperor, Pope Vigilius to Theodora the Empresse, Gregory the second to the Exarch, Gregory the third to Leo Isaurus. Instances enough, if they be right and true, to shew that the Fathers were of another mind then the Rule pretends.

But in this heap I must separate what is true and certain from what is false and uncertain,* 1.1111 and give an answer to them, and the rest will not trou∣ble us. * The story of the Emperor Philip is vehemently suspected: but if it were true, yet it was no excommunication, but his own submission to the discipline of penitents; to which, saith Eusebius, he was persuaded by the Bishop. * And the same was the case of S. Ambrose to Theodosius: the Prince was persuaded to it,* 1.1112 but it was onely to doe his repentance after the manner of the penitents in those days; the Bishop onely refus'd to cele∣brate in the presence of the Emperor if he would not give testimony of his repentance towards God. This the Emperor did, because he was a good man, and things were then in such a conjunction, that there was nothing amisse: but that S. Ambrose could not have verified his power, if the Em∣peror had been unwilling, and the Emperor did doe more then was necessa∣ry. But S. Ambrose said that he had his warrant to use the Emperor so,

from a vision. His warrant was extraordinary: for he had no ordinary power or commission. * The excommunications of the Prefects by S. Athanasius, S. Basil, S. Austin, Synesius and Gregory the second doe not come home to the inquiry, because the Prefects were but subjects and had not the privilege of supreme Princes. * The fact of Babylas to Decius was not excommunication: for Decius was a Heathen, and the Church hath no∣thing to doe with them that are without; but Babylas was zealous and fierce, and acted with the spirit of a Martyr, to which he hastned by his fervor. * S. Chrysostom indeed did that to Eudoxia which did not become him, and which he had leisure and cause enough afterwards to repent: he did in anger what himself in the sober hours of his life professed to be more then he could justify. That of Innocentius to Arcadius is of no credit, and so is that of Symmachus to Anastasius, as being onely seen in the Epistles of the Popes of Rome; concerning which there is nothing certain, but that very many of them are certainly spurious. The pretended excommunication of Theodora by Vigilius hath no testimony. Contra Theodoram & Acepha∣los Vigilius pronunciavit damnationis sententiam,* 1.1113 said Gregory. But this was nothing but a condemnation or rejection of the heresy of the Acephali with which she was partaker. And the like was the case of Leo Isaurus; it was sententia damnatoria, a condemnation of his opinion, called by Zonaras 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But these things are onely pretended to make noises. Pope Hildebrand was the first that ever did any thing of this nature; as is expressely affirmed by Authors of great credit, by Otho Frisingensis, by Godefridus Viterbiensis, and by Onuphrius, who counted all the other pre∣tences either fabulous or to no purpose.

But yet there is a third portion of excommunication,* 1.1114 which is a deny∣ing to administer the holy Communion to Princes of a scandalous and evil life; and concerning this there is no question but the Bishop not onely may, but in some cases must doe it. Nolite dare sanctum canibus, said Christ, Give not that which is holy to dogs; and cast not pearls before swine. But this is not an act of jurisdiction, punishment or coercion, but of charity to the Prince and duty in the Bishop. It is just as if a Physician should refuse to give drink to an hydropic patient; he may have it if he will be willing to die, but if the other refuses his ministery in the reaching it, he is charitable and kind, not imperious and usurping. For whatsoever is in the Ecclesia∣stical hand by Divine right, is as applicable to him that sits upon the Throne as to him that sits upon the Dunghil. But then the refusing it must be onely by admonition and caution, by fears and denunciations Evangelical, by telling him his unfitnesse to communicate, and his danger if he doe: but if after this separation by way of sentence and proper ministery the Prince will be communicated, the Bishop hath nothing else to doe but to pray, and weep, and unwillingly to minister. S. Gregory's case with Mauritius the Emperor was like this. The Prince commanded him to be the mi∣nister to hand an unlawfull Edict to the Churches: the Bishop told the Prince it was a sinne which the Prince went about, prayed, admonish'd, declam'd, did all that he could to hinder it, and then obeyed; that is, he did all he could to God, by using all his authority, the word of his proper ministery, and then all that he owed to the Prince, by submitting his ex∣ternal ministery to his command. The unlawfull proclamations and Edicts of a true Prince may be published by the Clergy in their several charges; but yet they must not conceal from the people any thing of their duty, nor

yet from their Prince when they can declare it. It was also the case of Saul and Samuel.* 1.1115 The King desir'd Samuel to joyn and communicate with him in the service of the Lord. He with the liberty of a Prophet refus'd at first, and declar'd the heinousnesse of Sauls sinne; but at last, when the King's will was pressing and importunate, Samuel did obey his voice and did joyn with him. Ivo Bishop of Chartres tells that in such cases where Princes will not comply with the customes and disciplines of the Church, the Bishops must doe their duty by saying, Nolo te fallere; introitum hujus visibilis Ecclesiae periculo tuo te habere permitto. Januam regni coelestis tali reconciliatione tibi aperire non valeo. S^r, I will not deceive you; at your pe∣ril be it if you will come into the holy place to partake of holy mysteries. I declare to you, that this ministery [of the communion] is not any reconciling of you to God. I cannot doe that, unlesse you repent. But the reason of this is wholly upon this account, because the Ecclesiastical state hath no proper coercion by Divine right, but is a Minister of the Divine coercion, of spiritual promises and threatnings; their power is spiritual and internal, it hath it's effort upon the spirit, and not upon the outer man, and there∣fore is to proceed by methods fitted to the spirit, that is, by reason and ar∣gument, by the fear of God, and the terror of his threatnings, by the love of God and the invitation of his promises. But all the ministeries and compulsions about the external is the gift and leave of Princes; and there∣fore it descends, but ascends not, unlesse they please; [of which by and by.] Admoneri quidem possunt, increpari, argui à discretis viris: quia quos Chri∣stus in terris Rex Regum vice suâ constituit, damnandos & salvandos suo judicio reliquit, said the Church of Liege in their Epistle to Paschalis: Kings may be admonished and reprov'd and argued by discreet persons; but they whom Christ the King of Kings hath appointed to be his vicars on earth, are intirely to be left to his judgement.

Upon the likenesse of matter it is to be inquir'd

Whether the guides of souls have a proper and spiritual power to enjoyn penances or Ecclesiastical satisfactions to a Prince that hath sinn'd publickly.* 1.1116

The answer to this depends upon the premisses.* 1.1117 For the Church when she enjoyn'd publick satisfactions, did separate from the Communion those whom they thrust into the place of publick penitents. Now if the Bishops may not separate the Prince from the Communion, then neither impose those penances to which that separation did minister: But this is one of the Censures of the Church, and part of that coercitive power which she hath by the permission of Princes and the voluntary submission and consent of good people: And therefore it cannot be done, unlesse the Prince please. In the Primitive Church, when this discipline was in godly use, none could be compelled to it, but by conviction in publick, or private confession, and in both cases their own consent was either expresse or im∣plied; and therefore much lesse can this be done to the supreme power whether he will or no.* 1.1118 Imperatoriâ unctione poenitentiam tolli, said Balsamo, From the suffering penances Kings are quitted by their anointing: and upon those words of David, [Against thee onely have I sinned] S. Ambrose hath this note, He was a King, he was held by no laws, because Kings are free from the bands of delinquents; Neque enim ullis ad poenam vocantur legi∣bus tuti Imperii potestate, Neither are they by any laws call'd to penance, being

safe by the power of their Empire. And since the Primitive Church was in∣finitely restrain'd in imposing publick penances on Bishops, for the honour of their order and dignity of their persons, we shall the lesse need to doubt of their opinion or practises concerning Kings.

But yet we find that some excellent good Princes did submit to such imposition of penances,* 1.1119 and did abstain from the publick communions till they had given testimony of their repentance toward God. So the Em∣peror Philip, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he of his own willing mind plac'd him∣self amongst the penitents. So did Theodosius under the discipline and con∣duct of S. Ambrose. But these things are but cautelously to be drawn into example, and as they give no power to the Bishop, so every seldome doe they advantages to Kings. Henry the Emperor was a sad example of it, for his affaires went into diminution, and his person into contempt, and his power into pupillage as soon as ever he had done penance at Canusium bare-footed, in a cold winter, for three dayes together, and had endur'd the insolency and scorn of Hildebrand. And when Kings made themselves lesse, the Bishops became greater without any good to the Church, but not without much detriment to religion.

But neither may Princes be reprov'd publickly.* 1.1120 For if he will not be obedient to the will of God in the voice of his ministers publickly tea∣ching, or privately admonishing, and prudently reproving; he that goes about to reprove him publickly, intends by that meanes by some indirect coercion to compel him, either by shame or by fear; neither of which ought to be impos'd by a subject on the Prince. For it is to be observed that reproof is a part of Empire and superiority, and differs not from tea∣ching, save onely that it is manus linguae, it is the hand of the tongue, not the voice onely. He that reproves teaches onely minors: and though Kings are so in respect of the conduct of their souls, yet it must not be done to them but very sparingly, because it can very hardly be done without dimi∣nution of their dignity; and teaching or declaring their duty will doe their work for them if they please, and if they doe not please, he that re∣proves will doe the Prince no good, but he shall hurt himself, and shall not be a Martyr when he is smitten. Let no man therefore pretend zeal for God in excuse of any boldnesse more then Priestly towards Kings. For the work of God is oftentimes better done by a gentle hand, then by a strong.

—peragit tranquilla potestas Quod violenta nequit:* 1.1121 mandatáque fortiùs urget Imperiosa quies—

And if we esteem reproof unseasonable where it is likely we may doe hurt, & where it is not likely we shall doe good, much more is not this course pru∣dent to be us'd to Kings, who may be provok'd by your ungentle Sermon, or may be hardened by your fire. For every Prince hath not the gentlenesse of Antigonus, patiently to hear himself revil'd: but if he had, yet it was but reason that Antigonus sapek when he bade the Souldiers if they would revile him, to goe further off. And such men should doe well to consider how ill themselves would take it if they were publickly in the Pulpit call'd schismatics or incendiaries. * But how and if the people be as zealous as the Priest, and think it lawfull to call their King by all the names of re∣proach which they hear in the sermons of the Ministers? And if the Bishop

calls a spade a spade, it is very possible the people may doe so too, for they are soon taught to despise their rulers; and then it is to be remembred what Aristole sayes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If they once come to despise their Prince, they will soon unclasp his royal Mantle.

It is true that the Ministers of religion are stewards of the mysteries of God and Embassadors for Christ:* 1.1122 and though I cannot say that they who upon this account think they have power publickly to reprove vitious Kings, and in plain language give names to their vices and publish their shame, doe overvalue their dignity, for that cannot easily be done; yet I say they use it incompetently and imprudently; for the effect of this pow∣er and dignity is not to upbraid, or to disgrace, but to edify and doe good to all men according to their capacity: and therefore S. Paul, when he had declar'd his office and commission to be Christ's Embassador, he addes, as the full, expresse and proper issue of that power, we pray you in Christs stead to be reconciled to God.

The old Prophets took liberty,* 1.1123 and were bold in their reproofs, and troubled Kings;* 1.1124 and the people sometimes were stirred too much upon such accounts: but when the Prophets were charged with sedition, they onely gave in answer the expresse Commandement of God. And therefore it was that Amos being very bold was bidden not to prophesy and more at Be∣thel,* 1.1125 because it was the Kings Chappel and the Kings Court: and he was forc'd to plead a special mission; which the Priests had not, and therefore we doe not find that ever they us'd any such licence and freedome of re∣proof, except in such cases in which they also became prophets; as it hap∣pened to Jehoiada, 2 Chron. 24. 20. and that's the very case of the Ministers of, the Gospel, who unlesse they had a special commission, must teach accor∣ding to the duty and obedience, the gentlenesse and prudence of the religion; lest it be said to them as was said by King Amaziah to a bold man that spake openly to him,* 1.1126 Have they made thee the Kings Counsellor? cease thou, why should they smite thee?

Now in this there can be the lesse doubt,* 1.1127 for they mistake it that sup∣pose this to be a question of duty; it is onely an inquiry after the manner of doing the duty: and therefore although for the former reasons this man∣ner of doing their duty is not fit, yet it is necessary that the duty should be done. For miser est Imperator cui vera reticentur. No misery is greater then that Kings shall not be taught their duty. They must be taught it all: and in this no liberty, if it be prudently conducted, can become licen∣tious. To which purpose, the Bishops and Ministers of religion must thus comport themselves to Kings.

1. Let the publick doctrines be instructive,* 1.1128 but not apt to raise suspi∣cion of the Prince. 2. Let it be in things certain and of evident and ap∣parent duty. 3. Let no doctrines be fitted to private interests and partia∣lities in the State. 4. let no reproof of Kings be in Pulpits, for it is un∣civil toward any ut quis crimen audiat eo loco quo refellendi copia non sit, as the Roman said, that a man should be reprov'd in that place where for re∣verence and religion sake the man may not answer for himself.* 1.1129 And there∣fore Clement the third caus'd a Clergy-man to be punish'd because multis

coram astantibus verba quadam in depressionem officii & beneficii nostri pro∣tulit, he spoke words in a publick audience tending to his disparagement: and the Emperors Theodosius,* 1.1130 Arcadius and Honorius made a law, Si quis mo∣destiae nescius, & pudoris ignarus, improbo petulantique maledicto nomina nostra crediderit lacessenda, &c. That if any man, forgetting shame and mo∣desty, thought fit to dishonour the Emperors, he should not presently be punish'd: for if the man were a fool or a light person, the thing was to be despis'd; if he were a mad man, he was to be pitied; if injurious or angry, he might be for∣given: but, ad nostram scientiam referatur, ut ex personis hominum dicta pensemus, & utrum praetermitti an exquiri debeant censeamus: the Princes would have it referr'd to their cognisance and judgment whether such per∣sons should be punish'd or no. 5. Let there be no doubtful speeches in pub∣lick sermons scatter'd amongst the people concerning Princes, for they are publick seditions, not sermons. 6. When it is necessary or when it is pru∣dent that private addresses to Princes be with a sacerdotal freedome, let it be in cases of great crimes, and evidently prov'd and evidently vitious, neither deriv'd from uncertain rumors of the people, nor from trifling sus∣picions, nor yet be in matters of secret concernment and undiscerned rea∣son. A Prince may be reprov'd for notorious adultery, or evident murder against the forms of law; but not so freely in the questions of warres or judicature: for the Bishops private opinion may be warrant enough for him to speak it when he is requir'd, but not to reprove a Prince upon pre∣tence of duty, and by a spiritual authority, when the matter of fact or the question of right is uncertain.

RULE VIII. Ecclesiastical Censures are to be inflicted by the consent and concurrence of the supreme civil power.

BY Ecclesiastical censures I mean the greater and lesser Excommunication.* 1.1131 This is a separation of a Criminal (who is delated and convict by wit∣nesses, or by confession voluntary) from the peace and communion of the Church, till he hath by exterior signes signified his internal repentance: this is called the lesser excommunication. The greater is onely of refractary & desperate persons, who will be subject to no discipline, make no amends, return to no goodnesse, and forsake no sinne. These the Church throws out from her bosome, and shakes the fire from her lap, and quits her self of the plague: and this is called the greater excommunication, or the anathema. Both these are bound by the Ecclesiastical power: but the first is bound that he maybe purged of his sins; the second, that the Church maybe purged of him. The first is bound as a man is tied fast that he may be cut of the stone; the other is bound as a Criminal that is going to execution: he is bound that he may be thrown into outer darknesse. Not that the Church hath pow∣er to damne any man, but when she observes a man confirm'd in impiety, she does antedate the Divine judgment, and secures the sound members, and tells what will befall him in the day of judgment. In the first case, the pe∣nitent is like a wandring sheep; in the second he is turn'd a goat or a woolf;

& by their own acts acts also as well as by the power of the Keyes they are both bound: the first consents to the Medicin, and the reprobate hath by his own act incurr'd that death which the Church declares; and both are acts of discipline, and directly or indirectly consequent to that power which Christ hath given to his Church of binding and loosing, and to the charge of the conduct of souls.

These two are by the fifth Roman Synod under Symmachus distin∣guish'd by the names of excommunication (meaning the lesser) and anathe∣ma.* 1.1132 He that breaks the decrees of this Synod, let him be depriv'd of the Communion: but if he will not amend, anathemate feriatur, let him be ana∣thema. The same we find in the Synod of Turon. c. 25. which commands that all the curses of the 108 [alias 109] Psalm be cast upon Church-rob∣bers, ut non solùm excommunicati, sed etiam anathematizati moriantur; that they may die not onely excommunicate, but anathematiz'd. They which are never to be restor'd to the Communion, but are to be accurs'd; so Agapetus expresses it in his 6^th Epistle. This is called eradication; while the lesser excommunicates are still members of the Church,* 1.1133 as S. Austin notes.

There is yet a third sort of excommunication,* 1.1134 brought in by zeal and partiality, a willingnesse to rule or to prevail; which is no part of the pow∣er given by Christ, but taken up as it happen'd; it is not part of Jurisdiction so much as improper, not an act of the power of the Keyes: and that is a refusing to communicate with him who is not excommunicate, a punishing one whom we have no power to punish, a doing that which we have no pow∣er to doe at all, or to such a person over whom confessedly we have no au∣thority or jurisdiction. For when this humor was got into the manners and customes of the Church they made a new distinction; and there was a communio cum fratribus, and a communio cum omnibus Christianis. He that might communicate with the people might not in some cases communicate with the Priests and Bishops his Brethren. The distinction we find in the 45. Chapter of the Council of Auxerre, and in pursuance of it we find one Bishop refusing to communicate with another. Thus if a Bishop came not to the Synod of his province it was decreed in the fifth Council of Carthage,* 1.1135 ut Ecclesiae suae communione debeat esse contentus, that he should onely commu∣nicate with his own Diocese. The like to which we find in the second Coun∣cil of Arles can.* 1.1136 19. in the Council of Tarracon can. 6. and the Council of Agatho cap. 35. Thus Epiphanius Bishop and Metropolitan of Cyprus re∣fus'd to communicate with the Bishop of Jerusalem, who was not his suf∣fragan.

Concerning which way of proceeding,* 1.1137 1. it is evident that there is no authority in it, or any thing that is like to jurisdiction, and 2. sometimes there may be duty, but 3. most commonly there is danger. 1. * There is evidently no authority: for if the authority were competent and the cause just, they might proceed to excommunication. But this was sometimes done by equals to equals, as by Bishop to Bishop, by Church to Church, as by Victor to the Churches of Asia, by Stephen to the Churches of Africa, and by angry or zealous Bishops to them that were not of their humor or opinion. Sometimes it was done by inferiors to their superior, the people withdrawing themselves from their pastor; so the Samosatenians refus'd to communicate with their Bishop that was thrust upon them after the

expulsion of Eusebius. So that evidently in this matter there is no autho∣rity to verify it.

2. Sometimes there may be duty:* 1.1138 as if a Bishop be a heretic or an open vitious person, his Brother that is a Bishop may use that liberty to him as the people might doe to a Brother that walks disorderly; that is, withdraw from his society, that he may be asham'd: and if his communica∣ting with him will give countenance to his heresy, or offence to his people, he is bound then to abstain and to refuse it: and so is the people tied not to communicate with their Priest or Bishop, if the condition of his com∣munion be a sin, or the countenancing of a sin. And thus we find in the An∣nals of Spain, that a daughter of an Arrian King of Spain suffer'd death rather then receive the Communion from the hands of an Arrian Bishop. In her case her refusal was duty, and her suffering was Martyrdome, because her Father impos'd his command of communicating with the heretical Bi∣shop as a secret allowance of the heresy, which in that case she was to re∣fuse, and obey God unto the death.

But when this does accidentally become a matter of duty,* 1.1139 the charity of our communion is no further to be refus'd then we are oblig'd by our duty; we are not to refuse it to that person, but for that cause, and there∣fore in other cases & upon all other accounts we are tied to doe the charity of Christians. I will not communicate with a Roman Priest in his worship of Images, or in his manner of Praying for the dead, or invocation of Saints; but I may not refuse to say the Lords Prayer and the Credo with him, un∣lesse by chance it give offence to some weak uninstructed person. I will not receive the Communion from the hands of him who was ordain'd by a Presbytery without a Bishop; because his hand is a dead hand, and reaches me nothing: but because he is my Brother, I will not refuse to give him the Communion if he will require it at my hand, which was made sacred by the Holy Ghost invocated by the prayer and the lifting up of the Bishops hand. I will not come to their Communions; but if they would use good formes of Liturgy, and preach well, I would not refuse to communicate in such assemblies: unlesse (as I said before) I be accidentally hindred by some other duty drawing me off a while.

But then thirdly, when it is not an expresse and a clear duty,* 1.1140 it is al∣wayes a great danger, an occasion of schisms and divisions in the Church, and consequently may be an infinite breach of duty, a certain violation of one vertue, for the uncertain preservation of another: it is commonly the daughter of spiritual pride, an accounting of our selves more holy then our Brethren, whom by such meanes we oftentimes provoke to jealousies and indignation; and so sometimes altars are erected against altars, and Pul∣pits turn to cock-pits, and seates of scorners and of proud and illiterate de∣clamations. Upon this account Christendome hath bled for many ages. The division of the East from the Western Churches, and in the West the division of Rome from divers Churches, the Protestants and Reformed, came in at this door; while one Church either pretends the singularity of truth, or the eminency of authority over other Churches: by which two things the Church of Rome hath been author of the permanent and greatest schisms of Christendome. For indeed little better can be expected when the Keys of the Church, which were given for the letting in or shutting out

of single criminals or penitents respectively, are us'd to oppose multitudes. A man may lock his chamber-door, but he cannot put a lock upon the Ocean:* 1.1141 and it was wisely said of S. Austin, that to excommunicate a single person cannot make a schism, unlesse the multitude favour him; intimating that a multitude is a dangerous thing to be involv'd in censures. The King nor the people are not to be excommunicated, is an old Rule. For if the whole multitude be excommunicate, with whom shall we communicate? if great parts of them be, they plainly make a schism, if they unwillingly suffer the censure; and therefore that one Church should doe this to ano∣ther is very hardly possible to be done with wisedome, or charity, or neces∣sity. For when S. Paul bad his flock to abstain from the society of forni∣cators, he told them he meant it onely in the smal numbers of the Brethren, where, it may be, one or two in a Diocese or city of that religion might be criminal; for he would not have them to goe out of the world to keep that Canon, and therefore meant not to involve the multitudes of fornicators which were in the world. But now he that excommunicates a Church, either does nothing at all, or he obliges every one in that Church to sepa∣rate from that multitude; and then if he must not goe out of the world, he must goe out of that Country, which no spiritual power can command, and which the Apostle never did intend, as appears in his caution and the whole Oeconomy and reason of that Canon.

But I am to adde this also,* 1.1142 That there is scarce any case practicable in which, if it be indifferently permitted to the people to separate from the communion of their superior, it will not very quickly proceed to mischief and become intolerable; a remedy worse then the disease. When Nestorius had preach'd these words,* 1.1143 whoever shall say that the Virgin Mary is the Mo∣ther of God, let him be accursed, the people had reason to be offended; but they did ill when they made a tumult: for when the people are stirred, zeal is the worst thing about them. Thus when the two Deacons of Pope Vigilius were displeased with their Bishop in the cause of the three articles which the Pope had condemn'd in the fifth General Council, they very pertly with∣drew themselves from his communion; and the effect of it was, that almost all the Roman Church and divers other Western Churches did so: and so did the people of Istria to their Bishops in the same cause,* 1.1144 and so did many more: and the evil grew so great, when every one would as he pleas'd with∣draw himself from the communion of their Bishop or Priest, that it was under great penalty forbidden by the eighth Synod the tenth Chapter.

But this may be done in these following cases.* 1.1145

1. When the superior hath manifestly erred in faith, that is, in an ar∣ticle of his Creed, or a plain proposition of Scripture, or in an article esta∣blished or declar'd by that authority which hath bound him and them equally, and in which they conceive no error. Thus the Priests and peo∣ple of Constantinople withdrew themselves from the communion of Euno∣mius,* 1.1146 because he erred in an article determined by the whole Church, and established by the laws of Emperors, and as they believed clearly declar'd in Scripture. But when Plato the Monk withdrew himself from the com∣munion of Tarasius the Patriarch of Constantinople because he refus'd to excommunicate the Emperor,* 1.1147 it was an insolence fit to be chastis'd by the rod of Ecclesiastical discipline.

2. Priests may withdraw themselves from the communion of their Bishop,* 1.1148 and people from the communion of their Priests, in things declar'd by laws to be against the peace of God and the Church, when the fact is evident and notorious. But this is not to be done by single persons, but by the whole community: and the reason is, because the fact is not evident, or not scandalous to that degree as to deserve this canonical punishment, unlesse the congregation be offended, or the congregation note it; for though the Bishop be more publick then any single person, yet he is not more publick or of more concernment then all his Diocese. These parti∣culars, that is,* 1.1149 this leave and this caution I have from Origen, explicating in what sense we are bound to cut off our right hand. Ego qui videor tibi ma∣nus esse dextra, & Presbyter nominor, & verbum Dei videor praedicare, si ali∣quid contra Ecclesiasticam disciplinam & Evangelii regulam gessero, ita ut scandalum tibi Ecclesia faciam, in uno consensu Ecclesia conspirans excidat me dextram suam, & projiciat à se. If I that am thy right hand, and preach the word of God, doe any thing against the discipline of Gods Church and the rule of the Gospel, so that I give offence to the whole Church, let the whole Church consenting together cut me off and throw me away.

3. But all this is to be understood to be done by permission or autho∣rity of the Prince,* 1.1150 in case he shall interpose, because where publick divisi∣ons and breach of peace are in agitation, the Common-wealth is more con∣cerned oftentimes then religion; and therefore where the laws of God doe not intervene, the laws of the King must, or the whole separation is a sin. And therefore we find that when Gregory the first, Bishop of Rome, had thus refus'd to communicate with John Bishop of Constantinople, he was commanded by the Emperor Mauritius to communicate with him. And it is very fit that such heats and private judgments and zealous, but unne∣cessary, proceedings should be kept from inconveniences by such publick persons who are to take care of peace and of the publick. For if such se∣parations be not necessary, they are not lawful; and if they be not the one∣ly way to avoid a sin, they are a ready way to commit one. For because every mans cause is right in his own eyes, when such heats as these happen between confident persons, every man is judge in his own cause; and what is like to be the event of such things, all the world can easily imagine.

But now concerning those other two proper kinds of excommunica∣tion,* 1.1151 the greater and the lesser, they have the same consideration, if we mean them according as the Church now uses them; that is, if they be im∣pos'd upon men against their will. For as for the lesser excommunication, so as it was us'd in the Primitive Church, and so as the Church of Eng∣land wishes it were now restor'd, when penitents came and submitted them∣selves to the discipline of the Church, and had exercises, stations and peni∣tential times allotted to them, and were afterwards with joy and comfort restor'd to the peace of the Church, it is a ministery done by consent, and without any evil, and no man hath to doe with it. But if the consent of the Criminal be not in it, the Bishop cannot compel him; but the Bishop and the King can. And therefore we find that the Emperors made laws in this very particular; and Justinian in his 123 Novel commanded that no Ecclesiastic person should excommunicate any one, unlesse the cause were first approved. Which law was commended by the Council of Paris under Ludovicus; and by John the 8^th, who upon the authority of that

law inhibited some Bishops from excommunicating one Bichertinus.

By this I doe not mean to say that the Ecclesiastical judge hath not power to deny a Criminal the peace and communion of the Church,* 1.1152 by declaring him to be unworthy to communicate; but because as the laws and as the customes of the world are now, there is disgrace, and there is tem∣poral evil consequent to such Ecclesiastical separations, the Bishop can be restrain'd in the actual exercise of his spiritual authority, if there be any thing in it of temporal concernment.

And therefore if the Bishop did excommunicate any of the Princes servants,* 1.1153 or any whom the Prince had a mind to communicate and con∣verse withall, the censure was to be revers'd; ut quod principalis pietas re∣cipit, nec à sacerdotibus Dei alienum habeatur, as the Fathers of the 12^th Council of Toledo did decree;* 1.1154 that what the piety of the Prince does re∣ceive, the Bishops may not reject. For to avoid the company of any per∣son is an effect of excommunication indeed, but not inseparable: and be∣cause to converse with any of his subjects is a right of Kings that none of his Bishops can devest him of, the Bishop can excommunicate no man with∣out the Kings leave; that is, he cannot separate him from the society of the faithful. And therefore Ivo Bishop of Chartres justified himself upon this account for conversing with one Gervasius that was excommunicate. Pro Regia enim honorificentia hoc feci fretus authoritate legis,* 1.1155 si quos culpa∣torum, &c. I did it (saith he) relying upon the authority of the law, and for the honourable regard of the King. And this he advises to others also, in his 171 Epistle: and S. Anselme, though he was extremely troubled with the Popes peevish injunctions against the King of England's right in the matter of Investitures, yet in his Epistle to Prior Ernulph he gives leave that though he durst not by reason of the Popes personal command to the con∣trary, yet they might communicate with those whom the Pope had excom∣municated for receiving Investitures from the King. Now although this appendage of excommunication, that is, abstention from the civil society of the Criminal, is wholly subject to the lawes and power of Princes; yet the spiritual part of the excommunication, that is, a separation from the communion by declaring such a person to be unworthy, and using to him the word of his proper ministery, is so wholly under the power of the Ec∣clesiastic order, that when the King commands that the company of the excommunicate should not be avoided, yet the man is not absolved from his sentence in the Court of Conscience, but is bound to satisfy the Church if she have proceeded legally and canonically. The King can take off the temporal penalty, but not the spiritual obligation; that is, the man is not to demand the Sacrament till he be absolved. If the King commands it, the Bishop must not deny his externall ministery: but the man sins that de∣mands it, because he communicates unworthily, that is, by a just power, but not by a just disposition. He must repent of his crime before he can come innocently.

For it is to be observed that in this affair one part concerns the Cri∣minal,* 1.1156 and another concerns the people. The Criminal is bound to ab∣stain from the communion: that duty is incumbent upon him, because he is judg'd to be unworthy of it by that authority which he is bound to trust, in case there be no apparent error. But to be thrust from civil society is

not directly any duty of his, but is incumbent on the people. Now though the Bishop can in some cases advise this, yet in a Christian Common-wealth he cannot without leave command it: and therefore the censure or judg∣ment of the Church is to have effort upon the Conscience of the guilty, and this invades no mans right; it is for his good that is concerned, and is wholly a spiritual power, and intrenches not upon the civil right of any man, much lesse upon the publick and supreme power. * In the lesser ex∣communication, if the subjects be not voluntary, or be not subjected by him that hath the power over them, that is, the King, they cannot be com∣pell'd by the Bishop to any external act or abstention. But if they doe themselves submit, or are submitted by their supreme, they are bound not onely to obey the censure of the Church, but themselves to goe away from company that know not of this calamity: as I have* 1.1157 already in∣stanc'd.

3. The sentence of the greater excommunication,* 1.1158 though to be esti∣mated in many particulars by the former measures, yet hath in it something of particular consideration. This is the great Anathema Maranatha, the excision of a man from the body of the Church; without which body, who∣soever is in that manner justly separate, there is no salvation to him: and this the Church called by the name of anathema. Not that whenever the word anathema is us'd, the greater excommunication is signified; for it is very often us'd as an earnest expression of the dislike of a thing: so the Clergy of Edessa, when they purg'd their Bishop Ibas of the Crimes ob∣jected to him in the Council of Chalcedon,* 1.1159 they solemnly protested they knew no evil of him, anathematizantes nosmetipsos, & terribili gehennae nosmetipsos obnoxios facientes, si novimus, anathematizing themselves and exposing themselves to the guilt of eternal damnation if they knew any such thing. Such anathemata are denounc'd against sacrilegious persons in the donatives made to the Church: and thus divers Councils doe pronounce anathema to false propositions,* 1.1160 and Justinian in the Code uses the same execration against certain heresies. Now to such an anathema as this all persons can be subject, Kings and Princes, Bishops and Priests, Multitudes and single persons. There is nothing considerable in this, but that the cause be great and worthy: for whoever he be that works abomination, let him be who will, yet he is abominable, and shall be separated from the com∣munion of Saints in the day of the New Jerusalem.

But the inquiry that remains is concerning the great anathema or ex∣cision of obstinate criminals from the body of the Church,* 1.1161 which is the onely excommunication that Christ gave in commission and warranty. For so the Fathers expound those words of Christ, But if he will not hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen and a publican; that is, not to be esteem'd for a Brother,* 1.1162 or a Christian, saith S. Gregory; quia neque influxum habet à capite, neque participat de Spiritu Christi, saith S. Austin, he neither hath any influence from the head, nor partakes of the Spirit of Christ. This man the Church does not pray for, does not pray with, does not communi∣cate, does not hope well of; he receives no assistance and gifts of grace from the holy Spirit of God: and S. Jude sayes, his works are gone aforehand unto judgement. Videlicet peccator gravis & scandalosus, noto∣rius, aut accusatus & convictus, he who is a grievous and a scandalous sin∣ner, notorious or convict, being ••••prov'd by the Bishop in the publick assemblies

of the Church, if he will not be humbled, but remains incorrigible and perse∣veres in his scandalous sinnes, tum anathemate feriendus est, & à corpore Ec∣clesiae separandus, then he is to be smitten with the anathema, and to be se∣parated from the body of the Church: so.* 1.1163 Gregory. To this there is nothing else consequent, but that the man, unlesse he timely and mightily repent, will be damned; and in the mean time that every man account him to be no Brother, and have no entercourse with him, but as with a Turk or a Jew.

Now concerning this,* 1.1164 he that is in Ecclesiastical authority, and hath received the holy order, hath this power; and he that hath a charge can minister this power: and so long as nothing temporal and secular is mingled with it, the Bishop can doe it wholly by his spiritual authority; and in this he does nothing depend on the supreme Civil power, save that he be per∣mitted to exercise his spiritual office. For though it be true that any Bi∣shop can by the Civil power be hindred from ministring in publick assem∣blies, for he may be banished or depos'd, and another put in his chair, or all his offices may be suspended quoad exercitium actus (as the Schools speak) so that he may not exercise his power; yet a Bishop that hath a flock, that is permitted actually to doe what Christ hath impower'd him to doe, can by his own sole authority inflict this sentence upon scandalous and refra∣ctary, disobedient and impenitent, rebellious and persevering sinners: and if the Church could not doe this, she had not power sufficient to the ends of her designation; she were no body politic, but without government and power;* 1.1165 and all that discourse of our Blessed Saviour in the 18^th of S. Mat∣thew, and his commands of delating refractary Criminals to the Church, & the promise to verify in heaven what they shall reject on earth, were words signifying nothing and of no effect. But because no wise man will imagine that it must follow that the Ecclesiastic state, they to whom Christ pro∣mised to give the keyes of the Kingdome of heaven, they who are Stew∣ards of the houshold and dispensers of the mysteries of the Gospel, have this power subjected in themselves independently from the Civil power, as they have a power to baptize, and to consecrate, and to ordain Ministers of religion; and they can no more be hindred from one then from the o∣ther; they may de facto, and they may by a competent power, but if they be, it is persecution. That this Bishop or that, that Cyprian or Silvester, that Valerius or Augustine should be the man, is under the power of the Ci∣vil Magistrate; but the man that is permitted to use the powers Christ put into his hand, can upon persons so disposed pronounce God's anathema and the Churches.

Now the reason of the difference why the Bishop cannot doe this in the lesser excommunication,* 1.1166 and yet can in the greater, is this, because the greater is of Divine institution, and the other is of humane, never us'd but by consent, or by a superinduc'd civil authority, and therefore must still depend upon the causes of it's being. Adde to this, there is a precept an∣nexed to this power: there is a double duty; the Bishop is to separate the vile from the precious, the leprous from the sound, and the people are to take heed of such impure mixtures. But in the lesser excommunications there may possibly be something of prudence; yet as there is no proper authority in the Ecclesiastical superior but what is given him by consent, so there is no obligation or duty in the subjects: it is well when they submit

to this discipline, and goe to be cur'd by the publick hands even for every malady; but they are not bound to this: but if they be delated or be noto∣rious and great Criminals, here the Church is warranted by God to pro∣ceed to discipline, and to separation and excision of the refractary. This onely hath effort upon the soul; but the lesser excommunication is a discipline of Ecclesiastical institution; and so is that denying of commu∣nion to equals or superiors, and so is irregularity, and so is refusing to men∣tion a name in our collects and publick or private prayers, and so is suspen∣sion and interdict, degradation and deposition: they are all of Ecclesiastical positive constitution, no part of the power of the Keyes, nothing of Di∣vine authority; but are introduc'd by the consent of Churches, and veri∣fied by custome, consent and the laws of Princes, and so come accidentally to passe an obligation, but effect nothing directly upon the soul. That is a peculiarity of the greater excommunication: and that which stands next to it is the lesser excommunication; which although it be humanum inven∣tum and of positive institution, yet because it is a part of the greater, and proceeds in the same way, upon lesser causes, but to designes of charity and edification, it is an use of the spiritual sword, it is the lancing of a sore, but not the cutting off a dead part; but it may be admitted to be a consequent of the power of binding or loosing, and so I have already call'd it* 1.1167. For it is a part of that intermedial monition which Christ hath in general commis∣sionated his Ministers and guides of the Church to make. If an offendor will not mend by private, and by a more publick admonition, tell it to the Church; then the Church is to doe something when the stubborn criminal is delated to her. The Church must try if he will repent upon her monition: for then the Ecclesiastical Rulers are to exhort him into repentance, to re∣prove, to correct, to doe what spiritual Fathers ought to doe: the particu∣lars of which because they are not specified by our Blessed Lord, they are left to the prudence of the Ecclesiastical Governours; so that the general Discipline is warranted, but the particular is left to their choice who by the analogies of the consequent power of the Keyes can proceed by lesser and an intermedial processe. But the power of the Keyes is given in order to something that is to be done afterwards. For that is onely the warranted and expresse authority, and that which imitates coercitive jurisdiction the nearest, that those be cut off from the Church who by their voluntary sub∣mission will not amend and submit to the paternal rod & gentle correption.

RULE IX. Excommunication inflicted upon a light cause binds externally, but not internally; but if it be in∣flicted upon an unjust cause, it binds not at all.

THis latter part of the Rule is evident and consented to by all.* 1.1168 For in this the Civil and Ecclesiastical power differ. The Civil power, if it condemns the Innocent, hath effect upon him, and does afflict or put him to death: But the Ecclesiastical power does nothing, unlesse the man hath done the mischief to himself. For God having undertaken to verify what the Church does, it must be suppos'd that the Church must doe right, else

God will not verify it; and then it signifies nothing, but that the Gover∣nours Ecclesiastical have sinn'd.* 1.1169 Ejiciunt oves qui contra justitiam de Eccle∣sia separant, saith S. Hierom, They that against right cast a man from the Church, they are ill shepherds, and drive the sheep from their folds where Christ loves to see them: and therefore Alexander the second 24. q. 1. c. Audivimus, sayes that: unjust excommunications are not to be slighted and neglected;* 1.1170 and Gerson sayes, it is honorable to the Church that such a Prelate should be resisted to his face. But this in case of injustice and manifest abuse: such are those excommunications in the Bulla coenae Domini, ••n which those persons who doe their duty, who doe not consent to the errors and abuses of the Church of Rome, who read good books that discover their horrible impieties, are excommunicated: it is Brutum fulmen; it is harsh as the noise of peacocks, but does no more harm to them that are intended.

But now in the other part of the Rule there is difficulty,* 1.1171 and it is oc∣casion'd by a discourse of S. Leo in his 93. Epistle; Let not the Communion be easily or lightly denied to any Christian, nor at the pleasure of every angry Priest; because the mind of the avenger ought unwillingly and with a kind of grief to proceed to the infliction of vengeance even upon a great guilt. For we have known some for slight actions and words excluded from the grace of the Communion, and a soul for which the bloud of Christ was shed, by the infliction of this so severe a punishment wounded, and as it were disarm'd and spoil'd of all defence, expos'd to the assaults of the Devil, that it might be easily taken.] By which words. S. Leo seems to say that he who for a tri∣fling cause is excommunicate, does neverthelesse feel all the evils of that greatest censure. He sayes well and true: But he does not say that he is separate from God, that he shall perish everlastingly, that God will in hea∣ven verify what is done upon earth; but he reproving this impiety, that the greater excommunication should be inflicted for trifles, tells the real evils which doe follow: for the excommunicate being separate from the com∣munion, denyed the prayers of the Church, banish'd from the communion of Saints, is devested of all these excellent helps and spiritual defensatives against the power of the Devil. Now this is very true, though the cause were wholly unjust; and much more if the cause be something, though not sufficient. De facto the man is depriv'd of the helps of the Church, and the advantage of holy Ordinances: and though God will, if the man be a good man and devout, hear his private prayers, and supply him with secret strengths, and in his behalf rebuke the Devil; yet it was a worthy cause of complaint in S. Leo, to consider that this evil was done for little things, and that for so small occasions God should be put to his extraordinary way, and the man be depriv'd of the blessings of the ordinary.

But whether this sentence so slightly inflicted doe really bind the soul before God,* 1.1172 is a question which Origen inquir'd into, but durst not affirm it; but concludes that it obliges in the Church and before men: for whether it obliges before God or no, Deus scit; nos autem pronun∣ciare non possumus, secundum quod scriptum est, Nolite judicare] God onely knows, but we must not judge. But yet if it be his unhappy lot to fall into such a calamity, factum valet, fieri non debuit; the eccle∣siastical Ruler did very ill in it, yet the man is bound to the Church. Qui ergor in peccato levi correptus … non se emendat, nos quidem sic eum debe∣mus habere quasi publicanum & ethnicum, abstinentes ab eo, ut confundatur,

He therefore that is taken and excommunicate for a small fault, and will not amend, we must esteem him as a Heathen and a Publican, that he may be ashamed. Indeed the Church hath put a heavy and an unequal load upon such a person, and hath erred greatly; for no man is to be separate from the Church of God, but he that separated himself from God, and hath left his duty: but therefore if the Church doe excommunicate him whose action or words though it be faulty, yet it can consist with the state of a good man, and does not destroy the love of God, the censure was too heavy as to the external, and false as to the internal; for the man is not fallen from God, but does communicate with the Head, and continues to receive of the Spirit of Christ.

But yet even such a man is bound externally: for this is the meaning of that famous saying of S. Gregory, Pastoris sententia etiam injusta timenda est,* 1.1173 The sentence of a Bishop though it be unjust is to be fear'd; that is, though it be in a cause that is not great and competent enough, but if it be in a light matter, yet it is to be feared; not onely because the man is depriv'd of the prayers and communions of the Church (which though it happen to an innocent person is a great evil, and therefore is to be fear'd, though it be in all senses unjust) but also because it binds the man that is deprehended even in a light fault, to submit to the judgment and satisfactions of the Church. The burden is very great, and ought not to have been impos'd; but when it is it must be suffer'd, because no repentance can be too great for any sinne: and although the Bishop made a false judgment concerning the man, and he does not stand so before God as before the Church, that is, for his first little offence; yet being censur'd and unfortunate, if he refuses to obey that which is indeed too much to be impos'd, but will doe him no hurt, it is not his first little sin, but his great contempt that is to be accounted for before God with the greatest severity.

But then if it be inquir'd in what cases onely excommunication may be lawfully inflicted; the answer is easy; but I chuse to give it in the words of the Fathers,* 1.1174 because there is in this case reason and authority 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ubi peccatum non est evidens, ejicere de Ecclesia neminem possumus, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 forte eradicantes zizania, eradicemus simul cum ipsis etiam triticum: So ••rigen. Unless the fact be evident, no man must be excommunicate, for else we may peradventure root up the wheat with the tares. But that's not enough.

2.* 1.1175 No man must be excommunicate but he that is peccator gravis & scandalosus,* 1.1176 a grievous and a scandalous sinner; so S. Gregory: and like to this is that of Aristotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, We must not separate from every sinner; but from the intolerable and malicious. For what should a man proceed to violent remedies, when a gentle application will make the cure? and for a trifling cause to cut a man off from the communion of the Church, is to doe as the man 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the fable, that espying a fly upon his neighbours forehead; went to put it off with a hatchet, and struck out his brains. And therefore the Fathers in the Council of Worms can. 2. decreed, Ut nullus Sacerdotum quenquam rect•• fidei hominem pro parvis & levibus causis à communione suspendat: praeter e••s cul∣pas pro quibus antiqui patres arceri jusserunt aliquid committentes. In the in∣fliction of Censures the Church should follow the practice of the primitive Fathers, excommunicating no true believer but for some very grievous fault.

3. Neither is this sufficient of it self: a scandalous sin alone is not enough,* 1.1177 for excommunication is the last remedie. Omnia prius tentanda quam bello experiendum; when nothing else will doe it, then this is to be us'd: for if the man will be amended by private correction, or by publick admo∣nition, if he be ready to hear his brother, or to obey the Church, why should he be esteemed as a heathen man and a publican? Si non audierit ecclesiam, is the condition of using the keyes; if he will not hear the Church: so it is in the Charter, if being publickly convict and reprov'd by the Bi∣shop, he will not be humbled, but remains incorrigible and perseveres in his sin, then he is to be excommunicated and smitten with the anathema. Like to this is that of Chrysippus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Some things are to be turned from, with our head a little aside; and from some things we must run away. Some things are more earnestly to be avoided; and from others we must be parted for ever. So S. Gregory in the place above cited. Spirituali gladio superbi & contumaces necantur dum de Ec∣clesia ejiciuntur,* 1.1178 so. S. Cyprian, The proud and the contumacious are slain by the spiritual sword when they are thrown out of the Church. Inobediens trun∣catur, is S.* 1.1179 Hierom's expression, He that is rebellious or disobedient to the discipline and correction of the Church, he is to be cut off.

Now all these must be joyned together.* 1.1180 If the fact be not notorious or prov'd, a man must be so severely smitten we know not why. And if the fact be evident, yet unless it be great, it deserves not the biggest punishment. For the judge is cruel, and not just, that puts a man to death with torments for spitting in his parlour: and the judgment of the Church being nothing else but an effective and terrible declaration of the judgment of God, must not be exterminating and final for things of little concern∣ment, but according to the wisedome which we see, and the mercy which we hope for. And after all, if it be evident and great, yet the last remedy must not be us'd at first; and a man will not have his arm cut off for a felon upon his finger, or the gout in his wrist, or an ulcer that can by any other means be cur'd. But when in a great pestilence and danger of in∣fection there is no other remedy; when the fire rages desperately, and can by no other means be stopp'd; then pull the house down, and separate the infected from the city; he is fit for nothing but charnel-houses, and the society of the dead.

4. This caution Gerson instances in pecuniary matters.* 1.1181 For (saith he) not ever contumacy against the orders of Courts Ecclesiastical is to be punish'd with this death.* 1.1182 If it be in matters of faith or manners, then the case is competent: but when it is a question of money and fees, besides that the case is full of envy and reproach, apt for scandal and to bring con∣tempt upon the Church, the Church hath no direct power in it; and if it have by the aide of the civil power, then for that a civil coercion must be us'd. It is certainly unlawful to excommunicate any man for not paying the fees of Courts; for a contumacy there is an offence against the civil power, and he hath a sword of his own to avenge that. But excom∣munication is a sword to avenge the contumacy of them who stubbornly offend against the discipline of the Church in that wherein Christ hath given her authority, and that is in the matters of salvation and dam∣nation immediate, in such things where there is no fecular interest, where

there can be no dispute, where the offender does not sin by consequence and interpretation, but directly and without excuse. But let it be consi∣dered how great a reproach it is to ecclesiastical discipline if it be made to minister to the covetousness or to the needs of Proctors and Advo∣cates; and if the Church shall punish more cruelly then civil Courts for equal offences: and because she hath but one thing to strike withall, if she upon all occasion smites with her sword, it will either kill too many, or hurt and affright none at all.

5. Spiritual censures must not be inflicted for temporal causes,* 1.1183 in questions of right and secular concernment, for which the civil sword is sharp enough and proper. In the Church of Rome it hath been very usual to use excommunications for the discovery of thefts, or the mani∣festation of secret actions. Divers examples of which are in the Decretals and later Canons of the Church; but not till the Church had been ex∣tremely corrupted both in Doctrine and Manners. But this advice is the same almost with the former, and relies upon the same reason. But who please to see more of it may see it in Gerson de vita spirit. anim. lect. 4. Corol. 7. & serm. in Concil. Rhemens. partit. 2. consid. 2. provis. 2.

As as Corollary to these advices, I am to adde one thing that is of great use and consideration,* 1.1184 and that is, That when a law is made that who ever shall commit such a fact shall be ipso facto excommunicate, it must never be understood of the greater and proper excommunication; for if it be, it is unlawful and it is ridiculous. For the abscission from the Church is not to be us'd but after all other remedies: when the crime is delated or notorious, and the person called, when he hath been admonished and re∣prov'd, and called to repentance, if after all he refuses and rebels, then he is to be cut off, else not: and therefore no man is ipso facto cut off. The offence alone deserves it just as it deserves damnation: but because God is pleas'd graciously to call a sinner to repentance, and cuts him not off till he hath refus'd his gentleness and forbearance, the Church must doe so too, following the Oeconomy of God; for if the Church kills on earth, and God saves in heaven, it is clear she hath not rightly us'd her power, and therefore must not kill at the first dash.

If therefore it be inquired whether all such sentences in law which de∣clare a man to be in certain cases ipso facto excommunicate be unlawful,* 1.1185 the Arch-Bp. of Spalato, who is fierce against them, answers affirmatively and confidently,* 1.1186 and disputes well against them: but his reasons are over∣valued by him and are not demonstrative; for they all rely upon this pro∣position, That no man can be tied to be executioner of any sentence against himself, which I have proved to be false* 1.1187. * What then doe such sen∣tences effect more then others which are comminatory, and threaten the sentence onely to be inflicted by the Judge if the crime be delated and prov'd? Gerson saith he learn'd thus to answer from his Master, That the Judge in such cases, when the fact is prov'd or confess'd, may pass to sen∣tence without any further Judicial process; which in other cases he cannot doe. But Gerson and his Master would fain have been at a new thing, but they could not hit it right. For whether any such thing was effected or no, or whether any more was intended, is not a matter of conscience; for this whole proceeding is not the ministery of the keyes, but wholly a

humane invention, done with great reason, and is of prudent conduct, and warranted by precedents in Scripture: and since in those places where many such laws are made and us'd it is certain that the law-givers intend more, and more is practis'd, i•• is not true that Gerson's Master told him, that these laws produc'd nothing but a power for the Judge to proceed summarily. And therefore he neither answered right in the point of law, nor in the case of Conscience; & yet he said well, that such sentences of ex∣communication doe not oblige others to abstain from the society of the excommunicate. It is true, but not for his, or for the reasons of the learned Arch-Bp. of Spalato; but for this reason, because these sentences doe not intend to involve the offender in the greater excommunication, which is not to be inflicted but upon him that hath sinn'd griveously, and after ad∣monition refuses to amend. For if the greater excommunication were intended, the laws were unlawful, and the sentence unjust. For a crime in manners is like an errour in faith: this without pertinacy is not heresy, and that without contumacy does not deserve excommunication. But what then?

Therefore all those laws which inflict the sentence of excommunica∣tion ipso facto are to be understood of the lesser excommunication,* 1.1188 and they mean thus much onely, That the Church declares that all such criminals are obliged to confesse their sin, to abstain from the Communion till they have truly repented, to submit themselves to the judgement of their spiritual guide, to receive discipline at his hand, and manners of emendation; and in this sense the laws are pious and reasonable, usefull and of great effect: but how much the conscience of the criminal is by them oblig'd is a secret of which we know nothing; but this we know, that where such laws are us'd and understood, without such submission and amends, a man that de∣sires to be good can have no peace of conscience.

The like is to be said of those ancient Canons of Councils which for light causes impose and decree the sentence of excommunication.* 1.1189 Thus the fourth Council of Carthage decrees him to be excommunicate qui sa∣cerdote verbum faciente in Ecclesia egressus de auditorio fuerit,* 1.1190 who shall goe out of the Church before the Sermon be ended. Very many of the same nature might be produc'd, but they all mean the same thing; that he that is delinquent in the instance when he is delated and convict shall be separate a while from the Communion, (for that was the Discipline of those times) and thrust into the place of publick penitents.

RULE X. It is not lawfull to communicate with those whom the Church hath by a just sentence excommuni∣cated.

THat is,* 1.1191 all prohibited Communion is unlawful: as if they be driven onely from holy offices, then we must not admit such persons to our assemblies; if a civil entercourse be prohibited, that the Criminal by shame might be brought to repentance, then that also must be denied him: for if

he be bound by the censure of the Church, then we also who are the rela∣tives of that coercion are tied to doe our duty to the Church.

To which purpose there is an excellent discourse in S. Cyprian,* 1.1192 Where∣fore* 1.1193 (saith he) although there be some of our collegues that think it fit to neg∣lect the Divine discipline, and doe rashly communicate with Basilides and Mar∣tialis, this thing ought not to disturb our faith; since the Holy Ghost in the Psalms threatens such persons, saying, Thou hast hated discipline and cast my words behind thee: if thou sawest a thief thou didst goe with him, and wert partaker with the adulterers. He shewes that they were consorts and partakers of other mens sins who were joyned with the delinquents.* 1.1194 But this thing also the Apostle Paul writes, saying, They are whisperers, backbiters, haters of God…. who knowing the judgement of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not onely doe the same, but have pleasure in them that doe them. For (saith he) they that doe such things are worthy of death. He manifests and proves that they are worthy of death and shall come to pu∣nishment, not onely that doe evil, but they who consent to them that doe evil; who whilest by an unlawfull communication they are mingled with evil sinners, and that will not repent, are polluted with the contact of the guilty, and be∣cause they are joyned in crimes, they are not separated in punishment.

The Church having so good warrant from Scripture proceeded to* 1.1195 adde Ecclesiastical penalties to those that would not verify her Sentences of just excommunications. For when some had got a trick to meet in houses and pray in Conventicles, because they were forbidden, or did vo∣luntarily refuse to enter into Churches, the Council of Antioch took notice of it,* 1.1196 and forbad all such communions and assemblies and entercourses un∣der the pain of excommunication. But this was decreed by the Canons commonly called Apostolical,* 1.1197 Si quis cum excommunicato saltem i•• domo simul oraverit, iste communione privetur, He that prayes with an excom∣municate person so much as privately in a house, let him be depriv'd of the Communion. The same we find often in the Ancient Epistles of the Popes; in thea 1.1198 second and in theb 1.1199 fourth Council of Carthage, in the first Council of c 1.1200 Toledo, and in the Synod atd 1.1201 Auxerre in France, in the first Council of e 1.1202 Bracara, in the Council off 1.1203 Touraine, and the Council ofg 1.1204 Verne.

But this is to be understood with one caution,* 1.1205 and to be reduc'd to practice by another. 1. Although the Church excommunicates the•• that communicate with excommunicates, yet it is alwayes to be understood that the partners are onely smitten with a lesser excommunication, and oblig'd onely externally, not internally. For there may be many cases very fa∣vourable in which an innocent person may innocently communicate with a heathen and a publican: and therefore in such cases in which a man does not take part against, or directly or by intention despise the Church, or give countenance, strength or increment to the sin of the excommunicate, but with simplicity pursues other lawfull purposes, and designs nothing of these, he is onely tied to give satisfaction to the Church; but is not guilty before God. For the places of Scripture quoted by S. Cyprian above-mention'd are onely spoken of such persons who by their society approve, and in their hearts doe consent to such crimes. But every man that goes along with them in their journey or in their Merchandise, does not goe along with them in their crime; and yet if they be forbidden to goe along the road

with them, and yet will doe it, they may justly be presum'd to goe along in their consent and approbation: and therefore the Church does well to forbid such to come to her communions till she be satisfied, that is, till the contrary does appear, or amends be made. But because in many cases the contrary can be made to appear, and in more cases the contrary is true, whether it can be made to appear or no, therefore in such cases it must be understood, that the companion of the excommunicate is onely bound in the face of the Church by such censures, and not in the Court of heaven.* 1.1206 And to this accords that of S. Leo, Certainly when any such cause does happen, that for the hainousnesse of some crime committed any one is justly depriv'd of the Communion, he alone ought to be punish'd who is in∣volv'd in the guilt; nec particeps debet esse supplicii qui consors non docetur fuisse commissi, neither is he to partake of the punishment that was not a consort of the fact.

2. This rule is to be reduc'd to practice with this caution,* 1.1207 That the Church intends not to forbid any such entercourse or communion to which we stand preoblig'd by the law of Nature, or any law of God, or of the Civil supreme power, from which the Church cannot absolve us. The sen∣tence of excommunication does not enjoyn a son not to help his aged Fa∣ther, nor the Physician to give him physic in his sicknesse, nor the tenants to pay their rent, and talk with their land-lord about his and their necessi∣ties, nor the feudatary to pay homage to his lord: to prohibite Natural or Civil duties the Ecclesiastical power hath nothing to doe. If the Civil power hath forbidden a civil duty, he may, and then the subject is civilly bound in all things but where God hath commanded a duty. For even the King cannot command a wife not to pay her duty to her husband, nor a child to his mother. To these they are bound by God, though they die for it; and if the Prince be angry, yet God is well pleased.

For although the supreme power can forbid even an action that is of it self good and pious,* 1.1208 and we are in the proper circumstances bound to obey him, and in this case also obedience is better then sacrifice; yet when the piety is necessary, and not under choice and counsell, but under a Com∣mandement, the King and the Bishop singly or conjunctly have no power to forbid it.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

for these are things that are not of to day or yesterday, but of an eternal rectitude, and no man knows when they did begin. For upon this account Antigona in Sophocles defends the fact of burying her dead Brother against the Kings commandement, Even the Gods themselves, that is, the great Rulers of the world, are subject to these laws. So Euripides,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.1209 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

This law rules them that rule the world: and therefore the Greek Tragedy does rarely well call these laws 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because all men and all things are under their feet. It is, as Pindar calls it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a law that is the King of all things mortal and immortal. And therefore excommunications, though verified by the secular power, cannot forbid the

necessary and dutifull entercourses of relations, or the issue of any duty commanded by a former obligation in the law of God.

But if the Church will take her measures from the words of her com∣mission,* 1.1210 which as they are her onely warrant, so they are the best rule, the external effect of excommunication is this onely, that we esteem him that refuses to hear the Church as a heathen and a publican. If we account and use him so, it is bad enough; but then we have no warrant to use him worse. And then as we eat and drink and talk and buy and sell with hea∣thens without sin, why also not with excommunicates, this precept notwith∣standing? I say, this precept notwithstanding, for it is more then an indul∣gence or a leave to use them so; it is a commandement: the Rulers and stew∣ards of God's houshold are tied to separate refractary Criminals from the sound part; and the people are bound to be separate, for they also have a share in this binding and loosing by way of consent and compliance and ve∣rification, according to that of S. Austin,* 1.1211 Si fratrem habes pro Ethnico & publicano, ligasti illum in terris; si correxeris fratrem, solvisti illum in terris. The people are to bind and loose, that is, to esteem him that is bound as a heathen and a publican, and to assist in the correcting of him, by bringing him to repentance by the instrument of shame. But this being matter of office, and not merely of benefit, it is evident that it is a precept, and not a leave onely, a Commandement, and not an indulgence.

But then if we enquire to how much and to what manner of usages it does oblige us,* 1.1212 we shall be able to understand our duty best by considering that it is a proverbial expression, or a form of execration, to signify im∣pious and prophane persons, of the vilest reproach. Just as in the Old Testament,* 1.1213 of what Nation soever he was, yet a stranger from the Cove∣nant of God was called an Aramite or a Syrian; and when S. Paul said that S. Timothie's Father was a Greek, the Syriac interpreter calls him an Ara∣mite: so here a heathen and a publican signifies a wicked and a reprobate person; as we call cruel people Turks, and in the time of the holy warre all very vile and intolerably vitious or hated persons were called Saracens. Harlots and Publicans Christ joynes together;* 1.1214 so Publicans and Sinners the same with Heathens and Publicans. Meaning that all contumaciòus sin∣ners, that upon admonition and Ecclesiastical correption refuse to repent, are to be accounted enemies and strangers to the rights and promises of the Gospell, enemies to the religion, and separate from God, and given over to a reprobate sense.

But it cannot be inferred from hence that the same usage which the Jews gave to Heathens and Publicans,* 1.1215 we are tied to have towards excom∣municates. That we must have no worse is certain, but not such, not so bad, is also very true; because our Blessed Saviour did not even amongst them approve of those harsh and contemptuous usages; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they would not eat, nor drink, nor trade, nor come to them.

Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti, Quaesitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos.

They would not doe common civilities or charities to an uncircumcised man, to a heathen. But when our Blessed Saviour had us'd them better, and so taught others to converse with them, to doe them good and to save

their souls, it will be very reasonable to collect from hence, that Christ did not intend by this to enjoyn us to such treatments of the excommuni∣cates as the proud Pharisees gave to Publicans and heathens: but the man∣ner of speech was in use among the Jews to signify impious persons and great sinners, and so Excommunicates are to be accounted.

That therefore which remains is,* 1.1216 that the usage here intended is, that they should be separate from the communion of holy offices, from par∣taking in the mysteries of religion; for that was the known use of the words of binding and loosing among the Jews, which Christ us'd in giving the Church a power of excommunication. To bind signifies to forbid, and to loose signifies to give admission and leave, according to that usual saying of the Jews, There was nothing bound by Ezekiel or by David but what was bound in the Law, that is, they forbad nothing else. So that the accounting these persons separate from God, and forbidding them to enter into the communions of the sons of God in the mysteries of their religion, is all that can by any probability be inferr'd from hence, excepting what is super∣added from common reason and the laws of nature; that if beyond this there be danger of receiving hurt, the separation goe further: and therefore the Apostles gave caution to their converts that they should not salute or admit into their houses false Apostles, because of the imminent danger; but beyond this I find no Divine Commandement.

Whatsoever therefore besides these things is superadded by the laws of the King of the Canons of the Church is to be obeyed upon those ac∣counts,* 1.1217 where no other duty is prejudic'd; and therefore in this there is no other rule of Conscience, but that we first attend to the laws of God concerning our other duties, and then to the laws of the King in this. But in the thing it self, excommunication cuts the refractary sinner from the communion or religious entercourse of the Church; he is not to be reck∣on'd as a Brother, or a relative in our religious friendship and union. The offices of humanity and civility are not to be denied to him; but there ought to be no dearnesse and proximity of friendship: we are not to take much care of reproving him; his eares are shut to truth, and he cannot hear good counsel; hujus ergo desperanda salus (as Cicero said of the like persons) unlesse a new hope arise, we may despair of his salvation.

One thing more I adde,* 1.1218 That when the Church inflicts censures upon those who communicate with the Excommunicates, it is not upon a real belief that all such persons are guilty of the same crimes by secret appro∣bation or consent, but because she cannot tell whether they be or no; for it is a just legal presumption, and hath some natural probability that it is so; and the Church is but too justly offended and scandaliz'd at such commu∣nications and entercourse. But then on all sides there is a difference to be made, and the Church must not be so offended when he that communicates with the excommunicate apparently does not, or by that communion cannot be presumed to partake of the principal sin: and therefore besides the ty∣ranny and usurpation and illegal proceedings of Hildebrand against the Em∣peror Henry, excommunicating him upon pretence of Simony in the matter of Investitures, he did foolishly and unreasonably excommunicate all them that did partake or converse with him. For first the Church hath no pow∣er directly to make laws in the matter of secular conversation: and if it be

said, by consequence and legal presumption the Church concludes such per∣sons that communicate with the excommunicates to consent or partake of the crime; that is according as the matter is, and in this case is extremely unreasonable and foolish: for it cannot be imagined that all the subjects of the Emperor should be partners of the bargains, or should know of them, or believe any such thing, or approve it, if they did know or believe it; and the communicating with their Prince as subjects could not infer it, with any seeming probability, that they were all simoniacs.

But then on the other side,* 1.1219 the sons of the Church must be with curi∣osity restrain'd in their communions with such excommunicates, whose con∣versation does with probability involve us in the guilt and participation of the principal crime: and this is especially to be observed in sins about Go∣vernment, and in matters of persuasion, that is, in matters of heresy and schisme; for their word eateth like a canker, that is, these crimes are infecti∣ous and scatter themselves into all that converse with them, or is very like∣ly so to doe; and therefore in these cases the subjects may be more re∣strained from entercourse with excommunicates, and it must be a greater necessity that must warrant it, then may passe and be allowed in other cases.

This is all I find necessary to be considered in the matter of Ecclesi∣astical censures,* 1.1220 in order to the regulating of conscience: which the Casuists in the Roman Church have handled in great volumes, and make it com∣monly the one half of all their inquiries and ministeries of Conscience. For all the questions and considerations concerning suspensions, irregu∣larities, interdicts, depositions and degradations, absolutions of the dead and of the absent, the forms of absolution, reservation of cases, delegations and licenses, absolutions against our wills, and by others who bound us not, and upon false suggestions, absolutions upon condition and reincidences, sentences un∣certain and unknown, excommunications comminatory & ipso facto, papal and episcopal, common and special, principal and delegate, by regulars and seculars, the excommunication of Angels and Devils, of fowls and beasts, Pagans & Jews, and thousands of questions, cases, accidents, incidents, limitations of times appendant to all these, which make the peace of conscience to be as impos∣sible as the conduct of it, all these are cut off by the simplicity of truth, and the plainenesse of Divine institutions, which are few, and easy, and use∣ful, and reasonable; wise, but not perplext; severe, but not insnaring. But those things which are introduc'd by humane authority and rely upon secu∣lar interests, the artifices of covetous or ambitious men, and are maintain'd by force and false or uncertain principles, they are fit for the forum conten∣tiosum for Courts of strife, but not for the Court of Conscience, which is troubled by any thing that destroys peace as certainly as by that which destroys innocence.

§ III. Of CANONS Ecclesiastical.

That which I am next to inquire of, is, concerning the more parti∣cular persons or communities of men in whom the Ecclesiastical power is subjected, and where we are to find the records of Ecclesiastical laws, and from whom the obligations of Conscience doe proceed, and in what mat∣ters their authority is competent, and their Canons obligatory. That is, to what and whose Ecclesiastical Canons the Conscience is, and how far it is bound.

RULE XI. The Canons of the Apostles which are of Order and external government doe oblige the Conscience by being accepted in several Churches, not by their first establishment.

THat the Canons which the Apostles made did oblige the Churches to whom they were fitted & directed is without all question,* 1.1221 according to that of the Apostle,* 1.1222 To this end also did I write, that I might know the proof of you, whether ye be obedient in all things. For whatsoever was their ordi∣nary power, yet they had so much of extraordinary, had such special com∣missions and warranties from Christ, had such gifts and miracles of power, so much wisdome, so much charity, and so intire a government, and were the onely fountains from whence the rules of the Church were to be de∣riv'd, that their word ought to be a law to whom it was sent, and a prece∣dent to them that should hear of it: it was like the pattern in the Mount, to which all Churches in equal circumstances and the same conjunction of affairs might conform their practices.

Thus we find that the Apostolical decree of abstaining from blood* 1.1223 was observed by more Churches then those of Syria and Cilicia to which the Canon was directed; and the college of Widows or Deaconesses, though provided for the first ministery of the churches and relief of anci∣ent widows, deriv'd it self into the manners of the Western Churches, and lasted longer then there was need. There was no hurt in it; the reve∣rence to the persons and dignity Apostolical was foundation enough to bear a greater burden: but the retention of such Canons and orders was just like the retention of the Judicial laws in some commonwealths, which they did in regard to the divine wisdome; though they in so doing did piously indeed, but yet did not imitate that wisdome by which those laws were made.

But because it is evident that the laws of order and government were fitted to times and places and present necessities,* 1.1224 the same wisdome that so fitted the laws and things together, did also know that those rules were not good when the things were changed and grew unfit for that measure. The Apostles in their first preachings and conversation in Jerusalem in∣stituted a coenobitic life, and had all things in common with the believers; indeed no man was tied to it: and of the same nature were their Canons, Counsels and advices, and propositions of what was best. But that advise related to the present necessities of believers: they were likely to suffer persecution, and the nation was in a little time to be destroyed, and there∣fore it was prudence to sell their lands, and charity to divide the use of it. But if any man shall say that this obliges all Christians, he is unreasonable; but if they doe not, then it is certain that their laws oblige according to the subject matter and the changing reasons of things, and therefore not by

their authority alone, but by their authority also who are judges of the reason of things, and can declare with obligation.

But yet further,* 1.1225 The orders which the Apostles gave to their Chur∣ches, though they be as good now as they were then, and have equal cir∣cumstances, yet unless it can appear that they by them intended to oblige all ages of the Church, although they were not free then, yet they are free now. Now this is certain, that they gave no such laws but what they re∣ceiv'd in Commandement from Christ; and when ever they said of any particular, This say I, not the Lord, they gave but an advice, or made a temporary order; but when they said, This we have receiv'd from the Lord, it is alwaies a doctrine of faith, or a moral Commandement. So that the rules of order being neither of these are but topical, and limited, and tran∣sient; such which when they are chosen by the Rulers of Churches they become Canons and measures of practice, but else not. The Apostle made an order in the Corinthian Church that men should not pray or prophesy having their heads covered: but yet in France the preachers are covered, and doe not think they prevaricate an Apostolical Canon; because they suppos'd it reach'd no further but to that Church, or at least was agree∣able to the manners and customes of those places. S. Paul appointed that they should lay aside every first day of the week something for the poor: but he that shall chuse to doe this upon his weekly fasting-day, does as well; he does the same thing in another circumstance. * S. Paul gave in order to Timothy that a Bishop should not be a novice; meaning in age, or in Christianity, or both: and yet S. Timothy himself was but a novice, being chosen Bishop at the age of XXV years, as the Ecclesiastical histories report; and Theodosius chose Nectarius being but newly converted; and the people chose S. Ambrose to be Bishop before he was baptiz'd, and the election was confirmed by Valentinian. Fabianus, Cyprian, Nicolaus, Seve∣rus, Tarasius, were all novices or new Christians when they were chosen Bishops;* 1.1226 and yet the Church made no scruple of that Canon of the Apo∣stles, because to break it was more for the edification of the Church. And I remember that Cassander, speaking of the intolerable evils that fell upon the Church by the injunction of single life to Priests and Bishops, he saies this law ought to have been relaxed, although it had been an Aposto∣lical Canon. * Thus also it happened in the Canon concerning the college of widows,* 1.1227 Let not a widow be chosen under threescore years; and yet Justi∣nian suffer'd one of forty years old to be chosen, and had no scruple, and he had no reproof: but that was no great matter; for the whole institution it self is now laid aside, and other appointments are established. * And which is most of all, that Decretal of the Apostles which was made in full Council, the most Oecumenical Council that ever was in Christendome, made at the request of the Churches of the Gentiles, and the inquiry of the Jews, forbidding to eat things strangled, is no where observed in the Western Churches of Christendome;* 1.1228 and S. Austin affirm'd that if any man in his time made a scruple of eating strangled birds, every man did laugh at him. But of this I have given a full account* 1.1229.

Now if those Canons Apostolical which are recorded in Scripture,* 1.1230 and concerning which we are sure that they had Apostolical authority, be with∣out scruple laid aside in all Christendome, some every where, some in some places, it is evident that it is the sense of the whole Catholick Church,

that the Canons of the Apostles for order and external measures of Go∣vernment had a limited sphere of activity, and bind not beyond their reason and convenience, that is, as every Church shall find them fitted to their own measures; and therefore this is much more true in such things which are but pretendedly Apostolical, whose name is borrowed, whose story is uncertain, whose matter is dubious, whose records are not authentick: and therefore whatever else can be pretended to be Apostolical, and is of this contingent nature and variable matter, is evidently subject to the pre∣sent authority of every Church or Christian Kingdome which is supreme in its own dominion.

But besides the reasonablenesse of the thing,* 1.1231 we see it practis'd in all places without dispute or question; that those things which are called Ca∣nons Apostolical, and either were not so, or not certainly so, are yet laid aside by those Churches who pretend to believe them to be so. The 5^th Canon of the Apostles in that collection which is called Apostolical, appoints that the first-fruits shall be sent home to the houses of Bishops and Priests, and makes no question but they divide them amongst the Deacons and Clercs; but I think in the Church of Rome they pay no first-fruits, and what they doe pay, the Bishops and Priests keep unto themselves. But this is nothing. The 6^th Canon commands that a Priest or a Deacon should not under pretence of religion put away his wife: now this is so far from being receiv'd in the Church of Rome, that for this very Canon's sake Baronius calls the collection apocryphal, and rejects them from being Apostolical. The 7^th Canon forbids a Bishop or Presbyter to have any thing to doe in secular affaires, under pain of deposition. This would destroy much of the grandeur of the Church of Rome if it were receiv'd. And the 10^th destroys one of their great corruptions in discipline and doctrine, for it is a perfect deletery of their private Masse; it excommunicates those of the people who come to Churches and goe away before they have received the Com∣munion, calling them disturbers of the Church: now this at Rome would seem a strange thing. And yet all these are within that number of fifty which Baronius sayes were known to antiquity. But he that desires more instances in this affaire, may consult the Canons themselves, amongst which he will find very few observed at this day by any Church in Christendome. The Church of Rome pretends to believe that the wednesday and friday fast were ordained by the Apostles;* 1.1232 and yet the wednesday fast is not obser∣ved except by particular order and custome but in very few places. * I shall give one instance more. The Apostles commanded the feast of Easter to be celebrated upon the Sunday after the full Moon which should happen after the vernal Aequinox: So the Western Churches said. The Eastern pretended another Canon from S. John to celebrate it after the manner of the Jewes: and though they were confident and zealous for that observation upon the Apostolical warrant; yet the Western Bishops at first, and after∣wards the whole Church did force the Easterlings to change that rule which they and their forefathers had avowed to all the world to have received from S. John; and it is observable that this was done upon the designes of peace and unity, not upon any pretence that S. John had never so given it in order to the Asian Churches.

RULE XII. All those Rituals which were taught to the Church by the Apostles concerning ministeries, which were of Divine institution, doe oblige all Chri∣stendome to their observation.

I Instance in the Holy Sacrament first of all:* 1.1233 concerning which the Apostles delivered to the Churches the essential manner of celebration, that is, the way of doing it according to Christs commandement: for the words themselves being large and indefinite were spoken indeed onely to the Apostles, but yet they were representatives of all the whole Ecclesiasti∣cal order in some things, and of the whole Christian Church in other, and therefore what parts of duty and power and office did belong to each the Apostles must teach the Church, or she could have no way of knowing without particular revelation.

Thus the Apostles taught the Bishops and Priests to consecrate the Symbols of bread and wine before they did communicate;* 1.1234 not onely be∣cause by Christs example we were taught to give thanks before we eat, but because the Apostles knew that the Symbols were consecrated to a my∣stery. And this was done from the beginning, and in all Churches and in all ages of the Church; by which we can conclude firmly in this Rule, that the Apostles did give a Canon or rule to the Churches to be observed al∣ways, and that the Church did never believe she had authority or reason to recede from it. For in those rites which are Ministeries of grace no man must interpose any thing that can alter any part of the institution, or make a change or variety in that which is of Divine appointment. For the effect in these things depends wholly upon the will of God, and we have nothing to discourse or argue; for we know nothing but the institu∣tion, nothing of the reason of the thing: and therefore we must in these cases with simplicity and obedience apply our selves to practice as we have received, for we have nothing else to guide us: memory and obedience, not discourse and argument, are here in season.

And in this we have an evident and apparent practice of the Church handed to us by all hands that touch these mysteries:* 1.1235 as who please may see ina 1.1236 Justin Martyr,b 1.1237 Irenaeus,c 1.1238 Origen,d 1.1239 S. Cyril of Jerusalem, and ofe 1.1240 Alex∣andria, f 1.1241 S. Basil, S. Gregory Nyssen de vita Moysi,g 1.1242 Optatus Milevitanus, h 1.1243 S. Chrysostom,i 1.1244 S. Ambrose,k 1.1245 S. Hierom,l 1.1246 S. Austin,m 1.1247 Theodoret,n 1.1248 Grego∣rius Emissenus,o 1.1249 Gregory the Great,p 1.1250 Damascen,q 1.1251 Remigius,r 1.1252 Paschasius and divers others, & absolutely in all the liturgies that ever were us'd in the Church: so that the derivation of this Canon from the Apostles is as evident as the obedience to it was universal.

But where the Apostles did not interpose,* 1.1253 there the Churches have their liberty; and in those things also which evidently were no part of the appointed liturgy or ministration, in those things though it be certain the Apostles did give rules of order and decency, yet because order is as varia∣ble as the Tactics of an army, and decency is a relative terme, and hath a transient and changeable sense, in all these things there is no prescription to the Church, though we did know what the Churches Apostolical did pra∣ctise, for they did it with liberty: and therefore we are not bound; the Churches are as free as ever; though the single persons in the Churches can be bound, yet the Churches always have liberty.

And indeed that is the best signe that the Apostles gave no perpetual order in any instance,* 1.1254 and that it is no part of the institution or the mini∣stery of grace, when the Ancient Churches, who were zealous for the ho∣nour Apostolical, and accounted every thing excellent that deriv'd from them, did differ in their practices. Thus the Greek and Latine Churches did always differ in the Sacramental bread, the Latins consecrating in un∣leavened bread which the Greeks refuse: if either one or other had been necessary they should have been clearly taught it, and if they had, there is no reason to believe but they would have kept the depositum, there being no temptation to the contrary, and no difficulty in the thing, and no great labour to preserve; the daily use of the Church would have had in it no variety; for no traditions are surer, or easier preserved then the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the matters of liturgy and the Rituals Apostolical: which when we find that they were unitedly and consentingly kept by the Ancient Churches, we may well suppose the Apostles to be the first principle of derivation, and that the thing it self was necessary and a part of the religion; but if at first they varied, they had no common principle, and therefore they had no necessity.

Thus that the Bishop or Priest should be the onely Minister of conse∣cration is an Apostolical Canon or Rule,* 1.1255 ad quorum preces Christi corpus sanguisque conficitur,* 1.1256 saith S. Hierom: and the continuation and descent of this particular from the manners of the Apostolical ministration is evident in the fore-alleged testimonies. Now because by this constant derivation we can pursue the track up to the Apostles, and from their practice and teaching of it we can understand it to be the will of God, and because this whole mi∣nistery is an act of grace and depends onely upon the will of God, we per∣ceive the thing to be necessary and unalterable, we must look for grace in the ministeries of grace so as God hath appointed them; and therefore in these things the Churches of the succeeding ages have no authority, no li∣berty, no variety. * That women do communicate in the holy mysteries is not set down in the institution: but the Church derives her warranty from the interpretation and order and practice Apostolical: the Church was taught by the Apostles to admit them, and she always did it: and these things amongst sober and modest men doe sufficiently prove one another. They always did it, and therefore they were taught it by the Apostles: and they were taught to doe so by the Apostles, and therefore they were ob∣lig'd to doe it. And now in matters of salvation and common duty, the rule of the Church is,* 1.1257 Scriptura loquens in Masculino procedit etiam in foeminino. There is no difference in sexes, and before God it is now as it shall be in the resurrection, There is neither male nor female with him, but all alike.

That the Symbols were to be consecrated,* 1.1258 and who were to conse∣crate, and who were to receive, were of great necessity to be taught and determin'd: and in all this we see unity and necessity, authority and obedi∣ence; but when we goe beyond this and the plain & necessary & constituent parts of the institution we find variety and uncertainty. That bread is to be us'd is plain: but whether leavened or unleavened neither Christ nor his Apostles have left in charge or memory. That wine is to be bless'd is cer∣tain: but whether mingled with water or not mingled, we are not determi∣ned by any authority. That the bread and wine are to be bless'd we are sure: but in what form of words, and whether by the mystic prayer, or the words of institution, is not deriv'd to us by sufficient tradition. That the Lords Supper is sacredly and with reverence to be receiv'd is taught us by the Apostles: but whether this reverence ought to be express'd by taking it virgine salivâ, fasting, or not fasting, the Apostles left the Churches to their choice. In those things which did cooperate immediately to the grace of the Sacrament, in those we were not to invent any thing, and in those we were tied to obey what was deliver'd us.

And the same is the case in Baptisme,* 1.1259 in which that which was neces∣sary is that the person be baptized in water, and in the name of the Father, Son and holy Ghost: but whether the Priest shall say, Ego te baptizo, as the Latins doe, or Baptizetur servus Christi, as the Greeks doe, is indiffe∣rent: and if the Apostles had us'd any other little variety of words, yet if there was not in the first Churches an unity and universality of practice, it is certain the Apostles did not by their act or Canon intend to oblige all Christendome; but themselves did it with liberty, and therefore so might the Churches after them.

For,* 1.1260 excepting those things which the Apostles received from Christ in which they were ministers to all ages, once for all conveying the mind of Christ to the generations to come, in all other things they were but ordi∣nary Ministers, to govern the Churches in their own times, and left all that ordinary power to their successors, with a power to rule their Churches, such as they had, and therefore what ever they conveyed as from Christ, a part of his doctrine or any thing of his appointment, this was to bind for ever; for Christ onely is our law-giver, and what he said, was to last for ever: in all things which he said not, the Apostles could not be law-givers, they had no such authority; and therefore whatsoever they order'd by their own wisdome, was to abide as long as the reason did abide; but still with the same liberty with which they appointed it; for of all men in the world they would least put a snare upon the Disciples, or tie fetters upon Christian li∣berty. But in Divine Commandements, and in what were the appointed ministeries of grace, they were but the mouth of Christ and Ministers of his holy spirit; and in those things, what they told to the Churches is our law for ever.

Of the same nature is the distinction of Bishops from Presbyters,* 1.1261 and the government of the Church by them: for this being done in the Apostles times, and immediately receiv'd by all Churches, who every where and ever since were governed by Bishops and by Presbyters under them, it is not onely still to be retain'd unalterably, and is one of those great things in which the present Churches have no liberty or authority to make a change,

but it is to be concluded to be a law of Christ, which the Apostles did con∣vey with an intent to oblige all Christendome; not onely because the Apo∣stles could not in things indifferent oblige or make a law to succeeding ages, for they had no authority and could not govern Churches after they were dead, and it was against the laws of Christ that the commandements of men should be taught for doctrines, and it is against Christian liberty, that a lasting necessity should by man be put upon any thing, and the succeeding Churches would be streightned in the liberty which Christ had given them, and in which they were bound to stand fast; not onely all this, but this was a Ministery of grace, the Bishops were for ever appointed to give a gift by the laying on of hands: and therefore here was an appointment by Christ and by Christs spirit; for there is not in the world a greater presumption then that any should think to convey a gift of God, unlesse by God he be appointed to doe it. Here then could be no variety, and no liberty: this Canon Apostolical is of eternal obligation, and the Churches cannot other∣wise be continued.

But then in the appendages and annexes of this,* 1.1262 the Apostles did doe their ministeries; they did invocate the holy Spirit upon those which were to be ordained: but in these they had no commandement what form to use. Imposition of hands and prayer were the necessary and appointed ministery; for in these things the Churches did not vary, but took them from the Apostles as the appointed liturgy: but with what forms of words, and with the tradition of what instruments, is left to the choice and Oeco∣nomy of every Church.

RULE XIII. In the Rules which the Apostles gave to their Chur∣ches in things indifferent, the Church hath a li∣berty; but it is not to be used but for great reason and great necessity, and for the edification of the people committed to their charge.

THe reasons of this Rule are these two.* 1.1263 First, because it is a great re∣gard to the honour'd names of the Apostles, the pillars and foundati∣ons of the Church, that there be not an easy change made of what they in wisedome had determin'd to be the measures of order and decency. * But this is to be understood in such things which change not, and whose nature although it be not of moral obligation, yet the reason that bound it first may be perpetual, and such which cannot be succeeded to, and cannot be ex∣celled. Thus the keeping of the Lords day, besides all the other reasons deriv'd from the nature of the thing, yet even for this alone, because it de∣riv'd from the Apostles, is to remain so for ever: because the reason being at first competent for which they kept their assemblies, and gave that day to religion, and the same reason remaining for ever, and another cannot come in place of it, and a greater there cannot be, although the Churches

are not in Conscience directly bound, yet collaterally and indirectly they are. For it would be a plain contempt of the persons and wisedome of the Apostles, besides the disrespect to the mystery it self, to change the Sunday Festival into any other day; for since there can be no reason for so doing, and a greater blessing then Christs Resurrection we are not to ex∣pect, and a greater reason for the keeping of a day then a thanksgiving for the greatest blessing there cannot be (except a Divine commandement) the onely reason why any Church should change it must relate to the Apo∣stles, and therefore be no lesse then a contempt of their persons and a lessening of their eminence, and could not be lesse then an intolerable scandal.

The other reason is,* 1.1264 because the Apostles even in things where they had no Divine Commandement, yet had the Spirit of God,* 1.1265 the spirit of wisdome and government; and therefore where evidently there is not an inconvenience, or an uselesnesse, or an unreasonablenesse by reason of the change of times and circumstances, the Churches are on the surer side when they follow the practice and precedents of the Apostles, and have the confidences of a reasonable hope that such appointments are pleasing to Christ, since it is not unlikely that they were deriv'd from the Spirit of Christ. But in these cases the practices and Canons Apostolical must be evident and prov'd: For since in these particulars of lesser concernment, we doe but presume and conjecture that the Apostles were taught by the Spirit immediately; if it be but a conjecture also that the Apostles did teach or practise it, we have two lame feet, and cannot tread securely.

I shall give one instance in this particular,* 1.1266 but it will be of great use, not onely for the verification of this explication of the Rule, but in order to conscience, because it is in some Churches tied with straight cords, and pretended to be very necessary, and of great obligation upon this stock, because it was appointed by the Apostles: and it is the observation of Lent and the weekly fasting-days.

Of the Lent-fast, and the weekly fasting-days.

The fast of Lent of all that are not pretends the most fairly to have been an Apostolical tradition;* 1.1267 and if it could prove so it would with much probability pretend to have been imposed with a perpetual obligation.

Of the first we have many testimonies from the Ancient Fathers.* 1.1268 So S. Hierom,* 1.1269 Nos unam quadragesimam secundum traditionem Apostolorum toto anno, tempore nobis congruo jejunamus.* 1.1270 So S. Leo, Quod ergo in omni tempore unumquemque convenit facere Christianum, id nunc sollicitius est & devotius exequendum, ut Apostolica institutio quadraginta dierum jejuniis im∣pleatur. And again,* 1.1271 A Sanctis Apostolis per doctrinam spiritus sancti ma∣jora sunt instituta jejunia, ut per commune consortium crucis Christi, nos etiam aliquid in eo quod propter nos gessit ageremus.* 1.1272 To these agrees Isi∣dorus Hispalensis, Quadragesima in universo orbe institutione Apostolicâ ob∣servatur circa confinium Dominicae passionis. To which Dorotheus a Greek Abbat does consent, save onely that he sayes more;* 1.1273 for he affirms that the Apostles did consecrate the seven quadragesimal weeks of fasting. So that

here we have four Ancient Authors giving testimony that the Lent-fast was a tradition or an appointment Apostolical.

Now if it came from the Apostles by way of precedent or authori∣ty,* 1.1274 the thing it self hath in its nature or appendage some advantages by which with much reasonablenesse we may believe it was intended to bind all ages of the Catholick Church. Because the usefulnesse of it will be as much now as ever it was; and it being a specification of the duty of fast∣ing, which will never be out of season, and having always the same com∣mon cause, that is the precedent of Moses and Elias, and the example of our Blessed Saviour himself, the duty not being relative to time or place, and the reason of the institution being of perpetual regard, and the useful∣nesse very great, and the thing pious and holy, and adde to these, all Chur∣ches ancient and modern having received it till now of late, it will be very like a duty incumbent upon all Churches and all ages to observe this fast which the Apostles with so much reason did prescribe.

And in pursuance of this we find some excellent persons in the An∣cient Churches saying expressely that this institution is warranted to us from Christ.* 1.1275 So S. Austin, The Caresme or Lent-fast hath an authority of a Fast both in the Old Testament from the fast of Moses and Elias,* 1.1276 and out of the Gospel (because so many dayes the Lord fasted) demonstrating that the Go∣spel does not differ from the law: and again, By that number of fourty in which Moses and Elias and our Lord himself did fast, was signified unto us that we must abstain from secular delights. The same thing also is affirmed by S. Hierom,* 1.1277 Moses and Elias in their forty days hunger were filled with the con∣versation of God: and our Lord himself fasted so many days in the wildernesse that he might leave to us the solemn days of fasting; or, as he says in another place,* 1.1278 haereditatem nobis jejunii derelinquens, ad esum corporis sui sub hoc numero animas nostras praeparat, leaving to us the inheritance of fasting, un∣der this number he prepares our souls for the eating of his body. So Isidore, The first is the fast of Lent, which began from the fast of Moses and Helias and of our Blessed Lord, who fasted so many days.

Now although these Fathers intend not to say that our Lord did command this fast,* 1.1279 but gave us a precedent and an example to imitate as well as we can; he was the occasion why the Church took that time, and perform'd that severity: yet the example of our Blessed Lord cannot be neglected without sin: Non enim, Fratres, leve peccatum est indictā Quadra∣gesimam à Domino non jejunare, & jejunia consecrata ventris voracitate dis∣solvere, &c. said the Author of the 25^th sermon in the works of S. Am∣brose. It is not a light sin not to keep the Lenten-fast which was indicted by our Lord, and with the greedinesse of the belly to dissolve these consecrated fasting-days. For what does he deserve that breaks the fast which Christ in∣dicted? If therefore thou wilt be a Christian thou must doe as Christ did. He that had no sin fasted forty days: and wilt not thou who hast sinned keep the Lent-fast? He (I say) that had no sin yet fasted for our sins: Think therefore in thy Conscience what a kind of Christian thou art, when Christ fasting for thee thou wilt eat thy dinner. This Author whoever he was (for it was not S. Ambrose) suppos'd that the example of Christ was a sufficient indiction of the Quadragesimal fast. But it is to be observed that it is not unusual with Ancient writers to affirm a thing to be by Divine right, if

there be in Scripture but an authentic precedent and example of it. Thus when the Canon law affirms in 6. de censibus, cap. Quanquam, That the Churches & Church-men are free from secular exactions not onely by hu∣mane but also by Divine right: which saying because to our eares it must needs seem extremely harsh, the Glosse upon the place does soften it, by referring it to the fact of Joseph to the Egyptian Priests,* 1.1280 & of Artaxerxes to the Israelites. So that it is not intended that things of this nature be Divine precepts properly so called; but such which the Church for decent regard takes up in imitation of so great examples: and indeed they are such, which when the Church hath upon such accounts taken up, cannot be omitted without sin, if they be omitted without cause: for then they have autho∣rity when they are commanded by our superiors. But the example of our Blessed Lord in such extraordinaries as these is but a very weak argument to introduce an institution, ordinary and perpetual, troublesome and ensna∣ring. But of this that we may be rid at once, I will set down the judge∣ment of S. Austin and of S. Chrysostom.* 1.1281 In what shall we imitate the ways of Christ? Shall it be in that magnificence in which God was in the flesh? Or does he exhort us to this, or exact of us to doe miracles such as he did? He did not say, Ye shall not be my disciples unlesse ye walk upon the sea, or unlesse ye raise to life him that hath been dead four days, or unlesse ye open the eyes of one that was born blind. What therefore does he mean, saying, Ye must enter by the doore; Learn of me, because I am meek and humble in heart? that's en∣tring in by the door, that's the imitation of Christ that is requir'd of us. But S. Chrysostom says the same thing,* 1.1282 and more pertinently and applied to this matter of fasting: He doth not say his fast is to be imitated, although he might propound those fourty days of his: But, Learn of me, for I am meek and humble in heart: yea rather contrarily, when he sent the Apostles to preach the Gospel, he did not say, Fast, but, Eat whatsoever is set before you. Now this argument of our Blessed Lord's example being remov'd, and it being certain that from his example to conclude a Divine precept in such extra∣ordinaries and external actions is the worst argument of the world, and it being expressely affirmed by S. Chrysostom that Christ did not in his fasting propound himself as imitable by us, we may now return to the first consi∣deration and pretence, and inquire whether or no the fast of Lent was a tradition and Canon Apostolical: that is, not onely whether this did de∣scend from their practice (for if Christs example did not oblige us in this, much lesse could that of the Apostles;) but also whether the Apostles did deliver this as a rule for the practice of the Churches in all descending ages.

The Lent-fast is not a tradition or Canon Apostolical.

This first appears in that we find it affirm'd often in Antiquity that the fasts of the Church were arbitrary and chosen,* 1.1283 without necessity and imposition from any authority. Which thing was observed by Socrates, speaking of the Lent-fast. Because no man can shew in any record that there was a Commandement concerning this thing,* 1.1284 it is manifest that the Apostles did permit a free power in the same, leaving it to every ones mind and choice, that every one might doe what was good, without the inducement of fear or of necessity. For so we ought to fast and to abstain (saith Prosper) that we may not submit our souls to a necessity of fasting and abstaining,* 1.1285 that we may not doe a voluntary thing by an involuntary devotion. But of this we have

elder testimony: for when Tertullian scrap'd together all that he could to justify the Lents of Montanus, the new fasts which he for discipline would have had the Churches for ever to observe, he lay'd hold upon the practice of the Catholics to verify Montanus his imposition, saying that the Catho∣lic Bishops did injoyn fasts sometimes and ex aliqua sollicitudinis Ecclesia∣sticae causa,* 1.1286 upon the occasion of some trouble or affliction in the Church, that is, temporary fasts, or solemn dayes upon special emergent accidents. He addes also that they kept the Paschal fast, the two days before Easter, in which the Bridegroom was taken from them: but in these days they did sometimes live on bread and water, ut cuique videbatur, & haec ex arbitrio agentes & non ex imperio; they did this not by any command, but by choice and as they pleas'd themselves: for so the Catholics did say and believe, sic & observasse Apostolos, nullum aliud imponentes jugum certorum, & in commune omnibus obeundorum jejuniorum,* 1.1287 that the Apostles did fast as every Chri∣stian else did and ought to doe, ex arbitrio, pro temporibus & causis uniuscu∣jusque, as every one had cause and opportunity and will; but they impos'd no other yoke of certain, and for ever to be observed fasts.

Laxus ac liber modus abstinendi Ponitur cunctis: neque nos severus Terror impellit: sua quemque cogit Velle potestas. Sufficit quicquid facias, vocato Numinis nutu prius, inchoare, Sive tu mensam renuas, cibumve Sumere tentes.

So Prudentius,* 1.1288 expressely affirming that even in his time there were no laws of set and annual fasts: for that very thing Victor Antiochenus makes to be a difference between the Old and New Testament;* 1.1289 for the faithfull in that time had fasting-days appointed by God, quae proinde modis omnibus explere obligabantur, etiamsi alias noluissent, which they were bound by all means to observe though against their will; but under the Gospel we fast by the love of vertue, and the choice of our own will, rather then by the coaction of any law.* 1.1290 For quibus diebus jejunandum sit nullo Apostolorum praecepto de∣finitum reperiri, said S. Austin; what days we are to fast is no where to be found determin'd by any precept of the Apostles.

2.* 1.1291 This also appears in that we find the original of the Quadragefi∣mal or Lent-fast attributed to other causes and beginnings then the tradi∣tion or Canon Apostolical.* 1.1292 Cassian sayes, that as long as the perfection of the Primitive Church did remain, there was no observation of a Lent-fast; for they who spent the whole year in abstinence were not tied with the necessity of a precept or legal sanction. But when the multitude of the believers every day cooling in their devotion did brood upon their wealth…..id tunc uni∣versis sacerdotibus placuit, then it seem'd good to the Bishops to recal men to the work of holinesse by a Canonical indiction of fasts, and to give to God the tenth of their days.* 1.1293 So that the cause of the institution of this fast was the universal declension of the Primitive piety: and the Authors of it were the whole consent of Bishops. Something like this was that of S. Chry∣sostom, who complaining of the diminution of the Primitive heats of pie∣ty, and their unworthy communicating,* 1.1294 especially at Easter, addes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c.

When the Fathers had observ'd the hurt that came from so carelesse conven∣tions, they meeting together appointed forty days for fasting and prayer and hearing Sermons, and holy assemblies. S. Austin does not, as Cassian, impute it to the sanction of the Bishops, nor to a Council of the Fathers, as S. Chrysostom, but to the custome of the Church. Ut quadraginta illi dies ante Pascha observentur Ecclesiae consuetudo roboravit:* 1.1295 Sic etiam ut octo dies Neophytorum distinguantur à caeteris, The custome of the Church hath esta∣blished the observation of forty dayes before Easter, and the eight dayes after Easter for the Novices. Both from the same principle. But it was not the authority of the Apostles, but the custome of the Church that made it into a law.* 1.1296 In Irenaeus his time there was a custome of fasting about that time, for one or two dayes or more, but it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a simple and a private custome. But when it was made, it was onely for the imperfect, and the men of the world that spent their year in gather∣ing money, and mispent their time; they onely were intended in the con∣stitution. This we have from S. Hierom,* 1.1297 jejunia à viris prudentibus propter eos constituta fuisse qui magis saeculo vacant quam Deo, Some prudent men appointed the solemn fasts for their sakes who spent their time in the af∣faires of the world, more then in religion. And since it is consentingly af∣firmed that the great end of the Lent-fast is for preparation to the Easter communion, what use (at least to this great purpose,) can it be of to those pious persons who communicate every fortnight, or it may be every week in the year? But it is true that the great end and ministery of the Lent-fast was in order to the Easter communion, but it was of such persons who being admitted to publick penance upon Ashwednesday were reconcil'd and admitted to the communion upon Easter-day: which custome being not in use, the use of Lent in order to the chief end to which it did mini∣ster is wholly lost. It was therefore true which S. Hierom said, that Lent was for the imperfect and secular persons, for publick penitents and persons convict of scandalous crimes, for men of the world, and not for the religi∣ous, who every moneth or week observe the religion of Easter, and live in a state of perpetual preparation. Perfecti non tenentur lege jejunii, They that all the year liv'd strictly were not bound to the observation of Lent: so Cassian; and from him* 1.1298 Isidorus Hispalensis and† 1.1299 Rabanus Maurus: and the same thing also was affirmed by S.* 1.1300 Chrysostom, from whom Cassian, who was his scholar, might receive it.

3.* 1.1301 Some of the Ancient and Primitive writers affirm Pope Teles∣phorus to have been the first author of Lent-fast about the year 136. So Eusebius in his Chronicon affirms, Quadragesimale jejunium à Telesphoro per hoc tempus institutum ac praeceptum quidam scribunt, Some write that Telesphorus commanded the Quadragesimal fast. Scaliger believes this not to be the saying of Eusebius, as not being to be found in the Greek MS. copies: but however, till Scaliger's time it was in the middle ages of the Latin Church and so downwards believed; and it was affirmed expressely by * 1.1302 Rabanus Maurus and† 1.1303 Rupertus.

4.* 1.1304 The Thing and the Name was unknown in the Church in the first three Ages. This is very apparent in Tertullian, who making his apology for the fasting-dayes of Montanus, sayes they are no such great matter that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the spiritual men (so he calls the Catholics) should complain of them as of so intolerable yoke upon the Disciples. It was but ten dayes

in all;* 1.1305 two weeks, abating Saturdays and Sundays: and Sozomen sayes these two weeks were before Easter. Now if the Catholics had known of our Lent then, of forty dayes fast, they would never have been so un∣reasonable to complain of the ten dayes of Montanus; and that was all he impos'd in the whole year, let the time be when it will. And yet this was more then the Catholics did; for when from their practice (as I noted be∣fore) Tertullian would fain have drawn some warranty and countenance, he sayes that the Apostles did not quite extinguish all difference of dayes;* 1.1306 for if they did, why did the Catholics then observe Easter every year? why the fifty dayes of joy after it? why the Wednesday and Friday fast, and [good Friday or] the preparation-day? and why the Saturday fast? though indeed this ye never fast but at Easter. Here is all the solennities both of feastings and fastings which the Church then had: and therefore it is easy without much dili∣gence to discover the weaknesse of those pretences which derive from more ancient record, but indeed are nothing but deceptions and interpolations. Such as is the 69^th Canon Apostolical, which commands the observation of Lent to a Clergy-man under pain of deposition, to a lay-man under excom∣munication. But the imposture of these Canons, especially of the last 36, amongst which this is one, are abundantly acknowledged by men of all per∣suasions. And so is that of S. Ignatius to the Philippians, Despise not the Lent, for it contains an imitation of the conversation of our Lord. But of this Epistle the Ancients make no mention,* 1.1307 and that it is supposititious is very fully proved by the learned and most Reverend Primate of Ardmagh, and it is so notorious as nothing can be more; for the author of this Epistle condemns that which S. Ignatius and his neighbour-Churches did, and calls him a companion of them that killed Christ, that keeps Easter after the manner of the Jews. But of this enough. But as to the thing; If the Lent fast were of Apostolical institution, it were strange there should be no men∣tion of it in the certain writings of the three first ages; not a word of it in Justin Martyr or S. Irenaeus, in Tertullian or Clemens Alexandrinus, in Clemens Romanus his genuine Epistle to the Corinthians, nor in S. Cyprian. There is indeed a little shred taken out of Origen's tenth homily on Leviti∣cus [Habemus enim quadragesimae dies jejuniis consecratos] we have the dayes of Lent design'd for fasting. But concerning this I can onely say that the homilies were supposed to be S. Cyril's, written in the fifth age and publish'd in his Name; but whoever be the author, he that wrote them destroys the letter of the Scripture all the way, out of his own brain, and is a man of no great authority,* 1.1308 sayes Bellarmine: and therefore it remains certain that in the three first ages of the Church there was no mention made of the quadragesimal or forty-dayes fast in Lent, and therefore it was not de∣riv'd as a law or by rule from the Apostles: but so strange a thing it was that there should be any common prescript fasts, that Apollonius accus'd Montanus for it, he was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he taught the solutions of marriage, and made a law for fasting-dayes.

5.* 1.1309 The Quadragesimal fast was relative and ever in order to the Easter feast, and therefore could not be before that for whose sake it was appoin∣ted. But the feast of Easter was, and the Sunday festival was introduc'd by custome and arbitrary choice, for relaxation of labours and the memory of Christs resurrection: indeed it was at the beginning of the dissemina∣tion and prevailing of Christianity, but it was without a Divine command, or an Apostolical Canon,* 1.1310 if we may believe Socrates. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

The feast of Easter and other feasts, every man as they pleas'd in several places did out of a certain custome celebrate the memory of the salutary Passion. For neither our Saviour nor the Apostles appointed this by a law. For the Apo∣stles did not trouble themselves about making laws for feasts, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but to introduce piety and a good life. The rest was permitted to the good will of the Churches, who being sen∣sible of the great benefits of Christs passion and resurrection, would quick∣ly introduce a custome of such a pious gratitude:* 1.1311 and Nicephorus tels the same story, and in words very like. And the thing was not long in doing; it was so reasonable, so pious, so obvious, so ready and prepar'd, that at the very beginning all Christians did it, though, as it happens, in several Churches after several manners. And supposing that these Greeks say true, yet it is no more lessening to the sacrednesse of that great feast, that the Apostles did not intend to make laws concerning it, then it is to Baptisme, that S. Paul sayes, Christ sent him not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel; that is, though to baptize was a holy office, yet he was to attend some∣thing that was greater and requir'd his diligence and presence. But this addes some moments to the sacrednesse of this and other such feasts, that the Apostles left it to the piety and good will of the Churches, as knowing that the Spirit of God, which they had receiv'd to this and greater pur∣poses, was more then sufficient for the leading them into a specification of their piety and gratitude upon such great causes: and it was a very great matter that instantly all Churches did consent in the duty, without any law, or common teacher, but the Spirit of God and right reason. The result of this consideration is this, That if the Apostles left the celebration of Easter and other feasts to the choice and piety of the Churches, it is not likely that they bound the Lent-fast by a Canon, since the Lent was always acknowleged to be a preparation for Easter, and was never heard of before there was a Christian Easter. But if I may have leave to interpose my con∣jecture (for it is no more) I suppose Socrates by Pascha does not mean the day of the Resurrection, but the day of the Passion; and that he intends onely to say that the solemnity of the good-Friday devotion was not ap∣pointed by Christ and his Apostles, but left to the piety and gratitude of the Church. The reasons of my conjecture are these. 1. Because Socrates calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the memorial of Christs passion; which the Easter Sunday was not, but of the resurrection. 2. Because we find the word Pascha us'd by the Ancient Fathers in the same sense; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 said Timotheus Alexandrinus, to fast on the Pasch: so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, S. Clement calls the good-friday fast, the Paschal fast, meaning that then began the Jewish passeover, and then Christ our Passeover was offered for us. So Tertullian,* 1.1312 Sic & die Paschae, quo communis & quasi publica jejunii religio est, merito deponimus osculum, &c. The day of the Pasch is a publick and a common day for the religion of fasting; which because it was never true of Easter-day, and being always true of good-friday, he must mean this. 3. Because it is very probable that the Easter festival was in use,* 1.1313 though not commanded, in the Apostles time, therefore because they kept the memo∣rial of the resurrection the first day in every week; and therefore Socrates could not in all likelyhood mean that day, but the Pascha passionis, the Paschal passion, not the Paschal resurrection. And then upon this account, though this fifth argument will not prevail, it is because we need it not; for

whatever destroys the premisses in this case, does establish the Conclusion. For if by Pascha he means the Paschal fast, that is, good-Friday, then he gives testimony, and that very consonantly to the prime antiquity, that it was left free and undetermin'd by Christ and his Apostles: but if he should mean the Easter feast, and did say true, yet it will follow from hence, that much more must the preceding fast be left undetermin'd.

6. If any man should say that Kings are all created,* 1.1314 as Adam was, in full stature and manhood by God himself immediately, he could best be con∣futed by the midwives and the nurses, the School-masters and the servants of the family, and by all the neighbourhood, who saw them born infants, who took them from their Mothers knees, who gave them suck, who carried them in their armes, who made them coats and taught them their letters, who observed their growth & chang'd their ministeries about their persons. The same is the case of the present article. He that sayes our Lent, or forty days fast before Easter, was established by the Apostles in that full growth & state we now see it, is perfectly confuted by the testimony of those ages that saw it's infancy & childhood, & help'd to nurse it up to it's present bulk.

For it is not to be denied but that from the very first ages of the Christian Church of which we have any records,* 1.1315 it was with sacrednesse and religion observed that before the feast of Easter they should fast. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 S. Clement calls it; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so the Council of Gangra about the time of the Nicene Council, the fasts which were delivered in common, and observed by the Church;* 1.1316 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the appointed fasts, so Constantine call'd them. But this Paschal fast was nothing like ours, it was not our Quadrage∣simal; it was but a fast of one or two days at first and in some places. For at first the Christians were very shie of receiving any load of ordinances and burdens to their consciences, as soon as ever they had entred into the li∣berty of Christians. They did all that reason, and all that love would re∣quire: but if love was the parent of their observations, they would doe them in love, and not in necessity, lest they should be again intangled in a yoke of bondage. That they kept their fasts with liberty, besides the fore∣going testimonies,* 1.1317 is expressely affirmed by Theodoret, who blaming the heretics that abstain'd from flesh and wine as being abominable. Ecclesia vero (saith he) de his nihil praecipit: neque enim horum usum interdicit. Ideo alii quidem permissis voluptatibus securi fruuntur, alii verò abstinent: & nemo qui rectè sapiat condemnat eum qui comedit; nam & abstinentia & participatio sunt in mentis potestate. But the Church commands nothing in these things, and forbids not to use flesh and wine; and therefore some enjoy them freely, others doe abstain, and no wise man condemns him that eats: for to eat or to abstain is in the power of every mans will. Now if the Church had from the Apostles receiv'd a law of the Lent-fast, or if in the Church there had been a law to command absti∣nence from flesh in Lent, it had not been truly said of Theodoret, Ecclesia de his nihil praecipit; for a commandement for a time and a revolving period, certainly is a commandement. But this further appears in the variety which is in all the actions and minds of men when they are at their own choice. Of this a fragment of Irenaeus mention'd by Eusebius is a great testimony:* 1.1318 for there had been an unlucky difference between the Western and Eastern Churches about their keeping of Easter, and Pope Victor was

transported into heats upon the question, and received from S. Irenaeus this sober advertisement, For there is not onely a controversy about the day of Easter, but about the kind of fasting. For some suppose they ought to fast but one day, others two, others more; some measure their day by forty hours of day and night. And this variety of them that observe the fasts did not begin in our age, but long before us with our Ancestors, who, as it is likely, retaining a custome introduc'd by simplicity and a private choice, did propagate it to posterity. And yet neverthelesse all these liv'd peaceably one with another, and we also keep peace together; for the difference of the fast is so far from violating the agreement of faith, that it does commend it rather. Here was the Paschal fast observ'd by all men, but with great variety and a propor∣tionate liberty. The cause of the variety was this, which was also the ground of their practice. They thought that the words of Christ, [when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, in those days shall they fast] were to be meant of the interval of Christs death and burial,* 1.1319 as we learn from Tertullian. Now because it was but one whole day that Christ was in the grave, some fasted but one day, beginning on the Friday afternoon. Others consider that Christ was about 40 hours dead, and the bridegroom was ab∣sent so long; and therefore reckon'd their fast to 40 hours, beginning from the ninth hour on good-Friday, & eating nothing till the morning of Easter day: and this was the most severe and the most prevailing amongst them; and this is the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the quadragesimal fast, this gave occasion to the name, which was kept when the forty hours was chang'd into forty dayes, and new analogies and new reasons found out for it, and their fasting for the absence of the bridegroom was chang'd into a fasting in imitation of Moses and Elias and our Blessed Saviour in the wildernesse. Onely by the way let me observe that at first they had no appointed fasts, but of those hours in which the bridegroom was taken from them, that is, none but the Pas∣chal fast; as Tertullian expressely affirms,* 1.1320 illos dies jejuniis determinatos pu∣tasse in quibus ablatus est sponsus, & hos esse jam solos legitimos jejuniorum Christianorum, The Catholics had no other days appointed for fastings, no other were the legitimate fasting days for Christians (as they thought) but onely those in which the Bridegroom was taken from them.

But S. Irenaeus said that some fast one day,* 1.1321 some two, and others more. Some kept the whole six days of the Passion week; we find mention made of it in Dionysius Alexandrinus about the 255^th year of Christ, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1322 the six days of fasting; but he affirms that all doe not equally observe them. For some fast all the six days, some two, some three, some four,* 1.1323 some none. But by Epiphanius his time the fast had possess'd the whole six days almost every where, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All the people spend the six days of the Pasch, or before Easter, in dry diet: but by this time the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Quadra∣gesima had prevail'd, and was us'd to signify the Paschal fast. The word was us'd in the Council of Nice, which commanded two Synods every year to be held in the Provinces, and the first of them to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Quadragesimal fast. But this did not signify the fast of forty days, for that was not yet brought into the Church.

But first the matter is clear that the word Quadragesima is often us'd in antiquity and by other good Authors to signify a set time of fast,* 1.1324 but plain∣ly lesse then forty days.* 1.1325 S. Hierom sayes that the Montanists doe make tres

in anno quadragesimas, three Lents; and yet two of them were but of five days a piece, and whether the third was more or lesse we cannot tell: and this Tertullian plainly affirms,* 1.1326 who was himself a Montanist. And this thing also came into the practice of some Catholics; for they did so too in the time of Amalarius, they kept tres quadragesimas, three quadragesimal fasts;* 1.1327 and yet that before Midsummer and that before Christmas were much shorter then forty days. The same word is several times used by a 1.1328 Rabanus Maurus andb 1.1329 Durandus. But that the use of the word may be no prejudice to the right understanding of the thing, we find the thing noted byc 1.1330 Socrates and wondred at exceedingly, that since there was so great diffe∣rence in the number of days, yet all alike called it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or the quadragesimal fast. The same also we find ind 1.1331 Sozomen, noting that some did onely observe three weeks of five days to the week, out of the number of the seven antepaschal weeks, and yet neverthelesse called it Quadragesi∣ma: and the same also we find in Nicephorus, who (I suppose) transcrib'd it from them: and in Cassian's time, when the Lent-fast came up to the number of 36 days,* 1.1332 yet he still calls it the Quadragesima or the 40 days fast: and it is no wonder, if Rigaltius say true, that all the set and stationary fasts of the Primitive Christians were called Quadragesimals. But the first use of the word is in the Nicene Council; unlesse the words of Origen be allowed to be good record: but yet both in Origen, and in the Nicene Council, though the word be us'd, yet without any remark of the number of the days, or intimation of it, untill the Council of Laodicea* 1.1333, which mentions more weeks then one in the Lent, commanding to fast also upon the Thurs∣day of the last week in Lent. For by this time it was come to three weeks, in some places more, and in some lesse, as appears in Socrates, Sozomen, Cassian and Nicephorus above quoted.

But for the reason of the word Quadragesima there are various conje∣ctures.* 1.1334 Cassian says it is an imitation of Christs fast of forty days,* 1.1335 and so had the name from thence. But he addes some little Cabalistical things of the number of forty in the Scripture, which are to no great purpose. But his first conjecture is not altogether unreasonable; and Rigaltius makes use of it, saying that the Apostles having obliterated the Jewish fasts, to which Christs forty days fast put an end, and asserted us into liberty, they would upon that day on which Christ wrought our liberty for us, nailing the hand∣writing of ordinances to his Crosse,* 1.1336 consecrate a fast to the memorial of this great work of redemption for us; [ut obliteratis Judaeorum Sabbatis jeju∣nia sua Christiani, quae Domino suo tantula pro tantis offerrent, de jejunii Do∣minici spatio vocitarent] that the Christians might call their fast by a name taken from the duration of the Lords fast, that since they could not attain to that great fast, they might at least have it in venerable memory. But this although it be ingenious and pretty, yet it is something violent, and hath no warrant from antiquity; and the question is better answer'd from the words of Irenaeus in Eusebius, who sayes that they who kept the Paschal fast would some of them produce the fast to forty hours: now the whole fast being in memory of the bridegrooms being taken away, and he having been absent, as they computed it, forty hours, this proportion did better carry the analogy, and therefore easily carried away the name, and a quadra∣gesimal of hours is as proper as a quadragesimal of days, and hath a better warranty then any other conjecture. But this I remark'd before.

But afterwards the number of weeks increas'd:* 1.1337 it came in some places to six and seven weeks;* 1.1338 so Cassian. But it was diverso more, for some would fast Saturdays, and some would not; but they made it but to be 36 days however: so we find it in S. Gregory, that 42 days were the appointment of Lent,* 1.1339 but taking away the Sundays, six and thirty days remain for fasting. But in all this whole affair there was nothing yet universally determin'd by any law of the universal Church. For in Rome about the year 437 they fasted but three weeks before Easter, [and out of them they excepted Satur∣days and Sundays* 1.1340.] But in Illyricum, in Greece & Alexandria they begin their Lenten fast above six weeks before Easter. Others begin seven weeks before Easter, but fast by intervals, and observe but fifteen days in all: and yet all call this the quadragesimal fast. So* 1.1341 Socrates. And S. Chrysostom sayes it was the custome against Easter to ask every one how many weeks he had fasted; and you should hear some answering two, some three, some all. For at Constantinople the Lent was longest: It was of seven weeks there and all up unto Phoenicia,* 1.1342 as Sozomen and Nicephorus re∣port: but all this while with liberty, by custome, and without a law. S. Austin tells that in some places they would not fast the Thursdays in Lent:* 1.1343 indeed the Council of Laodicea had commanded they should, but that was but provincial, and did not oblige and was not received every where; and that saying which is reported out of the constitutions of S. Clement might prevail as far, Jejunium quintae hypocritarum est. But at Rome this was then observed, they did not fast on Thursdays, nor yet on Tuesdays, or they might chuse:* 1.1344 so we find in S. Leo exhorting them to the Monday, Wednes∣day, Friday and Saturday fast, and on Saturday to watch beside. And because of the defalcation of these days in every week, some that were very zea∣lous made up their Lent to be eight weeks, and began it on Sexagesima Sunday, but at last it setled upon Ash-wednesday, and hath endur'd so to this day in many of the Western Churches.

Now if all this be not sufficient to prove that the forty days fast of Lent was not a Canon or institution Apostolical,* 1.1345 I cannot tell by what measures the question can be filled: and if the Apostles were the Authors of it, yet because the Churches kept themselves in great liberty and varie∣ty, it is certain that if they did so still, there would be no diminution to re∣ligion. For the use of it being wholly for preparation to the Easter com∣munion, and the setting apart some portion of our time for God's service, it can then onely be of use, when it ministers to such ends with an advan∣tage so great as to recompence the trouble, and so material as to quit it from a vain observance. * But how it can be enjoyn'd, and how it ought to be practis'd, I shall consider in the inquiries concerning the condition of Ecclesiastical laws. Here I was onely to quit the Conscience of this snare which is laid for her by some unskilfull Fowlers, and to represent that the Apostles did not by any Rule or Canon oblige the Christian Churches.

That which remains is this,* 1.1346 that we consider that it is and ought to be no prejudice to this liberty, that S. Hierom calls Lent an Apostolical tra∣dition. For it was very easy for them who lov'd the institution, and knew it very ancient, and that the custome of it did descend from Apostolical persons, to call it a tradition Apostolical. It is no wrong to S. Hierom if we

think he did so here: for he did as much as this comes to in the question of the Saturdays fast, for in his Epistle to Lucinus he sayes, Unaquaeque pro∣vincia abundet in sensu suo, & praecepta majorum leges Apostolicas arbitretur, Let every Province abound in their own sense, and suppose the precepts of their Ancestors to be Apostolical laws. But that the Churches had no such law upon them, but were at liberty, appears from all the premisses; which I summe up with the words of S. Austin. The Christians, not that the meats are unclean,* 1.1347 but for mortification, doe abstain from flesh and fruits; some few always, or else at certain times: Sicut per quadragesimam ferè omnes, quanto magis quisque vel minus voluerit, seu potuerit, As in Lent almost all men, more or lesse according as every man is able, or as every man is willing.

He that desires to see more particulars concerning the history,* 1.1348 the original, the variety and increase of Lent, may, if he please, read them in Cassian, in Amalarius, Alcuinus & Rabanus of old, and of late, in Durandus, in Hugo Menardus a Benedictine his notes in Gregor. Sacramentarium, in Peta∣vius his notes upon Epiphanius, Rigaltius upon Tertullian, Scaliger's admi∣rable animadversions upon Eusebius, in that excellent Epistle of Erasmus to the Bishop of Basil de interdicto esu carnium, in Delaunoy, Filescac and Daille* 1.1349. Out of these any man may satisfy his curiosity; I have endeavour'd onely to satisfy the Conscience.

Concerning the weekly fasts of Friday and Saturday,* 1.1350 the former of them is of great antiquity in the Church, as being in use in Tertullian's time, and without variety alwayes observed after it once began. We find the Wednesday and Friday fast mentioned by Clemens Alexandrinus, and the Wednesday station is equally in Tertullian.* 1.1351 But the Saturday fast was for some ages counted abominable in the whole Church; but it came into the Latin Church in time, but with so much scandal to the Greeks, that in the year of our Lord 707 they excommunicated them that fasted on the Satur∣day, and to this day persevere in the same mind. But that neither one nor the other was of Apostolical institution, is of it self clear by the conse∣quence of the former discourse concerning Lent; the Apostles having made no laws concerning fasting-days, as I have made apparent. * The Ro∣gation fast (all the world knows) was instituted by Mammercus Bishop of Vienna: and as for the Ember-weeks, they can pretend to no antiquity that is Primitive, and rely for their authority upon a spurious epistle of Pope Ca∣lixtus, which is pretended to have been written about the year 221, and which is abundantly detected of forgery by many persons, but especially by M^r Blondel. Tertullian's words are a hatchet to cut off all fasting-days from pretending to Apostolical authority, affirming that the Montanists did fast but two weeks in the whole year, and in them not on Saturdays and Sundays (though S. Hierom is pleas'd to lay three Lents to their charge,) and that the Catholics blam'd them for imposing so much; but themselves did fast onely upon those days the bridegroom was taken from them, that is, the paschal fast; that they did sometimes interpose half-fasts, and live on bread and water for some time,* 1.1352 but ut cuique videbatur, haec ex arbitrio agen∣tes, non ex imperio, as every man saw cause, doing these things by choice and not by command.

The result of this discourse is this,* 1.1353 That the Apostles did not lay a yoke upon the Disciples neck in the matter of fasting, much lesse in the forty days fast of Lent; that as in relation to the Apostles, the Conscience is at liberty. Now whether or no any positive constitution of the Rulers of our Churches can or doe oblige the Conscience to the observation of Lent, and how farre, I shall consider in the next Paragraph of this Chapter.

RULE XIV. The Canons of the ancient General and Provincial Councils are then laws to the Conscience when they are bound upon us by the authority of the respective Governours of Churches.

A General Council is nothing but the union of all the Ecclesiastical pow∣er in the world.* 1.1354 The authority of a General Council in matters of Government and Discipline is no greater, no more obligatory then the au∣thority of a Provincial Council to those who are under it. A General Council obliges more Countries and more Dioceses, but it obliges them no more then the Civil and Ecclesiastic power obliges them at home A General Council is an Union of Government, a consent of Princes and Bi∣shops, and in that every one agrees to govern by the measures to which there they doe consent: and the consent of opinions addes moment to the laws, and reverence to the sanction; and it must prevail against more objections then Provincial decrees, because of the advantage of wisdome and consul∣tation which is suppos'd to be there, but the whole power of obliga∣tion is deriv'd from the Authority at home. That is, if twenty Princes meet together and all their Bishops, and agree how they will have their Churches governed, those Princes which are there and those Bishops which have consented are bound by their own act, and to it they must stand till the reason alters, or a contrary or a better does intervene; but the Prince can as much alter that law when the case alters, as he can abrogate any other law to which he hath consented. But those Princes which were not there, whatever the cause of their absence be, are not oblig'd by that General Council; and that Council can have no authority but what is given them by consent, & therefore they who have not consented, are free as ever.

The Council of Florence,* 1.1355 so called because, though it was begun at Ferrara, yet it was ended there, Pope Clement 7^th calls the eighth General Council in his Bull of April 22^th 1527.* 1.1356 yet others call it the 16^th: but it was never receiv'd in France, as Panormitan* 1.1357 tells us: for the King of France did forbid expressely and upon great penalties that any of his sub∣jects should goe to Ferrara to celebrate that Council; and after it had been celebrated, and Charles the 7^th was desir'd by Pope Eugenius to accept it, he told the Legates plainly, that he had never taken it for a Council, and he never would. The Council of Basil, though the King of France had sent his Embassadors thither, and had received it as a Council, yet he approved it but in part, for he rejected the last thirteen sessions, and approv'd onely

the first two and thirty;* 1.1358 some of them as they lie, others with certain forms and qualifications: and this was done to fit and accommodate them to the exigencies of the times and places and persons,* 1.1359 saith Benedict a French lawyer. And upon the like accounts the last Council of Lateran is there rejected also. Thus in England we accept not of the Council of Trent, and excepting the four first General Councils, which are established into a Law by the King and Parliament, there is no other Council at all of use in England, save onely to entertain scholars in their arguments, and to be made use of in matters of fact, by them to understand the stories of the Church. Where any thing else is received into custome and practice of law, it binds by our reception, not by it's own natural force.

But I have already spoken sufficiently of this thing* 1.1360.* 1.1361 I now onely mention it to the purpose that those religious and well-meaning, persons who are concluded by the canon of an Ancient Council, and think that whatever was there commanded it layes some obligation upon the Consci∣ences of us at this day, and by this means enter into infinite scruples and a restlesse unsatisfied condition, may consider that the Ancient Doctors of the Church had no jurisdiction over us who were born so many ages after them; that even then when they were made they had their authority wholly from Princes and consent of Nations; that things and reasons, that juris∣dictions and governments, that Churches and Dioceses, that interests and manners are infinitely alter'd since that time; that since the authority of those Fathers could not be permanent and abide longer then their lives, it being certainly not greater then that of Kings, which must needs die with their persons, that their successors may be Kings as well as they, and not be subjects of the dead, the efficacy of their rules must descend upon succession by a succeeding authority; that therefore they prevail upon us by a new force, by that which is extrinsecal to them; and therefore in such cases we are to inquire whether the thing be good, and if it be, we may use it with li∣berty till we be restrained, but we may also chuse; for then we are to in∣quire whether the thing be a law in that Government to which we owe obedience: for that the Fathers met at Laodicea, At Antioch, at Nice, at Gangra, a thousand, 1100 or 1300 years agoe, should have authority over us in England so many ages after, is so infinitely unreasonable, that none but the fearfull and the unbelievers, the scrupulous and those who are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of a slavish nature, and are in bondage by their fear, and know not how to stand in that liberty by which Christ hath made them free, will account themselves in subjection to them. If upon this account the Rulers of Churches will introduce any pious, just and warrantable Canon, we are to obey in all things where they have power to command; but the Canon, for being in the old Codes of the Church, binds us no more then the laws of Constantine.

RULE XV. The laudable Customes of the Catholick Church which are in present observation doe oblige the Conscience of all Christians.

THis we have from S. Paul, who reproves the contumacy and regard∣lesse comport of those who,* 1.1362 against the usages of Christians and the places where they liv'd, would wear long hair: We have no such custome, not the Churches of God. In such cases where there is no law, the manners of Christians introduce a law so far, that we cannot recede from it with∣out some probable cause; or if we doe, we cannot doe it without scandal and reproach. And indeed it is an act of love to conform to the customes of Christians with whom we doe converse, who either will think you blame their custome, or despise their persons, if you comply not. S. Austin gave his advice to the same purpose,* 1.1363 In his rebus de quibus nihil certi tradit scriptura Divina, mos populi Dei vel statuta Majorum pro lege tenenda sunt. Et sicut praevaricatores divinarum legum, ita contemptores Ecclesiasticarum consuetudinum coercendi sunt. If the holy Scriptures have not interpos'd in the particular, we must keep the customes and decrees of our Ancestors as a law: and as they that prevaricate the Divine laws are to be restrained, so are all they that despise the customes of the Church. * It is a Catholic custome, that they who receive the Holy Communion, should receive it fasting. This is not a duty commanded by God: but unlesse it be necessary to eat, he that despises this custome, gives nothing but the testimony of an evil mind.

But this is first to be understood in such Customes as are laudable,* 1.1364 that is, such which have no suspicion or moral reproach upon them, such which are reasonable and fit for wise and sober persons. It was a custome of the Primitive Church, at least in some places, not to touch the earth with the bare foot within the Octaves of Easter: this was a trifle, and tending to phantastic opinions and superstitious fancies, and therefore is not to be drawn into imitation; onely so long as it did remain, every man was to take care he gave no offence to weak persons, but he was to endeavour to alter it by all fair means and usages. It was a custome in many Churches anciently, and not long since in the Church of England, that in cases of the infants extreme danger the midwives did baptize them. This custome came in at a wrong door, it lean'd upon a false and superstitious opinion; and they thought it better to invade the Priests office, then to trust God with the souls which he made with his own hands and redeem'd with his Sons bloud. But this custome was not to be followed if it had still continued; for even then they confess'd it was a sinne, factum valet, fieri non debuit; and evil ought not to be done for a good end. Quod si à mulieribus bap∣tizari oporteret, profecto Christus à Matre baptizatus esset, & non à Joanne: aut cum nos ad baptizandum misit, misisset mulieres nobiscum ad hoc: nunc vero nusquam neque jussit Dominus, neque per Scripturam tradidit, utpote qui naturae convenientiam & rei decorum nosset, tanquam naturae author & legislator,* 1.1365 said the Author of the Constitutions under the name of S. Clement.

If women might be suffer'd to baptize, Christ need not have gone to S. John, but might have been baptized by his Mother; and Christ would have sent women along with the Apostles when he gave them commission to preach and to baptize. But now our Lord hath neither commanded any such thing by his word, or in Scripture; for the author and law-giver of Nature knew what was agreeable and decent for their Nature.* 1.1366 To this agrees that of Tertullian, Non permittitur mulieri in Ecclesia loqui, sed nec docere, nec tingere, nec offerre, nec ullius virilis muneris nedum sacerdotalis officii sortem sibi ven∣dicare, A woman is not permitted to speak in the Church, nor to teach, nor to baptize, nor to offer, nor to doe the office of a man, much lesse of a Priest. * 1.1367 This custome therefore is of the nature of those which are to be laid aside. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, No man baptizes but he that is in holy Or∣ders, said Simeon of Thessalonica; and I think he said truly. But above all things, opinions are not to be taken up by custome, and reduc'd to practice: not onely because custome is no good warranty for opinions, and voluntas fertur carere oculis, intellectus pedibus, the will hath no eyes, & the understand∣ing hath no feet; that is, it can doe nothing without the will, and the will must doe nothing without that; they are a blind man and a lame when they are asunder, but when they are together they make up a sound man, while the one gives reason, and the other gives command: but besides this, when an opinion is offer'd onely by the hand of custome, it is commonly a signe of a bad cause,* 1.1368 and that there is nothing else to be said for it; and therefore it was a weaknesse in Salmeron to offer to persuade us to entertain the do∣ctrine and practice of Indulgences, Purgatory, Invocation of Saints, Images and the like, because they are customes of the Church, meaning his own.

2. This is to be understood also of the Customes of the Catho∣lick Church.* 1.1369 For if the Churches differ, it is indifferent to take either or neither as it may happen.* 1.1370 Clemens Alexandrinus said it was a wicked∣nesse to pull the beard, because it is our natural, it is a generous and an in∣genuous ornament: and yet Gregory the 7^th, Bishop of Rome, made Arch-Bishop James shave his beard close, pretending that it had been always a custome in the Western Churches;* 1.1371 Consuetudini sanctae obedire coegimus, We have constrained him to obey the holy custome. In such cases where seve∣ral Churches have several usages, every Church is to follow her own cu∣stome, and every of her subjects to obey it.

3. Though every subject is tied to the custome of his own Church,* 1.1372 yet he is not to give offence when he converses with another Church that hath a differing custome: according to that rule and example of S. Ambrose, Quando hic sum, non jejuno Sabbato; quando Romae sum, jejuno Sabbato: & ad quamcunque Ecclesiam veneritis, ejus morem servate, si pati scandalum non vultis aut facere,* 1.1373 When I am at Millain I doe not fast on the Saturday, when I am at Rome I doe: and to whatsoever Church you shall come, keep the custome of that Church, if ye will neither give nor receive offence. And these words S. Austin made use of to this very purpose,* 1.1374 Totum hoc genus liberas habet observationes, nec disciplina ulla est in his melior gravi prudentique Christiano, quam ut eo modo agat quo agere viderit Ecclesiam ad quamcunque fortè devenerit. The best way is to doe as that Church does where you happen to be. And in the same instance S. Hierom gave answer to Lucinus, servandam esse propriae Ecclesiae consuetudinem, The custome of the place of our own Church is to be observed. And therefore at Millain it is

counted a violation of their rights when the Roman Priests come into the Ambrosian Churches, and refuse to use the Missal of S. Ambrose, but use the Roman. It is a custome in the Church of England to uncover the head or to bow the knee when the name of Jesus is named: the custome is not onely innocent but pious, and agreeable to the duty of every Chri∣stian, and therefore abstracting from the injunction, the custome it self is sufficient to exact conformity of all modest persons. But if a son of the Church of England shall come into other Protestant Churches who use it not, he is to comply with them in the omission, unlesse himself be persuaded that it is a Divine Commandement; and yet even then also, the specifica∣tion and the circumstances of time and place may be undetermin'd, and leave him in a capacity to comply for a time, and in a limited place.

4. It is requir'd that the custome be of present observation,* 1.1375 or else it does not oblige the Conscience. Thus it is a custome of the Catholic Church that at the Baptising of Infants there be God-fathers and God-mothers. This custome is still of use in the Church of England: and al∣though much of the reason for which they were first introduc'd is ceas'd, and the case alter'd; yet it is enough to every man that is a subject, that it is the custome: and therefore if any man shall dispute and prove that the thing it self is not now necessary, that is no warranty to him to omit it, so long as the custome is allowed & upheld, & is no evil. But if the custome be left in a Church, that it was a Catholic custome & of long use in the Church is of no obligation to the Conscience. Socrates tells that omnes ubique in orbe ter∣rarum Ecclesiae,* 1.1376 all the Churches in the world, every week upon Saturday ce∣lebrate the mysteries. Alexandrini tamen & Romani ex antiqua traditione istud facere renuunt. But the Churches of Alexandria & Rome refuse to doe so, because they have an ancient tradition to the contrary. And in this they had their liberty. It was a long & a general custome in the Church upon all occasions and motions of solemnity or greater action to make the signe of the Crosse in the aire, on the breast, or on the forehead; but he that in Eng∣land should doe so upon pretence because it was a Catholic custome would be ridiculous. For a custome obliges by being a custome amongst them with whom we doe converse, and to whom in charity and prudence we are to comply: and therefore to doe an action that was a custome there where it is not a custome, must be done upon some other reason then because it is a custome; or else it is done because there is no reason. It was a custome of the Catholic Church to reserve infants all the year till Easter to be bap∣tiz'd, except it were in cases of necessity or great danger: but we have no such custome now; nor the Churches of God; and therefore to think we are bound to comply with that or any such custome, is to make our selves too fond admirers of the actions, and more then servants to the sentences and customes of Ancient Churches.

5. An Ecclesiastical custome against an Ecclesiastical law does not ob∣lige the Conscience.* 1.1377 It does in many cases excuse, but when there is no scandal accidentally emerging, it never binds us to follow it. I say it can excuse from penalty, then when the Ecclesiastical law hath been neglected, because the Governours are presumed to doe their duty; and therefore if they who made the law suffer it to be commonly broken, it is to be suppos'd they are willing the law should die: and this is the sense of that in the Comedy, Mores leges perduxerunt jam in potestatem suam,* 1.1378 Customes give

limit to laws; and they bind according as the manners of men are. And this the lawyers extend even to a custome that is against the law of God.* 1.1379 So the Presidents of Sena at the entry into their office take an oath in form that they will never receive bribes; and yet they doe so, and are known to doe so, and because of the general custome are never punish'd: and much of the same nature are the oaths taken at the Matriculations and admissions into Universities and offices respectively, concerning which it were very well there were some remedy or prevention. But if it can be understood that the law-giver intends the law should be in force, and that the negligence of his Ministers or the stubborn and uncomplying nature of the subjects is the cause of the want of discipline; then the conscience is oblig'd to the law, and not excus'd by the custome* 1.1380. And yet further, when the law is called upon, then although there be a custome in the Church against the Canon, it neither preserves from sin, nor rescues from punishment: quia lex derogat consuetudini, say the lawyers; when the law is alive the custome is dead, because the custome took it's life from the diminution of the law; and when there is a law actually called upon, the custome to the contrary is a direct evil, and that against which the law is intended, and which the law did intend to remedy. The Church hath made laws that no man shall fast upon the Lords day, nor the great Festivals of the year: if a custome of fasting upon Christmas-day should in evil and peevish times prevail, and the law be unable or unwilling to chastise it, but suffer it to grow into evil manners; when the law is again warm and refresh'd and calls for obedience, the contrary custome is not to be pretended against the law, but to be re∣pented of. In the Church of England there is a law, that when children are baptized they shall be dipped in the water; onely if they be sick it shall be sufficient that it be sprinkled upon them: but yet the custome of sprink∣ling all does prevail. In this case we are to stand to the law, not to the custome, because the law is still in force, and is actually intended to pre∣vail according to the mind of the Church, and it is more agreeable with the practice, the laws and customes of the Primitive Church, and to the practice of Christ and his Apostles. But of this I shall speak again in some of the following Numbers.

6. An Ecclesiastical custome must be reasonable or usefull,* 1.1381 or it can∣not oblige the conscience, except to avoid scandal, for that is in all things carefully to be observed, right or wrong, so it be not a sin against God; Customes must be kept, when the breaking them is scandalous. But ex∣cepting this case, an unreasonable custome does not oblige. For no man is bound to be a fool, or to doe a foolish action. Now a custome in the Ca∣non law is concluded to be reasonable if it tends to the good of the soul. In the Civil law it is allowed to be reasonable if it tends to any publick good. Thus it is a custome that Judges should wear their Robes upon their seates of judicature; that the Clergy wear blacks. Doctores por∣tant varium, quia habitus virum ostendit, saith the law, l. stigmata, C. de fabri. And that Priest were a strange peevish or a weak person who should chuse to wear gray, because there is no religion in the colour: his religion in this would have nothing else: and though these things tend not to the good of the soul, yet they tend to the good of the publick, they distinguish men, that honour may be given to them to whom honour be∣longs.

For it is considerable,* 1.1382 what the wiser Lawyers say, 1. That a custome is good if it contains bonum honestum, any honesty or matter of publick re∣putation. Thus it is a custome that civil persons should not walk late in the night, but be in their houses at seasonable times; it is a good custome that Bishops and Priests abstain from going to Taverns; this custome is reasonable, and therefore does oblige those that are concerned in it. 2. A custome is good if it contains bonum commune, if it be for the common good: and of this sort there are many customes in every nation which are pass'd into laws, as that in the cause of Dowries the Judge should proceed summarily; that a fact be tried in the country where it was done; that when any man is accused he should have his accusers brought before his face. And thus also in the laws Ecclesiastical there are very many of this nature; as that when Bishops visit their Churches there be allowance of procurations and Synodals, and aptnesses for their entertainment; that when we see a Bishop we beg his blessing; that when we come to a city we first goe to the Cathedral to pray, then to the Bishop to be bless'd and prayed for; that the contract of Marriage be publickly solemniz'd in Churches after three publications; that children ask their Parents benediction: these things are of publick use, for the advancing of a necessary duty, for the mutual en∣dearment of Relatives, for the establishment of piety, for the conciliating authority, and to many other good purposes, which whosoever can advance by the keeping of a custome & complying with the manners of the Church where he lives, is not to be excus'd if he will be stubborn and singular and proud.* 1.1383 3. Baldus sayes, Bona est consuetudo quae continet bonum honorabile, It is a good custome that gives honour and regard to whom it is due. Thus it is a custome that the Consecration of Bishops should be in publick Chur∣ches; that the Degree of Doctor, because it is an honour, be not conferred sneakingly and in conventicles. And upon this account, when any custome is honourable to religion or to a mystery, it is not to be omitted, because the custome is good, and in some proportions ministers to Religion and it's advantage.

Thus the Ministers of religion when they officiate are by an immemo∣rial custome vested in ables or surplices:* 1.1384 it was intended as an honour to the religion, because the white and the purple colours are the ensignes of Civil and Ecclesiastical dignity respectively, and are in honour to each other al∣ternately indulg'd, and Kings weare albes, and Bishops and Judges weare purple; and our Blessed Saviour was pleas'd to call it the glory of Solomon, when he was cloth'd in the purest linen of Egypt, whose whitenesse though very bright, yet it fell short of the natural whitenesse of the lilly. Glory is nothing but the excesse and greatnesse of honour, and therefore these garments which were glorious upon Solomon, at least were given to the Reli∣gious as ensignes of honour: the same which the Epigram says of the purple Mantle which was stoln from Crispinus,* 1.1385

Quisquis habes, humeris sua munera redde precamur: Non hoc Crispinus te, sed abolla rogat. Non quicunque capit saturatas murice vestes: Nec nisi deliciis convenit iste color.

Such garments are not fit for every shoulder, they are marks of honor, and the delicacies of the greatest and the worthiest Men. But that the white garment was given to Religion, it had besides the honour to the persons, the * 1.1386 signification and embleme of a precept: It signified purity and truth, which

in Philostratus in the image of Amphiaraus is said to be clothed with gar∣ments of snow, and cover'd with the purest whitenesse; anda 1.1387 Clemens Alex∣andrinus writes that Caeus the Sophister in the description of vertue and vice, describ'd vertue in a white robe; and so doesb 1.1388 Themistius invest truth, sitting upon an adamant, holding a bright splendor in her hand, and clothed with an albe. Concerning this S. Clement of Alexandria* 1.1389 spake much, even as much as the thing it self will bear: for it being nothing but the colour of a garment, is not to be prov'd to be necessary, & therefore not to be valued in such a quality: but yet neither is the custome of that colour to be de∣spis'd, because that colour is a good embleme, and hath as much advantage as a colour can have; and therefore there can be no reason to despise the thing, or peevishly to goe against the custome, where it is quitted from abuse. But I shall adde this to it, which is warranty enough for the Churches choice, that the Primitive Christians, who were free enough from any superstitious fancy concerning it, did neverthelesse particularly affect and chuse this colour. They saw that the Saints in the Revelation had 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 white garments, and they were dipt in the bloud of the Lamb: and S. Anthony to represent himself a Christian did goe in white, as S. Athanasius tells of him.† 1.1390 Eunapius tells that the Monks in Egypt went in black; and that many Christians that liv'd in other places did so too, for modesty sake and gravity, in humility and abjection, who please, may see demonstrated by many instances in Baronius:* 1.1391 & that is a good precedent to warrant the custome of the ordinary Clergy habit. But yet it is evident that very many Christians were pleas'd rather to use the simple and native colour of truth,* 1.1392 the embleme of purity; and Synesius writing to one John the Monk that chose to goe in a black coat, writes that which is enough to be said in this whole affaire, Atqui nihilo deterius erat si candida foret: splendidissimae quippe naturae dicatum ac consecratum id potius fuerit quod in his quae sensu percipiuntur purius atque lucidius est. Sed si pullum ideo colorem probâsti, quod id aliorum qui ante te usurpârunt imitatione feceris; laudo quicquid Dei causâ suscipitur, But it had been no worse if you had chosen the white, as that which is agreeable to the nature of splendor and puri∣ty, and brighter and purer to the eyes. But if you chose the black garment because it was the custome of others that went before you, it is well; I commend any thing that is done for God,* 1.1393 and for the cause of piety. Colorem album Deo maximè decorum, said Cicero, quòd sit index puritatis & nitelae, omnemque fucum excludat veritate nativâ contentus, The white garment is most come∣ly for religion, as being content with it's native simplicity, and an indica∣tion of brightnesse and purity. Upon this account it is a custome of clothing the bodies of dead in white;* 1.1394 for they that are dead are justified from sins, and they are candidates of immortality. But it may be this was too much to be said of so small a thing: I instanc'd in this, to shew that this colour was intended for an exteriour honour to religion, and that is sufficient (say the lawyers) to make a custome reasonable; and if it be reasonable, it must be complied with.

7. A custome whose reason is not known,* 1.1395 yet if it be of an immemo∣rial time, and does transmit a right to Ecclesiastical persons, is not without great reason and evident necessity or publick utility to be refus'd. Thus it is a custome in the Church of England that certain rights be paid to the Rector of the Church if the corps be interred in the Chancel: and though

in some places this did run into great abuse, which was excellently reprov'd by that learned and good man Sir Henry Spelman 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in his learned and pious Tract de Sepultura; yet the thing was not wholly to be blamed for the abuse sake, and the rights of any man are not easily to be snatched away because he cannot prove how he came by them, if he have had them long in possession. The thing was to have been reformed; but not after the new manner, that is, wholly taken away. Consuetudo cujus initii memoria non sit in contrarium praesumitur rationabilis, say Geminianus, Cardinal Alexander and Panormitan; and they instance in a Prelate receiving money beyond his procurations in his visitation. For though the reason of it be not now known, yet it is presum'd at first▪ there was a reason; & though we have lost the record, yet he must not loose his right; unless that right of his be manifestly other mens wrong. But this instance is to be under∣stood so, that the Sepulture be first perform'd, and the charity and the ecclesiastical right be done to the dead; for these things cannot be con∣tracted for: but when the piety is performed, the oblations of the faithful which at first were voluntary, and afterwards came into custome, and so transferred a right, may be receiv'd by the Rector, but must not be detai∣ned by the heire. Here in Ireland there is a custome of receiving oblations at the baptisme of infants; but if the Priest refuses to baptise the child till he be secur'd of the money, he is a direct Simoniac, for he contracts and takes a price for the Sacrament: but if he confer the Sacrament, to which he is tied by his charge and by the laws of God and Man, then afterwards he hath a right to the oblation which by law or custome was to be given. But the office is to be done without it: for the Infant hath a right to the Sacrament before the Priest hath a right to the offering; and that came in by the laws of God, this by the customes of Men.

8. A Custome Ecclesiastical that is but of a legal and presum'd reaso∣nableness does oblige us to a conformity.* 1.1396 I call that a legal or presum'd reasonableness, when the law in certain cases does suppose it reasonable; and though it be not known to be naturally or precisely so, yet because it is not known to be unreasonable, but there is a probability to conjecture that it entred upon a right cause, it is permitted and allowed. This happens in two cases. The first is when a Custome is besides the law, and not against it. For if it be against a law, it ought not to prevaile at all, unless it be precisely reasonable, that is, unless the law in the changing of affairs or in it self at first be unreasonable; for in that case a custome that is naturally reasonable may be admitted, and if it be, must be observed. But if it be only besides the law, and not against it, then it is presum'd to be reasonable, hoc ipso quod introducta est, say the Doctors, therefore because it is intro∣duc'd: and the reason is, because every thing is presumed to be reasonable that is done generally, unless it be known to be unreasonable; and the very interests of peace and the reputation and honour of mankind require this, without any more inquiry; save onely that this be added, that if the custome introduc'd besides law be either universal, or of an immemorial beginning, the law presumes the more strongly of the reasonableness of it, and therefore in these cases it ought to prevail the rather. For to this sense is that rule of S. Austin, Illa quae non scripta sed tradita custodimus, quae qui∣dem toto terrarum orbe observantur, dantur intelligi vel ab ipsis Apostolis,* 1.1397 vel plenariis Conciliis, quorum est in Ecclesia saluberrima authoritas, commendata atque statuta retineri, Those things which are delivered to us not by writing,

but by tradition [or custome] which are observed in all the world, we under∣stand them to be either retain'd by the appointment or commendation of the Apostles, or some General Councils, whose authority in the Church is of great use.] That is, when the custome is universal and immemorial. For the first we presume it to be very reasonable, it could not else have easily pre∣vail'd upon the whole Church: and for the second we suppose it to have had a very good beginning; for it addes moments to the custome, that when we know nothing to the contrary, we presume the best of its original. Not that we ought to conclude or to believe a Custome to have come from the Apostles, if it be universal or immemorial; but that we ought to re∣gard and reverence it as if it did, because we know not in some cases whether it did or no. * But if it be either one or other, it is sufficient to oblige us to retain it, or to comply with it so long as it is retained. Thus the solemn daies of Rogation which we observe in the Church of England were not of an immemorial beginning; for they were first us'd by the Bishops of Vienna, Mamertus, Isicius and Avitus; but yet they were quickly universal,* 1.1398 non per Gallias tantummodo, sed penè per totum orbem, not onely in France, but in almost all the world, said Alcimus Avitus in his time: and therefore this custome is not to be neglected by any single person, where the Church still retains it; for this is sufficient to make a legal presump∣tion of its reasonableness.

* The other case is, that a Custome is presum'd reasonable when the nature of it is such that it can have no positive and natural unreasonableness, but is capable of some extrinsic and accidental decency and fittingness. The custome that is actually in the practice and manners of a Church is pre∣sum'd reasonable: and this is of use but in small matters, but yet such which little and great men sometimes make great matters of; I mean pre∣sidencies and priorities of place, sittings in the quire, precedencies in Coun∣cils. Now in these cases Custome ought to prevail, for where there is no reason in the thing, there Custome is a reason sufficient; and if a law ought to prevail though there be no reason known for it, then so must Custome, because this is esteemed as a law. Capit. Consuetudo 1. dist. & l. de quibus, ff. de legibus. And it is remarkable, that although in the intro∣ducing of a Custome, it concerns the Governours of Churches to take care that it be reasonable; yet when it is introduc'd that care is over, and then they are to take care to keep unity and to avoid scandal. Praestat illic esse ubi nihil licet quam ubi omnia, said one, It is better to be under a Tyranny then under an Anarchy; it is better to be too much restrain'd then to be too loose: and if a Custome hath seiz'd upon us, it is better to stand still under that arrest, then to break the gentlest cords of a man, and inter into licentiousness. Perniciosior temeritas quam quies. It is not good to move any stirs in a quiet Church, for certainly peace is better then that which is onely a little better then a custome. And we see it by a sad experience, that those who are enemies and stubborn to the innocent Customes of a Church, intend nothing but to get the government into their own hands. Genus hominum potentibus infidum, sperantibus fallax; as Tacitus said of the Astrologers, we have too much reason to say of them, They are a sort of men that deceive their own confidents, and are no sure friends to their Su∣periors: for to difavow Customes is a great dishonour to the Govern∣ment, and a reproach to the ministery of laws; and to their disciples they preach liberty, that themselves onely may rule them absolutely. Quanto majore libertatis imagine teguntur, tanto eruptura ad infensius servitium;

Tacitus said it of such persons: by the exempting fools from the just rule of their superiors, they make them their own slaves. But to rebel against the Customes of a Church is an accusation not onely of the Rulers, but a condemnation of the whole society of the faithful.

9. A Custome in the administration of a Sacrament introduc'd against the analogy and mystery,* 1.1399 the purpose and signification of it, ought not to be complied with. I instanc'd before in a Custome of the Church of Eng∣land of sprinkling water upon infants in their baptisme; and I promised to consider it again.* 1.1400 Baptizabant enim veteres, non manibus suis aquam bap∣tizando aspergentes, sed trinâ immersione hoc Evangelii sequentes, Ascendit ex aqua, ergo descenderat. Ecce immersio, non aspersio; said Jeremy the Pa∣triarch of CP. Straightway Jesus went up out of the water, saith the Gospel: He came up, therefore he went down. Behold an immersion, not an aspersion. And the Ancient Churches following this of the Gospel, did not in their baptismes sprinkle water with their hands, but immerg'd the Catechu••en, or the infant. And therefore we find in the records of the Church, that the persons to be baptized were quite naked; as is to be seen in many pla∣ces, particularly in the 11^th Mystagogic Catechisme of S. Cyril of Jeru∣salem: and S. Dyonis* 1.1401 describes the ritual in the same manner. The Bishop puts his hand upon the Catechumen's head, and giving a sign to the Priests, commands that they write the name of the Catechumen and of his God-father; which being written he saies the office or prayers, which when the whole Church hath perform'd together with him, he dev••sts him of his garments by the Mini∣sters. And the same thing out of the same Author is observed by Elias Cretensis in his notes upon the fourth Oration of S. Gregory Nazianzen, and is reported also by S. Ambrose in his tenth Sermon. Nudi in seculo na∣scimur, nudi etiam accedimus ad lavacrum, We are born naked, and naked we enter into the waters of baptisme. All which are a perfect conviction that the Custome of the Ancient Churches was not sprinkling, but immersion, in pursuance of the sense of the word in the Commandement, and the exam∣ple of our Blessed Saviour. * Now this was of so sacred account in their esteem, that they did not account it lawful to receive him into the Clergy who had been onely sprinkled in his baptisme; as we learn from the Epi∣stle of Cornelius to Fabius of Antioch,* 1.1402 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It is not lawful that he who was sprinkled in his bed by reason of sickness should be admitted into holy orders. Nay it went further then this, they were not sure that they were rightly Christned yea or no who were onely sprinkled; as appears in the same Epistle of Cornelius in Eusebius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Nicephorus thus renders [if at least such a sprinkling may be called baptisme:] and this was not onely spoken in diminution of Novatus and indignation against his person, for it was a formal and a solemn question made by Magnus to S. Cyprian, an habendi sint Christiani legitimi,* 1.1403 eo quod aquâ sa∣lutari non loti sunt, sed perfusi, Whether they are to be esteemed right Chri∣stians who were onely sprinkled with water, and not washed or dipped. He answers, that the Baptisme was good when it is done necessitate cogente, & Deo indulgentiam suam largiente, in the case of necessity, God pardo∣ning and necessity compelling. And this is the sense and law of the Church of England; not that it be indifferent, but that all infants be dipped, except in the case of sickness, and then sprinkling is permitted. And of this sprinkling, besides what is implyed in the former testimonies, there was

some little use in the Primitive Church. Quis enim tibi tam infidae poenitentiae viro asperginem unam cujuslibet aquae commodabit?* 1.1404 saies Tertullian speaking to an impenitent person: Who will afford thee so much as one single sprinkling of water? (meaning) for his baptism. And Surius in the life of S. Laurence tells that as he was going to his Martyrdome, one Romanus a soul∣dier brought to him a pitcher of water that he might be baptized of him as he went; which in that case must needs have been done by powring water upon him. Fudit aquam super caput ejus: so did S. Laurence also to Lucillus,* 1.1405 he powred water upon his head. And Walafridus Strabo from these very examples concludes that in cases of necessity it is lawful to use sprinkling. He addes also, that it is lawful to doe it when there is a great multitude of persons at once to be baptized: and Aquinas supposes the Apostles did so when the 3000 and when the 5000 were at once con∣verted and baptized. But this is but a conjecture, and hath no tradition and no record to warrant it: and therefore although in cases of need and charity the Church of England does not want some good examples in the best times to countenance that permission, yet we are to follow her com∣mand, because that command is not onely according to the meaning and intent of the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Commandement, but agrees with the mystery of the Sacrament it self; For we are buried with him in baptisme, saith the Apostle. In aqua tanquam in sepulchro caput immergentibus vetus homo se∣pelitur & submergitur, deinde nobis emergētibus nouns resurgit inde: so S. Chry∣sostom,* 1.1406 The old man is buried and drowned in the immersion under water, and when the baptized person is lifted up from the water, it represents the resurrection of the new man to newness of life. In this case therefore the contrary Custome not onely being against an Ecclesiastical law, but against the analogy and mysterious signification of the Sacrament, is not to be complied with, unless in such cases that can be of themselves suffi∣cient to justify a liberty in a ritual and ceremony; that is, a case of ne∣cessity.

And of the same consideration is it,* 1.1407 that the baptisme be performed with a trine immersion, and not with one onely. In England we have a custome of sprinkling, and that but once. To the sprinkling I have al∣ready spoke; but as to the number, though the Church of England hath made no law, and therefore the custome of doing it once is the more indif∣ferent and at liberty, yet if the trine immersion be agreeable to the analo∣gy of the mystery, and the other be not, the Custome ought not to prevail, and is not to be complied with, if the case be evident or declar'd. Now in this particular the sense of Antiquity is clear. Nam nec semel, sed ter ad singula nomina in personas singulas tingimur,* 1.1408 saith Tertullian: Dehinc ter mergitamur, We are thrice put under water, not once; at the mention of every person we are dipped. The very same words we read in S. Hierom against the Luciferians. But more largely it is explicated by S. Ambrose. Thou wert asked,* 1.1409 Doest thou believe in God the Father Almighty? and thou didst say, I doe believe: and thou wert plunged, that is, buried. Thou wert asked again, Doest thou believe in our Lord Jesus Christ? and thou saidest, I doe believe: and thou wert dipped or plunged; and therefore thou art buried together with Christ. The third time thou wert asked, Doest thou believe in the Holy Spirit? and thou saidest, I doe believe: and the third time thou wert plunged; that thy three-fold confession might wash away the many lapses of thy former life. S. Denis says that the trine immersion signifies the Divine

essence and beatitude of God in a Trinity of Persons.* 1.1410 S. Athanasius says it signifies the death, burial, and resurrection of our Blessed Saviour, together with his being three dayes in the grave. And this thing was so the practice and custome of the Church, that in the Canons of the Apostles* 1.1411 (as they are called) he that does not use trine immersion is to be deposed from his dignity. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It is impious and ungodly to immerge but once in baptisme; so Zonaras upon that Canon: and S. Chry∣sostome derives it from Christs institution, Omnibus mysteriis velut signum imponens Dominus, in tribus mersionibus aquae unum baptisma discipulis suis tradidit, Our Lord did as it were impose a signe upon every mystery, and de∣livered one baptisme to his Disciples in three immersions or dippings: and therefore says, that though this descended by tradition, yet it hath the au∣thority of a law. And the same thing we find affirmed by Pope Pelagius, as he is cited by Gratian de consecrat.* 1.1412 dist. 4. And Theodoret speaking of the heretic Eunomius, who first of all without authority and against reason did use but single immersion, he says that he subverted the rite of holy bap∣tisme which at first was delivered by our Lord and his Apostles.

Now in these particulars it is evident that the Ancient Churches did otherwise then we doe:* 1.1413 but that is not sufficient to force us to break the Ecclesiastical custome which is of long abode with us. But when they say, these things are to be done by Divine precept, we are to consider that upon it's own account: and though some of the Fathers did say so, yet it can ne∣ver be proved to be so; and it were strange that there should be a Divine Commandement of which there is no mention made in the four Gospels, nor in the Acts or Epistles of the Apostles. But then that there is in dip∣ping, and in the repetition of it more correspondencie to the analogy and mystery of the Sacrament, is evident; the one being a Sacrament of the death and burial of Christ, the other a confession of, and an admission to the faith and profession of God in the most Holy Trinity: and therefore I say, it is sufficient warrant that every single person break that custome of sprinkling which is against the Ecclesiastical Law; and it is also a sufficient reason to move the Church to introduce a contrary custome to the other of single immersion, concerning which as yet there is no law. But because there is even in sprinkling something of the analogy of the mystery, as is rightly observed by Aquinas and Dominicus à Soto; and because it is not certain that the best representation and the most expressive ceremony is re∣quir'd; therefore the Church upon great cause may lawfully doe either: but because it is better to use dipping, and it is more agreeable to the myste∣ry to use it three times, and that so the Ancient Church understood it, therefore these things are a sufficient warrant to acquit us from the obliga∣tion of the contrary custome; because a custome against which there is so much probability, and in which there is no necessity and no advantage, is to be presumed unreasonable.

But if the custome of single immersion should by some new-arising necessity become reasonable, then it not onely might be retained,* 1.1414 but ought to be complied with. Thus it hapned in Spain in the year DC, the Arrian Bishops finding their advantage in the readily-prepared custome of trine im∣mersion, used it and expounded it to signify the substantial difference of the Son and the Holy Ghost from the Father. Upon this Leander the Bishop of Sevil gives advice and notice to S. Gregory Bishop of Rome; who com∣mends

Leander for using a single immersion, which he did to signify the Uni∣ty of nature in the Divinity, & that he might not comply with the Arrians: and this was afterwards brought into custome, and then into a law by the fourth Council of Toledo.* 1.1415 But unlesse such an accident happen, and that the reason be changed, every Church is to use her first customes, those which be right, and agreeable to the sense and purpose of the Sacrament. But otherwise an evil custome is better broken then kept.

RULE XVI. The Decrees and Canons of the Bishops of Rome oblige the conscience of none but his own sub∣jects.

THis must needs follow from divers of the former discourses:* 1.1416 for if Bi∣shops in their spiritual capacity have no power of making laws of ex∣ternal regiment without the leave of their Princes, or the consent of their people, then supposing the Popes great pretence were true, that he is the head or chief of the Ecclesiastical order, that from him they receive im∣mediately all the spiritual power they have, yet this will afford him no more then what Christ left to the whole order; of which I have already given accounts.

But in this there will be the lesse need of inquiry,* 1.1417 for since the Bishop of Rome by arts which all the world knows had raised an intolerable Em∣pire, he us'd it as violently as he got it, and made his little finger heavier then all the loyns of Princes: and in the Council of Trent, when in the 25^th Session the Fathers confirmed and commanded the observation of all Canons,* 1.1418 General Councils, Apostolical ordinances made in favour of Ec∣clesiastical persons and Ecclesiastical liberty, they at once by establishing the Popes Empire, destroyed it quite, for they made it impossible to obey, and the Consciences of people were set at liberty, because they were com∣manded every man to beare a steeple upon his back. For first there were an infinite number of Apostolical ordinances,* 1.1419 saith Cardinal Cusanus, which were never received even when they were made. Then let it be considered what there is to be done to Gratian's decretum, which is made part of the Popes law: and who knows in that Concordantia discordantiarum, that contradictory heap of sayings, which shall, and which shall not oblige the Conscience? But then the Decretals of Gregory the 9^th and of Boniface the 8^th, the Clementines and Extravagants, all those laws in that book which is called Collectio diversarum constitutionum & literarum Romanorum Pontificum, and in another called Epistolae decretales Summorum Pontificum in three volumes, and in another called Eclogae Bullarum & motuum propriorum, and in another called Summa Pontificum, and in the seventh book of the Decretals not long since composed, and in their Rules of Chan∣cery, their Penitentiary taxes, and some other books of such loads as these that I need not adde to this intolerable heap: but that a Christian Bishop should impose, and a Council of Christian Bishops and Priests should tie upon the Consciences of men such burdens which they can never reckon,

never tell over, never know, never understand; and that they should doe it then when a Christian Emperour had given advice that the Decrees and Canons should be reduc'd to a less number, and made to conform to the laws of God, is so sad a story, so unlike the spirit of Christ and to go∣vernment Apostolical, that it represents the happiness of Christendome that they are not oblig'd to such laws, and the unhappiness that would be upon them if the Pope had the rule and real obligations of the Consciences of Christendome.

But of these things the world hath been long full of complaint;* 1.1420 as appears in the writings of thea 1.1421 Cardinal of Cusa, inb 1.1422 Marsilius of Padua,c 1.1423 in Aventinus, ind 1.1424 Albericus Rosate, ine 1.1425 Gregory Hambourg, inf 1.1426 Matthew of Paris,g 1.1427 Matthew of Westminster,h 1.1428 Nicolaus de Clemangiis,i 1.1429 Franciscus Dua∣renus, k 1.1430 the Cardinal of Cambray, and many others both collected by Gol∣dastus, and the Catalogus testium veritatis by Illyricus. Insomuch that if the people had not been ignorant and superstitious, qui facilius vatibus quam Ducibus parent suis, and more willing to obey their Priests then their Prin∣ces, and if the Princes had not been by such means over-powered, these De∣crees and Canons would have been as easily rejected as many others have been. For if by the Papal sanction they doe oblige the Conscience, then they all oblige. If they all oblige, how comes it to pass that, as Cusanus saies, infinite numbers of them are rejected when they are newly made? And if so many of them may be rejected, then which of them shall oblige? If they oblige by the authority of the Pope, that is alike in them all: If by the condition of the matter, then they bind as they agree with our duty to God and to Princes, with the publick good, and the edification of the Church; and then the authority it self is nothing.

And it is no trifling consideration,* 1.1431 that the body of the Canon law was made by the worst and the most ambitious Popes. Alexander the third, who made Gratian's decree to become law, was a schismatical Pope, an An∣tipope, and unduly elected: The rest were Gregory the ninth, Boniface the eighth, Clement the fifth, John the 22, persons bloudy and ambitious, trai∣tors to their princes, and butchers of Christendome by the sad warres they rais'd, and therefore their laws were likely to be the productions of vio∣lence and warre, not of a just and peaceable authority.

But to come nearer to the point of Conscience;* 1.1432 who made the Bishop of Rome to be the Ecclesiastical law-giver to Christendome? For every Bishop hath from Christ equal power, and there is no difference but what is introduc'd by men, that is, by laws positive, by consent, or by violence. Ad Trinitatis instar, cujus una est atque individua potestas,* 1.1433 unum est per di∣versos Antistites sacerdotium, said Pope Symmachus. As is the power of the holy Trinity, one and undivided; so is the Episcopacy, divided a∣mongst all the Bishops,* 1.1434 but th•• power is the same. So S. Cyprian, Una est Ecclesia per totum mundum in multa membra divisa: item Episcopatus unus, Episcoporum multorum concordi numerositate diffusus, As there is but one Church in the whole world divided into many members, so there is but one Bishoprick parted into an agreeing number of Bishops. And again, Let no man deceive the Brotherhood with a lie, let no man corrupt the truth of faith with a

perfidious praevarication:* 1.1435 Episcopatus unus est, cujus à singulis in solidum pars tenetur, There is but one Bishoprick, and every one of us hath his share: a part of the flock is given to every Pastor. Now if one were the universal Bishop over all, then these zealous words of S. Cyprian had not been reconcilable to truth and sense: for then the unity of the Church had been by a unity of subordination, not by an identity of office and a partition of charge. To the same purpose is that of Pope Damasus,* 1.1436 writing to the African Bishops to require their aide in a matter of discipline, Nos excusare non possumus, si ejus Ecclesiam quae nobis generaliter commissa est in quantū praevalemus puram à tam illicitis superstitionibus non custodiamus, quia non aliter unus grex & unus Pastor sumus, nisi quemadmodum Apostolus docet, id ipsum dicamus omnes, &c. The Church is committed to us in common, and we have no other way of being one flock and one shepherd, but by speaking the same things] that is, consenting and joyning in the common government. This is the same which S. Hierom affirm'd, Omnis Episcopus, sive Romae fuerit, sive Eugubii, sive Constantinopoli, sive Rhegii, sive Alexandriae, sive Tanais, ejusdem est meriti, ejusdem sacerd••tii: It is all one, there is no difference in worthiness and power, whether he be Bishop of Rome or Eugubium, Con∣stantinople or Rhegium, Tanais or Alexandria. For as it was with the Apo∣stles,* 1.1437 so with their successors; Hoc utique erant caeteri Apostoli quod erat Petrus, pari consortio praediti & honoris & potestatis, What Peter was that the rest of the Apostles were; He was the Vicar of Christ on earth, and so were they, and so are their successors. Caput enim Ecclesiae Christus est, Christi autem Vicarii Sacerdotes sunt, qui vice Christi legatione funguntur in Ecclesia, said Pope Hormisda: and S. Cyprian calls the Bishop, unum ad tem∣pus vice Christi Judicem,* 1.1438 the Deputy and vicegerent of Christ. S. Peter had the Keyes given him, so had the Apostles, and so have their Successors; S. Peter was the pillar of the Church, and so were the other Apostles; He was a foundation, and so were they; for Christ hath built his Church upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets. He was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and every one of them was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a rock, and Christ was the Corner-stone. And what they were in their perpetual office, that the Bishops are. Antistitem puriorem caeteris esse oportet, ipsius enim [Christi] personam habere videtur, est enim vicarius ejus,* 1.1439 ut quod caeteris licet, illi non liceat, quia necesse habet quotidie Christi vicem agere, said S. Austin. A Bishop ought to be more holy then others, because he hath the person of Christ, he is his Vicar, what is lawful to others is not lawful for him, for he every day is in his place or stead. Adde to this, that the power which the Bishops have, they have it immediately from Christ, they are successors of the Apostles, of all, not of Peter onely, many Apostolical Churches which were established by others being suc∣ceeded in as well as Rome; that these things are evident in matter of fact, and universally affirmed in antiquity clearly and without dispute.

From hence it must needs follow that by the law of Christ one Bi∣shop is not superior to another.* 1.1440 Concerning which I need no other testi∣mony then that excellent saying of S. Cyprian in the Council of Carthage, It remains (saith he) that we all speak what every one of us does think, judging no man, and refusing to communicate with no man that shall happen to be of a differing judgment. Neque enim quisquam nostrum se Episcopum Episcopo∣rum constituit, aut tyannico terrore ad obsequendi necessitatem collegas suos adegit; quando habeat omnis Episcopus pro licentia libertatis & potestatis suae arbitrium proprium, tanquam judicari ab alio non possit, cum nec ipse possit

alterum judicare: sed expectemus universi judicium Domini nostri Jesu Christi, qui unus & solus habet potestatem & praeponendi nos in Ecclesiae suae gubernatione, & de actu nostro judicandi, For none of us makes himself a Bi∣shop of Bishops, or by tyrannical terror compels his collegues to a necessity of complying: for every Bishop hath a liberty and power of his own arbitrement, neither can he be judged by any one, nor himself judge any other; but we all must expect the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who by himself and alone hath power of setting us over the government of his Church, and of judging us for what we doe. Now if all Bishops be equal in their power, then the Pope can by the laws of Christ make laws no more then any Bishop can; and what the legislative of the Bishop is, I have already declar'd and prov'd: and therefore for these and infinite other reasons the Consciences of Chri∣stians may be at peace as to the Canons of the Popes, out of his temporal jurisdiction. Concerning which other reasons who please to require them may find enough in* 1.1441 Spalatensis, in the replies of our English Prelates in the questions of supremacy and allegeance, in Chamier, Moulin, Gerard, and divers others. I have the less need to insist upon any more particulars, because I write in a Church where this question is well understood, and sufficiently determin'd to all effects of Conscience. I onely adde the saying of Aeneas Sylvius who was himself a Pope,* 1.1442 Ante Concilium Nicenum quis∣que sibi vivebat, & parvus respectus habebatur ad Ecclesiam Romanam, Before the Nicene Council every man lived to himself (that is, by his proper mea∣sures, the limits of his own Church) and little regard was had to the Church of Rome.

§. IV. Of the matter and conditions of ECCLESIASTICAL Laws requir'd to the obligation of Conscience.

RULE XVII. Ecclesiastical laws that are meerly such cannot be Universal and perpetual.

I Doe not mean onely that Ecclesiastical laws can be abrogated by an Authority as great as that which made them;* 1.1443 for all positive laws both of God and man can be so, and yet there are some of both which have been obligatory to all men under such a government, and during such a period, that have been called perpetual & for ever. But that which is here intended is of greater consequence and concern to the Conscience, and it is this, That Ecclesiastical laws meerly such, that is, those which doe not involve a divine law within their matter, must be so made as that they doe not infringe Christian liberty; and secondly, that they be so enjoyn'd, that the Commandements of men be not taught for doctrines. These are very material considerations, but of great difficulty; and therefore it is fit they be most seriously considered.

They must be imposed so as to leave our liberty unharm'd;* 1.1444 that is, that the law be not universal, not with an intent to oblige all Christen∣dome, except they will be obliged, that is, doe consent. For laws are in publick as actions in particular; actions are done by single men, and laws

are made by limited communities. A Society cannot be said to doe an action, and the whole world cannot be said to make a law; but as the action is done by a determin'd person, so the law is made by a determin'd Go∣vernment, as by the Church of England, of Rome, of Millain; and the Ca∣tholick Church never yet did meet since the Apostles daies in any assembly to make a law that shall bind all Christians whether they consent or no. And because one Church hath not by any word of Christ authority over another Church, and one King is not superior to another King, but all are supreme in their own dominions, of which the Church is at least a part, and if they be all Christian, it is that Church, that Christian dominion; it must necessarily follow that no Ecclesiastical law can be made with a power of passing necessary obligation upon all Christians. And therefore the Code of the Catholick Church was nothing but a collection of some private constitutions which were consented to by many Churches, and to which they bound themselves, but did not long stand so, but changed them more or less according as they pleas'd. And when the Roman Emperors made any Canon Ecclesiastical into a law, it was a part of the Civil law, and by that authority did oblige as other civil laws did, not all the world, but onely the Roman world, the subjects of that dominion.

But when any law or Canon Ecclesiastical is made,* 1.1445 it is made by a cer∣tain number of Ecclesiastics, or by all. If by all, then all consent first or last, and then every Bishop may govern his charge by that measure; but that was never yet reduc'd to practice, and prevails onely by consent: But if by a certain number onely, then they can but by that measure rule their own subjects; but if they obtrude it upon others, then comes in the precept of the Apostle, Stand fast in the liberty with which Christ hath made you free, and be not again intangled in the yoke of bondage.* 1.1446

For when Christ had made us free from the law of Ceremonies which God appointed to that nation,* 1.1447 and to which all other nations were bound if they came into that Communion; it would be intolerable that the Chur∣ches, who rejoyced in their freedome from that yoke which God had im∣posed, should submit themselves to a yoke of ordinances which men should make: for though before they could not, yet now they may exercise com∣munion and use the same religion without communicating in rites and ordinances.

This does no way concern the subjects of any government (what liberty they are to retain and use,* 1.1448 I shall discourse in the following numbers) but it concerns distinct Churches under distinct Governments, and it means, as appears plainly by the context and the whole analogy of the thing, that the Christian Churches must suffer no man to put a law upon them who is not their Governour. If he have undertaken a pious discipline, let him propound it, and for God's glory and the zeale of souls endeavour to per∣swade it; for all that is not against Christian liberty, untill any man or any Church shall impose it, and command it, whether the Churches please or no, whether they judge it expedient or no, whether it be for their edifi∣cation or not for their edification: that's not to be suffered; it is against our Evangelical liberty, and the Apostolical injunction.

And this was so well understood by the Primitive Churches,* 1.1449 that though the Bishops did appoint temporary and occasional fasts in their Churches upon emergent and great accidents, as Tertullian affirms, yet they would suffer no Bishop to impose any law of fasting upon others, but all Churches would keep their own liberty, as I have already proved in this Chapter* 1.1450 & when Montanus did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 make a law of fasting, not for his own Church, but intended that all Christians should keep the fasts appointed, they made an outcry against him & would not endure it; & yet he did it onely for discipline, not for doctrine, for piety, not as of necessi∣ty, as appears in Tertullian's book of fasting, in the first & second Chapters:* 1.1451 and they also did keep fasting-days set and solemn, every Bishop in his own Church, at what times they would, but almost all upon Good-Friday; but this was by consent and with liberty, and that they ought to defend, and so they did.

But Ecclesiastical laws must not be perpetual.

That is, when they are made,* 1.1452 they are relative to time and place, to persons and occasions, subject to all changes, fitted for use and the advan∣tage of Churches, ministring to edification, and complying with charity. Now whatsoever is made with these conditions, cannot be perpetual: and whatsoever Ecclesiastical Law hath not these conditions, the Churches ought not to receive, because they are impediments, not advantages to the service of God. If they be thus qualified, no good man will refuse them; if they be not, they are the laws of Tyrants, not of Spiritual Fathers: For this whole affaire is fully stated in those words of our Blessed Saviour; reproving of the Pharisees and their Ecclesiastical laws, he says, they by their traditions did evacuate the Commandement of God, and they taught for doctrines the commandements of men. The full sense of which when we understand, we have the full measure of Ecclesiastical laws, not onely as they relate to the Churches and communities of Christians under distinct governments, but to every single Christian under his own governour and superior. These I say are the Negative measures: that is, Ecclesiastical laws are not good and are not binding if they be impos'd against the inte∣rest of a Divine Commandement, or if they be taught as doctrines. Of the first there is no doubt, and in it there is no difficulty: But in the latter there is a very great one.

For when our superiors impose a law of discipline,* 1.1453 they say it is good, it is pleasing to God, it is a good instrument and ministery to some vertue, or at least it is an act of obedience, and that it is so, is true doctrine: what hurt can there be in all this? The commandements of men are bound upon us by the Commandement of God, and therefore when they are once imposed, they cease to be indifferent, and therefore may then become 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doctrines and points of religion; what then is that which our Blessed Saviour reproves? and what is our Negative measure of Ecclesiasti∣cal laws?

To this the answer is best given by a narrative of what the Pharisees did,* 1.1454 and was reproved: for all was not repugnant to the law of God, neither is all that amisse which men teach to be done. For our Blessed Saviour commanded us to hear them that sate in Moses chaire, and to doe whatso∣ever

they commanded: not absolutely whatsoever, but whatsoever of a certain sort; that is, 1. whatsoever they taught by a probable interpre∣tation of what was doubtfull, 2. or by faithfull counsel concerning things belonging to piety and charity, 3. or by a determining to circumstances of time and place those things which were left to their choice and conduct.

Whatsoever was besides these,* 1.1455 that is, 1. whatsoever had it's founda∣tion in the opinions of men, and not in something certainly derived from God, if brought into religion, and impos'd on mens consciences as a part of the service of God, this is the teaching for doctrines the commandements of men. But besides this 2. if what is deduc'd onely by probable inter∣pretation be obtruded as a matter of faith; or 3. if what is piously coun∣sel'd, be turned into a perpetual and absolute law; or 4. if that which was left to the choice and conduct of the governours, be handled not as matter of liberty, but of necessity; in all these cases the commandements of men are taught for doctrines.

The reason of these things is plain.* 1.1456 For the first; If it have no founda∣tion in the law of God, but in humane opinions, and yet be taught for do∣ctrine, it is literally the thing that is here reproved. For the second. What∣soever is but probably collected is not the word of God, for that is always certain: it is true it is not probable in it self, but in it self is true of false; but to him it is but probable, and therefore to say this is the word or the Commandement of God, is more then the man can say; it is to say that it is true in it self, that is, it is a doctrine of God, when indeed it is but the word of Man for ought we know. * For the third; When God hath left it at liberty, if man turnes it into a commandement, and teaches it for the law of God, he does more then God would doe, and more then is true; for God never made it into a law, and man cannot make it to become God's law: for the Ecclesiastic order being but God's Minister and the publisher of God's will, must propose things as they received them from God; that which is law, as necessary, that which is Counsel, as highly rewardable. For the fourth; If it be left in the power of the Governours, then it is hoc ipso evi∣dent that it is not necessary, and therefore though it may minister to order and discipline, yet it must doe no more: it may be called obedience, so long as it is justly bound upon us with the cords of a man; but it must not in any other sense nor at any time be called religion. How these two last sorts may be made into laws I shall account when I speak of the positive mea∣sures of Ecclesiastical laws; but abstracting from that superinduc'd obliga∣tion, to teach these things as necessary which God hath not made so, is to doe as the Pharisees did, whom our Blessed Saviour so reproves.

An example of the first is the Pharisees teaching the washing of cups and dishes,* 1.1457 because they said that if a Gentile or any unclean person had touch'd their vessel that touch'd their meat, the impurity would goe into their body that eat it, and from thence into their soul; and therefore they taught the doctrine or tradition of cleansing vessels and washing their hands,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as he said in the Greek Comedy; finding out a vain remedy to cure a phantastical disease. Thus in the Church of Rome, they exorcise salt and water to cast our Devils; they give

verses out of the Psalms or Gospels to charm witches; they ring the bells to appease tempests, and very many more such ridiculous devices. 2. Of the second we have examples enough in the Council of Trent, who drew into a body of articles, and declar'd those things, some of which are but probable at most, and some of them apparently false, to be articles of faith: and un∣der this those also must needs be involved, who persecute men for opinions and doubtfull disputations. 3. Of the third, they are very evil examples who to some whole orders of men lay an injunction of keeping Evangeli∣cal counsels: such who forbid the whole order of the superior Clergy to marry, and command them that are married to forsake their wives or their office and livelihood. 4. But they are guilty of the fourth kind of pre∣varicating of the words of our Blessed Saviour, who persecute the breakers of an Ecclesiastical Law with a severity greater then the violators of a Di∣vine Commandement. For if there be any liberty of any sort left after an indifferent action is made into a law of man, it is all destroyed by them who give lesse liberty to the transgression of that law then to the breach of God's law, under which there is left no liberty, but the liberty of a chearfull and voluntary obedience. For they that doe such things must needs at least say that such humane injunctions are as necessary as the Divine Com∣mandements; for else why are they more severely punished?

The summe is this;* 1.1458 Not onely those who expressely teach that what they have invented is a Commandement of God, but all they that say any thing is a law of God which is not, though it be good, though it be proba∣ble, and all they which use arts and secret devices and little arguments and inforcements, and presse indifferent things up to the height and necessity of religion and a Divine Commandement, are guilty of this Pharisaisme, ob∣noxious to our Saviours reproof, and if it be in the matter of Ecclesiastical laws, have exceeded their measures and their power, and bind themselves, but not the consciences of their subjects. A Commandement is not onely then broken when we bid open defiance to it, but then also when we doe actions unlike the vertue of it, and actions tending to the violation of it; that is, there are degrees of violation of a Divine law: and an Ecclesiasti∣cal law that does in any degree break this law of our Blessed Saviour is therefore void, and is become intolerable.

Of these things I shall yet give two great examples,* 1.1459 one of the Pha∣risees, and another of some that follow their example in this affair. God gave a Commandement to the Jews of keeping holy the Sabbath-day, their new Moons and some other solemnities. Now there were many par∣ticulars in the observation which were not determin'd in the Law; but 1. what was doubtfull was to be expounded by their Doctors. 2. Some things were left to the liberty of good people, and the measure of them was best determin'd by their Doctors and men learned in the Law. 3. There were some Canons Ecclesiastical which were outer guards and hedges to the law it self, that men might by those distances be kept farther off from sin; and in these things their Rulers also had power. Now though all this they could doe, and might pretend an authority from God to interpret the Law and to guide the Consciences, yet when they fell into ridiculous Com∣mentaries and uselesse Glosses, neither the law it self about which their in∣terpretations were imployed, nor their authority which they had from God could secure them from tyranny, and corruption, and doing violence

to Conscience, and imposing unequal burdens.

Thus we find that their Rabbins taught that upon a solemn feast-day it was not lawful to catch fish in their ponds, but they might hunt the hens and catch the geese in their yard. They might not blow the fire with a pair of bellows, because that was too like the labour of Smiths; but they might blow it through a hollow Cane. They might make a fire and set on their pot, but they must not lay on their wood like the structure of a house, that is, too artifici∣ally; and you must rost or boyle no more then was necessary: and if you made a fire, you might wash your feet with warm water, but not your whole body. You must not touch an egge that was laid that day; nay if you were doubtful whether it were laid that-day or no, yet you might not eat it, and if that were mingled with a thousand, you might touch none of them: but if you kill'd a hen, you might eat the perfect eggs that you found in her.

These and many more such little doctrines they taught to be observed, as explications and manners of the observation of the Divine Commandement: but these I have here transcrib'd from the Jewes books, that we may perceive the sense of our Blessed Saviour's reproof by the in∣stances of their prevarication. He was pleased to speak to that of washing of cups and platters:* 1.1460 but it is also s••••d there, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, there are many other things, such as that was which they have received and teach, some of which I have recited. Now we doe not find that the Pharisees taught these as divine Commandements, but they us'd them as if they were; they did them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they thought themselves the more holy for doing them, they accounted them profane that did not, they plac'd much of their religion and Pharisaisme or separation in them, esteem∣ing them a part of the divine worship: This was their case, and Christ gave their sentence.

The other instance which I promised is the law of the Roman Church in keeping of Lent;* 1.1461 which it is certain was no law of Christ; not so much as the interpretation of a Divine law. Some of them pretend it was enjoyned by the Apostles; others of them say not, and these say true; so that it is a Commandement of men: but yet this they teach for doctrine in the cul∣pable and criminal sense, that is,

1. They value it more then some Commandements of God.* 1.1462 I need no other proof but the words of Erasmus, Veluti parricida, penè dierim, rapitur ad supplicium,* 1.1463 qui pro piscium carnibus gustarit carnes suillas, He that in stead of fish shall but tast a piece of pork is dragg'd to punishment almost as if he were a parricide. Gustavit aliquis carnes, clamant omnes, O coelum! O terra! O maria Neptuni! Nutat Ecclesiae status, &c. If they see a man eat flesh, they are amaz'd, they think the Church is in danger; they put men to death, to the sharpest death of burning alive, for eating flesh; they shut up the Butchers shambles, but leave open the publick Stews.

2. They account it to be a part of the service of God,* 1.1464 not onely as it is an act of obedience to superiors, but in it self and without any relative consideration.* 1.1465 Bellarmine saies they are not Christians that eat flesh in Lent: which words are extremely false, or else every one that disobeys an Ec∣clesiastical law hath forfeited his Christendome; or else he places the summe and life of religion in the keeping of Lent, and makes it a vital part, expressly prevaricating one of the most glorious propositions of Christi∣anity,

placing the Kingdome of God in meat and drink,* 1.1466 not in righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost; and doing that which the Apostle hath forbidden,* 1.1467 when he said to the Colossians, let no man judge you in meat and drink. If it were onely a question of obedience to the law, it were to be considered upon a distinct account, and were a sin or duty respectively according to the several dispositions of the person and the law: but no man saies that he is no Christian who at any time breaks any Ecclesiastical law; and therefore in this more is pretended, and it is to be reckoned amongst the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the commandements of men that are taught for doctrines.

3. They account the exterior action, the body of the injunction,* 1.1468 the element of it to be a service of God; and for that part of it esteem them∣selves the more holy and the better Christians, as appears in their con∣tentions about it, using arguments to prove the very Fast to be a sacrifice, a pure oblation* 1.1469. Now it is true that fasting is a good ministery to divers holy purposes, but it is no more; it is that which can be supplied by other ministeries as apt, and therefore that in kind is not necessary, nor requir'd; it is that whose work can be done without any ministery at all in some persons & some cases, even by love and by obedience, by hope and fear, which are of themselves direct graces, vertues and parts of the service of God. And therefore the Fathers of the Church press in their Sermons and exhorta∣tions to fasting, that they would take care to acquire the end of fasting, to be free from vice, to mortify the affections and lusts; according to that saying of Isidore, Fastings with good works are acceptable to God: But he that abstains from meat,* 1.1470 and does evil, imitates the Devils, quibus esca non est, & nequitia semper est, They never eat, but ever doe wickedly and perversly. But he fasts well that fasts from maliciousness and secular ambitions. Take heed therefore,* 1.1471 saies S. Hierom to Celantia, that when you begin to fast and use abstinence, you doe not think your self holy. For this strength adjumentum est, non perfectio sanctitatis, it is not the perfection of sanctity, but a help onely. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and there is no profit at all of fasting,* 1.1472 unless all things else doe follow, saith S. Chrysostome; that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an abstinence from sin intirely: and again, what gain is it if 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 being void and empty of good works we have kept the fast? If therefore another saies, I have fasted all the Lent, say thou, I had an enemy, but I am reconcil'd; I had an evil Custome of detracting from my neighbours fame, but I have left it off; I had an ungodly custome of swearing, but it is now amended. The summe is this, which I represent in the words of Prosper,* 1.1473 jejunia, abstinentiae, ac caetera hujusmodi, non pro justitia, sed cum justitia Deo sunt exhibenda, Abstinence and fastings are not to be given to God for good works, but with them. That is, they are of use in order to certain purposes, which when they doe effect they are good, when they doe not, they are useless troubles; and if they then be urg'd beyond their ministery, and instrumentality, and for themselves, then we return to the beggerly elements and rudiments of the synagogue: and if we suffer our selves to be brought under the power of these things by laws and affright∣ments and spiritual terrors, then we have lost our Christian liberty which was bought by the best bloud of the world.

4. But not onely the exterior and instrumental act is absolutely urged and taught as necessary,* 1.1474 but a circumstance, a manner and forme of that ex∣terior

instrument is enjoyned. It is enjoyn'd not that we fast totally; but that we fast so: you may dine if you will eat at the Merchants hours, after twelve or one of the clock, but you may not eat flesh; you may eat sweet-meats, the most delicious fish, the Sturgeon and the Scarus, the Lamprey and the Oyster, the Eele and the Salmon, and all the delicacies of Nature, so you doe not touch the fillets of a Veal, nor eat an Egge or Milk, Curds or Cheese, or any thing that comes from a beast or bird. Now what can be the meaning of this, when it comes to be expounded by wise and sober men that can judge of the causes and differences of things? For if abstinence and fasting be the thing that is requir'd, this is nothing of it: if we may dine, if we may fill our bellies with wine and delicacies, if we may eat and, as Adam might, of all the garden of Eden, it is no great matter as to tem∣perance and abstinence, as to mortification and austerities, if we abstain from one; it may be something as to our health, and so certainly it is to very many bodies. It may be an instrument of vexation, but it cannot edify. Is any man cur'd of his lust by eating nothing but fish and broaths for forty daies? He may indeed be made sick by it, and so very many are, but the interest of no vertue is serv'd by it, but by the other permissions it may be more destroyed; and by fishes and broaths and artificial meats provisions may be too abundantly made for the flesh to fulfill the lusts thereof. What therefore is in this manner of the law, but something of the beggerly reli∣gion of meats and drinks? In the daies of Prosper they abstain'd from the flesh of beasts, but not of birds; and his sentence of that kind of fasting is this,

But they that abstaining from the flesh of four-footed beasts, enjoy the flesh of Phesants and other precious birds or fishes,* 1.1475 seem to me not to cut off the delights of their bodies, but to change them, and to cast away the common and cheap delicacies of flesh, that they may fill their pleasures with more delicious and more precious flesh; not for absti∣nence, but because some flesh is unclean, or rather, as I suppose, for the tenderness of their wanton stomacks: since the nature of any flesh is not to be condemned, if it be intended for mans use and appointed by God; but the lusts of the flesh are to be avoided, which the Devil hath superin∣duc'd and offers to our senses. But they that would seem to themselves more abstinent, and by it acquire same and noises, doe so abstain from flesh, that they fill their vast appetite with rare fruits and curious broaths: but spiritual abstinence perswades not to refrain the use of cer∣tain meats, but the restraint of the lust and the desire; and they are ra∣ther to be esteem'd abstinent, who forbid not to themselves the use of some meats, but the delights of the body.

] And indeed let it be consi∣dered; if a man pretending to mortify his body shall abstain from wine, and will nevertheless drink sherbets and delicious beurages, strong ale and Spirits, I suppose his body will not by that discipline be dead to sin: and so it is in the abstinence from flesh, unless he also abstain from all nourish∣ment but what is necessary and made pleasant by want. For thus the holy Primitives when they had gotten the custome of the Lenten fast, for two daies, or six daies, or ten daies, or fifteen daies, according as the humor in∣creased, they did generally abstain from flesh; but so they did also from fish, and wine, and all delicacies, and eat a drie diet, bread and water, herbs and common fruits, turneps and berries, flies and nuts: and yet this they did without making it a religion not to eat a bit of flesh; but upon occasion would eat a meale of flesh, but not very delicious; and when their fasts were of many daies, they were not continual but intermitted. This latter

I have already proved; but that even in Lent the Primitive Christians did not abhorre flesh, appears beyond dispute in the case of Spiridion Bishop of Cyprus, who when a traveller came to him in the time of Lent very weary and faint, and there was no cold provisions in the house ready dress'd, it being a time of fasting, bids his daughter to boyle some pork which was in the house powder'd for the use of the family: she did so, and her Father the Bishop eat of it, and bade his guest doe so too; who refus'd, saying that he was a Christian. The Bishop replied, therefore the rather you ought not to refuse; because the word of God hath said, To the pure all things are clean.* 1.1476 So Sozomen tels the story. By which it is apparent, that then it was not the custome for Christians to eat flesh in Lent, for they eat no∣thing that was pleasant, but they abstain'd because it was pleasant, not be∣cause it was flesh; for of this they made no religion, as appears in the fact and exhortation and argument of Spiridion. And of the same considera∣tion was that law of Justinian, in whose time, which was in the middle of the sixth Age, the Custome of abstaining from flesh in Lent did prevaile much; but because it hapned in Constantinople to be great scarcity of other provisions, the Emperor commanded the shambles to be open and flesh to be publickly sold.* 1.1477 But Nicephorus tells that the people would not buy any, for they began to think it to be religion not to touch, not to tast, not to handle. But the Emperor and the wise men knew no religion against it. And that which Marcian said to Avitus in the like case is very considerable, We know that charity is better then fasting;* 1.1478 for charity is a work of the Divine law, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but fasting, is a thing urbitrary and of our own choice. * Since therefore to eat flesh or not to eat it, may become good or bad as it is us'd, and does not serve the end of fasting, and such fasting does not serve the end of the spirit, not onely to make fasting to be religion, to which it does but minister, but to call that fasting which they who first be∣gan Lent would call feasting and luxury, and to make that to be essential to that fast, and that fast necessary to salvation in the ordinary way of necessity, is not onely to teach for doctrine the Commandements of men, but to make the impotent, fantastick and unreasonable devices of men to become Commandements.

5. That this may be an exact parallel with the practice of the Phari∣sees in that folly which our Blessed Saviour reprov'd;* 1.1479 the Commande∣ment does so little regard the true end of fasting, and that fasting so little advance the use and interest of any vertue, that they spend themselves even in the circumstances of some circumstances, and little devices of supersti∣tion, taking care not to eat a turnip if boyl'd in a vessel in which flesh was put, not to cut their bread with a knife that had carv'd flesh, not to tast it, but to wash their mouth after a little whey or broath, if by chance it hath been touch'd: which things because they can serve no end of religion, the law that requires such things must needs be foolish or superstitious; it must either play with mens consciences as with a tennis-ball, or intimate some pollution and unholiness at that time to be in the flesh, or else at least must pretend to greater strictness then God does in the observation of his positive laws; and it certainly introduces the greatest tyranny in the world, destroys peace, and is the most unwarrantable of all the follies which can be incident to the wiser part of mankind, I mean to them that govern others.

I will not instance in the ridiculous and superstitious questions which they make about the keeping of this Ecclesiastical law;* 1.1480 as whether it be a dinner or a supper if we eat after Even-song said at high noon; whether a mornings draught does break the Ecclesiastical fast; whether a man may eat a bit of bread with his drink, and yet be a good son of the Church; whe∣ther a Cook that dresses meat for sick persons may lawfully lick his fin∣gers; whether he that eats one bit of flesh, sins anew if he eats another; and whether or no he may not at the same rate eat flesh all the Lent after; whether the wet nurse may eat flesh, because her baby may have good milk; whether it be lawful to eat birds and fowls, because they were pro∣duc'd out of the water: which doughty reason did incourage some to doe it, of whom Socrates speaks,* 1.1481 and is mention'd by Peter Comestor the Master of the scholastical history. Which questions, if they that make them be in their wits, and think other men are so too, they must needs believe that the keeping of Lent is so sacred, so principal a point of religion, so great a ser∣vice of God in the very letter and body, in the crust and outside of it, that the observation of it must consist in a mathematical point: it is like the De∣calogue, the very letters of which are numbred; and if a haire be missing, religion suffers diminution: and which of all these it be, yet in every one of them they doe what the Pharisees did and what Christ reprov'd in them, and therefore forbids in all men, they teach for doctrines the Commandements of Men.

6. To return to the particular of the Rule,* 1.1482 They make an Ecclesiastical law, which is of a relative use and nature, to be periodical and perpetual, which is unreasonable, and may be sometimes unjust, and very often un∣charitable, and therefore not the fit matter of an Ecclesiastical law. For this is certainly the greatest deletery of the liberty of Christian Churches, and a snare to Consciences, and is of it self apt to introduce superstition and the opinion of direct religion into the discipline.

But this is to be understood of such laws which are intended for dis∣cipline,* 1.1483 and are 1. a burden, and 2. of a nature relative to the future, and 3. of an alterable use. For if a law were made that every man at a certain time of the year should doe a certain discipline to mortify his lust, it were a foolish law; for the man at that time, it may be, needs it not, or he hath another remedy, or he is sufficiently contrite for his sins, and does his penance by internal sorrow, or it may be he cannot at that time mourn, or it may be the cause is alter'd, or a greater cause intervenes, and that ought to be serv'd, and therefore not this, for if you serve both, you tire obedience, and make religion to be a burden: but which is most of all, a law of burden if it be perpetual, makes the willing to be slaves, and tempts the unwilling to be rebels; and because it is intended to minister to things contingent and infinitely alterable, if the law be not so too, it must pass into an opinion of being a Divine worship and religion, or else into more then an opinion and imagination of tyranny. Adde to this, that laws of bur∣den are alwaies against charity, if they be not done in great necessity, or not effective of a good greater then the evil; and therefore to impose such laws with a perpetual obligation upon Churches, when it cannot be of perpetual use, and at all times good, or just at such times necessary, is against the equity & charity of that power which Christ intrusted in the hands of them whom he made stewards of his houshold, feeders of his flock, and Fathers of his family.

But if the laws be relative to what is past,* 1.1484 and no burden, but mat∣ter of ease or benefit, or comes from a perpetual cause, or that which is un∣alterable, then the law may be such which will be perpetually consented to, and kept for ever. Thus the Catholic Church keeps the Lords day, not by an everlasting ordinance, but by a perpetual consent, and for a never-failing reason; and that which makes it necessary now to keep that day, and will doe so for ever, is because the reason of it is always the same; and in this case that which was fit at first, will be so at last, and all the way: and things are in that constitution and conjunction, that no man can despise that day, without being carelesse to return thanks for the resurrection of Christ, and to separate a just portion of his time to the more solemn ser∣vice of God. But for all this, this is not a perpetual law impos'd upon all Churches; for God did not impose it, and no man hath power to doe it; for no mans power can last longer then his life: and therefore no Bishop can oblige his successors by any Canon, without the Civil power supervenes and fixes that law by continuation. And therefore although God did enjoyn the Jews an annual fast for ever, and although the Rulers of the Jews did add some more, and they were observed for ever: yet this will not infer that therefore now this may be done in a law of the Church. For God who is a law-giver does abide for ever, and therefore his laws are to remain as long as he please: & the Rulers of the Jews had both the powers, Civil and Ec∣clesiastical, conjunct, and they by a current legislation still caus'd their fasts to be observed; but yet the succeeding ages had been at liberty, and the Sanhedrim might have chang'd those solemn days, but that they were established by Prophets and by those whom they believ'd to speak the will of God: all which make their case special, and not to be drawn into ex∣ample and warranty in the sanction of Ecclesiastical laws in the Christian Church. * To which let this be added, that the Jews might keep and ob∣serve a religion of days and meats, and it not being against the analogy of their manner of serving God, their Rulers had an equal power to make laws in the difference of days and meats, as in any other matter whatso∣ever. But the laws of the Church must minister to piety and holinesse, and to nothing else; and they must be exacted with prudence and charity, and in no other manner; and they must be obeyed in love and liberty, and by no other measures: but the day or the meat must ever be the lesse principal in the constitution; they may be the circumstances, but no part of the Reli∣gion, and therefore cannot be perpetual; but just as a Venice glasse may, that is, if there be nothing to break it, it may abide for many ages, but every thing that strikes it can break the glasse, & every requisite of reason or charity can put a period, or take off the necessity of that portion in the law, which because it must be lesse principally regarded, must accordingly be imposed and exacted, but cannot be universal and perpetual.

The result of these considerations is this;* 1.1485 1. Ecclesiastical laws may be made by particular Churches, to prevail in their own governments, and to passe on their own subjects, but may not by one Church be imposed upon another, much lesse from one to passe upon all.

2. Ecclesiastical laws may be made and continued by any authority so long as that power lasts,* 1.1486 and so long as the reason of the law does last: but it can be no longer a law then it hath influence from the remaining power who is to establish it according to the remaining usefulnesse.

3. All Ecclesiastical laws in the matter of meats and drinks and days must be wholly relative to religion,* 1.1487 and the effect of graces and proper du∣ties, and must not at all be imposed with any regard to themselves, but to the ends of their ministery, and must live and die according to the nature of Relative beings: but cannot be perpetual, but where neither the cause nor the subject alters.

4. All Ecclesiastical laws must be imposed with liberty:* 1.1488 not with li∣berty of the subjects to obey or not to obey, but with the liberty of the whole Church, to change them or to continue them, to exact or to relax them, to bind or to loose, as may best stand with prudence and charity, with the interests of vertue or the good of the subject.

5. Ecclesiastical laws must serve religion,* 1.1489 but must never pretend to be religion or a direct service of God. It is true that all religious laws of our just superiors rightly imposed in order to any vertue are adopted into the society of that vertue; as a law of fasting does also enjoyn a duty of temperance; a law of Christian festivity, in order to our joy in God, and praising his Name, and paying him thanks, promotes all these graces, and therefore he that keeps that day to these purposes, besides his obedience, does an act of all those graces. Yet it is to be observed that the observa∣tion of these laws can never formally be reckoned to be actions of those graces; they are but ministeries and instruments, and they not necessary, but usefull onely: and therefore he that does not observe that day, though it may be he sins against obedience, yet he is not to be judg'd as if he were intemperate, or unthankfull, or unmindfull of God's benefits; because though these appointments are made for the services of these graces, yet these are not the adequate ministeries of them, they may be done by other ways at other times, and they may at that time be omitted without any neglect of such graces. If there be a just cause to omit the observation, then the omission is neither disobedience, nor intemperance, nor unthank∣fullnesse: but if there be no just cause, it is disobedience; and may be any of the other as it happens, but is not certainly so. But though in these re∣spects to obey an Ecclesiastical law may be a doing an act of vertue toge∣ther with the obedience, and so a serving of God; yet because it is onely in regard of the concomitant act of vertue, which is served by the law, if that law doe not serve that vertue, but by any cause be destitute of it's purpose, that external action which the law enjoyns is so far from being a service of God, that if it be urg'd imperiously, or acted for it self, and delighted in upon the Natural account, it enters into religion, with which it hath nothing to doe, and so passes into superstition.

6. Ecclesiastical laws if by any means they be taught for doctrines and Commandements of God,* 1.1490 they become unlawfull in the imposition, though the actions of themselves be lawfull; that is, they are unlawfull laws, and doe not bind the Conscience, for they are such things in which no man can have authority, for they are a direct destruction to Christian liber∣ty, which no man ought to take from us. If they once pretend to a ne∣cessity besides the equal necessity of obedience, they doe not oblige the sub∣jects of any government; but if they pretend to a necessity of obedience, they doe not oblige any Churches besides that whose Governours have made the law.

RULE XVIII. Ecclesiastical laws of Ceremonies and circumstances of external observances doe not bind the consci∣ence beyond the cases of Contempt and Scandal.

THat is they bind onely in publick,* 1.1491 and not in private; they bind not for any thing that is in themselves, but for something that is better then themselves; they bind, not for our own sakes, but for their sakes that look on: and therefore when no body looks on, when they have no end to serve, when they doe no good, when they signify nothing, they cannot bind at all; for whatsoever binds onely for this reason, does not bind at all when this reason is not. The Church of England commands that when the Priest says the Responsory after the Creed at Morning or Evening Prayer, he shall stand up: the purpose of it is, that the people who are concerned to answer may the better hear: but if the prayers be said in private, none being by, or it may be two or three that kneel near him, it is ridiculous to suppose that the Priest sins if he kneels on to the end of those ejaculations. In some cases he that officiates is bound to turn his face to the West, or to the body of the Church; but if there be no body in the Church, but the Clerk at his side, why he should doe so, there is no reason to be given, and therefore it cannot be supposed to be bound upon him by the law of the Church.

For it is highly considerable,* 1.1492 that in these laws of Ceremonies it is o∣therwise then in laws which concern the matter and instances of Divine Commandements. Because the laws of Common-wealths can change actions of themselves indifferent into the order of vertue and vice, if they be of the same matter and naturally capable: as when Incest is defin'd to be a forbidden conjunction of persons too near in bloud, the law by forbidding the marriage of Uncle and Neece for that reason, can make that to be in∣cest: and killing can by the law be made murder when it is forbidden, or not to be murder when it is justly commanded. Thus if there be a law made that corn or gold-lace shall be sold at a certain price, the law which is the measure of justice in contracts makes that price to be the instance of justice, and what exceeds it to be unjust, if it be a just law. Because these actions lying next to the instances of the Divine Commandement, and plac'd there as outer guards to Gods Law, and being naturally the same actions, when the prohibition comes from a just authority, then it is made to be a sin by the law, and that sin by the nature and participation of the same reason. For he that kills his adulterous daughter where it is permit∣ted, does doe the natural act of killing as much as he that kills his Father; but where there is no law against it, but by law she is sentenc'd to death, and that without solennities, there is no 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and therefore no 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it is not a sin unlesse it be the transgression of a law. So that the natural ca∣pacity and the supervening law together make up the action to be such a sin. But now this thing can never be in Ecclesiastical laws of ceremonies and rules of order: for they are not in their matter and in their own nature

like to religion or next to it; and nothing can be religion but that service which God hath chosen of himself, and that which is naturally and inter∣nally so, as glorification of God, loving him, obeying him, praying to him, believing him, and such other inward actions which are taught to us by our natural reason and our prime notices of God. But external actions and ministeries are then capable of being made religion when God appoints them, and not else, because God will be worshipped externally as he is pleas'd to appoint,* 1.1493 according to that saying of Origen, Nemo qui oculis animae cernit, alio modo Deum colit quam sicut ipse docuit, That man is blind in his reason, that will worship God otherwise then he himself hath taught.

* This onely,* 1.1494 The Church can adopt actions into religion which God hath made ready, and which he hath prepar'd and fitted for religion; such as are free-will-offerings and Counsels Evangelical: for when any man does chuse to doe any act which God hath recommended and not injoyn'd, this is religion; but this is onely in such things which are real graces ap∣pointed by the Divine law, and the instance onely is left undetermin'd: and how far the Church can command any of these things, I shall afterwards inquire; but for the present, these things can pass into religion, because God hath so prepar'd them.

But 2^dly,* 1.1495 external observances can become religion, if they be the out∣ward act of an inward grace; as giving money to the poor, worshipping God with the body; that is, when they naturally express what is conceived and acted within, not when they come from without: a commandement of man may make these actions to be obedience, but they are made religion by the grace within, or not at all. Thus fasting can be an act of religion, when it is naturally consequent to penitential sorrow, and the hatred of sin: but when it is injoyn'd by men, then it is but an instrument, and may be separate from all religion, and may be no act of repentance, and can be made to be religion by no man but by the nature of the thing.

But 3^d•y,* 1.1496 Ceremonies and rituals and gestures and manners of doing outward actions cannot be made to be any thing but obedience: they are neither fitted by God, as Counsels Evangelical are, nor yet by nature, as the outward actions of vertue are, to become religion; nay they are separated from being religion by the word of God, by the coming of Christ, by his death upon the Cross; and daies and meats and drinks, and carnal purities,* 1.1497 and external observances are now both by God and by nature remov'd far from being any thing of the Christian, that is, of the Spiritual religion.

The consequent of these things is this,* 1.1498 When a law is made, it binds either by the natural goodness of the thing, or by the order and usefulness of it's ministery to something else, or onely by the authority. Ceremonies cannot be of the first sort, but of the second they may, and then they oblige only so long as they can minister to the end of their designation, but no longer. For if that be the onely reason of their obliging, then they oblige not when that reason is away. Now because they are onely made for order and decency, both which are relative terms, and suppose an action done in public, there is no need, no use of them in private. But because even

after the reason ceases, the authority hath reasons of it's own to be regar∣ded, and things that are not binding by their absolute or relative nature, may yet bind by the authority and for the reverence of that, till there be opportunity to annul the law, therefore when the reason of the ceremony does cease, or is useless and operates not at all, we must yet regard the authority, that is, doe it honour, as Samuel did to Saul. If the thing it self be of an intrinsick goodness, though made necessary onely by the positive command, then it is to be done for it self, and in private as well as publick: * but if it be onely a relative ministery, then it hath no reason beyond that relation; and if that relation be publick, it binds onely in publick: * but if it be onely matter of obedience, and have no reason else either absolute or relative, then the law does not bind the Conscience, but even then we are bound so to comport our selves that the authority may not be despis'd nor offended; that is, she is not to be slighted or reproach'd, nor publickly dis∣regarded; though for the obedience it self in this case there is no absolute obligation, but the not-obeying is to be conducted humbly, inoffensively, prudently and regardfully. The reason of these things is this, because the Church makes no absolute laws; she makes them for good ends, and be∣yond that she hath no authority: her legislative is wholly a ministery of grace and godliness, not of empire and dominion. For the difference is this, Civil laws oblige in publick and in private, for reason and for Em∣pire, when the cause ceases, and when it remains, when the breach is scan∣dalous, and when it is not scandalous: But the Canons of the Church ob∣lige onely for their reason and religion, for edification and for charity, when the thing is useful to others or good in it self; but the authority it self being wholly for these purposes, is a ministery of religion, but hath in it nothing of Empire, and therefore does not oblige for it self and by it self, but for the doing good, and for the avoiding evil: and this is that which is meant by the cases of contempt and scandal.

These are the negative measures of ECCLESIASTICAL laws. The positive measures are these.

RULE XIX. Ecclesiastical laws must be charitable and easy, and when they are not, they oblige not.

WHen Ecclesiastical laws were conducted and made by the Spiritual power,* 1.1499 the Bishops, Rulers of Churches, before the Civil power was Christian, their laws were either Commandements of essential duty, or of that which was next to it and necessary for it, or else they were in∣dicted to a voluntary people, and therefore to be presumed easy and gen∣tle, charitable and useful, or it is not to be thought the people would have been willing long to bear them. But when the Civil power was the Eccle∣siastical Ruler, and the Common-wealth became a Church, the Spiritual sword was put into a temporal scabbard, and the Canons Ecclesiastical be∣came civil laws, though in their matter religious, and in their original they were Ecclesiastical. Now if the laws be established by the civil power, they must indeed be just and good; but yet if they be laws of burden, and

contain a load that is supportable,* 1.1500 they are to be obeyed. Quod quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est, said Ulpian; the case is hard, but so the law is written: meaning that though it be hard, yet the law is to be obeyed so long as it is just. But when the Ecclesiastical law is in∣dicted by the spiritual power, the civil power onely consenting and esta∣blishing the indicted Canon, that corroboration addes no other band to the Canon then that it be obeyed according to the intention of the spiritual power, onely so it becomes a law indeed, but it is a law onely as the Church can intend a law, or desire it to be impos'd; that is, what the Church might reasonably perswade, and fitly enjoyn, that so much and no more, in that manner and no other, the Civil power does corroborate it. For the Ecclesiastical Canon put into the hands of the civil power and made into a law, is like the twig of an apple-tree grafted into the stock of a thorn; it changes not the nature of it, but is still an apple: so is the Canon, still it is but an injunction of the Church, though the Church be enabled tempo∣rally to chastise the rebellious; but still the twig that is so ingrafted must retain it's own nature, and must be no sowrer then if it grew upon it's own stock; it must be such as is fit to be perswaded, such which men can be willing to, and easy under, and of which they shall have no cause to com∣plain: for since the Church in these things hath no power but to exhort and to perswade, and therefore can injoyn nothing but what can be reaso∣nably perswaded; she must not by the aid of the temporal power injoyn those things which are cruel and vexatious, and such to which no argument but fear can make the subject willing. The Church when she hath tempo∣ral possessions, alwaies is a good Land-lady, and when she makes judgments she meddles not with bloud, but gives the gentlest sentences, and when she is admitted to a legislative, she enjoyns a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an easy, a gentle yoke, and when she does not, the subject is concerned to avoid the temporall evil threatned by the civil power; but not to give obedience to the into∣lerable law of the Church, as in that capacity: for unless the law of the Church be such that good men may willingly obey it, it cannot be injoyned by the Church, and the Church ought not to desire the civil power to doe it for her: For since she hath no power to command in such things where the Divine authority does not intervene, all the rest is but perswasion; and he that hath power onely to perswade, cannot be supposed to perswade against our will: and therefore matters of intolerable burden are not the matter of Ecclesiastical laws, because they certainly are against the will of all men, who can serve God and goe to heaven without them.

Not that it is permitted to any man as he please to obey or not to obey the Ecclesiastical laws;* 1.1501 nor that the spiritual authority so depends upon the consent of every subject, that he is at his choice whether he will keep it or no: but that he is to obey willingly; that is, that no more be im∣posed then what he may be willing to, and then that he be not disobedient, when if he were not peevish, he ought to be willing. For this is all that share of Christian liberty which under his just superiors every single subject can enjoy; he may not break the law when he please, but when he cannot keep it; not when he is not in the humour, but when he is not in capacity; not because he will, but because without great evil he cannot.

I shall give an instance in the Ecclesiastical laws of fasting,* 1.1502 and by an inquiry into their obligation sta••e the sense and intention of this Rule.

What persons are tied to the observation of Ecclesiastical Fasts, and in what cases.

To the solution of which question,* 1.1503 first we are to consider to what end the Church enjoyns her Fast. For whoever is involved in that end is also concerned in the law, ordinarily and regularly. Thus if a Fast be onely in∣dicted to suppress incontinence, they who have no temptation to it, or have a sufficient remedy by which they please God, are not bound by that law, but in the cases of scandal and contempt. Fasting-spittle kils a Serpent (saies Pierius;)* 1.1504 but if a man have a rod in his hand that will doe it sooner, that law would be fantastical that should command him to stay till he could kill the snake with his fasting-spittle. * But if the Church intends many good ends in the Canon, any one is sufficient to tye the law upon the Conscience, because for that one good end it can be serviceable to the Soul: and indeed fasting is of that nature that it can be a ministery of re∣pentance by the affliction, and it can be a help to prayer, by taking off the loads of flesh and a full stomach, and it can be aptly ministerial to contem∣plation; and if fasting were onely for mortification of lustful appetites, then a virgin might not safely fast in publick, lest she fall into the suspicion of incontinence, or be expos'd to the bolder sollicitations of the yong men. Now because every one is concerned in some one or more of these ends of fasting, all people are included within the circles of the law, unless by some other means they be exempted.

But they are exempted from it who are sick and weak,* 1.1505 spent with labour, or apt to be made sick, or hindred in their imployment: Nisi quem infirmitas impedierit,* 1.1506 saies the Canon law; all are bound to keep fasting daies but such who are hindred by infirmity,

—seu Dura valetudo inciderit, seu tarda senectus,

any bodily infirmity, whether of age or sickness, weakness or disease. Con∣cerning which, if the infirmity be evident, there is no question, for the law does except such persons in the very sanction, or publick and authen∣tick interpretations, and common usages. Women with child, children and old persons, the sick and the traveller, the weary and the weak, the hard student and the hard labourer, the poor man and the beggar, these are persons which need not ask leave, for the law intends not to bind them. Now those that are but probably so, that is, not well, apt to be sick, suspected with child, not very weary, these also are within the power of having leave given them, that is, capable of dispensation; that is, it may be declared that the law intends not to bind them at all in such cases. So that upon this account none are bound but the lusty and the lazy, the strong and the unimployed.

Now in these things there is no other certaintie but what is set down in the laws of every Church respectively,* 1.1507 save only this, that in all Chur∣ches where such laws are us'd, they are ever expounded by the measures of great Charitie and Remission, excepting in such places where they place Religion in external observances; and yet there also they pretend great gentleness when they are charg'd with want of it by their adversaries, as is to be seen in Albericus Pius his Lucubrations against Erasmus.

But I consider that the laws of fasting are therefore very sparingly to be imposed,* 1.1508 when there are so many causes of being excus'd; and not at all but upon great occasions, and particular emergencies: and when they are, the injunction is to be so made, as fewest may be excus'd, and none may desire it but those who cannot help it: and the evil of the contrary is very visible and apparent in the fierce and decretory injunctions of the long Lenten fast, the burden of which is so great, that they who doe not think it religion, or a law of God, or a part of the Divine worship, use all the arts they can to be eased of the load, cosening the law, and easing themselves, and studying a new Cookery, and destroying the end of the law by keeping the letter, and buying dispensations, and complaining of the burden, and being troubled when it comes, and glad when it is over. A law of fasting is very imprudent and very uncharitable when it becomes, like Rehoboam's thigh, too big and too heavy for all the people: and what good is done by such fasting, that could not with more ease and more charity be acquired by other instruments or a better conduct of this?* 1.1509 Mantuan com∣plain'd with great sorrow and great reason in this particular.

Adjungunt etiam primi jejunia veris; Quae nisi sint servata, volunt nos ire sub orcum. Aspice quam duris, aiunt, fraenata capistris Gens electa fuit. Lex Christi aeterna, nec unquam Cessatura, sinus (dicunt) sine tendat in amplos, Ut sit conveniens, habilísque, & idonea toti Humano generi, non importuna senectae, Non onerosa inopi, non importabilis aegro.

The laws of religion should be, like the yoke of Christ, light and easy, fitted to the infirmities and capacities of all men; for let them be never so easy and delightfull, we shall be too much tempted to neglect them, though the laws themselves be no temptation to disobedience.

This is certain,* 1.1510 that in a law of so great burden in it self, and so se∣verely imposed, and so fiercely punished, and so religiously accounted of, and so superstitiously conducted, the conscience is so certainly made rest∣lesse by the scruples of the conscientious persons, the arts of the crafty, the ignorance of the over-busy, and the witty nothings of the idly-imploy∣ed, that the good which accidentally may be brought to some by it cannot pay for the many evils which it regularly produces in others: and that law of fasting can never be so good as the peace which it disturbs. For if you pretend your youth as a just excuse from the law of Lent, you shall be told, that the Fast consists in the quality of the meat, and in the singlenesse of the meal, and in the time of taking it; and that though you are excused from eating fish or pulse, yet you must eat but once; or if you doe eat at night, yet you must not eat in the morning; or if you doe, yet you are to be advised how much can be called a meal. And then you are not sure whe∣ther you are to fast at the beginning, or not till the consummation of your fourteenth year: and when that is out, if the understanding be so little as not to understand what and why and how, you fast to no purpose; and if sooner you doe understand, it may be you are obliged in conscience, though not punishable by law. * If you be old, yet some old men are lusty and strong; and the Church does not intend that the age alone, but that the in∣firmity should excuse: and because this infirmity is divisible, it is not every infirmity that will doe it; and it may be you are an easy and too gentle a

judge in your own case; therefore you must ask; and who shall tell you? Cajetan and Navarre, Filliucius and Gregory Sayr, Diana and Azorius under∣stand no physic; and they can tell you something in general of the law, but nothing absolutely in your case: if you will, be at the charge and goe to a Physician: for it may be if you live in the Country, you have a learned man within ten or twenty miles, or it may be fourty, and upon all occasi∣ons you may know of him whether your case requires ease; or it may be it ••equires leave this day, but you cannot have your answer so soon, and the case will alter by to morrow;* 1.1511 and Hippocrates said, that senes facillimè fe∣runt jejunium, old men bear fasting better then yong men: and though Cardan hath upon that Aphorisme spoken according to his usual manner many ingenious things, yet whether you will put your Conscience upon him or no is a material consideration. * But then if you be sick, you must know whether fasting can consist with your condition: for not every sicknesse can excuse you from the holy fast of Lent; or if you may not eat fish, yet you may be oblig'd to the single refection, or to the time. But that which is of material consideration is, that though you be not well, yet it may be your fasting will doe you no great hurt, and if it be but little, it must not be stood upon; for fasting is intended to be an affliction of the body, and therefore you must not be too hasty to snatch at ease and liberty. But however, if you will inquire of learned men, you may have from the Physicians some twenty or thirty rules by which you may guesse when and in what diseases you are excus'd from the quality of the diet, when you are dispensed in the time, when in the frequency, when you must exchange one for the other: and to this purpose you may inform your Conscience by readinga 1.1512 Vallesius, Cardan, Hollerius, Zacutus Lusitanus, Paulus Zacchias,b 1.1513 Alphonsus à Fontech, c 1.1514 Cognatus,d 1.1515 Arnoldus de Villanova,e 1.1516 Petrus Hispanus and his Author Isaac; and if you can find them agree, and that your case is describ'd, and their rules be rightly applied, and the particulars be well weighed, and the judge∣ment not byass'd by ease and fear and too great a care of your health, you might doe well, if it were not for one thing; and that is, that Physicians are not to be trusted, for they will speak excellent reason for the securing of your health, but they think they are not to answer concerning the state of your soul; and therefore they leane too much upon the wrong hand for your satisfaction, especially because Lent falls in the spring aequ••nox, in which we are very apt to sicknesses. * But then if we pretend to be excus'd by reason of labour and travel, every man must judge for himself: and yet there are in this a great many things to be consider'd; for it must be a con∣siderable diminution of our strength, and a great inanition of spirits that can dispense with us in this so great a law: but how great that must be, if we be judges, we shall be too favourable; if others judge, they cannot tell; and if we fear to be too gentle to our selves, we may be too rigorous, and by the laws of fasting break the laws of charity. But then it may be our labour is to come, and it will be necessary that we lay in stowage before∣hand, lest we faint by the way. And it is a great labour for a man to hunt all day, or to manage the great horse,

—leporem sectatus, equóque Lassus ab indomito: vel si Romana fatigat* 1.1517 Militia assuetum Graecari, seu pila velox Molliter austerum studio fallente laborem.

A little thing will weary a soft person, and a long sport will tire a strong man: and my not these put in their plea for a pleasant or an early meal? for

hungry men will plead hard. And the labour of the mind is also a great wearinesse to the bones; and who shall tell me how long I must study before I may be allowed not to keep the punctualities of Lent? for the thinking man must be fed tenderly and furnished with finer spirits. But then who shall come into this licence is worth inquiring; whether not onely the hard Student, but the Preacher that speaks long, and thinks little; whether School-Masters, Advocates, Orators, Judges, for every one would be glad of a little liberty: and if the bodily labourer shall be excused, whether all trades that sit long, and work easily, as Shoomakers, Tailers, Glovers, Book-binders may pretend to an exemption; for though Azorius is so kind as to except most of these, yet others doe not. And what shall the poor man doe? his rule is commonly to eat when he can get it; and if he be at a friends house must he refuse to eat, because it is not his time? or must he starve, because there is nothing but flesh?

Unde fames homini vetitorum tanta ciborum est?

Certainly he can hardly be tied to the measures and rules of eating Eccle∣siastically, that every day is in dispute whether he shall or shall not have something that he may eat naturally. But yet he is to inquire whether he be tied on those days to fast when he can be provided for: and it would also be known whether a poor man is not tied to refuse flesh and require fish where it can be had; and whether he is not bound first to spend the frag∣ments of his fish-basket before his bits of flesh, and keep them onely for necessity; and whether he may be secretly pleas'd that he hath that necessi∣ty put upon him that he hath flesh but no fish. There are also some hun∣dreds of questions more that might be consider'd; some are pleasant cases and some are sowre, some can be determined and some cannot. But the great case of Conscience in this whole affaire is, What great good that is which this law of Lent thus conducted can effect, which can no other ways be effected, and which can be greater then the infinite numbers of sin, and doubtings, and scruples, and fears, and troubles, and vexations, and sick∣nesses, and peevishnesse, and murmur, and complaints, and laborious arts of excuse, and cheating the law, and slavery, and tyranny, occasion'd and ef∣fected by it.

For although fasting is not onely an excellent ministery to some parts of religion,* 1.1518 but of health also,

Accipe nunc victûs tenuis quae,* 1.1519 quantaque secum Afferat: imprimis, vale as bene—

yet all the world knows that long fasting is the most destructive thing in the world to our bodies, and breeds diseases sharper and more incurable then fullnesse and intemperance; and therefore the Canon law* 1.1520 forbids a fast of two or three days, and a fast beyond our strength. Therefore it is certain that the Church cannot command a long fast: and therefore in the beginning of the custome of Lent it was but a fast of one day, or two at most, eating at night. And although this fast was then a fast of liberty, and permitted to every ones choice; yet it might be enjoyn'd in every Go∣vernment, according to the fore-described measures. But that in stead of a fast, the Church should prescribe a diet, an ill diet, not onely unpleasant, but unwholesome, and that with so much severity, and with so much danger, and so many snares, is no exercise of that power which Christ hath given her, but of that power which is usurp'd, ill gotten and worse administred. It is against the law of charity, and therefore ought not to be a law of the

Church; that men be tied for forty days together to keep from their usual diet, not to be temperate, but to be vex'd and rul'd, this I say is uncharita∣ble, and therefore unlawfull.

Hoc hic quidem homines tam brevem vitam colunt,* 1.1521 Quum hasce herbas hujusmodi in suam alvum congerunt, Formidolosas dictu, non esu modo: Quas herbas pecudes non edunt, homines edunt.

As the Cook in the Comedy complain'd, eating herbs and ill diet makes men to live such short lives. And what interest of religion is serv'd by eating fish and nettle pottage, is not obvious to him that hath tried it, or can consider it:

Thestylis hanc nimio pultem sale fecit amaram;* 1.1522

Death and sicknesse is in this pot. And I remember to have heard a Frier, none of the meanest of his Order, say, that he never kept Lent for a long time together, but at Easter he had a great fit of sicknesse: and therefore as the Canonists say that a future labour & wearinesse may legitimate the breach of the strict measures of the law as well as if it be actual & present; so may the fear of sicknesse as well take off the obligation as when it is present: and of this, every man that is not of an athletic health hath reason to be afraid.

But that which relates also very much to the law,* 1.1523 though not so much to us, is this, that all this trouble is for little or no good: if there be any good in it, it is relative, and transient, and contingent, and inconsiderable, and without hazard otherwise to be acquired. For though fools and poor folks are sometimes press'd with the evils of such a change of diet, yet the witty and the rich can change all that law into the arts and instruments of pleasure. For the greatest feasts and the greatest Epicurismes use to be in fish. So he in the Comedy,* 1.1524

Musicè herclè agitis aetatem, ita ut vos decet: Vino & victu, piscatu probo, electili Vitam colitis;

Wine and choice fish make music at the Table.* 1.1525

Nam in re praesenti, ex copia piscaria Consulere licebit.

They are forbid no sorts, no quantity, no delicacies of fish or wine. And if this be objected to them, they answer, that fish is lesse pleasant, lesse nu∣tritive then flesh, and therefore wisely chosen by the Church to be the en∣tertainments of our Lenten table: but if you object, that fish is therefore not to be eaten because it is unwholsome, breeds ill juices, and afflicts the body;* 1.1526 they answer, that we are mistaken; that fish is a delicacy; that Alexander the great was so delighted with little fishes, that he would send them for presents to his dearest friends; that Suetonius tells the same of Augustus Caesar; that Bullinger tells that the Rhodians esteem'd them▪ that lov'd and liv'd much upon fish to be gentlemen and well bred, and all others clowns and of a rude palate; that Julius Caesar at one triumphal feast entertain'd his guests with 8000 lampryes; that the great feast which Metellus made, & which we find describ'd in* 1.1527 Macrobius, was especially made costly and delicious with the fish there presented.

—quo pertinet ergo Proceros odisse lupos?

He therefore that objects against the severity and affliction of the Lenten diet, knows not the arts of feasting; and complains of the Church for a step-mother, when she is not onely kind, but fond also in making such pro∣visions.

But if fish be un wholesome, then eat herbs, but at no hand flesh.

Parcite mortales dapibus temerare nefandis Corpora:* 1.1528 sunt fruges, sunt deducentia ramos Pondere poma suo, tumidaeque in vitibus uvae. Sunt herbae dulces, sunt quae mitescere flammâ Mollirique queant; nec vobis lacteus humor Eripitur, nec mella thymi redolentia flore. Prodiga divitias alimentaque mitia tellus Suggerit, atque epulas sine caede & sanguine praebet. Carne ferae sedant jejunia.—

For lions and wolves, tigres and bears eat flesh; but God hath provided great variety of other things besides flesh. In some places milk is permit∣ted, in all, herbs and fruits and broaths: and these are agreeable to a weak stomack; according to that of S. Paul, Qui infirmus est, olus manducat, He that is weak eateth herbs;* 1.1529 it is the argument of Bruyerinus.

But I shall make a better use of it if I shall observe that S.* 1.1530 Paul gives it as a note of infirmity, when Christians upon pretences and little argu∣ments shall not dare to eat flesh, but in stead of them eat herbs; they are weak in faith that doe it, and doe not consider that flesh can as well be san∣ctified by the word of God and prayer, as lettice and asparagus: and that a little flesh and course and common, will better serve the end of fasting, and that fasting better serve the end of religion, then variety of fish, and a belly fill'd with fruits and wind and superstition. All or any thing of this may be done in discipline, and with liberty: but because it may be unfit for so very many, and for all at some time, and may produce much evil, and hath in it no more good then to give us cause to say that it may be us'd, it is a very unfit thing to become the matter of an Ecclesiastical law, a trouble and danger to the body, and a great snare to the conscience, which it may in∣tangle, but it can never cleanse:

—pinguem vitiis albumque nec Ostrea,* 1.1531 Nec Scarus, aut poterit peregrina juvare Lagois.

To eat fish or herbs, are of so little use in religion, they are so trifling an exercise of the body by restraining the appetite, that besides that all bodily exercise profiteth but little, this is so little of that, as it is conducted, and as it is even in the very permissions of the law, that it is not worth all this dis∣course about it; onely to rescue the conscience from such snares and little intanglements is of great concernment. * Fasting is very good to some purposes, at some times, and to some persons: but laws regard that quod plerumque est, and therefore in the matter of a periodical and long continu∣ed fast cannot but be uncharitable and unreasonable: and therefore when there is cause for such injunctions, they are to be press'd with argument and exhortation, not by Empire and necessity. For supposing the law otherwise without objection, yet he that fasts against his will, does not serve God; and therefore externally to be forc'd to doe it, is not a lawfull exercise of an Ecclesiastical power.

This summe is this.* 1.1532 If it be the fast of one day, it may be indicted by our lawfull superior, with the measures of prudence and charity, and according to the needs of the Church. * But if it be the fast of many days together, it is a burden, and therefore not to be exacted, lest it be

uncharitable. But if there be a law, the law ought to bend in all the flex∣ures of reason and a probable necessity, and to prevail onely by the reason of the thing, not the force of a command. * But if it be no fast, but a change of diet, it is of so little profit, that it will not recompence the trou∣ble, and will turn into superstition, and will more minister to evil then to good, and is not properly the matter of an Ecclesiastical law, and the Bishop hath no power to make a law in this matter: it is not for God, and it is not for religion, but for vanity, or Empire, or superstition.

This onely I am to adde in order to the determination of our consci∣ence in the practice of this inquiry,* 1.1533 That if there be a law made by the Civil power for the keeping Lent, then it is for civil regards, and the law is not for superstition, but therefore to be observed as other civil laws are, with the same equity and measures of obedience; of which I am to give further accounts in the Chapter of the Interpretation and diminution of hu∣mane laws. But if it be still an Ecclesiastical law, indicted and suggested by the spiritual power, and onely corroborated by the civil power, and for them efformed into a law, then it obliges the Conscience no otherwise then it did and ought to doe in the hands of the spiritual power; that is, onely when the law is for good, and not for evil, with Christian liberty, and not a snare, when it is fit to be perswaded and ought to be complied with, then and there it may be indicted, and is to be obeyed accordingly.

RULE XX. Ecclesiastical laws must ever promote the service of God and the good of Souls; but must never put a snare or stumbling-block to Consciences.

THE holy Primitives in their laws and actions ever kept that saying of the Apostle in their eye and in their heart,* 1.1534 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1535 Every word, every action must be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for the use of edifying: Let all things be done for edification:* 1.1536 and therefore much more must laws, which have a permanent causality and influence upon the acti∣ons of the Church; for therefore they are either a permanent good or evil.

When the Churches had hope of converting the Jews by gentleness and compliance in some outward rites,* 1.1537 the Church made laws of combina∣tion and analogy, of continuation and correspondence in some observances. Thus the Apostles at the Council of Jerusalem indicted the abstinence from blood, as being infinitely offensive to the Jews, and apt to estrange their hearts from the whole religion of them that eat it. And therefore the law was made that it might cement the stones of the Spiritual building,* 1.1538 and the Jews and Gentiles might make the two walls of the Church. But when the Jews refus'd to come in, and excepting the remnant onely (of which S. Paul speaks) which were saved, the rest grew to hate the Lord of life, then the Church consider'd that to use their liberty would be for the edification of the Church of the Gentiles; and then they remembred that Moses had

given the Jews flesh, but forbad them bloud, but Christ gave us both flesh and bloud, and forbad neither; and therefore they return'd to that use of it that was most for charity and liberty, instruction and edification. * Upon the same account, though the Church was kind to the Jews, yet they would take care not to offend any of her children by retaining words that might abuse them into a good opinion of their religion; and therefore at first they abstain'd from the name of Priest, and Temple, as is to be observed. ••n Justin Martyr, Ignatius and Minutius. * At the first the Christians kept the Jewish Sabbath; but in the Council of Laodicea it was forbidden; and in the 70^th Canon of that collection which goes under the name of the Apo∣stles,* 1.1539 which was published much about the same time, the Christians are forbidden [neque jejunia cum Judaeis exercere, nec festos dies agere, nec quae in ipsorum celebritatibus Xenta mittuntur accipere] to keep the Jewish fasts, or feasts, or to receive their presents, viz. of unleavened cakes which upon those daies they usually sent abroad. And the reason of the prohibition is, lest Judaisme should be valued, and lest Christians be scandaliz'd at such compliance, as Zonaras and Balsamo note upon that Canon of the Laodicea•• Council, but is more fully discoursed by Constantine upon the keeping of Easter,* 1.1540 as Eusebius reports in his life.

To this end all Laws and Canons must be made;* 1.1541 not onely for that great reason, because the end of the Commandement is charity, and of all Ecclesiastical government is the building up the Church in love;* 1.1542 but because the Church hath no power to make laws which are not for edification: and this the Apostle testifies twice in one Epistle using the same words;* 1.1543 that the power and authority which the Lord had given to him, was for edification,* 1.1544 not for destruction. * And this is not onely so to be understood, that if the Church makes laws which are not for edification, she does amiss; but that she obliges not, her laws are null, and doe not bind the Conscience. For it is otherwise here then in civil laws: right or wrong the civil constitutions bind the body or the soul; but because the verification of the laws of the Church is in the hands of God, and he onely materially and effectively punishes the rebellious against this Government, it is certain he will doe onely according to the merit of the cause, and not verify a power which he hath forbidden. But in the civil Courts there is a punishment that is ex∣terminating of afflictive, which can punish them whom God will finally absolve. Therefore it is that when the Church does any thing beyond her commission, she does no way oblige the Conscience, neither actively nor passively: the Church punishes no man temporally, and God will not either temporally or eternally afflict those who doe not obey there where he hath given no man power to command. And this is greatly to be ob∣served in all the cases of Conscience concerning Ecclesiastical laws. If we understand where the spiritual power can command, where she can exhort and ought to prevail, we have found out all the measures of our obedience. But if she goes beyond her commission, she hurts none but her self; for she hath nothing to doe with Bodies, and our Souls are in safe hands. And the case is much alike, in case the spiritual law be bound by the civil power: for the King when he makes laws of religion is tied up to the Evangelical measures; and if he prevaricates, he does indeed tie us to a passive obedi∣ence, but the conscience is no otherwise bound; and he is to govern Christs Church by the same measures with which the Apostles did, and the Bi∣shops their successors did and ought to doe before the civil power was

Christian. For he hath no more power over consciences then they had; and therefore he ought not by the afflictions of the body to invade the soul: but if he does, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he hath onely power over bodies, but no authorityover the Conscience. This being considered, the Rule hath effect in the following particulars.

1.* 1.1545 This Rule is to be understood positively and affirmatively; that is, The Church in all her constitutions must take care that the Church be edi∣fied and built up in some grace or other. But not so, that whatsoever is for edification she hath power to command. The measures and limits of her legislative power I have already describ'd *;* 1.1546 it must be within those circles: and though other things without them may be useful, and fit for instruction, or to promote the interest of a vertue; yet Christ hath left them at liberty, and his Church hath no power to bind beyond his commission. They can exhort and perswade, and by consent they can prescribe; but to the ma∣king of a law there is something else requir'd, besides that it be apt to edify or to instruct. For (besides that it must be of something plac'd in her power) it must edify, and not destroy; it must build up, and not pull down; that is, it must build with all hands, and not pull down with one.

I instance in the institution of significant ceremonies,* 1.1547 that is, such which are not matters of order and decency, but meerly for signification and the representment of some truth or mystery. Those which are pru∣dently chosen are in their own nature apt to instruct. Thus the use of pictures in the Greek and in the Lutheran Churches is so far useful, that it can convey a story, and a great and a good example to the people that come thither, and so far they may be for edification. But because these can also and doe too often degenerate into abuse and invade religion, to make a law of these is not safe; and when that law does prevail to any evil that is not easily by other means cured, it does not prevail upon the Conscience: and indeed to make a law for the use of them, is not directly within the commission of the Ecclesiastical power.

But there is also more in it then thus.* 1.1548 For although significant cere∣monies can be for edification to the Church in some degree, and in some persons; yet it is to be considered whether the introducing of such things does not destroy the Church, not onely in her Christian liberty, but in the simplicity and purity and spirituality of her religion, by insensibly changing it into a ceremonial and external service. To the Ceremonial law of the Jews nothing was to be added, and from it nothing was to be subtracted; and in Christianity we have less reason to adde any thing of ceremony, ex∣cepting the circumstances and advantages of the very ministery, as time and place, and vessels and ornaments and necessary appendages. But when we speak of rituals or ceremonies, that is, exterior actions or things besides the institution or command of Christ, either we intend them as a part of the Divine service, and then they are unlawful and intolerable; or if onely for signification, that is so little a thing, of so inconsiderable use in the fulness and clarity of the revelations Evangelical, that besides that it keeps Chri∣stians still in the state of infancy and minority, and supposes them alwaies learning, and never coming to the knowledge of the truth, it ought not to stand against any danger or offence that can by them be brought to any wise and good Christians.

In some ages of the Primitive Church,* 1.1549 and in some Churches, they gave to persons to be baptized milk and hony or a little wine (as we read in Tertullian and S.* 1.1550 Hierom) to signify that those Catechumens were babes in Christ; and in a rebus to recommend to them that saying of S. Peter, as new-born babes desire the sincere milk of the word. Now besides that this was not usual, to give hieroglyphics where they had plain precepts, and to give signs of things that were present and perceiv'd▪ it was of so very little use, that all Churches that I know of have laid it aside. It was also a custome anciently, when they brought the bread and wine to the altar or Communion-table, to present milk along with it; and this also did signify nutrition by the body and bloud of Christ.* 1.1551 But the Council of Bracara forbad it upon this reason, quia evidens exemplum Evangelicae veritatis illud offerri non sinit, because Christ did no such thing, and commanded no such thing; and therefore nothing is to be added to those ceremonies which Christ left. * And indeed if the Church might adde things or rituals of signification, then the walls might be cover'd with the figures of Doves, Sheep, Lambs, Serpents, Birds, and the Communion-table with Bread, Wine, Herbs, Tapers, Pigeons, Raisins, Hony, Milk and Lambs, or whatever else the wit of man or the nature and sense of the mysteries might invent or import. But concerning such things as these, the judg∣ment of Balsamen is this;* 1.1552 Eos malè facere arbitror, qui in Ecclesia columbas emittunt pro Spiritus sancti adventu; & qui pro illa stella quae novo modo apparucrat, & erat admirabilis, cereos accendunt; & qui arcanam & salu∣tarem Domini, & Dei, & Servatoris nostri Jesu Christi generationem thoro strato exprimunt; & quae sunt supra rationem & mentis cogitationem humanis adinventionibus describunt. To let a Pigeon fly to signify the coming of the Holy Spirit; to light up candles to represent the Epiphany; to dress a bed to express the secret and ineffable generation of the Saviour of the world; to which he might have added, to prepare the figure of the Crucifix, and to burie an image to describe the great sacrifice of the Cross for the redemption of mankind; these are things to no purpose: not onely for the levity and theatrical gayeties and representments unbefitting the gravity and purity and spirituality of Christian religion; but also the man∣ner of teaching these truths by symbolical things and actions is too low, too suspicious, too dangerous to be mingled with the Divine liturgies. Christ may as he please consign his own good things that he gives us; but he consigns no good, and represents none, but what he also gives and effects in that ministration and under that sign: but a symbolical rite of humane in∣vention to signify what it does not effect, and then introduc'd into the solemn worship of God, is so like those vain imaginations and represent∣ments forbidden in the second Commandement, that the very suspicion is more against edification then their use can pretend to. But if any such ritual or ceremony be introduc'd by custome or by consent, it ought to be us'd as men use their champignons; they boyl them in three or four waters, cleansing them both by water and fire before they be us'd at all; much more before they be perswaded into a law.

2. But when they can be innocently us'd,* 1.1553 that is, when they can be made usefull, and yet be innocent in themselves, yet it is to be taken care of, that they may not onely by their abuse, or by mistake, but that by their number they be not troublesome and inconvenient. This advice I learn from S. Austin, in whose time the Church had gone beyond her rule and

beyond her power in the introducing or permitting to be introduc'd very many significant ceremonies; every one of which he could not directly blame, but yet they were servile burdens, and intolerable besides, by their number and their load. [Etiamsi non intelligatur quomodo contra fidem sunt, tamen quoniam onerant religionem, & servilibus oneribus premunt quam Christus voluit paucissimis &* 1.1554 manifestis celebrationeum Sacramentis liberam esse; propterea faciunt ut tolerabilior sit conditio Judaeorum, qui etiamsi tempus libertatis non agnoverunt, legalibus tamen sarcinis subjiciebantur, non humanis praesumptionibus] Although it is not to be understood how these things are directly against the faith, yet they burden religion, and load with a servile pressure her whom Christ left free and charg'd onely with the two Sacraments: therefore our case is worse then that of the Jews; for though they had not a time of liberty, yet they were charg'd onely with burdens that God impos'd, but not with the presumptions of man: which words are a severe condemnation of such laws and customes Ecclesiastical. And therefore there is reason to celebrate and honour the wisdome and prudence of the Church of England, which hath in all her offices retain'd but one ritual or ceremony that is not of Divine ordinance or Apostolical practice, and that is, the Cross in bap∣tisme: which though it be a significant ceremony, and of no other use, yet as it is a compliance with the practice of all ancient Churches,* 1.1555 so it is very innocent in it self, and being one and alone is in no regard trouble∣some or afflictive to those that understand her power and her liberty and her reason. I said, she hath one onely ceremony of her own appointment; for the Ring in marriage is the symbol of a civil and a religious contract, it is a pledge and custome of the nation, not of the religion: and those other circumstances of her worship, are but determinations of time and place and manner of a duty; they serve to other purposes besides significa∣tion, they were not made for that, but for order & decency, for which there is an Apostolical precept, and a natural reason, and an evident necessity, or a great convenience. Now if besides these uses they can be construed to any good signification or instruction, that is so far from being a prejudice to them, that it is their advantage, their principal end being different, and warranted, and not destroy'd by their superinduc'd and accidental use. * In other things we are to remember that figures and shadows were for the Old Testament, but light and manifestation is in the New; and the Egyp∣tians indeed did teach religion by Symbolical figures; and in the Eastern Empire their laws were written with characters and abbreviatures; and in the schools of Plato and Pythagoras they taught their scholars by numbers and figures; and Diodorus of Tarsus and Origen brought in an allegorical way of expounding the Scriptures, and almost wholly, but certainly too much left the literal and simple way of interpretation, and so doe the Per∣fectionists and some others at this day: but we that walk in the light of the Gospel, and rejoyce in that light, have received from Christ and his Apostles an easier way of teaching the people; and are not therefore to return to the elements and rituals of Jews and Pagan schools. Christ left no sign but two that did also effect as well as signify: and if they had onely signified, and done no other good, we have no reason to believe that they would have been appointed. But this thing is gone into so great inconve∣nience in the Church of Rome, that there are not onely so many ceremo∣nies as doe fill a book in folio; but the reasons and significations of them are offered to us by Durandus, Durantus, Vicecomes and others: but it is certain that all the propositions and mysteries signified by them are

very much sooner learn'd then the meaning of those ceremonies. But that those rituals or circumstances of Liturgy, the actions, gestures, habits, and instruments of order and decency be also significant, gives an advan∣tage to the things themselves, and makes their first intended ministery of some more usefulness.

3.* 1.1556 Ecclesiastical laws are not then for edification when they give of∣fence to the wise and to the good; to the lovers of peace and the obedient to government; that is, when there is in their nature so much real evil, or so much cause of jealousy of which the law-givers cannot purge them, that the good and complying principles that are in the good subjects can∣not be sufficient to give them entertainment. But of this the law-givers are to be the Judges; and if they insist upon them when there is cause enough to lay them aside, they sin against their Brethren, and they sin against Christ. But the laws themselves doe not bind, if the exceptions against them be just and reasonable and sufficient: which whether they be or no, the Church-Rulers shall judge at present, and God shall judge at last: and in the mean time there can be no other rule given, but that the superiour and the inferiour endeavour by all waies of prudence and humility to satisfy one another. A peaceable mind, and willingness to learn, and a charitable ex∣position, are the just dispositions of the subjects duty; and the Governours are to take all the care of souls that can be supposed to be the duty of spi∣ritual Fathers: and if these things be done, there will be no hatred, and no reproach, and no schisme. But if the question be who shall yield, the Governours certainly have authority, and the others say they have reason: the one ought to be pitied, and the other ought to be obeyed; but both ought to yield: onely the subject must yield outward obedience though otherwise it were not necessary, yet if it be lawful, it accidentally becomes so; and if it be not lawful, or if he thinks it is not, yet he must be careful he give no offence, but modestly, humbly and without reproach offer his reasons against the law. But then the Governours also must yield: they must not consider how much is possible for them, but how much is fit; they must mediate nothing of Empire, but much of charity; they must con∣sider which will doe most good to the souls to whom they doe relate; they must with meekness instruct the gainsayers, and with sweetness endeavour to win them, and bear with the infirmities of the weak, if they can per∣ceive the weakness to be innocent. But if a crime be mingled with it, and be discerned, it is matter of edification that such criminals be discounte∣nanc'd, and the Authority be immur'd and kept from contempt. But in these and the like accidents the Spirit of God must be invocated and im∣plor'd and endear'd, that by his aides the Church may be safely and wisely and charitably governed. Whoever wants wisdome must ask it of God; and God will be easily intreated to doe good, and to give good things.

This onely is to be added,* 1.1557 that according as the matter of the laws is of advantage, or necessity, or onely of convenience more or less, so are the Governours of Churches and Guides of Souls to be more or less easy in dis∣pensing or annulling their laws: till then, neither the Rulers nor the subject can by any other means be excused from sin but by a hearty inquiry, and a sincere humble labour to doe their duty to each other according to the best of their understanding. For if this does not procure a just compliance, it will at least preserve peace and innocence: and though the first is best,

because it includes these, yet these are the next best.

4. Ecclesiastical laws that encourage and adorn,* 1.1558 and add degrees and moments and zeal to the service of God, are good ministeries of edifica∣tion; and till by excesse or accident they convert into evil, are of them∣selves fit to minister to religion.

Of Music in Churches.

Thus the use of Psalmody or singing of Psalms, because it can stirre up the affections, and make religion please more faculties, is very apt for the edification of Churches. The use of Musical instruments may also adde some little advantages to singing, but they are more apt to change religion into aire and fancies, and take off some of its's simplicity, and are not so fitted for edification. Ad disciplinas aliquid artificiale organum non esse adhi∣bendum, said Aristotle as he is quoted by Aquinas,* 1.1559 Artificial instruments are not fit to be applied to the use of disciplines. That is, the music of instruments of it self does not make a man wiser, or instruct him in any thing. This is true, and therefore they are not of themselves very good ministeries of religion. But vocal music, being natural, and the action of a man with the circumstance of pleasure, if it come to invest religion is of great use, as all the experience of man can tell. Instruments may guide the voice, and so they may be us'd; but they are but a friends friend to religion, and can have no near relation to the service of God.* 1.1560 Justin Martyr asks the Question why the Church uses songs in her Liturgy after the manner of the unwise and weak under the Law. Answers, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, That meerly to sing is not proper to weak and ignorant persons, but to sing with inanimate instruments, with dancings and with timbrels. There∣fore in the Churches we doe not use hymns with such organs or instruments. And S.* 1.1561 Chrysostom saith that those instruments were permitted to the Jews ob eorum imbecillitatem for their weaknesse: and he addes, As the Jews did praise God by all the instruments of music, so we are commanded to praise him with all our members, our eyes, our tongues, our eares, our hands. The same thing is also affirm'd by Isidore Pelusiot;* 1.1562 Since God permitted sacrifices and effusions of bloud for their childishnesse, it is no wonder that he did tolerate that music which is made by the harp and psaltery. But then in relation to us, he expounds that Psalm to signify not literally, but mystically. By the sound of the trumpet he understands the memory of the resurrection; by psaltery and harp, our tongue and mouth; by timbrel and dances, our body and mind; by every thing that hath breath,] every spirit: Angels and men are called upon to praise the Lord. But now upon this account we may easily perceive the difference of vocal from instrumental music in Churches; this being but typical of that, and permitted then when they knew not so well to use their voices and tongues to praise the Lord. And certainly the difference is very material, not onely because we find these wise men saying that instru∣ments were typical and permitted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for their tendernesse and in∣fancy; but also because by the voice and tongue we can properly and direct∣ly serve God, and as well by singing as saying, and better, if it be better; which can never be said of instrumental music: which though I cannot condemn if it be us'd as a help to psalmody, yet it must not be called so much

as a circumstance of the Divine service, for that is all can be said of vocal music. But of this the use is very great, and I will onely represent it in the words of Justin Martyr;* 1.1563 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, simple and plain singing is left in Churches. For this stirres up the mind with a certain plea∣sure unto an ardent desire of that which is celebrated in the song; it appeases the desires and affections of the flesh; it drives away the evil thoughts of our ene∣mies that are invisible and secretly arise; it makes the mind irriguous and apt to bring forth holy and Divine fruits; it makes the Generous contenders in piety valiant and strong in adversity; and it brings a medicine and remedy to all the evil accidents of our life. S. Paul in his spiritual armoury calls this the Sword of the Spirit: for it is all of it the word of God which is celebrated, in the mind, in the song and in the verse: it drives away evil spirits, and the pious mind is by the songs of the Church perfected in vertue.] The Eulogy is fair and large: but yet all wise and sober persons doe find fault when the Psalmody which is recommended to us by the practice of Christ and his Apostles, does sensibly passe further into art then into religion, and serves pleasure more then devotion; when it recedes from that native simplicity and gravity which serv'd the affections and holy aspirations of so many ages of the Church; when it is so conducted that it shall not be for edification, that is, when it is so made accurate and curious that none can joyn in it but Musicians, and they also are not so recitative, they doe not sing and ex∣presse the words so plainly that they which hear doe understand; for by this means the greatest benefit and use of edification is lost: as appears in those words of S. Basil,* 1.1564 who when he had highly commended 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the delight of melody mingled with hea∣venly mysteries, he addes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, For this cause were the tunes of harmonious Psalms devised for us, that they which either are yong in years, or novices in instruction, might when they think they sing, have their souls instructed in the truth. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, O the great wisedome of our Heavenly master, which at the same time designes to have us pleas'd and instructed to perfection by the singing of Psalms! But in this and all things like this, the rulers of Churches are to doe that which most promotes the end of their institution. Salus populi suprema lex esto, is a rule which in this affair hath no exception: the salvation of one soul is more then all the interests in the world besides.

5. Although Counsels Evangelical being observed are greatly for the glory of God and for the edification of the Church;* 1.1565 yet it is not for edi∣fication that they be injoyn'd, and therefore make not the proper subject and matter of Ecclesiastical laws: and the reason is, all that wisedome by which God was moved not to injoyn it, even because all men cannot take it, and few men will; and the imposition is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a gentle yoke, but is a perpetual snare. For here is the difference between things indif∣ferent and Counsels Evangelical, though alike they be left under no com∣mand by God, yet for several reasons: for things in themselves indifferent are too little for the service of God, and Counsels Evangelical are too great for our strengths; and therefore God will not be worshipped by those, and he will not put any necessary upon these: but yet those may be made matter of humane laws, because they may become usefull to many pur∣poses; but Counsels cannot be made into laws, not because the nature of the things themselves will not bear the load of a Commandement, but

because our natures will not: and therefore they are to be advis'd, encou∣rag'd, preached, practis'd, commended and rewarded; any thing but in∣joyn'd, or made into necessary duty. And indeed, when we consider that Counsels of perfection are a direct worship of God when they are per∣form'd, and that God onely is to make laws of his own worship and direct religion, and that in these he would make no law, because these should not become necessary, but the instruments of a voluntary service, that in these things we might shew our love, as in the matter of his laws we shew our obedience; the Church cannot have a power legislative in these, for she is the mouth of Christ, to command what he commands, to exhort to what he exhorts: and as the Church cannot make that to be a part of the Divine worship which God hath not made so, and therefore things indifferent may become ministeries and circumstances of religion, but no parts of it; so neither can any thing be otherwise a Divine worship then God hath made it, and therefore man cannot make that to be a necessary worship which God hath not made so, but hath chusingly, and wisely left to the choice of our will and love. And to this sense was that saying of Athenagoras in his Apology for the Christians, Deus ad ea quae praeter naturam sunt neminem movet, God moves no man to things which are besides his nature; that is, he urges no man to doe such things which must suppose great violence to be done to nature.

But the great matter in this whole affaire is,* 1.1566 that Counsels Evange∣lical when they are not left at liberty become a snare; not onely because they are commonly great violations of our desires, or great invasions of our interest, and therefore fit onely to be undertaken by a very few and after a long experience of their strength: but also because though they be excellencies in themselves, yet in some cases and in some conjugations of circumstances they doe destroy another duty; as giving all our goods to the poor hinders us from making provision for our relatives, a state of coe∣libate exposes us to a perpetual ustulation; and then either by our con∣trary state of affairs, or by our unequal strengths pull down that building which they intended to set up. Some Canonists say that the Church for∣bids a mutual congression of married paires upon Festival days; upon which days the Jews thought it a special duty, but the heathens abstain'd: but how if one be willing, and the other is not? he shall be put to dispute be∣tween two duties, justice and religion, and shall be forc'd like him in the Satyr to ask pardon for doing of his duty;

Ille petit veniam quoties non abstinet Uxor* 1.1567 Concubitu sacris observandisque diebus.

The Council of Eliberis commanded abstinence from conjugal rights for three or four or seven days before the Communion. Pope Liberius com∣manded the same during the whole time of Lent; quia penè nihil valet je∣junium quod conjugali opere polluitur, supposing the fast is polluted by such congressions: but because this relied upon an heretical stock, that marriage is unclean, and scarce to be allowed to be holy, of it self it seems unreasona∣ble: but when they commanded that those which were married should that day communicate, and they that did communicate should that night ab∣stain, (but that they had no power to command any such thing,) the law it self laid a snare for souls, and if it could have chang'd the action into a sin, would have ingag'd most married paires to become sinners.

Upon the same account,* 1.1568 but upon very much more reason, those Chur∣ches which injoyn coelibate to all their numerous Clergy doe unreasona∣bly and uncharitably; they have no power to make any such law, and if they had, they ought not to doe it, upon the account of this Rule, because they ought not to lay a stumbling-block and a stone of offence in their Brothers way.

Of the Marriages of Bishops and Priests.

Now concerning this,* 1.1569 I shall first consider the purpose and influence of the Rule upon it. For if this be a stone of offence, if this law be di∣rectly and regularly a snare to consciences, it is certain it is an ungodly law, and of no obligation to the subjects of any Church. Now this relying upon experience and being best proved by the event of things, will be suf∣ficiently cleared by the testimony of those wise persons who have observed the evil, and wish'd a remedy by annulling the law.

Aeneas Sylvius,* 1.1570 who was afterwards Pope Pius the second, said that the single life of the Clergy was upon good reason at first introduc'd,* 1.1571 but that for better reason it ought now to be let alone and taken off. And of the same mind was Panormitan; saying that we are taught by experience that from this law of coelibate not continency but a contrary effect does follow: for the Priests doe not live spiritually, neither are they clean, but are pollu∣ted with unlawfull mixtures to their great sin and shame, whereas it were chastity if it were a society with their own wife. And indeed the scandal was so great, the stories so intolerable, their adulteries so frequent, their lusts so discovered, and the accidents so ridiculous, that the Clergy became the contempt and jest of buffoons and drunkards, and the pity and shame of wise and sober men. And it was a strange thing which in the history of the Council of Trent is told out of Zuinglius,* 1.1572 that writing to the Cantons of the Suisses, he made mention of a law or edict made by the magistrates their predecessors, that every Priest should be bound to have his proper Concu∣bine, that he might not ensnare the chastity of honest women; adding, that though it seem'd a ridiculous decree, yet it could not be avoided, unlesse the word Concubine were chang'd into Wife, and the permission before given to unlawfull Concubinate might be given now to lawfull Marriage. And who please to see instances more then enough to verify the infinite scandals given by the unmarried Clergy generally, may be glutted with them in Henry Stephen's apology for Herodotus. * But if he be lesse relied upon, as being a friend to the complaining side,* 1.1573 the testimony of Cassander will not so easily be rejected, saying, If ever there was a time for changing of an old custome, certainly these times require it; where all the best and most religious Priests acknowledging their infirmity, and abhorring the turpitude of perpe∣tual fornication, if publickly they dare not, yet privately they marry. And they that did not, did worse: for things (saith he) are come to that passe, that scarce one in an hundred abstains from the fellowship of women. And Al∣varus Pelagius telling sad stories of the incests,* 1.1574 uncleannesse and fornications of the Priests and Friers, tells of their gluttony, their idlenesse and ease, their pride and arrogancy, their receiving boys into their houses and cloy∣sters, their conversation with Nunnes and secular women, that it is no wonder there is amongst them so impure a Clergy, that so many good men have complained, and all have been ashamed of it. And therefore

upon this account we may consider the evils which the Church suffers by such a law which permits their Clergy to walk in the fire, and commands them not to be burn'd; or rather not that so much, but they forbid them the use of cold water: I say, we may consider the intolerable scandals, the infinite diminution of spiritual good, the great loss and hazard of souls, when fornicators and adulterers, paederasts and the impurest persons shall by their sermons and common talk dishonour marriage, and at the same time put their polluted hands to the dreadful mysteries, and their tongues to sing hymns to God, and to intercede for the people, who the night before have polluted the temples of the Holy Ghost, and defiled them unto the ground. But I had rather these things were read in the words of other men, and therefore I shall remit the Reader that would see heaps of such sad complaints to the Via Regia of Weicelius, to Andreas Fricius Modrevius de Matrimonio presbyterorum, and in hisa 1.1575 Apology,b 1.1576 Albertus Pighius,c 1.1577 Dominicus Soto, thed 1.1578 Centum Gravamina Germaniae,e 1.1579 John Ger∣son, f 1.1580 Polydore Virgil. Many more might be reckoned, but these are wit∣nesses beyond exception; especially if we adde that the complaints were made by wise and grave men many ages together, and that their complaints were of an old canker in the Church, that could never be cured, because the spiritual Physitians did see, but would not take the cause away. For this thing we find complain'd of by S.g 1.1581 Bernard, Rupertus Tuitiensis his contem∣porary, who compares the Clergy of that age to the Nicolaitans, whom God hated for their uncleanness, by the author of the book de singularitate Clericorum attributed to S. Cyprian, byh 1.1582 Guilielmus Durandus in his book de modo concilii Generalis celebrandi, S. Hudelrichus Bishop of Auspurg, who wrote against the constrained single life of Priests to Pope Nicholas, i 1.1583 Robert Holkot,k 1.1584 Nicolaus de Clemangiis,l 1.1585 Petrus de Alliaco,m 1.1586 Tostatus, Platina in the life of Pope Marcellinus. The scandal must needs be notori∣ous and intolerable when so many persons of the ingaged party, of the Ro∣man Church, whence all this mischief came, durst so openly complain, and wish the annulling of the law of single life to the Clergy, or that the spirit of purity were given to all that minister to a pure religion, the religion of Jesus Christ. But the thing it self was it's own indication; it was a black cloud, and all good men abhorr'd it: for things came to that pass, that the Bishops Officials took annuities from all their parish Priests for licences to keep Concubines; and if they came to a continent person that told them he kept none, they replied, that yet he must pay, because he might if he would; as is reported by divers of their own, particularly by the Centum Gravamina, and by Espencaeus in Epist. ad Titum, cap. 1. I end this with the words of Martinus Peresius, Multis piis visum est ut leges de coelibatu tol∣lerentur propter scandala, Many pious persons have thought it necessary that the law of Priests single life should be taken away by reason of the scandals which it brings. For S. Paul was so curious, even in this very instance, that when he had but commended the ease and advantages of the single life to all Christians in regard of the present necessity,* 1.1587 and the affairs of religion under persecution, he presently claps in this caution, I speak not this to lay a snare before you, sed vestro commodo: If any of you find it for your ease or advantage, well and good, but at no hand let it be a snare.

2. But that which next is considerable is,* 1.1588 that this law is an intole∣rable burden. So said Paphnutius in the Nicene Council; he call'd it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; an excess of exactness: and therefore when some Bi∣shops

would have had it made into a law, he advis'd the contrary; Nolite gravare jugum Ecclesiasticorum, Lay not a load upon the Ecclesiastic state; for marriage is honourable in all men and the bed undefiled: adding, that all can∣not bear that institution of life that is void of all affections; and as he sup∣pos'd, no man should be sav'd in his chastity if husbands were depriv'd of their wives, but that such society was continence and chastity. So Gelasius Cyzice∣nus tells the story.* 1.1589 And though Turrian the Jesuite would fain make the world not believe it; yet he hath prevail'd nothing. For it is not onely related by Gelasius, but bya 1.1590 Ruffinus, by Socrates, Sozomen, by Aurelius Cas∣siodorus theb 1.1591 Author of the tripartite history, byc 1.1592 Suidas,d 1.1593 Nicephorus Calli∣stus, and bye 1.1594 Gratian. And the Synod did obey the Counsel. And therefore the third Canon of that Council cannot be understood by any learned man to be a prohibition to the Clergy to marry: it forbids a Bishop, a Priest or Deacon, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to have a woman introduc'd, unless she be a Mother, a Sister, or an Aunt, that is one of whom there can be no suspicion. Mulierem extraneam, a woman that is not a domestic; sof 1.1595 Ruf∣finus, g 1.1596 Fulgentius Ferrandus, and theh 1.1597 fourth Council of Toledo expound the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For by that time the opinion of single life had prevail'd both by right and by wrong; for in the three hundred years of danger and persecution many that were under the cross would not intangle themselves with secular relations, but fight naked and expedite: but besides this, the Nicolaitans and the Encratitees and the Manichees and the Montanists and the Gnosticks and the Priscillianists had so disgrac'd marriage, and preten∣ded such purities to be in single life, that it was very easy in that conjunction of affairs to insinuate it into the zeale and affections of some less-discerning persons, who not being content to have marriage left at liberty as it was during the whole 300. years, would needs have it imposed: not discer∣ning in the mean time that amongst those who pretended to the purities of coelibate, some would yet bring women into their houses; so did the Hie∣racitae, as Epiphanius reports of them, pretending they did not marry them, but made them house-keepers:* 1.1598 meer Platonics, or, as they call'd them, sisters; but they would kiss and embrace tenderly, and sometimes sleep together, but still would be thought Virgins, as we find in an epistle of S. Cyprian,* 1.1599 where he commands such persons to be thrust from the Communion of the faithful, unless they would either marry, or leave the communion of their women (for that gloss had not yet invaded the perswasions of men which since hath prevail'd: Sacerdos-amplectens mu∣lierem, praesumitur benedicere, If a Priest imbrace a woman, it is to be pre∣sum'd he onely gives her a blessing.) And the same S. Chrysostom tells of them in some homily he made against those that brought in such women.* 1.1600 They were the companions of their single life; so Budaeus renders the word: but it was usual amongst the Christians of those ages, Virgins to bring in men, and Monks to bring in women: but these were condemn'd by the Council of Nice; who yet did not prevail, but that they who might have wives or husbands had rather have such friends and companions, which ne∣vertheless gave infinite scandal and reproach. S. Gregory Nazianzen speaks of them with no good will or commendations at all,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

He neither knew how to call them* 1.1601, whether married or unmarried, or between both; but at no hand was that kind of life to be commended: but much less was it to be indured that men by new laws should be crush'd to death or danger under an intolerable burden. This was the sense of the Nicene Council. And the same thing was affirmed by Dionysius Bishop of Corinth to Pinytus Bishop of Gnossus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the heavy yoke of abstinence ought not to be imposed upon the Brethren. And of this the* 1.1602 Chancellor of Paris, a good man and a wise, discourses gravely.

Christ our most wise law-giver hath left rituals or Judicials to their choice of whom he said, He that heareth you, heareth me; but yet so that they should know they are set over others for edification, not for destruction: and that they should judge according to the law of God, which is the general rule for all the professors of Chri∣stian religion under Christ who is their General Abbat; not enlarging it, not restraining it, or making it harder then Christ expressed it when he said his yoke is easy and his burden light. For the Prelates of the Church have not power to bind their subjects to any things which are not delivered in the Evangelical law professed by all Christians; they have no other autho∣rity then Abbats have over their Monks, who, according to the doctrine of S. Thomas and other Doctors, cannot command their Monks any other thing then what they have professed in their Rule.

] Now whether this be a burden or no will need no inquiry, when there is not in all the laws of God so much difficulty as in this very thing; insomuch that without a special gift of God, it is impossible. I need not to prove this tell the sad stories of some Saints who have fallen foully by the sollicitations of their own nature; or how that youth, in which age many enter into holy Orders, is a state of flames and danger; that S. Hierom complains of it in his own particular, Scitis lubricum adolescentiae iter, in quo & ego lapsus sum, he lost his glory of a virgin body when he was young:* 1.1603 but I consider that those persons who have undertaken it, and had eminent graces, and were persons of rare and exemplar sanctity, yet could not preserve their virgin without almost destroying their body. Evagrius the Priest us'd to goe into a well in a winters night, S. Bernard into a lake, to cool their burnings: S. Francis us'd to roll his naked body in snows, S. Omar in nettles, S. Benedict upon thorns, S. Martinian upon burning coals, to overthrow the strongest passion by the most violent pains. And were not that law intolerable that should command all Ecclesiastics to doe such things? They must doe these or worse: I speak of those who have not the gift of continence. For to say that all men have it, or may have it if they will labour and pray for it, is to speak against reason and* 1.1604 Scripture and experience. It is easier to give our bodies to be burn'd for religion, then to live innocently in the state of per∣petual burning: and supposing those Saints now enumerated did by these violent remedies keep themselves from pollution, yet it is not certain that they took the better part when they chose ustulation before marriage, ex∣pressly against the Apostle, who not onely said, that it is better to marry then to fornicate, but, better to marry then to burn: and that these violen∣ces did cure their burning, is so false, that they doe suppose them afflicted with burnings, and that therefore they were constrain'd to use violent reme∣dies; for those which men invent are infinitely worse then that which God hath appointed; so easy it was by marriage to cure what they found scarce possible to keep from the extremest mischiefs, but not possible to doe in all degrees, by mortifications. And therefore S. Hierom speaking of Virgins

that did not doe honour to their virginity by real continence, he advis'd them,* 1.1605 ut aut nubant si se non possunt continere, aut contineant si nolunt nubere, that they would contain if they will not marry, or marry if they cannot contain: not onely if they cannot contain from outward acts of uncleanness, but even from the secret desires of it, and from burnings. Quid enim prodest (saith he) corporis pudicitia animo constuprato?* 1.1606 The chastity of the body is of no profit, if the desires be burning and dishonest.

Casso saltem delectamine Amare quod potiri non licet.

So the burning is well describ'd in the Comedy. Uri est illegitimo coitu aut foedis cogitationibus se polluere,* 1.1607 said Alfonsus Virvesius, To burn, is to pollute our self with unlawful mixtures, or with filthy thoughts; and these desires are not to be cur'd by mortifications and corporal austerities. Nella guerra d' amor chi fuge vince, saith the Italian proverb. There is no contesting against this passion; even to dispute against it is a temptation, even to fast and to be hungry does enkindle the flame. Fames & sitis ex∣asperat & incendit animos, saith Seneca, Hunger and thirst make a man angry: and anger and lust are fed by the same fuel,

—mea cum deferbuit ira Nolo prognatam consule—

A spare and temperate diet gives no extraordinary maintenance to the desire, and therefore it was advis'd and practis'd in all ages: but there is enough of desire in ordinary; even that which maintains health will keep up that natural desire; and that which destroys health, destroys charity, and hinders us more in the service of God then it can set forward. And S. Hierom saies that he had known them of both sexes who have by too much abstinence turn'd mad,* 1.1608 and lost their wits. They that from God's mercy have receiv'd strengths to live singly and purely, may use it as it serves best for God's glory and the interest of their souls, and their own in∣termedial comforts. But it is to be considered, that it is not onely a gift of God that some men can contain, but it is a peculiar gift that they will: and it is observed by wise and good men, that this desire hath or hath not re∣spectively been inspir'd by the spirit of God in several ages of the Church according to their present necessities; and when God gives the gift, then every thing wil help it forward. But in the present manners and cir∣cumstances of the world, as there is no public necessity of it, so there is no great care taken to acquire it; for there where the unequal laws of men have brought a necessity upon their Clergy, it is with them as with those of whom Epiphanius complains,* 1.1609 Ut ne confundantur apud homines occultè scortantur, & sub solitudinis aut continentiae specie libidinem exercent, They pretend purity in public, and fornicate in private. And it is certain, that such courses are no fit means to invite the spirit of purity to invest and adorn the Church. Neither is prayer a certain way of obtaining this gift, any more then of the gift of a healthful or a strong body; for God requires it of none of us directly; if accidentally he does require it, he will give him wherewithall: but therefore the Apostle does not say, But if a man does not contain, let him pray, but let him marry. It is sufficient that God hath given a remedy that is easy and infallible to all that love God; and it is best to use that remedy which is best, and was by the best Physician provided for all that need. Oportet compati & commetiri doctrinam pro virium qua∣litate, & hujusmodi qui non possunt capere sermonem de castitate, concedere nuptias,* 1.1610 said S. Cyril, Every ones strength must be measured, and so fit our

doctrines to their proportions, and to grant marriages to them who cannot receive the word of Continence.* 1.1611 And therefore what S. Austin said of Widows may be exactly applied to Ecclesiastics, There are some that call them adulterous if they marry, and so pretend themselves purer then the do∣ctrine of the Apostle, who, if they would confess their name, mundanos potius se quam mundos vocarent, they would prove to be servants of interest rather then of purity. For they compel the Widows [the Ecclesiastics] to burnings, because they suffer them not to marry. But we are not to esteem them to be wiser then the Apostle Paul, who saith, I had rather they should marry then burn. And like to this is that of S. Hierom,* 1.1612 Si quis consideret virginem suam, i. e. carnem suam, lascivire & ebullire in libidinem, nec refraenare se potest, duplex illi incumbit necessitas, aut capiendae conjugis, aut ruendi, He that considers his Virgin, that is, his flesh, and observes it troublesome and boyling into de∣sires, and cannot refrain himself, hath a double necessity upon him; either he must take a wife, or he must perish. * And therefore they that pre∣tend the gift of continence is in every mans power, should doe well to give God thanks that they find it so in their own, but yet they should also doe well to believe others who complain that they have it not.* 1.1613 S. Bernard's wish was something to the same purpose of charity and security. Utinam qui continere non valent, perfectionē temerariè profiteri, aut coelibatui dare nomina vererentur; sumptuosa siquidem turris est, & verbum grande, quod non omnes capere possunt, I wish that they who cannot contain, would be afraid to pro∣fess perfection, and undertake single life: for this is a costly tower, and a great word that all cannot receive.* 1.1614 Aeneas Sylvius having gotten a Lady with child, to his Father that was troubled at it he replies, in sua potestate non fuisse ut vir non esset, he could not help it: and when Origen had re∣solved to live continently, he found no course but one would doe it, even by making it impossible to be otherwise; and he was followed by many, particularly by the Valesii: and Leontius, who was afterwards chosen Bp. of Antioch by the Arrians, having a woman in his house, one of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of which I spake before, being commanded to put her away, emasculated himself that he might have leave to sleep with her: but that uncharitable folly produc'd a good law against it. For what chastity is that, or what service of God is it for a man to offer to God a single life when he hath made himself naturally impotent?* 1.1615 It is (that I may use S. Basil's expres∣sion) as if we should commend a horse for not hurting any man with horns. But I observe it for this purpose, to represent upon what terms the gift of continence was to be obtain'd by some who would fain, but by this act shewed plainly that they could not.

Propterea leges quae sunt connubia contra* 1.1616 Esse malas …… prudentia patrum Non satis advertit … quid ferre recusat, Quid valeat Natura pati. Cervicibus (aiunt) Hoc insuave jugum nostris imponere Christus Noluit. Istud onus quod adhuc quamplurima monstra Fecit, ab audaci dicunt pietate repertum.

And therefore those laws that command single life to so many thousands of Priests, Italians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, which are none of the most conti∣nent nations of Europe, are a snare to those that cannot keep them, and a burden to them that would,* 1.1617 and intolerable to both. So Origen complains

of some imperious and imprudent persons who in his time would be com∣manding single life and virginity; Non solum quae docent non faciunt, sed etiam crudeliter & sine misericordia injungunt aliis majora virtute ipsorum, non habentes rationem virium uniuscujusque, They not onely doe not what they teach, but cruelly and unmercifully injoyn to others things greater then their strength, not regarding the measure of every one. For it is a burden bigger then the weight of all the laws of Jesus Christ put together, except to such persons who are Eunuchs by nature, or have received a par∣ticular gift of God; of which they may make use as they finde other things concurring. For to be able to contain is one gift, and to be willing is another; and after all, that this can promote any end of religion is but accidental, and depends upon a special providence and Oeconomy of affairs. It may be useful in some times, and to some persons, and to some purposes; but of it self it is no act of religion, no service of God: and that's the next consideration.

3. The law of coelibate is an unreasonable law,* 1.1618 and besides that it does very much mischief to souls, it does no good at all. For if single life have in it any greater purity or spirituality then chast marriages, yet even that single life is more acceptable when it is chosen and voluntary; and if it be involuntary and constrain'd, it is not pleasing to God: so that the law in this case does effect nothing but this, that they who are willing may loose something of the reward, or may be uncertain whether they doe or no; and they that are unwilling are constrained either to hypocrisy, which will bring them an evil reward, or to a burden and slavery which shall bring them none at all. But that which I intended is this,

4. That all this stirre is to no purpose;* 1.1619 for Virginity is not more holy then chast marriage, and the one does not more advance religion then the other directly, but by accident, and in some circumstances, and as an in∣strument fitted for use in it's own time. For as S. Austin observes well, S. Paul does modestly dehort from marriage,* 1.1620 not as from an evil, but as from a burden:] neither is his advice for all times, but for that present necessity; neither is it to the Clergy, but to all Christians; neither is it for religion, but for convenience; neither was it from the Lord, but from himself; no∣thing of the Gospel or spirituality, but a matter of prudence, and the ex∣terior conduct of affairs. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, marriage is honourable, it is so to all, and such mixtures have in them nothing that defiles, and he that is perfect in his constitution, if he be also so much a Virgin as to have nothing that defiles, is a rare person, but it may be not to be found; but if he be, yet he does arrive but to that state of things in which the married man is, even when he does actually use his greatest liberty, he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 undefiled. Which thing if the zelots in some of the first ages of the Church had rightly observed, they would not have been so fierce for single life upon the account of heretical principles. For they did it because they suppos'd marriage to be a pollution: and if they did not ex∣pressly condemn it upon that stock, yet they secretly suspected it, as not being confident of the truth of the Apostles words, but suffering themselves to be a little abus'd by heretical sermons, though they did not openly joyn in their communions and professions. The Council of Gangra notes such persons as these, that refus'd the communion from the hands of a married Priest; but in the fourth chapter pronounces anathema against

them:* 1.1621 and S. Ignatius saies that they who call the society of married pairs corruption, and pollution, have the Devil that great Apostate dwelling in them. For what state of life can be purer then that which is undefiled? and from whence shall we take the measures of purity but from the foun∣tains of our Saviour, from the holy Scriptures, the springs of salvation? But to this the first ages of the Church gave apparent witness. Perfecti Christiani edunt, bibunt, contrahunt Matrimonium,* 1.1622 said Clemens Alexan∣drinus, Perfect Christians eat and drink and make marriages: and there∣fore the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the perfect state of Orders is not at all impug∣ned or diminished by marriage.* 1.1623 Sozomen tells of Bishop Spiridion, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He was a plain man, he had wife and children, but not at all the worse, not at all hindred in Divine things. The same also is said of Gregory Bp. of Nazianzum the Father of S. Gregory the Divine, and S. Basil, Et si matri∣monio se vinxit,* 1.1624 ita tamen in eo vixit ut nihil propeterea ad perfectam virtu∣tem ac Philosophiam consequendam impediretur. He comported himself so in the state of marriage, that he was not at all hindred for obtaining the perfection of vertue and [Christian] philosophy: and indeed what should hinder him? for marriage does not. Matrimonium non solum nihil nobis obstat ad philosophandum Deo,* 1.1625 si voluerimus esse sobrii, sed & magnam adfert consolationem: comprimit enim insanum naturae impetum, nec turbari sinit quasi mare, sed efficit ut scapha feliciter in portum appellet; & ideo Deus con∣solationem hanc tribuit humano generi, For if men will be sober, marriage is not onely no hindrance to Christian philosophy, but also brings great aids and comfort. For it represses the mad violences of nature, and causes that we be not troubled like the enraged sea, but makes the vessel arrive safely to her port; and therefore God hath given this comfort to mankind.

For although it be true that,* 1.1626 as S. Paul saies,* 1.1627 the Married cares for the things of the world, the Unmarried for the things of the Lord; He, how he may please his wife, This, how he may be holy both in body and in spirit; yet this is so far from disparaging holy Marriage, or making it less consi¦stent with the dignity and offices ecclesiastical, that in the world there is not a greater argument to the contrary. For consider where every ones trouble, and where their danger lies. The Married hath more necessities and more affairs in the world, and relations to look after: which if he well provides for according to his power, he hath indeed suffered some secular trouble; but he hath done his duty, & he is safe. But the unmarried is alone, & with∣out those relations; & therefore they may if they will let the things of the world alone, and mind the present imployment, which then was the mini∣steries and attendancies Evangelical. But though they have less care of the things of this world; yet their care which lies in another scene is a good care indeed, but it is very great and tender, and hath in it very great danger.

—poenaeque graves in coelibe vita.* 1.1628

The Unmarried takes care how she may be holy or clean in body and spirit. And this is a care not onely of greater concernment then that of secular supplies, but to most persons of extreme difficulty and danger. For it is to no purpose to be Unmarried, unless they remain pure in body and in spirit, that is, be free from carnal desires as well as unclean actions: and how great a care is requir'd to this, I need not say, because all men that have tried it know: but this care the Married need not know any thing of; for they have by God a remedy provided for them, and they are in the holy

state of marriage, without that care, holy both in body and mind; so that it is easy to say where the advantage lies. The one takes care to avoid want, the other to avoid damnation. The one hath troubles of this world, the other hath dangers of the other. The hardest province which the married man hath is how to please his wife; but his affairs are so well order'd, that he hath not such difficulties to please God as the other hath: which thing was long since observed by S. Gregory Nazianzen,* 1.1629 that indeed single life is higher and better (if it be pure and undefiled) but it is more difficult and more dangerous, and Marriage, which looks not so splendidly, is yet much more safe.] But this comparison is true between persons married, and the unmarried that have the gift of continence; for even that gift does not exempt them from great dangers and great labours. But if there be any burning, if there be a fire within, it is ill dwelling in the house where there is no chimny; for that the smoak will fill every corner of the dwelling, and at least make a perpetual trouble. But between the married, and the unmarried that hath not the gift of continence, which is far the greatest part of mankind, there is no comparison at all. And therefore though in respect to that conjunction of affairs, to the beginnings of a persecuted religion, in which many of them were to live an ambulatory life, and suffer the spoiling of their goods, and be thrust out of their houses, the Apostle had great reason to take care lest by the greatness and superfetations of trouble they should be tempted to forsake, and be vext out of their reli∣gion: yet abstracting from that consideration,* 1.1630 the married estate is much more secure for the state of souls, & propter eam quae in nuptiis est animi tranquillitatem (as S. Gregory Nazianzen affirms) and for that peace of mind which is in chast marriages, and is not in the state of single life with them who are perpetually fighting with a dangerous enemy, who is not alwaies resisted, and if he be, is not alwaies put to the worst. And there∣fore it was rightly observed of S. Clemens Alexandr. As [single life, or] Continence,* 1.1631 so Marriage also hath proper gifts and ministeries which pertain unto the Lord: but at no hand ought it to be admitted that marriage does hinder the service of the Lord; it sets it forward very much, but hinders nothing; it may be burdensome to those who are to travel and pass from country to country, but to them who fix in a place, and who attend the ministeries of one people, it is no hindrance; and then to the direct service of God in our personal piety and spiritual safety it is a very great advan∣tage: concerning which who please may read S. Gregory concerning his mother Nonna, and the Epistles of Paulinus* 1.1632 concerning Amanda the wife of Aper, who were to their husbands admirable advantages both in the affairs of the world and of religion. Sanctissimus Samuel filios genuit: non tamen justitiae suae merita minuit. Zecharias sacerdos vir justus in senectute sua genuit filium.* 1.1633 Quâ ergo ratione accusatur, quod minimè obesse probatur? so S. Austin. To which adde the instance of S. Chrysostome upon those words of Isai, [I saw the Lord,] Quis ista loquitur? Isaias ille spectator coele∣stium Seraphim, qui cum conjuge commercium habuit, nec tamen extinxit gra∣tiam. Samuel the most holy Prophet, and Zechary that just Priest, and Isaiah that Seer who saw the celestial Seraphim, were not hindred from their greatest graces, favours and perfections by the state and offices of marriage. The event of this consideration I represent in the words of the same excel∣lent Doctor,* 1.1634 Quamvis nuptiae plurimum difficultatis in se habeant, it a tamen assumi possunt ut perfectiori vitae impedimento non sint, Though marriage have in it very much difficulty (in respect of domestic cares) yet it may be

so undertaken that it may be no impediment to a life of perfection. For even in respect of secular cares and intrigues of business the single life, which seems in this to have advantage, is not alwaies found so innocent and dis∣in tangled, and yet some times even in this very regard a married man hath or may have advantages and ease and liberty:* 1.1635 Videmus virgines de seculo cogitare, & Matrimonio junctos Dominicis studere operibus, said S. Ambrose, Men of single lives take care for the world, and we see them that are mar∣ried study the works of the Lord. And if it were otherwise, yet a law to command single life were very imprudent; unless they could secure that they who have no wives shall have no children. But as Lipsius said of the Roman Senate,* 1.1636 who forbad their souldiers to marry, à Junone arcebant eos, non à Venere, Romanae leges, the Roman laws forbad Juno to them, not Venus, for Contubernii militibus semper jus, the souldiers alwaies might have women, but no wives; so it is amongst the Roman Prelates too much: but unless this also were so denied them, that they could have no children, or that they who have no children shall not be sollicitous to raise a poor family, or to increase a great, the law were very unreasonable as to this very pretence. For that things are otherwise there where single life is injoyn'd is too apparent, and it is complain'd of bya 1.1637 Alvarus Pelagius 300 years agoe, and byb 1.1638 Platina andc 1.1639 Bonaventure, and it is notorious in all the Popes; divers particulars of which in the instance of Sixtus quintus are to be seen in the excellentd 1.1640 Thuanus. I end this consideration with the excellent words ofe 1.1641 Salvian, Novum prorsus est conversionis genus: licita non faciunt, illicita committunt. Temperant à conjugio, & non temperant à rapina. Quid agis stulta persuasio? peccata interdixit Deus, non matrimo∣nia. This is a new and a strange kind of conversion. They will not doe lawful things, but they commit unlawful: they abstain from marriage, but not from rapine. O ye fools, why are ye so perswaded? God hath forbidden sins, not marriages.

Although these considerations are a sufficient explication of this in∣stance of the Rule,* 1.1642 and verify the first intention, that single life ought not by a law to be injoyn'd to any one order of men; yet because the instance is of great concernment beyond the limits of this Rule, I adde that the Apostles and the first ages of the Church not onely forbad that the Clergy should put away their wives, but left it indifferent for any man, or any or∣der of men to marry: and therefore that it ought not now to be done by the present guides of Churches, who have lesse reason so to doe; and if they had a greater reason, yet they have a lesse authority. But Christ and his Apostles left it free. Of this besides the matter and evidence of fact, there being no law of Christ or Canon of the Apostles to restrain it, but a plain supposition of liberty, and intimation of the thing done in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, there needs no other testimony but that of Cratian.* 1.1643 Copula sacerdotalis, vel consanguineorum, nec legali, nec Evan∣gelicâ, nec Apostolicâ authoritate prohibetur, Neither the Old Testament nor the New, neither Christ nor his Apostles have forbidden the marriage of Priests.* 1.1644 To which agrees that of Panormitan; Continentia non est de substantia Ordinis, nec de jure Divino, To contain from marriage is not of Divine appointment, nor necessary to them that are in holy Orders. The same also is affirm'd by Antoninus, as who please may see in summa, part. 3. tit. 1. c. 21.

Now then nothing remains to be considered but the practice of the Church,* 1.1645 which how far it can oblige, I have already discours'd: but sup∣pose it might in other cases, yet for the reasons above describ'd it ought to be altered in this; for if such a law may not bind, much lesse can the pra∣ctice; and yet if the practice might, here was no Catholick practice. For as for the whole Greek Church,* 1.1646 the practice of that is drawn into a compen∣dium by Pope Stephen. Aliter se Orientalium traditio habet Ecclesiarum, aliter hujus S. R. Ecclesiae: Nam illarum Sacerdotes, Diaconi & Subdiaconi matrimonio copulantur. The tradition of the Eastern Churches is otherwise then that of the Roman Church: For their Priests and Deacons and Sub∣deacons are joyned in marriage.* 1.1647 I shall therefore adde no more to this con∣fession but the Canon of the Council of Ancyra, which orders that if Dea∣cons in their ordination will professe that they cannot contain, and that they intend to marry, they may. But if then they professe otherwise, and doe against their profession, they must cease from their Ministery. And the practice is to this day, that the Greek and all the Eastern Priests; are if they please, married men, and most of them actually are so: though in the Ea∣stern Churches they always did exhort their Clergy to continence, yet they left it to their liberty, and they always took it.

In the Latine Church,* 1.1648 from the time of Pope Siricius, and the second Council of Arles, which Binius makes about the same time, at the end of the fourth Age after Christ, there were some canons provincial injoyning single life to the Clergy; but the practice was ever against the Canon: and as for the first 400. years or thereabouts, all had liberty to be married if they pleas'd, so even afterwards they would take it, as they saw cause. This we find in S. Hierom, who to Jovinian, objecting the marriage of Samuel, answers, that this was no prejudice to the honour of the virgin-state, quasi non hodie quoque plurimi Sacerdotes habeant Matrimonia, & Apo∣stolus describat Episcopum unius uxoris virum;] for the Apostle describes a Bishop the husband of one wife, and even at this day most Priests are mar∣ried. S. Hierom did not contend that all Priests ought to be virgins; but that if they that could contain, would, it were much better. But by this, the matter of fact against the law was evident.* 1.1649 S. Ambrose tells that in most remote or private Churches the Priests did use marriage: In plerisque abditioribus locis, cum ministerium gererent vel etiam sacerdotium, filios sus∣ceperunt. The clerical marriages were in his time almost universal: and therefore many endeavoured to persuade single life as much as they could, and from arguments they came to affirmations, and so to laws by little and little; but did not prevail. For when Petrus Damiani was sent from Rome into France to persuade the Priests to put away their wives, they defended themselves with the Canon of the Council of Tribur in Germany, and with the words of S. Paul,* 1.1650 To avoid fornication, let every man have his wife; to which the Legate knew not what to answer. And when in the year 1074 Pope Gregory the seventh sent fierce letters to Germany about the same af∣fair, the Arch-Bishop of Mentz, to whose conduct the businesse was com∣mitted, did publish the letters, but durst not verify them; and neither by fair means nor by foul could cause the Priests to put away their wives. And in England till the year 1100 it was not prohibited to the Clergy to marry,* 1.1651 saith Henry of Huntingdon: but then Anselme endeavour'd to put the Popes letters in execution;* 1.1652 and 25 yeares after the Cardinal of Crema was sent over to the same purpose: but because he was taken in bed with an harlot,

he got nothing but shame and money, and so went away. But at last, after the attempts* 1.1653 & pressures and tyranny and arts of an hundred and thirty years continuance (for it be∣gan in 970, and was not finished till An. Dom. 1100, as† 1.1654 Polydor Virgil computes it) the Clergy was driven from their chast marriages, & they took themselves to Concubines, whom they could change or multiply, and they found themselves undistur∣bed in that; and so they rested, till God being long provok'd by their im∣purest services, awakened Christian Princes and Priests into liberty and ho∣linesse and reformation. For amongst the Canons which are called Apo∣stolical, the sixth severely forbids Bishops or Priests upon pretence of reli∣gion to put away their wives,] according to the words of Christ, What God hath joyned, let no man put asunder; and the words of the Apostle, De∣fraud not one another, unlesse it be by consent, and for a time. And therefore the Church of Rome, which makes orders to dissolve marriage, and com∣mands Priests which before were married to depart from their wives, speaks and does against the practice of the Ancient Churches, and against the de∣crees of Councils, and the Canons of the Apostles, and the expresse laws of Jesus Christ. I end this with the saying of those in Mantuan,

Tutius esse volunt quâ lex Divina sinebat Isse viâ, veterumque sequi vestigia Patrum, Quorum vita fuit melior cum conjuge, quam nunc Nostra sit exclusis thalamis & conjugis usu.

The old primitives and holy Bishops and Priests in the first ages liv'd bet∣ter with their wives, then now-a-days they doe without them; and there∣fore it were better to tread in their footsteps, and to walk in that way to which we are pointed by the law of God.

One thing I am to adde which is of material consideration.* 1.1655 For every one observes in the story of the Church, that even then when they did per∣mit the Bishops and Priests to live with their wives and to get children, yet the Church did even then forbid Bishops or Priests to marry after their Ordination; and therefore many suppose that we might at least comply so far with the Catholick Church, according as it is set down in the constituti∣ons Apostolical attributed to S.* 1.1656 Clement,

Non licere autem iis, si post ordina∣tionem sine uxore fuerint, ad nuptias transire: vel si uxores habuerint, cum aliis conjungi;

but they must be content with her whom they had at the time of their ordination; but after orders they must not marry: and Paphnutius in the Nicene Council, said that they did not doe it, and left it as suppos'd that it ought not. Of this I doe not know any one that hath given a reason, or considered it apart to any purpose; and therefore it will not be uselesse or unpleasant if I give a short account of it.

1. Therefore the Primitive Church chose her Priests and Bishops commonly of great age,* 1.1657 of known vertue and holinesse. They were de∣signed to a publick and dangerous imployment, for some whole ages they were under persecution, and the way of the crosse was a great deletery to flesh and bloud; and therefore they might the rather require it of them whom in these dispositions they found fit to be taken into an imployment which would require a whole man, all his time and all his affections. Now if we consider that the married Priests and Bishops were commanded to re∣tain their wives, and the unmarried had been tried to be of a known and experienc'd continence, they might with much reason and great advantages

require that they should so remain; that is, they might ask their consent, and might trust their promise: for here was liberty, and but little danger. The Priests were few, and the unmarried much fewer, and their age com∣monly such as was past danger, and the publick affairs of the Church re∣quir'd it, and the men were willing; and then all was right.

2. The Greek Church,* 1.1658 and generally the Churches of the East, did by Custome and tradition oblige their Priests to single life, if in that state they were ordain'd, because they took care that if they could not contain they should take a wife before their Orders, immediately if they pleas'd, and then enter into the Priesthood; as appears frequently in the Greek laws and Canons, and particularly in the third Novel constitution of the Em∣peror Leo the sixth. So that this was but a circumstance of law, introduc'd for that which they apprehended to be decent: and in matters of decency, opinion is the onely measure. But if they might marry immediately before their ordination and live with their wives, then it is evident they did not believe that either the offices or the state of marriage were against the offi∣ces and state of Priesthood.* 1.1659 And this is affirm'd by Cajetan, Nec ordo in quantum ordo, nec ordo in quantum sacer, est impeditivus Matrimonii, Nei∣ther the order nor the appendant holinesse, that is, neither the office nor it's decency, are impeded by holy marriages.] And therefore he addes [that it can never be prov'd by reason or by authority, that if a Priest does contract mar∣riage, he does absolutely sin; because the Priesthood does not dissolve the mar∣riage, whether contracted after or before; stando tantum in iis quae habemus à Christo & Apostolis, that is, if we keep our selves within the limits of Christs Commandements, and the doctrine Apostolical.] And that's well enough; for if any Church or all Churches did otherwise, the Custome was not good for many reasons: it did dishonour to marriage, it made it to be secretly sus∣pected of some uncleannesse, it gave too much countenance to heretics who disparag'd it, it made a snare to those who promised continence and found it difficult or impossible, and at last it came to an intolerable mischief in the Church of Rome, it brought in divorces, which God hates; for they teach that Orders does dissolve Marriage, and that which Christ onely permitted in the case of adultery, they command in the case of ordina∣tion.

3. But because there are some persuasions that will not be mov'd un∣lesse they be shewn some precedents and practices of the Primitive Church,* 1.1660 and will always suspect it to be ill for the superior Clergy to marry after ordination, unlesse you can tell them that some good men did so before them, for they rely more upon example then upon rule; therefore I shall represent that although the ancient Canons and practices did generally in∣joyne their Clergy not to marry after Orders, (before orders they might) yet this thing did not prevail, but Deacons, Priests and Bishops, good men and orderly, did after ordination use their liberty, as they found it necessary or expedient.* 1.1661 This I have already remark'd in the case of Deacons, who are permitted by the Council of Ancyra to marry after ordination, if at their ordination they will not professe continence. But Bishops and Priests did so too: which is plainly gathered from those words of S. Athanasius to Dracontius, who refus'd to be made Bishop because he impertinently thought it was not so spiritual a state as that of Monks, since he saw the Bishops married men and full of secular affairs: S. Athanasius answer'd him, that he

might be Bishop for all that, and keep on his way as he was before: for if that did hinder him, he let him know, that all Bishops did not enter into the married estate, nor all Monks abstain. Multi quoque ex Episcopis Ma∣trimonia non inierunt; Monachi contrà liberorum patres facti sunt, Many Bishops did not contract marriages. Now if none did, his answer to Dra∣contius had been more full, and would not have been omitted; but therefore it is manifest that in his time some did. But Cassiodore gives an instance in a Bishop and Martyr that took a wife but a little before his Martyrdome,* 1.1662 Eu∣psychius of Caesarea in Cappadocia. In illo tempore ferunt Martyrio vitam fini∣visse Eupsychium Caesareensem, ductâ nuper uxore, cum adhuc quasi sponsus esse videretur. He was first a Priest in Caesarea, but afterwards he was a Bishop; and so he is called by S. Athanasius, who mentions Sylvester and Protogenes Bishops of Dacia,* 1.1663 and Leontius and Eupsychius Bishops of Cappadocia, of which Caesarea was the Metropolis. This Eupsychius having newly married a wife, while he was yet but as it were a bridegroom, gave up his life in Martyrdome for Christ. But this was no news in the Greek Church; For Pope Stephen having affirm'd that the Greek Priests, Deacons and Subdeacons are joyn'd in marriage, the gloss saies,* 1.1664 Multi ex hac litera dixe∣runt quod Orientales possunt contrahere in sacris Ordinibus, Many from these words have affirmed that the Easterlings can marry in holy Orders. And it is also added by the glosse upon the same distinction, that the Greeks in their ordinations doe promise continence neither explicitly nor tacitly: and if that be true, there is no peradventure but very many of them marry after their consecrations. But because the Latin lawyers and Canonists are none of the best historians, we may better inform our selves in this particular from the Greeks themselves: amongst whom we find that for almost two hundred years together after the Synod in Trullo, the Greek Priests had after their Ordination two years time for probation whether they could bear the yoke of single life, and if they could not, they had leave to marry. For although the Canons in Trullo had permitted them onely to stay with the wives they had married before Orders, and commanded that they should take none after; yet the Canon prevail'd not, but the contrary custome of two years probation lasted till the time of the Emperor Leo the sixth, as appears in his third Novel constitution before cited. The words are these, Consuetudo quae in praesenti obtinet, iis qui in Matrimonio conjungi in animo est concedit, ut antequam Uxorem duxerint, Sacerdotes fieri possint, & deinde biennium ad perficiendam voluntatem jungi Matrimonio volenti praestituit. They took their Orders first, and then had two years time to consider whether they would marry or no. Now this being the custome of the whole Greek Church, in which the Bishops because of the ordina∣tions were engaged. it is evident it was not illegal or irregular, but an ap∣proved custome of the Church; though before the end of two hundred years after the Synod in Trullo it was decreed against by an Imperial law. What became of it afterwards I have had no opportunity to inquire; but I find contrary relations by several persons. That which I most rely upon is the relation of Erasmus, who in his Apology against the Parisians saies that in Venice he saw a Greek Priest marry a wife: and in the history of Johan∣nes Magnus I find these words, Wilhelmi Cardinalis prima cura & intentio fuit revocare Suecos & Gothos à schismate Graecorum in quod Presbyteri & Sacerdotes ductis publicè uxoribus consensisse videbantur, Cardinal William endeavoured to recover the Suedes and Goths from the schism of the Greeks, to which they seem'd to adhere when their Priests and Bishops did marry

wives publicly. By which it appears the Greeks did so, since the others by so doing complied with them. And the Metropolitan of Russia in Sigismundus Baro cals it a great error and sin in the Roman Church, that they reject the Priests who marry wives according to the laws. But the matter is not great; for the Church might doe what they saw cause for.

But in the Latine Church it will be harder to find examples of Priests marrying after Orders.* 1.1665 Not but that there were very many that did; but that they durst not be known to doe it. But yet some notices we have even of this also. For Pope Innocentius the second observ'd that every where Bishops and Priests,* 1.1666 and the Religious professed did marry wives after they had purpos'd the contrary, and by a Decretal restrains it. And Ivo Bishop of Chartres tels of a Prelate that had two harlots;* 1.1667 but (as it should seem) being weary of that life, he prepar'd Matrimonial Tables for a third: and he tels also of a Canon in the Church at Paris who did actually con∣tract marriage,* 1.1668 and the Bishop held it rate and firm, that it was good and could not be dissolv'd:* 1.1669 and we find that Aeneas Sylvius being consulted by a Priest that was in the snare, he advis'd him actually to take a wife and marry. For what should hinder? The law of the Church was an evil law, made by an authority violent and usurp'd, insufficient as to that charge, it was not a law of God, it was against the rights and against the necessities of nature, it was unnatural and unreasonable, it was not for edification of the Church, it was no advantage to spiritual life: it is a law that is there∣fore against public honesty because it did openly and secretly introduce dis∣honesty; it had nothing of the requisites of a good law, it had no conside∣ration of humane frailty nor of humane comforts, it was neither necessary nor profitable nor innocent, neither fitted to time nor place nor person; it was not accepted by them that could not bear it, it was complain'd of by them that could; it was never admitted in the East, it was fought against and declaim'd and rail'd at in the West, and at last is laid aside in the Churches (especially) of the North, as the most intolerable and most unreasonable tyranny in the world; for it was not to be endur'd, that upon the pretence of an unseasonable perfection, so much impurity should be brought into the Church, and so many souls thrust down to hell. And therefore when the Latine Priests saw themselves so horribly insnar'd, they did secretly corrode the net, which openly they durst not tear in pieces.* 1.1670 And the case is clear. Dominicus a Soto observing that the Church did not for a long time permit Priests to marry after Orders, argues thus. The Church admitted married men to be Priests, but did not ad∣mit Priests to be married men, meaning afterwards: which thing (saith he) relies upon no other reason but this, Because they suppos'd the use of the marriage-bed to be inconsistent with the office and dignity of a Priest or Bishop. For if they who were Bishops and Priests might use marriage, what hinders them but that they might after Orders enter upon marriage?] That's his argument. To which I reply, That it is true, the Church, which was aemula continentiae, desirous to promote continence, did set it forwards where she thought she might with safety, and therefore injoyn'd her Priests, which anciently could not be ordain'd till they were almost 40. years of age,* 1.1671 to remain in that state in which their ordination found them: though even this was a snare also, and could not be observed, and was not (as I have pro∣ved) yet this was not because they disapproved the conjugal society; for

besides that the Scripture gives it a title of honour, and calls it purity; it was also declar'd to be chastity in the Nicene Council, who did therefore leave married Priests & Bishops to the use of it: and they who spake against the use of marriage in Priests and refus'd to pray with married Priests, were anathematiz'd in the Council of Gangra. And it is evident that those who were admitted in the state of marriage to holy Orders did 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 beget children. S. Gregory the Divine tels it of his Father, Gregory Nazianzen,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1672 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

That he said he had been in holy Orders longer then the age of his son, and yet he had also a yonger son then this Gregory; for Caesarius was his yonger brother. Baronius contends fiercely against this instance to con∣vince the son of a Poetical fiction, or an hyperbole, or some other civil word for a lie. But let it be as it was; yet the thing it self was infinitely evi∣dent: for as Fabianus said, Bishops and Priests did for a thousand years to∣gether in the Church live with their wives, nullâ lege prohibente, no law forbidding it, that is, no law in force;* 1.1673 and the Council of C P. decreed, Si quis praesumpserit contra Apostolicos Canones aliquos Presbyterorum & Dia∣conorum privare à contactu & communione legalis uxoris suae, deponatur. It is against the Canons Apostolical to forbid a Priest or Deacon the contact and society of his lawful wife; and he that shall presume to doe it, let him be depos'd. Now then the argument of Dominicus à Soto is very good. If Bishops and Priests might use marriage, what hinders them from con∣tracting marriage? There is no undecency in the thing, therefore no incon∣sistency with Orders. Since therefore it is certain that the married Bishops and Priests not onely in the Greek Church, but even in the Latine, in Ger∣many, in France, in England, where they kept their wives in despite of the Pope for a long time, did retain the liberties and societies of marriage; there can be nothing in the thing that can make it unfit for them to contract marriages, to whom it is fit to use them.

There is but one thing more which I think fit to be considered in this affaire,* 1.1674 and that is, that there is a pretence of a vow of Continence annexed to holy Orders; and that therefore it is not lawful for Bishops and Priests to marry, when they have vowed the contrary. * This indeed concerns them who have made such a vow; but not them that have not. But who made it necessary that persons to be ordain'd should make such a vow? even they onely that made laws against the Clergies marriage; and because they durst not trust the laws which they made, they took order that men should be∣come a law unto themselves,* 1.1675 that they might be insnar'd to purpose. This vow was onely introduc'd in the Latine Church, and injoyn'd to all her Clergy. Injoyn'd, I say, against the nature of a vow, which if it be not vo∣luntary, is no vow; which includes desire in its very name and nature. But Orders doe not include this vow in their nature, and it were intolerable that men should be forc'd from their wives against both their wills: that's a per∣secution, not an ordination, and it is so far from being for the advantage of the Church, that it is expressly against a Commandement of God, that what he hath joyn'd, any man should separate: and yet we find many in the primitive Churches by force made Priests and Bishops against their wills.

S. Augustin was taken at Tagasta and made Priest whether he would or no, but he was not married; but another good man was. Pinianus, the husband of Melania, was ordain'd against his will and the tears of his wife. Pauli∣nianus, the brother of S. Hierom, was first made Deacon by Epiphanius, and then made Priest, and they were forc'd to stop his mouth that he might not deny it. And can it be thought that these men did in this violence make a vow of single life? or can these be fitting circumstances for a vow? But I shall not insist upon the particulars of this: because if they should make such a vow, yet if they found it to be a snare, and impossible to be kept, they had not onely leave, but a necessity to break it. If the vow was con∣strain'd and prov'd impossible, it was the less sin in the taking, and none in the breach of it. But if it was voluntary, it was rash, unless they had been sure the thing had been in their power; and then if it proves not to be so, the fault is not in the breach but in the undertaking.* 1.1676 Quod si perseverare nolunt, vel non possunt, melius est ut nubant, quam ut in ignem deliciis suis cadant; certè nullum fratribus aut sororibus scandalum faciant. So S. Cyprian advises the professed Virgins. If they will not, or cannot persevere, it is better that they marry, then fall into the fire and into burning; onely let them give no scandal,* 1.1677 meaning by their unchast lives. And Epiphanius expressly, Melius est lapsum à cursu palam sibi uxorem accipere secundum leges. If a man have undertaken a load too heavy, and fals with it, it is better to lay it aside, and openly to take a wife.* 1.1678 The same counsel is given by S. Hierom, by S. Austin, and by Alfonsus Virvesius a Divine of the Roman Church. To which I shall adde nothing of my own but this, That if the holy vow of marriage, appointed and confirm'd and accepted by God, may yet be dis∣pens'd with and annull'd, much more may the vow of virginity and single life. If the adultery of the wife makes the husbands vow and promise to be void; much more may his own adultery or fornication make void his vow of single life. If for the dishonour of his house, and the introduction of bastards into his temporal possessions, he is absolved from his vows of wedlock which God certainly did approve and appoint; much more may his vow be null when there is danger or ruine to his soul. A man may law∣fully live with an adulterous wife; and yet he may chuse, and his vow does not oblige him: but he cannot safely live with burnings, he cannot lawfully abide in fornication and uncleanness. For Who can dwell with the everlasting burning?

It were not unseasonable to consider the Ecclesiastical law against the second marriages of Priests, or the ordaining them who have married the second time. But this also relying upon the humor of men, who will be more pure then God, and more righteous then the law of Christ, and more wise then the Apostle, it may be determin'd by the same considerations. The law is a snare, * it is in an incompetent matter, * it is a restraint of that liberty which Christ hath left, * it cannot be fitted to time and place, and yet remain a law; because there are so many necessities to be served, and so many favourable cases to be consider'd, that the exceptions may be more then the Rule. * It may also be considered that to make second marri∣ages a cause of irregularity, or incapacity of receiving holy Order, is no∣thing but a secret accusation and an open reproach to marriage; * that it was not of use and avail in the primitive Church,* 1.1679 Tertullian witnessing, apud vos digami ubique praesident, in the Catholic Church Bishops twice married doe every where govern; that Cauterius a Spanish Bishop was twice

married; that S. Hierom affirms that all the world was full of such or dina∣tions, not only of Deacons and Priests,* 1.1680 but of Bishops, and that he could reckon so many as would excell the number of the Bishops conven'd in the Council of Ariminum; * that S. Augustin had fornicated with two several women, and yet he was made Priest and Bishop for all that; * and to deny that to holy marriages which is not denied to unholy fornications, will be a doctrine unfit for the honour of Christiana 1.1681 schools; * that the second marriage is as holy as the first; * that it may be as necessary * and as usefull; * that it is al∣ways as lawfull; * that the Canon of the Apostle, that a Bishop should be the husband of one wife, is intended against plurality of wives at once, and marrying after divorces, both which were usual amongst the Jews and Greeks and Romans, and could not at first be taken away from the new-converted Christians; * that it was so expound∣ed by S. Chrysostom,* 1.1682 Theodoret,b 1.1683 S. Hierom, and divers others, but especi∣ally by the Greek Fathers; * that not onely the first marriages are blessed by God, but the second and the third, as S. Austin observes; * that S. Cle∣mens of Alexandria affirmed, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Digamy after a vow to the contrary is an irregularity, not for the contact and conjunction, but for the lye; * that the Church of Rome does without scruple frequently ordain them that have been twice married, if they will pay the price appointed in the Chance∣ry tax,* 1.1684 as is witnessed by one that knew very well; * that if the Apostle had forbidden it by a Canon, yet that Canon did no more oblige the descending ages of the Church then the other Canons which we see broken in every Church, according to their reason or their liberty; * that in the Primitive Church they were not very sollicitous about the affaires of marriage, be∣cause they suppos'd the end of all things was at hand:* 1.1685 Crescite & multipli∣camini evacuavit extremitas temporis; * that it was a blot in the face of the Primitive Church that they would not blesse second marriages; * that it was most rationally and elegantly complained of by S.* 1.1686 Bernard; * that se∣cond marriages are not a signe of incontinence but the cure, * or if they were a signe of an incontinent body, they are a sure signe of a continent mind, that will at no hand admit any uncleannesse; * that a great liberty per∣mitted is infinitely to be preferr'd before a little prevarication of a Divine law, * and therefore that second marriages are to be permitted to the Cler∣gy, rather then evil thoughts, or the circles of an inward fire; * that the prohibition of the ordination of persons after the second marriages did rely upon the opinions of holinesse that was in the Ecclesiastical order above the lay purity, and the unholinesse of marriage in respect of single life; * that in whatsoever sense the former can be true, yet the latter is a branch of Montanisme, and a product of the heresy of Tatianus; * that Theodoret did ordain Irenaeus that was twice married; * that he defends the fact by the consent and suffrages of the Bishops of Phoenicia, * & saies that he insisted in the footsteps of his Ancestors, * & produces for his precedent, Alexander of Constantinople, Acacius of Beroea, and Praylus of Caesarea, who ordained Domnus after his second marriage; * that the chief of the Diocese of Pontus did so, * and all the Bishops of Palestine; * that they accounted it holy ac∣cording to the opinion and doctrine of their Nation, * for so we read in Maimonides,

Although a man have fulfilled the precept concerning the multiplication of mankind,* 1.1687 yet neverthelesse it is prescribed in the sayings of the Scribes, that no man should cease from the multiplication of his kind,

so long as he can well continue it; for whosoever shall adde a soul to Israel. is like him that buildeth up the world. And it is moreover in the sayings of the wise men, that a man should not keep a house without a wife, lest he be provok'd by lust.

* It may also be considered that he that burns had better marry, though he have been already married, and though he be a Bishop; * that the virgin or widow estate is no where commanded, but that in some cases marriage is, as in that of burning; * that in Scripture no cha∣stity or continence is requir'd of a Bishop but the Matrimonial; * that Abraham the Father of the faithfull was married again after the death of Sarah; * that S. Joseph the supposed Father of our B. Lord was by the Ancients said to be twice married; * and lastly, that it is confessed that the forbidding second marriages to the Clergy, and refusing to ordain such as have been twice married, is neither of the law of nature, nor any ar∣ticle of faith, nor any necessity of the Sacrament; it is onely a constitution of the Church, which as the Pope binds on, so he may take off as he please, as is affirmed bya 1.1688 Aquinas,b 1.1689 Durandus,c 1.1690 Gabriel Vasquez and others: and therefore this law also ought to be cancell'd; but if it be not annull'd by expresse revocation, it is unjust, and unreasonable, and unnecessary, and a snare to consciences, and is not the circumstance of a thing commanded, but of that which ought to be left at liberty, and therefore is no measure or proper band of conscience; but to us it is an obligation neither in conscience nor in law. But

Haec ideo volui nostris intexere chartis,* 1.1691 Ut quoties Patres….coeunt Sint memores, magno ad leges opus esse ferendas Ingenio, multis oculis, examine recto.

I have given these instances not onely to fix the Conscience in these great inquiries, but by these to explicate the measures of the Rule.

§. V. Of Ecclesiastical Laws of FAITH, or Articles of confession.

RULE XXI. The Catholic Church is a witnesse of Faith, and a record of all necessary truths; but not the Mi∣stresse and Ruler of our Creed; that is, cannot make any laws of Faith.

IN our inquiries of faith we doe not run to the Catholic Church desiring her to judge our questions;* 1.1692 for she can never meet together; and she is too great a body to doe single acts and make particular sentences: but to her we run for conduct, by inquiring what she believes, what she hath receiv'd from Christ and his Apostles. So that the Authority of the Catholic Church is resolved into Catholic tradition. Whatsoever can be made to ap∣pear to have been by the Apostles taught, & consigned to the Church, that is a law of faith. But of this I have already given accounts.* 1.1693 The Catho∣lic Church, taking in the Apostolical, that is, the Church of all ages, is a

witnesse beyond exception. For if she have the Spirit of God, if she love truth, and if she doe not consent to deceive her self, she cannot be deceiv'd in giving testimony concerning matter of fact and actual tradition: or if she could, yet we are excused in following that testimony, because we have no better, we have no other. Better then our best, and better then all we have, we cannot be oblig'd to use: but therefore we have the justice and the goodnesse, our own necessity and the veracity of God for our security, that this is a sure way for us to walk in. But then when this is reduc'd to pra∣ctice in matters of belief, it will come to this onely, That she bears witnesse to the Scriptures, that they are the word of God; but beyond what is con∣tain'd in Scripture, she hath no article of faith.

The consequent of this which I have largely prov'd and explicated in the place above cited,* 1.1694 is, that all her Sermons and all her explications of doctrines must be by that measure. If it be agreeable to Scripture, it is that which she hath received: but if she hath not received it, she cannot make a do∣ctrine, nor deliver a proposition with authority, nor oblige the conscience.

But this Rule if it be understood of the Catholic Church of this or any one present age,* 1.1695 will not signify so much: for unlesse the Tradition be delivered in a constant succession from the Apostles, the Church is not a certain witnesse, but makes her self a Judge of truth; which she can never doe, but by relating to the Scriptures, by shewing there it is, in the Code which she hath received. But when any doubt does arise concerning any matter of belief, the Catholic Church hath no solemn Court of judica∣ture or place of resort where a single person may goe for determination. And if a question be between Church and Church, as between Rome and England, the question is, which is the Catholic Church; for indeed nei∣ther of them is: and there is no such thing then as a Catholic Church to determine the question: as when the head and the belly, the mouth and the armes fell out, the whole body could not be judge of the controversy; but if they had had a rule, thither they might goe to be guided. And if it be asked, who shall expound the rule, there is no other answer to be given, but to desire men to be good and humble, to pray to God, and without par∣tiality to desire truth; and then every man will be able to answer his own question. For if the Rule be hard, it is hard to them that are not willing and soft and compliant; but not to the gentle and the humble, to them that fol∣low God in simplicity and whithersoever he will lead them.

But it is to be considered that the Church is a Net that hath in it ••ishes good and bad,* 1.1696 it is a field of corn and tares; and but that the Apostles were guided by an infallible spirit, there could have been no certainty: bu•• then after them there was no more to be look'd for; what they left we were to use, but to look for no more. For the Catholic Church never was since the Apostles time without error. By Catholic Church, I doe not mean the right believing part of the Church, (for in questions of faith the dis∣pute was which was the right believing part) but I mean all that professe the faith of Christ, who when they are divided will never allow the op∣posite party to be their Judge: and therefore it cannot be suppos'd that God should appoint one to be the Judge, who must always be suppos'd a party, and will never be accepted by the other, unlesse he had given infallibility to that one part, and we had all known it. To the Apostles he did, and

they were the fountains of tradition: but when they were gone, the onely way that was left was to see what they left, and to that every part was to conform; but neither part was Judge, except onely for themselves: and in this every part ought to be trusted, because they onely had the biggest con∣cern to take care that they be not deceived. No man or company of men was charged with them; every Government was charg'd with it's own care and conduct.

But I shall not insist upon this,* 1.1697 because it can be of no use in the con∣duct of conscience. Because if ever there be a dispute in the Church, there is no Catholic Church to which we can goe: and if we call that the Ca∣tholic Church which is the greater part, that may deceive us; for in the days of Elias almost all Israel had corrupted himself, and in the time of the Arrians almost all the world was Arrian; and at this day a very great part of the Catholic Church is stain'd with the horrible errors and follies of Popery: and besides our notices are so little and narrow of the belief of Christendome, our entercourses so small, our relations so false, our informa∣tions so partial, that it is not possible for us to know what is the belief of the major part. It is not known at this day by the Doctors of the Roman Church what is the practice of the Greek Churches in the Marriage of their Priests, nor what is their doctrine of Purgatory, nor of the processi∣on of the holy Ghost, as appears in their disputes & contrary narratives of these particulars. We cannot tell in England at this day whether the Lu∣theran Churches have right Ordinations and perfect succession of Bishops in their Churches. I have endeavoured very much to inform my self in the particular, and am not yet arrived to any certain notice of it. This therefore, to appeal to the sense of the major part of the Church in a que∣stion, will signify nothing at all as to our conscience.

Especially if to this we adde,* 1.1698 that the Churches have got a trick of Empire and imposing their sometimes false, and always unnecessary arti∣cles upon all of their communion; and then the faith of the Church will depend upon the opinion of the chief and principals: and then their belief will be like a rumour spread from a few mouths into the ears of millions, who, though they all tell the same story, yet are no more credible for their multitude then the first reporters were for their authority. Nay in most places men dare not speak what they think, and dare not believe what they find dangerous, and dare not inquire into what they dare not disbelieve; so that if you had been at Trent and ask'd the Fathers, it would have signified nothing: for whatever their belief was, they were born down by the Con∣gregations, and the Congregations by the Legates, and the Legates by the Pope; and that's the Catholic Church.

It remains therefore that we are from the Catholic Church to ex∣pect no other determination of our questions,* 1.1699 but by conveying to us no∣tice of the doctrines Apostolical. And this is often and largely discours'd and taught bya 1.1700 S. Irenaeus, by S. Clementb 1.1701 in Euse∣bius, byc 1.1702 Tertullian, byd 1.1703 Origen,e 1.1704 S. Cyprian,f 1.1705 S. A∣thanasius, g 1.1706 S. Basil,h 1.1707 Epiphanius,i 1.1708 S. Hierom,k 1.1709 S. Austin, andl 1.1710 Vincentius Lirinensis: what they could derive from the fountains Apostolical by a clear chanel and conduit, that was first, and that was true,

and that was in the rule, and that was the measure of faith. And there∣fore when in the Council of Ephesus the Epistle of Capreolus the Bishop of Carthage was read for the establishment of antiquity, and the reproof of the new doctrines, all the Bishops cried out, Hae omnium voces sunt, haec omnes dicimus, hoc omnium votum est. This was the voice of them all, they all said the same thing: and what was that which they all affirm'd, nisi ut quod erat antiquitus traditum, teneretur? quod adinventum nuper, explo∣deretur? saith Vincentius, that what is ancient and at first deliver'd, that should be held; that which is lately invented should be exploded. For the Church cannot determine questions by way of judgment and authority, but by way of attestation, and as a witnesse onely of the doctrine Aposto∣lical. There is nothing else necessary, and nothing else is practicable.

RULE XXII. The Decrees of General Councils are of great use in the Conduct of Conscience, but not the proper measure, or last determination of matters of be∣lief.

I Before* 1.1711 considered Councils as they had acquir'd an accidental autho∣rity by the veneration of their age,* 1.1712 and their advantage of having been held in the elder ages of the Church: Now I consider them in their own proper and immediate pretence. I then consider'd them in order to Go∣vernment, but now in order to faith: for Councils Ecclesiastical have pre∣tended to a power over the conscience, so as to require both the obedience of the will, and the obedience of the understanding. Concerning which I am to say, that Nothing can oblige to Divine faith but a Divine autho∣rity: to which Councils can no more pretend for being General, then for being Provincial; and to which great assemblies have no other title or pre∣tence of promise then the private congregations of the faithfull, who though but two or three, yet shall be assisted by the Divine presence. But General Councils are so wholly of humane institution, that though by the dictate of right reason and natural wisedome they are to be conven'd; yet to make them a formal judicatory, and to give them a legislative power or a dominion and magistery in faith, there are so many conditions requir'd both to their indiction and convention, to their constitution and integrity, to their conduct and proceeding, to their conclusion and determination, that men are not to this day agreed about any one of them; and therefore they cannot be a legal judicatory obliging any but them that doe consent, and so oblige themselves.

But yet they are of great use for inquiry and consultation:* 1.1713 and there∣fore Eusebius speaking of Constantine the Emperour,* 1.1714 says of him, Conci∣lium generale tanquam Dei exercitum instruens, in unum locum coegit. A Ge∣neral Council is God's army; and being a representative of the Church in the same degree as it is General and rightly called, and rightly order'd, and rightly proceeding, it partakes of the Churches appellation; it is acies

ordinata, terrible as an army with banners. Let them be as many as it hap∣pens, in the multitude of Counsellors there is safety; that is, they are more likely to understand truth then single persons, for they are not so soon pre∣judic'd and corrupted: as a river is harder to be poyson'd or to be turn'd aside, then a pail of water or a dish-full; but if it be, it is so much the worse. But if they proceed rightly they are excellent helps, and some of them have done great good to the Church, and some have done great mischief; and which have, and which have not, we are to inquire by other instru∣ments: so that we are to judge concerning them, and then they are to be guides to us; that is, we consider which are fittest to be followed, of which we judge by General and extrinsic considerations, and then we follow them in the particular inquiry; that is, we follow them because we think they followed the Apostles, and were faithfull witnesses of their doctrine. Which indeed is an excellent benefit which we may receive by the first and most Ancient Councils, which were near the fountains: they could trace all the new pretences up to their original, they discussed the doctrines in their pro∣vinces, they heard what any one could say, they carried it to the General as∣sembly, they compared it with the tradition and doctrine of other Chur∣ches, and all together were able very well to tell how the Apostles had taught the Churches of their foundation. And because the four first Ge∣neral Councils did, or are suppos'd to have done so, therefore they have acquir'd a great, but an accidental authority, and are accepted by the most part of Christendome, and made into humane laws of faith, and the mea∣sures of heresy. Such use as this the conscience can make of the Anci∣ent Councils; but beyond this or some such good use as this the conscience is at no hand oblig'd to follow their determinations as the sentence of a competent judge, but as of an authentick witnesse, when it can appear or be credible that it can be so, and is so. And this was the very thing that S. Athanasius affirm'd of the Nicene Council,* 1.1715 Siquidem Nicaena Synodus non temere habita est, ut quae habeat gravissimos usus & legitimam rationem. The Nicene Synod was of great use. They met about the question of Easter and the Arian heresy. Sed in negotio Paschatis non abhorruerunt ab istiusmodi appendice. Ibi enim placuit ut adderetur, Visum est ut omnes ob∣temperarent. De Fide verò non scripserunt, Visum est; sed ad istum modum, Credit Catholica Ecclesia: & statim confessio ipsa credendi adjuncta est, ut ostenderent eam non esse novam sententiam, sed Apostolicam, & quae ipsi scrip∣sissent non esse sua inventa, sed Apostolorum documenta. But in the matter of Easter, because it was a ritual, and the circumstance of time and the unity of order, they decreed, that every one should obey. But in the matter of Faith they did not write so, that they appointed every one to obey, but in this manner, The Catholick Church believes: and then they adjoyn'd the confession of Faith, to shew that the doctrine was not new, but that it was Apostolical, it was that which they wrote, but nothing of a later birth. To any other purpose neither the Council of Nice nor the Council of Ariminum is of any use or authority: save onely it is the sentence of so many men, and is to be received according to the credibility of the men, or the reasonablenesse of the article.

But then let it be considered,* 1.1716 to what the authority of a Council will amount according to the sentence of most men. The Doctors of the Church of Rome (a few onely expected) say that a Council, if it be not con∣firmed by the Pope, hath no authority. Upon this account, if they say true, every Council is fallible, and therefore no rule or guide of faith: for

unlesse it can be deceiv'd, why should it be submitted to the judgment of the Pope? and if it can be deceived, it cannot bind, because it cannot secure the conscience. But the others that are not of the Roman party say, a Council is then not deceiv'd, when it delivers the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, and speaks consonantly to Scriptures: and if a single Doctor does so, he is to be believ'd. What then? wheres the difference? This onely is it, That it is more likely a Council shall find out the truth, and re∣port the tradition; and if we be to chuse our faith by guesse and probability, a Council is better then a single Doctor, by so much as there are many more then one Doctor in it. But this will onely serve the turn till men are willing or at leisure to inquire: this onely excepted; because few men can judge, and most men are rul'd by others, all such persons can have nothing better to rule and determine them then a General Council: but then it is an argument of reason, and not of authority; it is not because they are bound, but because it is most reasonable in their circumstances.

I should here have considered of what authority the writings of the* 1.1717 Fathers are to the interpretation of Scripture and the conduct of con∣science: but because I find onely the same use of them as of other learned men in all ages of the Church, save onely in those things where they are witnesses of the Apostolical doctrines, to which they best can give testimo∣ny who are the most Ancient,* 1.1718 and because themselves disclaim any autho∣rity in matters of faith, and call to be tried by the word of God; I had ra∣ther this thing should be read in others then in my self: because it is matter of envy and reproach to tell why they cannot be relied upon; and to adde more reputation to that authority which they have acquir'd by many inter∣vening causes, by reason, and by unreasonablenesse, would be matter of danger, and sometimes the causes of error, and very often of a deceitfull confidence. But who please may see this uncertainly disputed, and never concluded to any certaintly, by* 1.1719 Cajetan on one side, and Melchior Canus on the other. He may also consider the saying of the† 1.1720 Bishop of Bitonto, that he preferr'd the sentence of one Pope before a thousand Hieroms, and a thousand Augustines & Gregories; and that every side declines their arbitra∣tion when they speak against them: by which it appears that no side supposes themselves to be bound in conscience to follow them.

But the best use of them is that which the Church of England hath describ'd in one of her ancient Canons,* 1.1721 that her Bishops and Priests should teach nothing nisi quod ex doctrina Veteris & Novi Testamenti veteres Pa∣tres & Ecclesiae Episcopi collegerint, but what the Fathers & ancient Bishops of the Church have gathered out of the doctrine of the Old and New Testament: which Canon gives a very good answer to this inquiry if we should enter into it. For it declares that the Fathers are so far to be followed as they follow Scripture, and that their writings are of great use for the reproof of new doctrines: and certainly if Preachers were confin'd to this measure, possibly we might misse some truths which now it may be we find; but it is certain we should escape very many errors. For the rest, I refer my reader to the Archbp. of Spalato de rep. Eccles. lib. 7. c. 6. to Rivet's Prolegomena to his Criticus Sacer, to Daniel Tossanus his Synopsis de legendis Patribus, to Gregory de Valentia his analysis fidei, to Bishop Morton his Catholick Apolo∣gy, and to D Whittaker de Script, authoritate. In this whole affair the con∣science is at liberty, and therefore I am here to inquire no further.

RULE XXIII. Subscription to articles and formes of confession in any particular Church, is wholly of Political con∣sideration.

WHen forms of confession are made,* 1.1722 & public articles established, it is of great concernment not onely to the reputation of the Govern∣ment, but to the unity and peace of that Christian community, that they be not publicly oppos'd. To this purpose we find so many subscriptions to the Decrees of Councils, by Princes and Prelates and Priests and Dea∣cons, by Prefects of Cities and Governours of Countries; it was an in∣strument of unity and peace, a declaration of their consent, and at no hand to be reprov'd, unlesse it be in a false article, or with tyranny to consciences, or to maintain a faction. But that which the Government looks after is, that no new Religions be introduc'd to the public disturbance; of which the Romans were so impatient, that they put to death a Noble Lady, Pom∣ponia Graecina,* 1.1723 utpote novae cujusdam religionis ream, saith Tacitus, as being guilty of a new religion. Now to prevent this, Subscription is invented, that is, an attestation of our consent; which if it be requir'd by the supreme authority, it may be exacted in order to peace and unity: and Tacitus tells that Apudius Muraena was degraded from the dignity of a Senator because he refus'd to subscribe to the laws of Augustus. This is the same case, for subscription serves no other end but that which is necessary in Govern∣ment. We find in Polydore Virgil that the Ancient Kings of England at their inauguration,* 1.1724 Silicem tenebant juraturi per Jovem, se religionem & ritus Patrios retenturos, haec verba loquentes, Si sciens fallo, tunc me Di∣espiter salvâ urbe arcéque bonis omnibus ejiciat; They swore by Jupiter that they would keep the religion and their Country rites, and curs'd themselves if they did not. This was more then Ecclesiastical subscription: for that bound them to it for ever; this onely gives witnesse of our present consent, but according to it's designe and purpose, for the future it binds us onely to the conservation of peace and unity.

For though it may be very fitting to subscribe a confession of articles,* 1.1725 yet it may be very unfit that we swear always to be of the same mind; for that is either a profession of infallibility in the authority, or in the article, or else a direct shutting our heart against all further clarity and manifesta∣tions of the truths of God. And therefore subscription ought to be so in∣tended, that he who hath subscrib'd may not perceive himself taken in a snare: but yet he that subscribes must doe it to those purposes and in that sense and signification of things which the supreme power intends in his commanding it; that is, at least, that he who subscribes does actually ap∣prove the articles over-written; that he does at that time believe them to be such as it is said they are; true, if they onely say they are true, usefull, if they pretend to usefulnesse, necessary, if it be affirm'd that they are ne∣cessary. For if the subscriber believes not this, he by hypocrisy serves the ends of public peace and his own preferment.

But this whole affair is to be conducted with some warinesse,* 1.1726 lest there come more evil by it then there can come good. And therefore al∣though when articles are fram'd, the Sons of the Church ought to sub∣scribe them for public peace, in case they doe heartily approve them; yet such articles ought not to be made and impos'd, unlesse they of themselves be necessary, and plain by a Divine Commandement. And this was the advice of Melanchthon.* 1.1727 Ut sit igitur discordiarum finis, rectè facit potestas obligans homines ut obtemperent, quando alioqui parere est necesse, The su∣preme power may then command men to subscribe to such articles, which it is necessary that they should believe. But if God have not commanded us to believe them, no humane power can command us to professe them.

Beyond what is necessary or very usefull,* 1.1728 unlesse peace be concerned in the publication of the article and it's establishment, it is but weakly and impertinently concerned in the subscription. For if the peace of the Church be safe without the article, how can it be concern'd in the consent to it and profession of it, excepting onely by an accidental and a necessity superinduc'd by themselves and their own imprudent forwardnesse, or itch of Empire over consciences? If an article be contested publicly, and is grown into parties and factions, and these factions cannot be appeased with∣out decision of the question, then the conformity is as usefull to peace as the sentence and determination was; and then there is nothing else to be considered, but that the article be true, or believ'd to be so. But to them that are so perswaded, it is necessary they obey, if they be requir'd to sub∣scribe; and the supreme power hath authority to require it, because it is one of their greatest duties, to govern and to rule in peace. But these things can seldome happen thus without our own fault: but when they doe, there is inconvenience on all sides; but that which is least must be chosen.

When articles are established without necessity,* 1.1729 subscription must be requir'd without tyranny and imperiousnesse. That is, it must be left to the liberty of the subject to professe or not to professe that doctrine. The reason is plain. In things not certain in themselves no man can give a law to the conscience, because all such laws must clearly be Divine Commande∣ments: but if the conscience cannot be bound to the article, and the professi∣on serves no necessary end of the Common-wealth, then God does not bind, and man cannot: and therefore to bring evil upon men that doe not believe the article, and dare not professe to believe what they doe not, is injustice and oppression, it is a law of iniquity; and therefore it is not obligatory to conscience, and no humane authority is sufficient for the sanction and impo∣sition. Socrates was wont to say,* 1.1730 Sacramentum oblatum duabus de causis fide firmandum: vel ut teipsum à turpi suspicione liberes, vel ut amicos ex magnis periculis eripias. When you are requir'd to give faith and security by a sa∣crament, oath or subscription, there are two cases in which you must not refuse: when thou thy self art suspected, and canst no otherwise purge thy self; and when any of thy relations is in danger, that is, when it is for good to thy self or thy friends. But when there is no necessity of faith, and no public need to be served, the causes that besides these injoyn subscription are fond persuasions, and indiscreet zeal, and usurped Empire over con∣sciences: in which cases the Ecclesiastic state hath no power to give Com∣mandements; and if the Civil state does, they oblige to suffering calamity,

but not to any other conformity, and then it is a direct state of persecution.

Upon the account of this Rule it hath been of late inquir'd,* 1.1731 whether it can be lawfull for any man to subscribe what he does not believe to be true, giving his hand to public peace, and keeping his conscience for God.

But to this the answer is easy,* 1.1732 if subscription does signify approbati∣on; for in that case it is hypocrisy, and a denying to confesse with the mouth, what we believe with the heart. But if subscription were no more then the office of the Clerk of the Signet or of a Council, who in form of law is to signe all the acts of Council, then the consideration were different. For he that is a public officer, and interposes the signature of the Court, not as the account of his own opinion, but as a formality of the Court, all the world looks upon it as none of his personal act, but as a solennity of law, or an attestation of the act of the Council. But in subscription to articles of confession, or censure of Propositions as heretical, every Ecclesiastic that subscribes does it for himself, and not for the Court. Lubens & ex animo subscripsi: that's our form in the Church of England. Consentiens sub∣scripsi: so it was in the ancient Councils,* 1.1733 as S. Austin reports; I consent to the thing, My mind goes along with it. But in this case the whole affair is put to issue in this one particular, which I touch'd upon before. If the in∣tention of the Superior be to require our assent to be testified by subscripti∣on, he that subscribes does professe his assent, and whatever he thinks him∣self, it is the intention of the imposer that qualifies the subscription. S. Austin tels of a Senator that upon his parol went to treat for his ransome or exchange,* 1.1734 and promised to return to them again in case he could not ef∣fect it. But he going from the army pretended to have forgot something, and came back presently, and then departed. But telling his story to the Roman Senate, and pretending himself quit of his promise because he went back presently, they drave him out of the Senate; because they regarded not what he had in his head, but that which the enemy intended when they made him swear to return.

But the effect of these considerations will be this,* 1.1735 That no particular Church ought with rigor to require subscriptions to articles which are not evidently true, and necessary to be profess'd; because in the division of hearts that is in the world, it is certain that some good men may dissent, and then either they shall be afflicted, or be tempted to hypocrisy: of either of which if Ecclesiastic laws be guilty, they are not for edification, they are neither just nor pious, and therefore oblige not.

But if for temporal regards the supreme power doe require subscripti∣on,* 1.1736 those temporal regards must be complied with, so that the spiritual in∣terest of souls and truth be secur'd. And therefore the next good thing to the not imposing uncertain and unnecessary articles is, that great regard be had, and great ease be done to wise and peaceable dissenters.

And at last,* 1.1737 in such cases, let the articles be made with as great latitude of sense as they can; and so that subscriptions be made to the form of words, let the subscribers understand them in what sense they please which the truth of God will suffer, and the words can be capable of. This is the

last remedy, but it is the worst; it hath in it something of craft, but very little of ingenuity; and if it can serve the ends of peace, or of external cha∣rity, or of a phantastic concord, yet it cannot serve the ends of truth and holinesse, and Christian simplicity.

CHAP. V^th. Of Laws Domestic: or the power which Fathers of Fami∣lies have to bind the Consciences of their Relatives.

RULE I. Children are bound to obey the laws and Com∣mandements of their Parents in all things dome∣stical, and in all actions personal relating to the family, or done within it.

THE word of the Commandement is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifies to be or to make weighty;* 1.1738 but in Piel it signifies to honour, that is, Honour your Parents, and doe not lightly account of them: But in Levit. 19. 3. the word is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 fear thy Mother and thy Father. They signify the same event of things, for a reverential fear is honour, and they both imply obe∣dience. And there are three great endearments of this which make it necessary, and make it as absolute as it can be. The one is that our Parents are to us in the place of God:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

said the Greek Comedy,* 1.1739 Suppose your Parents to be to you as God. Haec enim paternitas est nobis Sacramentum & imago Divinae paternitatis, ut discat cor humanum in eo principio quod videt, quid debeat illi principio à quo est, & quod non videt. For the Fathers power is a Sacrament and image of the Divine Paternity, that a man may learn by the principle of his Being which he sees, what he owes to the principle of his Being which he sees not: and Plato saies there is no image by which we can worship God so well as our Fathers,* 1.1740 our Grandfathers and our Mothers. And therefore it is impiety to dishonour or disobey our Parents, and it is piety when we pay our duty to them. The same word signifies religion to God, which expresses this du∣ty. Parentes not amare,* 1.1741 impietas est; non agnoscere, insaniae. For as there are two great crimes which we commit properly against God, Impiety or Irre∣ligion, and Atheisme: so there are these two crimes against our Parents. He that does not honour and revere them is impious or irreligious; and he that will not acknowledge them is Atheistical, that is, like the Atheists, he denies the principle of his Being. And therefore upon that of Virgil,

Huc Pater O Lenaee veni—* 1.1742

Servius observes that the Heathens called all their Gods by the name of Fathers: and an injury done to our Father is said to be done to God, accor∣ding to that of Menander,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

He that reviles and speaks evil of his Father* 1.1743, does blas∣pheme God; for

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

God is the Great Father of the world, and therefore he hath by great∣est religion immur'd the Fathers honour.

Et Jovis imperium & chari praecepta parentis, Edocet….

Next to God is our duty to our Father.

2. The second endearment of our duty,* 1.1744 obedience and regard to pa∣rents, is gratitude; which here hath the greatest obligation, and is to this purpose remark'd by all laws and by all wise men of the World.

Omnis in Ascanio chari stat cura Parentis.

All their love and all their care is for their dear boy. The child is a part of his parents, a tender part, but under custody and a guard; and the state of descent and succession from parents or children is called Suitas in the law: and there is so much of a Father in his child, that if a Father and a Son be partners in a crime, and refuse to confesse it before torments, the law commands the Son first to be tormented; Charles the second, the Em∣peror, did so; as knowing that the Father will confesse rather then endure to see his son tormented: and when the Father does confesse upon the tor∣ment of his son,* 1.1745 the Father is said to be confessus in tormentis, said Baldus, he confessed in his own torments. And as long as the Son is in prison, the Fa∣ther is not accounted free in law: and the Fathers sins are then punish'd, when the child is made sick, or unfortunate. So that the government of children is no otherwise then as a mans will governs his own hand & foot; over which, always supposing him to abide within the limits and inclinations of nature, that is, to love and cherish them, and in no sense to hate them, in all other he hath an intire power of command.

3. The third endearment of childrens obedience is the power of bles∣sing and cursing which God hath given to Parents,* 1.1746 and which himself by his providence and great Oeconomy will verify. The Fathers blessing establisheth the houses of children* 1.1747 but the curse of the Mother rooteth out foun∣dations, saith Ben-Sirach. And S. Paul exhorting children to obey their pa∣rents,* 1.1748 saies it is the first Commandement with promise, that is, the first to which any special promise is annexed, the promise of longaevity in the land of promise. Benedictio merces obedientiae est, saith Elias Cretensis, The Fathers blessing is the reward of the sons obedience. But it is observable that the original word in the fifth Commandement is of active significati∣on, Honour thy Father and thy Mother that they may prolong thy days upon the Earth; that is, saith Paulus Fagius, thy parents are Gods ministers and instruments, the chanels and conveyances of the Divine blessing: for God hears the prayers of Fathers and Mothers blessing their obedient children, or cursing their disobedience;* 1.1749 insomuch that Ezekiel reckons their disobe∣dience to their parents to be to the Jewes the cause of their banishment from their own Country. Suidas tells that Leontius the Bishop of Tripolis in Lydia seeing his onely son of an ill nature and apt to mischief, prayed

to God that his son might die yong, lest he should fall into impiety: and God heard the Fathers prayer.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

The curses of parents are grievous upon the earth.* 1.1750 And this was observed a∣mong the Heathens in the sad examples of the children of O Edipus, Amin∣tor and Theseus, who grew miserable upon their Fathers curses; and there∣fore Telemachus was afraid to cast his Mother out of Ulysses house, lest she should curse him. And this was it that brought servitude or slavery into the world; God having in one of the fountains of mankind, in the great Patriarch of the world, consign'd a sad example that for ever children should be afraid to dishonour their parents, and discover their nakednesse, or re∣veal their turpitude, their follies and dishonours.

To these I need not adde their natural necessity,* 1.1751 their disability to help themselves, their obnoxiousnesse to every evil, their defencelesse condition, the miseries and calamities and infirmities by their want of wisedome, all which at first doe infinitely endeare obedience, and make it necessary: but I remember that this very thing was of great value amongst the Ancients, and they did use to tell this fable to their children to teach them to obey their parents.

An old Lion, amongst other precepts that he gave his son, charg'd him that he should never fight with a Man, because if he was not too strong, he would at least be too crafty. The young Lion heard him, but regarded him not, but therefore as soon as ever he was full grown, hastens abroad to seek a man to be his enemy. He came into a field, and saw a yoke of oxen standing ready furnish'd to plow, and ask∣ing them if they were men, they said, No, but that a man had put those yokes upon them. He left them and went aside, and espying a horse bridled and tied to a tree, ask'd if he were a man. He was answer'd, No, but a man had bridled him, and would by and by come to ride him, for a man was his Master. At last he finds a man cleaving wood, and ask'd him: and finding him to be so, told him he must then prepare to fight with him. The man told him, With all his heart, but first desired him to help to draw the wedge out of that tree, and then he would. The yong Lion thrusts in his paws, and a little opens the tree till the wedge fell out, and the tree clos'd upon his feet by it's returning violence. The man seeing the lion fastned, and the lion seeing himself entrap'd, the man cried out to his Neighbours to come to his help; and the lion to escape his danger tore his feet from the tree, and left his nailes and bloud be∣hind him, and returning with shame and smart to his old Father said to him, Mi Pater, si paruissem monitis tuis ungulas non amisissem, I had not lost my nailes if I had obeyed my Fathers commandement.

For the com∣mandements of parents being for the good of their children, he cannot be prosperous that will not obey his Father. That was their meaning.

But concerning the duty it self there is no question;* 1.1752 nothing is plain∣er, nothing is easier: but concerning the limits and administration of this power there is very great difficulty; the Scripture speaking either indefi∣nitely or universally, either of which does equally need a limit and specifi∣cation. Children, obey your parents in all things, saith S. Paul: and if that all were absolutely all, there were no difficulty in the understanding it; but infinitely difficult it would be to observe it, and reconcile it with our other duties and just interests. And just so is that law which by the consent of all

the world is represented as universally, Liberi quacunque in re parentibus dicto audientes sunto;* 1.1753 and he in the Comedy, Pater adsum, Impera quodvis, neque tibi ero in mora, Here am I my Father, Command me any thing, nei∣ther will I resist. But this any thing and this every thing, is but any thing and every thing of a certain kind; which if we can establish upon certain measures, we have one great line more for the conduct of conscience. The Divines and Lawyers reduce the issues of this relation to three heads, 1. Reverence, 2. Animadversion, 3. Piety.

Of Reverence to Parents.

And first it is certain whatever can be signified by honour and fear and reverence is the duty of children;* 1.1754 that is, so far as to think honoura∣bly of them, to speak well of them, to conceal their faults, to excuse them to others, to comport themselves with reverence and great regard before them.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

Above all things have your parents in honour: and this is to be express'd ac∣cording as the parents shall require, and according to the customes of the nation and the most pious and obedient in it; for vultu quoque laedi pieta∣tem, was an old rule, A child may be rude and undutifull in his very looks; and he deserves to be punished with blindnesse, qui parentum vultus torvo visu despexerit, & elatis oculis laeserit pietatem, saith S. Hierom, who by proud looks and scornfull eyes is impious to his parents. But this duty is well describ'd by Theophilus to Autolycus, Sanctum & laudabile censetur, non solùm apud Deum sed & apud homines, videlicet ut in simplicitate & absque omni malitia subjiciamur parentibus. Children must be subject to their parents without all malice perversenesse, and in all simplicity, that is, ••ngenuity of words and manners. And when Ptolemy asked one of the 72 translators of the Bible how a son should pay due thankfulnesse to his parents, he was answer'd, Si nullâ re illos tristitiâ affeceris, If you grieve them in nothing. That's the surest measure.

The next thing that is also certain in this is,* 1.1755 that all the good Coun∣sels and precepts of holinesse and wisedome which the parents give, it is ne∣cessary the children should observe; and besides that the not observing them is a sin against the special Commandements, it is also a sin of disobedience, and a rebellion against the Fathers authority. So the Father in the Comedy urges his authority,

Feceris par tuis caeteris factis,* 1.1756 Patrem Tuum si percoles per pietatem. Nolo ego cum improbis te viris, Gnate mi, neque in via, neque in foro ullum sermonem exequi. Haec noctes diesque tibi canto ut caveas …..meo modo, & moribus vivito antiquis: Quae ego tibi praecipio, haec facito: haec tibi Si mea Imperia capesses, multa bona in pectore consident.

Keep good company, avoid the debaucheries of the present times, live as I command, and as your forefathers did live; and if to these purposes you sub∣mit to my government, good things shall dwell within you.

But we find amongst the Ancients some little instances of this honour and reverence besides obedience specified.* 1.1757 The Ancients would not with∣out leave goe from the presence of their Father: so he in the Comedy,

—neque latebrosè me abs tuo Conspectu occultabo—* 1.1758

* They would not conceal from their parents the entercourses and acci∣dents of their youth, their amours, their mistresses, their designes of mar∣riage, their little plots, and advantages or disadvantages.

Quae fert adolescentia Ea ne me celet consuefeci filium:

that is, they accounted it part of the honour due to their parents, to tell them truth in all things where they were interrogated, or suspected.

Nam qui mentiri aut fallere insuerit Patrem,* 1.1759 aut Audebit, tanto magis audebit caeteros.

He that lies before his Father dishonours him, and commits two sins; he transgresses two commandements. * Adde to this, they counted it impie∣ty to steal any thing from their parents.* 1.1760

Egon' Patri surripere possim quidquam tam cauto seni? Atque adeo si facere possem, pietas prohibet.

That is, whatever was a single injury if done to a stranger,* 1.1761 was double if committed against their parents: for as to doe good to them was piety as well as charity, it was religion and justice too; so to doe any evil to them is to doe them dishonour, and expressely against the fifth Commandement. These are the first general measures, and the indication of very many par∣ticulars.

But there is one great measure more,* 1.1762 and that is, that specification of the duties of this Commandement which we find in the laws of Nations and the consent of all wise men, and particularly of those with whom we doe converse, and by whom we are governed. For our parents have a double power over us, one by the law of Nature, and the other by the Ci∣vil law; that is, there are some duties which children doe owe to their pa∣rents, which are primely and indispensably necessary, others which are spe∣cifications and instances of a general duty, but such which may suffer in∣crease and diminution, but are necessary by virtue of a Divine Commande∣ment when they are bound upon us by the laws of our Country; because these are of the nature of those things whose natures can be chang'd by be∣coming laws, and are reduc'd under the Category of their proper ver∣tues. The particulars I shall draw out of the laws of Nations, from the Civil and Canon laws, reducing them to distinct rules shall describe their several obligations of the conscience: and they relate to the other two parts of parental power, signified by Castigation and Piety.

Of Castigation, or the Coercitive power of Parents. RULE II. Fathers have a power to chastise their offending children, but not a power of life and death.

IN the laws of Romulus and Numa,* 1.1763 Fathers had a power three times to sell their children, and a power to put them to death in certain cases: and they attribute much of the prosperity of their city to this permission, no∣thing being a better instrument to make good citizens, then by making them good sons: it being very unlikely that ever he should command well abroad, that knows not well how to obey at home.

Quicunque patrem timet ac reveretur, Hic in bonum civem evadet proculdubio,

said Timocles, He that fears and obeys his Father, without a good citizen* 1.1764. And therefore it was observed by Dionysius Halicarnasseus that amongst the Greeks, Contu∣macy, Impiety and Parricide were very common; and he gives this rea∣son, because Charondas, Pittacus and Solon did by their laws give the Fathers no great power over their children. But I said that the Ro∣mans did, and those great examples of Titus Manlius, C. Flaminius, C. Cassius, who put their sons to death, were indeed very severe, but did imprint great terrors upon all the Roman youth. Bodinus thinks this to be a natural and unalterable power; and Aerodius supposes that God would not have commanded Abraham to kill his son, but that it was a part of his ordinary and inherent power; and when Judah commanded his daughter in law Thamar to be brought forth and burn'd for her adultery, it gave indication that he by his supreme paternal power in the family had power of life and death. And of this there is no question in the heads of families, where the Father is a Patriarch, the fountain of his nation, or of his society, and under the command of no superior: for the paternal power is the fountain of the Royal; and Abimelech was nothing but the King my Father.

But when families were multiplied,* 1.1765 though Fathers were fitter to be trusted with the severest power then any other sort of interested persons, yet because this might fall into disorder, God was pleas'd in the law of Moses so to order this affair, that the Fathers power should not be dimi∣nished, & yet the execution of it and the declaration of the sentence should be trusted to the Judge. For if a Father found his son stubborn, rebelli∣ous, disobedient, a glutton or a drunkard, all which are personal crimes, and against the private authority and counsel of the Father,* 1.1766 the Father and the Mother might delate him to the Judge, and without further proof but their own testimony he was to be ston'd to death. Drunkennesse & gluttony were in no other cases capital in the law of Moses, but when joyn'd with rebellion or disobedience to their parents. And like to this proceeding in Moses law was the processe in the Persian Monarchy. For Aelian tells that when

Rhaco the Mardian brought Cartomes his son with his hands bound behind him to Artaxerxes, desiring that the Prince would command him to be slain, because he was impudent, he was naught, he was a villain; the Persian King ask'd him if he could find in his heart to see his son die with violence. The Father replied, I have in my garden a goodly lettice, fat and wanton and full of leaves. When I find any of them luxuriant, proud and exor∣bitant, though it be a part of the body I cut it off; and so I doe to what∣soever is bitter and superfluous, and my lettice is the sweeter for it, it does not bewail the losse of it's bad leaves, but thrives the better. Think the same of me, O King; for though he be par'd away that hurts my family, that gives ill example to his Brothers, my stock will be the more thriving, florid and fruitfull in all good things.] By this instance we perceive that when Fathers had not power to put to death their rebellious children, they could require it of the Prince, who was to proceed summarily and meerly upon the Fathers instance. And we find in the French Annals that Stephen Boslée the President of Paris impal'd a yong fellow because his Mother said that she could by no arts or labour keep him from being a thief.

But this went off very much in the manners of men; and children were by other means restrain'd ordinarily,* 1.1767 before things were brought to that extremity;* 1.1768 and in the Civil law parents were forbidden to kill their children, and this law hath prevail'd in all Christendome, excepting that a man is in some places permitted to kill his daughter if he sees her in un∣chast Embraces. But in stead of these great excesses of power, there is left to Christian parents nothing but a decent castigation in the lesser and single faults, and disinherison in case of great and persevering. That children are to submit to the animadversions and chastisements of their Fathers is the voice of nature, and of all Nations, of Scripture and right Reason. So S. Paul,* 1.1769 We have had Fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: and Ben-Sirach teaches us, In opere & sermone & omni pati∣entia honora Patrem tuum,* 1.1770 Honour thy Father in thy work and in thy word, and in all patience, so the Vulgar Latin reads it; that is, suffer what he im∣poses upon you: and this was it which the yong Greek that Plutarch speaks of had learn'd in Zeno's school, Didici Patris iram ferre; I have learn'd (saith he) patiently to bear my Fathers anger. The authority is plain; the mea∣sures of it are onely, that it be done for amendment; that is, that it be dis∣cipline, not anger and revenge, and that it be done with charity and mode∣ration, which is signified by S.* 1.1771 Paul, Parents, provoke not your children to wrath; which precept he repeats, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1772 give them no opprobrious words, no contumelious and provoking language, and there∣fore much lesse any cruel and undecent castigations.

Pudore & liberalitate liberos Retinere satius esse credo,* 1.1773 quam metu. Hoc patrium est, potius consuefacere filium Suâ sponte rectè facere, quam alieno metu. Hoc Pater ac Dominus interest: hoc qui nequit, Fateatur se nescire imperare liberis.

A Master governs by fear, & a Father by love, & both by their authority: but the gentle way is the Fathers method; but if he will use the severe, he hath authority to doe it, and right or wrong he must be suffered, till the evil be insufferable, and then he may decline it, but ever with reverence to his Fathers honour; for indeed against a Fathers tyranny there is no aid, no

remedy, no intercession, but by an appeal to the common Father, the chief of all the tribes and all the families. This onely I am to adde, That as Fa∣thers have not a power of life and death over their children; so neither are they lightly to use that power which they have, and is next to this, that is, that I may use S.* 1.1774 Ambrose his expression, ne laesa pietas Patris ulciscatur se exhaeredatione vel abdicatione contumacis generis, a power of disinherison is not to be us'd for every great offence, much lesse for a litte. Pater, nisi magnae & multae injuriae patientiam evicerint,* 1.1775 nisi plus est quod timet quam quod damnat, non facile accedit ad decretorium stylum, said Seneca, A Father will not easily proceed to an exterminating sentence, unlesse great and many in∣juries have quite overcome his patience. Nor then neither, unlesse he fear worse things then those which he already blames. For, as Quintilian observ'd well, this power was not given to Fathers but when their sons are incor∣rigible.* 1.1776 Fulmen istud Patrum adversus ferociam adolescentiae datum est, adversus filios qui peccare plus possunt. If they will sin yet more, and will not be corrected, then they may unwillingly use this thunderbolt. It is like the sentence of excommunication, never to be us'd but when nothing else will cure the man, and nothing at all will make the mischief tolerable: that is, a son may not be disinherited, but when he may be hated, which may never be,* 1.1777 sine causis multis, magnis & necessariis (as Cicero affirms) The causes must be great and many, and intolerable, and without remedy. But of these things because the Fathers are judges, they must judge accor∣ding to the permissions of law, and the analogies of Christian prudence and charity; for if they doe amisse, the Child is miserable by the Fathers pas∣sion, and the Father by his own.

Of Piety to Parents. RULE III. A Father hath power over the goods and persons of his Children, so as to be maintain'd by them.

THe Lawyers define the Paternal power to be jus moribus legibusque con∣stitutum,* 1.1778 quo Patri in filium bonaque ipsius plenum jus olim tributum fuit;* 1.1779 a full right upon his son and his sons goods introduc'd by laws and cu∣stomes. Now this full right is alterable by the Civil law of any nation: that is, whereas amongst the Romans whatsoever the son acquir'd, he ac∣quir'd it not for himself, but for his Father; this may determine sooner or last longer, according to the appointments of law, for the heir so long as he is a child differs nothing from a servant, and therefore if the law please, may be us'd accordingly; and when the law hath so appointed, the Consci∣ence is bound by it.

But that which is not alterable by laws is that which is the natural and necessary duty,* 1.1780 that parents be maintain'd by their children if they need it: for this is in the Commandement, this is a part of the honour that is due to them. For so our Blessed Saviour remarks the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: the Pharisees that taught the children to cry Corban, it is a gift, and therefore out of it

the parents must not be profited,* 1.1781 he calls it a not honouring the Father and Mother;* 1.1782 and the double honour which S. Paul commands to be given to the Elders that rule well is instanc'd in the matter of maintenance. And this the Heathens had. So Hierocles, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Let us greatly honour our parents, affording them the ministery of our bodies and the use of our wealth most chearfully.* 1.1783 But this Cicero limits to the necessa∣ria vitae praesidia, quae debentur his maxime, the necessary aides of life; that is, what is for their support, to keep them from need and shame, ac∣cording to the quality of the parent and ability of the child:* 1.1784 so that this be first respected,* 1.1785 and then that, saith Bartolus. To this purpose is that of S. Ambrose, If the contumely of the Father and the reproaching or vilifying of the Mother be punish'd so severely, what shall their starving or their beggery be? This the Romans did resent so deeply, that they made a law that if a son that was emancipated or quitted from his Fathers government did de∣ny aliment to his indigent Father,* 1.1786 he was to be reduc'd under his Fathers power, and so to abide for ever. But by this instance it is apparent that this is no part of the Fathers power, but is an office of the sons piety. For be∣tween the Father & the son there is a threefold chord or tie, as I have already observed, the band of Reverence, of Castigation, and Piety; the two first are the Fathers authority, this last gives the Father properly no right, but obliges the son directly. But then this is to be added, that this obligation is onely confirm'd by the Civil laws, but it is immediately tied upon him by the Natural: for a son is bound to keep his Father from starving though he be a Bandito, or an Out-law, that is, though he have lost all civil rights, because no Civil power can prejudice a Divine Commandement.* 1.1787 Plutarch tells that by Solon's law the son was not bound to give his Father aliment, if his Father caus'd him to learn no trade, or taught him nothing whereby he might get his living. Indeed if the Father neither did give him where∣on to live, nor teach him whereby he might get it himself, the son is the lesse oblig'd; but yet sufficiently for this, because it is by a law of Nature that he is oblig'd, and all such obligations are before such conditions can intervene. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Ari∣stotle. Something else is to be considered besides the advantages of edu∣cation: the Father was the principle of his Being, and in that he can never be requited in kind, and therefore let him be paid by duty.

But if the case be such as divides the duty,* 1.1788 and the money cannot be divided, what shall then be done? Marco Tomaso a tradesman in Venice had a Father and a Son, both lame, both in great necessity. The Father lost all his goods to the Turks, and the son had rowed in the Gallies till all his strength and health was gone: but the poor Cutler (for Tomaso was no more) was not able to relieve them both: what shall he doe? The case here is hard. But love descends, and ascends not: therefore Tomaso's bowels yern upon his son; and he cannot have that tendernesse for his Father, and he were unnatural if he should let his son perish. It is true, but therefore he ought not to neglect his Father and feed his son, because his son does not, cannot love him so well as his Father does; and therefore he is obliged by gratitude to his Father, and by tendernesse to his son; to this there is more natural inclination, but to the other there is more natural duty. And therefore the Lawyers say that amor descendit, non ascendit, is to be under∣stood quoad ordinem dilectionis, non quoad effectum obligationis. Love does

descend, but it should not in some cases. And therefore when the law gives leave that a Son may by his Father be sold to keep the Father from starving, it shews plainly that the Father is in cases of necessity to be preferred.

And this indeed by the help of the Civil laws brings this rule to an instance of Paternal power;* 1.1789 for a Father in this law hath a right over his son, and can deliver him to labour and service for the necessary support of his helplesse Father. This we find done frequently,

—Et tandem demissa in viscera censu Filia restabat non isto digna parente:* 1.1790 Hanc quoque vendit inops.

And Eusebius tells it was done in the time of Maximianus the Emperor; and the Prophet Jeremy brings in the people complaining in a time of famine, Our sons and our daughters are too many, let us take corn for their price, that we may eat and live. But this being onely in the case of extreme necessity is not to be drawn to any thing else, for this power is onely just when it is unavoidable: and therefore it is permitted in laws, which doe therefore so comply with the necessity, and endeavour to find a remedy, or to make it tolerable, that in such cases the judges, if there be a contest in the particular, are tied to proceed summarily: and if a son should pretend causes of excuse from giving aliment to his Father, during the whole contestation, and till the proof be made, the Son is tied to maintain his Father in the interval; so carefull are the laws to secure the performance of this duty, for the omis∣sion of which all the world hath observed great marks of the Divine dis∣pleasure, expressed in judgments, and particularly of immature deaths;* 1.1791 so Homer observes of Semoisius

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

He refus'd to nourish his loving parents, and therefore he liv'd but a short life.

One particular more is to be added,* 1.1792 and that is, if an indigent Father have a rich Father living and a rich Son, although both are oblig'd to nou∣rish him, yet it is in the Fathers power to burden the Son and to excuse the Grandfather; that is, the power which the Father hath over the Son can require this duty: The Grandfather is equally oblig'd, but the Son hath no power over him, the law hath. For as for the thing it self there is no o∣ther difference in it. But if the rich Father refuses he is worse then an In∣fidel, if the rich Son refuses he is impious; the first is unnatural, and the second is ungodly; the first is a heathen, and the other is no Christian; the Grandfather hath no bowels, and the Grandchild no gratitude; the first hath no humanity, and the other no Religion; so that is an even lay between them which is the worst: but the necessitous Father may put the duty actu∣ally upon the Son by reason of his Paternal power, that is, he may so or∣der it, that if the Son refuses he is not onely uncharitable, but undutifull also, he commits two great sins; whereas the refusing Grandfather commits but one, though that also be enough to bring him an extreme damnation.

RULE IV. The Fathers power does not extend to matter of Re∣ligion, and persuasions of Faith.

IN the law of the XII Tables it was written,* 1.1793 Sacra privata perpetua ma∣nento, that the private Religion of a family should not be alter'd: which Cicero expounds to mean that all those to whom the care of the Father of the family did appertain were tied to the celebration of the same rites;* 1.1794 and the lawyers say,* 1.1795 that Filii sunt in sacris parentum dum sunt in eorum po∣testate, Children are within the holy rites of their parents while they are in their power. And indeed this is very true in the Court of Conscience so long as their understanding is in their Fathers power; but that is of all things first emancipated: when a Son can chuse for himself, when he is ca∣pable of malice and perversenesse, when he is judicable by external and pub∣lic laws, then he is emancipated and set free, so as he can chuse his religion, and for that the Father hath no other power over him but persuasion and instruction. For it is very observable that as it was said of the law of Moses, it was a school-master to bring us unto Christ, so it is true of the Im∣perium domesticum, the Fathers government, it is a pedagogy to bring us to the obedience of the laws both of God and Man: the Fathers commands are exacted before the laws of God or Princes doe require obedience; because the Government of children is like the Government of the sick and the mad-men, it is a protection of them from harm, and an institution of them to obedience of God and of Kings; and therefore the Father is to rule the Understanding of his child, till it be fit to be rul'd by the laws of God; that is, the child must believe and learn, that he may chuse and obey; for so we see it in the baptising infants, the Fathers and Susceptors first chuse the childs religion, and then teach it him, and then he must chuse it himself. For the Fathers authority to the understanding of the child is but like a false arch or temporary supporter, put under the building till it can stand alone: and it onely hath this advantage, that the Father hath the preroga∣tive of education, the priority of possession, which how great it is all the experience of the world can tell. But that this is part of the Paternal power is evident, because no child is to be baptized without his Fathers will. A Turk, a Jew, a Heathen can reckon their children in ••acris Paren∣tum* 1.1796, they have power, a natural and proper power to breed up their chil∣dren in what religion they please, but not to keep them in it; for then when they can chuse they are under no power of man, God onely is the Lord of the understanding: and therefore it is no disobedience if a Son changes his Fathers religion, or refuses to follow his Fathers change, for he cannot be injur'd in that where he hath no right and no authority.

But this is so to be understood that the religion of the Son must at no hand prejudice the Fathers Civil rights,* 1.1797 so that he must not quit his Fa∣thers house, if he be under his Fathers power, and by the laws o•• his coun∣try be oblig'd under that government. Vigoreus in his Sermon of S. Martin, tells that S. Martin being but a Catechumen and yet unbaptiz'd did still

abide with his Father and Mother though they were heathens, and he ne∣verthelesse did all the offices of a Christian. And there is in this great duty, because one right must not destroy another; and a man may be of what religion he please without doing wrong to any man, for a man cannot be hindred in his persuasion, for though he dies, he is of that religion; but no good religion does warrant the Son to doe wrong to his Fathers legal rights.* 1.1798 And therefore Marius Victor observes of Abraham,

Verum mente Deum venerans, Gentilia Sacra Aversatus erat—

He was a great hater of his Fathers idolatry and the impious rites of his family, yet he did not leave his Fathers house till after his Fathers death.

Linqueret ut sedes patrias, terramque nocentem Pollutamque domum, nisi postquam morte parentis Jussa sequi jam posse Dei sine fraude licebat.

He might doe it justly when he had no just power over him to restrain him by the cords of another justice and a differing duty.

There is onely this variety to be added,* 1.1799 that when either of the pa∣rents is Christian, and the other Infidel, the Son is to be reckon'd to the believing parent: the effect whereof can be this, that he or she that believes hath a right to educate the children in Christianity without injury to the other, and the Church may baptize the children against the will of the unbeliever: and the reason of this is, the prerogative of God, and of Christ who is head of the Church, and the Soveraign of all the world; for if the child is sanctified and made holy by the believing parent, then it may be brought to Christ; that sanctification of it is Christs seizure of it, it is his right, because he hath made a Covenant with the parents for themselves and for their children.

This is practis'd in the Countries of the Roman Communion to evil purposes;* 1.1800 and if the Father be a heretic in their account, they teach their children to disobey their parents, and suppose heresy to destroy the Fa∣thers right of power and government. Between Christian and Christian there is no difference as to matter of Civil rights; no law allows that: but between Heathen and Christian, so far as the soul is concern'd, the right of Christ is indubitable; for we are sure Christianity is the true religion: but amongst the Sects of Christians the case is wholly differing, for they may both have enough to secure the souls of pious persons, and yet may both be deceiv'd in their question, and unnecessary article.

RULE V. The Fathers power over the children can remit an injury done to them, without their leave or con∣sent.

THe reason of this depends upon the former considerations,* 1.1801 and is to have it's understanding accordingly. So long as the Son is within the Civil power of the Father, so long as he lives in his house, is subject to his command, is nourish'd by his Fathers charge, hath no distinct rights of his own, he is in his Fathers possession, and to be reckon'd by his measures, and therefore cannot have any actions of injury for his own amendment.

But this is to be limited onely to the effects of law and external Courts and trials of right,* 1.1802 or external actions of injury. For although a Son cannot repeat what the Father hath legally acquitted, yet if it be a per∣sonal action, in which charity and peace are concerned, the injurious per∣son is bound in conscience to ask the Son forgivenesse, upon the account of S. Paul's words, Follow peace with all men and holinesse, and, for as much as is possible live peaceably with all men; which no man can be said to doe who hath done wrong to a person, to whom he will not doe right. For be∣sides the relation and the communication of it's effect between Father and Son, the Son is a person too, and in personal actions hath an interest natu∣rally and unalterably, which no fiction of law, no supposition of case can take off. So that all the legal and external obligation the Father may re∣mit; but in the personal there is something of proper concernment.

This is also to be limited to an entercourse with extraneous persons,* 1.1803 and is not true in actions between the Son and a conjunct person to him. As if the injury be done by a wife, or a spouse, or a freed man, or a person endeared and oblig'd by the Son, the Father cannot remit any such injury. The reason is, because although by the force of the Civil or Municipal laws the Son be suppos'd to be still in the Fathers power, yet in such things he hath some peculiarity, and is as to those things free and in his own pow∣er. If the Sons wife commit adultery, the Father cannot forgive it, though the Son be under his Fathers power by law; because as to all personal acti∣ons the Son hath a personal right, and such things have great dependance upon the law of God and Nature, and these things to some great purposes doe not at all communicate with the Civil laws.

Lastly,* 1.1804 this Rule is so to be understood and practis'd, that it be no pre∣judice to the just interests of any other: and therefore a Father cannot so forgive an injury done to his Son, that he shall be tied not to witnesse it in public, when he is requir'd by the Civil power; for it may concern the Common-wealth that the Criminal be punish'd, when it may become the Father to pardon his and his Sons share. He may remit all with which he hath to doe, but not that which may passe into the Exchequer. But in

such cases the Judge may inquire, but the Son without the Fathers leave may be no voluntary accuser.

RULE VI. A Fathers authority cannot abide after his death, but the Sons piety to his Father must, and may passe upon him some indirect obligations.

THe Son after his Fathers death is as much lord of his person and his estate as his Father was:* 1.1805 and therefore although all the actions which the living Father did, which by law or the nature of the thing have a per∣manent effect, still doe abide as they were left; yet those things which are of an alterable nature, and to be administred by new Counsels, and to be determin'd by emergencies and proper circumstances, or are directly sub∣ject to Empire, or are personal concernments, these are in the power of the Son after his Fathers death. A Father cannot by his power command a Son to marry a person whom the Father does, but the Son does not love: He cannot command the Son by a just and a sufficient authority never to be a Priest, or Bishop, or a Magistrate: for in those things in which his own meer interest is concerned, his own understanding must be his guide, and his will his Ruler, for he alone does lie at stake whether it be good or bad; and it is not reasonable that he should govern who neither gets, nor looses, nor knows.

But though the Fathers authority be extinct,* 1.1806 yet his memory is not, and there is piety towards the dead, and to parents much more; and of this the Heathens gave some worthy examples.* 1.1807 Herodotus tells that the Issio∣nides, a people of Scythia, did use to embalm their Fathers head, and then to cover it with gold, and use it for a Divine image, and pay to it the ve∣neration of a yearly sacrifice. This they intended for an honour to their dead Father: but in this there were no signes of obedience. Nearer to this was that which Tertullian tells of the Nasamones,* 1.1808 that they took their ora∣cles at the graves of their Fathers, as supposing the souls of their Proge∣nitors to have some right or care to conduct their children. But it was a pretty story that AElian saies the Brachmanes tell of a certain King of the Indians that had many Sons,* 1.1809 who being all of them (the yongest onely ex∣cepted) immorigerous and rebellious, at last drove their Father and Mother from their Kingdome; and they with their yongest Son wandring in strange places were quickly consumed with age and wearinesse and inconvenience. The yong Son seeing his parents dead, burnt their bodies, and striking his head with a sword, put the ashes into the wound, by that act of piety giving his parents the most honourable sepulture, but with it also emblematically representing that his parents even after death had power upon his head, and that his head ought to be submitted to them. And it was well; if pie∣ty goes before, whatever duteousnesse or observance comes afterwards it cannot easily be amisse.

Piety sometimes does more then Authority can.* 1.1810 Plus potest patria potestas in liberos quam lex, legi••ve, aut summa Dictatura, say the lawyers; A Father or a Mother can prevail, when a Consul or a Prince cannot. Cum Martius Coriolanus pergebat infesto agmine adversus Patriam, quis illi arma succussit è manibus nisi una Veturia? saith the Roman story. Coriolanus took up armes in rage against his Country; and no authority could dis∣arme him but his piety to his Mother Veturia. Now this principle is a good one; but it hath no limits of it self, but onely what we give to it our selves by prudence, and necessity, and the nature of the things that are to be done. But in things that are pious and prudent, or that are innocent and indifferent, a dying Fathers desire, or a living Fathers counsel ought to be esteemed sacred: and though they make no law, yet they passe an in∣direct obligation; that is, if they be transgressed without reason, they can∣not be transgressed without impiety. It is certain, God is pleas'd with this obedience of piety, as is apparent in the case of the Rechabites; and such actions are exemplar in a family, and make the name of Father venerable and sacred; and sometimes the neglect of a dying Fathers charge hath met with a sad event; and a petulant disobedience hath been a rebellion against the greatest reason, which sometimes is the greater by how much it ought the more to be conceal'd. Philotimus of Athens having observ'd his Son given to amours and wandring fancies, upon his death-bed charg'd him by all that was Sacred and Prophane, that however he did resolve to please his fancy and satisfy his impotent desires, he should be sure not to court or to fall in love with Paegnium. Philotimus dies, and Philodectes his Son having quickly dried up his teares which were caus'd by the smoke of the funeral pile, hath a great curiosity to visit this pretty Greek that his Father had so forbidden to him. He sees her, likes her, courts her and lies with her; and in the first night of their congresse, she being over-pleas'd, told him that she infinitely preferr'd his kindnesse before the dull embraces of his Father Philotimus which had so often tir'd her. Upon this the yong man starts and trembles, and finds his sin and shame, the rewards of an impious disobedience. His want of piety to his dead Father made him incestuous in his mixtures and impious in his lusts.* 1.1811 And Pausanias telling of a Fa∣ther who meeting his Son in Charon's boat did then attempt to strangle him, to revenge his impiety and disobedience, by this does represent what their sentence was concerning the resentment of rebellion of Sons and their undecent stubbornnesse even after death.

And this is of so much the greater regard,* 1.1812 if the Father charges it upon the Son upon his blessing, and with great imprecations: for then un∣lesse the Father be evidently a light or trifling person, there is to be sup∣posed some great reason for the imposition, and then nothing can warrant the laying it aside, but a great necessity, or a very great, good, and certain reason to the contrary; that is, such a cause as may make the contrary ef∣fect to be infinitely unlike any image of impiety or disregard. But of this parents also must be very cautious, and not to put a load of duty upon a trifle that ought not to bear it. For he is foolish that upon his blessing will command his Son to make much of his Sparrow or his Monkey; and that Son is prodigal of his Fathers blessing, that will venture it all to please his humor, and his itch of liberty.

RULE VII. Neither the Father's authority, nor the Sonnes piety can oblige them to doe an action against the laws of God, or of the Father's and our just Superior.

THis Rule although it seems to contain in it nothing but what is ordi∣nary and confessed,* 1.1813 because God is rather to be obeyed then Man, and amongst men the supreme rather then the superior; yet I have here de∣scrib'd it, because the explication of it will not onely contain one great measure of our duty and conduct of conscience, but it will give the full ge∣neral proportion of the Fathers power and the Sons piety, and also very much endear the obedience and piety of children.

When Bias had discoursed well and wisely that God was present in every place,* 1.1814 he soon after argued weakly; If God dwels in all places, his presence makes all places holy, for it is his presence that hallows a Temple, and then there can be no such thing as sacrilege; for a thief that robs a Temple cannot carry it out of a Temple, but by carrying it into another.* 1.1815 And upon such a trick as this some in A. Gellius did argue that we were not to obey our parents. For either they command that which is good, or that which is not good: If of it self it be good, then for it's own sake we are to doe it, not for their command; but if it be not good, then though they doe command it, it is not to be done at all. For these men supposed, there is necessity and holinesse in every lawfull action, as the other did suppose there was holinesse in every place of Gods abode. But this Sophistry is quickly discover'd. For besides that every thing is not necessary to be done because it is good, but many are left to our choice to doe or not to doe them, there are many things also which are not good in themselves, but onely become so when they are commanded. In both these cases the au∣thority of our parents is competent. For if they be in themselves good but not necessary, by the command of our parents they are made necessary and passe into a law. But if they be not good of themselves, but when they are commanded become good, then also they become necessary. A. Gellius instances, in militiam ire, rus colere, honores capescere, causas defendere, uxorem ducere, uti jussum proficisci, accersitum venire, to goe into the coun∣try or to stay in the city, to live at court or to live in your farm, to take up armes or to be a merchant, to marry a wife, and to come when you are called, and to work in the vineyard, these things of themselves are inno∣cent and harmlesse,* 1.1816 but not necessary of themselves; propterea in ejusmodi omnium rerum generibus patri parendum esse, In all things of this nature we are to obey our Father. But adde this also, that if it be of it self a duty, and of that nature that it ought to be done sive imperet Pater, sive non imperet, whether his Father command or no, yet even here also the Fathers command is of great authority and great effect; for it addes a new law to the old commandement, and therefore the disobedience is guilty of a new sinne.

But in things dishonest and impious the Father hath no authority to give a commandement;* 1.1817 and if he does, the children are bound not to obey. If the Father commands the Son to marry a wife, to plead a cause for the guilty, obsequendum est; there is no more to be said, the Father must be obeyed. But if he command the Son to marry a harlot, an impudent woman, a drunkard, or to be an advocate for Catiline or Clodius, for Ra∣villas or Guido Faux,* 1.1818 he is not to be obeyed, quoniam accedente aliquo tur∣pitudinis numero, desinunt esse per sese haec media & indifferentia, When any turpitude is mingled with the action, it is no longer indifferent, or subject to command.

And therefore we find Acrotatus commended among the an∣cients because when his parents had requir'd of him to doe an unjust thing, he answer'd, I know that you are willing I should doe that which is just, for so you taught me to doe. I will doe therefore that which you desire I should, but what you bid me I will not doe.

And yet if a Father commands an unjust thing,* 1.1819 his Authority is not wholly nothing. For first, though it must not be obeyed, yet it must not be dishonour'd, nor yet rejected but with great regard. Quaedam esse pa∣rendum, quaedam non obsequendum, said some in A. Gellius. Sed ea tamen quae obsequi non oportet, leniter & verecunde, ac sine detestatione nimia, sine op∣probratione acerba reprehensionis declinanda sensim, & relinquenda esse dicunt, quam respuenda. What is not fit to be obeyed, must be declin'd and avoid∣ed rather then rail'd at and rejected with reproach. Etiam in bona causa filii apud parentes debet humilis esse oratio, said Salvian. When a Son denies his Father he must doe it with the language of obedience. Such as was the answer of Agesilaus to his Father when he would have had him to give judgement against the laws,* 1.1820 A te, Pater, à puero didici parêre legibus, quam∣obrem nunc quoque tibi obtempero, cavens nequid faciam praeter leges, Thou hast from my childhood, O Father, taught me to observe the laws; there∣fore even now also I obey your command, because I take care not to break them. For whatsoever the command be, yet the authority is venerable; if the command be unholy, yet the person is sacred. Liberto & filio sem∣per honesta & sancta persona Patris & Patroni videri debet, said Ulpian, The person of a Father is always honest and venerable to the Son, and so is that of a Patron to his freed man.

2. Though the command is not to be obeyed in things dishonest,* 1.1821 yet that then also the Fathers authority hath in it some regard appears by this, that if a Son transgresses the law by the command of his Father, his punish∣ment is something the more easy upon that account, though the offence be great, l. fin. de bon. damn. But if the offence be little, he is wholly ex∣cus'd saith the law, l. liberorum. §. fin. & seq. de his qui no. infam. Thus if a Son by the command of his Father marries a widow within the year of mourning, he does not incurre infamy by the law, say the Doctors. Velle enim non creditur qui obsequitur Imperio Patris vel Domini, saith the law; and Venia dignus est qui obtemperavit, saith Ulpian: If he did obey the command of his Father, he is to be pardon'd, it was not his own will; that is, not his absolutely, but in a certain regard, and in a degree of dimi∣nution.

3.* 1.1822 The Fathers authority hath this effect also upon children, that if the Father does wrong, the Son must bear it as long as it can be born: and

therefore the Son may not goe to law with the Father, and complain of him to the Judge, without leave from both their Superiors. For if by any means the Son can make the Father lesse then he is, it will destroy all duty, and dispark the inclosure which Nature and the laws have made with fear and reverence. But this hath a double consideration, the one in Religion, and the other in Laws.

1. In Religion we are to consider not onely what is lawfull in the pre∣cise question,* 1.1823 but what is to be done in the whole complication and practice of it. For if the Supreme can give leave in some case for a Son to com∣plain of his Father to a Judge, then in some cases it may be lawfull to doe it, that is, in those cases in which the law hath specified and restrain'd the Paternal power, in those things which the laws call excesses and injuries, and which indeed in themselves are cruel and intolerable. For in such cases the laws are a guard and defence to the oppressed Son; concerning whom although it is suppos'd that the Father takes sufficient care to keep him harmlesse, yet if the Father does not, the law does: and the law does in∣deed allow the greatest power to Fathers, because it presumes it will be for the childs good; but because there are some persons whom no presumption can measure, who are wicked beyond all the usual temptations and infirmi∣ties of mankind, therefore even in extraordinary cases there must be some provision; and therefore it is not to be supposed that it shall for ever be un∣lawfull for Sons to complain of their Fathers to the Prince. But what those cases are we can be taught by nothing but by the laws themselves, and by our own natural necessities. We must cry out when we cannot for∣bear, and we must throw off the burden under which we cannot stand; onely we must not throw it off as a wild horse does his load, and kick it with our feet, but we must lay it as gently down as we can. Thus if a Fa∣ther refuses to give alimony to his Son who cannot be otherwise provided for, the aid of the Prince or any superior that can rightly give us remedy may be implor'd. If a Father beats his child till he lame or dismember him, or endanger his life, the Son can be remedied, and without breach of duty can implore it. So long as a child is in his Fathers house, and under his Fathers power, these are the onely causes in which he can be allowed le∣gally to complain: because in all other things he is intirely under his Fa∣thers power. But when he is emancipated, and quit from his direct au∣thority, which the Lawyers signify by the power of Castigation, then the Son hath distinct rights, and in them because he can be injured, there are more causes of difference. To this therefore the answer is,

That in matters of contract,* 1.1824 in little injustices, in any thing that is tolerable, in such things the suffering of which can consist with charity to our selves and piety to our relatives, if a Son does contest with his Father at law, it may be it is no proper act of disobedience, and there is nothing of rebellion in it against his just authority; but there is also as little of piety; especially if we consider that such contests at law are extremely seldome manag'd with ordinary charity, and never without the greatest reproach on one side, and scandal on both: and if the Son can secure that on his own part, yet whether that seeming undutifulnesse, and more then seeming want of pious and loving regard, may not exasperate the Father into angry cur∣sings and evil thoughts, is a consideration of religion which ought to be taken care of by all that would be Innocent. There is not one of a thou∣sand

that goes to law at all but he runs into so many temptations that it is very hard for him to doe right and to doe nothing that is wrong: but not one in ten thousand can justify his cause and his person too, if he goes to law with a Father. And he will for no cause suffer wrong at any mans hands that will take no wrong of his Father; and he that does so, will give but an ill account of his Christianity.

2.* 1.1825 And these things appear the more by reason of the open dislikes which the Law professes against such proceedings. For look at this thing in Law, and we find that the laws expresse the Sons obedience in universal termes; Omnibus quae Pater imperat parendum, Sons must be obedient to their Parents in all things. Now if the dispute be betwixt our obedience to God or to our parents, it is an ill case; we know whom we are to obey, but the dispute it self is not good; and the very making a question of either is a disadvantage to the honour of both: and therefore the Law, which never supposes a question to be between God and our Father, does not think it fit to make this to be any exception to her indefinite termes; and therefore Tiberius said it without a limitation, Filium non posse detrectare jussa Patris; and Turnus against Tarquin said summarily and clearly, Nullam breviorem esse cognitionem quam quae inter Patrem & Filium, paucisque ver∣bis transigi posse; Ni pareat Patri, habendum infortunium, Between a Father and a Son the proceeding is short, and the case quickly summ'd up; Either let the Son obey, or let him be punish'd. And the law accounts it a dimi∣nution of such supreme authorities, to have exceptions and reservations ex∣press'd in the first provisions of the law; and the very making God and the Father to be the opposite and compar'd persons in the question, is to lessen them both. In comparatione personarum inest laesio & injuria, say the Lawyers; There is some wrong done when you compare two Emi∣nencies. Therefore in this case, if ever any such thing does happen, with∣out dispute we know what we are to doe: but it is not good that the laws should take public notice of it beforehand. * But if the question be be∣tween the Father and the Son, the law is so great an enemy to all such que∣stions, right or wrong, that the law judges for the person of the Father, even when it does not like the cause. It does so in the case of all Superiors in some degree, and therefore much more in the case of Fathers. Jus quod deprimitur, aufertur; if you lessen the authority, you take it away; and then you doe injury, though by doing of right. When Accia Variola question'd her Fathers Testament, because he had left immoderate Legacies to her Mother in law, the Fathers of rich families were present in great numbers, and the Sons of those families attended for the sentence in great and anxious expectations, looking which interest should get the advantage. But the Judges very wisely left the case undetermin'd, because it was hard on the Fathers side; but they were resolved never to leave a precedent in which the children should be in any thing superior to their Fathers: or that as Death and Love chang'd their quivers, so old age should be reckon'd as void of Counsel, and wisedome and prudence should be the portion of yong men.

RULE VIII. It is not lawfull for Children to enter into any lasting Course of life against the will or approbation of their Parents.

THis Rule contains two great Cases.* 1.1826 The first is concerning the states of Religion; the other is concerning the states of Civil life.

1. It is not lawfull for children to take them any religious vows,* 1.1827 or enter into any of those which are called states of Religion, viz. to take upon them the state of single life, to be Priests, Monks, Friers, Hermits, or any thing of the like nature, without the consent of their Parents.

Thomas Aquinas entred into the Dominican Order,* 1.1828 and became a Frier without the consent of his parents: and that unjustifiable action begat a more unjustifiable doctrine, Post annos pubertatis posse liberos se voto reli∣gionis obligare, absque voluntate parentum,* 1.1829 That afer 14 years of age or the first ripenesse, it is lawfull for children to take upon them the vows of Religion, whether their parents be willing or unwilling. And after his time it grew into a common doctrine and frequent practice; and if a Monk could persuade a yong heir,* 1.1830 or a pregnant youth into their cloysters, they pre∣tended to serve God, though certainly they serv'd themselves, and disserv'd a family. The ground they went upon was, the pretence of the great san∣ctity of the state Monastical; that it was for God and for religion; that to serve God no man that can chuse hath need to ask leave; that if the Father be superior, yet God is the supreme; that it is Corban; that if the yong man or maiden be given to God, he is given to him that hath more right to him or her then his parents; that religion in all things is to be preferr'd; and that although the parents have a right over the bodies of their children, yet of their souls they are themselves to dispose, because theirs is the big∣gest interest and concern: and whereas God hath commanded to Honour our Father and Mother, we know that God is our Father, and the Church is our Mother; and what does accrue to these, is no diminution to the o∣thers right.

Against all these fair pretences it is sufficient to oppose this one truth,* 1.1831 That Religion and Piety cannot of themselves crosse each other, but may very well stand together, and nothing is better then to doe a necessary du∣ty. And there needs not much consideration to tell which is better, to make our love to God and our love to our Parents, and our duty to them both to stand together, or to fight one with another. God intends the first, that is certain, for he is not the author of division, nor hath he made one good contrary to another. For if one be set up against another they are both spoiled. For that duty that goes away is lost; and that duty which thrust it away hath done evil, and therefore is not good. If therefore it be possible to doe our duty to our parents and to love God greatly at the same time, there needs no more to be said in this affair, but that we are to re∣member

that a man may greatly serve God, and yet never be a Frier or a Priest; and that allowing or supposing that these are great advantages, or ra∣ther engagements of duty, yet it is certain that no state of perfection can be set forward by doing evil; and he enters ill into the state of perfection that passes into it by the door of Undutifulnesse.

Now then,* 1.1832 we are certain of this, that Parents have the first right, and the first possession, and that to dispossesse any one of his rights against his will is great injustice, and therefore that no end can sanctify it; and that it would be a strange religion which teaches impiety for pious conside∣rations: and therefore without further inquiry, it follows that a Son may not upon any pretences of a religious manner and circumstances of life sub∣duct himself from his Fathers power, and put himself under other govern∣ments with which his Father shall have nothing to doe. A Son hath no power over himself, for he belongs to and is under the power of another; & therefore if he does subduct himself, he is undutifull, and impious, & unjust, and does not Honour his Father and his Mother. But he that does per∣suade the Son from his Fathers house into a Monastery, is reus Plagii, he is a Man-stealer.* 1.1833 Qui Patri eripit filium, educatori alumnum, Domino ser∣vum, Deo efficit impium, educatori ingratum, Domino nequam, said Tertul∣lian, He that debauches a Son, a Pupil, or a Servant, and snatches them from their Father, their Guardian, or their Lord, makes them impious, ingratefull and vile. And because this was done by some upon pretence of piety, the Council of Gangra forbad it upon a curse.* 1.1834 Quicunque fil•••• à parentibus pratextu Divini cultûs abscedunt, nec debitam reverentiam im∣pendunt illis….anathema sint. Pretence of the Divine service is no good warranty for disobedience to parents; and they who so neglect their Fathers blessing, will meet with the curse of their Mother. And this Canon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 cited and renewed in the sixth Council of Constantinople. * The Council of Tribur forbids expressely a yong maiden before twelve years of age ••o enter into a Monastery without the consent of her Guardian. Gratian citing this Decree, addes something of his own; for it is not known whence he had it, except from the degenerous and corrupt practices of his own times. Si verò in fortiori aetate adolescens vel adolescentula servire Deo ele∣gerit, non est potestas parentibus prohibendi, If the yong man or maiden be of greater age, the parents have no power to forbid him: which ••s a clause which is not to be found in the Codes of Councils, in any editions old or new. But when Monastical life had reputation and secular advantages upon religious pretences, then the advocates and promoters of it were willing by right and wrong to set it forward. But the corruption is plain, and appa∣rently against the doctrine and practices of the Fathers of the Church.

S.* 1.1835a 1.1836 Ambrose and S.b 1.1837 Austin say that a Father or Mother ought not to hinder a son or daughter from entring to a Monastery. But the▪ things were so ordered that the entry thither was not a perpetual bond, but a going thither as to a Christian School, a place for institution and holy practice, and from thence they might return when they would, they might serve God and their Parents too: the profession of a Monk was then nothing else but priscae liberaeque vitae ac pure Christianae meditatio, a meditation and in∣stitution of a Christian life according to the rate of the Primitive simplici∣ty,* 1.1838 liberty and devotion. But besides this, though they exhort parents not to hinder their children, yet they affirm that they have power to doe it▪

and they may if they will; as appears amply in S. Austin's Epistle to Ecdicia, and in his 233. Epistle to Benenatus. But most plainly and dogmatically it is affirm'd by S. Basil,* 1.1839 liberos non esse recipiendos in Monasteriis, nisi à pa∣rentibus suis offerantur, Children are not to be receiv'd into Monasteries un∣lesse their parents present them: and when S. Gregory Nazianzen had against his Fathers commandement run into a Monastery, he began to bethink himself what he had done, and found that without impiety he could not be contumacious against his Father, and therefore left his solitude and return'd home. Et hoc facio (saith he) jussu Dei magis quam hominum metu. Ita∣que, O pataer, dicto jam audienti praeb•• benedictionem. This he did in obe∣dience to God, and not for the fear of men; and therefore upon the account of his obedience and return, he begg'd his Fathers blessing. But besides this, there were two remarkable examples which abundantly conclude this duty. * The one was of Heliodorus, who together with S. Hierom had undertaken a Monastical life by vow; but finding that by Piety and Nature he was to regard his onely sister and her son, he return'd to her house, and took upon him the habit of the Clergy, and left that of Monks. Against him S. Hierom, who was then a yong man, newly come from the Universi∣ty and the schools of Rhetoric, storms very much, and saies some things which when he was older and wiser he changes and revokes, as appears in his Epistle to Nepotian, where he imputes his former sayings to his juve∣nile years and learning. Now though Heliodorus had no parents when he undertook a Monastical life, and therefore had his liberty; yet it is there∣fore certain he believ'd he ought not to have done it without the consent of parents if they had been living, because he did suppose a lesse Piety, even to his Sister and his Nephew, to be a sufficient reason for him to leave his solitude and shew Piety at home. * But the other instance is more mate∣rial. Stagirius was made a Monk, not against his Fathers commandement, but against his Counsel. The Father was very unwilling, but durst not ex∣pressely forbid it, upon some scruples which were put into his head by the humors which were then beginning. But because he had neglected his Fa∣thers Counsel, and caus'd trouble to him, Stagirius was vexed with the Devil,* 1.1840 and S. Chrysostome took great pains to comfort him. But afterwards the manners of men grew worse, and all religion was inclosed in a Friers habit, and it grew to be esteemed excellent to enter into a Monastery, and whatsoever did hinder it was to be despis'd, or us'd like a temptation; and the Orders of Religion grew potent and prevail'd over private interests and private religion, and by degrees it enter'd into unsufferable mischiefs and impiety. It was sometimes restrain'd by good laws, so that it could not grow so fast,* 1.1841 Charles the Great made a law concerning it: De pueris verò sine voluntate parentum ut tonsurentur, vel puellae velentur, modis omnibus inhibitum est, Boys must not be shorn nor maidens vail'd without the con∣sent of their parents. And to the transgressors of this law a fine was im∣pos'd, the same with that which was appointed in the Salic law* 1.1842; which did equally forbid them to be slain and to be shorn. For by religious pre∣tences not to doe kindnesse to their parents our Blessed Saviour called hy∣pocrisy in the Pharisees; and therefore upon the like pretences to doe them wrong, to take their right from them, to dispossesse them of their dearest pledges, must needs be so mcuh the worse. It is that which our Blessed Saviour calls Hypocrisy, and dishonouring our parents: It is that which the Church does call an anathema, which the Laws call plagium, or man∣stealing: It is homicide in the account of the Imperial laws: and S. Bernard

calls them wolves that doe it, in his first Epistle, which, as the story runs, was not written without a Miracle.

The other great case is in the Marriage of their Children,* 1.1843 concern∣ing which the sentence is ready and acknowledged in the greatest part of it.

2. It is unlawfull for Children to marry without and against the consent of their Parents.

That such marriages are not licitae is confess'd on all hands; that is, the son or daughter sin against God and the laws, by marrying against his Fa∣thers Commandement.

Adeone impotenti animo esse,* 1.1844 ut praeter civium Morem atque legem, & sui voluntatem patris, Tamen hanc habere studeat, cum summo probro?

said he in the Comedy. It is dishonourable, and a shame to take a wise against the will of his Father; it is against the manners and the laws of all Republics. But whether they be legitimae or no is a great question; that is, whether they be wholly invalid and null in law, or in case they be valid, whether or no they suffer any diminution, and what it is.

Amongst the Ancients,* 1.1845 and for a long time in the Civil law, such mar∣riages were esteem'd illegitimate, and no better then a meer Concubinate. So Ovid intimates in the marriage of Pyramus and Thisbe;

—Tedae quoque jure coissent, Sed vetuere patres—

If the parents had not forbidden, the marriage had been legitimate; but therefore not then when they are forbidden: and therefore as incestuous marriages were not onely Impious but Null, they are not onely sinfull in the entry, but all the way; so are these, alike evil in all the progression, though as yet they have not a proper name in law, as the other have. But Apulcius is more expresse;* 1.1846 Impares nuptiae, & praeterea in villa sine testi∣bus & Patre non consentiente factae, legitima non possunt videri, ac per hoc spurius iste nascetur. Unequal marriages, clandestine, and made without the Fathers consent can never seem legitimate, and therefore the children that are born will be illegitimate. And Musaeus observes in the marriage of Lean∣der, that it was ominous and unlucky upon this reason, because

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

The Father and the Mother did not sing the Hymenaeal or Marriage song The same thing was observ'd also by the Christians;* 1.1847 for when Tertullian is recounting the auspicious signes and causes of a blessed marriage, he puts this in, Unde sufficiam ad enarrandam felicitatem ejus Matrimonii quod Ec∣clesia conciliat, & confirmat oblatio, & obsignatum Angeli renunciant, Pater rato habet? That marriage will be very prosperous which is blessed by the Church, made solemn by publication and the rituals of religion, and esta∣blishe'd by the consent of the Father. For without it it is not onely inauspi∣cious

and unlucky, but illegal,* 1.1848 unfirm and insufficient. Nam nec in terris filii sine consensu Patrum ritè & jure nubent, saith he. For he liv'd in a time when the law pronounc'd such marriages illegal, and the children ba∣stards. For as some contracts are invalid unlesse the solemnity of the law be observed, and Testaments are ineffective without such a number of wit∣nesses; so the law requires the consent of Parents to make the espousals to be a legal and valid contract.* 1.1849 Non videri justum filium qui ex eo Matri∣monio natus est cui Pater non consensit, said Paulus the Lawyer: and this went so farre, that if a daughter were expos'd by her Father like a child of the people, and no care of her education or alimony taken, yet before the time of Constantine, that daughter might not marry without the leave even of that unnatural Father. And amongst the children of Abraham this was so sacredly observed, that even there where by the event of things we per∣ceive that the marriage was design'd by God, yet it was not to be acted but by the Fathers willingnesse;* 1.1850 as appears in the cases of Isaac and Rebecca, Sampson and his wife at Timnath.* 1.1851 Thus Agar took a wife for her son Ishmael, and Jacob went into Mesopotamia for a wife by the consent of his Father and Mother; and Sichem ask'd of his Father Hemor that he would get him the daughter of Jacob to wife.* 1.1852 And the words of the Law were directed to the Father,* 1.1853 not to the Son; Non accipies Uxorem filiis tuis de filiabus eorum, & filiam tuam non dabis filio ejus: and in the New Testament, He that giveth his Virgin in marriage doth well: still it is the Parent that hath the right and the power; it is the Parent that can make the contract;* 1.1854 he is the person suppos'd onely competent in law.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

said Hermione in Euripides, My Father is to take care of my espousals; that's no part of my care or determination.* 1.1855 And S. Ambrose, by the example of Rebecca, said that the choice of a husband for his daughter is to be permit∣ted to the Father.

And indeed by these instances and the perpetual practice and persua∣sion of the old world we cannot suppose it to be lesse then a Natural law,* 1.1856 or a natural reason, of great effect, or of great necessity. When the daughter of Cyaxarus was ask'd whom she would marry, she answer'd, Cyrus; for when they were children together he had delighted her with pretty songs and conversation: And when she was offer'd to him with a royal robe, Jewels and a crown of gold, and all Media for her dowry, Cyrus answer'd,* 1.1857 Et genus & puellam & dotalia laudo, I like the Lady, her dow∣ry and her family, but I must have these agree with the mind of my Father and my Mother, and then I will marry her. For (as Panaegyris in Plautus told his sister) in Patris potestate esse situm liberorum matrimonium, quibus faciendum hac in parte sit quod Patres imperant, Childrens marriage is in the power of their Father, and they must doe what their Father commands: and Simo would not allow Pamphilus to call him Father,* 1.1858 when he disobey'd him in this particular,

Quid, mi Pater? quasi tu hujus indigeas Patris. Domus, Uxor, liberi inventi invito Patre.

But Pamphilus in despite of his passion, suffered his duty to prevail,

Tibi, Pater, me dedo: quidvis oneris impone, impera. Vis me Uxorem ducere? hanc vis amittere? ut potero feram.

Pamphilus offer'd to quit Glycerium if his Father pleas'd, and yet he had been contracted to her, and had a Son by her. Certain it is, these contracts were to all purposes invalid by the Civil law both of the Greeks and Ro∣mans. Nuptias consistere non posse nisi consentiant omnes, hoc est, qui coeunt, quorumque in potestate sunt, saith the Law, Inst. de Nuptiis. ff. de ritu nupti∣arum.* 1.1859 And in the Jus Graeco-Romanum there is an expresse Canon, Qui in aliena potestate sunt eorum pacta nihil habent firmi: propterea quae citra voluntatem nuptiae fiunt eorum penes quos potestas est, pro scortationibus ha∣bentur. This is peremptory. Such marriages are fornications, and there∣fore the children are Bastards. And of this Justinian gives this account, Just••••••. nuptias inter se contrahunt qui secundum praecepta legum coeunt, Those marriages are true which are confederated according to the precepts of laws, when the contractors are of fitting age, whether they be the chief, or the sons of families. Onely if they be sons of families, they must have their con∣sent in whose power they are. Nam hoc fieri debere, & civilis & naturalis ratio suadet, in tantum ut jussus parentum praecedere debeat. For that this ought to be done, that the Fathers consent must be before the marriage, not onely is concluded by civil or political reason, but also by the natural.

Thus it was in the Natural and in the Civil law;* 1.1860 and at first, and for a long time after, it was no otherwise in the Canon law. To this purpose is that famous Decree of Pope Euaristus;* 1.1861 Aliter legitimum non sit conjugi∣um nisi ab iis qui super ipsam foeminam dominationem habere videntur, & à quibus custoditur, uxor petatur, & à parentibus & propinquioribus sponsetur, & legibus dotetur. Euaristus had enumerated a great many things which were fit (as he thought) and much for the honesty and decency, the blessing and prosperity of the marriage; as attending to solemn prayers for two or three days, oblations and bridemen, and some other things which are now out of use: he proceeds to that which was essentiall to the contract, the con∣sent of parents; and aliter legitimum non sit, it cannot otherwise be legiti∣mate: and he addes, aliter verò praesumpta non conjugia, sed adulteria, vel contubernia, vel stupra aut fornicationes potius quam legitima conjugia esse non dubitatur, Marriages without the consent of parents are adulteries and ravishments, fornications and concubinate, any thing rather then marri∣ages.* 1.1862 To this accords that Canon of S. Basil, Puellis quae praeter Patris sententiam fornicatores secutae sunt reconciliatis parentibus videtur res re∣medium accipere: sed non protinus ad communionem restituentur, sed triennio punientur. If Fathers will pardon their daughters that without their leave run after wanton persons, their crime as to him seems to be taken off; yet let them be put for three years into the station of Penitents. Upon this Canon Theodorus Balsamon saies,

that by [Puellis] or Girles, S. Basil means those that are under their Fathers power: and that if any such give themselves up to their lovers without their Fathers consent and are dishonour'd, although they to themselves seem to be married, yet such marriages are not valid, they cannot stand: and for this there is no remedy but being reconcil'd to their Fathers.

But S. Basil is also as expresse him∣self in his text as Balsamon in his Commentary, for in his 40^•h Canon he saies

that marriages without the consent of them in whose power they are, are fornications and not marriages

. And therefore the Council of Carthage requires that when the bridegroom and his bride are to be blessed by the Priest, that is, solemnly married, they should be presented to the Priest by their parents or their deputies; which thing is carefully to this

day observed in the Church of England. For according to the saying of S. Leo,* 1.1863 Paterno arbitrio foeminae viris junctae carent culpâ; If maidens be joyn'd to their Husbands by the consent of their parents, there is then no∣thing but innocence, no body hath cause to complain. But that's not all. For Gratian expounding these words, saies that from hence [datur intelligi quod Paternus consensus desideratur in nuptiis, nec sine eo legitimae nuptiae ha∣beantur] we are given to understand that the Fathers consent is requir'd, and without it the marriages are not to be accounted legitimate: and for it he quotes the words of Euaristus before mention'd. But the Council of Aquisgrane did not onely separate such marriages when the maiden was stoln away without her parents leave, but would not allow that ever after they should be man and wife,* 1.1864 as we find in Burchard; and the same was ve∣rified in the Council of Melda, which for it's warrant quotes a synodal de∣finition of S. Gregory to the same purpose.

The Church was indeed very severe against such undutifull proceed∣ings and rebellions against the supreme natural power;* 1.1865 and therefore the Council in Paris & divers others did anathematize them that so married,* 1.1866 & even when they were reconcil'd to their parents did impose on them severe penances. But because when things were once come to that passe, Fathers perceived that the reputation of their children was lost, and that it was not easy to get other honest Matches for their children, and especially when Marriage began to be called a Sacrament, and some scruples were by the Clergy cast into this affair, and because men were willing to make the best of a bad Market; the Fathers gave over making use of this power given them by the laws, and thought the public penances were castigation suffi∣cient. But then according to the nature of all good laws and manners running down the hill, this thing never left running till children had leave to despise their parents, and marry where and when they pleas'd; and though it was said to be a fault, yet factum valet, fieri non debuit, it was decreed in the Council of Trent to be valid and effectual.

But now this sentence which indeed relies upon some reason and very great authority,* 1.1867 and is wise and fit to prevent much evil in families, is yet very severe, and ought to receive some allay; which when I have represen∣ted upon the general consideration, I shall endeavour to give it a right un∣derstanding, and describe the truth that lies between the two extremes, and was yet never affirm'd and describ'd by any one that I know of, but is de∣terminable by a just weighing of all that which very many wise men have said, being put together.

First therefore I consider what Quintilian said:* 1.1868

If it be lawfull at any time for a son to doe an action otherwise unreprovable without the con∣sent of parents,* 1.1869 certainly liberty is in nothing so necessary as in marriage.

Ego eligam cum qua victurus sum, ego comitem laborum, sollicitudinum, cu∣rarum ipse perpendam. Quis enim amare alieno animo potest? It is fit that I should chuse her or him with whom I must always live, the partner of my joys and sorrows, the companion of my cares, the Father or the Mother of my own children: for it is impossible that a man should love with any affe∣ctions but his own. And if Pamphilus can love none but Glycerium, it will be hard for Simo, whose fires are extinct by age,* 1.1870 to command his son to burn and pine away without remedy and pitty. It was better which Pausanias

tells of Danaus, that he gave his daughters leave to chuse their husbands; and Herodotus tells that Callias the Athenian was much commended by the Greeks because he permitted to his daughters to chuse what husbands,* 1.1871 not he, but themselves lik'd best.

But the case is to be determin'd by these three Propositions.

1. When sons or daughters are of competent years and have the use of rea∣son,* 1.1872 they can naturally contract marriages; that is, there is nothing naturally requir'd but that they can consent, and be of a marriageable strength. Suf∣ficiat solus consensus illorum de quorum, quarumque conjunctionibus agitur, said Clement the third,* 1.1873 Consent alone makes marriage; that is, it makes a marriage naturally valid, if it be done by those persons who naturally can consent. For that the consent of parents is not essentially necessary to the validity of the contract naturally, appears in many instances. 1. Because children can contract when their parents are dead. 2. Because if their Father be dead, and their Mother living, the son that is of years of dis∣cretion is not under his Mothers power as to that, but that upon great and good reason he may marry by his own choice. 3. A son may marry at the command of a Prince, when it is for the public good, though his Father at the same time regard nothing but his private. 4. If a Father say nothing to hinder it, though he be secretly unwilling, or owns the unwillingnesse, but behaves himself negatively as to any cooperation, yet the son may marry: which demonstrates that the Fathers consent is no active principle, ingredient into the marriage, but a privative or a negative onely; that is, he can forbid it, and so hinder it, but it is not therefore naturally invalid; that is, he can legally prevent it, but not naturally annul it. 5. If the mar∣riage of the son be not onely of regard and advantage to the son, but so far from doing injury to the Father, that it does him honour; the laws de∣clare that such a marriage is valid, though the Father out of humor dis∣agree. And therefore when the law saies that the son cannot contract mar∣riage but with his Fathers consent, the Doctors limit it amongst other cases to this especially,* 1.1874 quando filius duceret uxorem turpem & indignam, when the son marries dishonorably; for then (say Bartolus and Decius) there is injury done to the Father: so that the prohibition lying for this reason, when the case is contrary to the reason, the extraordinary effect must be contrary to the ordinary law. 6. Whatever the law decrees in detestation of childrens disobedience, yet the marriage though to some civil effects it is null'd, yet that it is naturally valid appears in this, because the son that is born of that marriage is the Grandfathers own, and if the Father die be∣fore the Grandfather,* 1.1875 the Grandchild must inherit. So that the punish∣ment is but personally on the Son, and is not a perfect invalidating of the marriage. And this very case was determin'd in the Parliament of Har∣lay in behalf of Marguerite de Nesdes her children, the Nephews of her husbands Father, in the year 1584. 7. If the Father be unreasonable, and offers to his son or daughter an ugly, a deform'd, a vitious or a base person, and gives him no other choice, and the son cannot contain and live a single life, by the consent of all men the son may refuse, and he cannot but chuse another.* 1.1876 8. The same is the case, if the Father be negligent; then by the law a son sooner and a maiden after 25. years of age can chuse for her self. * 1.1877 An sedere oportuit domi virginem tam grandem? said Phalaris. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 For it is intolerable that a maid should be suffer'd to passe the

flower of her age at home.* 1.1878 And when the Gemara Sanhedrin had said [Doe not prostitute thy daughter, to make her a harlot] Rabbi Eliezer said this was spoken to him that marries his daughter to an old man. R. Akiba saies, it was meant of him qui domi retinet filiam nubilem, that keeps his daughter at home too long. Which two last cases relying upon the same reason produce the same effect, That the Fathers consent, though highly to be requir'd, yet is not essentially necessary; it may be a valid marriage without it. 9. And this is true also in case of Emancipation* 1.1879, or quitting the Son from the Fathers power; he is sui juris, and can marry where he will, and yet he owes to his Father all the obedience to which by the law of Nature he was obliged. 10. If a Son marries without his Fathers consent, the law saies it is void; but yet it is not so void, but that the Fathers ap∣probation makes it valid without marrying again: which could not be if it were naturally invalid, but therefore it is both naturally and Ecclesiasti∣cally good.* 1.1880 Quod enim ab initio malè factum est, parentum postea consensus reparare videtur, said Balsamon: it was ill done at first, and the Fathers consent repairs the dammage; but if it was invalid and null at first, nothing can make it alive upon the first stock. Quod enim ab initio non valuit, pro∣gressu temporis valere non debet, saith the law. 11. Servants or slaves in the Civil law were as much in the power of their lords as sons in the pow∣er of their Fathers; as much I say, though not for so many reasons; and yet the marriage of servants was valid in law though contracted without the consent of their Lords;* 1.1881 as Pope Alexander the third wrote in a decretal Epistle to the Arch-bishop of Canterbury: and therefore that the marriage of sons and daughters may be so too, that is, not to be dissolved, not to be declar'd null in conscience, I can find no reason to the contrary. 12. We find in Scripture that Esau's marriages were valid and went on, though con∣tracted against the interest of that family, the pleasure of the parents and, as Lyra saies, without their consent. It is true indeed that the Jerusalem Thargum saies that they were a grief to Isaac and Rebecca because they were undutifull, and proud, and idolatrous, refusing to be taught by their Husbands Father or Mother. But when I consider that it is not onely af∣firmed by Rebecca that they were an affliction to her,* 1.1882 but observ'd at the very first taking of them in, that they were a grief to both of them, and that Esau afterwards to gratify his Father did marry his Cosen german, the daughter of his Uncle Ishmael; the opinion of Lyra seems most proba∣ble, and that Isaac and Rebecca did not consent, and were not pleas'd with those first marriages. But if this should fail, there are arguments enough besides to evince that naturally such marriages are valid, though at no hand they ought to be done.

But what then shall we say to all the former discourse,* 1.1883 which prov'd that those marriages were illegitimate, and the conjunctions no better then concubinate? Does all that heap of things, and sayings of wise men, and laws Ecclesiastical and Civil and Natural, effect nothing? or doe they pre∣vail intirely? That they effect something their own strength does evidence; that they doe not prevail to effect a natural nullity in marriage, the contra∣ry arguments describ'd in the former Number doe sufficiently prove. What then is the conclusion?

From hence we may learn it.* 1.1884 2. Although the marriage is naturally valid, yet that natural validity can have this effect onely, that it can for ever

bind the conscience of the engaged parties to faith and mutual love, and to cohabitation when it is not hindred; and it is, even when it is most of all forbidden, yet potentially legitimate, that is, it wants no features and li∣neaments, nor life, but it wants solennity and publication; that is, it is like an Embryo in his Mothers womb, there it must stay till the law gives it name and birth. * For it is to be considered, that although the yong folks can contract even against their parents will, yet they can be hindred from possession: Not onely because natural rights can be impeded in their use and challenge by the Supreme Civil power; but because there is in marri∣age something that is wholly in the power of the Civil law. For in mar∣riage there are three things, Unity, and Society, and Mystery. This last is not of present consideration, because it is wholly of spiritual nature, and therefore of Ecclesiastical cognisance. But of the other two, the first is in the power of the Contractors, the latter is in the power of the Com∣mon-wealth. From union of minds, and obligation of mutual duties and affections, and perpetuity of relations they cannot be kept by their dissen∣ting parents, or by the Civil law. But from being a society, from begin∣ning a legal family, from rights of succession, from reckoning descents in their line, and from cohabitation they can be kept by that power which is the Supreme in the establishment and conduct of all societies. And the consequent of this will be, not onely that such persons shall loose all civil benefits and profits of inheritance, that is, all that can come from Society, but even their very Unity will be disparag'd, so as it shall be esteem'd no better then fornication; not that it is so before God, or is against the vertue of Chastity, but that it is so in the Civil account, and is against the laws of Marriage. It is in this as it is in the case of Raptus or Ravishment. In the Civil law, he that takes away a mans daughter without the consent of her parents rapuisse dicitur is a Ravisher: but it is not so in the Canon law, it is not so in Nature or Conscience. Raptus ibi dicitur admitti ubi nihil ante de nuptiis dicitur: If there was no treaty of marriage, it is a rape; but if the man was secretly betrothed, to carry her away and lye with her is no rape, licèt parentes reclamarent,* 1.1885 although the parents were against it, said Pope Lucius the third. Now to call this a rape, and to punish it as if it were, is in the power of law: just as the stealing of a knife out of a Church, or a Chalice out of the Clercs house, may by law be called Sacrilege; and then it is so to all the purposes of law; though before God it may not differ from simple theft. So for yong lovers to lye together before publication is by the Canon law called Antenuptialis fornicatio, and is punished as if it were so indeed: and yet though it be evil in the eye of men, and upon that account is so in it self, yet in the eyes of God it is not fornication; God himself having expressely called a Betrothed woman by the name of wife,* 1.1886 and punish'd her falshood to her husband before marriage with the same evil as adultery. And thus it is in the present inquiry: Marriage of per∣sons in minority is naturally invalid, because they are naturally unable to make a contract for their good, they understand it not; but if they be of good years, though under their Fathers power, they are naturally able, but politically unable, and therefore are inevitably engag'd in an evil condition, and they have sinn'd, and it is a miracle if they doe not sin again, and abide in it upon this account. For the marriage is good within doors, but it is not good abroad: they are both oblig'd, and yet cannot pay their ob∣ligation: this marriage is not good in law, and yet they cannot chuse ano∣ther in conscience: it was by their own fault, and therefore they must bear

their own burden: they are guilty of fornication, but it is not a sin against the seventh Commandement: they have not dishonour'd their own bodies between themselves, but they have dishonour'd them before all the world besides. And as covetousnesse is idolatry, and rebellion is witchcraft, so this disobedience is unchastity, it is uncleannesse against the fifth Commandement: and therefore it is no legal marriage, but unlawfull at first, and remains so all the way, till a legal remedy be found out. For this things is rightly stated by Paulus the Lawyer:* 1.1887 Matrimonia haec jure non contrahi, sed tamen con∣tracta non solvi, Such marriages ought not to be made, but being made they can∣not be dissolved. And he gives an excellent reason for it; contemplationem enim publicae utilitatis privatorum commodis anteferri. It is of public con∣cern that marriages naturally valid be not rescinded; but it is but of private emolument that the Father should be pleas'd in his daughter in law: and therefore although the* 1.1888 Law of God and man doe their several shares for the securing of every interest and concern, yet that regard which is greatest and more public is to be preferred. Now for the understanding of the full effect of this, and for the verification of it, it is to be consider'd, that laws are called Perfect, or Imperfect. A perfect law is that which either in it self or by the Magistrate rescinds whatsoever was done against her prescript. l. Non dubium, C. de legib. The imperfect law is that which does not indeed rescind the thing, but inflicts a punishment upon the transgressors: such as was the lex Furia Testamentaria, and such as is the law concerning these forbidden marriages against their Fathers will; the Marriage must stand, and the married must lie under the punishment* 1.1889: they in the civil law were reckon'd as Concubines, and their Children bastards, and there was neither dowry nor marriage allowed. And upon this account, all those sayings which I brought in the former numbers † are true: the marriages were then civilly null, that is, in estimation of law and to all intents and purposes of law were outlawed, and made uncapable of civil benefits and advantages; but the law could not make them naturally null:* 1.1890 and in the Law of Moses, although a maiden that had been humbled was to become the wife of him that did it, and to have her dowry accordingly, if her Father pleas'd, and he might chuse whether he would or no; yet there is no footstep or signe, that if he had betrothed himself to her, and lyen with her, that then she was not his wife, or that her dissenting Father could make it null. Indeed divorces were so easily granted then, that even in this case they had a re∣medy at hand: but we are tied up by stricter and more holy bands; and since Christ reduc'd it to the first institution, and that it was made to represent the union of the Church unto him, it is not so easy to untie this knot. So much as is in the power of law, so much is fit to be done for the securing the Fathers authority and his rights according to the interests of religion and the public: but the laws themselves have a limit; and though they can verify all their own acts, yet they cannot annul the Act of God: Quae Deus conjunxit, nemo separet. Conjunction of marriages is by a law of God and Nature, and to it nothing is requir'd but a natural capacity and an ex∣plicit consent, and therefore this no man can separate. But yet,

3. The Father hath over his children a double power;* 1.1891 a natural power and a political. His Natural power is intire, absolute, and unlimited, except where the Law of God or of Nations does intervene; but then it lasts but till the children are able to understand and chuse, and shift for themselves. For there are some natural and personal rights relating to duty, to the perpe∣tuating

the kind, to defending and providing for themselves, which are not to be taken from us, unlesse they be as well or better supplied otherwhere; for some can, and some cannot. The desires relating to marriage have in th••m so much natural necessity, and so much relation to personal duties, that either they must be in our own powers, or else our salvation must de∣pend on other men.* 1.1892 Nescis nostri arbitrii esse Matrimonia? Affectus nostri nobis non serviunt. Non potes efficere Imperio ut vel amen quam velis, vel oderim. Matrimonium vero tum perpetuum est, si mutuâ voluntate jungitur. Cum ergo quaeratur mihi uxor, socia thori, vitae consors, in omne seculum mihi eligenda est.

My wife is to dwell with me for ever, the half of my self, my lasting joy or my lasting sorrow, and if I doe not love her we cannot live comfortably, and to love I cannot be commanded, for my affections are not at my own command, much lesse at anothers:

and therefore the conduct of this belongs to my selfe, and to none else, for so much of the interest as the union and conjunction comes to; and in this I am no mans subject, when I am a man my self.

But the Father hath a political power.* 1.1893 Patria potestas est jus quod∣dam quod habent qui sunt de Imperio Romano in liberos Naturales & legitimos,* 1.1894 say the Lawyers. The paternal power is defin'd by the measures of the Roman law; and so it is in all Countries by their own measures. Now in most Countries, especially of old, the Father had so much power given to him over his children that they were a part of his possessions; they ac∣quir'd what they did acquire for their Father, not for themselves; they might be pawn'd, they might be sold three times for their Fathers profit; they must last and abide under this power till they were dismissed or eman∣cipated by their Father. Now whatsoever rights were consequent to these powers were so wholly to be dispos'd of by the Fathers, that whatsoever actions of the sons did destroy those rights were so far, and in relation to those rights, null and invalid. When therefore the Father had by the Ci∣vil law a power over the person of his son, so as to have the profit of his labours, the issues of his marriage, his children to succeed, the sons wife to be partner of his goods and his holy rites, and to perpetuate his family, he had by the Civil law power to dispose of him so far as concern'd these things, but no further. And therefore the Father had power to disinherit the son that married without his Fathers leave; and all the Emperors and all the Lawyers till the time of Constantine did allow it: but then it felt variety and change, and it was limited to the case of the sons marrying dishonourably.

The result of these three Propositions is this,* 1.1895 That every Common∣wealth hath power to extend or to streighten the Fathers political power, & to give sentences and judgements upon the actions that relate to such power: and if the law does declare the children of marriages against the parents will to be bastards, they are so; and the Son not to succeed in his Fathers estate, it must be so; and the marriage to be a concubinate, it must be accounted so; and the conjunction to be uncleannesse, it must be called dishonourable, and may be punished as if it were so: and this must last so long till the son be by the same law declar'd not to be under his Fathers power as to that particular; and when it is so, he can then chuse for himself without fraud or detriment; though even then also he hath upon him two bands, Reverence and Piety, from which the son can never be emanci∣pated

as long as he lives, and as long as he can be obliged to be a thankfull person, ever remembring what the old Sibyll said, that they deserve damna∣tion

… quíve parentes In senio linquunt, neque praemia digna rependunt Pro Nutricatu, vel qui parere recusant, Aspera vel contra dixerunt verba parentes,

who leave their parents in their old age, who speak words against them, who doe not pay their thankfull duty for their alimony and education, and who refuse to obey them, viz. according to the laws, and according to the exigence of reverence and piety which must be for ever.

Of exemption from the power of Fathers.

For by this means we shall the shortest and truest answer the inquiry,* 1.1896 when a Son is free from his Fathers power, and how long he is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Demosthenes his expression is,* 1.1897 subject to the necessity of the Fathers laws. I answer that, in those things which are parts of natural power and relate to personal duties, the Father hath always a power of Counsel, which must be regarded by the ties and analogies of reve∣rence and piety, and the reasons of the things themselves. But in those powers which the law hath given him, he is to abide in them as long as the law permits; for in this there is no other measure but the law. But in these and all other things whatsoever, when by nature and the laws we are quit from the Empire of the Father, and that power which is called Castigation, or the power of command and coercion, we are still tied to fear him with a reverential fear, and to obey him with the readinesse of piety in all things where Reverence and Piety are to have regard and prevail, that is, where∣ever it is possible and reasonable to obey. Quae praerogativa ex beneficentia acquiritur perpetuo durat, said Aristotle, The authority that is acquir'd by boun∣ty is perpetual.

And therefore even Marriage it self does not quit the children from their duty:* 1.1898 Not onely by force of Civil laws, in which sense the sons wife was in the Fathers power as well as the son himself till he was emancipa∣ted; but I mean it in respect of reverence and pious regards, and natural duty,* 1.1899 and humble observation. For Nomen Patris grande Mysterium est, & nomen Matris arcana Reverentia, said Origen; there is Reverence, and there is mystery, and all sacrednesse in the Names of Father and Mother; and that dignity lasts for ever. The Ancients tell that when Danaus, who had given liberty to his fifty daughters to marry according to their own liking, was compelled to give them to the fifty Grandchildren of Aegisthus, he gave to each of them a sword, and commanded them to kill their hus∣bands the first night before their congresse: and they thought themselves, though married, oblig'd to obey their Father, and all did so but Hypermne∣stra, who for her disobedience was question'd upon her life, and was by the equally-divided sentences of the Judges acquitted. The like story to this is told by Chalcondylas, that a daughter of a Florentine Physician being by the public request and necessity of the Town given to Lantislaus an amo∣rous Prince, who to get her besieged the Town, her Father gave her a poy∣son'd

handkerchief which he commanded her to use upon the Prince; and she did so, and upon her self, and both died. These indeed were excesses of power and obedience: but I noted them to shew that the sense of the world is to suppose children oblig'd to their parents even when they are in the power of a husband, or in necessitude and conjunction with a wife. And this is extended also to daughters that are Widows, if they be in mino∣rity, that is under 25 years; for so it was in the Roman law; or, if under any other number of years which the law calls minority in any Government. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, If she will marry again,* 1.1900 let her marry by the consent of her Father.

2. If a Son be a Magistrate,* 1.1901 the Magistrate is exempted, but not the Son. That is, in those things which concern his office and dignity the Father hath nothing to doe with him: but in things Oeconomical the Fathers power stands, and his person is capable of the same regards as formerly; of all the same, Salvo honore Magistratus. But yet the reverence of such a Son to a Father ought to be no otherwise exacted then by the measures of prudence and custome, and the common usages of the place. When Fa∣bius Maximus came to his Son who was then Consul, and sate upon his horse, otherwise then he ought, his Son sent the Lictors to him to call him to descend and come to him:* 1.1902 and the old Man gladly obeyed, and told him, Non ego Imperium tuum, mi Fili, contempsi, I did not despise thy authority, but I tried if you knew how to be a Consul: nec ignoro quid Patriae venera∣tioni debeatur; verum publica instituta privatâ pietate potiora judico, I know what veneration is due to a Father; but the private regard must give place to the public laws. And yet even in things of public nature, if a Father be wise, his Counsel ought to have some force besides the reason. When the Tri∣bunes of the people, who sometime had Consular dignity, contended which of them should goe to the Warre against the Lavicani (for they all would fain have gone, but none would stay at home to take care of the city) Quintus Servilius commanded his Son to stay, and doe his duty at home; and he did so, for it was for the public interest that one should, and the power of his Father determin'd him when they all refus'd at first.

3. If a Son enters into holy Orders,* 1.1903 it does not quit him from his duty and obedience to his Father, unlesse the law declare it so; that is, in such things wherein the Fathers political power did consist. And we find in that collection of Canons which is called Apostolical,* 1.1904 it is decreed that if a servant take on him holy Orders against the will of his lord, there was a redhibition allowed; he was to return to his service, till he was freed by his lord. The case is the same in Princes and in Fathers.

There are four little Queres more for the finishing this Rule; the answers to which will be short, because they depend upon the former discourses.

1. Whether if the Grandfather be alive,* 1.1905 and the Son be in his power, it be sufficient to legitimate the marriage of the Nephew if the Grandfather consent, though the Father be not ask'd.

To this the Lawyers answer with a distinction:* 1.1906 If the Nephew mar∣ry a wife,* 1.1907 the consent of the Son must be ask'd; but if the Niece mar∣ry,

the consent of the Grandfather is sufficient: and so it is if the Nephew marry in the same family, that is, the Niece by another son. The reason of the last is, because the Fathers are suppos'd willing to doe advantage to their own family, and therefore it may be sufficient that he who is in actual pos∣session of the Government should explicitly consent, and the other impli∣citely. But why to the marriage of the Niece the Grandfathers consent should be enough, but to the Nephew's marriage the Fathers consent also be requir'd, the reason that is pretended is onely this, Because no man ought to have his heir provided for him against his will, of which there is no danger in the marriage of a daughter. But in short, though this was thus in the Civil law of the Romans, and was no more reasonable then we see; yet now that it is a case of Conscience I am to answer otherwise. For it is against Natural and Divine reason and laws that the Father should in either of the cases be neglected, who ought rather to be preferred, as he that is most and longest like to be concerned in the good and evil of the mar∣riage.

2. Whether if the parents have consented and authoris'd the treaty of marriage till the affections of the children are irrevocably ingag'd,* 1.1908 and afterwards retract that consent, the children are bound to obey their pa∣rents, and quit their loves.

This I find in an elegant case related by Gentian Hervet in his oration to the Council.* 1.1909 Damoiselle Vitrou was espoused to a Cavalier by her pa∣rents;* 1.1910 but when he would have married her and carried her home to his friends, her parents, I know not upon what account, chang'd their minds and refus'd to let her goe. But the Souldier carries her away by force and marries her and lies with her, but us'd her ill; of which she being quick∣ly weary, flies into a Monastery; and that she might not be drawn thence and forc'd to return under her bondage, she pretends that he was not her husband by law, because he forc'd her from her Fathers house against the will of her parents. To this it was answered in behalf of the husband, that she who was espoused legally, might be carried away by the spouse lawfully,* 1.1911 according to that of Gregory, and Eusebius, Si quis virginem aut viduam furatus fuerit, nisi fuerit à se desponsata, anathema sit. If she was not espoused, it is Plagium & raptus, a rape and stealth; but if she was, it was no fraud to him.* 1.1912 Now if this was no ravishment, as it is plain, be∣cause she was espoused, and she was willing, though her parents were not, then she was his wife, saies the Law; and if so, then the revocation or dis∣sent of the Father hindred not but that she might proceed thither where she was ingag'd. Now this case went farre indeed: But if it be not gone so farre, yet if it be gone thither from whence they cannot honestly or de∣cently recede, the Fathers dissent ought not to be a prejudice to the con∣summation: for it began from an honest and a competent cause, it was a fire kindled from the Sun, and it proceeds to that which is honest in it self; and therefore there is no evil done. But if the parties are unengag'd, or be in∣different, or can well retire, the first liberty did not let them loose from du∣ty, but that they are to abide therewhere they were, unlesse (I say) by that first leave they are pass'd beyond a fair return. For the affections and the great content of children is not to be plaid with, as with a tennis-ball; and it is in this as in his children, if he have begotten the affection unto life, he must maintain it at his own charge.

3.* 1.1913 Whether Mothers have the same authority over their children as the Fathers have.

To this I answer, that in the Civil law sons were not in their Mothers power, but in their Fathers:* 1.1914 Appellare de nuptiis debui Patrem; and Eustathius upon Homer, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He that gives the dowry, it is fit that by his will the marriage be contracted. This is well enough, that the Father should doe it: but it becomes the piety of children to endeavour that their Mother be pleased; for to her also there is the same natural relation, obligation and minority, and in all things they are equal, abating the privilege of the sex; and there∣fore though the same duty is owing to them both, yet their authority is se∣verally express'd,* 1.1915 which to my sense is well intimated by Eustathius: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Not the pow∣er of my Father, nor the persuasion of my Mother, should make me marry even Venus her self. Where the Mother is allowed onely the power of per∣suasion. But that also implies all her power, onely that is the most pro∣per way for her exercise of it.* 1.1916 And it is the most forcible. Jussum erat, quodque est potentissimum Imperandi genus, rogabat, qui jubere poterat, said Ausonius. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Julian the Emperor.* 1.1917 For they that can if they please compel, ought most of all to prevail when they counsel and intreat. But however things were in the law of the Romans, yet by the laws of nature Mothers, who have so great an affection to their children, and so great an interest in the good and evil respectively of their Son in law's or their Daughters manners, must with duty & tendernesse be regarded like the Fa∣thers. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said S.* 1.1918 Cyril of Alexandria: Consonantly to the law of Nature he commanded his son to abstain from such marriages as were displeasing to his Mother. Isaac did so to Jacob. And to this purpose Catullus elegantly presses this obligation.

At tu ne pugna cum tali conjuge, virgo. Non aequum est pugnare, Pater cui tradidit ipse, Ipse Pater cum Matre, quibus parêre necesse est. Virginitas non tota tua est: ex parte parentum est. Tertia pars Matri data, pars data tertia Patri, Tertia sola tua est.—

Her Father and her Mother and her self had in her self equal share.

But if the Father be dead,* 1.1919 then the question is greater, because if the Mother have any power, she hath it alone: when her Husband liv'd she had power as the Moon hath light by the aspect of the Sun; but now that her light is extinguish'd, hath she any natural and proper power of her own? To this S. Austin answers clearly,* 1.1920 Fortassis enim quae nunc non apparet, apparebit & Mater, cujus voluntatem in tradenda filia omnibus ut arbitror Natura praeponit: nisi eadem puella in ea jam aetate fuerit, ut jure licentiore sibi eligat ipsa quod velit. From which words of S. Austin it is plain, that in the disposing of her daughter in marriage by the voice of Nature the Mother hath a power; and this is rather, and more, and longer then in the disposal of her son. The reason of both is the same, because by the advan∣tage of the sex and breeding, the son will be fit to govern in the family; and at the same time the daughter hath the weaknesses of feminine spirit

upon her as much as the Mother, and more by reason of her tender age and want of experience. To which may be added, that if the Father be dead, the estate is descended upon the Son, and then he is put by law under the power of Tutors and Guardians, and then is to marry, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies the law, by the consent of his Kindred and Guardians; that is, if he be not come to maturity: but if he be, the rule is,* 1.1921 Filius quidem pubes nullius expectat arbitrium, filia verò Matris & pro∣pinquorum, A son that is of a marriageable age if his Father be dead is wholly in his own power, but a daughter is under the power of her Mo∣ther. And yet this also lasts no longer but to a certain age, which is deter∣min'd by the laws of every Nation respectively. And yet both the Son and the Daughter are to shew piety to their Mother, and not to grieve her. Pulchre Deo obtemperat qui tristis est Parenti, for he does ill serve God, that brings sorrow to his parent. And therefore the Ancient laws of the Romans were ever favourable to that part of the marriage which the Mother chose. Postulatu audito Matris Tutorumque, Magistratus secundum parentis arbi∣trium dant jus Nuptiarum,* 1.1922 saies Livy. But the Wisigoths by their law were more kind to the Mothers interst,* 1.1923 for Patre mortuo utriusque sexus filiorum conjunctio in Matris potestate consistat; Both son and daughter if their Fa∣ther was dead were in the power of their Mother, and were to marry by her appointment and counsel.* 1.1924 And therefore Simeon Metaphrastes commends Abraham for taking a wife at the command of his parents, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as knowing it to be one of the Divine Commandements to obey his Father and his Mother. But these things were varied by laws and particular considerations. That which is of universal truth is this onely, That in their natural minority children are equally under the power of their Mother, as of their Father when he was alive; but when they can chuse, they are sooner quit from the Castigation or legal coerci∣tive powers of their Mother, then of their Father if he had liv'd. And this relies upon the practice and consent of all the world, and hath this reason, because women are not by laws suppos'd very fit to govern lasting interests. But lastly, they are never quit from their reverence and duty, piety and greatest and kindest regards: but the Mothers dissenting does not annul the marriage of her sons that are of age; and it is so far from that, that their not complying with their Mother in this affair is onely then a sin when it is done with unregarding circumstances, or hath not in it a great weight of reason. But every child should doe well to remember their obligation to their Mothers;* 1.1925 and as S. Chrysostom said in his own case, when he had a mind to enter into a Monastery his Mother recalled him, or rather the voice of God crying, Fili colito Anthusam, Son remember thy Mother An∣thusa, and grieve her not as long as she lives.* 1.1926 For Nomen Matris, arcana reverentia, There is a secret veneration due to the very Name of a Mo∣ther.

4. Although a Fathers authority is such that against it a Son may not marry;* 1.1927 yet whether or no is the power of the parents such that they can compel a son or a daughter to marry whom or when they will?

To this I answer,* 1.1928 that in the matters of marriage especially, and pro∣portionably to the probable event of things in other lasting states of life, that of Aristotle is very true, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Fathers authority hath in it no necessity, no constraint

Which Heliodorus Prusaeensis thus paraphrases, The commandements of Fa∣thers of their children 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have not in them such force that they can compel their children. And therefore Pamphilus in the Comedy complains passionately, and yet reasonably,

Proh Deûm atque hominum fidem! quid est,* 1.1929 si non haec contumelia'st? Uxorem decrêrat sese dare mihi hodie: nonne oportuit Praescisse me ante? nonne priùs communicatum oportuit?

Upon which place Donatus said well, quia nuptiarum non omnis potestas in Patre est, All the intire power of marriages is not in the Fathers. It may not be done against their wills, but neither is their will alone sufficient. The Fathers have a negative, but the children must also like. Constat enim circa nuptias esse filiis liberam voluntatem: ideo servatâ ratione pietatis com∣municatum oportuit, said Eugraphius. For it is certain they have the power of choice, and therefore in piety the Father ought to have acquainted the Son with it. And the same also is the case of the daughter, she is not to be forc'd to marry against her inclination and affections. Eustathius upon that of Homer,* 1.1930 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it was spoken according to the exactest political measures, that the Father should chuse an husband for his daughter ••enelope, and yet that his daughter should like the yong Prince Ulysses; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For there is diffe∣rence between a servant and a child; the Father may chuse for his daugh∣ter, so that at the same time she may chuse for her self: and therefore (saies he) when Homer said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he saies it in respect of the Father, that he may give her to whom he please; but when he saies 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, he saies it in respect of the Daughter, that the man whom the Father chuses must be gracious in her eyes: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Priscus,* 1.1931 It is impious to marry a daughter against her will.

But this is to be understood with some restraint.* 1.1932 For if a Father may chuse, and the daughter may chuse too, how if it happens that they fancy several persons? shall the Fathers authority, or the daughters liking pre∣vail? both cannot prevail at once: but the question is, which shall, and when, and how long, or in what cases. To this I answer that if the matter be indifferent, or the person be fit, the Father ought to prevail. Patris quippe jussa non potuisse filium detrectare,* 1.1933 A son may not refuse his Fathers commandement. For the Fathers authority is certainly a very great thing; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1934 A Father is by Nature to his child both a Lord and a Prince: and therefore Theophilus calls the Paternal power 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1935 which is the title of the Royal Majesty: and though the old name for disobedience in the Scripture is Witchcraft, yet Ennodius would fain have found a new name for this kind of it. Non in∣venio quâ novum facinoris genus explicem novitate sermonum, quibus fuit Sacrilegium non parere. It is Sacrilege at least not to obey our parents. Now although this be spoken generally and indefinitely, yet it must have it's effect in such commandements which have no great reason against them: and therefore if a Father offers a wife to a son, or a husband to a daughter, such as a wise or a good man may offer without folly and injury, the child is not to dispute at all, but to obey, if the Father urges and insists upon the precept.

But there are some cases in which the Father ought not to urge the children.* 1.1936 1. If the children be not capable or able for marriage, if it be destructive of their health, or against his nature; and this excuse was allowed amongst the Romans even where the Paternal power was at the highest.* 1.1937 Solent qui coguntur à Patribus ut Uxores ducant, illa dicere, Non sumus etiam nunc apti nuptiis. It is not fit to require them to marry that hate, or are unable to doe the offices of that state. 2. If the Father offer to his child a dishonest or filthy person, un∣equal, or unfit; that is, when it is notoriously or scandalously so: when the person is intolerably and irreconcileably displeasing, then the command is tyranny. The Son is bound to obey his Father commanding him to marry; Sed enim si imperet uxorem ducere infamem, propudiosam, crimino∣sam, non scilicet parendum,* 1.1938 said A. Gellius; But not if he offers to his child an infamous, a dishonest person. And so the law provides in behalf of the daughter, that she ought not to be compelled to marry an infamous man; l. sed quae Patris, ff. de Sponsal. and so Harmenopulus renders it, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.1939 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, She that is under her Fathers power can then onely refuse her Fathers command, when he chuses for her a man that is unworthy in his manners, and a filthy person: and indeed in this case she hath leave to refuse the most Imperious command of an angry Father. Son and daugh∣ter in this have equal right: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so Lucian.* 1.1940 Though his Father would have compell'd and forc'd him to marry a wife, yet he refus'd it: and he might lawfully, when he offer'd him a strumpet.

But there is another sort of persons which are called Turpes filthy or hatefull;* 1.1941 and that is, such as are deformed and intolerably ugly. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Lucian,* 1.1942 We call them filthy that are not fair or comely. But in this sense, if the Father offers a husband to his daughter, she hath not liberty to dissent, but onely to petition for liberty: for beauty is not the praise of a man, and he may be a worthy person, though of an ill shape, and his wit and manners may be better then his countenance. And there is no exception in this, but that if the daughter hath us'd all means she can to endure him, and cannot obtain it, she can onely then refuse when she can be sure that with him she can never doe her duty; of which because she cannot be sure beforehand, because his worthi∣nesse may overcome the aire and follies of her fancy, therefore the unhand∣somenesse of a man is not alone a sufficient cause for a daughter to refuse her Fathers earnest commands. But yet in this case though a Father have authority, yet a good Father will never use it, when it is very much against his Daughter, unlesse it be also very much more for her good. But a Son hath in this some more liberty, because he is to be the head of a family, and he is more easily tempted, and can sooner be drawn aside to wander, and beauty or comelinesse is the proper praise of a woman; comelinesse and good humor, forma uxoria, and a meek and quiet spirit are her best dressings, and all that she can be good for in her self; and therefore the uglinesse of a woman will sooner passe into an incapacity of person, then it can doe in a man. But in these cases, as children should not be too forward to dispute the limits of their Fathers power, lest they mistake their own leave or their Fathers authority; so Fathers also should remember what the

Lawyers say,* 1.1943 Patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate consistere, The Fathers power consists not in the surliest part of Empire, but in the sun∣shine side, in the gentlest and warmest part. Quis enim non magis filiorum salutem quam suam curat? saith Tertullian. He is an ill Father that will not take more care for the good of his child, then his own humor.

The like is to be said in case the Father offers to his child a person of a condition much inferior.* 1.1944 For though this difference is introduc'd prin∣cipally by pride and vanity in all the last ages of the world, and Nobility is not the reward of vertue, but the adornment of fortune, or the effect of Princes humors, unlesse it be in some rare cases; yet now that it is in the humors and manners of men, it is to be regarded, and a Diamond is really of so much value as men will give for it: and therefore a son or daughter may justly refuse to marry a person whose conjunction will be very disho∣nourable and shamefull: but at little differences children must not start. If the Nobility marries into the family of a Merchant, the difference is not so great, but that portion makes up the want of great extraction. For a hus∣band or a wife may be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Noble by their wealth; so the Greek proverb means: and old Ennius translating of Euripides his Hecuba, makes wealth to be Nobility,

Haec ita etsi perversè dicas,* 1.1945 facile Achivos flexeris. Nam cum opulenti loquuntur pariter atque ignobiles, Eadem dicta, eademque oratio aequa, non aequa valet.

When the rich and the ignoble speak the same things, the rich man shall prevail when the ignoble shall not.

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.* 1.1946

Wealth makes nobility. And therefore in such cases, if the sons or daughters refuse the command of their Father, it is to be accounted rebellion and dis∣obedience. But this whole inquiry is well summ'd up in those excellent words of Heliodorus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If the Fathers will use the utmost power of law, it is enough for them to say, It is their will. And it is to no purpose to ask, where they have power to compel. But when there is a marriage to be contracted, it is fit that they both consent.

There are some inquiries relating to the title of this Chapter, which would be seasonable enough here to be considered, concerning the powers of Husbands over their Wives: But because the Matrimonial questions and cases of Conscience are very Material and very Numerous, and of all things have been most injur'd by evil and imperfect principles and worse conduct; I though it better to leave this to fall into the heap of Matri∣monial cases, which I design in a book by it self, if God shall give me opportunity, and fit me with circumstances accordingly.

CHAP. VI. Of the Interpretation, Diminution and Abrogation of Hu∣mane lawes.

THERE are seven ways of the changing of humane laws so, that the obligation of Conscience is also changed: 1. Equity, 2. Judicial interpretation, 3. A contrary, or a ceasing reason, 4. Dispensation, 5. Com∣mutation, 6. Contrary Custome, 7. Direct revocation or abrogation. Of these I am to give account in this Chap∣ter, that the Conscience having already seen her obliga∣tion, may also discern when she enters into liberty.

§. 1. Of Equity.

RULE I. VVhen the letter of the law is burdensome and un∣just, the meaning and charity of the law does one∣ly oblige the Conscience.

SCire leges non est verba earum tenere,* 1.1947 sed vim ac potestatem; quia prior atque potentior est quam vox mens dicentis, say the Lawyers, The mind of the law-giver is more to be regarded then his words. For words change, and things change; and our expressions sometimes the more literal they are, the more obscure they are, because there are more words then things, and the circumstances and appendages are the best commentary.

Leges perquam egregia res sunt; sed is qui legibus utitur Nimium exacte, videtur esse Sycophanta, said Menander.

It is not the office of a Judge or Prince, but of a Sycophant, to be exact in the use of his laws: but there is abatement and allay to the words by the purpose of him that spake them.* 1.1948 For Nullam rem neque legibus, neque scripturâ ullâ, denique ne in sermone quidem quotidiano atque Imperiis dome∣sticis recte posse administrari, si unusquisque velit verba spectare, & non ad voluntatem ejus qui verba habuerit accedere, For nothing can be rightly administred either in lawes, or common talk, in public or domestic Go∣vernments, if we regard the words more then the mind of him that spake them. There are some tacite exceptions in all laws that would not be ty∣rannical. Quaedam etiamsi nulla significatione legis comprehensa sint, naturâ tamen excipiuntur, saith Quintilian; Natural reason excepts some things which are not excepted in the law. And it was counted a fierce and cruel piece of importune justice in Basilius Macedo the Emperor: when a stagge

fastned his horn in the Princes belt and toss'd him up with very much dan∣ger, one of his guard with a faucheon cut the Princes girdle and rescued him from his sad calamity; but he caus'd the poor man to be put to death, be∣cause by the law it was capital to draw a sword upon the Prince. The law could never intend to make it death to save the Princes life. Here was a ne∣cessity in this case; and if it had been like a fault, yet here it had been ex∣cusable; for necessity excuses whatever it compels to.

Now this happens in the matter of penal laws principally;* 1.1949 for those equities which are alleviations of duty, I shall consider under the other heads: but in penalties it is not onely the charity but the justice of the law, that the subject should neither be shared by an unwary or obscure letter, nor oppress'd by an unequal punishment.

Quid tristes querimoniae,* 1.1950 Si non supplicio culpa reciditur?

Laws intend not to cut away the life or to pare away the goods of the sub∣ject, but to cut off his crimes, to restrain him from that which the law would not have him to doe. This in propriety of speaking is justice: but equity although it signifies all that reasonablenesse by which the burden of laws is alleviated, and so will comprehend the six first heads; yet here I mean it in the particular sense, that is, the easing of punishments; and the giving gentle sentences; not by remission of what is justly incurred, for that is Clemency, but by declaring the delated person not to be involved in the curse of the law, or not so deeply; not to punish any man more then the law compells us; that's equity. And to this many rules in the law doe minister.

1.* 1.1951 Non debet aliquis considerare verba,* 1.1952 sed voluntatem, cum non inten∣tio verbis, sed verba intentioni debeant deservire, said the law. Which is thus to be understood; not that we are blindly to aime at some secret purpose of the law-giver, for the intention of man is to be judg'd by his words, and not the words by his intention. But the meaning is, that if some words be obscure,* 1.1953 they are to be made intelligible by others. Incivile enim esse nisi tot•• lege perspectâ unâ aliquâ ejus particulâ propositâ judicare, saies the law. We must in discerning the sense of the law take in all together, the antecedents and the consequences; and if darknesse be over all the face of the law, th••n the intention is to be judg'd by circumstances, by the matter and the occa∣sion, by the story and by use. Intelligentia dictorum ex causis dicendi assu∣menda est,* 1.1954 said S. Hilary, By the causes of the law we may judge of the intention of the law-giver.

2. When the first sense of the words inferres any absurdity,* 1.1955 contra∣diction, injustice, or unreasonablenesse, the mind of the law-giver is to be suppos'd to be otherwise, and the words are not to be adhered unto. In ambigua voce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio quae vitio caret,* 1.1956 prae∣sertim cum voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit. The laws are suppos'd to be good, and therefore no evil can come from them, and if there does, that was not their mind;* 1.1957 for, as Cicero said rarely well, Verba reperta sunt, non quae impedirent, sed quae indicarent voluntatem, Words were not invented to obscure, but to declare the will, and therefore not the words but the will is to pre∣vail; for if we could otherwise certainly and easily understand the Princes

will, we should never use words. When Leo Isaurus was in expectation of the Greek Empire,* 1.1958 he dealt with two Astrologers that were Jews: they pro∣mis'd that the summe of affairs would fall into his hands, and he pro∣mised them to grant them any one petition they should ask. When he had obtained his desires, they desir'd, that all the images of Saints might be demolished: he granted their request, but put them to death who put it in execution. This was against that mind of the promise which the Prince had or ought to have had, and he did not keep his promise though he kept his word; for it is not to be supposed that he promis'd or intended to re∣ward them with a mischief. So it is in laws, if an evil be consequent to the observation of the letter, the intention is then wholly to be regarded; for fraudem legi facit,* 1.1959 qui salvis verbis legis, mentem ejus circumvenit, saith the law, The law is then abus'd, when you keep the words of the law and prevaricate in the sense and meaning.

3. If the intention be gathered by circumstances,* 1.1960 by comparing of laws, by the matter and by appendages, and yet but obscurely, the obscure words are rather to be chosen then the obscure intention. The reason is, because words are the first and principal signe of the intention, and there∣fore ever to be preferred, and we are to seek no other, but when by accident these are hindred to signify: when the intention and the words doe differ, by what means soever the intention can rightly be found out, that must be stood to.* 1.1961 Ex lege esse tam quod est ex sententia legis, quam quod ex verbis; for that is law which is signified by the words, or by the causes and matter and circumstances. But when in respect of the obscurity on all hands the case is indifferent, we must stand to the words; for there is equity in that, that what is first in every kind, should be preferr'd and be the measure of the rest.

4. Adde to this,* 1.1962 that unlesse it be manifest that the words doe not re∣present the intention of the law-giver, the conscience of the subject is to obey the words of the law: so the law it self saies expressely, Non aliter à significatione verborum ejus recedi,* 1.1963 quam cum manifestum est aliud ipsum sensisse. For if this rule were not our measure, every witty Advocate might turn laws to what purpose he please, and every subject would take liber∣ty to serve his Prince not by the Princes law, but by his own glosses; and then our Conscience could have no measure of duty, and therefore no ground of peace.

5.* 1.1964 When there is and ought to be a little deflexion from the natural or Grammatical sense, and this deflexion is evident and perceiv'd, we must stand to that sense without any further deflexion, as strictly as to the first natural sense. That is, when a word in law signifies many things by pro∣portion and analogy, but one is the principal, we must stand to that princi∣pal. As if a law saies, He that steals a Chalice from a Church, let him die the death; the word death must signify naturally, for the separation of soul and body. But if by any other indication it appear not to signify in the first natural sense, then it must signify in that sense that stands next to it; it must stand, as the Logicians say, pro famosiori analogato, and therefore must signify a Civil death, that is, banishment, or the diminution of his head by losse of liberty, according to the usage of the laws. And when it is said, The son must inherit, it is meant, not the natural but the legitimate;

or if not this, yet not the adopted but the natural, not the yongest but the eldest.

6. If words us'd in law have a civil signification,* 1.1965 by parity, by exten∣sion, by fiction of law, it is then to be followed and chosen, and the natural to be left, when the circumstances; the matter and the appendages doe en∣force it, else not: but yet the legal sense of a word though it prevails not against the natural, yet it must prevail in the common sense of law, against the sense of privilege and exception. Among the Romans they who had three children had a right not to be sent to the warres. But if by the common use and signification of the law, the word [children] had signified Nephews, or adopted children, although this sense could not have prejudic'd the first and natural sense of the word; yet when the Emperor gave the same privilege to them that had children in no sense, but to such as made three books, children of the brain, the second sense could not pre∣vail against the first, yet it might against the last.

7.* 1.1966 Words that are of civil or legal signification must not signify ac∣cording to Grammar, but according to Law. Suspension must not signify hanging of the man, but a temporary laying aside his office or emolument: and Sacrament must not in Theology signify an oath, but a religious ceremo∣ny of Christs institution. For whatsoever is a word of art must be understood by the measures of that art; and therefore if it be a law-term, though that word be us'd also in common among the people, yet not this sense but that is to be followed in the understanding of the law* 1.1967. But if the law hath no propriety of use or interpretation in the word, but takes it up from the common usages of the Country, not the best lawyers, but the best Masters of language are the best interpreters. To which this is to be added, that if a word in law be taken from the common use, and this use change, and the law abide, the word in the law must abide the same as does the law, and must not change with the common use: and in this case, not the best Law∣yers, nor the best Grammarians, but the best Historians are the best mea∣sures of our Conscience. The word Censeo in the law of the Romans at first did signify to appoint, afterwards to estimate, and then to censure, and at last to counsel or to suppose. Now when the word censere is used l. ult. ff. de suis & legit. haered. it must not be expounded by Cicero in his oration pro Cluentio, where it stands for liquet, for in this law it stands for consulere: and therefore in such cases we are to inquire what the word signified when the law was made, for the word in the old use is not the measure of the present use; nei••∣ther if it were clear what it meant in the ancient laws, could that be the mea••sure of expounding contracts or humane acts or obligations at present; not yet can that word in that old law receive an interpretation by the differen••e which it hath got by time.

But it may be some of these rules will be but seldome usefull to our cases of conscience;* 1.1968 possibly they may often: but then to reduce these things to the intentions of the present Rule, and to become a measure of practice, there are three great rules which are the best and most general measures of finding out the meaning of the words of laws in order to equity and con∣science, when the Grammar or the common use of the words themselves is not sufficient.

1.* 1.1969 That is the meaning of the words of the law that does the work of the law. And this is the first rule of equity. For it is but conscience to sup∣pose that he that makes a contract does it bonâ fide, and he that makes a Will would have it executed, and he that leaves a Legacy would have it doe good, & he that appoints a guardian would have one that should be fit for the imployment, that the thing in hand may not perish and come to nothing. And therefore Brasidas did cavil, not treat like a Prince, when having agreed with the Greeks that he would quit his claim to the Boeotian fields, he after∣wards told them that those were not the Boeotian fields but his own where he encamp'd his army.* 1.1970 Which thing if it had been true, they all had trea∣ted about nothing. And when the laws of Sicily forbad their priests to re∣sign their Benefices to their sons, the two priests of Panormo that agreed together interchangeably to resign their's to the son of each other, did keep the words of the Canon well enough; but they took a course that the law should not acquire it's end, and therefore they sinn'd against it's meaning. And this Rule is of great use in all doubtfull and amphibological expressi∣ons, according to that rule in the law,* 1.1971 Quoties idem sermo duas sententias exprimit, ea potissimum excipiatur quae rei gerendae aptior est. Thus in the discerning contracts and other entercourses, the substance of the thing and the present imployment is more to be considered then any improper or aequivocal expression, or quirk in the words of the law or entercourse. Antonio Casulano a poor Piemontane having a sad vintage & harvest one year by reason of the early rains running from the hills before he had gather'd his fruits, comes and complains to his landlord Signior Vitaldo, and tells him his sad condition, and how unable he was to pay his rent. Vitaldo pitying his poor tenant, told him he would never exact any thing of his tenants that were ruin'd by the hand of heaven, and therefore for his rent he bid him be at rest and let it alone. Casulano makes his leg and thanks his lord, and goes home. But the next year he had so brave a harvest and so full a vintage, that it was greater then two years before. He comes and brings this years rent: but Vitaldo asks him where was the rent of the former year. The tenant saies it was forgiven him. Here then is the question, what was meant by, let it alone, and he would not exact his rent of his dis∣abled tenants; that is, while they were not able he would forbear them: for there all the entercouse was about forbearing the rent, and he never thought to ask his lord to forgive it him. But this sense of the words was rei gerendae aptior, it was agreeable to both their interests in conjunction, and therefore Casulano is bound in conscience to pay his rent. So the Lawyers say,* 1.1972 Si ambigua sit intentio seu actio, quod utilius sit actori accipiendum est. The landlord is to have the advantage of the ambiguity; for besides that he knew his own meaning best, the right was his, and no man is to be pre∣sum'd to part with his right against his will. And thus it is in the law, as well as in Contracts, Amphiboliae enim omnis in his erit quaestio: aliquando uter sit secundum naturam magis sermo; semper utrum sit aequius, utrum is qui sic scripsit ac dixit, sic voluerit.* 1.1973 So Quintilian draws into a compen∣dium all the rules of expounding doubtfull words. First, see whether it be agreeable to the thing in hand, for no man is willing his own act should perish: for this sometimes will doe it; but if it will not, then equity must intervene: but if by any other way we know the mind of the law-giver, that is of all things to be preferred. For though the case be hard, yet if it was the mind of the law-giver and be not unjust,* 1.1974 it must stand. Quod qui∣dem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est, It is hard, but so the law is

written. That is, if the mind of the law-giver be certain and clear, no equi∣ty is to intervene; but when the mind is not known, equity is the best mea∣ning. But of this by and by. This is of great use in Religion as well as in justice. For when God gives a command and uses mystical expressions, me∣taphors, ritual or typical representments, or signifies his pleasure by the outside and crust of services, though this is not to be despis'd or omitted, yet the spiritual and moral sense and internal service is the principal, that is rei gerendae aptior, more to God's purposes, and more to ours. When God commands us to repent, and to serve him, he that asks the question, when God would have us to repent, whether it will not serve the turn if we re∣pent at all, if we repent upon our death-bed, because the words of the com∣mandement doe indifferently signify any time; here we are rightly deter∣min'd by this Rule, That was God's meaning which does God's work, that without which the work would perish, and God would not be serv'd: for God's intention being that we should glorify him by a free obedience, and serve him in a holy life, that which makes God to loose his purpose, cannot be the meaning of his words. Thus when God commands us to come into his Courts, to fall down upon our knees before his footstool; it must mean that we must worship God with the lowest adoration of our souls, with the prostration of our mind: for the body without the mind being nothing, un∣lesse this commandement for bodily worship be expounded to signify the worship of the spirit, God is injur'd, his intention is defeated: and therefore the law hath taken care of this.* 1.1975 Impropriè verba regulariter non accipiun∣tur, nisi aliter actus vel periret, vel elusorius redderetur, Words are not to be taken improperly, unlesse the proper acception of it does elude the pur∣pose of the law-giver, and makes his law vain. Thus the very Gentiles understood the mind of God: when he commanded men to offer sacrifi∣ces and oblations to him, his meaning was, they should kill their lusts, and sacrifice themselves to God. To this purpose are those excellent words of Menander,

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He that offers to God the sacrifices of bulls and goats, or of any other beast, gold or rich garments, Ivory or precious stones, and thinks by this means to re∣concile God to him, is deceiv'd, and is a fool. When God commanded these things he intended to be understood to other purposes.

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For the sacrificer must be a spiritual man, dead unto sin and living unto righteousnesse; he must be chast and charitable, just and true, a despiser of the world, and must not desire so much as another mans pin; and he must be the same in private as in public, walking ever as in the presence of God. This is an excellent summe of religion, and the best interpreter of the spi∣ritual

sense of Moses law, next to the Sermons of the Gospel: but without this the work of God had perished, and religion it self had been elusory. And this is a sufficient warrant for a sense beyond the letter of a Com∣mandement.

2. In all laws and obligations of conscience by contract,* 1.1976 when any doubt arises, we are to consider what is most likely and what is most usual, and rest upon that.* 1.1977 In contrahendo quod agitur pro cauto habendum, saies the law. We must suppose that the contractor did intend that sense that is the wariest, because that is the most likely; nothing being so reasonable as to think the man intended that which all the world does, that is, to buy cheap and to sell dear. If this will not doe it, then we must run to the cu∣stome of the country; because the things and manners of custome, though they were not in the contract, yet veniunt in bonae fidei judiciis, they are to be of weight in judgements, as being a reasonable decision of questions and obscurities. But if nothing of all this will doe, then comes in the principal rule of equity and remissions:* 1.1978 Semper in obscuris quod minimum est sequimur, In all things of burden the least is to be chosen. This is of use in Contracts, in Testaments, and in infliction of punishments.

* In Contracts.* 1.1979 He that promises to give a man an hundred or two hundred pound, cannot be challeng'd nor oblig'd but for a hundred. In summis semper quod minus est promitti videtur.* 1.1980 The reason is, because when two things of burden are expressed, he that promised must so far be his own judge as to determine himself in the event, when he did not in the sti∣pulation; and therefore it is to be presum'd that he would be bound but to the lesse. For as in the Canon law, when a Bishop had obtain'd leave to resign or quit his litle Bishopric, of his superior, it is not granted that he shall be translated to another in the grant of cession; and the reason given in the law is this,* 1.1981 Nam si circa translationem idem fieri voluisset, quod de cessione dixerat, & de translatione poterat expressisse, Because he that granted a cession, could as easily have said translation if he had so intended: so here also it is presum'd that he intended to give the least, because if he had in∣tended the biggest, he might as easily have said so, as to have nam'd a lesse; and if he intended the greater, he may perform it yet if he please. Thus if Titius promise to pay his debt within a year or two, Caius cannot by virtue of that promise force him to pay it till the two years be out.

* In Testaments also the case is the same.* 1.1982 Maevius makes his Will, and leaves Lucius his heir of all, but gives his sister as much as one of his sons. The heir is tied to pay his Aunt but so much as that son hath whose por∣tion is the least. Thus when Regulus left to his wife Quintilla the field that was next to the Campus Martius, the Praetor understanding that he had two fields next to the Campus Martius,* 1.1983 gave her the least of the two: the reason is, because the Father is suppos'd to put upon the Heir that burden which is the lighter.

But this holds not in all cases:* 1.1984 the rule is the same, and ease and re∣mission is to be done, and the gentler sentence is to be followed, and the least burden to be impos'd, and the smallest legacy to be pai'd and receiv'd, or the most advantageous sense of favour is to be pursued: but all the diffi∣culty will be to whom the ease or the advantage is to be done; for sometimes

one, and sometimes another is to have the benefit of the Chancery. 1. For the heir is to be favour'd against the Legatées, unlesse God and religion be the Legatée, for the Church is to be favour'd against the heir. And there∣fore Scaevola said, that if a Roman in his Testament appointed an image to be set up in a Temple in which there were marble and brasse and silver sta∣tues, the legacy was to be performed in the most costly material;* 1.1985 idque fa∣vore Dei & religionis, saies the law; because in doubts it is fit that God should have the preeminence, and it is also to be presumed that the Testa∣tor intended to give the best unto the best. Let the instance bé chang'd and it is a good measure for conscience in the causes and questions of Chri∣stians. 2. The heir or the Donor is to be eas'd and to be understood in the least sense, unlesse that least sense makes the gift unprofitable and good for nothing. Aruns dying left a servant to his Brother for a legacy. Canidius who was the heir offers to give to his Uncle his man Spinax, who was the veriest rogue in all the Empire. But his Uncle answered, My Brother did not intend to give me a mischief. Then he offers him Lentillus who was little better then a fool. To this his Uncle answer'd, My Brother did not intend to give me nothing. And at last the Uncle demanded Aretius, who was his Brothers Physician: but that Canidius refus'd, and he might very well; but he gave him Merula that was a very good Baker, and both were indifferent∣ly pleas'd: but such a one that was not the best, and yet was good for some∣thing, was due by justice. 3. Causes of repetition are to be favour'd more then causes of gain. He that desires but to save himself, or to get his own, is to have the advantage of him that if he prevails gets gain: and the rea∣son is, because it is better to save a main stake, then to get an accession; it is better to have one preserved then another increased: and it is more to be presumed that he who demands restitution seeks but his own, then that the others gain is justly his. 4. He that buyes in doubts of conscience and law, is to be preferr'd before him that sells, and the interpretation ought to be on the behalf of the first. The reason of this is, because he that sel••s can∣not so easily be deceiv'd as he that 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for every man is justly presum'd to know the price of his own goo••••, and be cunning in his own trade. 5.* 1.1986 For dowries and 6. for liberty and 7. possession sentences are to be given in the favourable sense, because the cases themselves are full of chari∣ty and mercy; and they that complain in these cases are commonly the op∣pressed party.

* This Rule also is intended and that principally in punishments and penal sentences of law.* 1.1987 Where if the law be obscure, it is on all hands confess'd, that the sense of equity is an excellent interpretation and declares the mind of the law-giver:* 1.1988 and it is also true that if several pen••lties be expressed in the law, ordinarily the judge is to impose the least; and the rea∣son is, because he does at once the actions of two vertues; it is justice and it is charity at the same time. I say ordinarily, for sometimes there are great examples to be made, and in them there is very often Aliquid iniqui* 1.1989, nothing of equity, but something that was very hard: and the Hebrew Kings (say the Rabbins) had a power of causing the malefactor to hang all day and all night upon the accursed tree; though the law was more gentle, and com∣manded the body to be taken down before the Sun set; but if the public ne∣cessity requir'd it, the Jewish Doctors say that their Kings had power.

But the great difficulty is,* 1.1990 when the words of the law are expresse, and name the punishment, whether or no can there be any remission by equity or interpretation? Titius being cited to appear in Court, came not, and was fin'd: but he came immediately. The question is, whether he ought in conscience to be relieved. It is certain that in law the sentence against him is just; for let the cause be never so odious, the law must be understood according to the propriety of the words, unlesse the intention of the law∣giver can otherwise be certainly known. But if by any ways he can be re∣lieved, he ought to be, if there be evident equity on his side. But because this equity is against the solemnity of law, it must be introduc'd as solemnly, that is, by a law, or a solemn decree according to the disposition of law. But this latter part is matter of prudence more then of conscience; and concerning this conflict of law and equity Cicero hath spoken excellent things, as who please may see in his Oration pro Caecina and in his lib. 2. Vet. Rhet. But for the practice of it both in law and conscience it is an ex∣cellent rule of law,* 1.1991 Capienda est occasio quae praebet benignius responsum; An occasion must not be forc'd against law, but if any can be found it must be us'd in the behalf of equity. And therefore Celsus, Marcellus and Ulpian are noted with a fair memory for being studious of equity in the sentences of law:* 1.1992 and for this very thing Cicero commends Servius: but Scaevola, Paulus, Julianus and the Sabiniani and some others were more propense to rigor and subtilty, and were lesse belov'd.

Turpe rigor nimius:* 1.1993 Torquati despue mores.

Titus Manlius was to blame in putting his son to death for a glorious vi∣ctory gotten by a little offence. But all good laws were ever desirous of easy interpretation when the matter it self was a burden: and it was well said of Gattinara to the Emperor Charles the 5^th,* 1.1994 Chi vuole troppo abbrac∣ciare, va à pericolo di non strignere cosa alcuna, He that strains the cord too hard, breaks it and can bind nothing. Periculosum est praegrave Impe∣rium: & difficile est continere quod capere non possis, said* 1.1995 Curtius. He that fills his hand too full, lets goe more then he should. There is a measure in laws, which must not take in every thing, but let some things passe gently; for a government that is too heavy is dangerous: and therefore without all peradventure when the punishments are general, the least special ought to be taken. Thus Gentlemen are not to be punish'd with the punishment of slaves and vagabonds. If bodily punishment by law be commanded, scourg∣ing is to be understood, or such as is in use in the nation, and not the cutting off a member,* 1.1996 or putting to death, say the Greek lawyers. And there is no exception to this, but this onely, That this is to be understood in lighter offences, not in greater; for in these it may be of as much concernment to justice that the severer part be taken, as it is to charity that lighter offen∣ces should carry the lighter load. And therefore the S. C. Syllanianum decreed that if a slave had kill'd his lord, all the slaves in the house should die for it. It was a hard and a severe law; but it was a great crime, and by great examples the lives of masters were to be secur'd: and to this purpose C. Cassius the Lawyer defended it with great reason,* 1.1997 as is to be seen in his oration in Tacitus.

3. In matters of favour and matters of piety,* 1.1998 the sense of the law is to be extended by interpretation. Things odious and correctory are cal∣led strictae in the law, and that which is favourable is called res ampla; be∣cause

as the matter of that is to be made as little as it may be, so the mat∣ter of this may be enlarged. Thus if any thing be done in the favour of the children, the adoptive and the naturall are included, when it is not to the prejudice of the legitimate. And that which is made legitimate is to be reckoned as that which is so of it self; and he that is naturaliz'd is to be reckon'd as a Native; and a freed man, as he that was born free; and the privileges granted to a city are to be extended to the suburbs. But this Rule is to be estimated as the former, there being the same reason of Contraries, save onely that there is in the matters of favour something of particular consideration. For although it is by the former measures set down who are the persons, and which are the causes to be favour'd and eas'd; yet those persons are not in all cases to receive the advantage; that is they are in all cases which the words of the law can bear, except that by that favour the whole processe be evacuated, or the thing be lost. Therefore although the guilty person is favour'd in all the methods and solennities of law, where the law can proceed; yet where the favour would hinder the proceeding, the accuser and not the guilty person is to receive it. For the accuser hath the advantage of taking his oath in law, which the guilty person hath not; because the law supposes he will deny the fact, right or wrong. And thus we are also to proceed in our private entercourses of justice and chari∣ty, we are rather to believe the accuser swearing, then the accused. But if the accusation be not sworn, or if the guilty person be brought into judge∣ment upon suspicion onely, and a public fame, we are rather to believe the accused swearing his innocence, then the voice of fame, or uncertain accusers.

§. 2. Judicial Interpretation.

RULE II. When the power that made the law does interpret the law, the interpretation is authentical, and ob∣liges the Conscience as much as the law; and can release the bond of Conscience so far as the inter∣pretation extends, as much as if the law were ab∣rogated.

WHen the law is interpreted by the Emperor,* 1.1999 ratam & indubitatam habendam esse say the Lawyers. The reason is plain and easy. The law is nothing but the solemn and declar'd will of the law-giver; and he that speaks, best knows his own mind; and he that can take away the law, can alter it; and he that can cut off the hands, may certainly pare the nails: and since the legislative power never dies, and from this power the law hath it's perpetual force, and can live no longer then he please, by what method of law soever he signify his mind, whether it be by declaring the meaning of the law, or by abating the rigor of it, or dispensing in the case, or en∣larging the favour, or restraining the severity; it is all one as to the event

and obligation of conscience. The interpretation is to the law, as the Echo to the voice; it comes from the same principle; and though it speaks lesse, yet it speaks oftner, and it speaks enough, so much as is then to be the mea∣sure of the Conscience in good and evil.

For when the law-giver does interpret his law,* 1.2000 he does not take off the obligation of the law, but declares that in such a case it was not in∣tended to oblige. Tacitus tells of a Roman Knight who having sworn to his wife that he would never be divorc'd from her, was by Tiberius dis∣pens'd with when he had taken her in the unchast embraces of his son in law. The Emperor then declar'd that the Knight had onely oblig'd himself not to be divorc'd, unlesse a great cause should inter∣vene. Thus we find that P. Lucius* 1.2001 the 3^d did absolve those from their oath that sware they would not speak to their Father or Mother, Brother or Sister, or shew them any kindnesse: but this absolution quitted them not from the sin of a rash & impious oath, but declar'd that they were not bound to keep it.* 1.2002 Absolvit, i. e. absolutum ostendit, as Pope Nicholas did in the Case of the Arch-bishop of Triers, he declar'd him to be at liberty; and the Glosse derives a warranty for this use of the word out of the Prophet Isaiah.

It was ill said of Brutus,* 1.2003 that a Prince might not be more severe, nor yet more gentle then the law. For there are many things quae naturâ vi∣dentur honesta esse,* 1.2004 temporibus sunt inhonesta, saith Cicero, which at first sanction of the law and in their own Nature are honest, but in the change of times and by new relations become unjust and intolerable: and therefore the Civil law allows to Princes a power juvare,* 1.2005 supplere, corrigere, to help, to supply, to correct the laws. For those are but precarious Princes who when they see a case that needs a remedy, cannot command it, but like the Tribunes of Rome, when they offer'd to intercede and interpose between Fabius and the sentence of Papyrius the Dictator by which Fabius was con∣demned, could effect nothing till they went upon their knees in his behalf. But it is worse that the laws of a nation should bind the Prince as Jupiter in Homer was bound by the laws of Fate, so that he could not help his son Sarpedon, but sate weeping like a chidden girle. But of this I have already given sufficient accounts. The Supreme power is Dominus legum, Canon animatus in terris, lex animata, fons justitiae, supra jus dispensare potens, as Innocentius said of himself;* 1.2006 and therefore of this there can be no question. Inter aequitatem jusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis & oportet, & licet inspicere, saith the Emperor, C. de leg. & const. Princ. The Prince alone hath power to intervene between equity and strict law by his inter∣pretation. This is now to be reduc'd to practice.

First this power must be administred with noblenesse & ingenuity;* 1.2007 not fraudulenty, or to oppresse any one, which Cicero calls calumniam, & ni∣mis callidam,* 1.2008 sed malitiosam juris interpretationem, a crafty and malicious com∣mentary. Such as was that act of Solyman, who after he had sworn never to take from Ibrahim Bassa his life, kill'd him when he was asleep, because Ta∣lisman the Priest declar'd that sleep is death. Thus the Triumviri in Rome having a mind to kill a boy, which by the force of law they could not doe, they gave him the Toga Virilis, and forc'd him to be a man in estimation of law, that by law they might oppresse him: and Mithridates King of Arme∣nia thought himself secure when Radamistus the son of Pharasmanes the Iberian King had promis'd he would neither stab nor poyson him; but the

yong Tyrant interpreted his promise maliciously, when he oppressed him with pillows and featherbeds: and all Europe hates the memory of the Arch-bishop of Mentz, who having promis'd to Atto Adel a Palatine of Franconia that he should safely return out of his Castle, did indeed per∣form the letter of his word; but pretending kindnesse as well as justice, when he had brought him forth of the Castle, passionately invited him to break-fast, and then killed him when he reentred. The power of Princes to give senses to their laws must be to doe justice and to give ease to the pi∣tiable and oppressed.

2^ly,* 1.2009 This power is not to be administred but upon grave & just causes: for to be easy and forward in bending the laws by unnecessary interpreta∣tions is but a diminution of justice, and a loosenesse in government; as was well observ'd by Livy,* 1.2010 speaking of those brave ages in which the Romane honesty and justice was the beginning of the greatest Empire of the world, Sed nondum haec quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia Divum venerat, nec in∣terpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum & leges aptas faciebat, sed suos potius mores ad ea accommodabat, The neglect of the Gods and the laws was not gone so farre as to bend the laws to the manners of men, but men measur'd their manners by the laws: and then no man can deny to a Prince leave to derogate from his laws by such interpretations.* 1.2011 Licet enim Regi in civitate cui reg∣nat, jubere aliquid quod neque ante illum quisquam, neque ipse unquam jusse∣rat, saith S. Austin; A King in his own dominions may command that which neither any man before him, or himself before that time command∣ed: meaning that although he must govern by his laws, yet when there is a favourable case, he may give a new sense to them, that he may doe his old duty by new measures. Thus Solomon absolved Abiathar from the sentence of death which by law he had incurred, because he had formerly done wor∣thily to the interests of his Father David. Thus when Cato Censor had turned L. Quinctius Flaminius out of the Senate, the Majesty of the Roman people restor'd him; and though they had no cause to doe it, yet they had power. Now this power though it may be done by interpretation, yet when it is administred by the Prince it is most commonly by way of par∣don, absolute power and prerogative. Thus Princes can restore a man in bloud.* 1.2012 Fas est cuivis Principi maculosas notas vitiatae opinionis abstergere. So Antony the Emperor restored Julianus Licinianus whom Ulpian the President had banished. When a law determins that under such an age a person shall be uncapable of being the General of an army, the Supreme power can declare the meaning of the law to be, unlesse a great excellency of courage and maturity of judgement supply the want of years: in which very case Scipio Africanus said wisely, when he desir'd to be imployed in the Punic warre, se sat annorum habiturum si populus Romanus voluerit, he should quickly be old enough if the Roman people pleased. Thus Tiberius put Nero into the Senate at fifteen years of age, and so did Augustus the like to Tiberius and his Brother; and the people declar'd or dispens'd the law in Pompey's case, and allowed him a Triumph before he had been Con∣sul or Praetor.

But to this there is not much to be said;* 1.2013 for he that can make a New law, may by interpretation change the Old into a New; that is, any inter∣pretation of his is valid, if it be just, naturally just, though it be not accor∣ding to the Grammar or first intention of the Civil or Municipal law: quia

si leges condere soli Imperatori concessum est,* 1.2014 etiam leges interpretari solo dig∣num impero esse oportet. He that can doe the greater can doe the lesse; and he that hath power of cutting off the head, can dispose of the tongue as he please, so that if it will not speak what he would have it, he can take a course it shall speak nothing against him. But the case is otherwise in Judges.

For the interpretation of laws made by Judges is matter of fidelity* 1.2015 and wise dispensation, but nothing of Empire and power; and it is a good probable warranty of Conscience, but no final determination in case any cause of doubt happens to oppose it. And this was well observed by Ci∣cero:* 1.2016 Nemo apud Judices ita solet causam agere; Ignoscite Judices, Lapsus est, Non putavi, Si unquam posthac. In Senatu vero, & apud populum, & apud Principem, & ubicunque juris clementia est, habet locum deprecatio. No man is to ask any favour of the Judges but what the law allows him, but of the Prince he may;

A quo saepe rei,* 1.2017 nullo licet aere redempti, Accipiunt propriam donato crimine vitam.

For what is wanting in the provisions of law he can make up by the ful∣nesse of his power: and if there be no injury to any, let there be what fa∣vour or indulgence he please, his interpretation is good law, and can bring peace to the conscience in the particular. According to this is that of the Lawyers,* 1.2018 Qui jurato promisit judicio sisti, non videtur pejerasse, si ex con∣cessa causa hoc deseruit, He that hath sworn to appear in judgement, is not perjur'd if he have leave given him not to appear: meaning, from him that can interpret the law, or dispense, declare the man not bound, or give leave to break it. But when the Judges interpret a law, they either expound it by customes of the Court or Country, or else by learning and wise conje∣ctures. Interpretations by prevailing and allowed customes are good law and sure measures of action according to the doctrine of customes; of which in part I have given account, and shall yet adde something in the 6. §. of this Chapter, and therefore I shall adde nothing here. But if the Judges inter∣pretation be onely doctrinal, it is sufficient to us that it is not introductive of a law, and it cannot of it self be a resolution of conscience; but is to be made use of according to the doctrine of probabilities* 1.2019. This onely is to be added, that if the authoriz'd Judges doe consent, and by a delegation of power, or the customes of the Nation, or the disposition of the law the sentence does passe in rem judicatam into a legal sentence, then it obliges as a law; for it is a warranted interpretation and declares the sense of the law, and consequently does bind the Conscience.

§. 3. A contrary or ceasing reason.

RULE III. A law made for a particular reason, when the reason wholly ceases, does no longer oblige the Con∣science.

THe title of this §. implies a distinction of reasons considerable in this* 1.2020 particular. For sometimes it happens that onely one reason dies, and there is no other change, but that the efficient cause of the law, from whence it had it's being, is dead. But sometimes it is more then so; for not onely the reason of the law is gone, but a nettle is risen up in the place of it, and that which was once profitable is become intolerable, and that which was just is now dishonest, and that which was righteous will not be righte∣ous still, but against the public interest. * Now when a contrary reason does arise there is no peradventure but the law ceases: and this is to be extended not onely to the case of injustice or impossiblity, but of trouble or of use∣lesnesse; that is, if the contrary reason makes things so that the law could not justly have been impos'd, or if it had been de facto impos'd, it could not oblige the conscience, then the conscience is restor'd to liberty and dis∣obligation. * But then this case must be manifest: for if it be doubtfull, the law retains her power; for it is in possession, and the justice of it is pre∣sum'd.

But if the reason of the law ceases onely,* 1.2021 and no more, there is some more difficulty, for it may be the will of the Prince does not cease, and he intends the law should last for the support of his authority; and that will be reason enough to keep up a law that once was good and now hath no harm in it: and there ought to be a great reason that shall change a custome, though it be good for nothing; and where there was a law, a custome will easily be suppos'd, especially if the law was usefull and reasonable, as we suppose in the present case. And if the law did prevail unto a custome, and that it be not safe to change a custome, then though the proper reason of the law be ceas'd, there is another reason arisen in the place of it that will be enough to bind the conscience to obedience. For the stating of this question, it is still necessary that we yet first distinguish, and then define.

1. Some laws have in them a natural rectitude or usefulnesse in order to moral ends,* 1.2022 by reason of the subject matter of the law, or by reason that the instance of the law is made an instrument of vertue by the appoint∣ment of law. 2. Others have onely an acquir'd rectitude, and an extrinsic end; that is, it was by the law-giver commanded in order to a certain pur∣pose, and beyond that purpose it serves for nothing. Thus when a Prince imposes a tribute upon a Country for the building of certain bridges, when the work is done, the tribute is of no public emolument. But if he imposes

a fast upon Wednesdays and Fridays for six moneths to obtain of God to remove the plague from a City or a Country, though the plague be gone before the end of four months, yet the fast may serve many other good ends.

Another distinction to be considered is concerning the cessation of* 1.2023 the reason of the law, whether the reason be intrinsecal or extrinsecal. For sometimes the reason ceases universally. Sometimes it remains as to the generality, but is alter'd in the particular cases. So if a Superior com∣mands that none of his subjects shall enter into such a family where there are many fair women amorous and young, lest such a conversation should tempt them to wantonnesse; the general reason of the law remains, although Alexis be an Eunuch, and old Palaemon have a dead palsy upon him and can∣not be warm'd by such fires. The reason ceases in the particular, but abides still in the general.

A third thing is also to be observed,* 1.2024 which hath in it some difference of case. Sometimes there are many parts of a law, and sometimes it is uniform and hath in it but one duty. That which hath parts and is a com∣bination of particulars may cease in one or more of them, and the rest abide in their full usefulnesse and advantage. And these and all the former may be uselesse, or their reason may cease for a time, and be interrupted, and a while after return: and in all these the reason may cease negatively, or contrarily; that is, the first cause may cease, or another quite contrary may come.

According to these distinctions, the cases and the answers are several.

1. If there be two ends in the law,* 1.2025 an extrinsecal and an intrinsecal, though the extrinsecal be wholly and generally ceas'd, yet the law obliges for it's intrinsic reason, that is, when it commands an act of it self honest and vertuous. Thus if a Prelate, or a Prince, commands women in Chur∣ches to sit apart, and to wear vailes that they may not be occasion of quar∣rels and duels amongst yong Gentlemen; if it happen that the Duelling of Gallants be out of fashion, and that it be counted dishonourable to fight a duell, then that end of the law ceases; and yet because it is of it self ho∣nest that women should have a vail on their head for modesty sake, and be∣cause of the Angels, this law is not to cease, but to stand as well upon one leg, as it did before upon two. But this can onely be when Divine and hu∣mane laws are complicated, or at least when humane laws are mixt with a matter of perfection and Counsel Evangelical, or of some worthinesse, which collaterally induces an obligation distinct from the humane law.

2. If a law be appointed for an extrinsecal end,* 1.2026 when that reason ceases universally, though there be an inherent and remaining worthinesse in the action, and an aptnesse to minister to a moral end, yet that law binds not unlesse that moral end was also intended by the law-giver. For that which was no ingredient into the constitution of the law, can have no pow∣er to support the law, for it hath nothing to doe with the law; it never help'd to make it, and therefore by it cannot be a law, unlesse by the legis∣lative power it be made anew. So that such actions which can be good for something of their own, and are not good at all for the end of the law-giver, can onely be lawfull to be done, but they are not necessary. There∣fore

when a law is made that every Thursday the subjects should goe to Church to Morning prayer, that they might in the public offices pray for the life of the Prince, if the Prince be dead that law obliges not; for al∣though going to Morning prayer is of it self good, yet if the Prince had no consideration of that good, but of his own, that good entred not into the law, and had no causality in it, and therefore was no part of the duty of the subject in relation to that law.

3. If the action commanded by law be in it self indifferent,* 1.2027 when the reason of the law ceases extrinsecally, the whole obligation is taken away, because the act is good for nothing in it self, and good for nothing to the Common-wealth, and therefore cannot be a law. Thus there was an oath fram'd in the Universities that no Professor should teach Logic publicly any where but there, meaning that it should not be taught in Stamford, whe∣ther the Scholars made so long a recesse that it had almost grown into an University. But when the danger of that was over, the oath was need∣lesse, and could not oblige, and ought not to have been impos'd. In Spain a law was made that no man should cut any timber-trees: in a few years the province grew so full of wood that the reason and fear of the law was over; and it was more likely to passe into inconvenience by abundance then by scarcity, and therefore then it was lawfull for any man to cut some of his own. So if a law were made for ten years to forbid hunting of wild beasts, that some royal game which was almost destroyed might be preserved for the Prince, if in five years the wolves and lions were grown so numerous that there were more danger then game, the law were no longer obligato∣ry. For as Modestinus said well,* 1.2028 Nulla ratio aut juris benignitas patitur, ut quae salubriter pro hominum commodis statuta sunt, nos duriore interpre∣tatione contra ipsorum commodum producamus ad severitatem; It is against reason that what the law decreed for the good of men, should be severely and rigorously expounded to their damage. And this is to be understood to be true though the reason of the law ceases onely negatively; that is, though the act doe still remain indifferent, and there be no reason to the contrary. To which this is to be added, that when the reason of a law commanding an action otherwise indifferent does cease universally, the very Negative ceasing passes into the contrary of it self: not that it does so in the matter of the action, for the action is still indifferent and harmlesse, but that it does so in the power of legislation: it does not so to the subject, but it does so to the Prince; that is, the subject may still doe it without sin, but without sin the Prince cannot command it to be done, when it is to no pur∣pose. Thus we find in the Legends of the Roman later Saints that some foolish Priors and Superiors of Convents would exercise the obedience of their Monks by commanding them to scrape a pibble, to fill a bottomlesse tub, and such ridiculous instances; which were so wholly to no purpose, that though the Monk might suffer himself to be made a fool of, yet he was not tied to it in virtue of his obedience, and the Prior did sin in command∣ing it. This ought to be observ'd strictly, because although it looks like a subtilty, yet it is of use in the conduct of this Rule of conscience, and hath not been at all observ'd exactly.

4. When the intrinsecal reason of a law does cease universally,* 1.2029 the negative ceasing of the reason passes into a contrary; and if the action be not necessary, it is not lawfull. For actions which have in them an inter∣nal

rectitude have it so always, unlesse the case be wholly chang'd, and then it is become very evil. To restore that which is deposited with us is com∣manded because of the natural justice that is in the action; but when the reason of this ceases, that is, that it is not just to doe it, it is unjust, or un∣charitable: and therefore if you restore to a mad-man his sword to kill an innocent, you are unjust to innocence, and but aequivocally just to madnesse and folly.

5. When a law hath many parts,* 1.2030 and is a conjugation of duties for several reasons, when one of the parts of the law does loose the reason of it wholly, though it be tied in the same bundle, and by the same tie, yet that part is slackened and obliges not, though included in a law which does oblige. The reason of this is the same with the former; onely this is to be added, that in this case it is not one law, but a conjugation of laws; it is not a single starre, but like a constellation, and particularly as the Pleiades, where one of the seven hath almost no light or visibility, though knit in the same confederation with those which half the world doe at one time see. * And the same also is the case in the suspension of a law, that is when the reason ceases universally and wholly, but not for ever: while the rea∣son is absent, the conscience is not tied to attend; but when it returns to ve∣rify the law, the duty returns to bind the conscience. But in this there is no difficulty.

These are the measures of conscience when the reason of a law ceases wholly and universally, that is, as to the public interest; but that which is more difficult, is when the reason of the law remains in the general, but it fails in some particular cases, and to particular persons: and what then is our duty, or our liberty?

The reason of the difficulty is,* 1.2031 because laws are not to regard parti∣culars, but that quod plerumque accidit, saith Theophrastus; and therefore the private damage is supplied by the public emolument: and the particular pretences are not to be regarded, though they be just, lest others make excuses, and the whole band of discipline and laws be broken, Satius erat à paucis justam excusationem non accipi, quam ab omnibus aliquam tentari, said Seneca; It is better to reject the just exception of a few, then to en∣courage the unjust pretensions of all. And therefore subjects should for the public interest sit quietly under their own burden. For lex nulla satis commoda est; id modo quaritur, si majori parti & in summa prodest, said Cato. It is a just law if it does good to the generality and in the summe of affairs. And therefore if Cajus or Titius be pinch'd in the yoke, they may endure it well, when they consider the public profit.

But this were very true onely in case there were no other remedy;* 1.2032 but our inquiry here being onely a question of conscience, which is to be judged by him that commands justly in general, and will doe no injustice in parti∣cular, and can govern all things without suffering them to intangle each other, the case will prove easy enough: for if God does not require obedi∣ence to the laws, when the reason of the law ceases in particular, of them I say in whose particular case the reason ceases, it is all that is look'd for. Now for this the conclusions are plain.

1. If the extrinsic reason of the law ceases in a particular case onely negatively,* 1.2033 that is, so as no evil, grievous burden, sin, or danger be incum∣bent upon his person, the law retains her obligation and is to be obeyed; because in that case, although there be no reason in the subject matter, yet there is reason enough in the reverence of the law, and in a conformity to the public manners of the Nation. Thus when the law forbids a citizen to bear armes in the night because of frequent murders that have been done or are apt to be done by armed night-walkers; he that knows himself a peaceable man and that is resolv'd to offend no body is not bound by the reason of that law in his own particular, but he is bound by the law as long as the public is bound whereof he is a part: for if he have no reason to the contrary, but onely there is no reason for it in his case, it is reason enough that there is a law in the case, which is usefull to the public, and of great interest as to the communities of men. And therefore he that disobeys in these circumstances cannot be excus'd from contempt of the law: because though his obedience be causelesse, yet so is his disobedience, and this cannot be innocent, though that can; especially because though the obe∣dience be causelesse in his own particular in relation to that matter, yet it hath cause enough in it in relation to example and the veneration of the laws.

2. If the reason of the law ceases contrarily,* 1.2034 that is, turns into mis∣chief; then though it ceases onely in a particular, in that particular the subject whose case it is, is free (from the law I mean, but not free to obey it.) Whatever we have vowed to religion or the Temple we are bound to perform: but if in the interval of the solution my Father or my nearest rela∣tive, or any to whom I am bound to shew piety, be fallen into want, or needs my ministery, I am bound to doe this first, and let that alone till both can be done: and the reason is, because I could not bind my self by vow to omit any duty to which I am naturally oblig'd: and therefore though the law that commands payment of vows be just, yet it must be always with exception of preceding obligations; so that if it be certainly a sin which is consequent to the obedience of any law, it is certainly no sin to disobey it.

3. If the general reason of the law remaining,* 1.2035 in some particular cases it ceases contrarily, but not so as to introduce a sin, but a great evil, or such a one which the law would not have commanded, and the law-giver is supposed not to have intended, the law does not oblige the conscience of the subject in that case. For here is the proper place for equity. In the former case it is duty not to obey the law. Either then there is no equity but what is necessary and unavoidable; or if there can be any shewn or us'd by prudence and great probability, and in mercy, it follows that then it is to be us'd when the yoke pinches the person, though it does not invade the Conscience. And it is not to be suppos'd that a superior would have his laws burdensome to any one beyond the public necessity; it being as cer∣tainly in his duty to be willing to ease single persons in their private bur∣dens, as to provide for the common interest in their great and little politi∣cal advantage.* 1.2036 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Equity is as much law as the law it self, it is as just as justice, onely that it is a better justice, saith Aristotle: it is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the legal justice, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a rectification and an amendment of it.

—Bonum jus dicis;

Impetrare oportet,* 1.2037 quia aequum postulat, said he in the Comedy; It is fit that you prevail, you ask reason & equity. That's bonum jus; it is justice & mercy in a knot. Thus if a Church commands such ceremonies to be us'd, such orders, such prayers, they are to be observ'd when they may; but if I fall into the hands of an enemy to that manner of worship, who will kill or afflict me greatly for using it, I am in that case disoblig'd. For though this case be not excepted in the law, yet it is supplied by the equity and cor∣rection of the law: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it is fit that when the law-giver hath commanded ab∣solutely and indefinitely, he should in cases of particular evil make provision and correct what was amisse or omitted by the law.* 1.2038 For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saies Aristotle; if he had known of it before he would have provided for it before-hand: and because he did not, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, if the law-giver were present, he would use equity and give leave to the grieved subject to ease himself. And therefore since it is reasonable to sup∣pose that if it had been thought of, this very case would have been pro∣vided for in the law; and if the law-giver were present he would declare the law in that case not to oblige; it follows undeniably, that the law binds not any man to a great inconvenience in his own person, though otherwise, and as to the public, it be a just and a good law, of a remaining reason and a remaining obligation. In order to this consideration, that is usefull which hath been already said in the first Chapter of this book, in the second and third Rules.

4. If the reason of the law ceases in a particular,* 1.2039 so that without sin it may be obeyed, and without any great and intolerable evil to the obedient, yet sometimes the law does not intend to oblige in the particular case, even when there is a little inconvenience, or but a probable reason to the con∣trary; and this is in things of small concernment. I should instance in ri∣tuals and little circumstances of Ecclesiastical Offices and forms of wor∣ship, in the punctualities of Rubrics, in the order of Collects, in the num∣ber of prayers, and fulnesse of the Office upon a reasonable cause or induce∣ment to the omission or alteration: for these things are so little, and so fit to be intrusted to the conduct of these sober, obedient and grave persons, who are thought fit to be trusted with the cure of souls; and these things are always of so little concernment, and so apt to yield to any wise mans reasons and sudden occasions and accidents, and little and great causes, that these were the fittest instances of this rule, if Superiors, for want of great manifestations of their power, would not make too much of little things. But the purpose and declar'd intention of all just laws and just governments is in these things to give the largest interpretation to persons of a peace∣able mind and an obedient spirit, that such circumstances of ministeries may not passe into a solemn religion, and the zeal of good men, their cau∣tion and their curiosity, may not be spent in that which does not profit. But the measures of practice in this particular must be taken from the manner and circumstances of the government, and the usual disposition of the law. In many cases an equity may be presum'd; but if it be explicitely denyed, it must not be us'd.

Question.

But upon the instance of these particular rules it is to be inquir'd,* 1.2040 whe∣ther in these cases the subject is so quitted from the obligation of the law, that without further leave he may use his liberty, or must he require it of his Superior?

To this I answer,* 1.2041 that if the case be evident, the subject may use his liberty: for if he should be tied to goe to his Superior, it is either to ask of him that the law should not bind him, or that he may declare that the law in his case does not bind, or to promulgate and publish the law in that particular. Not to ask leave that the law shall not bind, for of it self it ceases, and it was never intended to bind against equity and reason. Not for declaration, because the case is here suppos'd to be evident. Nor yet last∣ly for promulgation, because that is onely necessary in the sanction and re∣vocation of laws which depend upon the will of the Prince; whereas in this case the law ceases by natural justice and the nature of thing, and the reasons of equity.

2. But if the case be doubtfull,* 1.2042 and it is not evident whether the par∣ticular case ought to be excepted in the general law, then we are to consider whether it be a doubt of fear onely or a doubt of reason, that is, whether it be nothing but an unjust fear, or relies upon just grounds; for some men may easily perceive in themselves a diffidence in any thing, not that they have reason to cause their fear, but because they dare not trust the greatest reason that they either have or hear. If it be onely a doubt of fear, then it is to be conducted by the rules given concerning a scrupulous Conscience:* 1.2043 If it be a fear of reason, we are to manage it by the measures of a doubting Conscience. But if he supposes upon probable inducements that he is not obliged, then according to the nature of the probability we are to proceed. For if he believes it as probable that such a case ought not to be compre∣hended in the law, as supposing it to be a sin that in his case would be com∣manded, or too great a burden impos'd, and so to be beyond the power of the law-giver, then the subject may of himself be free, without recourse to his superior. The reason is, because to avoid a sin, or to doe a great charity to our selves, a probable reason is a sufficient inducement, provi∣ded a more probable reason be not oppos'd against it, we being comman∣ded, to avoid all appearance of evil. Now if this opinion be the more pro∣bable that by obeying the letter of the law in my case I should sin, it must needs appear to be an evil to doe it, and not to obey the law in this case does not appear to be an evil, as being the lesse probable: for if the opinions be equally probable, then the conscience is in doubt, and is to proceed by mea∣sures fitted to a doubting conscience: but when I say there is a greater pro∣bability and a lesse, the greater must carry it; and therefore the law is not to be obeyed, it being here suppos'd to be the more probable opinion that the obedience would produce a sin. So also in the case of a great burden or intolerable pressure, the presumption is for ease; and the law-giver is to be supposed good and gentle and reasonable; and besides, it is supposed as the more probable opinion that the law-giver hath not power to make a law or to oblige to so much inconvenience, and then the case is the same.

* But if he believes it as probable that to oblige in the present case was not in his will, but it is certain that it was in his power, then the case is so that the subject may without injustice or violence obey it; and therefore ought not to use his liberty by his own opinion, but by recourse to his supe∣rior that hath power to declare the intention of the law.

In the first case if it be easy and convenient to goe to the Superior,* 1.2044 or that there is time enough and all things fitted, it were the surer way to re∣quire his sentence. But if there be not time, and the action urges by has∣tinesse, or necessity, or present opportunity, the liberty is as present as his need. But in the second case, (which is oftentimes harder to know then the first, it being more difficult to pronounce definitively concerning the will of the law-giver which is free, then concerning his power which is not free,) when it is onely probable that the law-giver is willing, it is not safe to venture upon the not-obeying, without recourse to the Superior. Be∣cause our innocence depending wholly upon his will, and there being no sin in keeping the law, we may safely doe this; but we cannot safely disobey without being more assured of his leave: and therefore if it be opportune and easy to have recourse to our competent Superior, it is worth our paines to goe and inquire; if it be not opportune, it is worth our stay till it be; for the securing our duty and the peace of conscience are interests much greater then the using of an unnecessary liberty.

3. But in these cases of uncertainty,* 1.2045 when we are not confident of a just liberty by the force of reason and the nature of the thing, we may just∣ly presume that the Superior does not intend to oblige in all those cases in which he usually and of course dispenses; that is, when his dispensation is not of special favour, but of ordinary concession; because as in the first case it is suppos'd a gift, so in this latter it is suppos'd a justice. For example, A law is made to keep so many fasting-days. Maevius is a hard student, and feels himself something ill after fasting, and believes it will not be for his health; but yet things are so with him, that he can obey the law without great or apparent mischief, but yet he probably believes that the law-giver would not have him bound in this case. If he perceives that they that have recourse to the Superior in lesse needs then his, are ordinarily dis∣pensed with, then he hath reason enough not to goe to his Superior; for it is already declar'd that he does not intend to bind in his and the like cases. This is evident, and the best measure that I know in such cases. It is the surest, and the largest, and the easiest.

4. When the recourse to a Superior for declaration of the case hath in it great difficulty or inconvenience,* 1.2046 though the cause of exception from the law be not very great, yet if together with the inconvenience of ad∣dresse to the Superior it make up an unequal burden, and so that the par∣ticular case seem very probable to be excepted, and that in it the legislator did not intend to bind; it is sufficient to consult with wise men and good, and by their advice and answers, as by extrinsecal causes of probability, or by any other just and probable cause of determination, to use our liberty, or to obey. The reason of this is plain necessity. Because we have no other way of proceeding, but either we must in this, as in almost all the other cases of our life, be content with the way which to us seems the more probable; or else if we were tied to make it secure, our lives and conditions

would be burdensome and intolerable, and the whole processe would be a snare and torment to a conscience: the Superior, who is to be consulted, it may be, not being within 40 miles of us; or when we come, it may be he is of difficult accesse, or otherwise imployed, and it will be impossible for many to be heard by him, if all in the like cases were bound to consult him; or it may be when we goe, we shall not be admitted, or if we be, it may be we shall not be eas'd unlesse we carry along with us the rewards of Divination in our hands, and we are poor; or it may be the matter requires hast, and cannot stay the leisure of the Oracle; and besides all this, the great∣est part of the actions of our lives are not so well conducted as to be deter∣min'd by the consultation of a wise man, but we doe them of our own head, and it may be of our own heart, without consideration; and therefore it is a prudent course to proceed this way: and he that in such cases ties the con∣sciences to proceed more then prudently, and thinks that prudence is not a sufficient warrant, does not consider the condition of humane nature, nor the necessities of a mans life, nor the circumstances of his condition, nor the danger of an unquiet and a restlesse conscience.

Upon occasion of this subject,* 1.2047 viz. the alteration of humane laws by the interpretation and equity of reason, it is very seasonable, and very use∣full to conscience, to inquire whether by the similitude of reason the law may not as well receive advantage and extension, as well as the subject can receive liberty and ease. That is,

Question.

Whether the obligation of the law does extend it self to all cases that have the same or an equal reason, though the case be not comprehended direct∣ly in the law.

To this the answer is by several Propositions.

1. In laws declarative of natural right or obligation,* 1.2048 the obligation extends to all things of equal reason, though they be not comprehended under the law. Thus because we are bound by the laws to pay honour and gratitude to our parents for their nourishing of us and giving us education, the same duty is to be extended to those persons who took care of us when our parents were dead, or that took us in when we were exposed; and children are to pay a proportionable regard even to their Nurses; and Moses was for ever oblig'd to Pharaohs daughter, because she rescued him from drowning, and became as a Mother to him. And the reason of this is, because in these things there is a natural rectitude, and a just proportion between the reason and the event; the reason of the thing is the cause why it was commanded. But in laws dispositive or introductive of a new obli∣gation there is some difference. Therefore,

2. In odious cases,* 1.2049 and especially in penal laws, the extension of the reason does neither extend the obligation nor the punishment; according to that glosse in the Canon law,* 1.2050 In poenis non arguimus ad similia, quia poenae non excedunt proprium casum. Punishments and odious burdens must not exceed the very case set down in the law: for if in the cases set down the Judges are to give the gentlest measure, it is not to be suppos'd that they can

be more severe then the letter of the law, which it self requires an abate∣ment and allay when it is capable: and as it is with Judges in the punish∣ments appointed by law, so it is with all the subjects in the obligation of the law. For in both these cases, it is to be presum'd that the mind of the law-giver was not to oblige or to punish more and in more cases; for si vo∣luisset, expressisset, is a good presumption in these things, he could as easily have spoken that as this, if he had intended both alike; and he would, be∣cause he knows that in odious things every one is willing to take the easiest part: and therefore that is a good warranty to presume of the mind of the law-giver; especially since the apportioning such a punishment to such a fact hath in it no natural necessity, but depends upon the will of the law-giver, and therefore is not to be extended by a participation of the reason, but by a declaration of the will.

3. When there is a defect in the law,* 1.2051 and the public necessity or utility requires a supply, it may be supplied, and the obligation and the judge∣ments even in matters of burden can be extended by the similitude and pa∣rity of reason; for in this sense it is true which the lawyers say, Casus si∣milis expresso non censetur omissus. If it was omitted onely in the law, by the imperfection of it's sanction, or want of consideration, the Common-wealth must not suffer detriment, and therefore is to be help'd by the pa∣rity of reason. But then it is to be observ'd, that this is not wholly for the force and consequence of the reason of the law, but for the necessity and profit of the republic, and therefore the supply is to be made by jurisdiction rather then by interpretation:* 1.2052 so saith the law, Is qui jurisdictioni praeest, ad similia procedere, atque ita jus dicere debet, The Praefect that hath ju∣risdiction must doe right by proceeding to the like cases: so that the jurisdicti∣on and power is the sufficient and indeed the adequate efficient of this sup∣ply; onely by the similitude of reason he that hath jurisdiction can take oc∣casion to doe right.* 1.2053 Quando lex in uno disponit, bonam esse occasionem caete∣ra quae tendunt ad eandem utilitatem vel interpretatione vel certâ jurisdictione supplendi; The Law having made provision in one case, it is a good occa∣sion to supply other cases which tend to the same advantage; but this sup∣ply is to be made either by interpretation, if it can, or if it cannot, then by certain jurisdiction and authority. So that here are three things to be con∣sidered in this extension of obligation. The one is, that the law be de∣fective and need supply. The second is, that the supply be for the same utility and advantage which is in the expressed case of the law. And the third is, that if it cannot be by interpretation, that is, if it cannot be done by force of something contained in the law, but that there be a very defect in the law, it be done by the force of authority: for the similitude of rea∣son is not enough, and therefore either the supreme, or a jurisdiction dele∣gate with this power in special, is necessary. But where there is such a pow∣er, the way of doing it is procedendo de similibus ad similia,* 1.2054 the occasion of supply must be taken from the similitude of the reason. But this I say is to be done either in cases of public necessity, or great equity and questions of favour. In other cases there are yet more restraints.

4.* 1.2055 A similitude of reason (except in the cases now expressed) does not extend the law to cases not comprehended in the words and first mea∣ning of the law.* 1.2056 For ratio legis non est lex, sed quod ratione constituitur, say the Lawyers, Every thing that is reasonable is not presently a law, but that is

the law which for that reason is decreed. And when a thing is propounded to a Prince, it is in the body politic as in the body natural, though the Un∣derstanding propound a thing as reasonable, the Will stil hath power to chuse or to reject it; and there may be reason for the thing in one regard, and rea∣son against it in another; and if the reason in both cases onely be alike, they are also unlike. Omne simile est etiam dissimile. For Titius contracts friend∣ship with Callinicus because their Fathers were fellow-Souldiers in the Par∣thian warre, and they lov'd well: but Titius refuses to contract the same league with Catulus, although the like reason was for him, his Father ha∣ving been in the same legion in the same warre: but Catulus was an ill-na∣tur'd man, and not fit to be entertain'd into such societies.

5. The Conscience is not bound to a greater duty then is express'd* 1.2057 in the words and first meaning of the law by the proportion and commu∣nication of the reason, unlesse the reason be not onely alike, but be abso∣lutely the same in both cases; and not onely so, but that the reason was adequate to the law, that is, was the reason which actually and alone did procure the sanction of the law. When Caesar took in a town in Gallia Narbonensis, he destroyed the walls, and commanded they should not build any more walls: they consented, but cast up a great trench of earth; and he came and fir'd their Town, because although a trench of earth was ••ot in the words of the contract or prohibition, yet because Caesar forbad the rebuilding of the walls for no other reason but because he would not have it fortified, the law against walls was to be extended to trenches also for the identity of an adequate reason.* 1.2058 To the same purpose is that of Quinti∣lian, Caedes videtur significare sanguinem & ferrum: si quis alio genere homo fuerit occisus, ad illam legem revertemur. A law against murder does com∣monly signify shedding of his bloud; but if a man have his neck broken, or be smother'd with pillows, or strangled with a bow-string, he shall be avenged by the same law that forbad he should be killed with a knife or dagger: for it was not the instrument or the manner which the law regard∣ed, but it wholly intended to secure the lives of the subjects.

6. Now this identity of reason must be clear and evident,* 1.2059 or else it effects nothing; for in matters of doubt the presumption is for liberty and freedome. But it commonly is best judg'd by one or more of these following cases. 1. The relative and the correlative are to be judg'd by the same reason when the reason of the law does equally concern them, though onely one be named in the provision of the law. If the husband must love the wife, the wife must love the husband, though she were not nam'd in the law. For here they are equal. But in superior and inferior the reason cannot be equal, but therefore is onely to be extended to the proportion of the reason. A Son must maintain his Father that is fallen into poverty, and so must a Father a Son: but they are not tied to equal obedience; to equal duty they are, but not to equal significations and in∣stances of it. A husband must be true to his wives bed, and so must she to his; but she may not be admitted to an equal liberty of divorce as he is: the reason is, because the duty is equal, but the power is unequal; and there∣fore the consequents of this must differ, though the consequents of the other be the same. 2. The identity of the reason is then sufficient for the extension of the law when one thing is contain'd under another, a parti∣cular under a general, an imperfect under a perfect, a part under the whole.

3. When the cases are made alike by the effort of other laws. 4. When the law specifies but one case for example sake, the rest also of the same na∣ture and effect are comprehended. 5. When the cases are radicated in the same principle, and are equally concerned.

7. What is here said concerning cases and actions is also to be under∣stood not onely of persons,* 1.2060 which cannot be separated from the considera∣tion of actions which are always personal, but of places and times, when the analogy and force of the reason or the words require it. Onely each of these is to observe their proper caution.* 1.2061 Places are equally included in the meaning of the law, though they be not express'd in the words of the law, if they be within the jurisdiction of the law-giver, that is, within the capacity of the law* 1.2062.* 1.2063 But the caution concerning time is this, That although in laws declarative there is no difference of time, because there the present law is not the measure of our duty, but supposes the duty limi∣ted and prescrib'd before (nihil enim nunc dat,* 1.2064 sed datam significat, saith the law in this case;) yet laws constitutive or introductive of a new right or ob∣ligation never of themselves regard or can be extended to what is past, be∣cause this is not in our power, and is not capable of Counsel or Authority; but they can onely be extended to the future: but the allay is this, for this is to be understood onely in precepts and prohibitions, but not in matters of indulgence and favour; for in this it is quite contrary: what the law hath forbidden in time past or present, and what she hath or doth command is to be extended to the future;* 1.2065 but Cum lex in praeteritum quid indulget, in futurum vetat, When the law gives a pardon for what is past, and this par∣don relies upon a proper reason, there is no leave given for the future to doe so though the same reason shall occurre; for the pardon of what went be∣fore is a prohibition of what is to come hereafter.

8. When a law is made to take away an evil,* 1.2066 it is to be understood also, and to be extended to all cases of prevention, and from an actual evil passes on to a probability. When Antiochus agreed that Ptolemy should not bring an army into Syria, he did not onely intend to remove the present hostility that he fear'd, but he intended also that he should not bring any at all, though for passage onely through his Country; because if his army were at all in Syria, he was in danger of suffering what by his treaty he de∣sir'd to prevent.

9. Whatsoever is said in laws is also true in promises and contracts:* 1.2067 for these are laws to the contractors and interested persons, and to be mea∣sur'd by the same proportions. For when the adequate reason of a promise or contract is evidently extended to another instance though not nam'd in the contract, it must be perform'd and suppos'd as included in the stipula∣tion, and so still in succeeding and new-arising instances; and the state of things is not changed so long as that adequate reason remains for which the obligation was first contracted, though the thing be varied in a thousand o∣ther circumstances and accidents. But of this I shall have better opportu∣nity to speak in the last book.

33. I onely adde this one thing,* 1.2068 That there is great caution to be us'd in determining our cases of Conscience by the measures of the reason of a law. For Non omnium quae à Majoribus constituta sunt ratio reddi potest, said

Julian. It will be hard to find out what was the reason of the laws made by our forefathers; and unlesse the reason be expressed in the law, our con∣jectures are very often so wild and far amisse, that they will be very ill mea∣sures of conscience or obedience.* 1.2069 Et ideo rationes eorum quae constituuntur inquiri non oportet, alioquin multa ex iis quae certa sunt subvertentur. We must obey the law, and never inquire after the reason, unlesse the law of it self declares it: it is not good to examine, for by this means many clear laws are made obscure and intricate. Delicata est illa obedientia quae causas quaerit. The law-giver is mov'd to the sanction of the law by the reason of the thing, but the sanction of the law is to be the onely reason of our obedience.

§. 4. Dispensation.

RULE IV. The Legislator hath authority to dispense in his own laws for any cause that himself prudently shall judge to be reasonable, so that no distinct interest be prejudic'd or injur'd.

DIspensation differs from interpretation of laws,* 1.2070 because this does declare the law in certain cases not to bind; but dispensation supposes the law in actual obligation, not onely in general, but in this case, and to this person; and it is but like the old man in the fable his laying aside his burden of sticks, which he is bound to carry with him to his long home unlesse some friendly person come to help him. But Dispensation differs from diminu∣tion of laws by a ceasing or a contrary reason, because the law ceases of it self in this case, but in dispensation wholly by the will of the Prince. And lastly it differs from equity, because equity is law, melior lex, but dispensa∣tion is a remission of the law; and the cases of equity are such as by justice must be eas'd, but in dispensations there is nothing but benignity and fa∣vour. So that Dispensation is a voluntary act of the Princes grace and fa∣vour, releasing to any single person or community of men the obligation of the law, others at the same time remaining bound, not onely in other cases, but in the same and in the like. For although the same and the like cases of equity doe procure remission to all alike, yet in dispensations it is not so. One may be eased, and another not eas'd in the very same case. And the not understanding or not considering this great and material difference hath caus'd so great errors both in the understanding and in the ministeries of dispensation.

For if we use the word improperly,* 1.2071 Dispensation can signify a decla∣ration made by the superior that the subject in certain cases is not oblig'd, that the law-giver did not intend it: but this is interpretation of laws, or a declaration of the equitable part of the law, and is not properly an act of authority, but of doctrine and wisedome; save onely that that doctrine and that wisedome shall be esteemed authentical, and a warranty in doubt∣full

cases: but if the subject did know the meaning of the law, as in most cases he may, his conscience is of it self and by the intention of the law at liberty without any such declaration; for that liberty is from an intrinsic cause, that is, from the natural equity and reasonablenesse of the case, and therefore claims nothing but what the law intends and ought to intend in its very sanction. Now in these cases to require dispensation, is to ask more then is needfull; it is as if one should desire his friend to untie his girdle when his cloths hang loose about him: he needs it not; but that the wisdome and charity of the law is made an artifice to get mony, and to put the subject to scruples and trouble that he may get his ease.

But when Dispensation signifies properly,* 1.2072 it means an act of mere grace and favour, proceeding from an extrinsic cause; that is, not the na∣ture of the thing, or the merit of the cause, but either the merit of the person, or some degrees of reasonablenesse in the thing; which not being of it self enough to procure the favour of the law, is of it self enough to make a man capable of the favour of the Prince; and if this be authority enough, that is reason enough. For since dispensation is an act of mere ju∣risdiction, and not of doctrine or skill and wisedome and law, that is, it is not declarative of something already in being, but effective of a leave which is neither unreasonable nor yet due, so that it is not an act of justice, but of mercy and favour upon a fair and worthy occasion; it must follow that the reason and causes of dispensation must be such as are not necessa∣ry: but probable and fit to move a Prince they must be, lest he doe an un∣reasonable act.

All those disputes therefore amongst the Civil and Canon Lawyers and the Divines,* 1.2073 Whether the Prince sins in dispensing without just cause, or the subject in desiring it or using it without just cause; Whether if the cause be not that which they are pleas'd to call just, the dispensation be va∣lid, and very many more, are inquiries relying upon weak grounds, and ten∣ding to no real purpose. For since the cause need not be necessary, but pro∣bable, it will be very hard if the Prince can find out no probable reason for what he does, and harder yet to imagine that he should doe it at all, if he have not so much as a probable reason why he does it; and since the reason of dispensation is extrinsic to the cause or matter in hand very often, or else is but occasion'd by the matter in hand, as most commonly it is in wise and good governments, it will be impossible but that the Prince will have reason enough to doe an act of kindnesse in his own affairs and matters of his own disposing: the Princes will being enough to satisfy us, and any good reason within or without being sufficient for him if it does move and deter∣mine his will, the consequent will be, that the Conscience ought to be at rest, without curious inquiry into the cause, if it have a dispensation from a just and competent authority.

And indeed it is not easy that the Prince can be reprov'd for the in∣sufficiency of the cause of dispensation:* 1.2074 for a dispensation is not necessary to the conscience at all, when the cause it self is great and sufficient for equity; but then it is necessary for the avoiding of scandal or civil punish∣ments in some cases, that there be a declaration of liberty & equity: but to dispense is onely then proper and a fitting ministery 1. when the law is still usefull and reasonable to one or more good purposes, but accidentally be∣comes

an impediment of a greater good; or 2^ly, when it is doubtfull whe∣ther the cause of equity and legal remission without asking leave be suffi∣cient, for in this case, if the superior dispenses, he supplies by favour what is wanting in the merit of the cause, and makes the conscience sure when the question it self was not sure; or 3^ly, to reward a vertue, or the service of a worthy person, or to doe honour or favour, mercy and benignity upon the occasion of any reasonable consideration. These being all the causes of proper dispensations, it will be hard that every thing of this should be wanting, or that what moves a prudent Prince to doe it, should by the sub∣ject not be thought sufficient, especially since no man is judge of it but he that does it: and therefore he that saies the dispensation was for an insuffi∣cient cause, hath no sufficient cause to say it; it may be evil in the manner, or in the excesse, or in the event, but not in the moving cause, because a little cause is sufficient, and therefore a little cause cannot suffice to blame it. Nullius sensus esse praesumitur qui sensum vincat principalem.* 1.2075 The subjects opinion can never overcome the opinion of the Prince in those things where the Prince is Judge.

There is onely this to be added,* 1.2076 That he that dispenses with a law to particular persons be carefull that it be in a matter wholly in his own pow∣er, and make no intrecnhment upon religion so much as collaterally, so far as he can perceive, nor yet that any man be injur'd by it. And therefore if a Prince dispenses with any one in the matter of tribute, he must abate it from his own rights, and not lay it upon others, to their considerable and heavy pressure. If it be inconsiderable, no man is to complain, but to indulge so much to the Princes reason and to the man whom the King will honour; but if it be considerable and great, the Prince ought not to do it, but upon such a reason which may repay the private burden by the public advantage: and the reason of this is not, because the Supreme power cannot dispense with his own laws without great cause, but becasue he cannot dispense with other mens rights. And therefore when by the laws of Christendome the Tiths were given to the Curates of souls of all the fruits arising in their pa∣rishes, it was unjustly done of the Pope to exempt the lands of the Cistertians and some other Orders from paying that due to the Parish Priest: for though he that hath a just power may use it for the benefit of his subjects, yet he may not use the rights of others and give away that which is none of his own, to ease one and burden another. In cases of public necessity this may be done, but not for pleasure, or a little reason. And therefore dispensations must be sparingly granted, because if they be easy and frequent, they will oppresse by their very numbers.* 1.2077 Dispensationum modus nulli sapientum dis∣plicuit, said the Canon law. That which is but seldome and in small things, or in little degrees, will be of no evil effect, and that which may greatly pro∣fit one or two will be no burden to a Common-wealth; but if it be often done, and to many, it may be of evil consequent, and therefore ought not to be done, but upon a cause so weighty, that the good effect of the cause may prevail above the pressure of the dispensation: for though this may be favour to one or to a few, yet it is justice to all. But if the dispensati∣ons be in matters of government, or censures, or favours and meer graces, where some are benefited and no man is injur'd, as in taking off irregula∣rities, personal burdens which return to no mans shoulders, in giving graces beyond the usual measures of laws, dispensations in time, in solennities of law, giving what by law could not be claimed; in these and the like the

Prince as he hath supreme power, so his good will being mov'd by any rea∣sonable inducement is warrant enough for him that gives it, and for him that uses it.

§. 5. Commutation.

RULE V. The same power that can dispense, can also commute a duty; and as in the first it eases, so in the latter it binds the Conscience.

COmmutation is nothing but a kind,* 1.2078 or rather a particular manner of dispensation; and therefore hath in it no particular consideration differ∣ing from the former, but onely such prudential advices as are usefull to the ministery and conduct of it.

For Commutation is a changing of the burden of the law into an act of,* 1.2079 it may be, a greater usefulnesse but a lesse trouble. Thus when a public penance is enjoyn'd to a lapsed person, who by a public shame would be hardned or oppressed, the Church sometimes dispenses in the obligation, and changes it into almes, ut solvat in aere, quod non luit in corpore, that the fruit of his labours may goe for the sin of his soul, and an expensive almes may be taken in recompence of his exteriour humiliation.

1. But this must be done so as may be no diminution to religion,* 1.2080 or to adde confidence to the vices of great persons, who spend much more in the purchases of their lust then in the redemption of their shame, and therefore think they escape with their sin, when they enjoy it at a price.

2. It must be done never but upon considerations of piety and great regard;* 1.2081 not because the sinner is powerfull or rich: for though in matters of commutative justice neither the rich man is to be regarded for his riches, nor the poor man for his poverty; yet in matters criminal and of distribu∣tive justice the rich man is lesse to be eased, when the indulgence makes the crime more popular and imitable by the greatnesse of the evil example; but he is more to be eased, when the punishment will by reason of his greatnesse of honour be too unequal a diminution to him, and cause a contempt grea∣ter then the intention of the law.

3. The commutation of the punishment imposed by law must at no hand be done at a set price before-hand,* 1.2082 or taxed in penitentiary tables, and be a matter of course, or indifferent dispensation: for when men know the worst of the evil, which they fear, to be very tolerable and easy, it is an in∣vitation, and does tempt to the sin. But therefore this must be done by particular dispensation; not easily, not to all, not to many, not at all for the price, but to relieve the needs of him who is in danger of being swallowed by too great a sorrow.

4. Commutations are not to be impos'd but when the dispensation is something of ease in a law of burden;* 1.2083 for then to change it into a lesse bur∣den is a dispensation by a commutation of which it is properly capable. Thus when abstinence from flesh is enjoyn'd by a law, it may be upon good ground dispens'd withall and chang'd into an abstinence from wine or strong drink, or society, or into almes. But when laws are made which contain in them no burden, but are in order to some end of personal or pub∣lic advantage, some end of vertue, or caution, or defence, then either the dispensation (when it is reasonable to be requir'd) must be without com∣mutation; or if it be not, the commutation must be made into something that shall contribute to the end intended in the law. Thus if any one hath reason to desire to be dispensed with in the publication or trine denuncia∣tion of an intended marriage, it is not reasonable, nor according to the in∣tention and wisedome of the law, to change that law into a taxe of money, though for almes and religion; but it may be done by commanding them to abs•••••• in from mutual congresse till the secret marriage can prudently be ma•• public; because this commutation does in some degree secure the end of the law, and makes some amends for want of publication of the bannes. If a Deacon have reason to desire to receive the Order of Priesthood from one that is not his own Diocesan, the Bishop that dispenses with him can∣not prudently or justly require of him to give a summe of money for the reparation a Church, because that, though it be a good work, yet it is not in the same matter, nor does it cooperate toward the wise end of the law: but he does well, if he enjoyns him to procure and carry along with him greater testimonials of his conversation and worthinesse, and that he publish his intention to all his own neighbourhood, that they may, if they see cause, object against him; and he may not be promoted by a clancular ordination.

5. I might adde here, that in commutations the pretences of charity* 1.2084 and almes and religion must not be the cover of avaritious practices and designes; but that this, although it be usefull in respect of the corrupted manners of men, yet it is nothing to the explication of this Rule.

§. 6. Contrary Custome.

RULE VI. A Custome can interpret a law, but can never ab∣rogate it without the consent of the Supreme power.

THe doctrine of Customes both in divine laws and in humane,* 1.2085 I have al∣ready explicated,* 1.2086 so far as concerns their positive power, and the pow∣er of binding the Conscience to obedience and complying. That which now is to be inquir'd is concerning their power to disoblige and set at li∣berty: and even this also may very well be estimated by those positive measures, and hath in it not very much of special consideration, save this

onely, that there is very great reason of dissenting from the commonly-re∣ceived doctrine of the power of customes in this very particular.

For although by the consent of all the world custome can introduce a law,* 1.2087 according to that saying of Tertullian,* 1.2088 Consuetudo in rebus civilibus pro lege suscipitur, cum deficit lex, When there is no law, it is supplied by cu∣stome; and this is so far to be extended, that if the custome be reasona∣ble, and antecedent to a law, it shall remain after the making of a law in that very matter,* 1.2089 nisi expressè caveatur in ipsa, unlesse the law does ex∣pressely cancell it by particular caution: yet when a law is established and is good, the force of custome is not sufficient of it self to annul it, and to cancel the obligation of Conscience.

A custome can interpret a law.* 1.2090 Si de interpretatione legis quaeratur, inprimis inspiciendum est,* 1.2091 quo jure civitas retro in hujusmodi casibus utere∣tur, saies the law. For it is to be suppos'd that the law was obeyed, and in that sense in which the law-giver intended it; and that the people doe their duty in things of public concern is a just and a legal presumption: and there∣fore nothing is more reasonable in questions concerning the interpretation of a law, then to inquire how the practice of the people was in times by∣gone, because what they did when the reason and sense of the law was best perceiv'd, and what the law-giver allowed them to doe in the obedience of it, may best be suppos'd to be that which he intended. Upon this account, the judg'd cases in law are the best indication of the meaning of the law; because the sentence of the Judges does most solemnly convey the notice of a custome, and allow it reasonable, and by those customes does interpret the law, so that they give aid each to other; the custome gives assistance to the Judges in understanding the meaning of the law, and the Judges giving sentence according to the custome declare that custome to be rea∣sonable; according to that in the Spanish laws,* 1.2092 That custome is for ever here∣after to be observed, si secundum eam bis judicatum fuerit, if there have been two sentences pronounced according to the custome. But this use of cu∣stome is expressed both in the Civil and Canon law.* 1.2093 In ambiguitatibus quae ex legibus proficiscuntur, consuetudinem aut rerum perpetuò similiter judi∣catarum authoritatem vim legis obtinere debere. Custome and precedents of law are as good as law in all questions of law and of doubtfull in∣terpretation: and therefore the Presidents of Provinces were commanded to judge by the measures of custome:* 1.2094 probatis iis quae in oppido frequenter in eodem controversiarum genere servata sunt, causâ cagnitâ statuat; see what is the custome of the place, and by the measures of that let the decree passe. And so it is in the Canon law, where a certain Bishop is commanded to inquire what is the custome of the Metropolitan Church and the Chur∣ches in the neighbourhood,* 1.2095 & diligentius imitari, to follow it diligently, meaning both in practice and in sentences. Now in this, if the Conscience can be relieved and the rigor of the law abated by the aides of custome, it is safe to use it, and to proceed according to the rules of equity, describ'd in the beginning of this Chapter.

But all this is therefore reasonable because it is consuetudo secundum legem,* 1.2096 it is according to law; all the ease and abatements of which that are reasonable the Conscience may safely use. But if a custome be against a law, the law, and not the custome ought to prevail; for a custome cannot take

off from us the duty and obedience we owe to the just laws of our superi∣ors. Consuetudo nec rationem vincit nec legem.* 1.2097 As in Divine laws reason and truth can never be prejudic'd by contrary customes; so in humane laws, the authority and obligation cannot be annull'd by desuetude alone. For al∣though a man may get impunity and save his skin whole under the prote∣ction of contrary custome; yet our inquiry is for the indemnity of Con∣science: and as to this, it is considerable that when a custome contrary to law does enter, it enters by neglect or disobedience, by rebellion or con∣tempt, it proceeds all the way in the paths of iniquity; for still men goe quà itur, non quà eundum est, they goe, like frighted or wandring sheep, there where the gap is open, not where the way lies: and it will be impossible that such customes should be a warranty to the conscience, and that it should be lawfull to break a law, because the law is broken; that disobedi∣ence should warrant rebellion* 1.2098; and that it be innocent to follow the mul∣titude to sin. So that so long as the custome is alone and walks by it self, it walks amisse: but if by any means this custome pass into lawfull, as a traveller that goes so far westward and still goes on till at last he comes to the rising of the sun, then it is not by any force of the custome, but by first obtaining pardon and then procuring leave.

For it is observable that in law,* 1.2099 customes themselves are esteem'd il∣legal and reprobate if they be against law.* 1.2100 Licet usus consuetudinis non mi∣nima sit authoritas, nunquam tamen veritati aut legi praejudicat; Use and custome hath great authority, but nothing against truth or law: and Non valet consuetudo contra canonicam institutionem;* 1.2101 for the custome is unreaso∣nable if it be against law: for illam dico rationabilem quam non improbant jura, saith the Glosse in cap. ult. de consuet. verbo rationabilis; and the Lateran Council defines those customes to be reasonable, quae ratione juvantur & sacris congruunt institutis, which are assisted by reason and are agreeable to the holy Canons. Now because a custome is by no law admitted unlesse it be reasonable, and that by all laws those customes are judg'd unreasonable which are against law; we have reason to withdraw our selves from the practice of such customes though they be never so general and long, un∣lesse they be by some other means allowed.

And therefore there is wholly a mistake in this doctrine,* 1.2102 upon the ac∣count of ••n 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and some antinomies in law: for it is certain that in the Civil law, and in the laws of many nations anciently, the custome of the people was esteem'd sufficient to abrogate a law; but it began first, and continued long onely in those Common-wealths where the people had power to make a law, or had some pretensions and colours of that power which were not wholly to be taken from them: and therefore, Rectissimè receptum est ut leges non solum suffragio legislatoris,* 1.2103 sed etiam tacito con∣sensu omnium per desuetudinem abrogentur, Laws are abrogated not onely by the expresse revocation of the law-giver, but by the secret consent of all. And the reason of this is well express'd by Julianus the Lawyer,* 1.2104 Quid interest suffragio populus voluntatem suam declaret, an rebus ipsis & factis? It is all one how the people signify their will, by suffrages or by actions: meaning that so long as the legislative power was in them, they had power to revoke their own law by custome as well as by voice, at long running as well as at one convention. But when the people are not their own subjects and their own Princes (for so they are in all popular governments) but that the Prince

or the Senate hath the legislative power, they cannot introduce a custome but by rebellion and disobedience. In Democracies, when the people did otherwise then their own laws requir'd, they disobeyed themselves, and so were innocent and out of danger; but now they cannot disobey but they sin, and a sin can never of it self lead a man to innocence, nor a lie to truth, unlesse it be by the help of some other intervening cause, of it self alone it cannot. But this affair relies upon the same ground which I formerly dis∣cours'd of in this book;* 1.2105 for the mistake of men is alike in both. The ob∣ligation of a law does not depend upon the acceptation of the people; and as a law hath not it's beginning so neither can it have it's perpetuity depen∣dantly upon them; and no man thinks it hath, but he who supposes the supreme power to be originally in the people, and in the King by trust; and there are too many that think that, for there have been so many Democra∣tical governments that many wise men have said so, because then they had reason: but so many popular governments have also produc'd popular opi∣nions, which being too much receiv'd even by wise men, have still given the people occasion to talk so still, and to very many to believe them.

But if a contrary custome could justly abrogate a law,* 1.2106 then it were no matter who had the legislative power, for whatever the Prince please, the people shall chuse whether it be a law or no; which because it is a perfect destruction to all government, must needs proceed from an intolerable prin∣ciple. To which I adde this consideration, that whatever effect in law and external regiment a custome may be admitted to have, of which I am not concern'd to give accounts, yet if the custome be against law, it is certain the conscience can have no safety, and no peace but in the obedience to the law. For besides that there are so many difficult and indeterminable que∣stions in the conduct of the matter of customes, as whether the custome be reasonable, and who is to judge of that, and by what measures; what are the sufficient causes of custome, whether there must be some inequality or pressure or iniquity in the matter, or is it sufficient that the multitude is willing to introduce a custome against law? what time and continuance is requir'd to prescribe a custome, and when it begins to be innocent, and how long it is disobedience; how many must concurre to the making of it, and whether the dissent of a few does interrupt it's coalition and growing into a custome, and how shall we know whether all or no doe consent? or how are we sure that a greater part is sufficient, and that we have the greater part with us? whether for the abrogation of the law a mere desuetude or omission is sufficient, or must the custome be contrary to the law and matter of fact? and if that be sufficient to annul an affirmative precept, how many things and circumstances of things will be further requir'd for the re∣moving the obligation of a negative commandement? and very many more to the same purposes, that is, to no purposes: besides this, I say, the con∣science can never be warranted in any thing but obedience, because it is im∣possible to tell the precise time in which the law is actually abrogated by the custome; and therefore a man can never know by all that is before him in this affair, whether he be worthy of love or hatred.

There is onely one case that can set this right,* 1.2107 and give warranty to the conscience, and that is when the Prince or the supreme power allows the custome and annuls his own law; for he onely that made it can give it a pe∣riod: and therefore our inquirie can be onely this, how we shall know when

the Prince is willing the law shall goe for nothing. Concerning which there are but two ways of our knowing it, or his doing it. The one is by tacit consent or secret approbation of the custome, as by not punishing, by not complaining, and by silence; and the other is by direct revocation. The former will be very hard to know so well as to be able to bring peace to an inquiring and curious conscience; but I shall give accounts of the best ways of knowing it in the next book, in the explication of this Rule, Qui tacet consentire videtur: of the latter I am to speak in the next Rule. In the mean time there is nothing sure for the conscience but to obey the laws, onely that we can understand that the custome is then approved when it passes in rem judicatam, when the Kings Judges have given sentence in a cause against an old law, for a later custome; which when they have reason to doe, the Princes will is sufficiently declared; till then, if we cannot suffi∣ciently know that the Prince does secretly approve the custome against the law, we must stay till the law be expressely abrogated, and then the custome may safely be complied with, because then we are sure it is not against law. For, as Panormitan said well, Oportet ut duae partes sint scientes consuetudinis quae introducitur. Not onely the people, but the Prince too must consent before the custome be approved. For there must be two words to this bargain.

§. 7. Abrogation.

RULE VII. Abrogation of a law by a competent, that is, by the Supreme power, may be just and reasonable, though the law it self be neither unreasonable nor unjust.

THe causes of abrogating a law are all those which are sufficient to make a good and a wise man change his mind.* 1.2108 The alteration of the cause of the law, new emergencies, unfit circumstances, public dislike, a greater good: for it is no otherwise in the public then in the private will; there where a man is master of his will and ruler of his own affairs, there is no∣thing to be consider'd, but that what he does be done wisely and justly and charitably. The same power that makes the law, the same can annul it, and the same reason which introduc'd the law, can also change it: and there is no difference but this onely, that a law may not be imposed unlesse the matter of it be honest, or holy, or profitable; but it may be abrogated though it be all this, provided it be not necessary. For to the making of a law all the conditions are requir'd, a competent authority, and just mat∣ter, and fitting promulgation; but to the abrogation of it, the defect of any one cause is sufficient. And therefore if the law be unjust, it ceases of it self; if it be uselesse, it falls into just neglect; if it be not publish'd, it is not born; if it be generally dislik'd, it is suppos'd to be uncharitable, and there∣fore is as good as if it were not born, for it will be starv'd at Nurse. But when it is made it must continue and be maintain'd by all these things to∣gether;

and therefore when any one fails, the whole structure descends into dissolution and a heap. But therefore if the will of the Prince changes, and that he will not have it to be a law, it looses the spirit, though the body and the external causes of life remain. For though an action must not be done unlesse it be good and innocent, yet it is not necessary that it be done, though it be so. Every thing that is good is not necessary, and many good things are let alone, and at the same time others as good as they are done, and sometimes better: and because there are many good provisions and counsels which are not taken, and are not made into laws, many such things which are well enough may be laid aside, either for the procuring a greater good, or for the avoiding of some appendant inconvenience. But in these cases, unlesse the Prince be obliged by oath or promise to preserve this law, his abrogating even of a good law is no question of justice, but of prudence and charity, both which also may be preserved, if the good be chang'd, or improv'd, or recompens'd. But whether it be right or wrong on the Princes part, yet if the law be annull'd, the conscience of the subject is no longer bound. The Prince cannot bind the conscience, unlesse the law be good; but the conscience is at liberty, though the abrogation be not good. Because the goodnesse of the matter cannot make it into a law with∣out the Prince's will, but the Prince's will can alone make it cease to be.

Upon this account,* 1.2109 it is not unseasonable to inquire whether, that a thing hath been abus'd may be accounted a just and a prudent cause to take it quite away.

That it may be a just,* 1.2110 that is, a sufficient cause, is out of all question, because it is not unjust; for then in this case it is just enough, though it be not necessary. But whether it be prudent for the Prince to doe it, and whether it be necessary that it be done, is another consideration. But to this the precedent of Hezekiah King of Judah is a good guide. For he brake in pieces the brazen serpent, because the people made it an idol; and he did prudently, because the people who were too apt to that crime could not easily be kept from doing it so long as that great memorial of the di∣vine power did remain. It is like removing a beautifull woman from the greedy eyes of a yong person; he cannot behold her and be safe: and thus it is in all cases, if the evil be incumbent, and not remediable, nor to be cleans'd from mischief or just suspicion and actual danger, then whatsoever is so abus'd not onely may, but ought to be remov'd. But if that which was abus'd be now quitted from the abuse, then it may be kept, if it be good for any thing: and if it were not, I suppose there would be no question about it.

But in the change of laws,* 1.2111 or reformation of prevailing evil customes, prudence is good always, and zeal sometimes: but certainly the contrary and the exterminating way of reformation is not always the best, because he that opposes a vice too fiercely may passe into a contrary vice as readily as into a contrary vertue. If a Church happens to command some rituals and formes of worship in a superstitious manner or to superstitious purposes, or if men doe observe them with a curiosity great as to the nicenesse of su∣perstition, it is not good to oppose them superstitiously. If the obedient doe keep the rituals as if they were the Commandements of God, they are to blame: but if the disobedient will reject them as if they were of them∣selves

against God's Commandements they are more to blame, because a superstitious obedience is better then a superstitious rebellion; that hath piety and error in an evil mixture, but this hath error and impiety.

But as to the subject matter and inquiry of the Rule;* 1.2112 That a thing hath been abus'd, and a law hath been made the occasion of evil, it does not make the law of it self to cease, unlesse that abuse and deception be not to be cur'd without abrogation of the law. So that if a subject sees the abuse and is offended at it, and is not tempted to comply with it, he is still tied to observe the law, and in his own practice separate it from the abuse. Thus in the Primitive Church, the observation of Vigils and Wakes was a holy custome, and yet it afterwards grew into such abuse, that the Ecclesiastic authority thought it fit to abrogate it; because the custome in the declining piety and corrupted manners of the world was a ready temptation to the evil. But till the Vigils were taken away by authority, the laws of the Church did still oblige, and did not cease of themselves: and therefore where with innocence and without active scandal they could be observed, the subject was oblig'd. But then this was cause enough why the Rulers of Churches should annul that law or custome. If they could easily have quitted those meetings from corruption, they might if they pleas'd retain them or annul them, as they listed; onely they were bound to annul them when the evil could find no other remedy. The abuse even so long as it was curable was yet cause enough why the Supreme power might abrogate the law, but not sufficient to make the abrogation necessary, nor yet for the subject to disobey it. For the inferior cannot lawfully with∣draw his obedience, till the superior cannot lawfully retain the law: but when to abrogate it is necessary, then to disobey it is no sin.

I conclude these numerous inquiries and large accounts of the obliga∣tion of Conscience by Humane laws,* 1.2113 with the Apologue taken out of Nico∣laus Damascenus his Politics. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Laws are like the girdles of the Iberian women: if any mans belly or his heart is too big for those circles, he is a dissolute and a dishonour'd person.

The end of the Third Book. Non nobis Domine.

OF THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF Good and Evil, THEIR Limits & Circumstances, THEIR AGGRAVATIONS & DIMINUTIONS. The Fourth Book.

LONDON, Printed by James Flesher, for Richard Royston at the Angel in Ivy-lane. 1660.

The Fourth Book.

HE that intends to consider any thing fully and intirely, must consider it in all the four kinds of causes. The Formal cause, or the essentiality of good and evil is the doing it with or against Conscience, true of false, right or wrong, confident or doubtfull, probable or certain; and this I have explicated in the First book. The Ma∣terial cause of good and evil is derived from the object or the Rule, which is the laws of God and Man, by a conformity to which the action is good; and if it disagrees, it is materially evil. And this I have largely represented in the Second and Third Books.

But because it is not enough that any thing be in its own nature honest and just, unlesse it be also honestly and justly done, according to that saying of the wise man, Qui sanctitatem sanctè custodiunt judicabuntur sancti, They that keep holinesse holily shall be adjudged holy; to make up the Rule of Conscience complete, it is necessary that it be considered by what Rules and measures a good action may be rightly conducted, and how all may be rightly judged, that we passe on to emendation, either by repentance or ••••provement, that a good action may not be spoil'd, and an evil may not be allowed, but that according to the words of the Apostle we may be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 prepar'd for every good work: which will be done by considering the efficient and the final causes of all humane actions; the nature and rules of which when we understand and consider, as we have the measure of humane actions in all the four kinds of causes, so there will be nothing deficient to the fulnesse of a general or universal Rule of Con∣science.

CHAP. I. Of the efficient causes of all Humane actions good or evil.

§. 1. Of Choice and Election, voluntary and involuntary.

RULE I. An action is neither good nor evil, unlesse it be vo∣luntary, and chosen.

THis Rule is taken from the doctrine of S. Austin,* 1.2114 who makes freedome and election to be of the constitution and definition of sin.* 1.2115 Peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod justitia vetat, & unde liberum est abstinere. The will is the mistresse of all our actions, of all but such as are ne∣cessary

and natural; and therefore to her it is to be imputed whatsoever is done. The action it self is good or bad by it's conformity to, or difformi∣ty from the Rule of Conscience; but the Man is good or bad by the will. Nemo nostrûm tenetur ad culpam,* 1.2116 nisi propriâ voluntate deflexerit, said S. Ambrose. If the actions be natural and under no command of the will, they are good by creation and the act of God; but if it be a moral action it is to be conducted by another Oeconomy. For in these it is true which the Wise man said, Deus posuit hominem in manu consilii sui: God intending to be glorified by our free obedience hath set before us good and evil: we may put our hand to which we will; onely what we chuse that shall be our por∣tion: for all things of this nature he hath left us to our selves; not to our natural strengths, but to our one choice; he hath instructed us how to chuse; he hath open'd to us not onely the nature of things, but the event also of all actions, and invited the will with excellent amabilities and glorious objects; and by all the aides of the Spirit of Grace hath enabled it to doe it's own work well. Just as Nature is by Physic enabled to proceed in her own work of nutriment and increase by a removing of all impediments, so does the Spirit of God in us, and to us, and for us: and after all the will is to chuse by it's own concreated power.

I shall not here enter into the philosophy of this question,* 1.2117 but con∣sider it onely as it is to be felt and handled. Let the will of man be enabled by what means it please God to chuse for it, without God's grace we are sure it cannot doe it's work; but we are sure also that we can doe our work that God requires of us, and we can let it alone: and therefore as sure as God's grace and help is necessary, so sure it is that we have that help that is necessary; for if we had not, we could not be commanded to work, and there were no need of arguments or of reason, of deliberation or inquiry, according to the words of S. Austin,* 1.2118 Quis non clamet stultum esse praecepta dare ei, cui liberum non est quod praecipitur facere; & iniquum esse eum dam∣nare, cui non fuit potestas jussa complere? for if in humane actions, that is actions of morality, there be a fate, then there is no contingency, and then all deliberation were the greatest folly in the world; because since onely one part is possible (that being impossible to come to passe which God hath inevitably decreed shall never be) the other part is but a chimae∣ra, and therefore not subject to consultation. Adde to this, if all our acti∣ons were predetermin'd, then one man were not better then another, and there could be no difference of rewards in heaven or earth; God might give what he please, but he shall reward none, not in any sense whatsoever; & Christian Princes may as well hang a true man as a thief, because this man no more breaks his law then the other, for neither of them doe obey or disobey, but it is fortune that is hang'd, and fortune that is advanc'd:

Ille erucem [sortis] pretium tulit, hic diadema;

and there is no such thing as vertue, no praise, and no law. But in all this there is nothing new. For these were long since the discourses of S. Austin against the Manichees, and S. Hierom against the Pelagians; and S. Leo by these very Mediums confutes the Priscillianists, as appears in his 19^th Epistle to Turibius the Bishop. But certainly that is a strange proposition which affirms that nothing is possible but what is done; and to what purpose is re∣pentance? No man repents that he could not speak as soon as he was born, and no man repents that he was begotten into the world by the ordinary

way of all the earth. He that repents is troubled for doing what he ought not, and what he need not. But I will goe on no further in this particular; not because I cannot chuse, for I could adde very many more things, but because if a man hath not a power to will or nill, it is to no purpose to write cases of Conscience, or indeed to doe any thing as wise men should. A fool and a wise man differ not, a lazy man and a diligent, a good man and a bad, save onely one hath a better starre; they differ as a strong man and a weak: but though one be the better thing, he is not the better man. But I am not here to dispute, yet I shall observe a few things which may be usefull to the question as the question can minister to practice.

1. That whereas all men granting liberty of will in actions of natural life and common entercourse,* 1.2119 many of them deny it in moral actions, and many more deny it in actions spiritual, they consider not that they evacuate and destroy the very nature and purpose of liberty and choice. For besides that the case of moral actions and spiritual is all one, for that action is mo∣ral which is done in obedience or disobedience to a law, and spiritual is no more, save onely it relates to another law, to the Evangelical or Spiritual law of liberty, but in the nature of the thing it is the same, and can as well be chosen one as the other, when they are equally taught, and alike com∣manded, and propounded under the same proportionable amability, and till they be so they are not equally laws; besides this, the denying liberty in all moral things, that is in all things of manners, in all things of obe∣dience to the laws of God and Man, and the allowing it in things under no law, is a destruction of the very nature and purpose of liberty. For the onely end of liberty is to make us capable of laws, of vertue and reward, and to distinguish us from beasts by a distinct manner of approach to God, and a way of conformity to him proper to us; and except in the matter of Divine and humane laws, except in the matter of vertue and vice, except in order to reward or punishment, liberty and choice were good for no∣thing: for to keep our selves from harm, and poison, and enemies, a natu∣ral instinct, and lower appetites, and more brutish faculties would serve our needs as well as the needs of birds and beasts. And therefore to allow it where it is good for nothing, and to deny it where onely it can be usefull and reasonable and fit to be done, and given by the wise Father of all his creatures, must needs be amisse.

2. Liberty of choice in moral actions,* 1.2120 that is, in all that can be good or bad, is agreeable to the whole method and purpose, the Oeconomy and designe of humane nature and being. For we are a creature between An∣gel and beast, and we understand something, and are ignorant of much, and the things that are before us are mixt of good and evil, and our duty hath much good and some evil, and sin hath some good and much evil, and there∣fore these things are and they are not to be pursued; Omne volunta∣rium est etiam involuntarium, and there is a weight on both sides, and our propositions are probable, not true and false, but for several reasons seem∣ing both to several persons. Now if to all this there were not a faculty that should proportionably, and in even measures, and by a symbolical pro∣gression tend to these things, we could not understand, we could not see, we could not admire the numbers and music and proportions of the Divine wisedome in our creation in relation to this order of things. For since in our objects there is good and evil in confusion or imperfect mixture, if our

faculties tending to these objects were natural, and not deliberative & ele∣ctive, they must take all in, or thrust all out, and either they must receive no good, or admit every evil. It is natural for every thing to love it's good and to avoid it's evil: now when the good and evil are simple and unmixt or not discerned, an instinct and a natural tendency to the object is suffici∣ent to invest it in the possession. But when they are mixt, and we are com∣manded to chuse the good and eschew the evil, if to an indifferent object there be not an indifferent faculty, what Symmetry and proportion is in this creation? If there be two amabilities propounded, and onely one is to be followed, and the other avoided, since the hand hath five, the soul must at least have two fingers, the one to take, the other to put away. And this is so in all species or kinds of moral actions, even that kind which we call spiritual; for with that also there is mingled so much difficulty and displea∣sure, that is, so much evil, so much that we naturally and reasonably desire to avoid, and the avoiding of this evil does so stand against the chusing of the other good, that a natural and unchusing faculty can doe nothing at all in the question. But upon this account God hath commanded industry, di∣ligence, toleration, patience, longanimity, mortification; that is, he hath set before us several eligibilities in order to several ends, which must either be wholly to no purpose, or an art of vexation and instrument of torment to evil purpose, or else the means of a reward, and the way of felicity by the advantage of a free and a wise choice, and this is to very good pur∣pose.

Materiamque tuis tristem virtutibus imple:* 1.2121 Ardua per praeceps gloria vadit iter. Hectora quis nosset, si felix Troja fuisset? Publica virtutis per mala facta via est.

It is difficulty and the mixture of several amabilities that presupposes choice and makes vertue. But if events and actions were equally prede∣termin'd, idlenesse would be as good as labour, and peevishnesse as good as patience; but then a man could never come to God. It was well said of Eusebius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. As idlenesse is to the body, so is carelesnesse and in∣consideration to the soul, but exercise and difficulty and mortification bring us unto God: but these things cannot be understood but where there is liberty and election, and yet without these there is no vertue.

—Nam virtus futile Nomen Ni decus adfuerit patiendo,* 1.2122 ubi tempora lethi Proxima sint, pulchramque petat per vulnera laudem.

Difficulty makes vertue, and the contrariety of objects makes difficulty, and the various ends and amabilities make the contrariety, and liberty is the hand and fingers of the soul by which she picks and chuses, and if she gathers flowers she makes her self a garland of immortality.

3. All this state of things thus represented must needs signify a state much more perfect then that of beasts,* 1.2123 but very imperfect in respect of that of Angels, and of that which we our selves expect hereafter; and therefore that liberty which is made in just proportion to fit this imper∣fection must also of it self needs be imperfect, and need not be envied to mankind as if it were a jewel of the celestial crown. Alas it is an imper∣fection,

fit to humble us, not to make us proud; it is not too much to be given us, it is a portion of our imperfect condition; it onely sets us higher then a Tulip, and enlarges our border beyond the folds of sheep or the Oxens stall, but it keeps us in our just station, servants to God, inferior to Angels, and in possibility of becoming Saints. For in moral or spiritual things liberty and indetermination is weaknesse, and supposes a great infir∣mity of our reason and a great want of love. For if we understood all the degrees of amability in the service of God, and if we could love God as he deserves, we could not deliberate concerning his service, and we could not possibly chuse or be in love with disobedience, we should have no liber∣ty left, nothing concerning which we could deliberate; for there is no de∣liberation but when something is to be refus'd, and something is to be pre∣ferr'd, which could not be but that we understand good but little, and love it lesse. For the Saints and Angels in heaven and God himself love good and cannot chuse evil, because to doe so were imperfection and infelicity; and the Devils and accursed souls hate all good, without liberty and indif∣ferency: but between these is the state of Man in the days of his pilgrimage, untill he comes to a confirmation in one of the opposite termes. Liberty of will is like the motion of a Magnetic needle toward the North, full of trembling and uncertainty till it be fixt in the beloved point: It wavers as long as it is free, and is at rest when it can chuse no more. It is humility and truth to allow to man this liberty; and therefore for this we may lay our faces in the dust, and confesse that our dignity and excellence supposes mi∣sery and is imperfection, but the instrument and capacity of all duty and all vertue.

4. In the inquiries concerning the efficient cause of moral actions men doe deny one truth for fear of loosing another,* 1.2124 and will not allow ••o man a liberty of choice in spiritual actions and moral effects, for fear of dispa∣raging the grace of God; whereas it is by the grace of God that we have this liberty.* 1.2125 Ipsa ratio quemlibet nostrum quaerentem vehe∣menter angustat, ne sic defendamus gratiam ut liberum ar∣bitrium auferre videamur: rursus nec liberum sic asseramus arbitrium, ut superbâ impietate ingrati Dei gratiae judice∣mur. It is very easy to reconcile God's grace with our li∣berty, because by this grace it is that we have this liberty. For no man can chuse what he does not know, and no man can love that which hath in it no amability. Now because we have all notices spiritual and the arguments of invita∣tion to obedience in duties Evangelical from revelation and the grace of God, therefore to this we owe the liber∣ty of our will, that is, a power to chuse spiritual things. Grace and truth come by Jesus Christ, and liberty of will comes from him; for if the Son makes us free, then are we free indeed: but this is not by giving us new fa∣culties, but new strengths and new instruments to these faculties we have already. But let it be this way or any other, we cannot work till we have powers to work, and we cannot chuse till we have liberty, and we cannot be under a law, and promises and threatnings, if we cannot chuse: and there∣fore it matters not as to our present inquiry, the explication and manner of speaking of which school of learning we or any man shall please to follow: this onely we are to rely upon, that the man cannot be a good man, if he doe not chuse the good and decline the evil; and there is no such thing as

Conscience, and there is no need of it, and no use (except it be merely to torment us,) unlesse it be to guide us into the choice of good, and to deterre us from doing evil.

But lastly,* 1.2126 It will yet be sufficient to the verification of this Rule, that whether we affirm or deny the liberty of the will, yet that there be in every action good or bad the action of the will; and if that be not necessary to be admitted as the cause of morality, then he that kills a man against his will is as bad as he that did it with his will, and he that receives the holy Sa∣crament by constraint does as well as he that chuses it, and to confesse Christ against our Conscience is as good as if we confesse him according to it: for when the material actions are the same, there is nothing can distin∣guish the men that doe them, but something within that can doe this, or let it alone. Now because a good understanding, and a good fancy, and a great reason, and a great resolution, and a strong heart, and a healthfull body may be in a reprobate or vitious person, but a good will and the choice of ver∣tue is onely in a good man, it follows that all morality depends on the action of the will; and therefore that all other faculties are natural and ne∣cessary and obedient, this onely is the Empresse, and is free, and Mistresse of the action.

And yet beyond this heap of things,* 1.2127 there is another reason why a man can be good or bad onely by the act of his will, and not of any other faculty, because the act of the will produces material and permanent events; it is acquisitive and effective, or recusative and destructive, otherwise then it is in any other faculties. For the other faculties are like the eye and ear, they can see or hear foul things and be never the worse, and good things and be never the better: but the will of a man is like the hand and the mouth and the belly, if they touch foul things they are defiled, and if they eat poison they die; so is the will of man, it becomes all one with it's ob∣ject. For it works onely by love or hatred, and therefore changes by the variety of the object it entertains. He that loves a lie is a liar; but he that onely understands it, is never the worse. Facti sunt abominabiles sicut ea quae dilexerunt,* 1.2128 saith the Prophet, They are made abominable according as they loved; [as the things are which they loved] so the Vulgar Latin: and so it is in good things,* 1.2129 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that is joyn'd to the Lord is one spirit: love makes the faculty like to the object, and therefore as the object of the will is, whose action is love, so is the man good or bad accordingly.

Now this is not so to be understood as if the actions of other faculties could not be sins;* 1.2130 for a sin may be in the memory, in the fancy, in the un∣derstanding, in the eye, and in the members of the body: but then in these is onely the material part of the sin; if the actions subjected in them be in∣voluntary they are not criminal, they may be irregular, but not sinfull; one∣ly as the will commands them and they obey, so they are to stand or fall in judgment. For so ignorance is a sin when it is voluntary. Qui dixerunt Deo,* 1.2131 Recede à nobis; scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus. The wicked say unto God, We will not understand thy ways. So the Psalmist complains, Noluit intelligere ut bene ageret, He refused understanding. Now since in all the faculties the will of man hath a dominion, and is the cause of all moral actions, from thence they have their estimate, and are acquitted or

condemned accordingly; according to that of S. Bernard, Nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas, Nothing makes fuel for the flames of hell, but the will of man, and evil actions that are voluntary and chosen.

The consequent of this discourse in order to Conscience is,* 1.2132 that no man loose his peace concerning the controverted articles and disputes of Chri∣stendome. If he inquires after truth earnestly as after things of great con∣cernment; if he prays to God to assist, and uses those means which are in his hand and are his best for the finding it; if he be indifferent to any pro∣position, and loves it not for any consideration but because he thinks it true; if he will quit any interest rather then loose a truth; if he dares own what he hath found and believ'd; and if he loves it so much the more by how much he believes it more conducing to piety and the honour of God, he hath done what a good and a wise man should doe; he needs not regard what any man threatens, nor fear God's anger when a man of another sect threatens him with damnation: for he that heartily endeavours to please God, and searches what his will is that he may obey it, certainly loves God; and nothing that loves God can perish.

2. It follows also from hence that no unavoidable calamity,* 1.2133 no being born of evil parents, no being born from illegitimate embraces, no un∣just sentences of men can irreconcile us to God, or prejudice our Eter∣nal interest. God will judge us according to our works, not according to his, or any mans else, or by any measures but by his own law and our obe∣dience.

3. Let no man think that either God will,* 1.2134 or that the Devil can make us sin. God loves not sin, or that we should die; and therefore will not di∣vide his own kingdome, or set up that by his effective power which by his legislative and his persuasive, and his natural and eternal, he intends to de∣stroy. And as for the Devil, he can tempt indeed, but unlesse we please, he cannot prevail; it is our consent and willingnesse that makes him conque∣ror. And if we be really persuaded of these plain and evident truths, there is a plain way made to encourage our industry, to actuate our caution, to glorify God, to work out our salvation with fear and trembling, to walk humbly with our God, to devest our selves of all excuses, to lay the burden where it ought; that is, to walk in the right way, in the way of duty and the paths of the Divine commandements, without tempting our selves, or being fool'd and cosen'd out of our duty, or hindring our repentance and hu∣miliation, if we have done amisse.

These are the material events,* 1.2135 and that proper usefulnesse of this proposition which can doe benefit to us in the conduct of Conscience. Our own will and choice is all that upon which we are to make judge∣ment of our actions. For the further declaration of which we are to in∣quire into divers particulars, in order to the institution and regulating of Conscience.

Question I.

Whether every action of our life ought to be directed by a right conscience, or a well-persuaded will: or, Are not some actions not onely in their whole kind, but in their circumstances and limitations also, merely indifferent?

To this I answer,* 1.2136 that actions, if they be considered in their Physical or natural capacity, are all negatively indifferent; that is, neither good nor bad: the going into a house, the entring into a field, the striking of a blow, the act of generation, eating or drinking, as they are taken in their natural capacity, are not moral actions, that is, by all that they are in nature are nothing at all in manners: even homicide it self and adultery, in their na∣tural capacity, differ nothing from justice and the permissions of marriage; and the giving of almes is no better naturally then giving money to Mer∣cury, or to an Image.

2. Omissions of acts are oftentimes indifferent,* 1.2137 even always when the omission is not of a thing commanded or morally good from some law, or sufficient principle of morality, as perfection, counsel, praise and fame, worthinesse and charity. The reason is, because omissions may come in upon a dead stock, and proceed from a negative principle, from sleep and forgetfulnesse, from a lethargy or dulnesse, from differing businesse and divertisements. And that which is nothing can produce nothing, and nei∣ther good nor evil can come from that which is not; they both must have a positive cause, if they have in them any morality. Even not to commit adultery is not commendable, unlesse that omission be chosen. * And this is very remarkable in order to Conscience. For the whole duty of man consists in eschewing evil and doing good: but to will and to chuse good is so necessary, and if we can, to doe it is so requir'd of us, that the very avoiding evil is exacted in that manner, that unlesse it be a doing good, it is a doing nothing at all, it is good for nothing, it will goe for nothing. To eschew evil is a labour and a mighty work, it is a running from temptation, a shutting the doors against it, a praying against it, it is a flying from it when we can, and a resisting of it when we cannot. A porter cannot be said to eschew ambition, nor does he doe well by not commencing of a proud warre, when he can think of nothing but how to fill his belly by breaking of his back; and the poor shepherd shall never be thank'd for not contend∣ing for the Arch-bishopric of Toledo, or not fighting against his Prince, when nothing enters into his armory but his bottle and his hook, and no∣thing into his head, but that his sheep may wander in wholesome and plea∣sant pastures, and his lambs be free from dogs and foxes. A mere negative does nothing in God's service. The avoiding evil is neither good nor bad, unlesse it be by a positive act, unlesse the will be in it: and indeed as things are order'd it is many times harder to decline evil then to doe good; and therefore the eschewing evil is a contention and a warre, it is a heap of severe actions, a state of mortification, it is a resisting of temptations. For he that was never tempted may be innocent; but he is not vertuous, and shall have no reward.

* This is to be understood to be true in all cases; unlesse his not acting a sin, and his not being tempted now, be the effect of a long prayer, and a

former contention; and that either the temptation by his preceding piety be turn'd aside, or made impotent by mortification, or by his chosen and be∣loved state of life be made impossible; that is, unlesse by the arts of the spirit he hath made it vain, or by his frequent victories he hath made the Devil flee away, and so bought his peace at the price of a mighty warre, and his rest at the charge of a pertinacious labour. In all these cases the omission is negative as to the present state of things; and yet it is vertuous, because it had a positive and a vertuous cause, which now it may be lies still, because it hath produc'd a permanent and perpetual effect.

And upon this account we also can hope for the reward even of those graces which we never exercise.* 1.2138 The Prince that refuses the offer of a crown or the possibilities of Empire because they doe not belong to him, shall certainly have a great reward, because upon the noblest account he avoids a very great evil. But the poor herdsman that dwells upon his own acre, and feeds his little yokes and couples of sheep on high ways and moun∣tains, and looks not ambitiously on his neighbours farm, nor covets the next cottage, which yet he likes well, and thinks it excellent because it hath a chimny, nor would doe an act of falshood to get his own tenement rent∣free, this man shall have a reward in proportion great as that just Prince who refuses to oppresse his brother when his state is broken by rebellion and disadvantages. For there is no vertue but may be lov'd and courted, delighted in and commended in every state and circumstance of life: and though it be not exercis'd in noble temptations and trials proper to the most excellent and remarked persons; yet the very images and little records of trial may expresse a love and choice which may be equal to that which is prosperous by the greatest exercise and indication. For there are little envies & ambitions even in cottages, and therefore there may be the choice and volition of humility and peacefull thoughts and acts of charity: and there may be unchastity even in marriage; and therefore though the conten∣tion is easier, and the temptations but inconsiderable, yet they also when they are immur'd by their Sacramental defensatives and securities may de∣light in chastity, and therefore rejoyce in that state because it secures them from uncleanenesse; and therefore for this love, and act of choice, even for delighting in that safety, may find a reward of chastity: and there may be covetousnesse amongst them that are full of plenty, and therefore even the richest person can be imployed in securing the grace of contentednesse, though he have but little temptation to the contrary. * Indeed if a begger were tempted with the offer of 20000, the temptation would be too big for him, if he understood the summe; and possibly if he be a vertuous man, and would not be tempted to tell a lie for 20^s, or for one of his own possi∣ble and likely summes, yet for so vast a heap of gold bigger then his thoughts, he might be put beyond his vertue. But therefore God in his goodnesse to mankind does seldome permit such trials and unequal hazards, and to our not being so tempted (without disparagement to our vertue and our choice) we may well confesse we owe our innocence. But because God suffers our temptations to be by accidents happening in our own condition, and we are commonly tried by that which is before us, or next above us; every one can either exercise or chuse the worthinesse of every grace, and may hope for the reward of the whole vertue by resisting the most incon∣siderable temptation to it's contrary, if in case he have no bigger, he equal∣ly chuses the vertue and rejoyces in his innocence. And he that does resist,

or by any means expedite himself from his own temptation, shall be re∣warded equally to him, to whom the greatest is but his next best. * For our vertue is not to be estimated by the instance, but the willingnesse and the courage, the readinesse of mind and alacrity of choice, by the proportion of the man and the methods of his labour, the resolution of the will, and the preparation of the heart; and we must account our omissions or eschewings of evil to be vertuous, by what we have done against it, by our prayer and our watchfulnesse, our fear and caution, not by an unactive life, and a dull peace, and a negative omission: for he does not eschew evil that does not doe evil, but he that will not doe it.

3. All acts that passe without any consent of the will are indifferent;* 1.2139 that is, they are natural, or unavoidable, or the productions of fancy, or some other unchusing faculty, or they are the first motions of a passion, or the emotions of some exterior violence; as the sudden motion of an eye, the head or heart, the hands or feet. Now that these are as indifferent as to grow, or to yawn, to cough or to sneeze, appears because they are of the same nature, and partake equally of the same reason. But these instances can be made to differ. For those which are so natural that the whole ef∣fect also is natural, and cannot passe on to morality or be subject to a com∣mand, are always indifferent in their whole kind, and in all their degrees and in all their circumstances. Thus to grow taller, to digest meat, to wink with the eye in the face of the Sun, are not capable of morality. But those things which are at first onely natural, and afterwards are nurs'd by the will and discourse, they are onely at first indifferent, because they then onely are unavoidable. To look upon a woman is no sin, if she suddenly comes into our presence, though every such look by reason of the mans weaknesse were a temptation: for at first there was no time to deliberate, and therefore we could not be bound not to look, and if we had not seen her, it had not been good at all, nor evil. But to look upon her so long till we lust after her, to look upon her but to the entertainment of any fa∣culty that ministers to lust, to observe that which is precious in her but so long that the will doe consent to that which is, or is likely to be vile, that corrupts the manners and prevaricates the law.

4. No action of the will is indifferent,* 1.2140 but is either lawfull or unlawfull, and therefore good or bad. For although there is in many actions that which the School calls indifferentiam secundum speciem, an indifference in the kind of action, or in respect of the object; yet when such actions come under deliberation and to be invested with circumstances, they cannot be consider'd at all, but that first they must be understood to be lawfull or unlawfull; for that very objective or specific indifference supposes the action lawfull: and he that does a thing though but with that deliberation and precaution, does doe well, unlesse there be something else also to be consi∣der'd, and then it may be he does better, or it may be ill; but when it is come as far as to be chosen and considered, it must be good or bad. For whatsoever that is about which we deliberate, we doe it for a reason that to us cannot seem indifferent; it is for an innocent and a good end, for good to our selves or others: and nothing can come under the consideration of being an end of humane actions, but is directed by the words or by the reason, by the designe or the proportion of some law. For even our profit or our pleasure are to be conducted by the measures of the spirit: and there

is nothing else besides profit and pleasure that is good, or can become the end of an action, excepting onely what is honest: and therefore every thing that is good or can be the reason of an action is under a law, and conse∣quently cannot be indifferent, according to the doctrine of S. Austin, Quanquam voluntas,* 1.2141 mirum, si potest in medio quodam ita consistere, ut nec bona nec mala sit: aut enim justitiam diligimus, & bona est, & si magis dili∣gimus, magis bona, si minus, minus bona; aut si omnino non diligimus, non bona est. Quis vero dubitet dicere voluntatem nullo modo justitiam diligen∣tem non modo esse malam, sed pessimam voluntatem? Ergo voluntas aut bo∣na est aut mala, &c. Whatsoever we doe, we doe it for a good end or an evil; for if we doe it for no end, we doe not work like men: and according as the reason is which moves the action so is the will, either good or bad: for though vertue oftentimes is in the midst between two evils; yet the will of man is never so in the middle as to be between good and evil; for every thing that can move the will is good, or it seems so, and accordingly so is the will.

Indeed every action we doe is not in an immediate order to Eternal blessing or infelicity;* 1.2142 but yet mediately and by consequence, and in the whole disposition of affairs it addes great moments to it. Bonum est con∣tinentia, malum est luxuria; inter utrumque indifferens, ambulare, capitis na∣ribus purgamenta projicere, sputis rheumata jacere. Hoc nec bonum, nec ma∣lum: sive enim feceris, sive non, nec justitiam habebis nec injustitiam, said S. Hierom.* 1.2143 Continence is good, and luxury is evil; but between these it is in∣different to walk, to blow the nose, to spit. These things are neither good nor bad, for whether you doe them or doe them not, you are by them neither just nor unjust. For besides that S. Hierom instances in things of a specific and objective indifference, of which I have already spoken, that which he saies is true in respect of the supernatural end of man, to which these things (concerning which oftentimes we doe not deliberate at all, and even then when we doe deliberate, they) operate but little. But because the instan∣ces are in natural things, where the will hath very little to doe, we shall best understand this proposition by the instance of S. Gregory;* 1.2144 Nonnulli dili∣gunt proximos, sed per affectionem cognationis & carnis, quibus in hac dile∣ctione sacra eloquia non contradicunt. Our natural love to our kindred is a thing so indifferent, not in it's own nature, but of so little concern to eter∣nity if it be onely upon the stock of Nature, that all that can be said of it is, that the Scripture doe not forbid it. That is, whatsoever is natural is not considerable in morality. But because this which first enters by nature is commanded by God, and can be confirm'd and improv'd by the will, therefore it can become spiritual: but that which is natural is first, and then that which is spiritual: so that although at the first and when it is onely the product of nature, it is but a disposition and a facility towards a spiritual or moral duty; yet as soon as ever the will handles it, it puts on it's upper garment of morality, and may come to be invested with a robe of glory. And this was very well discours'd of by the Author of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in S. Austin;* 1.2145 Esse fatemur liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus, habens qui∣dem judicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum quae ad Deum pertinent sine Deo aut inchoare, aut certè peragere, sed tantum in operibus vitae praesen∣tis, tam bonis quam etiam malis. Bonis dico quae de bono naturae oriuntur, id est, velle laborare in agro, velle manducare & bibere, In things pertaining to God we cannot begin, or at least we cannot finish any thing without God and

his grace. But in the things of this life we have a free choice, whether the things be good or evil. For those I call good which doe natural good, as to be willing to work in the field, to will to eat or to drink. Now even these things are always good or bad when they are once chosen by the will, and to these very things the Divine grace does give assistance. So the same author, Velle quicquid bonum ad praesentem pertinet vitam, non sine Divino guber∣naculo subsistunt, A man cannot chuse well even in things belonging to this life, without the Divine assistance. And therefore in things of great concernment we pray to God to conduct and direct our choice. And since the order and perfection of every creature is to doe actions agreeable to the end and perfection of his nature, it is a pursuance of the end of God and of his own felicity. Although to doe so is not vertue in beasts, because they are directed by an external principle, and themselves chuse it not; yet in men it is vertue, and it is obedience: and although it is natural to doe so, and it is unnatural to doe otherwise; yet because it is also chosen in many instances, in them it is a vertue or a vice respectively: and though it be no eminent vertue to doe so, yet it is a prodigious sin to doe otherwise; for sins against nature are ordinarily and in most instances the worst; which does demon∣strate, that even things of nature and the actions of our prime appetites, when they can be consider'd and chosen, never can be indifferent; and for other things which are not of nature, there is lesse question. Thus to walk, to eat, to drink, to rest, to take physic for the procuring health, or the ease of our labours, or any end of charity to our selves or others, to talk, to tell stories, or any other thing that is good or can minister good to nature or society is good, not onely naturally, but morally, and may also be spiritually so: for it being a duty to God to preserve our selves, and against a commandement to destroy our selves; it being a duty to be affable and courteous in our deportment, to be gentle and kind and charitable; it being charity to make our own lives and the lives of others pleasant, and their condition not onely tolerable but eligible; there is no peradventure but every thing of our lives can be good or bad, because if it can minister to good or evil ends, it can be chosen for those ends, and therefore must partake of good or evil accordingly. How these ends are to be considered, and with what intention and actual or habitual intuition, I am afterwards to consider: for the present it suffices that upon this account the actions them∣selves are not indifferent.

And this doctrine is to great and severe purposes taught by our Blessed Saviour,* 1.2146 Of every idle word that a man shall speak,* 1.2147 he shall give account in that day. It was a known saying among the Jews, Cavebit vir ne cum uxore lequatur turpia, quia etiam propter sermonem levem viri cum uxore adduce∣tur ille in judicium,* 1.2148 said Rabbi Jonah; Even the loosenesse of a mans talk with his wife shall be brought into judgement: and Maimonides said, Plera∣que verba sunt otiosa & causam praebent iniquitatis, Most words are such which some way or other minister to iniquity, and therefore shall certainly passe the fiery trial. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so it is in some Greek copies, every wicked word: for an idle word is not indifferent; it may have in it some de∣gree of wickednesse, and therefore may be fit to be forbidden, and conse∣quently shall be judged. Otiosum verbum est quod sine utilitate & loquen∣tis dicitur & audientis, si omissis seriis de rebus frivolis loquamur, & fabulas narremus antiquas. Caeterum qui scurrilia explicat, & cachinuis ora dissol∣vit, & aliquid profert turpitudinis,* 1.2149 hic non otiosi verbi, sed criminosi tenebi∣tur

reus, said S. Hierom, That which neither profits him that speaks nor him that hears, is an idle word; any thing that is not serious, but frivolous and like an old tale. But if it be dissolute or wanton, it is not idle but criminal. S. Chrysostome expounds the words to the same purpose, calling that an idle word, which is spoken without just inducement in some kind or order of good things,* 1.2150 and that which is mixt with lying or slander. Omne verbum quod non conducit ad propositam in Domino utilitatem vanum & otiosum est, said S. Basil; That word which is not for edification, that is, that which does no good at all, must needs be evil: Nay further yet, Verbum otiosum est quod, etiamsi bonum sit, ad aedificationem fidei tamen non aptatur. Et si ejus∣modi verba in celeberrimo illo totius orbis conventu examinabuntur, quid scurrilibus, & detrahentibus, & obscoenis verbis fiet? That is an idle word, which although it be good, yet does not tend to the edification of faith: and if such words as these shall be examin'd in the great assembly of all mankind, what shall be done to detracting, scurrilous and lascivious talkings? I suppose, S. Basil's meaning is that all those propositions which being built upon the foundation are not fit for the promotion of it, they are not silver or gold, but a superstructure of wood or hay or stubble: even these and those shall be examin'd in the eternal scrutiny; nothing shall escape there; if it will not endure the fire, it shall be consumed. For if the action here have any material end, it shall hereafter have a material reward: if it have no end, yet the man that did it was sent hither to a better end then to doe foolish and uselesse things. The very doing or speaking that which is good for nothing, is evil, and shall be discern'd and judged. We see it even in the judgements of men. Martial tells of a good man that had got a trick to invite his friends to walk, to bath, to eat, to drink with him, and in all his enterviews he would be perpetually reading of his verses: one would have thought the thing it self were innocent, if the question had been ask'd concerning the thing alone; but they that felt the folly and the tediousnesse of it, were afraid to see him.

Vir probus, justus, innocens timeris.

And Sidonius tells of some idle persons,* 1.2151 quos execrabilis popularitias agit; civium maximos manu prensant, éque consessu publico abducunt, ac se∣questratis oscula impingunt, operam suam spondent, sed non petiti. Ut∣que videantur in negotii communis assertione legari, evectionem refun∣dunt, ipsosque sumptus ultro recusant, & ab ambitu clam rogant singu∣los, ut ab omnibus palam rogentur, &c. their very civility is trouble∣some, their idlenesse is hugely busy, and their imployment signifies no∣thing.

Ardelionum natio, occupata in otio, Gratis anhelans,* 1.2152 multa agendo nihil agens, Sibi molesta & aliis odiosissima.

They doe nothing, and yet never stand still, and are very troublesome to themselves and others. Such an idlenesse as this, whether in words or deeds, if it can be consider'd and observed here, shall not escape a stricter consideration hereafter. For none of these things in the event of affairs shall prove to be indifferent.

The effect of this question is very great;* 1.2153 for it ingages us upon a strict watchfulnesse over all our words and actions, and to a wise inquiry when they are done, and scatters that incuriousnesse and inadvertency of

spirit which seizes upon most men while they doe actions which they consi∣der not whether they be right or wrong, and supposing actions, many more then there are, to be in their whole kind indifferent, would fain make them so in their individual, and by never disputing the particulars, detain the action in a neutrality as to the Conscience, never representing it either as lawfull or unlawfull, much lesse as good and evil. But our actions shall be judg'd by Gods measures, not by our wilfull and ignorant mistakes. 2. E∣very thing we doe must twice passe through the Conscience; once when it is to be done, and again when it is done: And not onely whatsoever is not of faith is sin, so that we sin if we are not persuaded it is lawfull; but it be∣comes a sin, when we are carelesse and consider not at all, either actually or habitually, either openly or by involution, as it is alone or 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it is in con∣junction with something else, by direct intuition or consequent deduction, by expresse notices or by reasonable presumptions, by rule or by fame, by our own reason or by the reason of others whom we may fairly trust.

Question II.

Whether is it necessary for the doing of good that we have an expresse act of Volition?* 1.2154 or is it not sufficient in some cases that we are not unwilling? Is it not enough that we doe not oppose it? but must we also promote it? That is, Although actions of themselves be not indifferent when they are chosen; may not the will be allowed to be indifferent to some good things that are laid before her? and what kind or degrees of indifference to good can be lawfull, and in what cases?

This is not a question of single actions principally,* 1.2155 but of states of life and being▪ and of single actions onely by consequence and involution in the whole: But of great usefulnesse in the conduct of Conscience and making judgements concerning the state of our souls; and it is a great en∣dearment of the actions, the zeal and forwardnesses of the will and an active piety. First therefore in general I answer, then more particularly.

In the Law of Moses the righteousnesse commanded was a designe for Innocence,* 1.2156 their great Religion was Rest, their Decalogue was a systeme espe∣cially of Negative commandements, the sanction of the Law was fear and terror, which affrights all men, but invites none, it makes them afraid, but never willing; their offices were purifications and cleansings away: but so little of good was to be done, that God was more carefull that the people should not commit idolatry, then severe in calling them to admire his beau∣ties; that they should learn no evil, then that they should learn much good. Now to this negative state of duty, a will doing nothing, an understanding not considering, a forgetfulnesse of the question, and a sitting still might in many cases minister; and then the will is accidentally indifferent, when the action never stands before it, either as good or evil. But now under the Gospel we are unclean unlesse we have active purities, and we are covetous unlesse we despise the world, and we are malicious by interpretation of law, unlesse we take what opportunities we have of doing good to them that have us'd us ill, and even to be luke-warm is abominable to God, and our tongues may sin with silence, and we are to keep holy-days not by rest, but by religious labour, and we dishonour the holy Name of God not one∣ly

by cursed swearing, and false oaths, and evil covenants, but if we doe not doe him honour; if we doe not advance his kingdome we are rebels, if we doe not set his glory forward we have prophan'd his holy name that is cal∣led upon us.

And this is with some mysteriousnesse intimated in the several senses of those words of Scripture [Therefore let my Name be called upon them.* 1.2157] So Jacob's name was called upon Rebeccah,* 1.2158 and Uriah's name upon Bathsheba; Rebecca Jacobi, & Uriae Bathsheba: and upon Ephraim and Manasseh when Jacob's name was called, the purpose was that they should be reckon'd not as if they had been sons of Joseph, but the sons of Jacob, having an equal portion in the divisions of Israel. So in the Prophet* 1.2159, Onely let thy Name be called upon us, that is, let us be reckon'd in thy portion, accounted to be thy people, thou our Father, and we Sons and Daughters unto God. Now in these instances of the Old Testament, it signifies honour and privilege, security of title and advantage of relation, something that on their part was passive all the way. But in the New Testament we find the same ex∣pression rendred to such purposes as will signifie something on our parts also, some emanation of our will and choice, even an active duty. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2160 They blaspheme that holy Name which is invocated upon you, that is, they blaspheme the Name of Jesus Christ which was put upon them in baptisme, by invocation and solemn sacramental prayer. The Name of Christ was then put upon us in that manner which teaches us how to wear it for ever after: it was called upon and so put upon us; it must be called upon, and so worn by us. Here is invoca∣tion relative to two termes, both active and passive. And since it is evi∣dent and clear in the Scriptures of the New Testament that calling on the Name of the Lord is us'd for being Disciples and servants of the Lord, as appears in those words, Whosoever shall call on the Name of the Lord shall be saved, that is, all that have given up their names to Christ, all that have taken his Name and live accordingly; it follows that all we who bear the name of Christians must not be content with the glorious appelation, or the excellency of the relation, but we must by our holy lives, by our active obedience, by an operative faith, and a busy love doe honour to Christ, and glorify that Name by which we are called and made illustrious.

And this is rarely well taught us by a proverbial saying used by our Blessed Lord,* 1.2161 He that is not with us is against us;* 1.2162 and he that gathereth not, scattereth abroad: that is, it is not enough that our will doe not chuse evil, or oppose it self against God, and his holy laws and sermons. For many unconverted Gentiles, children and strangers, the luke-warm and the indif∣ferent, the deaf and the dumbe, the stones of the street and the gold of the Temple, the starers and the talkers, the Sceptic and the carelesse, these have a negative indifference of will; they doe not take part against Christ, but neither doe they fight of his side, and therefore are not populus volun∣tarius, their will and choice is not on Christ's side. But the particulars are these, which determine the cases of Conscience which can arise from this inquiry.

There are in the Gospels two proverbial sayings,* 1.2163 each of them twice us'd. He that is not with us is against us] and,* 1.2164 He that is not against us is with us.] The sayings are of contrary purpose and effect. For as the first

injoyns us to the labour of love, and an active will, and an effective zeal, and a religion productive of permanent effects; so the latter seems to be content with negative measures, to approve of an indifferent will, to allow a neutrality, and that not onely many single actions, but that a whole state of life may have a negative indifference and indetermination. Now because both the propositions must needs be true, they must have distinct measures, and proper significations. Therefore

1. When Christ said,* 1.2165 He that is not against us is with us, he meant it principally of strangers and aliens, persons not admitted into the strictures of the Covenant Evangelical. For when the Princes of the nations con∣spire against the Lords Christ, he that refuses to joyn with them, declares that he will not be Christs enemy; and est quiddam prodire tenus, this little is more then nothing. Thus Gamaliel was on Christ's side, when he gave a gentle counsel in a case of the Apostles, with whom although he did not joyn, yet because he would not joyn against them, he was so far with them, that he was not esteem'd an enemy: and it was noted of Joseph of Arima∣thea, that he was not consenting to the sentence of the high Priests in put∣ting our Blessed Lord to death, and therefore he was a good man. His not doing that evil was a great indication of a friendly mind.

2. This is also true in questions of religion of difficult understanding,* 1.2166 and lesse necessary knowledge, or not of immediate concernment to salvati∣on. He that does not disbelieve the miracles of Christ, he that does not stop his ears against the voice of Christ, he that does not run after a stran∣gers voice, is not far from the kingdome of heaven: though the man knows little, yet if he believes nothing against any word of Christ, though many words of Christ were deliver'd of which he knows nothing, he hath put his head into the folds of Christ. For in articles of belief which are not of the foundation, an implicite belief in God and his Christ is sufficient, when there is no vitious positive cause of the not knowing them explicitely: and if this were not true, ignorant and unletter'd persons were tied to as great learning and explicite knowledge as the profoundest Clercs; which because it is no where commanded, and is very often impossible, and al∣ways unreasonable to be exacted, it must follow that it will in most cases be enough for the ideot or unlearned that they doe not oppose what they doe not understand, but humbly submit themselves to God and their superiors, by a confident confession of what they understand, and a modest conformi∣ty to those other articles in which public peace is more concerned then pub∣lic truth, or their private duty. In this case a negative indifference of the will by reason of the ignorance of the understanding, that is, a not opposing what they understand not, and cannot understand, is their security and their innocence.

3. He that is not against Christ is with him,* 1.2167 is true in the preparati∣ons and dispositions to conversion. For he that makes use of a little grace shall have more; and he that well uses the laws of his country, and keeps the justice of his nation, and observes the principles of reason, and walks ac∣cording to the light he hath, though he hath not the broad noon-day of the Gospel, yet he is so far on Christ's side, that Christ will joyn himself to his, and draw him nearer, and advance his Nature, and promote his ex∣cellent dispositions, and by the methods of the spirit bring him to God.

Upon this stock it was that God sent S. Peter to Cornelius, and that so many of the Jewish Proselytes were converted to Christianity, and so many wise Heathens, who had just and ingenuous souls and liv'd good lives, were brought into the schools of Christ.

4. This is true also in the habits or actions of any one vertue when it is alone,* 1.2168 or when it comes in upon the stock of nature, or education, or passion, or humane laws. He that does one good act for Christ, though he doe no more, by that one action declares himself to be no-enemy, and therefore he shall not loose his reward; though he give but a cup of cold wa∣ter to a thirsty disciple, in that capacity of his being a disciple; nay if it be but in the consideration of his being thirsty, if it be but by a natural pity and tendernesse, by the emotions of humanity, by the meltings of a wor∣thy disposition and of tender bowels: and therefore much more shall every worthy habit, though it be alone, though entring from a lesse perfect prin∣ciple then a spiritual and Christian grace. The chastity of Lucretia, the honesty of Decianus, the truth of Rutiius, the bravery of Scaevola, the re∣pentance of Ahab, the humiliation of Manasses, the zeal of Jehu, the com∣passion of Titus over Jerusalem, these things and these persons are consi∣der'd by God, and have their portion of reward. And he is not wholly against Christ that does any thing for him: for our Blessed Lord is so gra∣cious, that no man shall speak a word for him, or relieve any of his servants, or keep a memorial, but as far as that action goes, according to the pro∣portion of the choice and the good will, Christ will reckon him to be on his side, and allot him a portion of his blessing, a yonger Brothers part, though not the inheritance.

5. This is true of those who being secretly convinc'd cannot yet shake off their prejudices and their pitiable fears,* 1.2169 who own Christ in their hearts, whose faith is weak and their doubts are strong, who fear God hear∣tily, and yet cannot quite shake off the fear of men; they also are reckon'd on Christ's side so far, that they are not present and actual enemies, but actual friends, and but potential professors and Disciples. Thus Nicodemus was on Christ's side by not being against him. He owned as much as he durst; he spake in behalf of Christ, but profess'd him not; he believ'd in him, but fear'd the Jews. This was not enough to adopt him into the king∣dome, but this brought him from the enemies side, like the Kenites and the sons of Rechab in the land of Israel.

6. To be with Christ hath many parts and degrees of progression and avail.* 1.2170 Every man that professes Christ is with him; he that is bap∣tized, he that is called Christian, he that delights in the name, he that is in the external communion of the Church is in some sense with Christ, be∣cause he is not against him. For whoever is a member of the Church, whosoever retains his baptismal right, he that hath not renounced Chri∣stianity, lost his faith, defied Christ, or turn'd Apostate, he is still within the covenant of mercy, within the limits of grace and the power of the spirit; that is, he hath a right to the privilege and grace of being admitted to repentance and the consequent grace of pardon: for baptisme is for the remission of sins, and as long as that is not renounc'd, we have a perpetual title to remission of sins, the Sacrament as to this purpose being of perpe∣tual effect. Every such person is yet a member of Christ, though barren

and unfruitfull: his leaf doth not prosper and his fruit springs not, yet there is a root remaining. For thus the Gospel is compar'd to a net with fishes good and bad, to a field of corn and tares. For no man is thrown from grace and mercy but the open, profess'd, irreconcileable enemies of Christ, voluntary and malicious Apostates; for they are cut off from the root, and have no portion in it, as S. Paul largely discourses in the sixth and tenth Chapters to the Hebrews. But those who sin against Christ, & dishonour and grieve the holy Spirit of Christ, who sin and repent and yet sin and re∣pent again, being always sorrowful, and always have cause, these men have hopes, and time, and helps, and arguments, and probabilities of life, which they could not have but by being members of Christ's mystical body. They are with Christ in Covenant and desire, in title and adoption, because they are not against him in profession and voluntary hostility: but they must goe further, or they die.

For all this effects nothing else,* 1.2171 but that we are tied to treat such per∣sons not as enemies but as brethren; it exposes such to be chastis'd and guided by the rod of Ecclesiastical discipline, but not to be cut off by the sword of excision and anathema, and sentences of despair; it does manifest the goodnesse of God, the glorious mercies of our Redeemer, his aptnesse to pardon, his readinesse to receive us, his desires to have us sav'd, his passion for our felicity, and the presence of his preventing and auxiliary grace. But this was but the Proverb of strangers and beginners, of infants and babes in Christ.

7. But when we are entred into the Covenant of Grace,* 1.2172 when we have declar'd, when the question is concerning final pardon and the hopes of glory, then the other Proverb is onely true. It is not enough that we are not against Christ, but we must be with him and for him, earnest and zea∣lous, passionate and obedient, diligent and true, industrious and inquisitive; then it is, He that is not with Christ, is against him. For it is not enough that we are in the root, that is, in preparation and disposition, but we must also bear fruit in the root;* 1.2173 for so saith our Blessed Saviour, I am the Vine; my Father is the Husbandman: Every branch in me that beareth not fruit shall be cut off. First they are in Christ as in the vine, before they can bear fruit; and there he suffers them to be in expectation of fruit; of which if they fail in their season, they shall be cut off. * For the case between Christ and the world is as it was between Caesar and Pompey. Pompey had the pos∣session and the right: and therefore as Cicero in his Oration pro Ligario affirms, Pompey's party acknowledged none but his certain and professed friends; adversarios autem putare nisi qui nobiscum essent, and all to be against them that were not with them: Te autem (saith he to Caesar) qui con∣tra te non essent, tuos. For Caesar was but entring upon his new fortune, and all that he could get to himself, and all that would not assist his enemy, were his purchase or security. So it is with Christ in the beginnings of our Con∣version; it is a degree of victory to arrest our thoughts, and our not consent∣ings to the world and it's fond affections, is an approach and an accession to Christ. But when our Lord hath gotten the first victories, when he hath acquir'd possession as well as right to a soul, and hath a title to rule alone, then the proposition is chang'd. Christ will not be satisfied with neutrality and an indifferent undetermin'd will, but he will have our love and active choice, and he will be honour'd by all our services: and then the Christian

philosophy relies upon these principles: * He that does not love God is his enemy; * Not to goe forward is to goe backward; * Not to doe good is a doing evil, and luke-warmnesse is an evil state; and * We must not onely not resist the word of truth, but we must contend earnestly for it; and * We must confesse with our mouth, what we believe with the heart; * To be a Christian is to hurt no man, and to doe good to every man; and * We must not onely proceed when we are not hindred, but we must take care that we be not hindred, we must remove every impediment, and pare away that which is uselesse;* 1.2174 for obstat quicquid non adjuvat, if it does no good, it does hurt: and when the talent is intrusted to us it must not onely not be spent riotously,* 1.2175 but it must not be laid up in a napkin. Pensemus quod lucrum Dei fecimus nos qui accepto talento ad negotium missi sumus. Unlesse we gain and put something to God's heap, we are unprofitable servants.

By the proportion of this truth in the state of our life,* 1.2176 we are to ac∣count concerning our single actions; not that every single action must be effective of a real, discernible event of piety, but that is be fitted to the ge∣neral designe of a Christians life; nothing of evil, but ministring to good some way or other, or at least in some good order of things; good for edi∣fication, or good in charitable society, or good for example, or usefull to some purpose that is fit to be design'd, and fit to be chosen.

RULE II. The virtual and interpretative consent of the Will is imputed to Good or Evil.

THis Rule is intended to explicate the Nature of Social Crimes,* 1.2177 in which a mans will is deeper then his hand, though the action of the will is often indirect and collateral, consequent or distant; but if by any means it hath a portion into the effect, it is intire in the guilt. And this happens many ways.

1.* 1.2178 By Ratihabition and Confirmation.

In maleficio Ratihabitio mandato comparatur,* 1.2179 saith the law: To command another to doe violence is imputed to him that commands it more then him that does it. So Ulpian interpreting the interdict Unde tu illum vi dejecisti, affirms eum quoque dejicere qui alteri mandavit vel jussit: and therefore Ptolemy was guilty of the bloud of Pompey when he sent Pothinus to kill him,

Hic factum Domino praestitit….

Now because ratihabition is by presumption of law esteem'd as a Com∣mandement, therefore Ulpian affirms of both alike, Dejicit & qui mandat, & dejicit qui ratum habet. He that commands, and he that consents after it is done are equally responsible. Now though the law particularly af∣firms this onely In maleficio in criminal and injurious actions, yet in the edition of Holoander that clause is not inserted; and it is also certain that it holds and is true in contracts and civil affairs. Thus what a servant or a

son imployed by his Father or his Master shall contract for, is the Father's act if he accounts it valid. If the son borrows money in the Father's name, the Father is the debtor. But in matters Criminal and Civil there is a real difference as to this particular.

For in matters Criminal,* 1.2180 ratihabition or approving of the act does always make the approver guilty. The Jews crucified their Lord and King: he that saies it was well done, is guilty of that intolerable murder, and for an ineffective malice and spite, procures to himself a real and effe∣ctive damnation. But in actions Criminal there is this difference to be ob∣served. Some actions are done by the lust and appetite of the Criminal agent onely, as adultery, rape, fornication; and if this be the state of that affair, that sin is wholly imputed to him that acted it, not to him that ap∣proves it. He that approves it is indeed guilty of the same kind of sin, be∣cause he hath applied his will to that which God forbids, and for his lustfull disposition approv'd and consented to by his will commits a sin like it, but is not guilty of that. 2. But if such approbation become an incouragement to the Criminal to doe so again, if it fortifies his heart in sin, or hardens his forehead, or makes it pleasant, he that approv'd the first is not onely guilty of a sin like the first, but partakes with the Criminal really in the guilt of the sins that follow upon that account. 3. But there are other sins which are, as the law speaks, ratihabentis nomine gesta, which are done in anothers Name, and either partly or wholly for his interest; and therefore if by him they be approv'd, the ratihabition is valid to all evil purposes, and is therefore all one as if the actions were by him commanded for whose interest they were acted, and by whose will they are approved. And thus it is also in the former sins which serve the lust of him that acts them, if besides the ser∣ving of his lust they are designed to serve anothers interest; as if Titius steal Sempronia and run away with her, or lie with Maevia the daughter of Amilius to doe a spite to the Father for the injury he did to Tubero, not onely Titius but Tubero is guilty of the crime, if Tubero approves what Titius did for his sake.

But now if it be inquir'd what real event as to Conscience this nice distinction without greater difference can have,* 1.2181 that in one case he that ap∣proves the sin is not guilty of the same but another like it, and in the other cases he is partner of the same fault; I answer, First, in humane laws the difference of effect is very great. For to approve an act of sin done not in my name introduces no punishment upon the approver; but if it be done in my name and for my interest, by a fiction or presumption of law it is sup∣pos'd I gave command or warranty, and therefore I also shall partake of the punishment, unlesse by the consideration of other circumstances I be relieved in equity, and the presumption be found to fail. But in the court of Conscience the difference depends not upon presumption; but upon what it is in the truth of the thing, which shall be judged well enough by him that knows the secret. For whether the crime was done for me or not, I shall be judg'd according to that influence which I would have upon the effect. If I will'd it directly and caus'd it to be done knowingly, or by some causality which I at any time us'd to that purpose, I am liable to all the evil that can be consequent to that sin: but if I be guilty onely by rati∣habition, that is, if really I did not command it, or effect it, or cause it to be effected, but onely rejoyce in it and use it when it is done, then my ratiha∣bition is ordinarily (though very evil) yet much lesse then the other's action.

I say ordinarily, that is in all cases where craft and machination, plots and contrivances, intermedial violences and deceivings, and other evil things of the retinue of the sin are previous to the crime. For in all these things he that onely approves the act hath commonly no interest, or care, or no∣tice, or consideration. If it happens that he considers and approves them too, then the case is alter'd: but it is not always so. This case will explicate the Rule. Ventidius was married to Romanella; but growing rich, and be∣ing made a Roman Knight, grows weary of his first bed-fellow, because he hopes now to get a richer wife if she were gone. While he tumbled this often in his head, it hapned that a slave of Ventidius upon some trifling oc∣casion, but in a great passion, flings something at Romanella, which caused her to miscarry, and to die. Ventidius observing his good fortune, secretly puts away his servant that he may escape the hand of justice, and promises him liberty, making what pretences he found convenient to his purpose. He went presently to get him a new wife, but was arrested in his designe, because he was told that he that was guilty of his wives death was to loose the privilege of a second marriage; but because he confirm'd it and rejoyc'd in it, it was esteem'd in law as a Commandement. Upon this he takes ad∣vice, and was told, that though in Conscience he was guilty of murder, be∣cause he delighted in and approv'd it, yet mere ratihabition in such things which must be judg'd not by the effect but by the previous machination and designe, did not produce that punishment of impeding his future mar∣riage. And there is reason for it; because though Ventidius was so base as to wish his wife dead or kill'd, yet he would not doe it himself, nor procure it to be done, his covetousnesse had not prevail'd so far with him; and there∣fore neither ought the punishment goe to the extremity of the law. 2. In Divine laws and in the direct obligation of Conscience there is this great difference. If a crime be done in my name, and I approve it, I am not one∣ly guilty before God of the crime, and liable to an equal share of the punish∣ment (according to the foregoing measure) but I contract a new necessity of duty; I am bound to restore the man that sinn'd for my interest to his former state of justice and integrity as far as I can, by disallowing the act, by dis∣countenancing it, by professing my own repentance, by inviting him to the like: which obligation is not at all upon me by a simple and mere ratihabi∣tion of an act in which I have no interest, and to which I had no previous concurse, directly, nor by interpretation. This is the state of this question in relation to matters Criminal.

But in matters Civil,* 1.2182 as in contracts, debts, pledges, provisions for pupils, the law is to determine the whole affair, and to account the ratiha∣bition at what rate she please, and upon what conditions; and therefore we are to be determin'd by our own laws in all such inquiries. That which can be a general measure and relates any way to Conscience is this; Where the law does require an expresse command pro forma, the after-ratification is of no effect in law, nor conscience, if the law impedes the effect. Thus if a Minor makes a contract without the consent of his Guardian, though afterward the Guardian allow it, the contract is invalid: because the law requir'd in the very form and solennity of the contract that the authority of the Guardian should be interpos'd; and ea quae pertinent ad solennitatem contractus, à contractu dividi non possunt, say the lawyers; and ubi forma actus deficit, corruit actus, l. Julianus. 9. §. si quis. ff. ad exhib. If there be an essential defect of what is by law requir'd to the validity of the act, the

act is null and invalid, and therefore is also invalid and effects nothing in Conscience, unlesse where the law of Nature intervenes; of which I have already given accounts* 1.2183. Thus also it is in punishments which are not to be incurred but in cases nam'd in the law, and therefore are not to be im∣pos'd in cases of presumption or fiction of law, amongst which is this, of the equivalence of ratihabition to a command.* 1.2184 If the son marries a wid∣dow within the year of mourning, he is legally infamous; but so is not the Father, though he approves it, unlesse he did consent in the beginning; be∣cause these effects being wholly depending upon positive laws, can have no other measures but what the laws put upon them. But in the Court of Conscience the matter is not so easy.

But since ratihabition is at the worst but an interpretative command,* 1.2185 and yet is so very bad as to imprint the guilt of the whole action upon him that so hath influence into the effect by interpretation, it must needs be that a direct command is more evidently criminal, and in greater degrees; which I needed not to have observed but in order to a further inquiry, and that is,

Question.

Upon whom doth the greater portion of the Guilt lie; upon him that commands a sin, or him that sins in obedience?

Although the question of degrees may here be usefull to some pur∣poses of Conscience, yet it is just to condemn them both with a downright sentence. For so the wise Ape in Esop judg'd the question between the wolf and the fox about a piece of flesh which the fox had stoln from the village, and the wolf had stoln from the fox, who now complain'd of the wrong. The judicious ape answer'd,

Tu non vidêris perdidisse quod petis:* 1.2186 Te credo subripuisse quod pulchre negas.

The fox saies he hath lost it, but he lies; and the wolf saies he hath not stoln it, and he lies too. They were both in the wrong, and it was hard to say which was the worse. But because although they were equally wick∣ed in their nature and their manners, yet in this cause there might be some difference, and in the partners and confederates in a crime some have more causality then others, though both of them are in a sad condemnation; therefore

To this I answer by a distinction known in the Civil law,* 1.2187 of Manda∣tum & Jussio. Mandatum is amongst equals, by bidding, incouraging, war∣ranting and setting on; and in this case, they are both equally guilty, except what difference can be made by the degrees of confidence and earnestnesse, and by wit and folly, by the advantage and reputation of the man that bids, and the weaknesse of him that is bidden. But Jussio is from Superior to Inferior; Father to Son, Master to Servant, Prince to Subjects. In this case and amongst these persons the efficiency is unequal, and hath it's esti∣mate from the grandeur and sacrednesse of the authority, and the degree of the fear which can be the instrument of prevailing and determining.

And therefore when Attilius had spoken gently with Cracchus ut Patriae parceret, seeming to have discover'd his design, Gracchus looking terribly upon him, one of his servants, non expectato signo, ex solo vultu conjectans adesse tempus, ratusque initurum se gratiam apud Patronum si primus rem ag∣grederetur, stricto ferro trajecit Attilium,* 1.2188 saith Appian, staied neither for com∣mand nor sign, but supposing by his forwardnesse he should please his Patron, and guessing by his cruel aspect it would not be displeasing to him, he kills Atti∣lius upon the place. Now such an influence as this from a superior to an in∣ferior is so little, that the servant is much more to blame then the Master. But when Henry the second in a rage complain'd that none about him would rid him of that peevish man, meaning Arch-Bishop Becket, it was more then the frown of Gracchus, but yet not so much as to lessen the fault of the sacrilegious homicides; because there was no violence done to their choice, but the crime entred upon the account of lust and ambition, and that was as bad as if it had begun and ended upon the stock of their own anger or revenge. But when a Prince or a Lord commands his subject to sin, as Domitius the Father of Nero commanded his freed man to drink to drunkennesse, so earnestly that he kill'd him for refusing it, and as Cambyses did to Praxaspes; then it is evident that the Prince is so much more guilty then he that obeys, by how much it is evident that the subject sins with lesse delight, and a more imperfect choice, and with a will which in it's acti∣ons suffers diminution: and therefore in such cases servants are very much excused from punishment in exterior courts, as knowing that such actions proceed from an excusable principle, from a regardfull obedience, and an undiscerning subjection; which because in most things it ought not to dis∣pute, they not discerning their utmost limit, being born to serve, not to rule and distinguish by their reason, and besides this, having all their fortune bound up in their Masters frown or favour, are very much to be pitied if they obey too much;* 1.2189 etenim quod imperante te servus tuus Faciebat, abs te id esse factum existimo. And this the law it self observes in the commands of some superiors:* 1.2190 Qui jussu judicis aliquid facit, non videtur dolo malo fa∣cere, cui parêre necesse habet; The command of such a superior whom we esteem it necessary to obey, exempts our obedience from being Criminal. And though this of Judges be a particular case,* 1.2191 because Res judicata pro ve∣ritate accipitur, saies the law, they declare law by their sentence and com∣mands; yet the Romans observ'd it in the case of Clients and freed men to their Patrons, as Livy reports it in the case of the freed man of Appius the Decemvir; and the old books of Philosophers observ'd it in the obedience of children to their parents,* 1.2192 as Aulus Gellius recites out of them.

But then this also admits of one distinction more,* 1.2193 which the law thus expresses;* 1.2194 Ad ea quae non habent atrocitatem sceleris vel facinoris, igno∣scitur servis, si vel Dominis vel his qui vice Dominorum sunt, velut Tutoribus & Curatoribus, obtemperaverint, Servants and inferiors are excus'd if they transgresse at the command of their superiors in a small matter, but not in a great. This is observed by the Sages of our Common law. If a Feme covert doth steal goods by the commandment of her husband (with∣out other constraint) this hath been holden to be felony in her, saith S^r Ri∣chard Bolton the L. Chancellor of Ireland: and for this he quotes Bracton, and addes this reason out of him; For licet Uxor obedire debeat viro, in atro∣cioribus tamen non est ei obediendum, In great matters, and sins of high nature, a wife is not to be excus'd for her obedience. But if the husband not onely

commands, but uses compulsion, then it is so far excus'd, that in the wife the theft is not felony; but murder is, because the greatnesse of the horror in such a fact is sufficient to prevail against the husbands threatnings and her own fear,* 1.2195 unlesse there were in her some evil principle. If a servant defending his lords right doe some injury, he is excus'd in law, but not if he kills a man; if he speaks a rude word he may be born with, but not if he steals a horse. And this also hath some proportions of truth in the Court of Conscience, that if the superior be great, and the command be urgent, and the instance not very considerable, the fault is by every of these consi∣derations very much lessen'd, but the man is not totally excus'd; his excuse is upon the stock of fear or a great temptation: so far as they intervene in the present case, and so far as they can excuse in any (which I am afterwards to consider) so far the guilt suffers diminution. But the advice of the son of Sirach is the great rule in this question,* 1.2196 Accept no person against thy soul, and let not the reverence of any man cause thee to fall.

But all this is to be understood of those actions which are Criminal both in the Commandement and in the obedience,* 1.2197 in the sanction and in the execution, such as are adultery, murder, treason, blasphemy, and all the prevarications of the natural law, in all moral precepts, the transgres∣sion of which can by no intention become legitimate. But in the positive and temporary laws of God which enjoyn no moral, natural rectitude, but simple and just obedience during the abode of that law, the subject, the son or the servant if he be commanded by his just superior to an external ministery in the sin of the superior, if he consents not to the sin, and declares against it according as he can be requir'd, sins not at all in the obedience. Thus when Joab and the Captains numbred the people against their wills upon the peremptory command of David their King,* 1.2198 they had no part in the sin, because they explicitely dissented all the way, and the execution and obedience did not implicitely and by interpretation involve them in it. The reason is, because the act of numbring the people was of it self innocent, and made criminal onely by David's circumstances; of which when they had advertis'd their King, and disclaim'd the malice and irregularity, they interested themselves in nothing but the material part: which when it can be separated from the evil heart, as in this it was, and in all the like it may, the obedience is innocent, though the commandement be impious; and therefore David wholly takes the fault upon himself,

—mea fraus omnis, nihil iste nec ausus, Nec potuit….

I have sinn'd and done wickedly, but what have these sheep done? * To this also is to be added, that even in the case of positive precepts our obedience must be wholly passive, and in no sense active; that is, it must be wholly an act of obedience, without any promoting or advancing the sin in him that commands, no way increasing, or incouraging, or confirming the sin or the sinner.

2. Under this head is reduc'd the praising of an action: Which if it be done with a designe to promote it, is first a sin in the approving it se∣cretly, and is another sin in setting it forward publicly. According to this is that saying of the Arabians, Qui laudat obscoenum perpetrat illud, He that praises an unclean action is himself an unclean person. And therefore it was good Counsel,

Qualem commendes etiam atque etiam aspice…* 1.2199

for by our words we shall be judged: but, as Salust said of Caesar and Cato, Alius aliâ viâ, some one way, and some another get great names. Cato was famous for discountenancing, Caesar for being a patron of evil men; but Ca∣to was the better man: and upon this account Pliny commends one, or navit virtutes, Insectatus est vitia, he adorned vertues with a fair character, but reproach'd vitious persons: and he that by praises and dispraises respective∣ly does not distinguish vertue and vice cannot be a good man.

Ne laudet dignos,* 1.2200 laudat Callistratus omnes. Cui malus est nemo, quî bonus esse potest?

For in vain doe laws make a distinction between good and bad, if they be all blended in a common reward. Malè pereas qui Gratias virgines, mere∣trices effecisti, said Democritus to one that gave large gifts to all men a∣like.* 1.2201 Concerning which it was excellently said by Maximus Tyrius, Qui largiuntur indignis ea quae dignis conferenda essent, tria prae∣stant absurda: Nam & ipsi jacturam faciunt, in bonos sunt injuriosi, malos∣que roborant segete ac materiâ vitiorum suppeditatâ To give to vice any of the treatments or rewards of vertue is a treble mischief: The gift or re∣ward is lost, and injury is done to vertue, and evil men are incouraged in their evil courses.

3. By consent,* 1.2202 silent and implicite, we are partakers of the fact of others: by not contradicting we are sometimes adjudged willing.

Of the main part of the proposition there is no doubt, but that a con∣senting to evil is a sin; a consenting to any action gives it as much authori∣ty, being and warranty as his consent can effect: but the question here is what are the signes of consent when it is not express'd, and when the man that is silent is justly presumed willing. This inquiry is of use in the matter of presumptive dispensations, and in the participation of good and evil actions and rewards. But it hath in it but little difficulty.

For 1. It is evident that then silence is an implicit consent,* 1.2203 when the superior or the interested person, whose consent can verify the act, and whose power can easily hinder it, and who is bound to hinder it if it be unlawfull, does yet hold his peace, and forbids it not. The reason of this is, because every man is suppos'd to doe his duty, unlesse the contrary be known: and therefore when a Prince sees his subjects doing what the law forbids, and which he can easily hinder, it is to be presum'd that he dispenses with them in that case, because he knows that they will expound his silence to be a li∣cense; and therefore he also intends it so, so long as he is silent, or else he does unreasonably, and to no good purpose holds his peace.

But this is not true in those things which to their stabiliment or war∣ranty require a positive act.* 1.2204 For sometimes a silence is but an indifference and neutrality,* 1.2205 according to that of the law, Qui tacet non utique fatetur, sed tamen verum est eum non negare; He that holds his peace neither con∣fesses nor denies:* 1.2206 and in the Canon law, Id in tua Ecclesia dissimulare po∣teris, ita quod nec contradicere, nec tuum videaris praestare assensum; The Bishop's dissembling or taking no notice in some cases, is expounded nei∣ther to be a contradiction nor consent: and the glosse in cap. cum jamdudum de praeben, affirms, Multa per patientiam tolerantur, quae si deducta fuerint

in judicium, exigente justitiâ non debent tolerari, Some things are patient∣ly suffer'd, which if they were publicly complain'd of, ought not to be suf∣fer'd. But these seeming antinomies are both very reasonable in their own senses, and therefore are easy to be reconcil'd.

For if the act about which the superior is patient be connvi'd at,* 1.2207 it is either because for some reasonable cause he pardons the Criminal; or else because his patience is necessary and by constraint, he cannot help himself. For no silence is esteem'd a ratihabition of a past act: because when the thing is done without the leave of the superior, his silence or speaking cannot alter it, or legitimate the action if it was evil; at the most it does but par∣don what is past, which is no allowance of any future action of the same nature. Indeed in the Court of Conscience, such a silence, or not repro∣ving of a past fault, may be want of duty and discipline, and a criminal o∣mission of what we are oblig'd to; but hath no legal or natural causality upon that action which is past, and can be but an accidental cause or occa∣sion of a future.

But then silence is an interpretative consent,* 1.2208 when it is 1. a silence of a thing observed, and 2. at present, and 3. that can be hindred: and then indeed in law it is a great presumption, but not always in Conscience; because it may proceed from a neglect of duty that the superior takes no notice of the action, or from many other causes, as pusillanimity, just fear, or weak∣nesse, which because they cannot always be prov'd or observ'd, they may conclude legally from silence to consent or dispensation: yet the processe of Conscience must be upon more wary grounds, and where there is so much fallibility in the presumption, the conscience must proceed to action upon more certain accounts, and must strictly follow her rule, or must have grea∣ter causes to justify her liberty.

And therefore though the superior be silent,* 1.2209 and does observe the action, and can hinder me; yet I am not to presume that he dispenses, or consents, or gives me leave to goe besides the law, unlesse there be in the state of my affairs a just cause of dispensation, and yet a reasonable cause of hindring me from asking, or him from expressing his leave; then silence may be presum'd to be leave, though the cause of dispensation be probable one∣ly, and not very necessary.

In the reducing this to practice three cautions are to be attended.* 1.2210

1. When a subject proceeds to action upon the presumption of leave, or a tacit dispensation, this presumption or supposition must be made use of before the action be done, not afterwards. For it can never be honest to doe an act in hope to get leave afterwards; for untill the leave be actually given or reasonably presum'd, it is prohibited, and consequently unlawfull; and if a dispensation were afterwards given and obtained, it were nothing but a pardon, which is so far from making the past action to be innocent, that it supposes it to be Criminal, for else there were no need of pardon. He that sins in hope of pardon, fears nothing of the sin but the smart, he thinks there is no evil but punishment; and therefore hath nothing towards vertue but the fear. If therefore before the action be undertaken the dispensation be not presum'd, nothing that comes after can change the action.

2. This presumption is not to be extended beyond that very action that is done in the presence,* 1.2211 or within the notice and observation of the superior. For although it should be true that he does give tacit consent or leave to this particular, yet it follows not that therefore he does so to any or all of the same kind. For that may be just or tolerable once, which if repeated may be chang'd in circumstances, or become evil example, or of intolerable effect by the very repetition; or the mind of the superior may change, or the causes of dispensation may cease: and after all, since this dis∣pensation wholly depends upon the consent of the superior, and this con∣sent is then onely justly presum'd when he observes the action and forbids it not, the presumption is wholly at an end when he does not see it; and therefore a tacit consent or leave to an observed action can at no hand be extended to a consent or leave to others that are not observ'd by him.

3. If the tacit dispensation be of such nature that it cannot give leave to a present observed action,* 1.2212 but by introducing a faculty, or state, or po∣tentiality of doing the like, then it is certain that if the present action be tacitly dispens'd withal or consented to, it may be extended to all of the like kind; but it is also as certain, that such a tacit consent is not so easily to be presum'd. The Bishop of Bitonto for his exercise was flinging of a leaden weight, and by chance kill'd his servant who unfortunately cross'd the way as the lead was irrecoverably passing from his hand, and for this misfortune in the chance of bloud is made irregular. Afterwards in the presence of his superior seeing a yong Turk dying who had express'd some inclinations to Christianity, baptizes him in the instant before his death, and was observ'd and conniv'd at by his superior, and therefore had a presump∣tive leave or dispensation for his irregularity. But because this single acti∣on could not have been dispens'd withall but by taking off his irregularity, it took away all that which could hinder his future doing his Episcopal office; and therefore he hath the same presumptive leave for the future actions which will not be observed, as for the present which was. But then the first presumption must be very reasonable and sure: for although a proba∣ble presumption may suffice to conclude for leave in a single present action whose effects determine with it self; yet if it have influence upon the fu∣ture (as in the case before cited) it ought to be better consider'd, and more warily conducted by the superior, and therefore not readiy presumed by the subject. These are the measures of guessing at a consent by silence. There is also one way more of implicit or secret consent, viz.

2. He does implicitely consent to an action, who consents or com∣mands any thing to be done,* 1.2213 from whence such an action or leave must ne∣cessarily follow: and the reason is, because he ought not to doe things re∣pugnant to each other. He that makes it necessary for me to doe a thing, is the cause of my doing it, as much as if he commanded it. And this is more then a tacit consent or dispensation respectively, for it is a virtual. He that collates the order of Priesthood upon me, intends I should doe the whole office.* 1.2214 Princeps enim qui illi dignitatem dedit, omnia gerere de∣crevit, saith the law. Thus he that dispenses in the irregularity, consents to all the actions which he does by virtue of the removing that impedi∣ment, who is so dispens'd with. Which proposition is onely so to be under∣stood, when there is nothing wanting to the effecting such an action but the removing that impediment: but it is suppos'd that he that is dispens'd

with, will use his liberty; and the dispensation if it be at all is directed so, and is in order to it. But if the superior does an action which is not in order to an end, neither in order of nature or of intention, but yet it can be consequent to it, that consequent action is not to be imputed to him who did something precedent, without which that action could not have been done. Thus if a Prince pardons a thief, or a friend begs his pardon that kill'd a man, although he could not have stoln any more without that par∣don, yet that after-theft or murder is not imputable to him that gave or to him that beg'd the pardon, unlesse they did it with that very intention; for the pardon is not in any natural order to any such consequent action, and therefore without his own actual or design'd conjunction and intuition, can∣not convey the crime and guiltinesse.

Question.

Upon the occasion of this,* 1.2215 it is seasonable to inquire how far it may be lawfull, and can be innocent to permit a sin.

The case is this.* 1.2216 Pancirone an Italian Gentleman invites a German Embassador to dinner, feasts him nobly, sets before him plenty of delicious wine, enough to exhilarate him and all his company; but the German after his country fashion thinks it no entertainment unlesse he be drunk. The question is whether Pancirone sins in setting before him so much more as will fill the utmost capacity of his intemperance. Is it lawfull to suffer him to be drunk?

If this Question had been ask'd in the Primitive Church,* 1.2217 the answer would have been a reproof to the inquirer, as one who no better under∣stood the laws of sobriety and hospitality, and the measures of the Chri∣stian feastings. Posidonius tells of S. Austin, Usus est frugali mensa & so∣briâ, quae quidem inter olera & legumina etiam carnes aliquando propter hospi∣tes & quosque inferiores continebat. Semper autem vinum habebat, quod ta∣men moderatissime bibebat, quia noverat & docebat, ut Apostolus dicit, quod omnis creatura Dei bona sit, & nihil abjiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur. He had that which was good and usefull for himself according to his own measures, and something better for strangers. He always had wine, but it was drank very sparingly; because every creature of God is good, if it be received with thanksgiving. But if the guests be permitted to drink to drunkennesse, who shall say Amen at thy giving of thanks? or how shalt thou give thanks at the spoiling of the gifts of God? There is no perad∣venture but as a feast is the enlargement of our ordinary diet, so the enter∣tainment of guests is a freer use of our liberty, so it be within the limits and capacities of sobriety. But though the guests meal may be larger then our ordinary, yet we must secure our own duty more then we can secure theirs. When the Greeks whom Lucullus feasted wondred why for their sakes he should be so large in his expences,* 1.2218 he answer'd, Nonnihil, O Hospi∣tes, vestri causâ, sed maxima pars Luculli gratiâ, Something of this, O Guests, is for your sakes, but the most of it is for my own magnificence. We should take care to doe so, that though for our guests we doe something more then ordinary, yet our greatest care should be for our selves, that we doe nothing that may misbecome the house of one of Christs servants. Would

Pancirone suffer the German Embassadour to lie with his women when he entertains him, and make his chambers a scene of lust? Certainly he would esteem it infinitely dishonest, if to an honest family he should offer so great an injury; and why may not his chambers minister to lust, as well as his dining-room or cellars to beastly drunkennesse? and is it not as honorable that the family should be accounted sober, as to be esteemed chast? or is not drunkennesse dishonesty as well as lust? and why may not Panicrone as well bid his servants keep the door to wantonnesse, as hold the chalice to beastly vomitings? In these things there is no other difference, but that as cloths, so vices also are in and out of fashion as it happens. He that means to be a servant of God, must for himself and all his house take care that God be not there dishonour'd. I and my house will serve the Lord, said Joshuah: and when God gave to the Israelites the law of the sabbath, he gave it for themselves and their families and the strangers within their gates. * But so corrupt and degenerous are the manners of Christians, that our feasts are ministeries of sin, and every guest hath leave to command the house even when he cannot command himself: but this is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Christian sobriety hath other laws. Does any man when he re∣lieves the poor at his gate give them leave to drink till they be drunk? and yet what they give to the poor is given for God's sake: but when they mi∣nister to the rich man within, for whose sake is that excesse given? If Co∣drus askes an almes, we refuse him, if we suppose he will make himself drunk with it, and we think we are bound to refuse him: & can it be lawfull to give to a guest within what it is unlawful to give to a guest without? If it be unlawful, it is certain it is not unavoidable: but if there be difficulty in declining it to some men, then besides that which is principally intended by our Blessed Saviour, we see also there is very great reason in those words, When thou makest a feast, call not the rich, but call the poor: These will not tempt you to make them drunk, it may be the others will. If our Guest makes himself drunk with the usual provisions which must be indistinctly ministred at feasts, that cannot be help'd, but by refusing to receive such persons again to our Table: but he that knowingly and observingly espies the meeting turn to God's dishonour, and does not put a limit to that sea of drink, and place a shore and a strand to the inundation, will find that God is departed from that meeting, and the pleasing of his drunken guests will not make him recompence for the losse of such an inhabitant. A man must at no hand consent to his brothers sin: and he that can and ought to hinder it, and does not, by interpretation does consent. For he that gives a man a goblet of intemperance, with which he sees him about to drown his soul, is just as innocent as he that lends him a knife to cut his own throat. But this is to be understood when the case is evident and notorious; for in the ap∣proaches and accesses to drunkennesse the matter is lesse then in the lending of a knife, because it is yet disputable whether he will finish his intempe∣rance: but if it be plain that drunkennesse is design'd, the case is all one; and if it be not perfectly design'd, yet as it steals on discernably, so the sin of him that ministers to the crime increases up to the same proportion of effect and guiltinesse. Hospitality is one of the kinds of charity: and that is but an ill welcome which first procures a feaver, and it may be after it an irrevocable damnation.

3. He that gives Counsel or aid to an action good or evil,* 1.2219 consents to it,* 1.2220 and it is imputed to him as a product of his will and choice.

This is expressely affirm'd by all laws Civil and Canon, and the Muni∣cipal laws of all those Nations of which I have seen any records concern∣ing this matter: and the interpreters universally consent, with this proviso, that the counsel be so much cause of the action, that without it it would not have been done. For if the action would have been done however, then he that counsels to it is guilty in Conscience always; but unlesse it be in great crimes, and in detestationem facti, it is not always punish'd in law. But if it were it would be very just, so that a difference were made in the degree of punishment: For he whose counsel is wholly author of the fact is guilty of more evil then he who onely addes hardnesse to him who was resolved upon the crime. But in the Court of Conscience he stands guilty that gives evil counsel, whether the Criminal would have done it with or without his counsel: and therefore the laws doe very well also to punish evil counsellors.

Quam bene dispositum terris,* 1.2221 ut dignus iniqui Fructus consilii primis authoribus instet? Sic multos fluvio Vates arente per annos, Hospite qui caeso monuit placare Tonantem Inventas primùm Busyridis imbuit aras, Et cecidit saevi, quo dixerat, hostia sacri.

So Claudian. The evil counsellor is first to feel the evil effect of his own pernicious counsel; that is, if his counsel persuade to sin, not if it prove in∣fortunate: not but that even counsel that is given with purpose to doe a mis∣chief is highly to be punish'd not onely by the degree of the evil effect, but by the degree of the malice that advis'd it; but that those events which were not foreseen or design'd cannot be imputed to him that gave the best ad∣vice he could, but could not help it if he were deceiv'd in his judgment. But if the counsel be to a sin or an unworthy action, there is no need to ex∣pect the event to make a judgement of the counsel.

The same also is affirm'd in the case of giving aides to an action good or bad;* 1.2222 in which there is no variety, but of degrees onely: for when they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in combination, it is mischief with a witnesse.

Non caret effectu quod voluere duo.

It is an aggravation of the impiety when the zeal of malice is so potent, that it is greater then the power, and therefore calls in aide to secure the mischief. But he that so assists, that he is the great effective cause of the evil which without his aide would not have been done at all, is intirely guilty.

Sic opifex Tauri,* 1.2223 tormentorumque repertor, Qui funesta novo fabricaverat aera dolori, Primus inexpertum Siculo cogente Tyranno Sensit opus, docuitque suum mugire juvencum.

Perillus invented and made witty instruments of cruelty, to invite Phalaris to a witty mischief; but the Tyrant was just that once, and made him teach his own brazen bull to roar. * But if the aide doe but facilitate the work, the assistant is punishable according to the efficacy of his aide, in humane

laws; but in Conscience he is guilty according to the secret malice of the principle: and therefore when Lucius Carpentus kill'd Nicanor, his page that hated Nicanor mortally, and did nothing but thrust his Masters sword further into his heart, to shew his ill will, though Carpentus had sufficiently kill'd him, was as much a Murderer as his Master was. In humane laws there is great difference in these things.

1. For if many by joyn'd counsel set upon a man and kill him toge∣ther, though one onely gave him a deadly wound, yet all are guilty of the murder, because they all intended it, and did something towards it.

2. But if in heat of bloud and by the surprise of passion this be done, he onely that gave the deadly wound is the homicide, and the rest are in∣jurious, and are punish'd accordingly.

3. If one give the deadly wound, and the other knock him on the head and so speed him, they are both murderers alike.

4. If many strike a man, and of all these wounds together he dies, they are equally guilty; for the law justly presumes that their malice is equal, by their conjunct attempt, and there being nothing in the event to distinguish them, the presumption is reasonable and ought to passe into effect.

5. If the man be dead but with one wound, and it be not known which of the assistants did it, they are all alike accounted homicides; for every of them is justly suppos'd to have had malice enough to have done it, and which of them had the hap to doe it is not known; therefore there can be nothing to distinguish them in the punishment, because the guilt is alike, and the event not discernably any ones peculiar. But although in external judicatories the proceedings are various, and considering there is no other way of judging what is secret and indistinguishable, this way is necessary and unavoidable of proceeding by the most reasonable and probable me∣thods of justice; yet in the Court of Conscience there is a more certain pro∣ceeding, and the answer is regular, and one; according to the degree of the will and choice, and the tendency of our affections to the event, so we shall be judged: and therefore concerning this, our own conscience is the onely measure of our expectations; and the will is the measure of reward. But these things onely two can know, the Spirit of God, and the spirit of a man; and that's enough to finish the processe at the day of judgement.

Question.

Whether or no is the making and providing the instruments which usu∣ally minister to sin,* 1.2224 by interpretation such an aid to the sin, as to involve our will and consent to the sin, and make us partakers of the guilt?

To this I answer, first in general, that all those arts and trades of life which minister onely to vanity and trifling pleasures are of ill fame, such as are Juglers,* 1.2225 Tumblers, Players, Fencers and the like; it being an injun∣ction of the Apostle that every Christian should labour with his hands 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that which is good, that is, something profitable to the Common-wealth, and acceptable to God: and to the same purpose it is that all that a Christian does must be apt to be reckon'd amongst one of these heads,* 1.2226 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, either the true or the honest, the just or the pure, the lovely or of good report; and it will be hard to reduce some of those trades to any of these heads. But I cannot

see reason enough to say that if any man sins by the using of these arts•• and their productions, that the artist is partaker of the crime; because he designing onely to maintain himself, and to please the eyes and ears and youthfull passions of others, may possibly not communicate in their sin, who over-act their liberty and their vanity. But because such persons are not so wise or discerning as to be able to discern so nicely one formality from another, but desire upon any termes to get as much money as they can, and that if they were so wise as to be able to discern the measures of their duty, they would imploy themselves better, therefore in the whole such persons are to be reprov'd, though the arts themselves might other∣wise be tolerated. They are not unlawfull because they are directly evil, but because they doe but little or no good, such as are jesters, and buffoons, and juglers; at the best they are but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 vain arts, and if they be not directly punishable, they can have no reward at all. But Alexander did very well to a fellow who made it his trade and livelyhood to stand at distance and throw little pease in at the eye of a needle made on purpose just so big as would receive them: the fellow seeing the Prince admire his dex∣terous aime expected a great reward; and the Prince observing the fellows expectation, rewarded him with a whole Bushel of pease. It was a reward worthy of such an imployment. A man cannot be blam'd for having such an art, but he that makes that to be his trade, cannot be otherwise then an idle person: and therefore although he may be tolerated in the Common-wealth where there live many persons more idle and uselesse then himself, and al∣though, if other things were well, the man could not be directly condemn'd for this, and said to be in a state of damnation; yet because if other things were well he would quickly imploy himself better, therefore such persons when they come near a spiritual guide are to be called off from that which at the best is good for nothing, and stands too near a sin to be endur'd in the scrutinies after life eternal.

But some inquire whether the trade of Card-makers and Dice-makers be lawfull:* 1.2227 and the reason of their doubt is, because these things are us'd by the worst of men, and to very vile purposes; to which these arts doe minister, and therefore are reasonably suspected as guilty of a participation of the consequent crimes.

To which I answer,* 1.2228 that some things minister to sin immediately, o∣thers mediately onely and by the intervention of something else; some mi∣nister to sin inevitably and by their design and institution, others by the fault of them that use them ill; and lastly, some things minister to evil and to no good, others to good and evil promiscuously. These three distincti∣ons make but one difference of things, but give several reasons of that dif∣ference. Those things which minister to sin immediately, by their very nature and designe, and therefore minister to no good unlesse it be acciden∣tally and by the virtue of something else nothing appertaining to them, are certainly unlawfull: and of this there is no question, and that for all those reasons contain'd in their description, they are of evil, and they are evil, and they tend to evil. But if they can minister to good, if they of themselves are innocent, if they can be us'd without doing hurt, although they are ge∣nerally abus'd, yet he that makes them in order onely to such uses to which of themselves they can and ought to minister, partakes not of the sin of them that abuse the productions of his art and labour. And this is re∣markable

in the case of pictures and images: concerning the making of which there was a great question in the Primitive Church; but the case of Conscience they thus determined: It was unlawfull to make pictures or images for heathen Temples, or for any use of religion: imò tu colis, qui fa∣cis ut coli possint; He that makes them that they may be worshipped, is a worshipper of them, that is, he partakes of his sin that does worship. But because the art statuary and of painting might be us'd to better purposes, therefore they were advis'd to doe so, but to separate them from all ap∣proaches toward religion;* 1.2229 of which I have already given accounts out of Ter∣tullian De spectaculis c. 23. And the same is the answer concerning the trades of making cards and dice. But although this be but an instance of this Rule; yet because it relates to the practice of so great a part of mankind, it may deserve to be considered alone in order to that relation and that pra∣ctice. For it wholly depends upon this, If it be innocent, if it can be good to play at cards and dice, then the trade of making the instruments of playing is also innocent. If not, that which ministers to nothing but sin, must be of the kinred of sin, and in the same condemnation.

Question.

Whether it be lawfull to play at Cards or Dice.

S. Chrysostome affirms,* 1.2230* 1.2231 Non Deum invenisse ludum, sed Diabolum, Not God, but the Devil* 1.2232 found out play. It may be he alluded to that ofa 1.2233 Plato, who saies that the spirit Theuth invented tables and dice; but then he saies that the same spirit found out Arithmetic, Geometry and Astronomy; and therefore from hence we can make no conjecture. S.b 1.2234 Cyprian saies that, quidam studio literarum bene eruditus, multum medi∣tando hoc malum & perniciosum studium adin∣venit, instinctu solius Zabuli qui eum artibus suis repleverat. Hanc ergo artem ostendit, quam & colendam sculpturis cum sua imagine fa∣bricavit, Some very learn'd person inspired and filled with the arts of the spirit Zabulus taught the art of dice and tables: and he addes, that he so or∣der'd it, that no man might touch the tables till he had first sacrific'd to Zabu∣lus. And therefore M. Mantua affirm'd it to be very unlawfull to play at dice or tables, upon this very reason; Non tantum aleae lusum crimen esse, sed malorum daemonum inventum, It must needs be unlawfull when it is more then so, as being the very invention of the devil. And this fierce declama∣tion hath prevail'd amongst many wise men to the condemnation of it.* 1.2235 Vin∣centius saies, Manus Diaboli est ludus taxillorum: and Bodinus is yet more particular, he tells us how;* 1.2236 for, saies he, in alea & fortuito illius jactu geo∣mantiam artemque diabolicam sitam esse, The chance and luck of it is a kind of geomancy or diabolicat art. Indeed if he had meant that the art of con∣ducting the fall of the contingent die had been diabolical and a jugling art, he had spoken reason and truth: but that there is a diabolical art in the con∣tingency and chance of it, is little better then a contradiction; unlesse he could make it appear that the fall of the dice was by God committed to

the Devils conduct: which truly is not very improbable in some cases to be admitted; but because it is uncertain, Apherdianus calls it diabolical or found out by the Devil, by reason of the craft us'd in it, and the evils con∣sequent to it.

Daemonis instinctu sibi quod reperêre maligni Cum variis homines in sua damna dolis.

And indeed this is almost the whole state of the question; for there are so many evils in the use of these sports, they are made trades of fraud and livelyhood, they are accompanied so with drinking and swearing, they are so scandalous by blasphemies and quarrels, so infamous by the mispending our precious time, and the ruine of many families, they so often make wise men fools and slaves of passion, that we may say of them that use these in∣ordinately,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉* 1.2237 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

they are in an ocean of mischiefs, and can hardly swim to shore without pe∣rishing. And therefore it is no wonder that holy men and wise Common∣weaths, observing the great evil of them, and having not skill or experience enough to tell of any good that is in them, have forbidden them utterly. This is the observation of S. Isidore;* 1.2238 Ab hac arte autem fraus & menda∣cium atque perjurium nunquam abest, postremo & odium & damna rerum. Unde & aliquando propter haec scelera interdicta legibus fuit, Fraud and lying and perjury are the inseparable attendants upon cards and dice, and hatred and great losses follow; and therefore because of this appendant wicked∣nesse, sometimes these are wholly forbidden by the laws.

For so we find it forbidden in the Civil laws of Princes and Repub∣lics.* 1.2239 M. Mantua tells that by an old law of Egypt, every man was easily ad∣mitted to the accusation of a gamester or dice-player;* 1.2240 and if he were con∣victed of it, he was condemned to the quarries: and Josephus Mascardus tells that those who were remark'd as daily and common gamesters were infamous, and not admitted to give testimony in a cause of law. It is cer∣tain it was forbidden by the laws;

Seu mavis vetitâ legibus aleâ.* 1.2241

The lex Roscia punish'd those persons with banishment who lost any conside∣rable portions of their estates by playing at dice; and sometimes the laws did condemn them that lost money, to pay four times so much to the Fiscus, as Asconius Paedianus tells in his observations upon Cicero's second book de Divinatione. Justinian the Emperor made an expresse law against it,* 1.2242 for∣bidding it both in public and private houses. Magnus Sfortia forbad dice and tables to be us'd in his campe: Philippus Adeodatus severely prohibited it in the Commonwealth; so did Charles the seventh of France: For in the perpetual and daily abuse of such sports the Commonwealth hath much in∣commodity, and consequently many interests in the prohibition.

Ludus enim genuit trepidum certamen &* 1.2243 iram; Ira truces inimicitias & funebre bellum.

The public peace cannot be kept where public dicing-houses are permitted, and therefore the Romans were so severe against such public houses and scenes of debauchery, that the Praetor said, Si quis eum apud quem aleâ lu∣sum

esse dicetur,* 1.2244 verberaverit, damnúmve ei dederit, sive quid eo tempore do∣mo ejus subtractum erit, judicium non dabo, If the Gentlemen beat the Ma∣ster of such gaming-houses, or stole any thing from his house at that time, he should have no remedy. For these were houses of public hatred, and therefore outlawed. And therefore Seneca calls them loca aedilem metuen∣tia, houses afraid of the Magistrate.* 1.2245 Virtutem in Templo invenies, in foro, in Curia, pro muris stantem, pulverulentam, coloratam, callosas habentem manus; Voluptatem latitantem saepius ac tenebras captantem, circa balnea ac sudatoria, ac loca aedilem metuentia, You may find Vertue standing in Courts, and Temples, and upon the walls of a city, dusty and discolour'd, and with brawny hands; but Pleasure sneaks up and down to baths, and sweating-houses, and places that fear the presence of the Aedile; that is, gaming-houses, which we learn from Martial,

Arcana modo raptus è popina Aedilem rogat udus aleator,

The Dice-player half drunk newly snatcht from his Tavern or Ordinary be∣seeches the Aedile for mercy. But in the Civil law the punishments of the Gamesters, and especially the keepers of the gaming-houses, by the confi∣scation of the house, nay the destruction of it, that no man may dwell in it for ever, in that place where God hath been so many times dishonour'd and blasphem'd, are sufficient indication of that just detestation in which the laws had them: and who please may see them largely describ'd ina 1.2246 Danaeus andb 1.2247 Jodocus Damhouderius. But I observe that the especial remarks that the Civil laws of Princes and republics put upon this kind of ga••••ing is that it causes many quarrels;

—dum vitreo peraguntur milite bella:

the contention for the victory begets a more cruel war: but this is especially upon the account of money which is then lost, and which the laws most re∣gard, as the cause of all the mischief.

But when this question and these observations fell into ••he hands of the Church,* 1.2248 that is, of Christian and pious Princes and Prelates, and they that were and ought to be zealous for souls had observ'd that God was ex∣ceedingly dishonour'd, that his name was infinitely blasphem'd, that much of that precious time which God had allowed to us for the working out our salvation with fear and trembling was spent in luxury, and swearing, and passion, and lying and cursing, and covetousnesse, and fraud, and quarrels, and intemperance of all sorts, & that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 d••inking and gaming are joyned so frequently that they are knit in a proverb, and that these to∣gether baffle the spirit of a man and drive away the spirit of God,

Aleáque &* 1.2249 multo tempora quassa mero Eripiunt omnes animo sine vulnere vires,

they disarme and weaken the mind of a man without a wound; it is, I say, no wonder that they forbad it so fiercely, and censur'd it so severely. Alea∣tor quicunque es,* 1.2250 Christianum te dicis, quod non es, said S. Cyprian, A common gamester or dice-player may call himself Christian, but indeed he is not: and S. Clemens Alexandrinus saies, inconsideratum luxuriae amorem otiofis isthaec ••••eae oblectamina suppeditare, desidiámque in causa esse, idlenesse and wanton∣nesse provides these games for the lazy and uselesse people of the world.

And therefore S. Bernard said that the pious and Christian souldiers that inhabit Jerusalem,* 1.2251 aleas detestantur, mimos, & magos, & fabulatores, scur∣rilesque cantilenas, tanquam vanitates aut insanias respuunt & abominan∣tur; they hate dice, and abominate jesters, and juglers, and players, and idle songs like vanities and madnesse. Upon these or the like accounts the Fa∣thers of the Council of Eliberis separated these gamesters from the Com∣munion. Si quis fidelis aleâ,* 1.2252 id est, tabulâ luserit, placuit eum abstinere. Et si emendatus cessaverit post annum poterit reconciliari; A Christian playing at dice or tables is not to be admitted to the Holy Communion, but after a years penance and abstention,* 1.2253 and his total amendment: and the Canon law forbids a Clergy-man either to play at tables, or to be present at those places where they doe. But the Capitular of Charles the Great joynes dicing and drunkennesse together, as being usual companions, and forbids them both alike to Bishops, Priests and Deacons. And indeed when the case is thus, I may say as Schonaeus said in the case of Saul,

—quae potest esse in tanti sceleris Immanitate coercendâ crudelitas?

No laws are too severe,* 1.2254 no sentence is too rigid for it's sentence and con∣demnation.

But if the case can be otherwise,* 1.2255 if playing at dice and tables can be∣come an innocent recreation, then all these terrible and true sentences will not reach them that so use it. And indeed even amongst those places and republics where such gaming was so highly condemn'd & severely punish'd, some of their braver men did use it, but without the vile appendages, and therefore without scandal and reproach. For first in general, it cannot misbecome a wise and a good man to unbend his bow, and to relaxe the se∣verities, the strictures and more earnest tendences of his mind.

Quin ubi se à vulgo & scena in secreta remôrant* 1.2256 Virtus Scipiadae & mitis sapientia Laeli, Nugari cum illo, & discincti ludere, donec Decoqueretur olus, soliti.—

Laelius and Scipio would play till they had digested their meal. And of Ar∣chias of Tarentum it was said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He was an old and a wise man in public Counsels and imployments, but he would play like a yong man. And concerning very many wise Princes and Philosophers you shall find many stories of their confident using lighter but innocent sports for the refreshment of their spirits 'tir'd with study and labour,* 1.2257 collected by Alexander ab Alexandro. But in particular concerning dice and tables we find in Valerius Maximus related of Q. Mucius, Aleae quo∣que & calculis vacasse interdum dicitur, cum bene ac diu jura civium ac caeremonias deorum ordinasst: Ut enim in rebus seriis Scaevolam, ita & in scurrilibus* 1.2258 lusibus hominem agebat: that sometimes he would play at dice and tables, when he had first dispatch'd the businesse of the Commonwealth prospe∣rously, and the affairs of religion wisely: In serious things doing as Scaevola should, in his recreations doing as a man: quâ quidem aleâ Porcius Cato lusisse fertur animi laxandi causâ, and Porcius Cato himself, wise and severe though he was, yet play'd at tables to refresh and relaxe his mind. And if cards or tables have in their own nature nothing that is evil, provided it can be also separated from all the evil appendages,* 1.2259 from the crimes and from the re∣proach,

from the danger and from the scandal, that which onely remains is, that they as well as other innocent recreations and divertisements may be us'd. In the case so stated we suppose them onely to be recreations and relaxations of the mind: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Julian,* 1.2260 such little imployments are like the pauses of music, they are rests to the spirit and intervals of labour. And therefore Johannes Sarisburiensis allows of every game,* 1.2261 quae absque vitio curarum gravium pondus allevat, & sine virtutis dispendio jucundam interpolationem gaudiorum affert, if it can ease our griefs, or alleviate our burdens without the losse of our innocence.

Now that cards and dice are of themselves lawfull I doe not know any reason to doubt.* 1.2262 For if they be unlawfull, it is because they are forbid∣den, or because there is in them something that is forbidden. They are no where of themselves forbidden: and what is in them that is criminal or suspicious? Is it because there is chance and contingency in them? There is so in all humane affairs; in Merchandise, in laying wagers, in all consulta∣tions and warres, in journeys and agriculture, in teaching and learning, in putting children to school or keeping them at home, in the price of the market, and the vendibility of commodities. And if it be said that there is in all these things an overruling providence; though no man can tell in what manner or by what means the Divine providence brings such things to a determinate event, yet it is certain that every little thing as well as every great thing is under God's government, and our recreations as well as our wagers. But what if it be and what if it be not? He can never be sus∣pected in any Criminal sense to tempt the Divine providence, who by con∣tingent things recreates his labour, and having acquir'd his refreshment, hath no other end to serve, and no desires to engage the Divine providence to any other purpose: and this end is sufficiently secur'd by whatsoever hap∣pens. I know nothing else that can be pretended to render the nature of these things suspicious; and this is perfectly nothing: and as for the evil ap∣pendages which are so frequently attending upon these kinds of games, be∣sides that they also are as near to other exercises as to these, as to bowling, horse-racing, cock-fighting, the fight of quailes and of partridges, bul∣baiting, pall-mall, billiards, and all other games for money and victory, to some more and to some lesse, besides this, I say, the evil appendages are all separable from these games, and till they be separated they are not law ••ull: but they may be separated by the following advices.

Rules of conducting our Sports and Recreations.

1. Let no mans affections be immoderately addicted to them.* 1.2263 And this requires a great diligence and caution. For as Petrarch said well, Hoc est in regno stultitiae commune, ut quarum rerum minor est fructus, & cupi∣ditas & delectatio major sit, In the kingdome of folly we are most pleased with those things by which we have the least profit. And the want of do∣ing us good, is supplied by doing us pleasure. But the moderation of our affections to our sports is best express'd, by using them according to those measures which wise and severe men use in their recreations, that is, not to be frequent or long in them. For it is in these as in meat and drink, which are then good when they are necessary and usefull to the purposes of our na∣ture

and imployment. Sleep is necessary, and so long it is good: but a man must not therefore spend the best of his time in sleep, but that time that is allowed to it, and without which he cannot well doe his businesse. The limits of these things are not so streight as necessity, nor yet so large as humor or desire; but as a man may drink to quench his thirst, and he may yet drink more to refresh his sorrow, and to alleviate his spirits, and to ease his grief, provided that he turn not his liberty into a snare, so he may in his recrea∣tion and his sports.

Cito rumpes arcum semper si tensum habueris:* 1.2264 At si laxâris, cum voles, erit utilis. Sic lusus animo debent aliquando dari, Ad cogitandum melior ut redeat tibi.

Within this bound he must keep, * that he loose none of his businesse for his sport; * that he make his other time more usefull; * that this be the lesse principal; * that it be taken as Physic, * or as wine at most: * and the minutes and little points of this measure are no otherwise to be weighed and consi∣der'd, but that we take those proportions which our selves think we need to good purposes, or which we are advis'd to by a wise guide. To this pur∣pose was that saying of Plato reported by Laertius; Parum est aleâ ludere, at non parum est assuescere, It is no great matter to play at dice or tables, but to be accustom'd to it is a great matter; that is, to make it a portion of our businesse, an expence of our time due to worthy imployments: and there∣fore in the laws, not the action it self, but the abuse, and particularly the frequency,* 1.2265 is noted and forbidden. Ludentes quotidie ad aleam, & taberna∣rum frequentatores inter infames habentur, saies the constitution. Quorum aut latrunculi, aut excoquendi in sole corporis cura consumpsêre vitam, Men that spend their lives in cards and dice, and making much of themselves, Haunters of drinking and gaming-houses. A man may innocently and to good purposes goe to a Tavern; but they that frequent them have no excuse, unlesse their innocent businesse does frequently ingage, and their severe re∣ligion bring them off safely. And so it is in these sports, with this onely difference, that there can be no just cause to frequent these sports: there is onely one cause of using them, and that comes but seldome, the refresh∣ment I mean of my self or my friend, to which I minister in justice or in charity; but when our sports come to that excesse that we long and seek for opportunities, when we tempt others, are weary of our businesse, and not weary of our game,

….Cum mediae nequeant te frangere noctes, Nec tua sit talos mittere lassa manus,

when we sit up till midnight, and spend half days, and that often too; then we have spoil'd the sport, it is not a recreation but a sinne.

2. He that means to make his games lawfull must not play for money,* 1.2266 but for refreshment. This, though (it may be) few will believe, yet it is the most considerable thing to be amended in the games of civil and sober persons. For the gaining of money can have no influence into the game to make it the more recreative, unlesse convetousnesse hold the box. The re∣creation is to divert the mind or body from labours by attending to some∣thing that pleases and gives no trouble; now this is in the conduct of your game, in the managing a prosperous chance to advantage, and removing the

unprosperous from detriment and losse of victory, so to crosse the pro∣verb,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

and that by wit he may relieve his adverse chance, and by a symbol learn to make good and vertuous use of every crosse accident. But when money is at stake, either the summe is trifling, or it is considerable. If trifling, it can be of no purpose unlesse to serve the ends of some little hospitable en∣tertainment or love-feast, and then there is nothing amisse; but if it be con∣siderable, there is a wide door open to temptation, and a man cannot be in∣different to winne or loose a great summe of money, though he can easily pretend it. If a man be willing or indifferent to loose his own money, and not at all desirous to get anothers, to what purpose is it that he playes for it? if he be not indifferent, then he is covetous, or he is a fool; he covets that which is not his own, or unreasonably ventures that which is. If with∣out the money he cannot mind his game, then the game is no divertise∣ment, no recreation, but the money is all the sport, and therefore covetous∣nesse is all the designe: but if he can be recreated by the game alone, the money does but change it from lawfull to unlawfull, and the man from be∣ing weary to become covetous, and from the trouble of labour or study re∣move him to the worse trouble of fear and anger and impatient desires. But here indeed begins the mischief, here men begin for the money to use vile arts,

Quaerit compositos manus improba mittere talos,

here cards and dice begin to be a diabolical art, and men are witty to undoe or defraud one another,

…..Neque enim loculis comitantibus itur Ad casum tabulae, positâ sed luditur arcâ.

Men venture their estates at it, and make their families sad not poor, be∣cause the dice turn up an unlucky chance: and what sport is it for me to loose my money if it be at all valuable? and if it be not, what is it to my game? But sure the pleasure is in winning the money. That is it certain∣ly. But

Hoccine credibile est aut memorabile,* 1.2267 Tanta vecordia innata cuiquam ut siet Ut malis gaudeant, atque ex incommodis Alterius sua comparent ut commoda? ah! Idne est verum? Imo id genus hominum Est pessimum…..

Nothing is more base then to get advantages by the losse of others; they that doe so, and make the losse of their neighbour their game & pastime, are the worst of men, said the Comedy. But concerning the losse of our mo∣ney, let a man pretend what he please, that he plaies for no more then he is willing to loose; it is certain, he is not to be believ'd: for if that summe be so indifferent to him, why is not he easy to be tempted to give such a summe to the poor? to give that summe? his sport will not be the lesse if that be all he designes.* 1.2268 Positâ dum luditur arcâ, stat pauper nudus atque esuriens ante fores, Christusque in paupere moritur, Whilest men play for great summes of money, a poor man at the door, redeem'd by the bloud of Christ, wants a shilling, and begs it for Christs sake, and goes without it.

Whenever the case is this or like this, he sins that plays at cards or dice or any other game for money. It is alike in all games, for I know no diffe∣rence; Money is the way to abuse them all: and cards and dice, if there be no money at stake, will make as good sport and please the mind as well as any the sports of boys, and are as innocent as push-pin. For if we consider it rightly, from hence is taken the great objection against cards and tables, because men at these venture their money, and expose their money to ha∣zard for no good end, and therefore tempt God; and certainly to doe so is unlawfull, and that for the reason alleged: but when we play onely for recreation, we expose nothing of considerable interest to hazard, and therefore it cannot be a criminal tempting of God, as it is in gaming for money,

Ubi centuplex murus rebus servandis parum est,* 1.2269 where no wit, no observation, no caution, can save our stake: for Adversis punctis doctum se nemo fatetur; Vulnera plus crescunt punctis quam bella sagittis,

saies the Epigram, No man is crafty enough to play against an ill hand; and therefore to put a considerable interest, to the hazard of the ruine of a fa∣mily, or at least more then we find in our hearts to give to Christ, is a great tempting of God. And in these cases, as I have heard from them that have skill in such things, there are such strange chances, such promoting of a hand by fancy and little arts of Geomancy, such constant winning on one side, such unreasonable losses on the other, and these strange contingencies produce such horrible effects, that it is not improbable that God hath per∣mitted the conduct of such games of chance to the Devil, who will order them so where he can doe most mischief; but without the instrumentality of money he could doe nothing at all.

There are two little cases pretended to lessen this evil,* 1.2270 and bring it from unlawfull to lawfull. The one is, that when a man hath lost his mo∣ney, he desires to play on for no other reason but to recover his own: the question is whether that be lawfull or no. To this I can give no direct answer, for no man can at first tell whether it be or no: but at the best it is very suspicious, for it engages him upon more losse of time, and he tempts God in a further hazard, and gives himself the lie by making it appear that, what∣ever he pretended, he did play for more then he was willing to loose.

Sic ne perdiderit,* 1.2271 non cessat perdere lusor, Et revocat cupidas alea saepe manus.

He plays on that he may give over, and looses more that he may not loose so much, and is vexed with covetousnesse, and chides his fortune, and re∣proves he knows not what: so that by this time I can tell whether he sinn'd or no; for though it was hard to say whether he did well or ill to desire the recovery of his money, yet when we see upon what termes it is design'd and acted, the question is very easy to be resolved, and the man had better sit down with that losse then venture a greater, and commit more sins.

The other case is this;* 1.2272 If I can without covetousnesse of the money play, is it then lawfull? and to shew that I am not covetous, I will give the money I win to the standers by, or to my servants, or to the poor. When Theodoric King of the Goths did win at dice or tables he was very bountifull

to his servants, and being over-pleas'd with his own good fortune, would grant them any thing.* 1.2273 But Augustus Caesar did use to doe this thing brave∣ly. He gives this account of himself in a letter of his to Tiberius; Ego per∣didi viginti millia nummûm meo nomine: sed cum effusè in lusu liberalis fuissem, ut soleo plerumque. Nam si quas manus remisi cuique exegissem, ant retinuissem quod cuique donavi, vicissem vel quinquaginta millia: sed hoc ma∣lo. Benignitas enim mea me ad coelestem gloriam efferet. He lost (suppose) 20000 Crowns; but it was not his ill fortune or his ill conduct, but his ex∣cessive liberality: he forgave to many what he had wone, and other summes which he took, he gave to the standers by, and chose this bounty as the way to immortality. Now it is true this is a fair indication that convetous∣nesse is not the prevailing ingredient; but to him that considers it wisely it will appear to be but a splendid nothing. For what kind of sport is that to bring it into my power to oblige my play-fellow with his own money? and what bounty is that by which I reward my friends and servants with another mans estate? Parysatis did it yet more innocently, when playing with her yong son Artaxerxes, she on purpose lost a thousand Darics at a throw, to help the yong Prince to money. Thus far it was well enough; for I doubt not but it is as lawfull to loose my money as to give it away, if there be nothing else in it: but besides that it is not so honourable, it may be, he that plays against me is not of my mind, or of my ability, and I cor∣respond to him in an action in which he is not so innocent as I should be, if I did not something minister to his evi: so that though I play that I may oblige him, yet there are so many circumstances requir'd to keep my self and him innocent, that it is a thousand times better in some cases to give him something, and in all cases to play for nothing.

3. For it is a worthy inquiry,* 1.2274 if we ask whether it be lawfull for a man to possesse what he gaines by play. For if it be unlawfull, then when he hath wone he hath got nothing, but is bound to make restitution, and cannot give almes of that; and then it can be good for nothing, but on all sides pierces his hand that holds it like a handfull of thorns. But in an∣swer to this question, if I shall speak what I think, I am like to prevail but little, because the whole world practises the contrary;

…..Et nunc in hacce publica Contage morum, congreges inter malos Malum esse jus est. Nam nunc Leges nihil faciunt quod licet, nisi quod lubet,

Nothing prevails but evil manners and evil propositions: and in such things as these it is easy to confute a good counsel or a severe reproof, by saying, The man is angry, or too strict, and all men are not of his mind. There∣fore in this inquiry I shall onely tell what I have learn'd in the schools of wisedome, in the laws of wise people, and the sayings of holy men. In the Civil laws of the Romans,* 1.2275 all the money that these gamesters wone was taken from them and spent upon public works; and he that lost and paid the money was punishable, for the Senate forbad to play for money, or to make any promise or give any pledge for payment. The same hath been forbidden by the laws of many republics, ut quod ille in alea perdiderat, be∣neficio legis dissolveret, that the law should pay what the fool and the prodi∣gal had lost. An old Epigrammatist affirmes that such gains will never thrive,

Per scelus immensas quid opes cumulare juvabit? Turpiter è manibus res malè parta fluit.

And no wonder if such gains be the purchaces of a thief, and no better then robbery.* 1.2276 Aristotle joyns them together in the same kind of dishonou∣rable crime, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He that plays at dice for money, and the thief are illiberal gamesters, for they are guilty of filthy lucre: and Seneca says,

—immensas opes Jampridem avaris manibus, ut perdat, rapit.

He is greedy, and gets nothing; he wins much, and looses more; he snatches from his neighbour what belongs to him, and looses that and his own be∣side. Pascasius Justus observes that the Spaniards call such gamesters Ta∣hur, which is the Metathesis of Hurta, a thief; for to cast the dice for money what is it but to desire to take another mans money against his will? and that is theft.* 1.2277 S. Bonaventure saies that which is gotten by play is possess'd by no good title, and cannot be lawfully retain'd: he that lost it, hath in∣deed for his folly deserv'd to loose it; but he that hath it, does not deserve to keep it, and therefore he must not, nor yet must he restore it to him that lost it, unlesse he persuaded or compell'd him to play; but therefore the money is to be given to the poor: and the same also is expressely affirmed by S. Austin.* 1.2278 Now if it be not lawfull to retain such purchaces, they are not our own when we have wone them, and therefore it is no thanks to us if we give them away. Aleatoris eleemosyna invalida est & nihili apud Deum,* 1.2279 saith S. Bonaventure. Oblatio enim de rapina reprobatur▪ saith the Canon law, and eleemosynae & sacrificium non placent Deo quae offeruntur ex scelere. The money is gotten by an equivocal contract, and an indirect ra∣pine, and therefore can never become a pleasing sacrifice to God; it is a giving our good to the poor without charity, and that profits not, saith S. Paul. But at last,* 1.2280 although he that looses his money, deserves to loose it; yet because by laws such purchaces and acquisitions are forbidden, and we have no right to give almes of what is not our own, and as God will not ac∣cept it when it is done by us, so he hath no where commanded that it should be done at all, therefore it is certain that all such money is to be restor'd, if the looser please.* 1.2281 Bona aleâ amissa tanquam furto ablata [veteres] resti∣tuenda putabant. S. Austin said, that the Ancients did affirm, money wone by dice and tables ought to be restor'd, like the money that was stollen. But if the owner will not, let it ascend to pious uses. And if this be the state of this affair, it cannot be lawfull to play at cards or dice for money. For the love of money is the root of all evil, which some having coveted, have pierced themselves through with many sorrows. And this appears yet more in the next advice.

3. No man can play lawfully at such games but those who are dispas∣sionate,* 1.2282 and of sober spirits, under the command of reason and religion; and therefore to play for money will be quickly criminal, for

Ploratur lachrymis amissa pecunia veris;* 1.2283 Et majore domus gemitu, majore tumultu Planguntur nummi quam funera.

Men may weep solemnly for the dead, but they will be heartily troubled

when their money is departed; and therefore there is but little sport in such games. And this Alexander the Great rightly observ'd, when he set a fine upon some friends of his,* 1.2284 quod in ludo aleae sensisset eos non ludere, sed velut in re maximè seria versari, fortunas suas omnes aleae permittentes arbitrio, because they did not play at dice, but contend as in a matter of greatest concernment. And certainly so it is. For doe not all the nations of the world think the defence of their money and estates a just cause of taking up armes and venturing their lives? He that plays at games of fortune should put nothing to fortunes conduct, but what he can perfectly subject to reason every minute. Seneca tells that Julius Canus was playing at ta∣bles, when the Centurion being sent upon a desperate service, and went out leading agmen hominum periturorum a troup of men to death, hapned to call him out to march in that service. Julius Canus knew the danger well enough, but being summon'd, call'd to his play-fellow to tell the men upon the tables; and now, saies he, doe not say when I am dead that you had the better of the game; and desir'd the Centurion to bear him witnesse that he had one man more then the other. He that is thus even and serene may fairly play; but he that would be so, must not venture considerable portions of his estate, nor any thing, the losse of which displeases him and shakes him into passion. Not that every displeasure, though for a trifle, is criminal; but that every degree of it tends to evil, and the use of it is not safe, and the effect may be intolerable.

Ludit cum multis Vatanas, sed ludere nescit: Et putat imperio currere puncta suo.

If the chances will not run as we would have them, or if our passions will not, then it is at no hand safe to play; unlesse to fret, and vex secretly for trifles, to swear and lie, to blaspheme and curse, to cheat and forswear, to covet and to hate can be innocent.

4.* 1.2285 Upon these accounts it is that wise men advise that yong men be at no hand permitted to play at dice or the like games. Ab isto lusu arcendi sunt pueri,* 1.2286 tum propter pecunias quas perdunt, tum propter vitia quae colli∣gunt, & mores pravos quos inde addiscunt: Yong men and boys loose their money and learn evil manners at such games, they have great passions, fierce desires and quick angers, and their flames are stirr'd perpetually with chance. It is a sad story that is told of the yong Prince,* 1.2287 the onely son of Claudius the Emperor, who when he had lost all his money at dice, and had tir'd out all his invention for the getting more, and could not doe it fairly, being impatient of his losse, and desirous of new hopes and ventures, he stole a rich jewel from his Fathers closet, the Princes Tutor knowing and concealing the theft. But it came to the Emperors ear, and produc'd this tragedy. He disinherited his son, he banished all the Princes play-fellows, and put the Tutor to death. Yong men are not to be trusted to play with such aspics. And therefore Sidonius saies, Alea est oblectamentum senum, ut pila juvenum, Tables for old men, and the Ball for yong men. Cato allows to yong men, armes, horses and bows, and such like sports; but would have dice and tables permitted to old men, whose minds are more to be refreshed with diversion then their bodies by laborious exercise. And in allusion to this, Augustus in his letter to Tiberius mention'd by Suetonius hath these words, Inter coenam lusimus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & heri & hodie, Yesterday and to day we plai'd like old men; that is, at tables. But this is matter of pru∣dence,

and not of Conscience; save onely that old men are more masters of reason and rulers of their passion, and a sedentary exercise being fittest for them, they who cannot but remember that they are every day dying, though possibly they need some divertisement to their busied and weary spirits, yet they doe more need to remember their later end, and take care to redeem their time, and above all things not to play for any considerable money, not for any money the losse whereof is bigger then a jest: and they that doe thus, will not easily doe amisse. But better then all these permis∣sions is that resolution of Cicero,* 1.2288 Quantum alii tribuunt intempestivis con∣viviis, quantum denique aleae, quantum pilae, tantum mihi egomet ad haec studia recolenda sumpsero, What time other men spend in feasting and revellings, in dice and gaming, all that I spend in my studies: and that is very well. For though there is good charity in preserving our health, yet there is a greater necessity upon us that we doe not loose our time.

5. That our games may be innocent,* 1.2289 we must take care they be not scandalous, that is, not with evil company, not with suspicious company. Ciceroni nequissimorum hominum in ludo talario consessus?* 1.2290 shall Cicero suffer base persons to sit and play at tables in his house? That's not well: and therefore he objected it as a great crime to Marc Anthony, domum ejus ple∣nam ebriorum aleatorumque,* 1.2291 his house was frequented with gamesters and drunkards. We must neither doe evil, nor seem to doe evil: We must not converse with evil persons, nor use our liberty to our brothers preju∣dice or grief: we must not doe any thing which he with probability or with innocent weaknesse thinks to be amisse, untill he be instructed rightly; and if he be, yet if he will be an adversary and apt to take opportunities to re∣proach you, we must give him no occasion. In these cases, it is fit we ab∣stain: where nothing of these things does intervene, and nothing of the former evils is appendant, we may use our liberty with reason and sobriety. * And then, if this liberty can be so us'd, and such recreations can be inno∣cent, there is no further question, but those trades which minister to these divertisements are innocent and lawfull.

RULE III. The act of the Will alone, although no external acti∣on or event doe follow, is imputed to good or evil by God and men.

THe will of man in the production and perfecting of a sin hath six steps or degrees of volition,* 1.2292 in all which the sin is actual, excepting the first onely. 1. The inclination of the will is the first; and that so far as it is natural, so far it is innocent. Sin oftentimes enters in at that door, but the door was plac'd there in the first creation; it was a part of that building which God made and not man, and in which every stone and stick was good. It was not made for sin, but for vertue; but it was made so, that if we would bring sin in that way, it was in our choice, and at our perill. But al∣though this be the case of our natural inclination, yet if our inclinations be

acquir'd, or increas'd, or habitual, that is, if they become facilities and promptitudes to sin, they are not innocent: for this state is a state of sin and death, it is the effect of many vile actions and vile desires, it is an aversion from and an enmity against God; it is a bed of desires which are sometimes asleep, and then doe no more mischief then a sleeping wolfe, but when they are awake they doe all the evil they can.* 1.2293 And therefore the case of an ha∣bitual sinner is such, that even his first inclinations to any forbidden action in the instance of his own habit are criminal as the external effect. But in natural inclinations the case is different. 2. The first beginning of the sin is when the will stops and arrests it self upon the tempting object, and con∣sents onely so far that it will have it consider'd and disputed. Then the will is come too far, not when it is willing a thing should be disputed whether it be lawfull or unlawfull, good or evil; but when it is willing it be considered which is to be followed, Reason or Sense, wise counsels or sensual pleasures: for when the will is gone so far it is past beyond what is natural, and come so far towards choice and guiltinesse, that it is yet no more friend to ver∣tue then to vice, and knows not which to chuse. 3. The next step the will makes is when it is pleas'd with the thought of it, and tasts the honey with the top of a rod, a little phantastic pleasure before-hand in the medi∣tation of the sin. This prelibation is but the antepast of the action, and as the twilight to the dark night, it is too near an approach to a deed of darknesse. 4. When the will is gone thus far and is beyond the white lines of innocence, the next step towards a perfect sin is a desire to doe the acti∣on; not clearly and distinctly, but upon certain conditions, if it were lawfull, and if it were convenient, and if it were not for something that lies crosse in the way. Here our love to vertue is lost, onely fear and God's restrain∣ing grace remains still for the revocation of the man to wisedome and se∣curity. 5. But when this obstacle is remov'd, and that the heart consents to the sin, then the Spirit is departed, and then there remains nothing but that the sin be [6] contriv'd within, and [7.] committed to the faculties and members to goe about their new and unhappy imployment; and then both the outward and the inward man have combin'd and made up the body of a sin. But the sin begins within, and the guilt is contracted by what is done at home, by that which is in our own power, by that which nothing from without can hinder. For as for the external act, God for ends of his own providence does often hinder it; and yet he that fain would, but cannot bring his evil purposes to passe, is not at all excused, or the lesse a Criminal before God.

Question.

But is it not a mercy for a man to be recalled from acting his adultery?* 1.2294 is it not charity to two persons to keep Autolycus from killing the steward of Stratocles? and if so, then there is sin in the action as well as in the affe∣ction, and the hand sins distinctly from the heart: but then it will be found untrue to say that all our good and evil comes from the will and choice, and yet it will not be possible to tell from what principle the evil of the hand is derived, if not from the evil will. This brings a necessity of inquiring into the union, or difference of the actions internal and external, and the influence the will hath upon the external act, and whether it can have any aggravation or degree beyond what it receives from the inward principle.

To this therefore I answer,* 1.2295 That all the morality of any action depends wholly on the will, and is seated in the inner man; and the eye is not adul∣terous, but it is the instrument of an adulterous heart; and the hand is not the thief before God, but the covetous desire is guilty: and this appears in this, because if a man takes the goods of his neighbour, which he would not have taken if he had suppos'd they had been his neighbours, he is in∣nocent before God. And yet it cannot be denied but it is worse to steal then to covet, it is worse to humble and dishonour our neighbours wife then to lust after her. But the reason is, because the doing of the action supposes a great many precedent acts of lust, even the whole method and oeconomy of sin: for every act of the will, every degree of desire is lusting or cove∣tousnesse; and the external act which supposes them all, is worse then all them except the last. The natural inclination of the will is but a capaci∣ty or readinesse and disposition of the faculty, and is no act. But the arrest and stop of the will, the delight in fancying, the desire of action, the con∣sent of the heart, and the deliberation and resolution, these are the acts and products of the will; and the second is worse then the first, and the third worse then the second, and so till we come to the immediate addresse to the action: but that action is not worse then the last resolution and deliberate purpose of the will; and therefore when it is charity to hinder the man from acting his lust, it is therefore charity, because in the acting of the sin ex∣ternally there are more acts of the will, even the whole method of death is completed, and the same acts of will are repeated, or confirm'd, and there is mischief done to some person or to some interest, to something be∣sides the sinning man, and there are some contingencies and some circum∣stances to which new actions of the will must be consenting and give their influence and renew their acts: but still, if we compare every consent and deliberate purpose of the will with the action, or that part of the action which is immediately produc'd in it, there is in that event no morality, and no good, and no evil but what is first within. So that he who hinders a man from acting of his lust, does hinder him not from sins distinct from those of his will, but from more sins of the will, from repetition, or con∣firmation, or abiding in the same chosen folly.

Upon this account it will be easy to answer whether is the greater sin,* 1.2296 the wishing and desiring a very great evil, and willingly doing but a little one, or the doing a very great evil and an intolerable mischief with a little malice. For it is certain that the sin is much more increas'd by the malice of the action and effect then by the malice of the will, if the malice of the will be little, and the evil of the event be great and intolerable. For at first to desire a very great mischief, and then to act but a little one, sup∣poses that the great malice went not to it's utmost period; it was desir'd, but not resolved on, and deliberately determin'd: and then that malice though in it self great, yet it was ineffective, and was retracted before it was consummate by the will, and acted by her subjects the other faculties and members. But now, if a great mischief be done by a little malice, to that little malice all that event is to be imputed: though not to it alone, yet to that malice manag'd by ignorance, carelessenesse and folly; which being no excuses, but of themselves criminal appendages, the man shall be judged by his action, not by his ignorant and imperfect choice; because though the choice was naturally imperfect, yet morally and in the whole conjunction of it's circumstances it was completely Criminal. If this thing happens to

be otherwise in any particular, God will discern it, and not man; for the greatnesse of the mischief in humane laws and accounts supposes the great∣nesse of the malice, if malice at all, and not chance wholly was the prin∣ciple. But if the question be in the acting of a great mischief where the sin most lies, in the will or in the event, I say it is originally in the will; and it is equally in the event, if all that event was foreseen and known, al∣though it was not principally or at all design'd. He that steales a cow from a widow, and does verily believe that the losse of her cow will not onely undoe her, but break her heart, though he does not designe this, yet because he knows it, all that event is to be imputed to him. They that abuse their own bodies by abominable and unclean contacts, & the sin of Onan, though they design onely the pleasing of their lust, yet if they consider what they doe, and what will be the event, they secondarily chuse all that event, and are as guilty of it as of that which they principally design'd.

—quòd pellice laevâ* 1.2297 Uteris, & Veneri servit amica manus, Hoc nihil esse putas? scelus est, mihi crede, sed ingens, Quantum vix animo concipis ipse tuo. Ipsam crede tibi naturam dicere rerum, Istud quod digitis, Pontice, perdis, homo est.

For the internal act of the will and the external act of the man are but one act, unlesse the instrument and the efficient cause produce two distinct effects in every concourse; and whatsoever is done without is first consen∣ted to within, and is but the ministery and execution of the sin within. For the act of chusing is the foundation of all morality: and therefore when not onely the first design, but the appendages and other consequents are foreseen, and yet the action is chosen, the will is guilty of so many evils as it chuses directly and indirectly, principally and consequently.

But to reduce this doctrine to more minute and particular considera∣tions* 1.2298 and order.

Of the identity and diversity respectively of actions internal and external, and the multiplications of sins by them.

1. Every external act proceeding from the internal makes but one moral act, whether it be good or bad. The election and choice is the foundation: and as they are many houses which are built upon many foundations, but many chambers and galleries built upon one foundation is but one house, though there be many rooms; so the internal and external relying upon one basis operating to the same end, effecting the same work, having the same cause, and being but several lengths of the same thrid, doe not make two acts; as the soul seeing by the eye hath but one vision, and the will acting by the hand does but her own act by her own instrument: and therefore although they are Physically or Naturally several actions, because elicite and acted by several faculties, yet morally they are but one; for what the hand or eye alone does, is neither good nor evil, but it is made so by the mind and will.

2. If there be two acts of will in one external act,* 1.2299 there is a double malice or goodnesse respectively. A Prince commands his Almoner to give much almes to the poor; the almoner being also a good man loves the imployment, and does it very often: the external act is but the one ministery of almes, but the internal is both obedience and charity.

3. The external act is the occasion of the intending or extending the internal,* 1.2300 but directly & of it self increases not the goodnesse or the badnesse of it. For the external act is not properly and formally good or bad, but onely objectively and materially; just as a wall cannot increase the white∣nesse, unlesse the quality it self be intended by it's own principle. But as heat in iron is more intense then it is in straw; so may the goodnesse or the badnesse of an internal act be increased by the external: but this is onely by accident. By instances of these several assertions, they will be more in∣telligible. When John surnam'd the Almoner commanded his boy to carry an almes to a poor man that was sick in the next village, the boy sometimes would detain it and reserve it for his own vanity; but S. John lost not the reward of his charity, for his internal act was good, but it was no cause of the outward event at all. And on the other side, when Maevius lay with his wife Petronilla, supposing she had been Nicostrata, he was an adulterer before God, though by the laws of men he was harmlesse. And if a man steals a horse in the night from his neighbours field, and carries him away secretly, and by the morning perceives it to be his own, he is no lesse guilty before God and his Confesssor then if he had indeed stoln his neighbours. The rea∣son is, because the external act hath another cause, which is or may be in∣nocent, but the internal act was of it self completely evil and malicious. In these cases, where the internal volition is not the cause of the external event, the sin is terminated within, and that to him who is to be our Judge is as vi∣sible as any thing. But when the internal volition is properly the cause of the action external, there more is done then it could doe alone. For in a good work the will finds the difficulties which it could not perceive while it was onely in purpose; and it is easy to resolve to be patient in sicknesse when we feel nothing of it, but onely discourse it, and cast about in our easy minds what we suppose it will be: but Tu si hic esses, aliter sentires, said the sick man; it may be when it comes to be acted, the will shall find new work, new difficulties, and will need new fortifications, and renewed resolutions, and the repetition of acts, and fresh aids of reason: so that although all the good or evil that is in all this, is the good or evil of the will; yet this is it which I said, that the external action hath in it the materiality of good and evil, and by accident the external act is better then the internal, that is, the will does better when she reduces her purposes to act very often, then when she does onely resolve. And for this very reason

4. The external act does superadde new obligations beyond those* 1.2301 which are consequent to the mere internal volition though never so perfect and complete. For the external act is exemplar in vertue, or scandalous in evil; it obliges to restitution, to Ecclesiastical censures and legal penalties, in which there are active and passive duties incumbent on us (as I have re∣presented in the third book.) Thus also in good things; the external par∣ticipation of the Sacraments hath in it some advantages beyond the inter∣nal: but these things are accidental to the action, and nothing of the nature of it; they are nothing of the direct morality, but the consequent of it;

which the sinner ought indeed to have consider'd beforehand, and to act or to omit accordingly.

5. If the course and continuance of the outward act be interrupted,* 1.2302 and then proceeded in again, when the cause of the intercision is over, that action seeming but one, is more then one sin, or vertuous act respectively. He that resolves to bring up a poor orphan in learning and capacities of doing and receiving worthy benefit, does often sleep and often not think of it, and hath many occasions to renew his resolution: although his obli∣gation be still permanent, yet if he delights in it, and again chuses, so often is the almes imputed to him, he does so many acts of charity. Titius in∣tends to give to Codrus a new gown at the next Calends, but forgets his in∣tention; but yet at the Calends does upon a new intention give him a gown. This act is but one, but hath no morality from the first intention, but from the second, though there were two internal acts of volition to the same external; because the first did cease to be, and therefore could have no in∣fluence into the effect. But this multiplication of actions and imputati∣ons cannot be by every suddain and physical interruption, but by such an interruption onely where the first intention is not sufficient to finish the external act. Thus if a man against his will nod at his prayers, and awaken∣ing himself by his nodding proceed in his devotion, he does not pray twice, but once, because the first intention is sufficient to finish his prayer. But if he falls asleep over-night and sleeps till morning, his morning-prayer is upon a new account, and his will must renew her act, or nothing is done. But in instances of good this part of the Rule hath but little use; for no man will dare to call God to a strict and minute reckoning, and require his reward by number and weight. But in sinfull actions there is more consideration; and if we be not strict in our weights and measures, God will; and if we will not be sure to put enough into the ballance of repentance, there will be too much in that of judgment and condemnation: and therefore it con∣cerns us as much as we can, to tell the number of our sins. Therefore

6.* 1.2303 External actions in order to one end, though produc'd by one inter∣nal act or resolution of the will, yet doe not make one external act, unlesse the end be at the same time acquir'd. Thus if the man resolves to lay wait for his enemy till he have destroyed him, and therefore lays wait to day and to morrow, and prevails not untill the third day, his sin is more then one, though his resolution was but one. The reason is, because there must of necessity be a repetition of the same resolution, or at least of some ministring acts toward the perfecting that resolution; and although the resolution and the end were one, yet to every ministring intermedial act there is also some internal act proportionate. Thus every impure contact in order to impure embraces are sins distinct from the final adultery, and so is the joyfull re∣membrance of it afterwards. But because these things have in them some little intricacy, therefore I add this which is plain and usefull: Every re∣newing of an external action subordinate to a sinfull end is either a repea∣ting of the sin, or, which is all one, it is an aggravation of it; it extends it, or intends it. He that calls a man fool three times together either com∣mits three sins, or one as great as three: and he that strikes seven blows to kill a man, hath so many times lift up his hand against God; and though he hath kill'd the man but once, yet he shall be avenged seven times. But if after any notable interruption of the act, the intention be renewed, so often

is the sin repeated, though it be but one external event afterward. He that resolves every day of the week to be absent from Divine service the Sun∣day following, is to estimate his sin by the number of his internal actions, and not by the singularity of that omission.

7.* 1.2304 Internal acts of the will are then multiplied, when they proceed after an expresse revocation, or a deliberate intermission, or a considerable physical interruption, or by an actual attendance to things incompossible and inconsistent with the first resolution. There is no difficulty in these particulars, save onely that in making judgments concerning them we pro∣ceed by prudent and moral proportions, by the usual measures of laws, and the accounts of wise men; onely the extremes are evident and notori∣ous. For he that being upon his knees looses his attention for a minute & then recalls it, does not pray twice, or so often as he again thinks actually of what he is doing; and we are sure that he who saies a Pater noster to day, and another to morrow, does pray twice: and between these no certain rule can be given but what is measur'd and divided by prudence and similitude with the unity of natural and artificial compositions. But he onely does well who secures his cases of conscience in this inquiry, by interrupting his evil acts as soon as they begin, and gives them quite over as soon as they are interrupted, and when he hath chosen well, perseveres as long as nature and exteriour accidents will give him leave, and renews that choice as soon as his divertisement can cease.

Question.

In the pursuit of the matter of this Rule,* 1.2305 it is seasonable to inquire concerning [what degrees of guiltinesse are contracted by the beginnings and desires of wickednesse which are imperfect and unfinish'd.]

I have already* 1.2306 given account that the inward acts of will are very often punishable by humane laws, and from thence some light may be reflected to this inquiry, which is concerning the estimate which God and the Conscience are to make of imperfect actions: for though in humane accounts and the estimate of our laws, that a thing is secret or public is a great difference and concernment; yet in this question, and in relation to God and the conscience immediately, it is nothing at all, for nothing here is secret, every thing is visible, and it is always day here. But now the inquiry is concerning those things which are imperfect, and so sometimes are secret as to men because they are onely in desires, and sometimes they are public, but yet not finished & completed:* 1.2307 And here the rule is, Nunquam mens exitu aestimanda est. God judges not by the event, but by the mind, by the good or ill will: so Apuleius, In maleficiis etiam cogitata scelera, non perfecta adhuc, vindicantur, cruentâ mente, purâ manu. He that thinks it, that is, that resolves it perfectly, putting the last hand of the will to it, his mind is bloudy, though his hand be pure, and shall find an equal vengeance. But this is to be understood of the last act of the will, and that which is immediate to the external action; if it be in counsel, that is, not whether it shall be done or no, but how it shall be done, it is as bad and hatefull in the eyes of God as the external violence.* 1.2308 To this purpose is that of Paulus the Lawyer, Consilium unius∣cujusque, non factum puniendum est, Not the fact; but the Counsel is to be

punished: by Counsel meaning the design and resolution, the perfect and complete volition, which is then without all question come to the perfe∣ction of its malice and evil heart, when it is gone as far as to the beginning of action. Insidiatus civi etiamsi non effecerit scelus, poenas tamen legibus solvet, said Quintilian, He that lays a snare for a mans life shall smart for it, though the man escape; the laws shall punish him: but if they doe not, it is all one in Conscience.* 1.2309 For as Donatus said well, Non perficere, sed conari velle aliquid ad scelus, effectio est, etiamsi non potest fieri. It is nothing to the sinner that God defends the innocent and rescues him from his fraud or violence, or slander; he hath done his work when he resolv'd and endea∣vour'd it. For there is no degrees of morality beyond the last act of the will: the sin or vertue may be extended by multiplication or confirmation of the same acts, but no way intended beyond that act of the will which com∣mands execution.

But this distinction ought to be observed not onely in order to punish∣ments inflicted by humane laws upon Criminals accus'd of imperfect acts,* 1.2310 but in order to conscience. For though the whole morality of the act de∣pends upon the last purpose of the will, and is before God the fulnesse of the sin in respect of degrees of any simple sin; yet when it passes on to ex∣ecution the will may grow worse by repetition of her acts, or abiding in them, she may sin more sins. For the acts themselves about which there are endeavours made, are not always perfect, so as the criminal can perfect them; for it is not to all purposes perfect when the will hath commanded the resolution to be acted, no nor when something is done towards it by the sinning man, but something else may be added, and till it be, there is some difference in the case. The examples will clear it. Priscus Merula resolves to kill his brother Taurinus, and in order to it, buyes a dagger, way-lays him as he goes to Augustus, set upon him, throws him down; but as he is lifting up his hand to strike, hears a noise behind the hedge, and being af∣frighted, curses his brother and wished him dead, and runs away. Merula is in the sight of God guilty of murder, and if he had kill'd him effective∣ly, there had been no greater malice, but more mischief, and more acts of malice; and therefore the judges are to diminish something of his punish∣ment, not onely because the life of a citizen was not lost, but because Meru∣la had not done all his part of the murder, that is, his brother could not have died, unlesse he had done something beyond what he did. But when the Egyptian nobility being weary of a dull melancholy Prince, who by his healthlesse spirit was good for nothing, gave him a brisk poison to dispatch him; that which would have burnt to ashes any person that had any fire within him, did but heighten him to the ordinary temper of another man, it onely warm'd him into an active spirit, and he became a wise Prince. Here the murder was not effected, but there was on the traytors part no∣thing wanting to the completing of the wickednesse: and therefore as in hu∣mane laws they are to have no abatement of sentence extraordinary, so in the Court of Conscience they are to think of no excuse, no diminution, but every thing is present that can make all that greatnesse which can be in the nature of that sin: and in the first case there may be an alteration so timely as to change the mind before it was at the utmost end of the line of wicked∣nesse; but in the second case, whether the effect follow or no, there is place left for nothing, unlesse peradventure for repentance. That part which concerns humane laws is alterable as men please, and in Christendome (un∣lesse

it be in the greatest crimes) custome hath against the purpose of laws given impunity to them who without effect have attempted to commit vile actions; yet in the Court of Conscience and by the measures of religion the matter is unchangeable.

There are some other ways of imperfect acts,* 1.2311 which are to be regulated by the proportion of these measures. 1. He that kills a child in his Mo∣thers wombe is as guilty of murder as he that kills a man in the field, if he did equally intend it. In this it is true that the Lawyers and Physicians distinguish the time of the abortion. If the child was efform'd into a hu∣mane shape it is capital by the laws; but not if it was inform and unshapen. But in order to Conscience I perfectly consent to the doctrine of the old Christians,* 1.2312 recorded by Tertullian, Etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc san∣guis in hominem deliberatur, dissolvere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est prohibere nasci. Nec refert natam quis eripiat animam an nascentem distur∣bet. Homo est, & qui futurus est: etiam fructus omnis jam in semine est. While the bloud is in deliberation whether it shall be male or female, it is not lawfull to dissolve it; and he that intends to hinder it from life is but a hasty murderer. He is guilty of inferring death who prevents that to have life to which God and nature did design it. But this is owing to the choice and design of the will, for the effect of one is much lesse then the effect of the other upon many considerations: but if the malice was not lesse, the dif∣ference of the effect makes no diminution.

The other case is,* 1.2313 If a man smite his neighbour that he die, he shall sure∣ly be put to death,* 1.2314 saith God to Moses. That is, if he purpose to smite him, though he did not purpose to kill him, but wound him onely, he hath sinn'd unto death. The Vulgar Latin reads it, Qui percusserit hominem volens occidere] He that smites a man, willing to kill him. But this last clause is nei∣ther in the Hebrew nor the Greek. And though it is something lesse to in∣tend to wound him grievously, then to kill him; yet he that willingly gives that wound which he would have doe him a mischief, and gives it so that it does give him his death, had a malice so great that it could not well discern between wounds and death. But in this case though it is certain God will judge righteously, and make abatement if there be any cause; yet in humane laws, and in the measures of his own repentance he will not and ought not to find gentle sentences, but the whole perfect event will be imputed to the imperfect act of his will. For it was too much that he was willing to doe any mischief; and ex toto noluisse debet qui imprudentiâ defenditur, said Seneca: He cannot pretend that the evil event was against his will, when it is certain he did perfectly consent to a great part of it.

RULE IV. An involuntary effect proceeding from a voluntary cause is imputed to the agent, as if it were volun∣tary and directly chosen.

HE that is Husband of the wife is justly presum'd to be the Father of the child,* 1.2315 and he that chuses the cause must own all those which are the ef∣fects and proper productions of it; and all causes are not immediate and contiguous to the effect. He that drinks himself drunk that without fear and shame he may fornicate, though when he fornicates he hath not the use of his reason any more then of his modesty, and cannot deliberate, and therefore cannot chuse, yet he is guilty of fornication as well as drunken∣nesse. He that eats high and drinks deep that in his sleep he may procure pollution, is guilty of that uncleannesse as well as of that excesse, which S. Paul intimates in those words, Make not provision for the flesh to fullfill the lusts thereof; that is, what you design as the purpose of your intemperance, is your crime, though it be a natural effect when things are by your choice so disposed:* 1.2316 and when our Blessed Saviour commanded us to take heed of surfeting and drunkennesse, he forewarned us as well of the effect as of the cause; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, surfeting hath it's name from the event, because it causes dissolutions of the nerves and dilutions of the brain, and consequently palsies, which when we have contracted, we are by our own fault disabled in the service of God. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, surfeting is the product of yesterdayes debauchery: and since the effect is also forbidden, he that chuses it by delighting in the cause, chuses also what is forbidden, and therefore that which will be imputed to him.* 1.2317 But this I have largely proved upon a distinct account, by making it appear that even a vitious habit, the facility and promptnesse to sin is an aversion from God, and makes us hatefull by a malignity distinct from that which is inherent in all the single actions. Thus he sins that swears by custome, though he have no advertency to what he saies, and knows no∣thing of it: he chose those actions which introduc'd the habit, and he can derive no impunity from his first crime: and he that is the greatest sinner can never come to that state of things that he shall take God's name in vain, and yet be held guiltlesse.

But this Rule is to be understood with these Cautions.* 1.2318

1. The involuntary effect is imputed to the voluntary cause, if that effect was foreseen, or if it was design'd, though when it be acted, the foolish man knows but little of it, no more then a beast does of his own acts of pleasure, which he perceives by sense, but does not by Counsel enter into it. Of this there is no question, because he put his hand to a hook of iron, and that being fastned upon the rich vessels in the house draws forth what the man it may be knows not to be there; but his hand willingly mov'd the iron hook, and therefore his hand and his will is the thief.

2. The involuntary effect is not imputed to the voluntary cause,* 1.2319 if after it is chosen by the will in one act, it is revok'd by another before the mischief be effected. Thus if Maevius shoot an arrow to kill Paternus, and in the instant of it's egression nollet factum, repents of the intended evil, that mischief which is then done shall not be imputed to him. This indeed is generally said both by the Divines and Lawyers; but it hath no effect at all that is material and considerable, save onely this, that the re∣pentance does wash away the guilt: but in true speaking the whole guilt was contracted, because the act of the will was completed up to action and execution, beyond which there can be no intension of the evil; but then the effect is therefore not imputed because the cause also is pardon'd by the meanes of repentance, and so it is even after the mischief is done. He that by repentance recalls the mischief, shall by pardon be clear'd from guilti∣nesse, whether that repentance be before or after.

3. But that which we can rely upon in this particular,* 1.2320 and of which great use is to be made, is this, That though all the evil events which are foreseen, or ought to have been consider'd, are imputed even then when they are not in our power, to him who willingly brought in the cause of those evils; yet whatsoever was not foreseen, and therefore not design'd, nor yet chosen, by consequence and implication is not imputed to him that brought that foolish necessity upon himself. Consonant to this is the do∣ctrine of S. Austin,* 1.2321 Culpandus est Loth non quantum incestus in ebrietate ad∣missus, sed quantum ebrietas meretur, Lot was answerable for his drunken∣nesse, but not for his incest caused by his drunkennnesse, which he foresaw not and designed not. But this case also suffers alteration. For if Lot had been warned of the evils of his first nights drunkennesse, and yet would be drunk the next night, he is not so innocent of the effect, the in∣cest lies nearer to him. Onely if after that monition he suspected as little as at first, he was not indeed guilty of the incest directly, but of a more in∣tolerable drunkennesse and a carelesse spirit, who by the first sad event did not consider and was not affrighted from the intolerable cause. But thus if a servant throws himself into a pit, and breaks a leg or an arme that he might not work, his not working is as much imputed to him as his uncha∣ritable injury to himself: but if afterwards, as Pyrrho saw his Master faln into a ditch, and by reason of that first fall he cannot help his Master out, that is not to be imputed to him; for he will'd it not, it was not included virtually in any act of his will or understanding. And thus it is also in the Divine judgements, which if we procure by our own vilenesses, all that impotency and disability of obeying God in external religion which is con∣sequent to the suffering that judgment which himself procur'd, & by which he is faln sick or mad or lame, is not imputed to him; because to make him∣self guilty of a thing, it is not sufficient that he be the meritorious cause of that which procur'd it, but he must be the voluntary and discerning cause. That evil of which a man is onely the meritorious cause depends upon another will besides his own, and is indeed an effect deserv'd by him, but not willingly consented to, but very much against him; and therefore can never be imputed to him to any other purpose but to upbraid his infelicity, who justly suffers what he would not foresee, and now cannot avoid.

4. When a man falls into a state or condition in which he cannot chuse,* 1.2322 those acts which are done in that state are imputed to him, if they be such

acts to which no new consent is requir'd, but that it be sufficient that he doe not dissent, and if those acts be consonant to his former will, all such effects are imputed to the will. Thus if Titius being a Catechumen desir'd to be baptized, and then falls into madnesse, or stupidity, or a lethargy he is capable of being baptized, because nothing is in some persons requir'd but a mere susceptibility, and that there be no just impediment; the grace of the Sacrament being so mere a favour, that it is the first grace to which no∣thing on our parts is previous but that all impediments be removed. Since therefore in this a man is passive, his present indisposition of making new acts of election renders him not incapable of receiving a favour; always pro∣vided that there was in him no indisposition and impediment before his present accident, but that he did desire it and was capable before: that vo∣lition hath the same effect in the present state of madnesse or stupidity as it could have if he had been well. But when this comes to be reduc'd to practice, I know of no material change it works upon the man in case he dies in that sad affliction, but what was by the mercies of God laid up for him upon the account of his own goodnesse and the mans former desire. But if he does live, that susception of the Sacrament of baptisme is suffi∣cient for him for his whole life, and the daies of his recovery; that is, all that which he could be bound to in the susception, is perform'd effectively in that state in which he could not presently chuse. But I shall resume this consi∣deration and inquiry upon occasion of something to be explicated in the sixth Rule of this Chapter.

5. But in matter of punishment the case is something different.* 1.2323 The case is this; Mizaldus a Florentine smote an Officer of the Great Duke in the Court, and apprehending that he was in great danger of suffering a great punishment, grew sad and impatient, and at last distracted •• the que∣stion upon the case is,

Question.

Whether or no Mizaldus may, being mad, be punished by death, or the abscission of his hand, for a fact he did in his health and the days of under∣standing. To this the answers are various by reason of the several cases that may arise.

1. If the punishment cannot be inflicted without legal processe,* 1.2324 trial, conviction and sentence, the mad man cannot be punish'd, because he is not capable of passing through the solennities of law: but if the sentence was pass'd before his madnesse, then the evil may be inflicted, that is, it is just if it be; and it may be done unlesse some other consideration interpose to hinder it.

2. In punishments where no judicial processe is requir'd,* 1.2325 a man that is mad may be punish'd for what he did when he was sober. If a son strikes his Father,* 1.2326 and then falls mad, the Father may disinherit him for all his mad∣nesse, because the Father may proceed summarily and upon sense of the crime; and he that by his own voluntary act did deserve it, is not by mad∣nesse made uncapable of the punishment, to which in this case nothing but a passivenesse is requir'd.

3. This also holds in cases of punishments ipso facto incurr'd, that is,* 1.2327 which a man is fallen into as soon as ever the crime is committed. And of this there is a double reason; the one is because the punishment is actu∣ally incurred before he is actually mad, for the very crime it self is to him as a Judge and sentence, and the sanction of the law is all the solennity: and that's the other reason, consequent to the former; in this case there needs no processe, and therefore the sinners indisposition cannot make him unca∣pable of passing into punishment.

4. In punishments Emendatory,* 1.2328 that is, such which besides the exem∣plar justice, intend to reform the Criminal, he that is fallen into madnesse ought not to suffer them, whether the sentence be to be pass'd by the law or by the Judge, whether it be solemn or summary, whether it be pass'd before his calamity or after. The reason of this is plain, because such punishments being in order to an end which cannot be acquired, are wholly to no purpose, and therefore are tyrannical and unreasonable; the man is not capable of amendment, and therefore not of such punishments which are emendatory.

But after all this,* 1.2329 the moderation of charity in Christian Judicatories is such, as that they refuse to inflict corporal penalties on distracted people, it being enough that they are already but too miserable.

Solus te jam praestare potest Furor insontem:* 1.2330 proxima puris Sors est manibus, nescire nefas.

He that knows not what he does, or what he hath done, is next to him that is innocent. And when the man is civilly dead, it is to little purpose to make him sink further under the civil sword. That's a dreadfull justice and security that would kill a man twice over. Onely when any thing of ex∣ample, or public interest, or detestation of the fact is concern'd, it may be done according to the former measures, and for the present considerations; just as it is in some cases lawfull to punish a man after he is dead, by denying him an honourable or Christian sepulture: where although there be some∣thing particular in the case, the nature of this punishment being such, that because we doe not bury them before they be dead, this evil must be inflicted upon him that feels it not, or not all be inflicted; yet indeed it is true that it ought not at all to be inflicted upon any direct account of justice, but upon collateral considerations, as for terror and exemplarity; and so it may be in the case of the present question.

§. 2. Of the Diminutions of voluntary actions: and first of Igno∣rance, and it's influence into the morality of Humane actions.

RULE V. Nothing is good or bad, but what we know, or con∣cerning which we can deliberate.

1. THe great measures of morality are,* 1.2331 Chuse the good, and eschew the evil: before these can be chosen or avoided they must be consider'd and dis∣cern'd. And therefore those things concerning which there can be no de∣liberation are neither morally good nor bad, and those persons who cannot deliberate, can neither be vertuous nor vicious; but the things may be law∣full, and the persons be innocent, but both of them negatively, that is, the things are not evil, and the persons are not criminal. And therefore S. Paul celebrating the immense love of God to mankind,* 1.2332 says that God would have all men to be saved; and in order to this, he addes, he would have all men come to the knowledge of the truth, as knowing this to be the onely way: no man can be sav'd unlesse he knows saving truth, but every man may be sav'd unlesse it be his own fault; and therefore there is to every man reveal'd so much truth as is sufficient to his salvation. It may be this saving truth is reveal'd by degrees, and so that he who hath the first general propositions of nature and reason, and uses them well, shall have more, even so much as is necessary untill he comes to all sufficient knowledge. He that comes to God (saith S. Paul) must believe that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him. This is the Gen∣tiles Creed, but such as at first will be sufficient to bring them unto God; whether when they are come he will give them his Holy Spirit, and teach them whatsoever is yet necessary. I am not here to dispute what is likely to be the condition of Heathens in the other world: it concerns not us, it is not a case of Conscience: but we are sure that all me have the Law of God written in their hearts; that God is so manifested in the creatures, and so communicates himself to mankind in benefits and blessings, that no man hath just cause to say he knows not God. We see also that the Hea∣thens are not fools, that they understand arts and sciences, that they dis∣course rarely well of the works of God, of good and evil, of punishment and reward: and it were strange that it should be impossible for them to know what is necessary, and stranger yet that God should exact that of them which is not possible for them to know. But yet on the other side, we see infinite numbers of Christians that know very little of God, and very many for whom there is no course taken that they should know him; and what shall be the event of these things is hard to tell. But it is very certain that without a mans own fault, no man shall eternally perish: and therefore it is also certain that every man that will use what diligence he can and ought in his circumstances, he shall know all that in his circum∣stances is necessary; and therefore Justin Martyr said well, voluntate igno∣rare illos, qui res ad cognitionem ducentes hebent, nec de scientia laborant.

Every man hath enough of knowledge to make him good if he please: and it is infinitely culpable and criminal that men by their industry shall be∣come so wise in the affairs of the world, and so ignorant in that which is their Eternal interest; it is because they love it not.

Non aurum in viridi quaeritis arbore,* 1.2333 Nec vite gemmas carpitis: Non altis laqueos montibus abditis Ut pisce ditetis dapes,

No man looks for Emeralds in a tree, nor cuts his vines hoping that they will bleed rubies or weep pearls. Which of all the Heathens or Christians ever went to take goats in the Tyrrhene waters, or look'd for Crystall in a furnace? Many know what pits have the best Oysters, and where the fat∣test Tortoise feeds.

Sed quonam lateat quod cupiunt bonum Nescire caeci sustinent: Et quod stelliferum trans abiit polum Tellure demersi petunt,

and yet they look for immortality in money, and dig deep into the earth, hoping there to find that blessednesse which their reason tells them dwells beyond the starres. Men have enough of reason and law put into their hearts by which they read the will of God; and therefore no man can in the universall lines and measures of salvation pretend ignorance: I am sure we cannot, and that is all that concerns us. And therefore ignorance in the Law of God, in that which concerns our necessary duty, is so far from ex∣cusing any thing it causes, that it self is very criminal. Non est levius omnino nescire quod liceat,* 1.2334 quam facere aliquid quod scias non licere, To doe somethings that we know to be unlawfull, is not so great a crime, as to be wholly ignorant of what is and what is not lawfull. So that since the great end why God hath given us liberty and election, reason and under∣standing, is that by these we should serve him and partake of his felicities, it follows that in all that is of necessity to our salvation God is not wan∣ting to give us sufficient notice; and of good and evil in general every man that hath the use of reason does or may understand the rules and diffe∣rences.

But if we descend to particular rules and laws,* 1.2335 the case is different. So Gregory Nyssen said,* 1.2336 Universalium secundum electionem non esse invo∣luntariam ignorantiam, sed particularium, A man cannot against his will be ignorant of the universal precepts that concern our life Eternal and Ele∣ction, but of particulars a man may. That a man must not oppresse his brother by cruel or crafty bargains every man ought to know: but there are many that doe not know whether all usury be a cruelty or oppression, or in any sense criminal. But concerning these things we may better take an estimate by the following measures.

Of what things a man may or may not be innocently ignorant.

1. No man can be innocently ignorant of that which all the Nations of the world have ever believed and publicly professed;* 1.2337 as that there is a

God; that God is good and just and true; that he is to be worshipped; that we must doe no more wrong then we are willing to receive or suffer. Because these things and the like are so conveyed to us in our creation that we know them without an external Teacher; and yet they are so every where taught, that we cannot but know them, if we never consulted with our natural reason.

2. No Christian can be innocently ignorant of that which the Catho∣lic Church teaches to be necessary to salvation.* 1.2338 The reason of this is, be∣cause every one that knows any thing of God, and of heaven and hell, as every Christian is suppos'd to doe, cannot but know it is necessary he learn something or other in order to it; and if any thing, then certainly that which is necessary: and of that nothing can so well judge, nothing can teach so readily as the whole Church; for if the whole Church teaches it as ne∣cessary, then it is taught every where, and at all times, and therefore to be ignorant of such things can never be suppos'd innocent.

3. Of that which is by several Churches and societies of wise and good men disputed,* 1.2339 a man may be innocently ignorant; for there is suppos'd dif∣ficulty, and obscurity, and every degree of these is the greatest indication that there is not of them any absolute necessity. What God hath made necessary to be known, he hath given sufficient means by which it can be known. But because every man cannot dispute, and of them that can, very many doe it to very little purpose, and they had better let it alone, and by disputing men often make more intrigues, but seldome more manifesta∣tions of what is obscure; it is certain that which cannot be known but with some difficulty and more uncertainty, may be unknown with very much innocence.

4. Those things which doe not concern good life,* 1.2340 and the necessities of this world and of the other, are not of necessity to be known by every one; because there is beyond these no common and universal necessity. But beyond these.

5. Whatsoever concerns every mans duty in special,* 1.2341 to which he is specially oblig'd, of that he cannot innocently be ignorant, because he hath brought upon himself a special obligation of a new duty, to which he must take care that sufficient aides and notices be procur'd. Thus must a Bishop understand not onely the articles of faith, but the rules of manners, not onely for himself, but for those which are under his charge; he must be able to instruct others in the mysteries of religion, and to convince the gainsayers; that is, he must have knowledge sufficient to doe what God re∣quires of him, and what himself hath undertaken. * But then as there is in the duty of every Christian, so there is in the charge of every office, some things that are primely necessary, some things that are onely usefull, and some for ornament, and some for excellency and perfection. So that as of every Christian so much knowledge is requir'd, that he be not igno∣rant of what is necessary for his great calling, but of other things lesse ne∣cessary there is lesse knowledge requir'd; so it is in every special calling. For although a Bishop must know how to teach sound doctrine, and to re∣prove evil manners; & if he knows not these things, his ignorance is crimi∣nal: yet a Bishop may be innocent and laudable though he be not so learned

as S. Gregory Nyssen. Valerius the Bishop of Hippo was a good man and a good Bishop, yet he was not so instructed and able as his successor S. Au∣stin; and Nectarius of Constantinople was accounted a good Patriarch, yet he was very far short of S. Chrysostome. Of what is more then of simple necessity, some may be innocently ignorant, but yet very few are. Because God hath not confin'd his providence and his spirit to the ministery onely of what is merely and indispensably necessary: and therefore when God hath largely dispensed and open'd the treasures of his wisedome and hea∣venly notices, we should doe well not to content our selves with so much onely as will keep us from perishing. Therefore that the Conscience may be directed how far it's obligation of inquiry does extend, and may be at peace when it inquires wisely whether the duty be done, these are the best measures whereby we can take account.

What diligence is necessary that our ignorance may be innocent.

1. Our inquirie after things necessary must have no abatement or di∣minution,* 1.2342 nothing lesse then that it be so great and diligent as that the work be done. Because whatsoever is necessary is sufficiently communi∣cated, and without that we cannot doe our duty, or receive the felicity de∣sign'd for us; and in that where God's part is done, if the event answer not, it is because we have not done our part, and then we are not innocent. So that in these inquiries we are no otherwise to make a judgement of our diligence then by the event: whatsoever is lesse then that, is lesse then duty.

2. But in things not absolutely necessary,* 1.2343 such which are of conve∣niency and ornament, of advantage and perfection, it is certain we are not tied to all diligence that is naturally possible: and the reason is, because these things are not simply necessary, and therefore not of necessity to be ac∣quir'd by all means. Adde to this, if a man were bound to use all dili∣gence to acquire all notices that can be usefull to him in his general or in his special calling, he should fall under a perpetual rack of Conscience. For considering that a mans life were not sufficient to doe this in some callings, and it is necessary in this world that a man doe many things more then the works of his office, he could never be suffer'd to attend to any necessity but what is mere and indispensable and indivisible, and never use any diver∣tisement, recreation, variety or ease, but he must first be tied upon the wheel, and feel the pains of a doubting and tormenting Conscience, by rea∣son of the impossibility of knowing whether we have done all that we can.

3. In acquiring notices concerning doing any work with advantages a moral diligence is necessary:* 1.2344 for he that stops at the gate of simple necessi∣ty hath some love to himself, and great dread of God, but no love to him; for love cannot consist with a resolution of knowing no more then we must needs; to get so much and no more will well enough serve the ends and the design of fear, but not of love: and therefore although the man that does so is innocent as long as he is in that state, and as long as that state is ac∣ceptable; yet because the state of fear is but the state of infancy and imper∣fection, it must proceed further, or be imperfect for ever; that state will not be accepted long. For if a man does his duty in that state, he shall be

enabled to goe further; and then he must, or else he sins by despising the spirit of grace. But if he does not doe his duty in the first state, then he must not in that state of carelesnesse and neglect of using moral diligence pretend that he is innocent. A man that hath been blessed in his first at∣tempts must still follow the method and Oeconomy of the Divine spirit; that is, as God increases in aides, so the man must increase in diligence and labour, and must use what means are before him to doe still better and better.

4. In acquiring notices not simply necessary,* 1.2345 a moral diligence is suffi∣cient. This is an immediate consequent of the second Rule, and therefore needs not particular confirmation, but explication rather.

Therefore by Moral diligence is to be understood such a diligence in acquiring notices as can * 1. consist with our other affairs, and the requi∣sites of our calling and necessities; * 2. such as is usual by our selves in the obtaining things which we value; * 3. such which is allowed by wise men, such which a spiritual guide will approve; * 4. and such as we our selves doe perceive to be the effects of a real desire. For there ought to be no∣thing of scruple or vexation in the acts of this diligence, nor in the inqui∣ries concerning it. And therefore if we are sure we desire to know what we can, and doe towards it such like things as we doe in the purchase of other things which we greatly value, we may be at peace. For this thing does not consist in an indivisible point, it is not just thus much, neither more nor lesse; but it is more or lesse according as our love is and our lei∣sure, our opportunities and abilities: and if we cannot judge concerning our selves so well as to rest in peace, let us ask a spiritual guide, having first declar'd to him the narrative of our life and actions whereby he shall be enabled to make a judgement.

What is a probable ignorance?

Upon this account we can also give the measures and definitions of a probable ignorance,* 1.2346 that is, such an ignorance which is next to an invincible or an irremediable ignorance: this the Schools call probable. For as the invincible ignorance is a mere nescience, and is either of such things which we are not bound to know, because God requires them of no man; or of such things which we cannot know, because we never heard of them, and are not taught sufficiently, and so God will not require them of us: so next to this stands the probable ignorance, that is, when the things are pro∣pounded to be known, and can be known if we would use all our natural and possible diligence; but yet because God hath not plac'd them in a neces∣sary order to salvation, he hath not tied us to use all our natural diligence, but some diligence he does require, which when we have us'd, and yet misse, the ignorance is probable. Now when that is so, we shall learn by the pro∣portions to the description of the parts and requisites of a moral diligence, and by these following measures.

1. Then our ignorance is probable,* 1.2347 when we enter upon the action without temerity, and yet without doubt or trepidation; that is, when our addresse is with consideration, but we find no reluctancy against the action,

nor remorse after it. For then it must be that we have faith, and doe it with a good mind, not against our Conscience; and yet having no fierce∣nesse of passion or fancy, and a mind wary enough to discern any objection that is near, it will be very probable that there is none at all but what stands a great way off, and therefore farre enough from disturbing the innocence of the action.

2. But this is to be understood onely in the ordinary accidents and traverses of our lives.* 1.2348 But if it be in matters of great concernment, such as are above our ordinary imployments, as if it be in the actions and duties of an eminent office, it is not sufficient that we have no regret or remorse, but we must have an actual consideration, a plain perceiv'd deliberation and counsel, and then no regret. It is not here enough that we have nothing against it, but we must have something for it, because in such persons and in such accidents the processe ought to be more then ordinary; that as there are greater abilities requir'd to the performance of that office, so there may be a proper use and exercise of those abilities. And there is in this a great evidence of truth. For in ordinary things, it is very often so that they are well enough if they have not evidently any evil in them. But in the actions of public imployments things are not so indifferent; they doe hurt unlesse they doe good, they are scandalous if they be suspicious; they are design'd always to doe benefit, and if they doe not they cannot be justified, and therefore they must be look'd on with an actual consideration: in which state of things it is certain that every thing will occurre that is obvious to be considered; and what it not obvious to such persons is indeed very difficult, and may well be suppos'd to leave a probable and very excu∣sable ignorance.

3. This also is to be extended to the case of confident asseverations,* 1.2349 and confirming any proposition with an oath, in which no man can have a probable ignorance, but he that hath us'd a diligence of inquiry so great as to give confidence great enough to an oath, which must be of a thing so sure, that nothing can be a cause of doubt, unlesse some secret and undis∣cerned thing, to which a great and proportionable diligence hath not ar∣riv'd and made discovery, doe accidentally intervene. No man must swear a thing is so, and yet at last say, I did bonâ fide suppose it so: but I examin'd it, I search'd as well as I could, I entred into all the corners of it, I had great reasons to believe, I had fair assurances it was so, and I every day am assur'd of many things of which I had lesse testimony. If beyond this any thing escapes him, the ignorance is probable and excusable. But the rule is the same as at first: He is sufficiently and innocently confident, who hath no distrust, and upon inquiry finds no cause of distrust; always provided that the inquiry be in proportion to the dignity, and difficulty, and duty of the occasion and subject matter.

By the use of these premisses it will be easy to determine Plato's Case of Conscience which he propounded to Hippias the Sophister.* 1.2350 Whether is the better or worse,* 1.2351 he that sins willingly, or he that sins by folly & igno∣rance? of them that wrastle, whether is the more inglorious, he that falls willingly, or he that is thrown in despite of himself and all his strength? whether foot is better, that which halts upon designe, or that which halts with lamenesse? whether were it better for a man to have a fool or a knave

to his servant? But this discourse of Plato concerns arts onely and sciences. But Hippias answer'd well, It was not so in vertues; the differences of which Plato did not seem to discern,* 1.2352 but Aristotle afterwards very well explicated. The sense of which in order to the purpose of the present Rule is well ex∣pressed by Seneca;* 1.2353 Vis scire quam dissimilis est altarum artium cognitio & hujus? In illis excusatius est voluntate peccare quam [casu,] ignorantiâ: in hac maxime culpa est, sponte delinquere. If a Grammarian speaks a soloe∣cisme on purpose, he blushes not; but if ignorantly, he hath reason to be asham'd. If the Physician knows not what his patient ailes, it is more shame to him then if he on purpose names a wrong disease. At in hac parte vivendi, turpior volentium culpa est; But in manners to erre willingly is the more intolerable. The reason of these things is plain, which who please may read ina 1.2354 Gifanius the interpreter of Aristotle, andb 1.2355 Marsilius Fi∣cinus the expositor of Plato: for indeed it is evident that to moral actions the rectitude of the appetite is requir'd, not so to arts and sciences and the vertues intellectual. It is enough to art that the work be well done, though with what mind it matters not as to that: and when the Italian painter, who was to depict a Crucifix, hir'd a slave to be tied to a Crosse, that he might lively represent a body so hanging and so extended, did afterward stab him to the heart, that he might see and perceive every posture and accent and little convulsion of a dying man, he was very much the worse man for it, but no whit the worse Painter; as appear'd by the incomparable excellency of that piece; and the principles of Art cannot be corrupted with the evil manners of the Man: but because evil desires pollute the manners, the will is to be taken care of, as the principle of all morality. To which we may adde that he who in arts erres willingly, can mend it when he please; but so cannot he that erres ignorantly. Ignorance is the onely disparagement of his art, and malice is the onely disparagement of our manners.

But this, though disputed to little purpose amongst the Philosophers,* 1.2356 may be of good use in Cases of Conscience.* 1.2357 Cardinal Campegius having wickedly said to the Senate at Norimberg, that it was worse for a Priest to marry then to fornicate, offer'd in justification of it a reason that could lesse be justified. For (saith he) the Priest that fornicates knows he does amisse, and therefore may in time repent; but the Priest that marries thinks he does well, and therefore will never change his mind, he will never re∣pent. It is true, he needs not, because he believes he does well; and he is not deceiv'd. But suppose he were deceiv'd, and abus'd by error, what man before him was ever so impious as to say that he that knows he does evil is in a better condition then he that erres with a good mind, & supposes he does very well? For the present, the state is infinitely different: & for the time to come, which is the more likely to obtain mercy, he that does a thing ignorantly, or he that does it maliciously, we shall not need to appeal any whether but to all the notices of vertue and vice which are in mankind.

Indeed there are some sins of ignorance,* 1.2358 that is, such which are sub∣jected in the understanding, which are worse then some sins of malice, or such which are subjected wholly in the will and the faculties which obey it. Thus to be ignorant of the fundamental articles of faith is a worse state of things then to have committed an act of gluttony, or to have en∣tertain'd a wanton thought, or to have omitted Divine service upon a Fe∣stival. They Jewes had an opinion that thoughts were free, and God did

not require them of us with severity; but a thought against faith, that was highly criminal. Cogitationem pravam Deus non habet vice facti, nisi concepta fuerit in Dei fidem atque religionem,* 1.2359 said R. David Kimchi; mea∣ning that no sin was greater then heresy, or an error in faith. But the rea∣son of this is, not onely because the effect of heresy is, like the plague, infectious and disseminative; but because by how much the articles of faith are more necessary to be believed, by so much is the ignorance of them more criminal, and more voluntary, and therefore lesse excusable. But even in matters of faith, where there is lesse of malice or wilfull negli∣gence ingredient into the ignorance of them, there the crime is lesse then any thing else, be the instance what it will. But this will be more expli∣cite in the sequel.

RULE VI. Ignorance does always excuse the fact, or diminish the malignity of it, or change the kind and na∣ture of the sinne.

IGnorance according to it's several capacities,* 1.2360 and the several methods of art and ways of speaking, hath several divisions. But all are redu∣cible to this in order to Conscience. Ignorance is either voluntary or in∣voluntary. It is vincible or invincible, that is, it can be helped or it can not. It is the cause of an action, or it onely goes along with it. And of these several ignorances there are many degrees, but no more kinds that are here fit to be considered.

1. The first sort of ignorance,* 1.2361 which is involuntary, invincible, and antecedent, that is, is the cause of an action, so that the thing would not be done but by that ignorance, does certainly make the action also it self involuntary, and consequently not criminal. In this sense is that of the law,* 1.2362 Errantis nulla voluntas, nullus consensus, They that know nothing of it, consent not. This is meant of ignorance that is involuntary in all regards, that is, such as is neither chosen directly nor indirectly, but is involuntary both in the effect and in the cause. Thus what fools and mad-men and infants doe is not at all imputed to them, because they have no understanding to discern good from evil, and therefore their appetite is not deprav'd or malicious which part soever they take.* 1.2363 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith the law, according to the interpretation of the Greeks. Injury proceeds from the affection, and consequently we say that a mad-man or an infant if they strike or reproch anyone they are not cri∣minal, they have done no injury because they perceiv'd it not. Nec reputantur infantiae anni qui sensu carent, saith Pliny; The years of infancy come not un∣der the notice of laws and judges, of right or wrong, for they have no reason, that is,* 1.2364 they use none. So Galen, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, All the scholars of Chrysippus constantly affirm that beasts and babies have no use of reason.

And Iamblichus suppos'd that the rational soul was not infus'd into chil∣dren before the tenth year of their age.* 1.2365 But that is more reasonable which almost all wise men (excepting the Stoics) affirm, and is thus expressed by a 1.2366 Gregory Nyssen, and his contemporaryb 1.2367 Nemesius in the very same words; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Although in infants there is no action or motion of reason, yet we say that they have a reasonable soul, for they manifest the use of it when they are growing up.

But this occasions a difficulty in this subject.* 1.2368 For we see the ratio∣nal soul exercising it's operations in some sooner in some later; and as the body grows in strength and grandeur, so does the soul in the use of reason and powers of deliberation and choice.

Nam velut infirmo pueri teneroque vagantur* 1.2369 Corpore, sic animi sequitur sententia tenuis. Inde ubi robustis adolevit viribus aetas, Consilium quoque majus, & auctior est animi vis.

And Hippocrates addes that the soul does always grow, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, A mans soul is born every day of a mans life, it always receives some increment. Now the question is How long shall infant ignorance or childshnesse excuse so far as that the actions they doe shall be reckon'd neither to vertue nor to vice?

To this it will not be possible to give a strict and definite answer,* 1.2370 but a rule and a measure may be given. Possidonius said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The rational faculty is at first very weak, but it is great and strong about the age of fourteen years:* 1.2371 and Plutarch saies that the Stoics affirm'd 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, about the second septenary, or the fourteenth year,* 1.2372 they begin to be perfect: but Zeno said that from that year complete, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 it is perfect, that is, as to all capacities of reward and punishment. But in this there was great variety. For some laws would punish boys after twelve years, not before: so the Salic law,* 1.2373 Si quis puer infra duodecim annos aliquam culpam commiserit, fredus ei non requiratur, A boy before he is twelve years old, committing a fault is not tied to make amends or composition.* 1.2374 Servius upon that of Virgil, Alter ab undecimo tum me jam ceperat annus, saies, the thirteenth year is meant, because that was next to puberty; for, saies, he, the law judges of maturity not onely by years but by the habit and strength of the body. But though this be lesse by one year then that of the Stoical account, and more by one year then that of the Salic law; yet we find in the law of the Greeks and Romans that after seven years complete boys were punishable; so the * 1.2375 Basilica,† 1.2376 Michael Attaliotes and some others.

But this variety was not wholly arbitrary,* 1.2377 but it was commonly esta∣blished upon reason; for the differences were made by the different nature of the crimes of which boys were not equally capable in every year: but al∣though in every crime some were forwarder then others, yet all were capa∣ble

of some sooner then of others. Spite and malice comes sooner then lust: and therefore if a boy after seven years old kill'd a man, he was liable to the lex Cornelia de Sicariis;* 1.2378 but not so if he were a pathic and a correspon∣dent in unnatural lusts, as appears in Matthaeus Blastares and Leo; if he were under twelve years, he had impunity, quum aetas ipsa argumento sit nescire eum quid patiatur, said the Emperor, His age is an argument of his igno∣rance, that he knows not what he suffers. For in these things it was reaso∣nable that Galen said of Hippocrates, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, infancy is to be reckon'd untill youth, or a power of generation: and that was it which I observ'd before out of Servius, Bene cum annis jungit habitum corporis. Nam & in jure pubertas ex utroque colligitur. The strength of body must be suppos'd before you allow them strength of reason, that is, a power to deliberate and chuse those sins to which they cannot be tempted before they have natural capacities. But this, I say, relates onely to the crime of unclean∣nesse. Now because this was commonly the first of our youthfull sins, malice in infancy being prodigious and unnatural, which caus'd that advice of S. Paul, In malice be children; therefore wise men and the laws did usu∣ally reckon that age to be the first beginning of their choice as well as of their strength. But this rule is very far from being certain, and therefore S. Austin blames those that doe not impute any sins to boys before the age of fourteen;* 1.2379 Meritò crederemus (saith he) si nulla essent peccata nisi quae membris genitalibus admittuntur, We might well doe so if there were no sins but the sins of lust: but they can steal sooner, and they can lie, and, as unnatural and as unusual as it is, they can be malicious, some sooner, some later, according to the basenesse of their disposition, their pregnancy and education.* 1.2380 A. Gellius tells that the Decemviri, who wrote the laws of the XII Tables, ex caeteris manifestis furibus liberos verberari, addicique jusse∣runt ei cui factum furtum esset, They caus'd thieving boys to be whipp'd and given up to them from whom they had stoln; and if they cut corn by night and stole it, they were to be chastis'd by the discretion of the Praetor; which also Pliny notes.* 1.2381 But then this also is to be added, that even in these things although they did not esteem them innocent, yet because their understanding was but little, and their choice proportionable, they inflicted but easy punishments:* 1.2382 which Theophanes expressed by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they were beaten with thongs, or rods, or ferula's.

From hence we may take an estimate how it is in this affair as to the question and relation of Conscience.* 1.2383 For then these wise men and wise law-givers did declare them punishable when they did suppose them crimi∣nal; though in the Sanction of laws they were to proceed by rule, and de∣termine 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as things were most commonly. But then it is to be consider'd, that since they being to make a rule could not at all take in extraordinaries, and there would many particulars and hasty instances be pass'd before it could come to a just measure and regular establishment, we must therefore proceed something otherwise in the Court of Conscience. For,* 1.2384 as Libanius speaking concerning boys, said, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this is not a name of age that cannot sin and cannot be punished. But Anastasius Sinaita saies that some∣times God imputes sins to boys from twelve year old and upwards. But S. Austin confess'd the sins of his first years,* 1.2385 the peevishnesse of his infancy, his wrangling with his nurses, his very envying for the nurses milk and fondnesses: this was indeed a greater piety then reason. But when he was a

boy and robb'd an Orchyard, he had reason then to be troubled for it. The sins of children are but little,* 1.2386 but they are sins. Puerorum sensus in qua∣liacunque verba prorumpens, qui certè ad ea quae majores sapiunt penè nullus est. When boys give evil words, it is almost nothing. But because it is but almost and comparatively nothing, it is of it self and absolutely some∣thing; and we know not at what period of time any child first comes to the use of reason, and therefore neither can we tell when God will impute their follies; and when he does not impute their follies to damnation, it may be he will impute them so far as to cause a sicknesse or an immature and a hasty death. And therefore Parents and Tutors can never discharge their duty but by a coercion and strict restraint of children, from the very first begin∣ning of their being capable of laws, of the laws I mean of their parents, and even before that to restrain them from the material parts of any evil, even from evil words which they understand not. For when they once have learnt the sound they will quickly perceive the sense: and although we account their infant malices pretty and sportive, yet because we know not from what an early principle they come, nor how soon God will impute them, nor whether they will tend, nor what impression they leave, we should betimes exercise our legislative; and it is God's great mercy to chil∣dren that they can understand fear as soon as they can learn to sin, that their evil company and evil inclinations may not prevent the discipline of the parents, but that God and the good things of his law may get the first possession. And he that will let his children alone till they have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, animum consilio ac ratione firmatum,* 1.2387 a fixed and settled judgement, shall find evil habits fixt and permanent as the foot of a rock, and that good counsel will be too late, too easy a remedy. The summe is this; So long as they are ignorant, that is, so ignorant that they know not how to deliberate sufficiently to avoid a sin, so long their evil is not imputed, but together with their reason begins their vertue or their vice.

2. The second sort of ignorance is concomitant,* 1.2388 that is, such which is really and actually conjoyn'd with the cause of the action, but it self is not the cause; for if the man were not ignorant, he would doe the thing never∣thelesse. Thus the boy that flung a stone at a bird, and hit his cruel step∣mother whom he knew not to be there, said he did not then design it, but the stone was well thrown. He that shoots an arrow at a stag and hits his enemy whom he resolved to kill when he could well doe it, but knew not at all that he was in the bush, hath an ignorance and a malice at the same time; and here the question is which prevails, the ignorance to excuse, or the malice to condemn. To this I answer, that the ignorance excuses that action, but not that man. He is not a murderer in that shooting, nor in the counsels and deliberation of that action; but for his mind and his malice distinct from that action, he is proportionably guilty. But if the man have no malice to the unfortunate man that is kill'd, then he is intirely inno∣cent, if his ignorance be innocent. The mind of the man is, and the action is; and if the ignorance were invincible and irremediable, then there is in∣nocence on all parts.* 1.2389 Non consentiunt qui errant, saith the law. For there is in this concomitant ignorance the same reason as in the antecedent, so far as relates to that event, though not as to that action: the action was indeed voluntary and not procur'd by ignorance, but that event was; and that be∣ing the thing onely in question, is to be accounted for, just as those actions which are wholly produc'd by ignorance antecedent.

I deny not but the laws of wise Republics have principally regarded the mind and Counsel of him that sin'd,* 1.2390 and that therefore the laws of the Romans under their Christian Princes did professe to follow the law of God in the matter of involuntary murder, and so did the Lombards and the Vi∣sigoths; yet sometimes this chance-medly was punish'd by a lesser punish∣ment: so we find in the laws of the Thuringians, Qui nolens sed casu quodam hominem vulneraverit vel occiderit, compositionem legitimam solvat. If a man unwittingly wounds or kills a man,* 1.2391 si telum fugit potius quam jecerit, as Ci∣cero expresses the instance, if his arrow or weapon slipt from him, rather then was flung, he shall not be put to death; but yet neither shall he wholly escape, but must pay a fine appointed by law. And there is some reason for this. 1. Because the law must require the life and bloud of every of her citizens from whom it is taken, and the external event, of which she is the most competent judge, must as well as it may be repair'd. But 2. although it may appear that the event was not intended, yet it cannot so well appear whether the man did use all that diligence and precaution which wise and good men ought to doe to prevent mischiefs. And 3. something is to be indulged to the injur'd person, some consideration had of the grief and losse and the passion of the relatives of the slain person. And upon these con∣siderations God was pleased to appoint sanctuaries for such persons; which in true speaking is but a just remedy for an unjust calamity, and supposes that something was permitted in favour of the relatives of the unhappy man that died, something, I say, which yet was not always deserv'd of him that was in danger to suffer it.

3. The third sort of ignorance is the worst,* 1.2392 it is that which is vin∣cible and voluntary, that is, procur'd by the will, is not the prime cause of it's actions but the effect, brought in on purpose to make way for an easy mischief with a colour and excuse. Of this there are two noted and dis∣cernible degrees: An ignorance crasse and dul, and introduc'd by negligence voluntary and observed more or lesse; and an ignorance affected, that is, chosen and delighted in, to serve evil purposes. Now concerning these degrees of this criminal ignorance it is true of them both that they bring guilt upon the head of the ignorant, according to their several proportions: but concerning the actions themselves which are acted by men in that state of ignorance and disorder, there is something of particular consideration. For we find our Blessed Saviour praying for pardon for his persecutors upon this very inducement:* 1.2393 Father, forgive them, for they know not what they doe; that is, they doe not now know, for they are blinded and are in a state of ignorance: but that it was vincible and voluntary appears by those words of Christ,* 1.2394 If ye were blind, ye had not sinn'd; but now ye say that you see, therefore your sin remains; and having eyes they see not, that is, they would not see, they did it ignorantly, and they would not cure their igno∣rance, for it was evident that Christ said and did enough infinitely to con∣vince them that he was the Messias.* 1.2395 So also S. Paul's ignorance was very culpable, when in zeal and rage he persecuted the Church of God; but yet this ignorance lessen'd the malice of the effect, and dispos'd him greatly towards pardon. Upon these considerations, it is a worthy inquiry into that effect or influence which proceeds even from a criminal ignorance and undiscerning estate, and what it can operate towards pardon. The questi∣on then is, whether what is done by persons that know not what they doe, when that disability to know is procur'd by themselves, either by volun∣tary

negligence, or malicious purpose, is a sin as great as if it were done knowingly.

Question.

The case is this,* 1.2396 Marcus Bibulus falls frequently into drunkennesse; when he is drunk he fights, and fornicates, and steals, and does (as it hap∣pens) all manner of impiety. Does his drunkennesse excuse, or does it exte∣nuate, or does it aggravate his fault?

The Greeks call'd these things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2397 that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Contention and every mischief that comes from wine, saith Hesychius; which when a man hath observed to be consequent to his intemperance, or hath been foretold of it by laws and wise persons, he may justly fall under the sentence not onely of drunkennesse, but of homicide, or incest, or whatever happens to be the vile daughter of so disgrac'd a Mother. Drunkards are very often proud and quarrelsome: and there∣fore to that of Solomon, Look not upon the wine when it is red, Rabba saith, Ne spectes vinum cujus finis est sanguis,* 1.2398 Look not upon the wine whose end is bloud: and Eustathius saith that the nurses of Bacchus were painted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, having snakes and daggers in their hands, to shew that drunkards were beastly and bloudy. And therefore if such persons could have impunity, there were no safety for the lives of innocent men, or the chastity of modest women. But they neither have, nor have they reason why they should 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2399 said Aristotle; They that being drunk doe evil, are guilty of the injury. Be∣cause they are causes of their own ignorance: for they might have abstain'd from that excesse which caus'd them ignorantly to smite their Father. Pitta∣cus by a law caus'd a double punishment to be inflicted upon drunkards, one for the cause, and the other for the evil effect. The same also seems to be the sense of Plato both in his first and in his sixth book of Laws: but gene∣rally all the interpreters of Aristotle,* 1.2400 the old Philosophers, the Mahumetans and the Christians and the Heathens, are perfectly of this persuasion, that the sins they doe in their drunken fit are perfectly to be imputed to them. To this purpose is that of Cicero,* 1.2401 Nam qui se propter vinum aut amorem aut iracundiam fugisse rationem dicet, is animi vitio videbitur nescisse, non imprudentiâ. Quare non imprudentiâ se defendet, sed culpâ contaminabit, He that with wine or anger or lust looses his reason, cannot pretend igno∣rance or want of knowledge for his excuse, for by his own fault he is pol∣luted. And this is the sense of the Doctors of the Church. S. Basil saies drunkennesse is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so S. Chrysostome; vo∣luntaria insania, so S. Austin; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so Isidore Pelusiot: A vo∣luntary Devil, a chosen madnesse, a spontaneous fury. And the very same words are us'd by Seneca and Ammianus Marcellinus. And therefore the sinning man must not excuse him by his stupidity, and blame the wine, but himself onely;* 1.2402 as Callicles in the Comedy convinc'd Dinarchus when he pray'd him to give him pardon,

Quod animi impos vini vitio fecerim;

he was not himself when he did it, it was his wine not he. The old man answer'd him,

—non placet In mutum quippiam conferri quod loqui non potest. Nam vinum si Fabulari possit, se defenderet: non vinum moderari, Sed vino solent qui quidem probi sunt: verum Qui improbus est, sive subbibit, sive adeo caret temeto, Tamen ab ingenio est improbus.

Blame not the wine; for wine does not govern a good man, but a good man the wine: But he that is wicked is wicked from within, whether he drinks or no. By these sayings of wise men we perceive that they held not the drunkard innocent even in those vilenesses which he did in his drunken∣nesse; and their reason was Philosophical, The effect from a voluntary cause is to be imputed to the first principle.

But Commonwealths have another interest to serve;* 1.2403 they are to se∣cure the lives and good things of their citizens, and therefore they are by all means to effect what is necessary: and if drunken mischiefs were unpu∣nish'd, men might pretend drunkennesse for an excuse, and make it really to be the warrant of their licentiousnesse, their rapine, their lust or their re∣venge.

Nam si isthuc jus est,* 1.2404 ut tu isthuc excusare possies, Luce clarâ diripiamus aurum Matronis palam; Post id si prensi simus excusemus ebrios Nos fecisse amoris causâ: nimis vile'st vinum atque amor, Si ebrio atque amanti impunè facere quod lubeat, licet,

said old Euclio to Lyconides. If drunkennesse may be our excuse, let us goe and drink drunk that we may rob the Matrons in the streets. And Manuel Palaeologus tells of one that had a mind to be reveng'd and put some affront upon a great man;* 1.2405 and because he durst not when he was sober, he drank himself into an impudent fiercenesse, that he might first have boldnesse and then, as he hop'd, impunity. And therefore there may be great reason why the Civil laws of any Nation should punish the evil ef∣fects of drunkennesse not onely for the evil mothers sake, but for the secu∣rity of the citizens.

But in Theology and in the just estimate of things in order to Con∣science we are to speak and to proceed with some little difference.* 1.2406 For if it be ask'd concerning the drunkennesse, or concerning the man, there is no peradventure but he is for these evil effects the worse man, and the drunkennesse is also the greater crime. The drunkennesse makes the in∣jury or the murder lesse criminal then if it were done with actual reason and choice, but these make the drunkennesse more intolerable and crimi∣nal. The man in chusing drunkennesse with or for these effects is much the worse man; but the crime is the voluntary drunkennesse, not the in∣voluntary rage and injury. And this appears upon these reasons.

1. Because by how much more the sense and reason is depraved,* 1.2407 by so much the lesse the man hath pleasure in his sin. For if he be wholly mad or senselesse, his sin is wholly uselesse to him, it does him no present de∣light, any more then to a beast to push with his horns; which therefore is

not criminal because he cannot reflect upon his own act, he cannot chuse it for a reasonable consideration, he hath no will to entertain it. But if he be not so far gone, then there is some proportion of guilt, because there is of choice in the shipwracks of his reason and his will: and therefore Theo∣doret said,* 1.2408 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Drunken∣nesse hath some reproof, and some pity; some punishment, and some par∣don. And Arrius Menander said that per vinum aut lasciviam lapsis ca∣pitalis poena remittenda est,* 1.2409 They that sin by drunkennesse or passion may be punish'd, but not capitally; the same with that in Stobaeus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Even in the follies and stupidities of drunken∣nesse there is something amisse besides the material part. But this is when there is something left by which he can understand and chuse some∣thing of the crime.

2. The mischiefs consequent to drunkennesse are therefore lesse mo∣ral evils,* 1.2410 because they doe lesse moral mischief. For no man by his lust acted in his drunkennesse is made more lustfull, or by any act then done is promoted towards a vitious habit; for he knew not what he did, and re∣members it not: it is like Lot's incest, no more known after then before, and therefore it leaves no sediment or lees behind it; which shews it to have more natural vilenesse then moral, and therefore is nearer to pardon.

Et causa justa est,* 1.2411 siquidem ita est ut praedicas, Te eam compressisse vinolentum virginem.

If the yong man was drunk when he lay with her, he hath some excuse, that is, as to his lust; but that is an aggravation of his drunkennesse, and he is not the more acquitted, when the aggravation of his sin and punish∣ment is onely plac'd upon the right cause.

3. If the consequent mischiefs of drunkennesse were formally those sins which materially they are,* 1.2412 that is, if they were properly guilty of all that they ignorantly doe, then it would follow that because murder is worse then drunkennesse, and yet that murder was involuntary, some action that is involuntary would be more malicious then that which is chosen. If it be replied that those consequent acts are chosen because the cause of them is chosen, according to what is discours'd in the 4^th Rule of this Chapter; I answer, that this is true if drunkennesse were not an accidental cause of them: but these effects being but contingent to drunkennesse, and the effect of some other evil principle, which then prevails when by drunkennesse the mans guards are called off, therefore they cannot be intirely attributed to drunkennesse; and therefore if a man be surpris'd with drink, or is advis'd to it as to a medicine, if he falls into such consequent disorders, it would be hard to damne this man as a murderer or as an incestuous person, when he is so neither by his present, nor his antecedent choice. Therefore it is that Libanius saies that one who hath grievously offended another 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2413 oftentimes is not punished when wine was his excuse; and the Scholiast upon the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 saies that he that kills a man 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; with deliberation is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not to be pardon'd: If he does it by chance, he is free; but if by drunkennesse, he was by the Roman law banish'd for five years: and thus justice is preserved on all hands, that the drunkennesse should be punish'd more then drunkennesse, and the murder lesse then murder. For that is the worse for having such a daugh∣ter,

but this is more pardonable for having such a Mother.

But if the drunkennesse be but imperfect,* 1.2414 if the consequent crimes be remembred and delighted in afterwards, (for that is a certain indication the stupidity was not extreme, nor equal to an excuse) then

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

such a drunkard is also all that which he acts and professes in his folly: a re∣membring drunkard, as he is but an ill companion, so if he falls into the horrid consequents which too often are the punishments of intemperance, hath no excuse. But if he chose drunkennesse on purpose that he might have impudence enough to doe a mischief, he committed the sin before∣hand, and was before he acted it guilty before God; and when he hath acted it, he is also guilty before men* 1.2415. But unlesse it be in these cases, the actions done by him that understands not what he does are as the actions of a mad man or a fool. The sin was done before, and the mischief and the punish∣ment doe follow: but the guilt is in the cause, not in the effect that is in∣voluntary; though proceeding from a cause that was indeed voluntary, but not univocal and proper.

The sense of this question thus explicated agrees with the doctrine of the Fathers,* 1.2416 who in the instance of Lot declare him criminal onely as to his drunkennesse,* 1.2417 not to his incest. So Origen, S. Chrysostom, S. Austin: and S. Ambrose gives this account of the whole question; Sanè discimus vitandam ebrietatem, &c. We learn that drunkennesse is to be avoided, by which we are brought to that evil state of things, that we cannot beware of crimes. For those things which being sober we avoid, when we are drunk we ignorantly commit. And a little after; They who have been too free in drink∣ing wine, know not what they speak, they are like men dead and buried: ideoque siqua per vinum deliquerint,* 1.2418 apud sapientes Judices veniâ quidem facta donantur, sed levitatis damnatur authores, Therefore what vilenesses they commit in their wine (meaning when they know not what they doe) for the deeds themselves so ignorantly committed they find pardon amongst wise Judges, but for their temulency a condemnation.

The result of these discourses is this.* 1.2419 The vilenesses which are done by drunken and stupid persons unwittingly, are not of the same kind of which naturally they are and would be if the actors were sober: they are not the crimes of murder or lust or incest respectively, but circumstances of great horrour aggravating the drunkennesse, and deeply condemning the man. And yet, if the drunkennesse be not extreme, I mean the stupi∣dity and ignorance, if that be not such as to take away wholly the use of reason and moral choice, all the remaining portions of reason doe in their proper degree make the imperfect drunkard guilty of other perfect crimes, even of whatsoever he then shall act; and they shall for their own degrees of remaining choice be imputed to him as certainly as the drunk∣ennesse.

The same is the case of Inconsideration and Oblivion,* 1.2420 whose effects are innocent upon the same accounts and no other. If they come in upon a ne∣gative principle, that is, begin and proceed upon a natural deficiency and an unavoidable cause, that which is forgotten, or that which is done by for∣getfulnesse

must be amended and repair'd as well as we can; but by a pre∣ceding morally-diligent care, and an after-revocation, nolition or amends, it may be kept innocent. This onely thing is to be interpos'd, that if by the precontract of a vitious habit there is ingenerated in our spirits and ex∣teriour faculties such a promptnesse and facility of sinning, that many of the acts of such a habit are done without advertency, as in vile and habitual swearing, every such action though passing without notice is criminal, be∣cause it is the product of the will habitually depraved; and there is no other cause why the actual consent of the will is not at it, but because it was not requir'd, but presum'd, and taken without dispute. A yong Lutenist dis∣putes and contends for every single touch of a string: but when he hath made it easy and habitual, he resolves to play a set of lessons, and every stroke is voluntary, though every one is not now actually consider'd.

Question.

To this §.* 1.2421 of Ignorance belongs the question concerning Fraud and Guile. For if another man cosens and abuses my understanding, he places me in ignorance; and then it is worth our inquiry, What morality or what obli∣gation there is in those actions which are done by us so abus'd, so deceiv'd, so made ignorant, and incapable of judging rightly.

The answer relies upon the same grounds as formerly,* 1.2422 with this advan∣tage, that he who is deceiv'd by the crafts of another, hath most common∣ly an ignorance that is very innocent; and then if that ignorance be wholly the cause of any action, the cause is innocent and so is the production. And upon the same accounts we are to judge concerning the obligation of pro∣mises and contracts made by persons in error and deception. 1. If the er∣ror be concerning the substance of the thing contracted for, the contract is naturally invalid, and obliges not at all. If Titius buy a horse, and Caius send him a Mule or an Oxe, there is nothing done, Titius hath made no bargain at all. If I buy a man-servant, and the Merchant sells me a mai∣den dress'd in mans apparrel, this makes the contract invalid; I made no bargain for a maid-servant, but for a man. When Jacob married Rachel, and lay with Leah, that Concumbency made no marriage between them; for the substitution of another person was such an injury as made the contract to be none at all: and unlesse Jacob had afterwards consented, Leah had been none of his wife. 2. If the error and ignorance be not in the sub∣stance of the contract, whatever else the error be, the contract is natural∣ly valid, that is, without a new contract and renewed consent it can stand; but if that error was the cause of the contract, which if the error had not been would not have been at all, then it is in the power of the abused per∣son to rescind the contract, and the fraudulent contractor is in Conscience bound to recede from all his ill-acquir'd advantages. The reason is, be∣cause he did injury to his neighbour, and plac'd him in evil dispositions and unaptnesse to chuse wisely, otherwise then God and the laws of nations and the common intention of contractors doe intend: and therefore although there was so much of the substantial requisites as could make a contract na∣turally valid,* 1.2423 yet it was so ill, that all laws and intentions and tacit condi∣tions of contractors have thought fit to relieve the abused person, Dolo vel metu adhibito, actio quidem nascitur, si subdita stipulatio sit: per doli mali

tamen vel metûs exceptionem submoveri petitio debet: and the reason is given l. si dolo. 5. C. de rescindenda venditione; Si dolo adversarii deceptum venditionem praedii te fecisse Praeses provinciae aditus animadverterit, sciens contrarium esse dolum bonae fidei (quae in huju smodi contractibus maxime exi∣gitur) rescindi venditionem jubebit. In Contracts the honesty of the con∣tractors is principally to be regarded, and fraud is destructive of all honest intentions; and therefore the Praetor shall rescind such fraudulent bargains. 3. But if the error was not the intire cause of the contract, but that upon other accounts we would have bargain'd, onely we would not have paid so great a price, then the bargain is valid, and the Praetor cannot rescind it, nor the injur'd person revoke it; but the Civil law in this case did permit actio∣nem quanti minoris, that is, an amends for so much detriment as I suffer ap∣parently by the fraud.* 1.2424 If Caius sells to Maevius sheep which he affirms to be sound, but they are indeed rotten, the law permits not rescission of the bargain, but forces Caius to restore so much of the price as the sheep were overvalued. And this is also the measure in the Court of Conscience. But this is to be understood in such cases where the fault of the vendible com∣modity cannot be discerned by the buyer, and where the seller did deceive voluntarily. For in other cases Caveat emptor is the rule of the law, let the buyer look to it, and it is also the rule in Conscience. The seller must not affirm the thing to be without fault, if he knows it vitious and faulty. But neither is he bound to proclaim the faults of his goods, if they be discer∣nible. And of this Cicero discourses reasonably,* 1.2425 Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille quod non placebat proscripsit; quod placebat emisti. Quod si qui proscribunt villam bonam benéque aedificatam, non exi∣stimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est, nec aedificata ratione; multo mi∣nus qui domum non laudarunt: ubi enim judicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas? Quid vero est stultius quam vendito∣rem ejus rei quam vendat vitia narrare? Quid autem tam absurdum, quam si Domini jussu ita praeco praedicet, Domum vendo pestilentem? Who com∣pell'd thee to buy? The man that sold it did not (it may be) so much as de∣sire thee. He sold it because it did not please him; and because it did please thee, thou hast bought it. He that sets up a bill of sale and proclaims a house fair, and well-built and well-seated, hath not deceiv'd thee, though it be neither well-built, nor well-seated; because if it be intire for thee to make a judgement, he hath not deceiv'd thee. Much lesse if he hath not prais'd it. For if all that is spoken in the bill is not of necessity (viz. in order to the bargain or thy choice) to be verified, much lesse must that be perform'd or requir'd which was not spoken. But does ever any man cry stinking fish to be sold, or say, Come and buy a house that hath the plague in it? All this is great reason: Onely this is to be added, that such faults as cannot be discerned by the buyer, must be declar'd, or must be allowed for in the price: and the case is the same, if the buyer be a child, or a fool, or an ignorant undiscerning person;* 1.2426 for no man must be made richer by the injurie and folly of his Brother. I know that in all the public contracts of mankind, that which all men consent in is, to buy cheap and to sell dear: but Christian religion, and the contempt of the world, and the love of spiritual interests,* 1.2427 are sent from heaven, to cause merchandise to be an instance of society, and not a craft and robbery. 4. If the buyer be deceiv'd, but not by the seller, but by a third person, and that deception be the cause of the contract, the buyer may rescind the contract if he can; that is, he is

not in Conscience oblig'd to stand to it, if he can be quit in law: but he that deceiv'd him is bound to repair his injury if he have suffer'd any, or to break the bargain, if the goods be unalter'd. These things have no particular reason, but are evident upon the former accounts.

§. 3. Of Fear and Violence, and how these can make an action involuntary.

RULE VII. Fear that makes our reason uselesse, and suffers us not to consider, leaves the actions it produces free from crime, even though it self be culpable.

THe case is this;* 1.2428 Roberto Mangone a poor Neapolitan travelling upon the Mountains to his own house, is seized on by the Banditi, a pistol is put to his breast, and he threatned to be kill'd unlesse he will be their guide to the house of Signior Seguiri his Landlord, whom he knows they intend to rob and murder. The poor Mangone did so: his Lord was murder'd, his goods rifled and his house burned. The question is, whether Mangone be guilty of his Lords death.

To this the answer is easy,* 1.2429 that Mangone is not innocent; and though he did not consent clearly and delightingly to Seguiri's death, yet rather then die himself he was willing the other should. No man is desirous in a storm to throw his goods into the sea, if he could help it, and save his life; but rather then loose his goods and his life too, he heaves them over∣board. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2430 said Aristotle, These kind of actions are mixt, but they have more of spontaneity and election in them then of constraint. No Christian remaining a Chri∣stian is willing to offer sacrifice to Daemons, or to abjure Christ, if he be let alone: but he that in time of persecution falls away, not changing his heart, but denying his profession, this man is not excus'd by his fear, but betray'd by it.* 1.2431 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, There are some things to which a man must not suf∣fer himself to be compell'd by any force, but he must rather die then doe them. And because there are some things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are insufferable to humane Nature, and therefore there is in laws as∣sign'd a certain allowance of fear qui potest cadere in fortem & constantem virum, that is, in the case of danger of suffering the extremest evils, and our obedience to humane laws is excus'd in such cases, because no man is ordinarily bound by the laws to suffer a greater evil in keeping the law, then is threatned by the law it self to him that breaks them; therefore the law allows an omission of obedience in the fear of the greatest evils, as I have already explicated* 1.2432. But in Divine lawes it is otherwise, because no man can threaten or inflict on another an evil comparably so great as God does on them that break his laws; and therefore the lesse fear cannot be a reasonable excuse against a greater; and in all cases, the fear of man must

yield to the fear of God. And therefore in the matter of a Divine Com∣mandement, no fear of temporal evil is an excuse or warranty. Because we are taught to despise poverty and pain and death, and to doe all this chearfully and gloriously. And therefore this case of Conscience and it's whole dimensions are quickly measur'd.

But this is onely in Negative commandements,* 1.2433 for they can never be broken with innocence upon what pretended necessity or violence soever. But in positive Commandements the case is not so clear, but fit to be more consider'd: But it will quickly also come to an issue, if we distinguish o∣missions from commissions. For no man may upon any pretence doe anything against a positive Commandement. He may omit to visit a Christian in prison, if he fears he shall loose his life in the visitation, or be threatned with any great calamity; but he may not doe him any injury or oppression to save his life and liberty.* 1.2434 But I have to this also given particular answer upon another occasion. That which I am to adde here is this; There is no peradventure but the obedience to a positive commandement, till it be plac'd in it's own circumstances and requir'd here and now and so, will give place to so just a cause of deference and stay as is the securing our selves against a great fear. For where God hath not requir'd us in particular manner to doe a duty, he hath requir'd it in a very particular manner to preserve our selves. But when the case is so, that the particular is requir'd, no fear of man can hinder us. For in all things God is to be preferred. And therefore it is so rarely well order'd that unlesse it be in extraordinary cases, as the Apostles preaching the Gospel, their open confessions of faith, their declaring against the religions of the world at that time, for which they had special commands, and were to doe them and not to fear the fear of men, there is scarce any positive law of God but either it may be per∣form'd by an internal suppletory, by a desire and willingnesse and endea∣vour, or else will be sufficient to be done in the article of death, that is, then when we need not fear the worst that man can doe unto us. Thus it is in the susception of the Sacraments; from the actual susception of which by a great and just fear if we be frighted, we cannot be hindred from the desire and spiritual and most effective susception of them: and from the actual if we be by a just fear delayed (though the case cannot often happen) yet it is generally suppos'd that if they be done before our death, the commande∣ment is obeyed, if the delay was not on our part; and at our death no new fear of death can be a just excuse. However, if it or any thing else be po∣sitively and determinately requir'd in circumstances, we must not be afraid of them that can onely kill the body; or if we be, the fear and the omission are both criminal, and this is not excus'd by that.

But if in these or any other cases the fear be a surprise,* 1.2435 sudden, and violent, and impetuous, that is, such that our reason is invaded and made uselesse, such as by a natural effort disorders all our faculties, such as that of Arachne in Ovid,

Quid mihi tunc animi misera fuit? anne quod agnae est Siqua lupos audit circum stabula alta frementes? Aut lepori, qui vepre latens hostilia cernit Ora canum, nullos audet dare corpore motus?

such a fright as a hare or lambe are in when they are pursued by dogs and ••oxes,

Occupat obsessos sudor mihi frigidus artus,* 1.2436 Caerule aeque cadunt toto de corpore guttae,

when nature is in a lipothymie, and our strengths are made extravagant, when we can doe any thing in flying and nothing at all to consider; then our understanding cannot deliberate, and then our will does not consent, and then the effect is pityable but not criminal, but the fear it self possibly may be both. For sometimes our fear may be so great, that it fills all our fa∣culties, and then there cannot be any deliberation; for that must be at leisure, and must look upon two objects. Statius well describes this kind of fear in the similitude of a hunted stagge.

…..qualis cum cerva cruentis Circumventa lupis,* 1.2437 nullum cui pectore molli Robur, & in volucri tenuis fiducia cursu, Praecipitat suspensa fugam, jam jamque teneri Credit, & illusos audit concurrere morsus:

she hath no courage, no confidence, no hope of any thing; she dies if she stayes, but she cannot stay to consider so long; and when she runs, she dies too, and she hears the wolf at her ear, and sees him with her eye, and feels the teeth in her heart, and dies with fear. In such cases as these we are as men without reason, and therefore to be judg'd accordingly. I have heard of a Trouper who in the late sad warres of England being alarm'd, was so affrighted that he bridled his Comerade instead of his horse: and in the last inroad which the Turks made into the Empire, a German carrier was so affrighted with the noise of Turkish horses coming, that he knew not how to make use of his own to fly away, but deploring his condition that his horse being loaden could not run fast, had not the reason left him, though he had time, to throw off his pack, but staid in that amazement, till the prisoner of fear became a slave to the Turks. What a man does in such a case, no equal estimator of things will impute to choice or malice. He that flies from a lion pursuing him, and in his affrightment runs into a River, is not criminally guilty of his own death. He runs into one death before another, but prefers it not: for if he were in the same fear of drow∣ning, he would leap ashore though a Lion did stand there expecting of a prey.

Concerning degrees of fear which are lesse,* 1.2438 such which leave us in a power to consider and deliberate, they may lessen the malice of the crime to which they drive, but cannot make the fact innocent. He that is taken by a Tyrant and an unjust power and put amongst the troups, is not innocent though in that fear and against his will he fight against his Prince. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, said Dio Cocceius, They went willingly to warre, if at least they may be said to be willing who are constrain'd by fear. It is an unwilling willing∣nesse, and therefore it is a sin almost against their will. For in despite of such a constraint,* 1.2439 a man may use his liberty; as Lucian saies of the yong man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, He did not marry, but though his Father forc'd and compell••d him, yet he refus'd.

The same is the case of Superstition,* 1.2440 which is an excessive and inordi∣nate fear in the matter of religion. If the fear be supreme and distracting, the effects of it are very pityable; but criminal onely in that degree in which

it is vincible and can be subdued by reason. When Michael Stifelius a Ger∣man in Luther's time had affrighted the people with a confident and terrible prediction of the day of Judgement within a few days to be revealed, the poor affrighted people left off their daily labours, and took care of no du∣ty for this life. This omission at another time would have been very cri∣minal; but now their superstitious fear did alleviate it, if not wholly take it away. But in this there is nothing particular, save onely that the causes of fear in this case are worse then in other things; but the effects themselves are not commonly very bad.

But this passion of fear hath in it yet more difficulty in relation to humane contracts and obligations,* 1.2441 which can be evacuated and declar'd ne∣ver to have oblig'd if they commenc'd with fear. For upon this account some pretend contracts of marriages, absolutions from Ecclesiastical cen∣sures, testimonies in testamentary causes, vowes, donations, sentences, re∣signations of Benefices, constitutions of Proctors, election to offices, and oaths of obligation to men, and promises, not to oblige, if the promiser or contractor was constrained by fear.

But to all these the answer will be the same,* 1.2442 for they are all discernable by the same reason. If the fear was such that it might affright a wise and a constant person, the law judges the contract to be null, and not to oblige in law, which is the measure of contracts and legal obligations. But al∣though the law declares many particular cases, in which the fear does annul the contract, and in such cases ordinarily there needs no further inquiry; yet because many cases happen in which the law hath not regularly declar'd her sentence, by that measure which the law goes by, we may without trou∣ble determine our selves. The rule therefore is this; When any evil threat∣ned is so great, that to suffer it is more intolerable then to doe the thing to which you are compell'd, there the fear is suppos'd great enough to nullify the contract. If a rich person be threatned, that he shall be forc'd to pay a hundred pound, or marry the oppressors daughter; if he promises to marry her he is oblig'd, and that fear and that threatning shall not prevail to eva∣cuate his promise. Because he that so threatens intending but an evil that is very tolerable, if the marriage be of worse mischief, he did not chuse it out of fear; for he that does so, chuses the lesse evil to avoid a greater, not a greater to avoid a lesse:* 1.2443 so S. Austin observes, Neque enim dici solet quispiam voluntate fecisse, siquid fecit invitus; quanquam si subtiliùs advertamus, etiam quod quisque invitus facere cogitur, si facit, voluntate fecit: sed quia malit aliud,* 1.2444 ideo invitus, hoc est, nolens, facere dicitur; and Simplicius to the same purpose, quia licet inviti agamus, tamen sic agere eligimus, It is in∣deed against our will; but when things are in an evil state, we chuse the least. If therefore he chuses that which he saies is a worse evil, he cannot pretend it is for that fear; and consequently it must be upon some other motive, something of his own; and if it be, it will verify the contract. Titius finds Caius at an advantage with a Watch & a Ring about him of no great value; he threatens to take them from him, unlesse Caius will promise the next day to bring him twenty talents. Caius promises it, and therefore is oblig'd, for he cannot say, he was compell'd. For no lesse violence can constrain us to suffer a greater, because that is far more eligible then this. And there∣fore the law calls nothing a just cause of fear, but the fear of the greatest evils, as death, torment, dismembring, intolerable disgrace; that is, such

things which to avoid a man would suffer any evil that is lesse. Now be∣cause in contracts we intend some advantage to our selves, real or imagina∣ry, and in contracts effected by a great fear we can design none but the avoiding of a greater mischief, the law and right reason wholly attribute it to fear, and therefore annul the contract. Martial's case is pertinent to this inquiry,

Quod si me tonsor,* 1.2445 cum stricta novacula supra est, Tunc libertatem divitiasque roget, Promittam: nec enim rogat illo tempore tonsor; Latro rogat: res est imperiosa timor. Sed fuerit curvâ cùm tuta novacula thecâ, Frangam tonsori crura manusque simul.

If a Barber when the rasor is upon my throat contracts with me for twenty pound, if I fear he will cut my throat if he be denied, I promise to him as to a thief, with whom whatsoever contract I make in my intolerable fear, no law of man does verify it. But Martial as to his instance was no good Casuist.

For if it be inquir'd whether I am oblig'd in Conscience to keep my promise to a thief or a bandito,* 1.2446 which I made to save my life; I answer that I am. Because he being an outlaw and rebell against all Civil laws, and in a state of warre, whatever you promise to him, you are to understand it ac∣cording to that law under which then you are, which is the law of Nature and Force together. So that you cannot be guarded by the defensative of the Civil laws, nor is your contract under it's guard and conditions. In contracts under the protection of Civil laws, we are to goe by it's mea∣sures, and the contract is good or bad accordingly. But when we have no measures but what we can get of our selves, our contracts are to begin and end between our selves, and by our own proportions. But in law no man is suppos'd to have consented, but he in whose power it is to dissent. Si vis scire ut velim,* 1.2447 effice ut possim nolle: and every contract must have 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Damascen calls it, a desire free from all bond. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If there be force and a sad necessity in it, it is a calamity ra∣ther then a contract; and therefore the laws intend to defend and rescue us from the oppression.

I am to adde one caution,* 1.2448 That no reverential fear, let it be never so great, and the person never so timorous, so that the use and ministeries of reason be left, can excuse a sin, or nullify a contract. The reason is given by Aristotle,* 1.2449 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Fathers Empire hath in it no violence and no coaction. And Heliodorus Prusaeus in his paraphrase saith the same thing, that the commands of Pa∣rents, or such whom we reverence and fear, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have not such force as to compel: not but that we are to obey; but that what we doe out of reverential fear to them is not compell'd, but voluntary and chosen.

What is said of Fear,* 1.2450 is not true of other passions, lust and anger, or whatever else is productive of those effects which use to make men asham'd, and disorder all their interests. 1. Because these passions are seldome of that nature and degree of violence as to take away all powers of delibera∣tion, and therefore they are but seldome fit to be pretended in excuse of any

action. 2. They are commonly the true Mothers, the univocal parents of their productions, otherwise then it is in fear and drunkennesse and igno∣rance; for these produce things of a nature different from their immediate principles, as drunkennesse produces effects of anger, of lust, &c. that is, it is the occasion of them, not the proper Mother. But lust produces lust, and anger sends forth angry words, and spitefull actions, and resolutions of revenge. 3. The products which come from these passions are so very far from being rendred involuntary, that by these passions they are made most delightfull, and without them they could not please at all. 4. Whenever they prevail to any violence or extremity of degree, it is by an increasing will; not by weaknesse and natural infirmity, but by a moral state of infir∣mity, that is, a state of sinfulnesse. 5. It is not in these as it is in fear, or vincible ignorance, that what is voluntary in the cause may be involuntary in the effect: but in these passions and temptations, the Mother and the daughter are chosen; not the one directly and the other by interpretation, but both of them properly, directly and immediately. For these rea∣sons the case of these passions is curiously to be distinguish'd from the pre∣cedent. But when these passions doe come to extremity, although their proper acts are not the lesse sins but the greater, as an act of anger is the more devilish by how much the passion is the more extreme; yet if any aequivocal and contingent effects be produc'd, as if in the violence of lust a child be run over and hurt, or any thing that is not natrual to that passion, nor intended by the man, then according to the degree of the ecstasy and transport by the passion, the contingent effect may be lessen'd in it's malig∣nity. And in this sense is that of Libanius to be understood;* 1.2451 or else it is not true, that injuries are very often to be remitted if the man hath drunken∣nesse for his excuse, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or anger, or for∣getfullnesse, or arrogance, or any such like thing. Like to this is that of Arrius Menander,* 1.2452 Capital punishments are not to be inflicted per vinum aut lasci∣viam lapsis, to them that offend by the follies of drunkennesse or the violence of lust.

—Et vino tortus, & irâ:

Wine & rage are like two racks, & compel men to open secrets. Now when the case is so that the effect is aequivocal, as it is in drunkennesse in many instances, and in other passions sometimes, there onely there is some dimi∣nution or excusing of the crime. But the Ancients gave too much liberty, and an indifferent sentence in these cases, because wanting the Christian measures they understood no better.

CHAP. II. Of the Finall Cause of Humane actions; and it's influence or Causality of Good and Evil.

RULE I. In every good action the means and the end must be Symbolical: so that, 1. a good action done for an evil end, and 2. an evil action done for a good end, are alike Criminal.

THE first part of this Rule is in the express words of our Blessed Lord,* 1.2453 Take heed that you give not your alms be∣fore men to be seen of them.* 1.2454 Even alms, which are our righteousness, and so rendred both by the Arabick and the Vulgar Latin, yet if done to vainglorious purpo∣ses, are good for nothing, but are directly acts of vain∣glory. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith S. Basil, The noise of a trumpet spoils our alms. For from the end every action is qualified; and an indifferent action is made good and bad by the end; and that which is so already, is made more so by a participation of that to which it is design'd. For the end changes the nature as well as the morality of the action.* 1.2455 So Aristotle, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He that commits adultery for gain is covetous, not lascivious: but he that spends his money and suffers loss for his lusts sake, he is the wanton. And therefore God and all wise men regard not the exterior action in their accounts of vertue, but the manner and purpose of doing it. Quoniam quidem non in facto laus est, sed in eo quemadmodum fiat. Eadem res si gulae datur, turpis est: si honori, re∣prehensionem effugit. Amico aegro aliquis assidet? probamus: at hoc si hae∣reditatis causâ facit, vultur est, cadaver expectat. So Seneca. The praise and vertue is not in the thing done, but in the manner of doing it. If we spend great sums of money in our Kitchin, it is sordid: but if upon publick works, on Colleges and Hospitals, on the Poor or upon Religion, it is brave and noble. He that visits his sick friend in charity, does well; but he that sits by him and watches with him in hope to get a legacy, is a vultur, and watches for the Carcasse and the Prey.

Now concerning this,* 1.2456 the best Compendium of all the Cases of Con∣science which can relate hither, is, that with hearty simplicity we pursue that rule of S. Paul,* 1.2457 VVhether ye eat or drink, and whatsoever ye doe, doe all to

the glory of God: the same with those other words of his, for the one illustrates and explicates the other,* 1.2458 Whatsoever ye shall doe in word or deed, doe all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God even the Father by him. Concerning the obligation and full sense of these precepts, the fol∣lowing measures are our Rule.

1. He that in every action that is considerable,* 1.2459 and fit to be noted and discerned, and is distinguished by counsels and consultations, by delibe∣ration and observation, does actually design the glory of God, does his work most perfectly. It will shame the tepidity and incuriousness of Chri∣stians, if I tell them that this advice is given to us by some wise Heathens. When Marcus Brutus had given many excellent precepts to parents, and children, and brethren, he adds, Haec nemo faciet quemadmodum debet nisi habuerit quò referat. Proponamus oportet finem summi boni, ad quem ni∣tamur, ad quem omne factum nostrum dictúmque respiciat, veluti navigan∣tibus ad aliquid sidus dirigendus est cursus. No man can doe these things as he ought, unless he direct them to some proper end. We must propose to our selves the chiefest good for our end, to which every word and every deed of ours must have regard; as mariners in their sailing look to a star for con∣duct. This is not so to be understood as if we were to make acutal directions and dedications of every single word, or little minute action we doe, to the glory of God: this is a snare to Consciences, and an Hypochondriacal devotion which some Friers have invented, and attributed to S. Gertrude, of whom they report that Christ admonish'd her that she should conse∣crate every little part of action and word unto him; not only every wri∣ting, and every discourse, and every meal, and every prayer, but every bit she put into her head, & every letter she did write, every single step she did tread: just as if a man that were to receive a thousand pound should tell it over by so many single Maravides, and not be content to tell every shilling, but reckon how many farthings are in the whole sum; this would sound great as the Spanish Coblers portion to his daughter, but certainly a wise man will find something else to doe, which may be more really for God's glory, then so to tell his little minutes and particles of actions. It is a great piety if we dedicate to God all our states of life, and all our great actions in every state, and all changes, and every day, and every night, and every meal, and every beginning of labour, and give God thanks at every end, and invocate his help in every progression; for so doing, we shall consecrate our whole life to God.* 1.2460 And this counsell S. Macarius of Alex∣andria gave to Palladius Bishop of Helenopolis; who when he was a young man was much troubled in Conscience concerning his unprofitable life, and suppos'd that he did nothing that was good, nothing that was profitable, but all he did was vain and trifling. Macarius told him, Dic tu tuis cogitatio∣nibus, Propter Christum custodio parietes, when such afflictive thoughts doe intervene, say unto them, For Christs sake I keep the walls. Nothing could be a meaner imploiment, nothing could be less usefull; for the walls were not likely to run away. His meaning was, whatsoever the imploiment of a mans day or a mans life be, though never so mean, yet if it be done with a single eye, and with an intuition to Christ, it is a holy imploiment.

2. Although our intentions by how much the more they are actual,* 1.2461 by so much they are the better, yet it is not necessary that they be alwaies actual; but they are right if they be virtually and habitually directed unto

God: that is, that by some general designation of our actions, by the re∣newing of our intentions actually in certain periods of time, as in the mor∣ning of every day, or at evening, or both, or in every change of imploi∣ment, we have an actual intuition on God and God's glory; and then, though we only attend to the work without any more actual consideration of the end, the intention may be right, and the action sanctified.

3.* 1.2462 But because thousands of words and actions may pass wise and good men in which they do not actually reflect upon the end of God's glory, and that possibly the thinking of it, and saying, I design this to God's glory, is of no more value then if a man saies, I love God; which if it be only an act of fancy, or of ineffective affection, is no sure indication of the true love of God, but must be expressed by something that is more mate∣rial and properly significative of love according to the Commands of God and the manner of Men; therefore we cannot better judge of the goodness of our intentions, or that we do our actions for the glory of God, then when we are in all things carefull that we doe nothing against any of the laws of God. For this is that charity which is the singleness of a Christian eye: Ut noverimus omnia opera nostra tunc esse munda, & placere in conspectu Dei, si fiant simplici corde, id est, intentione supernâ, fine illo charitatis, quia & plenitudo legis charitas est. Oculum ergo hic accipere debemus ipsam intenti∣onem quâ facimus quicquid facimus: quae si munda fuerit & recta, & illud aspiciens quod aspiciendum est, omnia opera nostra quae secundum eam opera∣mur, necesse est bona sint. So S. Austin. He does all to the glory of God, that does all his works, and speaks all his words in charity; just as he works for a reward, who does that good thing which shall be rewarded, though it may be he thought not of it since his first beginning of his Un∣dertaking. To doe all things by the rule of God's will, is to doe all things for the end of God's glory. For he that walks with his eye upon the rule, is all the way carefull that he may not dishonour God; and that's a great matter towards it:* 1.2463 and he may at least say of himself, Non ideo tamen eximiam gloriam meruisse me credo, sed tamen effugisse flagitium; if God hath acquired no honour by my action, I am glad I have not dishonoured him: and yet he that actually takes care that God be not dishonoured, does obey God, and that's our best love to God, and in this world our greatest glorification of him; it is more then all songs and thanksgivings expressed in words or transports of fancy. If we take care that all our actions be obedience, and nothing be against God's will, we glorifie God rightly. Adjice nunc, quod nihil honeste fit,* 1.2464 nisi cui totus animus incubuit atque affuit, cui nullâ parte sui repugnavit. That is done honestly that is done with an honest and a whole heart, and is all of a piece, nothing at all repugnant to the Rule.

4. He does all things for the glory of God,* 1.2465 that does nothing for an evil or a forbidden end: that is, if we take care that there be no foulness or any unlawfull thing in our purposes. For if a man does things wisely, he must design some end; and therefore if his end be not evil, then it is a law∣full end: and if he studiously declines every end that is evil, he is carefull that God be not displeased, that God be not dishonoured, and whatever ends can be besides all ends that are evil, are certainly good, that is, eligi∣ble for some good purpose; it comes from God, & to him it returns. The first of these waies is a doing all things to the glory of God actually. The second

does it virtually, or habitually. The third is a glorifying of God interpreta∣tivè, by equivalence and interpretation: and this fourth does it consecuti∣vè, by way of consequence and acceptation.

5. There is yet another way of doing it,* 1.2466 which is so perfect an indi∣cation of the designing God's glory, that unless our hearts deceive us, the sign will not; and that is, a beginning all our actions and changes with prayer,* 1.2467 and ending them with thanksgiving: this is that which S. Paul cals a doing all things in the name of the Lord Jesus; giving thanks to God the Father by him. For to doe things in the Name of Christ can signifie no∣thing but a doing them at his word, and by his aid; which when we pray for of God in his Name, and then return thanks to God by him, we have evidently directed that action to the Divine glory. And this is the full meaning of those words of the Apostle, Every creature is sanctified by the word of God and prayer. That is, whatsoever is taken according to God's word, and upon whatsoever so taken we pray for the Divine blessing, it is sanctified, and ministers to the good pleasure and glory of God. So that if God be at any end of the action, and be at no end of it displeased, we have secur'd our intentions: and there will be the less need by scrupulous fears to afflict our selves concerning actual remembrances and intuitions of the end; since there are so many waies of supply and equivalent perfor∣mances. For

6. He that does all that he does because he supposes God commands him or allows him,* 1.2468 and abstains from all things from which he does abstain only because God hath forbidden those things, this mans intentions are right, and his actions pointed to a proper end. For then every act is an act of obedience, and that is love, and that is the great instrument of the glori∣fication of God.

The second part of this Rule, viz. An evil action done for a good end is Unlawfull, is plainly enough taught us by S. Paul, Rom. 3. 8. and I have alrea∣dy * 1.2469 given account of such particulars as are under the general Considera∣tion. This only is to be added; that an evil done for a good end merely and intirely, is less then that which is not so alleviated; according to that saying of S. Austin, Pejor est qui concupiscendo quam qui miserando furatur, He that steals that he may give alms is not so bad as he that steals in Co∣vetousness and for his own increase.

RULE II. To doe an action of it self lawfull, for temporal re∣gards, for ends of profit, pleasure or honour, is not unlawfull, except it be accidentally.

THE Arabians have an excellent Proverb,* 1.2470 Anima boni operis bona est intentio, A good intention, or a good Mind, is the Soul of a good work. Now by how much the more noble that end is which is the design and pur∣pose of the agent, by so much the more excellent is the action. We ought therefore to consider that every thing that God hath made is good, and every desire of man which is Natural is also good; and God made

amabilities in several objects, and inclinations and tendencies towards them in several faculties; and he that gave us desires to them, intended also that we should obtain and use them, and therefore he also fitted us with means to acquire them. It follows therefore that those actions which proceed from those desires as those desires proceed from God, and tend to∣wards those ends whether God himself by the measures and laws of Cre∣ation hath directed them, must needs be very innocent and lawfull. If God gives Riches as a blessing and a reward of piety, it is lawfull to desire riches, and to labour for them. If Honour be a gift of heaven to them that honour God, then to desire honour and to doe actions for that end cannot be criminal. If Pleasure be created by God as an instrument to serve many ends of Nature and Grace it self, then to desire pleasure, and to doe acti∣ons in order to it, is not against the end of God's glory, because it is not against his will. These things are as evident as a demonstration. All that remains is, that in these we also glorifie God; that is, so use them, so de∣sire them, so design them, that they be still left in that place and in that order where God appointed them: that is, that they entertain our in∣termedial desires, and satisfie the needs of our journy and travel, and please our ministring appetites in order to their service to their Superi∣or: that as this life is but a passage to a better, so these desires may mini∣ster to higher, and by the comforts and satisfactions of this world promote our affections and purchases of the other. The particulars of which are briefly these.

1. These temporal ends must not fill our affections and divert them from things better and more excellent.* 1.2471 Si ipsa cordis intentio quâ facis quod facis, quae tibi nota est, sordidatur appetitu rerum terrenarum & tempo∣ralium, atque caecatur, quanto magis ipsum factum, cujus incertus est exitus, sordidum & tenebrosum est? said S. Austin. Our appetites must not be pol∣luted with earthly affections. Which S. Basil expresses well in answer to that question,* 1.2472 How in eating and drinking can we glorifie God?

Mensam accedas animo non nimium soluto, & in solum cibum hiante, Come not to the table with a dissolute mind and a greedy desire. Say not, Bring me, bring me, the meat is mine own, I lick my own plate, I live of mine own provisions; and therefore I will please my self, that I may feel my self to live. You must not so speak, and you must not so eat: but rather revolve in thy mind, Inspectorem habeo Deum, God beholds me; I will therefore so eat that no man may be offended, nor God's glory lessened. I will not be the slave of my own belly, or follow it's pleasures alone; neither will I live to eat, but eat that I may live, and be enabled to bear the burdens of my life and duty.

Plainly thus; He that observs the mea∣sures of Temperance, the limits and ends of Nature, aud materially serves those ends which he is bound to take care of; he eats and drinks to God's glory: although he doe not formally design by actual intuition this meal to God's glory. Let him so eat that he may be fit to serve God, and that he neither desire, nor actually do serve his lust; let his pleasure extend no further then to serve his health and natural and religious ends, that is, let it be intermedial to that end whether the eating it self is design'd; and the intention is innocent. For he that chuses this dish rather then another, because it is pleasant, hath not corrupted his intention; if this pleasure serves no more but that intermedial end which is in a natural or proper or∣der to a further end of God's appointing. That he eats this and not that,

his end is pleasure; but because that he eats at all hath another end, even to enable him to live in duty to God and his Neighbour, and to preserve his life according to the measures of charity and duty, this end of pleasure is innocent, because it is Natural, and produc'd by God, and goes on further towards the other ends of God. So that the result is this; Actions may be done innocently for temporal ends, if those tem∣poral ends be but intermedial, and be carried on further according to the purposes of God.

2. We may serve our temporal ends according to our Natural or Po∣litical desires,* 1.2473 alwaies provided that we observe those measures which God hath prescribed; for then we are sure they will bear us on to the glory of God; for that's their purpose, and that must be ours. A man may seek to be honoured, but he must not seek it by ill means; * he must not make the service of God to give way to that; * his affections must not dwell in that purchase; * it must leave no vanity upon his spirit; * it must not serve the end of pride; * it must be some way or other for God, in the beginning or in the latter end: that is, if it be not actually or virtually designed for Gods glory and service, that is, for the good of our Neighbour or our own Soul, by that means to incourage us in vertue; it must at last be referred to God,* 1.2474 and passing through us rest upon him. Cajetan, Navarre and Regi∣naldus from this instance except two cases; saying that if the honour be our due, as if we receive it from our Subjects and inferiors; or if it be matter of favour and grace, indulged to us by our Superiours, it is lawfull to receive it without either actually or habitually referring it unto God: that is, we may take honour to our selves without referring it to God, when that honour is our due, and when it is not our due; when it is paid us in justice, or when it is given us in kindness; which are almost all the cases in the world of receiving honour. But this doctrine ought not to be receiv'd, as being infinitely unreasonable and very impious; since in the case of Herod God declar'd his anger mightily because he received honour from his Subjects, and did not in so doing glorifie God.

3. All designs of profit,* 1.2475 pleasure and honour, must be the less princi∣pal; that is, ever subordinate to duty and religion: for although the profit or the pleasure swim uppermost, and be the actual mover to the particular instance, and be more perceived then any actual consideration of the last and noblest end; yet this is not sufficient to condemn the intention, unless it be made the principal; that is, that it be not only more delighted in by the contacts of sense, but preferred also in our understanding part, and our abused reason. Concerning which we may take accounts by the pro∣portions I have formerly described.* 1.2476 But in General, Our best measure we can take in the regulating this Case of Conscience is, that we enquire whether we prefer the ultimate or the intermediall end; which trial we may easily make when they cross one another, as it often happens they doe in the very instance, and very often in their proportions, circum∣stances and degrees. If we will not receive our profit or our plea∣sure without innocence, our purposes and our hearts are right; only then we are to take care that the love of our profit doe not hinder us in making right judgments concerning Lawfull and Unlawfull. For very often we think our affections and our purposes are right, when there is no other cause to think so but because our understandings are not right.

But for the fuller understanding of our measures in this inquiry, there are some particular Cases of Conscience to be resolved.

1. Whether it be lawfull to serve God for any end less then him∣self;* 1.2477 for riches, for honour, for defence and security of our lives, for health and secular satisfactions: that is, Whether it be lawfull to make God and his service to be intermedial to the things of the world, the ultimate end to be in∣termedial, and this to be the ultimate.

I answer;* 1.2478 It is at no hand lawfull to doe so, if the meaning be such, that if these ends should fail, we would no longer serve God; for then these temporal ends are principal, when without them the service would not be done, and with them alone it would. But it is lawfull to serve God for temporal ends, provided that these being but some or all the first in∣centives of duty, they bear us on indeed to the service of God. For he that serves God for temporal ends does well; and it matters not where the service of God begins; whether by fear or hope, whether for temporal re∣gards or upon wise discourses: the more imperfect motives are more usual with beginners. But then although it matters not where we begin, yet it is a very great matter whether these beginnings carry us: for if upon these first incentives we do indeed serve God, then our love to God begins from them; and if these imperfect principles be the beginning of our love, they will certainly end in God. But if the question be concerning a single action, whether it be lawfull to be done only for a temporal regard, as to get fame or money; I answer, that a single action done alone for any such consideration with actual rejection, or positive neglect of all other consi∣derations, is in it's whole constitution criminal: and in this sense those words of Publius Mimus are true, Malus est vocandus qui suâ causâ est bo∣nus, He is no good man that does good only for his own sake. For it is a direct preferring the world before God, and is not a serving God for tem∣poral ends, but wholly a serving our selves by actions which in those circum∣stances are no serving of God, but a doing of some material actions of religion in mere hypocrisie. But to serve God for temporal ends is very lawfull, 1. when these temporal ends are either the incentive and argument used by God to move us to his service; especially if no other be used, and if the Covenant be founded upon temporal promises, as the Law of Moses was; 2. or when these temporal ends are but the first and beginning motive, and lead us on to other and better; 3. or when they doe actually consist & are conjunct with others; 4. or when they are in true estimate and value subordinate and less principal; or 5. when the temporal end is first served, and the service is a return of gratitude, and the effect of preceding obligation.

The first of these was the case of them in the old Law. The second is the ordinary case of beginners in religion. The third was the case of Moses, who despised to be called the son of Pharaohs daughter, because he had an eye to the recompence of reward: which reward was both temporal and eternal. The fourth is the case of all them who follow after godliness because it hath the promises of the world that now is, and of that which is to come; and that seek the Kingdom of heaven and the righteousness thereof, knowing that all these things (which they need here) shall be added to them; added ex abundanti, besides those greater and more glorious promises belon∣ging to the Kingdom of grace. And the last was the Case of Job. Doth

Job serve God for nought? No, he had received many blessings which had endeared and obliged his services. But as in all cases God gives us temporal blessings in order to his service and the communication of Eternal; so must our intentions and designs be, ever subordinate, ever apt to yield in case of opposition, but alwaies ministring in case of compatibility and consistency.

2. The second inquiry is,* 1.2479 In what sense it is true that God must be served purely for his own sake; and vertue pursued for vertues sake, and not for low regards, for fear or hope, or secular considerations.

To this I answer,* 1.2480 that this question hath it's principal effect in dis∣course and contemplation, and but little in practice and in the real events of actions. For the first thing that any man knows of God is, that he is, and is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him: and no man does chuse to serve God but he really is assured and believes he shall have a very great reward:* 1.2481 and all the laws of God are established upon promises and argu∣ments of amability and desire. So that to serve God for his own sake, is nothing but an extasie of love used by some excellent and contemplative persons, in which they only actually consider the excellencies and perfecti∣ons of God; being built up in the love of God by the instruments of fear and hope and experience, and the spirit of God: and to serve God without reward, can never be any more then a fiction of law or fancy, a supposition, and a case put, which can never be reduced to act. But even as the serving of God with intuition of the reward is virtually a serving God for love of him; so serving God out of mere love of him, is virtual∣ly a serving God for reward.

Diligeris populo non propter praemia, Caesar:* 1.2482 Propter te populus praemia, Caesar, amat.

For as no man can wisely hope for the reward but he that does love God; so no man loves God purely and for himself but he knows also that he is most sure of his reward. It is like S. Paul's wishing himself anathema for his Brethren: the greater charity he had in so wishing, the further that thing was from being effected.

2. But yet there is something more material in the answer to this question.* 1.2483 For by God and wise men it is intended we should love God purely and for himself; but so he does who loves God above every thing else; for all that supereminent love by which God is more loved then all the world, all that love is pure and for himself. He that loves God only for riches or health, loves these better then God: but he that loves God above these, loves him for these and for himself too; for the good that he is, as well as for the good which he does.

3. He is understood to love God for himself,* 1.2484 who abstains from sin not only because it is forbidden, or because it will bring him to mischief, but because he hates it; though it may be the prohibition and the fear first brought in that hatred. For this they usually called the love of ver∣tue and honesty;* 1.2485 but the other is necessity. Neque enim minus apud nos honestas, quam apud alios necessitas valet, said Pliny. And of this we still receive the greater evidence, by how much the less we are moved with any of the lesser appendages of vertue.* 1.2486 Quam me juvat (said Secundus) quod

in causis agendis non modo pactione, dono, munere, verum etiam Xeniis semper abstinui. Oportet siquidem quae sunt inhonesta, non quia illicita, sed quasi pudenda vitare. Jucundum tamen, si prohiberi publicè videas quod nunquam tibi ipsi permiseris. I am pleased that in the administration of justice I did not only abstain from bribes and presents, but even from new-years gifts and gratuities. For we ought to abstain from dishonest things not only because they are unlawfull, but because they are shamefull. But when a man had rather doe a base action then suffer trouble, then he gives in evidence, that he loves not God and vertue in any sense principally. So he in the Comedy,

Pol pudere quam pigere praestat totidem literis.* 1.2487

It is better to blush then to be hungry, to be ashamed then to smart. Lucrum pudori praestat. That's the intention and design of these men: they serve vertue as long as vertue will serve their ends of pleasure and profit, and no more: and this is therefore infinitely against the will and glory of God, because it destroies the noblest conjugation of graces that are in Chri∣stianity; it makes that there shall be no such thing as self-denial and Chri∣stian fortitude, and the greatest love in giving our lives for God, and Mar∣tyrdome. But the surest conjecture we can make of our intentions when they are complicated is by the actual cession of one to the other. Theodoric advised well to Marcellus the Advocate of his Exchequer, [in Cassiodore] Non quoties superes, sed quemadmodum vincas inquirimus. Non quaeras de potestate nostra, sed potius de jure victoriae: quando laudabilius à parte fisci perditur, cum justitia non habetur. I have alwaies power on my side, but do you take care that I have right. I am willing my revenue be increased, but at no hand would I have justice violated. Such men as these & in these cases do love God for himself, therefore because they love good actions for other considerations then the temporal reward; they love God and serve him whether it does them hurt or good, pleasure or displeasure: and that's the true meaning of the old brave Philosophers and Poets, of loving vertue for vertues sake; they lov'd it when it was discountenanced, when it was the Enemy of their temporal ends and prosperities; and what they call'd loving vertue for vertues sake, the Christian calls loving God purely, or for God's sake.

4. But if we search the Scriptures,* 1.2488 we shall but seldom see foot-steps of any such Metaphysical love, as to love God or doe our duty without con∣siderations of hope or fear: and amongst the braver Gentiles, and amongst the better Christians in imitation and contentions to excel them, it is fur∣ther observable, that when they speak of loving vertue for vertues sake, they only mean to exclude all considerations of sordid ends, of slavish fear of laws, or the acquist of money. But even in their greatest bravery, some of them designed to themselves the reward of Honour and an im∣mortal Name; and the best of them did rest in the peace of their minds, and that satisfaction which uses to reward a good action even in this life: but by both these they were by God secretly conducted to an expectation of a reward hereafter: and there was no love of God ever so abstracted by any command or express'd intention of God, as to lay aside all intuition of that reward; because in the receiving of that reward we are most united unto God, and shall in the best manner and measures glorifie him for ever.

RULE III. The end and intention of a Law is under the Com∣mandement, as much as the action it self com∣manded in order to the end.

THIS Rule is meant principally of the Laws of God:* 1.2489 Because the end of all these laws is that which is simply and absolutely good, and nearer to the chief end which is primarily design'd: and this is an en∣dearment of our services and a Monitor to our duty in many particulars not express'd. God hath commanded us to honour our Parents; his end is, that we may receive the fruits of Government, provision and order, de∣fence and maintenance respectively. Upon this account, since we are more bound to comply with the purpose and end of God then with the means to that end when it is evident and known, because the end is greater in God's account then the means; we are taught that it is the will of God so to ex∣pound the words of that Commandement, as may best promote that end: and by Honour is understood all those duties whereby the Parent is confessed Honourable; and by Parents is meant all that are in the place of Parents, and who minister to the ends of Government.

Now this must not be understood as if God did design the end,* 1.2490 and car'd not for the means; for he is the best chuser of the instruments also of his own service and his own glory: and though the end is better then the means, yet those are the best means which God hath appointed: but if we cannot obtain the means, then it will suffice that the end be acquired as well as we can by other instruments Symbolical. Thus we are bound to profess the faith of Christ in the susception of baptism: but if we cannot obtain baptism, which is the usual and appointed publication of our faith, yet we are obliged still to pursue the end, and confess the faith of Christ by profession, by holy living, by declaring our desires of baptism, by dy∣ing for Christ if it be requir'd.

This also hath effect upon the instances of our duty so as to enforce the sincerity and ingenuity of them,* 1.2491 and to make them really usefull in order to their proper ends. Thus we must confess our sins, because we will forsake them; pray to God for his grace, because we intend to make use of it; not resting in forms of godliness, but living in the power of it. Di∣odorus lent to Caius ten Attic talents; but Caius is not able to pay a drachm, and therefore Diodorus forgives him; that he may be thank'd indeed for nothing.

Condones aut sustineas, Diodore, necesse est: Nam tibi quod solvat non habet arca mea.

But if Diodorus will be truly charitable let him lend to Caius so much more; for he serves no end of charity that lets that alone which he knows he can never get.

Ridiculè hac homines,* 1.2492 nequeunt quae vendere, donant.

I deny not but it may accidentally serve the ends of charity to forgive him that is insolvent; it may free him from fear of trouble, and make his life

comfortable; and he that does it upon these considerations serves the end of the Commandement. But he that forgives it for no other reason but because he cannot have it, he does nothing at all; for though he perform the instance of the law, yet he does nothing toward the end of it.

But in humane laws the case is something different;* 1.2493 for we are only obliged to doe nothing against the end of the law: for in this sense is that of the law to be understood, Fines mandati sunt diligenter custodiendi. l. diligenter, ff. mandati. The ends of the law are with diligence to be kept. But we are no otherwise bound to promote that end then by observing of such means as are appointed; that is, if the end be only civil and humane, and do not also include a duty of religion commanded by God. If the Church command a fasting-day in order to a corporal affliction of our selves and an external ministery of repentance, we are bound to obey it; and though that fasting-day should accidentally be no affliction, yet by virtue of that law we are no further obliged to afflict our selves. But we are in∣deed obliged to doe nothing that shall be against the end of that law. Fi∣nem certum respicientia non debent contrarium operari. l. quod favore. C. de legibus. We must not caress our selves with delicious juice of fishes and costly wines upon a fish-day. The reason of these things is briefly this. In humane laws the end is not alwaies good; or if it be, it is not alwaies ne∣cessary; or if it were in any degree necessary, yet the necessity of it is to be judg'd by the Supreme, and is no otherwise to be estimated necessary by the Subject, then by the conjecture, the proportion and efficacy of the means or instrument appointed by the Supreme to effect that end: and therefore we are bound to restrain our liberties no more then the law re∣strains them; and we need not be wiser then the laws: but he that goes against the mind of the law, upbraids the insufficiency of her provisions, and shews that he obeys with an ill will.

But the laws of God have it in their intention to regulate all the pur∣poses and whole intention of the Subject;* 1.2494 and therefore our obedience can∣not be measured only by the instance of the precept, but by the purpose of it: and because we must serve God with all our heart and all our skill, our duty must be coextended with all the holiness & designs of God in eve∣ry Commandement; that is, we must doe all that which we really suppose God would have to be done in every of his laws, whether it be express'd or only implied. For he that intends the just end of all humane actions, that is, the glory of God, can be assured that his purposes are right, when he measures them by their tendency to the end, better then by their commen∣suration with the expressed means.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.2495 said Philostratus. That's the sum of all; we must take care that the end of our actions be all of gold.* 1.2496 If they be design'd well, they are likely to end well; for this is truly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for in the service of God, a Golden head shall never have the feet of clay.

The End.

Nomini tuo da gloriam.

Notes

• * 1.1

  1.
• * 1.2

  2.
• * 1.3

  3.
• * 1.4

  4.
• * 1.5

  Lib. 1. Rule. 1.
• * 1.6

  5.
• * 1.7

  1 Cor. 7. 23.
• * 1.8

  6.
• * 1.9

  7.
• * 1.10

  8.
• * 1.11

  9.
• * 1.12

  10.
• * 1.13

  11.
• * 1.14

  Prov. 8. 15.
• * 1.15

  Wisdom 6. 3, 4.
• * 1.16

  Rom. 13. 1, 2.
• * 1.17

  John 19. 11.
• a 1.18

  L. 2. retract. c. 9. & ep. 105. ad Sixtum.
• b 1.19

  Cap. 20. lib. contr. collato∣rem.
• * 1.20

  12.
• * 1.21

  1 Pet. 2. 13.
• * 1.22

  Rom. 13. 5.
• c 1.23

  In Rom. 13.
• c 1.24

  In Rom. 13.
• c 1.25

  In Rom. 13.
• d 1.26

  Ep. 54. ad Ma∣ced. Vide etiam S. Hieron. in c. 3. ad Titum.
• e 1.27

  Cap. placuit 16. q. 6. & in l. extat. ff. quod metus causa.
• f 1.28

  Gl. in cap. Jus gentium dist. 2. verbo Sedium. Capp. 1, 2, 23. q. 2. l. ait prae∣tor. §. si debi∣torem. ff. de his quae in fraud, Creditorum.
• * 1.29

  13.
• * 1.30

  1 Cor. 7. 12.
• * 1.31

  Lib. 5. Ethic. cap. 7.
• * 1.32

  14.
• * 1.33

  15.
• * 1.34

  Unum necessa∣rium Chap. 3. p. 101.
• * 1.35

  16.
• * 1.36

  Lib. 2. de Bap∣tis. c. 6.
• * 1.37

  John 20.
• * 1.38

  17.
• * 1.39

  18.
• * 1.40

  De Sepultur. cap. corripian∣tur. c. 25. q. 3. gl. ad verbum [Major.]
• * 1.41

  Lib. 10. ep. 83.
• * 1.42

  19.
• * 1.43

  Numb. 16.
• * 1.44

  20.
• * 1.45

  21.
• * 1.46

  22.
• * 1.47

  Lib. 1. de prae∣cept. & dispens. c. 11.
• * 1.48

  Cap. 12.
• * 1.49

  Lev. 26. 15.
• * 1.50

  Lev. 26. 15.
• * 1.51

  Gloss. in cap. Metropolita∣num 2. quaest. 7.
• * 1.52

  23.
• * 1.53

  24.
• * 1.54

  25.
• * 1.55

  26.
• * 1.56

  27.
• * 1.57

  28.
• * 1.58

  Isai. 33.
• * 1.59

  Luc. 1.
• * 1.60

  Apoc. 1. & cap. 19.
• * 1.61

  1 Pet. 2. 15.
• * 1.62

  See the Doct. and Pract. of Repent. chap. 4 p. 173.
• * 1.63

  Galat. 5. 13.
• * 1.64

  1 Cor. 7. 20. 21, 24.
• * 1.65

  Lib. 3. instir. cap. 19. § 10.
• * 1.66

  James 1. 25.
• * 1.67

  Rom. 8. 12.
• * 1.68

  Rom. 8. 1, & 14.
• * 1.69

  1 Cor. 8. 9.
• * 1.70

  Rom. 8. 22.
• * 1.71

  Acts 13. 33.
• * 1.72

  1 Cor. 7. 23.
• * 1.73

  Verse 24.
• * 1.74

  Vide etiam Francisci de Silvestris opus∣culum de E∣vangelica liber∣tate.
• * 1.75

  29.
• * 1.76

  If a man have but a right understanding that it is all one before God to eat flesh o•• egges, milk or fish; that to him it matters not whether you wear a red or a white garment in your times of solemn prayer; this is enough, says Calvin [lib. 3. cap. 19. §. 10. instit.] he need not tie himself to either, but if he does, his conscience is still free, though his action or choice be determined. And so it is though the law of his Superiour determines him.
• * 1.77

  1 Pet. 2. 19.
• * 1.78

  De benefic. 3. 2. 2 ae q. 104. art. 5.
• * 1.79

  30.
• * 1.80

  31.
• * 1.81

  32.
• * 1.82

  33.
• * 1.83

  34.
• * 1.84

  35.
• * 1.85

  Col. 3. 23.
• * 1.86

  36.
• * 1.87

  37.
• * 1.88

  38.
• * 1.89

  39.
• * 1.90

  40.
• * 1.91

  41.
• * 1.92

  42.
• * 1.93

  43.
• * 1.94

  44.
• * 1.95

  Vide Rule 6. of this chapter.
• * 1.96

  Rule 4. of this chapter.
• * 1.97

  45.
• * 1.98

  46.
• * 1.99

  Orat. 17.
• * 1.100

  Apolog. 2. pro Christ.
• * 1.101

  Lib. 1. de prae∣cept. & dispens. c. 11, 12.
• * 1.102

  Videat lector Latomi librum [de Ecclesia & legis humanae obligatione] & Claudium Carninum [de vi & potestate legum humanarum] Cajetanum verb▪ praeceptum, Navarrum, Card. Toletum de hac materia in libello de 7. peccatis mortal.
• * 1.103

  1.
• * 1.104

  2.
• * 1.105

  3.
• * 1.106

  Lib. 1. Offic.
• * 1.107

  4.
• * 1.108

  5.
• * 1.109

  6.
• * 1.110

  7.
• * 1.111

  8.
• * 1.112

  9.
• * 1.113

  10.
• * 1.114

  11.
• * 1.115

  12.
• * 1.116

  13.
• * 1.117

  14.
• * 1.118

  Lib. de bono conjug. cap. 16.
• * 1.119

  15.
• * 1.120

  16.
• * 1.121

  17.
• * 1.122

  18.
• * 1.123

  2.
• * 1.124

  Clement. Exivi de Paradiso, de verb. signif.
• * 1.125

  3.
• * 1.126

  L. in causae. §▪ idem ••ompo∣nius. ff. de mi∣noribus. & l. item si precio. §. quemadmo∣dum. ff. locati & conducti.
• * 1.127

  Levit. 19.
• * 1.128

  1 Thes••. 4.
• * 1.129

  4.
• * 1.130

  Cap. at si Cle∣rici. in princip. de Judi▪
• * 1.131

  Rom. 14.
• * 1.132

  5.
• * 1.133

  Cap. 10.
• * 1.134

  Epist. 91.
• * 1.135

  Claudian. ad Honor.
• * 1.136

  L. 1. ff. de legi∣bus.
• * 1.137

  In Hippia.
• * 1.138

  Lib. 3. cap. 3.
• * 1.139

  Ethic. lib. 8. c. 10.
• * 1.140

  Lib. 4. Eth. cap. 1.
• * 1.141

  Ubi suprà.
• * 1.142

  De Clemen••. 1.
• * 1.143

  6.
• * 1.144

  7.
• * 1.145

  8.
• * 1.146

  9.
• * 1.147

  10.
• * 1.148

  11.
• * 1.149

  12.
• * 1.150

  13.
• * 1.151

  14.
• * 1.152

  Lib. 3. de le∣gib. cap. 30. ••. 11.
• * 1.153

  1.
• * 1.154

  2.
• * 1.155

  3.
• * 1.156

  4.
• * 1.157

  1.
• * 1.158

  2.
• * 1.159

  3.
• * 1.160

  4.
• * 1.161

  5.
• * 1.162

  6.
• * 1.163

  De Poenit.
• * 1.164

  7.
• * 1.165

  8.
• * 1.166

  L. 18. ff. de poe∣nis. l. fugitivus. ff. de verbor. signific.
• * 1.167

  9.
• * 1.168

  Novel. 135.
• * 1.169

  1.
• * 1.170

  Vide etiam Au∣thent. ut factae novae constit.
• * 1.171

  De benefic. q. 22. n. 14.
• * 1.172

  2.
• * 1.173

  3.
• * 1.174

  4.
• * 1.175

  5.
• * 1.176

  6.
• * 1.177

  7.
• * 1.178

  8.
• * 1.179

  1.
• * 1.180

  2.
• * 1.181

  3.
• * 1.182

  4.
• * 1.183

  5.
• * 1.184

  Lib. 2. Polit. c. 6. § leges dist. 4. l. dequibus ff. de legibus.
• * 1.185

  Apolog. c. 4.
• * 1.186

  6.
• * 1.187

  7.
• * 1.188

  8.
• * 1.189

  9.
• * 1.190

  Rule 3.
• * 1.191

  Panormit. c. cum olim. de cleric. conjug.
• * 1.192

  1.
• * 1.193

  Cap. 2. de con∣stitut. n. 6.
• * 1.194

  L. omnes po∣puli de justitia & jure.
• * 1.195

  2.
• * 1.196

  3.
• * 1.197

  4.
• * 1.198

  5.
• * 1.199

  L. Qui non facit ff. de regu∣lis juris.
• * 1.200

  6.
• * 1.201

  7.
• * 1.202

  1.
• * 1.203

  Vide A. Gelli∣um lib. 1. cap. 13.
• * 1.204

  2.
• * 1.205

  3.
• * 1.206

  4.
• * 1.207

  5.
• * 1.208

  1.
• * 1.209

  Nemo sibi pu∣tabit turpe quod aliis fuit fructu••sum. Pa∣tercul. lib. 2. in princ.
• * 1.210

  1 Chron. 29. 12.
• * 1.211

  1 Tim. 6. 15. Psal. 82. 6.
• * 1.212

  2.
• * 1.213

  Rom. 13.
• * 1.214

  3.
• * 1.215

  4.
• * 1.216

  5.
• * 1.217

  6.
• * 1.218

  7.
• * 1.219

  8.
• * 1.220

  9.
• * 1.221

  10.
• * 1.222

  11.
• * 1.223

  12.
• * 1.224

  13.
• * 1.225

  14.
• * 1.226

  15.
• * 1.227

  16.
• * 1.228

  See the Doctr. and Practise of Repentance, chap. 5. sect. 5. p. 280.
• * 1.229

  17.
• * 1.230

  ••hilippi••. 8.
• * 1.231

  18.
• * 1.232

  Gen. 9. 6.
• * 1.233

  Lib. 4
• * 1.234

  Lib. 4. Etymol. c. 21. & habe∣tur. dist. 4. can. factae sunt leges
• * 1.235

  1.
• * 1.236

  2.
• * 1.237

  Exod. 21. 25, 26.
• * 1.238

  3.
• * 1.239

  Lib. 2. chap. 2. Rule 3. n. 8.
• * 1.240

  4.
• * 1.241

  Levit. 22. 14.
• * 1.242

  5.
• * 1.243

  Num. 5. 6.
• * 1.244

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.245

  6.
• * 1.246

  1 Cor. 11.
• * 1.247

  7.
• * 1.248

  8.
• * 1.249

  9.
• * 1.250

  10.
• * 1.251

  11.
• * 1.252

  12.
• * 1.253

  13.
• * 1.254

  14.
• * 1.255

  15.
• * 1.256

  16.
• * 1.257

  17.
• * 1.258

  De supersti∣tione.
• * 1.259

  Lib. 2. En∣nead. 1.
• * 1.260

  18.
• * 1.261

  19.
• * 1.262

  20.
• * 1.263

  21.
• * 1.264

  22.
• * 1.265

  23.
• * 1.266

  Lib. 1. Offic.
• * 1.267

  24.
• * 1.268

  25.
• * 1.269

  26.
• * 1.270

  26.
• * 1.271

  Lib. 2. ordinat. Regal. tit. 9. l. 1.
• * 1.272

  Ibid. tit. 15.
• * 1.273

  27.
• * 1.274

  28.
• * 1.275

  Cap. Caeterum, & cap. Nonnulli de rescriptis. cap. Novit. in fine de his quae fiunt à praelato.
• * 1.276

  29.
• * 1.277

  Lib. 17. cap. 7. Noct. Attic.
• * 1.278

  30.
• * 1.279

  Virgil. lib. 4. Aeneid. & lib. 4. Geor.
• * 1.280

  Alph. à Castro lib. 2. de leg. poen. cap. 7.
• * 1.281

  31.
• * 1.282

  Lib. 1. de Divi∣nat.
• * 1.283

  Epist. ad Attic.
• * 1.284

  Cap. in poenis de reg. ju••. lib. 6.
• * 1.285

  32.
• * 1.286

  1.
• * 1.287

  2.
• * 1.288

  Lib. de men∣dac. c. 13.
• * 1.289

  3.
• * 1.290

  4.
• * 1.291

  Vide Diogen. Laert. in Ze∣non.
• * 1.292

  Alexander A∣phrodisaeus in 2. de anima. Lucian. in Macrob.
• * 1.293

  Galen. 5. de loc. affect. Plutarch. in Pericle. Suidas. ••lin. l. 1. ep. 12.
• * 1.294

  Lib. 15.
• a 1.295

  In Phaedon. Platon.
• b 1.296

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 4.
• c 1.297

  Annal. 6.
• * 1.298

  Vide Front. Ducaeum Tom. 1. S. Chrysost. n. 628.
• * 1.299

  Lib. 3. de Virgin.
• * 1.300

  In cap. 1. Jonae, in haec verba, Mittite me in mare.
• * 1.301

  §. quod si ff. quod metus causâ.
• * 1.302

  5.
• * 1.303

  Hii••or. Sep••entr.
• * 1.304

  Exposit. in Johan. tract. 52.
• * 1.305

  Et lib. 19. de Civit. Dei.
• * 1.306

  Bell. Judaic. l. 3. c. 25.
• * 1.307

  Lib. 3. Ethic. cap. 7. & lib. 5. cap. ult.
• * 1.308

  Metamorph l. 7. fab. 25.
• * 1.309

  Ubi suprá.
• * 1.310

  7.
• * 1.311

  Lib. 1. cap. 20. de Civit. Dei.
• * 1.312

  Eth. Nic. li. ••. cap. 11.
• * 1.313

  8.
• * 1.314

  9.
• * 1.315

  Lib. 3. Instit. cap. 18.
• * 1.316

  10.
• * 1.317

  Lib. de Senect.
• * 1.318

  Somn. Scip. Vide Platonem in Phaedone.
• * 1.319

  Lib. 1. Tuscul.
• * 1.320

  Ad Carm. aur. Pyth.
• * 1.321

  Jamb. 18.
• * 1.322

  11.
• * 1.323

  In 12. Aeneid.
• * 1.324

  12.
• * 1.325

  Lib. 5. c. 11. Eth.
• * 1.326

  13.
• * 1.327

  1 Macc. 6. 43.
• * 1.328

  14.
• * 1.329

  15.
• * 1.330

  16.
• * 1.331

  Orat. de Pro∣vinciis consu∣laribus. Adv. Jovinian.
• * 1.332

  Lib. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.333

  Gal. 1. 4.
• * 1.334

  Gothicor. 4.
• * 1.335

  Lib. 6. c. 70.
• * 1.336

  Aeneid 6.
• a 1.337

  Lib. 1. de ci∣vit. Dei, c. 20. 21, 26. ep. 61. ad Dulcit. & l. 11. contra 2. ep. Gaudent. c. 23.
• b 1.338

  Excid. Hie∣ros. 3. c. 17.
• c 1.339

  Epitom. log. c. 4.
• d 1.340

  Aethiop. 2.
• * 1.341

  1.
• * 1.342

  2.
• * 1.343

  Exod: 22. 1.
• * 1.344

  Ibid.
• * 1.345

  Can. Miss. de consecrat. dist. 1.
• * 1.346

  Tacitè per∣••issum est quod sine ultione prohibetur. Tertull. 1. adv. Marc.
• * 1.347

  3.
• * 1.348

  4.
• * 1.349

  5.
• * 1.350

  Lib. 1. Retract. c. 9.
• * 1.351

  A. Gellius, lib. 20. cap. 1.
• * 1.352

  6.
• * 1.353

  7.
• * 1.354

  8.
• * 1.355

  9.
• * 1.356

  Lib. 1. Offic.
• * 1.357

  1.
• * 1.358

  Lib. 12. variar. hist.
• * 1.359

  Lib. 6. de Rep.
• * 1.360

  Clem. Alex. lib. 6. cap. 4.
• * 1.361

  2.
• * 1.362

  3.
• * 1.363

  Prov. 13. 5. 30. 8. Psal. 5. 7.
• * 1.364

  Col. 3. 9. Revel. 21. 8, 27.
• * 1.365

  4.
• * 1.366

  5.
• * 1.367

  S. Gregor. lib. 26. Moral. cap. 7.
• * 1.368

  Epist 8. ad Hieron.
• * 1.369

  Eurip. in Phoeniss. Lactant. 6. instit. 16.
• * 1.370

  6.
• * 1.371

  7.
• * 1.372

  8.
• * 1.373

  Luc••••.
• * 1.374

  Niceph. 16. c. 35.
• * 1.375

  9.
• * 1.376

  10.
• * 1.377

  Homil. 5. de poenitent.
• * 1.378

  Natali 5. S. Felicis.
• * 1.379

  In Philopseu.
• * 1.380

  Lib. 5. Constit. cap. 37.
• * 1.381

  Lib. 3. Epist. 16.
• * 1.382

  Quaest. 68. in Levit.
• * 1.383

  11.
• * 1.384

  Ovid. 3. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.385

  12.
• * 1.386

  Sophocl. in Creusa.
• * 1.387

  Caus. 22. qu. 2. c. Nequis.
• * 1.388

  Lib. de pudicit.
• * 1.389

  De mendacio, ad Consenti∣um.
• * 1.390

  13.
• * 1.391

  Lib. de men∣dac. cap. 13.
• * 1.392

  14.
• * 1.393

  Num. 16.
• * 1.394

  15.
• * 1.395

  16.
• * 1.396

  Habetur in compendio Navarri per Petr. Guivar. edit. Antverp. 1595. pag. 93.
• * 1.397

  Pagina 82.
• * 1.398

  Vide Compen. impress. Lugd. 1641. pag. 335.
• * 1.399

  17.
• * 1.400

  S. Aug. lib. de bono viduit. cap. 22.
• * 1.401

  18.
• * 1.402

  De verbi Apost.
• * 1.403

  Dorotheus doctr. 2. n. 11.
• * 1.404

  Eth. lib. 4. c. 7.
• * 1.405

  Evagr. lib. 1. c. 15. hist. Niceph. lib. 14 c. 55.
• * 1.406

  19.
• * 1.407

  Pindar.
• * 1.408

  2 Kings 6. 19.
• * 1.409

  Lib. 1. de Sa∣cerdotio.
• * 1.410

  Livius l. 3. 29.
• * 1.411

  Val••••. Max.
• * 1.412

  Iliad. 8.
• * 1.413

  De offic. l. 1. c. 29.
• * 1.414

  Epist. 1. ad Bonifac.
• * 1.415

  Hi••ius, Bell. Gallic. 8. c. 3. Cicero, lib. 3. Offic.
• * 1.416

  Vide Orat. Cicer pro C•• Rabirio. Appian. bel Civil. 1.
• * 1.417

  Stromat. l. 1. c. 13.
• * 1.418

  20.
• * 1.419

  Qu. 10, & 11. in Josu••.
• * 1.420

  Virg. L. 1. ff. de dolo male.
• * 1.421

  Lib. 17.
• * 1.422

  21.
• a 1.423

  5 Politic. c. 17.
• b 1.424

  Lib. 10. Pol. c. 38, & 46, 47.
• * 1.425

  Sanazar. 1. Epig.
• * 1.426

  22.
• * 1.427

  Lib. 2. Anti∣quit.
• * 1.428

  23.
• * 1.429

  Lib. 3. de rep.
• * 1.430

  24.
• * 1.431

  25.
• * 1.432

  26.
• * 1.433

  27.
• * 1.434

  28.
• * 1.435

  29.
• * 1.436

  Lib. 6. in 1 Reg. c. 3.
• * 1.437

  30.
• * 1.438

  31.
• * 1.439

  Isa. 38.
• * 1.440

  32.
• * 1.441

  Theophylact. in 24. Matth.
• * 1.442

  Moral. lib. 10. c. 27.
• * 1.443

  33.
• * 1.444

  34.
• * 1.445

  S. Aug. de conflictu virt. & vitiorum.
• * 1.446

  35.
• * 1.447

  36.
• * 1.448

  37.
• * 1.449

  38.
• * 1.450

  39.
• * 1.451

  40.
• * 1.452

  8. l. Hist. c. 22.
• * 1.453

  41.
• * 1.454

  42.
• * 1.455

  43.
• * 1.456

  ••. 2••. q. 3. art. 1.
• * 1.457

  44.
• * 1.458

  Lib. de discipl. & habitu. virg.
• * 1.459

  Orat. 21.
• * 1.460

  45.
• * 1.461

  Vide Senecam epist. 115.
• * 1.462

  46.
• * 1.463

  Epist. 99.
• * 1.464

  47.
• * 1.465

  Vide Aq••i∣nat. in 3. ••. dist. 38. art. 3. ad 5.
• * 1.466

  48.
• * 1.467

  Lib. 4. Eth. c. 7.
• * 1.468

  49.
• * 1.469

  Vide in fine li. 1. de Sacerd.
• * 1.470

  Serm. of Chri∣stian simpli∣city.
• * 1.471

  50.
• * 1.472

  1.
• * 1.473

  2.
• * 1.474

  3.
• * 1.475

  Deut. 13. 9.
• * 1.476

  4.
• * 1.477

  5.
• * 1.478

  6.
• * 1.479

  7.
• * 1.480

  Jubet Deus ut manus no∣stras super mi∣nores semper habeamus, hoc est, ut peccantes eos assiduis verberibus corrigamus, n•• amore inuili & indulgentia nimi•• e••u∣••entur ad malum, & ad vitia nutriantur, Lactant. lib. 6. instit.
• * 1.481

  8.
• * 1.482

  C••d. rubr. quando liceat se sine judice vindicare.
• * 1.483

  9.
• * 1.484

  Rom. 12. 19.
• * 1.485

  10.
• * 1.486

  11.
• * 1.487

  12.
• * 1.488

  Caus. 2. qu. 5. c. 22. mono∣machiam. Decret. tit. de vulgari purgat. 6 Stows Annals. 25. of Henry
• * 1.489

  13.
• * 1.490

  14.
• * 1.491

  Lib. 5. hist. Ital.
• * 1.492

  in Dobunis.
• * 1.493

  Bald. 5. conf••••. 493.
• * 1.494

  Horat. epist. l. 1. ep. 2.
• a 1.495

  De lingua Latina.
• b 1.496

  in verb. Du∣ellum.
• c 1.497

  Amphitruo.
• d 1.498

  in lib. 1. Annal. Enn.
• e 1.499

  de Rep. lib. 1. cap. 26.
• f 1.500

  lib. 1. c. 3.
• g 1.501

  lib. 2. c. 8.
• h 1.502

  de Singul. certam. c. 3.
• i 1.503

  de Rep. c. 4. l. 7.
• k 1.504

  conclus. 76.
• l 1.505

  de Jure belli, lib. 1. c. 3.
• * 1.506

  15.
• * 1.507

  Juvenal.
• * 1.508

  De amicitia.
• * 1.509

  16.
• * 1.510

  17.
• * 1.511

  18.
• * 1.512

  Vide Great Exemplar, part. 2. p. 363.
• * 1.513

  apud Ly∣siam.
• * 1.514

  Serm. 2.
• * 1.515

  19.
• * 1.516

  20.
• * 1.517

  1.
• * 1.518

  2.
• * 1.519

  1 Cor. 6. 20.
• * 1.520

  3.
• * 1.521

  4.
• * 1.522

  5.
• * 1.523

  Lib. 20. cap. 1.
• * 1.524

  6.
• * 1.525

  Oratione pro Quintio, apud Livium, l. 6.
• * 1.526

  7.
• * 1.527

  L. 1. C Theod.
• * 1.528

  Vide Raevar∣dum ad Ll. 12. Tabul. c. 8.
• * 1.529

  Lib. 1. Cod. Theod. qui bon. ex leg. Jul. ced. & l. si vi∣ctum. ff. de re judic.
• * 1.530

  l. 2. C. de exact. tribut. l. 10.
• * 1.531

  8.
• * 1.532

  In Rullum.
• * 1.533

  In Catilin.
• * 1.534

  9.
• * 1.535

  Lib. de Nabu∣the, cap. 5.
• * 1.536

  Offic. lib. 1.
• * 1.537

  10.
• * 1.538

  Lib. de Tobia cap. 10.
• * 1.539

  11.
• * 1.540

  Lib. de Tobia cap. 8.
• * 1.541

  3. p. q. 41. in 4. a. 4. Corol. lar. 3.
• * 1.542

  in 2. 22. q. 108. a. 4. ad. 2.
• * 1.543

  12.
• * 1.544

  Livius l. 38.
• * 1.545

  Sueton. in Ju∣lio, c. 69. in August. c. 24.
• * 1.546

  Livius l. 36.
• * 1.547

  Lib. 45.
• a 1.548

  Lib. hist. 6.
• b 1.549

  Lib. 14, & 17.
• c 1.550

  In Crasso.
• d 1.551

  Civil. 2.
• e 1.552

  Lib. 48.
• f 1.553

  In Opilio Macrone.
• * 1.554

  13.
• * 1.555

  14.
• * 1.556

  15.
• * 1.557

  1.
• * 1.558

  Rom. 13.
• * 1.559

  Ad hoc tri∣buta praestamus, ut propter ne∣cessaria militi stipēdium prae∣beatur. S. Aug. lib. 22. c. 74. c. Faust. Ma∣nich.
• * 1.560

  Cicero prolege Manilia.
• * 1.561

  2.
• * 1.562

  Lib. 5. Eth. cap. 8.
• * 1.563

  3.
• * 1.564

  Matth. 22. 21.
• * 1.565

  Rom. 13. 7.
• * 1.566

  In Apolog.
• * 1.567

  In 1. Reg. 14. 11. q. 1. c. 28.
• * 1.568

  Vectigalia sine Imperatorum praecepto, neque Praesidi, neque Curatori, neque Curia constituere, nec praecedentia reformare, & his vel addere, vel diminuere licet, ff. de Publican. l. 10.

  Vectigalia nova nec decreto civitatum institui possunt, Sever. C. de vectigal. nov. instit. non post. l. 2. & Gallien. l. seq. ait, Non solent nova vectigalia inconsultis principibus instituti.

  Placet nullum omnino Judicem de caetero Provincialibus inferendum aliquid indicere, ut ea tdntum sedulo cunctorum studio pensitentur, quae Canonis instituti forma complectitur, vel nostra clementia decernit inferenda, vel delegatione solem∣niter sanciente, vel epistolis praecedentibus, Constantin. l. 8. C. de excusat. mun. lib. 10.
• a 1.569

  Deuter. 20.
• b 1.570

  Tacit. hist. l. 4.
• c 1.571

  Lib. 1. ad Quintum fratr. ep. 1.
• * 1.572

  2.
• * 1.573

  3.
• * 1.574

  4.
• d 1.575

  Pra••crea cum pedagia, gui la∣gia, salinaria tibi legatus in∣terdixerit, au∣thoritate Apo∣stolica duximus declarandum, illa esse pedagia, salinaria, guidagia interdicta, quae non apparent Imperatorum, vel Regum, ••el Later an••nsis Concilii largitione concessa, vel ex antiqua consuetudine à tempore cujus non extat memoria introducta. Innocent. 3. de verb. signif. c. super quibusdam, § 1.
• * 1.576

  5.
• * 1.577

  L. Universi. C. de vectig. & l. omnium. C. eod.
• * 1.578

  1.
• * 1.579

  2.
• * 1.580

  3.
• * 1.581

  4.
• * 1.582

  5.
• * 1.583

  6.
• * 1.584

  Quid est publicanus? N••nne caput rapinae, & lex violentiae? Quid est publicanus? Praedo sine pudore, medius exterminii. Nónne immanior furibus publi∣canus? Fur namque vel metuens furatur, hic autem delinquit confidenter. Fur laqueos tegit, timet, hic autem quicquid fecerit legem putat. Lex furem deterret ab illicitis, hic ad iniquum malitiae suae compendium legem trahit. Quis eo iniquior qui verbis justitia justitiam damnat, & armis innocentiae spoliat, vulnerat, occidit Innocentes? lege utique legem per∣••ertit, & dum urget ad legem, exlex est, Laurent. Episc. Mediol. in Homil.
• * 1.585

  Juvenal. Sat. 8.
• * 1.586

  1.
• * 1.587

  2.
• * 1.588

  3.
• * 1.589

  Lib. 53.
• * 1.590

  In Arg. trag. supplic.
• * 1.591

  Decad. 1. l. 9.
• * 1.592

  4.
• * 1.593

  5.
• * 1.594

  De Magistrat.
• * 1.595

  August. 53.
• * 1.596

  Tacit. in Agric.
• * 1.597

  Lib. 7. De be∣nef. cap. 4.
• * 1.598

  Ibid. cap. 5.
• * 1.599

  Cap. 6.
• * 1.600

  6.
• * 1.601

  4. ad Herenni∣um.
• * 1.602

  7.
• * 1.603

  1 Sam. 8.
• * 1.604

  Deuter. 17.
• * 1.605

  8.
• * 1.606

  Contr. Chri∣stian.
• * 1.607

  9.
• * 1.608

  1 Consil. 245.
• * 1.609

  10.
• * 1.610

  11.
• * 1.611

  12.
• * 1.612

  Illust. Quaest. 1.
• * 1.613

  1.
• * 1.614

  2.
• * 1.615

  Instit. d. tit. 2.
• * 1.616

  3.
• * 1.617

  4.
• * 1.618

  5.
• * 1.619

  Vestri consilii, vestrae pruden∣tiae est spectare quid deceat vos, non quantum liceat. Cic. pro Rabitio.
• * 1.620

  Hieron. Mus∣cornus tract. de Jurisdict. & Imp.
• * 1.621

  Principes qui Superiorem non habent, plus puniuntur à Deo, & itaque caveant sibi, ne peccent. Castr. 11. C. de jud.
• * 1.622

  Vindicta certè maxima in no∣bis siua est. Co∣gunt timere? odisse rursum possumus: jus••a odia superant omne vindictae genus. Meursi.
• * 1.623

  6.
• * 1.624

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 4. 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.625

  Lib. de regno
• * 1.626

  Apud 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.627

  7.
• * 1.628

  In Eph••••. 6.
• * 1.629

  8.
• * 1.630

  In Martyrol. Rom.
• * 1.631

  9.
• * 1.632

  10.
• * 1.633

  11.
• * 1.634

  L. 3. C. de r••∣sta. L. 6. C. qui test. ••••c. po.
• * 1.635

  12.
• * 1.636

  Lib. 20.
• * 1.637

  13.
• * 1.638

  14.
• * 1.639

  Cassiod. var. l. 10. 16, 17.
• * 1.640

  15.
• * 1.641

  Authen: si q••is de eden.
• * 1.642

  16.
• * 1.643

  L. 1. ff. de con∣stitut. Princip. & § sed & quod Principi. instit. de Jure Natur. & praef. pandect. l. 1. ff. de offic. praef. praet. & Cod. de vet. Jur. enucleand. l. 1. § sed & hoc.
• * 1.644

  Lib. 8.
• * 1.645

  Fodder.
• * 1.646

  17.
• * 1.647

  Comm. Pii 2. lib. 3.
• * 1.648

  Lib. 20. de Ci∣vit. Dei, c. 26.
• * 1.649

  Nov. 105.
• * 1.650

  18.
• * 1.651

  Sen. Herc. Fur.
• * 1.652

  Senec. De cle∣ment.
• * 1.653

  Variat. 11.
• * 1.654

  19.
• * 1.655

  20.
• * 1.656

  21.
• * 1.657

  1 Kings 2. 26.
• * 1.658

  22.
• * 1.659

  23.
• * 1.660

  24.
• * 1.661

  25.
• * 1.662

  Vani capitis est existimare superiorem non posse evocare sine causae cog∣nitione. Innoc. in c. ad aures de Temp. Ord.
• * 1.663

  1.
• * 1.664

  2.
• * 1.665

  3.
• * 1.666

  Eccl. 10. 20. Eccles. 8. 2, 3.
• * 1.667

  Prov. 30. 31.
• * 1.668

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.669

  4.
• * 1.670

  5.
• * 1.671

  6.
• * 1.672

  1 Pet. 2. 13, ad 17. vers.
• * 1.673

  7.
• * 1.674

  Jude 8.
• * 1.675

  8.
• * 1.676

  Biblioth. PP. Tom. 8. edit. Binian.
• * 1.677

  Orat. 1. in Julian.
• * 1.678

  Et in 1 Ti∣moth. c. 2. v. 1.
• * 1.679

  Et Epist. 54. ad Macedon. & tract. 6. in Johan.
• * 1.680

  9.
• * 1.681

  10.
• * 1.682

  Orat. in obit. fratr. Satyri.
• * 1.683

  apud Simon. Scard.
• * 1.684

  lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. c. 21.
• * 1.685

  11.
• * 1.686

  Polit. 7. c. 13.
• * 1.687

  1 Tim. 2. 2.
• * 1.688

  lib. 3. Confess. cap. 8.
• * 1.689

  12.
• * 1.690

  13.
• * 1.691

  14.
• * 1.692

  Dion. Cassius.
• * 1.693

  15.
• * 1.694

  16.
• * 1.695

  Bell. Jugurth.
• * 1.696

  lib. 1. Fam. ep. 9.
• * 1.697

  17.
• * 1.698

  18.
• * 1.699

  19.
• * 1.700

  Eurip.
• * 1.701

  Claudian.
• * 1.702

  1.
• * 1.703

  2.
• a 1.704

  De pontif. Rom. l. 2. c. 17.
• b 1.705

  Annal. Eccles.
• c 1.706

  Contr. Apol. Eccl. Angl.
• d 1.707

  Contr. Episc. Eliens.
• e 1.708

  in Comment. in Esther.
• f 1.709

  in Theatr.
• g 1.710

  de Justa abdicat. Henric. 3.
• h 1.711

  De jure Magistratuum.
• i 1.712

  De potestate Papae.
• k 1.713

  De temp. et spirit. Pontif. potestate.
• l 1.714

  Of the broken succession.
• * 1.715

  3.
• m 1.716

  de Presby∣terio
• n 1.717

  in his last Reply
• o 1.718

  Christian. poli••iâ.
• p 1.719

  lib. disciplinae
• q 1.720

  loci comm. Theol.
• r 1.721

  Observat. in Psal. 1.
• s 1.722

  De jure regni apud Scotes.
• t 1.723

  treatise of Obedience
• u 1.724

  De jure ma∣gistratuum
• w 1.725

  Francogallia
• x 1.726

  Dial. 2. p. 65.
• * 1.727

  4.
• * 1.728

  lib. 5. Annal. Boior:
• * 1.729

  Epist. ad Peri∣mannum Epis. Metens.
• * 1.730

  5.
• * 1.731

  6.
• * 1.732

  7.
• * 1.733

  Cum jus con∣ferendi opi ••a sacerdotia ab Henrico Imp. vi fuerat ex∣tortum, ea res (inquit Paulus AEmilius lib. 5.) multum virium Imperatoriae Majestati detraxit in animis popularium, plus enim quam dimidium suae jurisdictionis perdidit.
• * 1.734

  Auson.
• * 1.735

  l. 4. Eutrop. l. 2. L. Flor.
• * 1.736

  lib. 8.
• * 1.737

  1 Cor. 6.
• * 1.738

  8.
• * 1.739

  Lib. 2. de Di∣vinat.
• * 1.740

  Horat.
• * 1.741

  Orat. 5. in Ver∣••em.
• * 1.742

  in Bacchis
• * 1.743

  in Supplic.
• * 1.744

  Novel. 42.
• * 1.745

  Eorum impe∣riis remp. am∣plificuam qui relizionibus paruissent, dixit Cicero, de Nat. Deor. l. 2.
• † 1.746

  Orat. de arusp. resp.
• * 1.747

  contra Colot.
• * 1.748

  9.
• * 1.749

  Solo sacramento inclyti principes tuti sunt, Symmach. lib. 10. ep. 54. Maximum, dicente Catone; majoribus nostris telum, ex quo plures pace susceptae quam bello gentes fuere devictae, quo solo continetur omnis societas, & dissoluto dissolvitur. Appius lib. 6. in fin. Omnium primum, rem ad multitudinem imperitam, & illis seculis rudem efficacissimam, Deorum metum in∣jiciendum ratus est. Livius lib. 1. Pri∣mum enim militiae vinculum est religio, & signorum amor, & deserendi nefas. Senec. epist. 96.
• * 1.750

  10.
• * 1.751

  11.
• * 1.752

  Matth. West∣monast. in Henr. 3.
• * 1.753

  lib. 8. Rerum Gallicar.
• * 1.754

  Aventin. lib. 7. Annal.
• * 1.755

  in Sertorio.
• * 1.756

  Diod. Sicul. lib. 6. c. 10. Florus lib. 3. c. 16.
• * 1.757

  lib 2. De bello Judaic. cap. 12.
• * 1.758

  12.
• * 1.759

  13.
• * 1.760

  lib. 2. cont••. Applon.
• * 1.761

  Liv. lib. 15.
• * 1.762

  Liv. lib. 39.
• * 1.763

  14.
• * 1.764

  Liv. 5. dec. 3. & lib. 10. dec. 4. in Augusto, c. 31.
• * 1.765

  Joseph. lib. 13. Antiq. Judic. c. 6.
• * 1.766

  Novel. 103. c. 2.
• * 1.767

  15.
• * 1.768

  lib. 1. Paedag. c. 1.
• * 1.769

  apud Cassiodo∣rum, lib. 2. Va∣riar. ep. 27.
• * 1.770

  lib. 10. ep. 26.
• * 1.771

  16.
• * 1.772

  Marsil. Ficin. in praefat. lib. Trismeg. Strabo lib. 5. In bell. Alex∣andr. Diod. Sicul. l. 6. c. 10.
• * 1.773

  lib. 10. Aeneid.
• * 1.774

  Fastor.
• * 1.775

  lib. 2. De nat. Deor.
• * 1.776

  17.
• * 1.777

  Festus Pom∣peius, lib. 17. Dionys. Halic. lib. 4.
• * 1.778

  A. Gell. lib. 10. cap. 15.
• * 1.779

  Liv. lib. 2.
• * 1.780

  18.
• * 1.781

  Annal. lib. 3.
• * 1.782

  19.
• * 1.783

  Hebr. 1. 2.
• * 1.784

  Revel. 1. 5. 11. 17. 17. 14. 19. 16.
• * 1.785

  1 Tim. 6. 15.
• * 1.786

  Matth. 28. 18.
• * 1.787

  Serm. de B. Virg.
• * 1.788

  Synes.
• * 1.789

  Matth. 20. 25.
• * 1.790

  20.
• * 1.791

  21.
• * 1.792

  in Sent. c. 51.
• * 1.793

  Epist. 75.
• * 1.794

  S. August. Ep. 166.
• * 1.795

  22.
• * 1.796

  1.
• * 1.797

  Contr. Cres∣con. l. 3. c. 51.
• * 1.798

  2.
• * 1.799

  3.
• * 1.800

  4.
• a 1.801

  3. q. 6. c. 16, 17. & 2. q. 8. c. 4.
• b 1.802

  2. q. 3. c. 3.
• c 1.803

  3. q. 6. c. 1.
• * 1.804

  3. q. 9.
• * 1.805

  35. q. 6.
• * 1.806

  25. q. 2.
• * 1.807

  c. 1. Ext. de juram. calum.
• * 1.808

  5.
• * 1.809

  Novel. 133.
• * 1.810

  C. de feriis. l. 3. & Cod. Theod. de fer. l.
• † 1.811

  Epist. 31.
• * 1.812

  1. Leo. 6. Novel. 54.
• * 1.813

  Ep. 2. ad Nepotian.
• * 1.814

  6.
• * 1.815

  tom. 7. A. D. 541.
• * 1.816

  7.
• * 1.817

  apud Radenon. in Frider. lib. 1. cap. 15.
• * 1.818

  Epist. 166.
• * 1.819

  l. 2. ind. 11. ep. 61.
• * 1.820

  Epist. 10.
• * 1.821

  c. 14.
• * 1.822

  lib. 2. Cath. Concord. c. 40.
• * 1.823

  1.
• * 1.824

  Homil. 23. in Epist. ad Rom.
• * 1.825

  2.
• * 1.826

  Hist. l. 4. c. 15.
• * 1.827

  Apolog. 2.
• * 1.828

  Epist. ad Mau∣ritium.
• * 1.829

  Comm. in Tit. 1.
• * 1.830

  de Privileg. c. super specula. c. innotuit, de Arbitr.
• * 1.831

  c. 1. de No. oper. nunc. c. constitutus de In integr. restitut. c. authoritate, de Concess. praeb. in 6.
• * 1.832

  3.
• * 1.833

  Vide Athan. de Synod.
• * 1.834

  Socrat. l. 1. c. 25.
• * 1.835

  Sozom. l. 2. c. 28.
• * 1.836

  Theodor. l. 1. c. 20.
• * 1.837

  id. ibid. c. 31.
• * 1.838

  Athanas. Apol. 2
• * 1.839

  Socrat. l. 2. c. 14.
• * 1.840

  Sozom. l. 3. c. 9. l. 2. Quorum appel.
• * 1.841

  Cod. Theod.
• * 1.842

  Socrat. l. 6. c. 16.
• * 1.843

  Vestra pia ge∣nua protensis manibus at∣tingimus. Anastas. bibli∣oth. in Sym∣macho. Epist. Hor∣misdae 56, 57. Novel. 42. et ponitur in Concil. Gen. 5. Act. 1. Liberatus in Breviat. c. 22.
• * 1.844

  4.
• * 1.845

  ad Can. 12. syn. Antioch.
• * 1.846

  5.
• * 1.847

  6.
• * 1.848

  7.
• * 1.849

  8.
• * 1.850

  9.
• * 1.851

  10.
• * 1.852

  11.
• * 1.853

  12.
• * 1.854

  Orat. 15. ad subd. tim. percul.
• * 1.855

  13.
• * 1.856

  14.
• * 1.857

  15.
• * 1.858

  16.
• * 1.859

  17.
• * 1.860

  18.
• * 1.861

  Isai. 43. 4.
• * 1.862

  19.
• * 1.863

  20.
• * 1.864

  Ora. post redi∣tum.
• * 1.865

  in 5^tâ Synod. Act. 1. Tom. 2. Concil.
• * 1.866

  Herman. in Chron.
• * 1.867

  21.
• * 1.868

  tom. de Vinc. an••them.
• * 1.869

  apud Baron. tom. 10. A. D. 904. ••. 17.
• * 1.870

  Dist. 10. c. de capitulis. 2. q. 7. c. Nos si.
• * 1.871

  11. 9. 1. c. si∣cut enim. §. ex his. 2. q. 2. §. item.
• * 1.872

  22.
• * 1.873

  23.
• * 1.874

  24.
• * 1.875

  25.
• * 1.876

  26.
• * 1.877

  De communi Apost. R. 6.
• * 1.878

  27.
• * 1.879

  A. D. 1040.
• * 1.880

  28.
• * 1.881

  29.
• * 1.882

  30.
• * 1.883

  31.
• * 1.884

  32.
• * 1.885

  33.
• * 1.886

  34.
• * 1.887

  35.
• * 1.888

  36.
• * 1.889

  37.
• * 1.890

  38.
• * 1.891

  Epist. 64. ad Theodorum medicum.
• * 1.892

  1.
• * 1.893

  Polit. l. 3.
• * 1.894

  2.
• * 1.895

  3.
• * 1.896

  4.
• * 1.897

  Vide Luitpran. lib 6. c. 6. Cuspinian, & Theodoric. à Niem in vita Othon. 3.
• * 1.898

  lib. 4. Chron.
• * 1.899

  5.
• * 1.900

  6.
• * 1.901

  lib. 39.
• * 1.902

  ••pud Cyril. ep. 17.
• * 1.903

  7.
• * 1.904

  de vita Con∣stant. lib. 4. c. 24.
• * 1.905

  Epist. 166.
• * 1.906

  8.
• * 1.907

  In Concii. Roman. sub Martino l.
• * 1.908

  lib. 4. cap. 41.
• * 1.909

  9.
• * 1.910

  10.
• a 1.911

  de vita Con∣stant. l. 7. c. 6.
• b 1.912

  lib. 1. hist. c. 1.
• c 1.913

  lib. 1. c. 16.
• d 1.914

  lib. 2. hist. c. 5.
• * 1.915

  apud Athanas. apol. 2.
• * 1.916

  apud Athanas, ibid.
• * 1.917

  Theodor. lib. 2. c. 16. in dial. & Liberius in Epist. ad Ho∣sium Cordub. apud Baron. Tom. 3. A. D. 353. n. 19.
• * 1.918

  Synod. con∣stit. libell.
• * 1.919

  apud Cy••il. Ep. 4.
• * 1.920

  Epist. 17. apud Cyrilium.
• * 1.921

  In Concil. Chalced. act. 1. scribensad Dios∣corum Alex. Leo Epist. 21. Tom. 1. Epist. RR. PP.
• * 1.922

  de Concord. l. 3. c. 16.
• * 1.923

  11.
• * 1.924

  Vide etiam Baron. Tom▪ 5. A. D. 441. n. 103. Theod. l. 2. c. 19. 20.
• * 1.925

  fine 6^tae act.
• * 1.926

  12.
• * 1.927

  Apol. ad. Ruffin. lib. 2.
• * 1.928

  apud Baron. A. D. 590. to. 8. n. 40.
• * 1.929

  13.
• * 1.930

  Novel. 146.
• * 1.931

  14.
• * 1.932

  Vide l. nemo. ff. de summa Trinitate.
• * 1.933

  Nicet. Cho∣niat.
• * 1.934

  23. q. 5. c. prin∣cipes.
• * 1.935

  15.
• * 1.936

  Imperator, ut communis 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 existens & nomina∣tus, Synodalibus praest sententiis & robur tribuit, Ecclesia∣sticos ordines componit, & legem dat vitae politiaque ••orum qui altari serviunt. Et rursus ut uno verbo dicam, solo sa∣crificandi excepto ministerio, reliqua Pontificialia privilegia Imperator repraelentat? Demetr. Chomaten. in resp. Orien. F••agrius Leonis Imp. Concilii Chalced. approbarionem ve∣cat decisionem de fide, lib. 3. c. 4. &c. 5. videat lector totum hujus re•• processum ex l. 1. Heracl••••, incip. Cum sanctus, inter constit, Imperial. Cum. S. (inquit) Sophronius, tunc fummo Sacerdotio fungens Hierosolymis, subjectis sibi sacerdotibus convocatis synodice demonstrasset eos qui unam in duabus Christi naturis volun••aiem atque energiam affirmarent palam unam quoque natur•••• statuere, eique Johannes Papa Romanus assensus esset, Imperator edictum proponit, Neque singularem, neque duplicem in Christo energiam esse asserendam,
• * 1.937

  25. q. 1. c. Sar∣agendum.
• * 1.938

  Novel. 123. c. 10.
• * 1.939

  16.
• * 1.940

  1.
• * 1.941

  Tortur. Tort.
• * 1.942

  2.
• * 1.943

  3.
• * 1.944

  Sozom. l. 7. c. 12.
• * 1.945

  in 5^ta Synod. Constant.
• * 1.946

  4.
• * 1.947

  5.
• * 1.948

  apud Acta Con∣cil. Ephes. in liter. Theod. ad Synod.
• * 1.949

  apud Surium die 5. Jun.
• * 1.950

  Epist. 164.
• * 1.951

  6.
• * 1.952

  lib. 5. Epist. 32.
• * 1.953

  lib. 1. Cod. Theod. de re∣lig. Novel. Valen. de Episc. Jud. l. graviter. ibid. Novel. 89.
• * 1.954

  Cicer. lib. 1. de leg.
• * 1.955

  7.
• * 1.956

  Concil. Later∣sub Leon. 1.
• * 1.957

  lib. de Myster. sign. in Bib∣lioth. SS. PP.
• * 1.958

  1.
• * 1.959

  Hom. l. 4. ex verb. Isaiae.
• * 1.960

  2 Kings 9. 4.
• * 1.961

  2.
• * 1.962

  3.
• * 1.963

  4.
• * 1.964

  5.
• * 1.965

  in l. 1. in verbo Potest. FF. de jurisdict.
• * 1.966

  Orat. in Verrem 4^ta.
• * 1.967

  Cap. 33.
• * 1.968

  6.
• * 1.969

  1 Cor. 3.
• * 1.970

  2 Cor. 5.
• * 1.971

  2 Cor. 6.
• * 1.972

  Act. 26.
• * 1.973

  Luke 12.
• * 1.974

  lib. 5. contr. Parmen.
• * 1.975

  Homil. 35. in Matt. apud Chrysost.
• * 1.976

  ibid.
• * 1.977

  1 Cor. 9.
• * 1.978

  7.
• * 1.979

  in Apologet.
• * 1.980

  in Epitaph. Nepot. Ep. 3.
• * 1.981

  Homil. 3. in Acta Apost.
• * 1.982

  Homil. 3. in Tit. Hom. 3. in Acta.
• * 1.983

  Hebt. 13. 17.
• * 1.984

  1 Thess. 5. 12.
• * 1.985

  v. 14.
• * 1.986

  8.
• * 1.987

  Deuter. 17. 8.
• * 1.988

  contr. Appi••••. l. 11. c. 6.
• * 1.989

  9.
• a 1.990

  1 Corinth. homil. 15.
• b 1.991

  de Poenit. l. 1. c. 17. S. August. contr. Epist. Parmen. l. 3. c. 1.
• * 1.992

  2 Cor. 13. 2.
• * 1.993

  1 Cor. 11. 30.
• * 1.994

  Epist. 75.
• * 1.995

  10.
• * 1.996

  2 Cor. 12. 12. Homil. 14. in 1 Cor. Homil. 29. in 2 Cor. Homil. 5. in 1 Tim.
• * 1.997

  11.
• * 1.998

  12.
• * 1.999

  Homil. 13. in 2 Tim.
• * 1.1000

  13.
• * 1.1001

  14.
• * 1.1002

  Orat. pro Cluentio.
• * 1.1003

  15.
• * 1.1004

  16.
• * 1.1005

  17.
• * 1.1006

  1.
• * 1.1007

  Epist. ad Flo∣rent. Pupian. lib. 4. ep. 9.
• * 1.1008

  Homil. 61. in Matth.
• * 1.1009

  2.
• * 1.1010

  3.
• * 1.1011

  4.
• * 1.1012

  5.
• * 1.1013

  1 p••••t. Clem. 1. in a••e.
• * 1.1014

  6.
• * 1.1015

  Epist. ad Tral∣lian.
• * 1.1016

  Epist. ad Mag∣nes.
• * 1.1017

  7.
• * 1.1018

  in Apologe.
• * 1.1019

  8.
• * 1.1020

  Ep. ad Cornel. Papam lib. 1. ep. 5.
• * 1.1021

  9.
• * 1.1022

  in Regul. Mo∣nachor. cap. 17.
• * 1.1023

  Episcopacy asserted Sect. 34, 35.
• * 1.1024

  1.
• * 1.1025

  ad Trallian.
• * 1.1026

  ad Magnes.
• * 1.1027

  Epist. ad Ephes.
• * 1.1028

  2.
• * 1.1029

  3.
• * 1.1030

  lib. de Praecepto & dispensation••
• * 1.1031

  4.
• * 1.1032

  ad Rusticum Monach.
• * 1.1033

  5.
• * 1.1034

  1.
• * 1.1035

  In regul. bre∣vior. cap. 14.
• * 1.1036

  2.
• * 1.1037

  Homil. 6. in Genes.
• * 1.1038

  3.
• * 1.1039

  Lib. de jejunio in psychicos
• * 1.1040

  4.
• * 1.1041

  5.
• * 1.1042

  6.
• * 1.1043

  7.
• * 1.1044

  l. cum aurum. 19. §. perveni∣amus ff. de aur. & argent. leg.
• * 1.1045

  8.
• * 1.1046

  9.
• * 1.1047

  11.
• * 1.1048

  12.
• * 1.1049

  c. cum con∣tingat. extr. de jurejur.
• * 1.1050

  14.
• * 1.1051

  15.
• * 1.1052

  16.
• * 1.1053

  17.
• * 1.1054

  Hebr. 13. 17.
• * 1.1055

  18.
• * 1.1056

  Philem. 8. vers.
• * 1.1057

  19.
• * 1.1058

  20.
• * 1.1059

  21.
• * 1.1060

  Hebr. 13. 17.
• * 1.1061

  22.
• * 1.1062

  1 Thessal. 4. v. 2, 3, and 6.
• * 1.1063

  23.
• * 1.1064

  24.
• * 1.1065

  25.
• * 1.1066

  Philemon. 8, ••.
• * 1.1067

  26.
• * 1.1068

  27.
• * 1.1069

  28.
• * 1.1070

  1.
• * 1.1071

  2.
• * 1.1072

  3.
• * 1.1073

  in act. Con∣cil. C. P.
• † 1.1074

  Vide Chapt. 3. Rule 8. hujus libri.
• * 1.1075

  4.
• * 1.1076

  Vide Concil. Tolet. 6.
• * 1.1077

  5.
• * 1.1078

  1.
• * 1.1079

  2.
• * 1.1080

  3.
• * 1.1081

  Leunclav. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.1082

  4.
• * 1.1083

  Annal. 3.
• * 1.1084

  Declam. 4.
• * 1.1085

  de Clementi••
• * 1.1086

  5.
• * 1.1087

  6.
• * 1.1088

  lib. 6. de civit. Dei.
• * 1.1089

  de Divinat. 2.
• * 1.1090

  7.
• * 1.1091

  Levit. 7. 20. 2 Chron. 30. 28.
• * 1.1092

  Levit. 1. 5. 2 Chron. 29. 24. & 30. 17.
• * 1.1093

  1.
• * 1.1094

  2.
• * 1.1095

  3.
• * 1.1096

  4.
• * 1.1097

  5.
• * 1.1098

  6.
• * 1.1099

  Epist. 171.
• * 1.1100

  1 Timoth. 5. 1.
• * 1.1101

  7.
• * 1.1102

  Homil. 4. de verbis Isai. Vidi Dominum.
• * 1.1103

  8.
• * 1.1104

  Euseb. lib. 6. c. 27.
• * 1.1105

  Chrysost. adv. Gentes.
• * 1.1106

  Basil. Ep. 47.
• * 1.1107

  Paulin. apud Baron. A. D. 387.
• * 1.1108

  Theod. lib. 5. c. 17.
• * 1.1109

  Leo Aug. orat. de vita Johan. Chrysostom. Niceph. lib. 13. c. 34.
• * 1.1110

  Aug. Epist. 6. in append. Greg. lib. 2. Ep. 36. Anastas. Biblioth in Greg. 2.
• * 1.1111

  9.
• * 1.1112

  ultrò à com∣munione absti∣nuisse Theodo∣sium aiunt Ruf∣finus lib. 2. c. 18▪ & Ware∣mund. ab Ere••b. c. 2. 〈…〉〈…〉 reg. n. 35. et seqq.
• * 1.1113

  lib. 2. Ep. 36.
• * 1.1114

  10.
• * 1.1115

  1 Sam. 15. 25.
• * 1.1116

  11.
• * 1.1117

  12.
• * 1.1118

  ad Can. 12. Synodi Ancy∣ranae
• * 1.1119

  13.
• * 1.1120

  14.
• * 1.1121

  Claud. in Paneg. Mallii.
• * 1.1122

  15.
• * 1.1123

  16.
• * 1.1124

  Amos. 7. 10.
• * 1.1125

  Amos 7. 13.
• * 1.1126

  2 Chron. 25. 16.
• * 1.1127

  17.
• * 1.1128

  18.
• * 1.1129

  de Maledic. c. 1.
• * 1.1130

  tit. C. Si quis Imper maled.
• * 1.1131

  1.
• * 1.1132

  2.
• * 1.1133

  Hom. 50. in Psal. 101.
• * 1.1134

  3.
• * 1.1135

  Can. 10.
• * 1.1136

  Vide distinct. 18. cap. placuit. &c. si quis au∣tem, & cap. si quis Episcopus.
• * 1.1137

  4.
• * 1.1138

  5.
• * 1.1139

  6.
• * 1.1140

  7.
• * 1.1141

  Contr. Epist. Parmen. l. 3. c. 2.
• * 1.1142

  8.
• * 1.1143

  S. Cyril. Ep. 18. ad Caele∣stinum.
• * 1.1144

  Paulus Diacon. degest. Longob. lib. 3. c. 12.
• * 1.1145

  9.
• * 1.1146

  Theodoret. lib. 4. c. 14.
• * 1.1147

  Baron. A. D. 795.
• * 1.1148

  10.
• * 1.1149

  in Josu. Hom. 7.
• * 1.1150

  11.
• * 1.1151

  12.
• * 1.1152

  13.
• * 1.1153

  14.
• * 1.1154

  Cap. 3.
• * 1.1155

  Epist. 62.
• * 1.1156

  15.
• * 1.1157

  Chapt. 2. Rule. 2. Num. 15
• * 1.1158

  16.
• * 1.1159

  Act. 10.
• * 1.1160

  Cod. de summa Trinit. l.
• * 1.1161

  17.
• * 1.1162

  in Psal. 5. poe∣nit. in it. Tract. 27. in Johan.
• * 1.1163

  ubi suprà
• * 1.1164

  18.
• * 1.1165

  Matth. 18. 15, 16, 17, 18.
• * 1.1166

  19.
• * 1.1167

  Numb. 1. of this Rule.
• * 1.1168

  1.
• * 1.1169

  in Jerem. c. 23.
• * 1.1170

  De vita spirit. an. lect. 2. ad em.
• * 1.1171

  2.
• * 1.1172

  3 Tract. 6. in Matth.
• * 1.1173

  In Evange. Homil. 26.
• * 1.1174

  In Josue. Homil. 21.
• * 1.1175

  6.
• * 1.1176

  In 5 Penit. Psal.
• * 1.1177

  7.
• * 1.1178

  Lib. 1. ep. 11.
• * 1.1179

  Epist. 1.
• * 1.1180

  8.
• * 1.1181

  9.
• * 1.1182

  De vita Spirit. anim. lect. 4. corol. 7.
• * 1.1183

  10.
• * 1.1184

  11.
• * 1.1185

  12.
• * 1.1186

  Lib. 5. de Rep. Eccles. cap. 9. n. 23, 24.
• * 1.1187

  Chap. 2. Rule 2.
• * 1.1188

  13.
• * 1.1189

  14.
• * 1.1190

  Cap. 24.
• * 1.1191

  1.
• * 1.1192

  2.
• * 1.1193

  lib. 1. Ep. 4.
• * 1.1194

  Rom. 1. 29, 30, 31.
• * 1.1195

  3.
• * 1.1196

  Cap. 2.
• * 1.1197

  Can. 10. a•••• 11.
• a 1.1198

  Cap. 7.
• b 1.1199

  Cap. 73.
• c 1.1200

  Cap. 15.
• d 1.1201

  Cap. 39.
• e 1.1202

  Cap. 33.
• f 1.1203

  Cap. 8. & 21.
• g 1.1204

  C. 9.
• * 1.1205

  4.
• * 1.1206

  Epist. 93.
• * 1.1207

  5.
• * 1.1208

  6.
• * 1.1209

  in Hecuba.
• * 1.1210

  7.
• * 1.1211

  de verbo Do∣mini, Homil 15.
• * 1.1212

  8.
• * 1.1213

  Levit. 25. 47.
• * 1.1214

  Matth. 21.
• * 1.1215

  9.
• * 1.1216

  10.
• * 1.1217

  11.
• * 1.1218

  12.
• * 1.1219

  13.
• * 1.1220

  14.
• * 1.1221

  1.
• * 1.1222

  2 Cor. 2. 9.
• * 1.1223

  2.
• * 1.1224

  3.
• * 1.1225

  4.
• * 1.1226

  Consult. Art. 23.
• * 1.1227

  Novel. 123. c. 12, 13.
• * 1.1228

  Lib. 32. contra Faustum Ma∣nich. c. 13.
• * 1.1229

  Lib. 2. Chap. 2. Rule 2.
• * 1.1230

  5.
• * 1.1231

  6.
• * 1.1232

  Reginald. prax. fori poenit. l. 4. c. 12. sect. 3. p. 148. n. 133.
• * 1.1233

  1.
• * 1.1234

  2.
• * 1.1235

  3.
• a 1.1236

  Apol. 2. ad Anton.
• b 1.1237

  lib. 4. Ad. haer. c. 34.
• c 1.1238

  lib. 8. contr. Celsum.
• d 1.1239

  Mystag. Catech. 3. & 4.
• e 1.1240

  in. Johan. lib. 10. c. 13.
• f 1.1241

  lib. De spir. S. cap. 27.
• g 1.1242

  lib. 2. Contr. Par.
• h 1.1243

  in 2. Tim. Hom. 2. Serm. de prodit. Jud.
• i 1.1244

  de Sacram. lib. 4. c. 4.
• k 1.1245

  Ep. 1. & Ep. 85. ad Evagrium, & in Sophon. c. 3.
• l 1.1246

  de Trinit. lib. 3. c. 4. contra Faust. Manich. lib. 20. cap. 13. & Serm. 28. de verbis Domini.
• m 1.1247

  Dial. 1.
• n 1.1248

  Serm. 5. de Paschate.
• o 1.1249

  Dial. l. 4. ••. 58.
• p 1.1250

  de Fide. l. 4. c. 14.
• q 1.1251

  in 1 Cor. cap. 10.
• r 1.1252

  lib. de Corpore Domini.
• * 1.1253

  4.
• * 1.1254

  5.
• * 1.1255

  6.
• * 1.1256

  Epist. 85.
• * 1.1257

  Panormitan. in capit. Majores in princip. in 5¹⁰ Notab.
• * 1.1258

  7.
• * 1.1259

  8.
• * 1.1260

  9.
• * 1.1261

  10.
• * 1.1262

  11.
• * 1.1263

  1.
• * 1.1264

  2.
• * 1.1265

  1 Cor. 7. 40.
• * 1.1266

  3.
• * 1.1267

  4.
• * 1.1268

  5.
• * 1.1269

  Epist. 54, ad Marcell.
• * 1.1270

  Serm. 6. de 40^ma
• * 1.1271

  Serm. 9.
• * 1.1272

  Origin. l. 6. c. 19. p. 83. a.
• * 1.1273

  Biblioth. PP. Graecolat. T. 1. p. 839.
• * 1.1274

  6.
• * 1.1275

  7.
• * 1.1276

  Epist. 119. ad Januar. in Psal. 110.
• * 1.1277

  in Isai. l. 16. c. 58.
• * 1.1278

  in Jonae cap. 3.
• * 1.1279

  8.
• * 1.1280

  Vide Bellar. lib. 1. de cleric. c. 28. §. quinta propositio.
• * 1.1281

  S. Aug. in Psal. 90.
• * 1.1282

  Homil. in Matth. 47.
• * 1.1283

  9.
• * 1.1284

  lib. 5. cap. 22. Grae. 21. Latin.
• * 1.1285

  de vita contem∣plat. lib. 2. cap. 24.
• * 1.1286

  lib. De jejun. cap. 13.
• * 1.1287

  Cap. 2.
• * 1.1288

  Cathemet. hymn. 8.
• * 1.1289

  in Marc. cap. 2.
• * 1.1290

  Epist. 68. ad Casulanum.
• * 1.1291

  10.
• * 1.1292

  Collat. 22. c. 30.
• * 1.1293

  Cap. 9.
• * 1.1294

  in Vet. Test. T. 5. Hom. in eos qui Pascha jejunent.
• * 1.1295

  Epist. 119. ad Januar.
• * 1.1296

  apud Euseb. lib. 5. cap. 26.
• * 1.1297

  in Galat. l. 2.
• * 1.1298

  de Offic. Ec∣cles. l. 1. c. 36.
• † 1.1299

  de Instit. Cleric. lib. 2. cap. 20.
• * 1.1300

  Homil. 10. in Genes.
• * 1.1301

  11.
• * 1.1302

  ubi suprà, cap. 34.
• † 1.1303

  de Divin. offic. l. 4. c. 9.
• * 1.1304

  12.
• * 1.1305

  Sozom. l. 7. cap. 19. Petav. in not •• ad Epiph. p. 361. Tertull. de je∣jun. c. 15.
• * 1.1306

  Cap. 14.
• * 1.1307

  Dissert. ad Ignat. cap. 12.
• * 1.1308

  de Verbo Dei lib. 4. c. 11.
• * 1.1309

  13.
• * 1.1310

  lib. 5. c. 22.
• * 1.1311

  Hist. lib. 12. c. 32.
• * 1.1312

  lib. de Orat. c. 14.
• * 1.1313

  Vide lib. 2. Chapt. 2. Rule 6. Numb. 55, 56.
• * 1.1314

  14.
• * 1.1315

  15.
• * 1.1316

  apud Socrat. lib. 2. Hist. cap. 3.
• * 1.1317

  lib. 5. Haeretic. fabul. cap. 29.
• * 1.1318

  lib. 5. Hist. cap. 26.
• * 1.1319

  lib. de Jejun. c. 14.
• * 1.1320

  lib. de Jejun. cap. 2.
• * 1.1321

  16.
• * 1.1322

  Epist. can. ad Basil.
• * 1.1323

  lib. 3. Exp. fi∣dei & hae••••s. 75.
• * 1.1324

  17.
• * 1.1325

  Epist. 54. ad Marcel.
• * 1.1326

  lib. de jejun. c. 15.
• * 1.1327

  lib. 4. de offic. Eccles. c. 37.
• a 1.1328

  lib. 4. de in∣stit. ••••••ic. c. 1.
• b 1.1329

  lib. 6. Ratio∣nal. de 1^a 40^mae Dominic.
• c 1.1330

  Hist. lib. 5. c. 22.
• d 1.1331

  lib. 7. cap. 19.
• * 1.1332

  in notis ad Tertull. de jejun.
• * 1.1333

  A. D. 460. Can. 50.
• * 1.1334

  18.
• * 1.1335

  Collar. 21. cap. 28.
• * 1.1336

  ubi suprà
• * 1.1337

  19.
• * 1.1338

  Collat. 21. c. 27.
• * 1.1339

  lib. 40. Homil. Hom. 16.
• * 1.1340

  Hac clausula inseritur in loco non suo: oportuit enim p••st narrationem de Ecclesiis Grac•• & Alex∣andrina interseri. Videat lector Hugonem Menar∣dum in notis ad Gregor. Sacram. qui etiam aliter emendat hunc locum satis mendosum.
• * 1.1341

  lib. 5. c. 22. Homil. 16. ad pop. Antioch.
• * 1.1342

  lib. 7. c. 19. lib. 12. c. 34.
• * 1.1343

  Epist. 118. ad Januar.
• * 1.1344

  Serm. 4. de 40^ma
• * 1.1345

  20.
• * 1.1346

  21.
• * 1.1347

  contr. Faustum Manich. l. 30. cap. 5.
• * 1.1348

  22.
• * 1.1349

  de j••juniis & 40^ma
• * 1.1350

  23.
• * 1.1351

  Stromat. 7.
• * 1.1352

  Co••••a ••••ych. •• 2. 13, 15.
• * 1.1353

  24.
• * 1.1354

  1.
• * 1.1355

  2.
• * 1.1356

  Vide Surium in Epist. ad le∣ctorem, ante Concil. Ferrar. tom. 4. Concil.
• * 1.1357

  in Tract. de Concil. Basil. circa princ. n. 6. Vide etiam Ni∣colaum de Cle∣mangiis
• * 1.1358

  Vide prooemiū pragmat. sanct.
• * 1.1359

  Guil. Benedict. in repetit. cap. Raynutius.
• * 1.1360

  Chapter 3. Rule 7. and Chapter 4. Rule 5.
• * 1.1361

  3.
• * 1.1362

  1.
• * 1.1363

  Epist. 76. ad Casulanum Presbyter.
• * 1.1364

  2.
• * 1.1365

  lib. 3. c. 9.
• * 1.1366

  lib. de Virg. veland.
• * 1.1367

  see the Divine institution of the order and offices Minister. sect. 4.
• * 1.1368

  Disput. 18. in 1 Cor. 11. in solut. 8^vi. dub.
• * 1.1369

  3.
• * 1.1370

  lib. 3. Paedagog. cap. 3.
• * 1.1371

  lib. 8. Registri, Epist. 10.
• * 1.1372

  4.
• * 1.1373

  Epist. 86.
• * 1.1374

  Epist. 118.
• * 1.1375

  5.
• * 1.1376

  lib. 5. Hist. cap. 21.
• * 1.1377

  6.
• * 1.1378

  Plaut. Trinum.
• * 1.1379

  Baldus in l. observare, §. proficisci, cir∣ca fin. ff. de officio procon∣sul. & leg.
• * 1.1380

  See the VI^th Rule of the last Chapter of this Book.
• * 1.1381

  7.
• * 1.1382

  8.
• * 1.1383

  C. si Judex laicus desent. excommunicat. lib. 6.
• * 1.1384

  9.
• * 1.1385

  lib. 8. Epigr. 48.
• * 1.1386

  Vide Liliú Gi∣raldum Syntag. 1. Deorum, ti∣tulo de Diis ex humanis actio∣nibus: & Char∣tarium lib. de Deorum••magi∣nibus.
• a 1.1387

  lib. 2. Paedag. cap. 10.
• b 1.1388

  Orat. 3. sub finem.
• * 1.1389

  ubi suprà, & lib. 3. cap. 11.
• † 1.1390

  sub finem vitae Aedesil.
• * 1.1391

  An. Dom. 57. n. 77.
• * 1.1392

  Epist. 146.
• * 1.1393

  lib. 2. de Legib.
• * 1.1394

  Videat lector, si, placet, Plutar∣chum lib. de Iside sub initi∣um, & 26. Rom. quaest. & Theodor. orat. 2. de Provid. & Eliam Creten∣sem in Nazian. orat. 4. in initio, Arrianum lib. 3. cap. 1. & Philon. Jud. lib. de plantat. Noae.
• * 1.1395

  10.
• * 1.1396

  11.
• * 1.1397

  Epist. 11••. cap. 1.
• * 1.1398

  Homil. de Rogat.
• * 1.1399

  12.
• * 1.1400

  Resp. 2. cap. 4.
• * 1.1401

  Lib. de Eccl. Hi••••••••ch. cap. de Baptismo.
• * 1.1402

  Apud Euseb. lib. 6. c. 43.
• * 1.1403

  Epist. 76.
• * 1.1404

  De Poenit. c. 6.
• * 1.1405

  De rebus Eccle. cap. 26.
• * 1.1406

  In illud 3. Johan. Nisi quis renatus &c.
• * 1.1407

  13.
• * 1.1408

  Adv. Praxeam c. 28. De corona milit. c. 15.
• * 1.1409

  Lib. 2. de Sa∣cram. cap. 7.
• * 1.1410

  in Dictis & in∣terpret. Script. qu. 91. Vide August: Homil. 4. & apud Gra∣tian. de Con∣secr. dist. 4. cap. 76.
• * 1.1411

  Can. 49.
• * 1.1412

  Lib. 4. Har••t. fabul.
• * 1.1413

  14.
• * 1.1414

  15.
• * 1.1415

  Can. 5. aliàs 6.
• * 1.1416

  1.
• * 1.1417

  2.
• * 1.1418

  Cap. 20.
• * 1.1419

  Lib. 2. c. 11.
• * 1.1420

  3.
• a 1.1421

  Ubi supra.
• b 1.1422

  In Defens. pacis part. 2. c. 23.
• c 1.1423

  L. 7. Annal. Boiorum.
• d 1.1424

  In ••. Bene à Zenone, C. de quadrien. prae∣script.
• e 1.1425

  In Confut. Primat. •• apae 2. consider. prin∣cip.
• f 1.1426

  In Henrico 3.
• g 1.1427

  In parte 2. A. D. 1247.
• h 1.1428

  Lib. de ruina & reparar. Eccl.
• i 1.1429

  In Praefat. libri de sacris Ecclesiae Mini∣steriis, impres. 1551.
• k 1.1430

  Alliacens. de Reformat. ••ccles. consid. 2. See also the Vergers Dream made in Latine in the time of Charls the fifth, and translated into French.
• * 1.1431

  4.
• * 1.1432

  5.
• * 1.1433

  Baron. A. D. 499. n. 36.
• * 1.1434

  Lib. 4. Epist. 2.
• * 1.1435

  Lib. 4. Epist. 3. Lib. 1. Fp. 3.
• * 1.1436

  Epist. 5.
• * 1.1437

  Cyprian de unit. Eccles.
• * 1.1438

  Vide S. Cypr. l. 1. ep. 3. & lib. 5. ep. 6. S. Ambrose in 1 Cor. 11.
• * 1.1439

  In Quaest. Vet. & N. Test. q. ult. & ad fratres in Eremo, cap. 37.
• * 1.1440

  6.
• * 1.1441

  Lib. 2. Cap. 1, 5, 6.
• * 1.1442

  Epist. 288.
• * 1.1443

  1.
• * 1.1444

  2.
• * 1.1445

  3.
• * 1.1446

  Galat. 5. 1.
• * 1.1447

  4.
• * 1.1448

  5.
• * 1.1449

  6.
• * 1.1450

  Rule 13. n. 9.
• * 1.1451

  Vide etiam c. 13. & 15.
• * 1.1452

  7.
• * 1.1453

  8.
• * 1.1454

  9.
• * 1.1455

  10.
• * 1.1456

  11.
• * 1.1457

  12.
• * 1.1458

  13.
• * 1.1459

  14.
• * 1.1460

  Mark 7. 4.
• * 1.1461

  15.
• * 1.1462

  16.
• * 1.1463

  Epist. ad Epis. Basil.
• * 1.1464

  17.
• * 1.1465

  Lib. 2. de bonis operib. c. 9. § tertio addit.
• * 1.1466

  Rom. 14. 17.
• * 1.1467

  Coloss. 2. 16.
• * 1.1468

  18.
• * 1.1469

  Beliar. ubi supra c. 11. § item.
• * 1.1470

  Lib. 2. Senten. cap. 44.
• * 1.1471

  Epist. 14.
• * 1.1472

  Homil. 3. ad pop. Antioch. & hom. 4. & hom. 16.
• * 1.1473

  L. 3. de vita contemplat. cap. 10.
• * 1.1474

  19.
• * 1.1475

  Lib. 2. de vit. contempl. cap. 23.
• * 1.1476

  Lib. 1. hist. 11.
• * 1.1477

  Lib. 17. cap. 32. hist.
• * 1.1478

  Theodoret. hist. relig. in Mar∣ciano.
• * 1.1479

  20.
• * 1.1480

  21.
• * 1.1481

  Lib. 5. hist. cap. 21.
• * 1.1482

  22.
• * 1.1483

  23.
• * 1.1484

  24.
• * 1.1485

  25.
• * 1.1486

  26.
• * 1.1487

  27.
• * 1.1488

  28.
• * 1.1489

  29.
• * 1.1490

  30.
• * 1.1491

  1.
• * 1.1492

  2.
• * 1.1493

  Contra Cel∣sum lib. 7.
• * 1.1494

  3.
• * 1.1495

  4.
• * 1.1496

  5.
• * 1.1497

  Coloss. 2.
• * 1.1498

  6.
• * 1.1499

  1.
• * 1.1500

  L. Prospicit. ff. qui & à quibus.
• * 1.1501

  2.
• * 1.1502

  3.
• * 1.1503

  4.
• * 1.1504

  Lib. 14. Hier.
• * 1.1505

  5.
• * 1.1506

  C. quadragesi∣ma. de consecr. dist. 5. & cap. 2. §. cum autem de observ. jejun.
• * 1.1507

  6.
• * 1.1508

  7.
• * 1.1509

  Lib. 1. Fast.
• * 1.1510

  8.
• * 1.1511

  lib. 1. Aphor. 13.
• a 1.1512

  de Victus 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in acut.
• b 1.1513

  in Specim. m••d. Christ. lumin. 2.
• c 1.1514

  lib. 1. Var. lect. c. 18.
• d 1.1515

  libell. de Esu carnium.
• e 1.1516

  Comm. in Isaac de di••••a particul.
• * 1.1517

  Horat. serm. lib. 2. Sat. 2.
• * 1.1518

  9.
• * 1.1519

  Horat. Serm. l. 2. sat. 2.
• * 1.1520

  C. non dico. &c. non me∣••••ocriter. de cons••••cer. dist. 5.
• * 1.1521

  Pseudol. Act. 3. Scen. 2.
• * 1.1522

  Mantuan.
• * 1.1523

  10.
• * 1.1524

  Mostell. Act. 3. Scen. 2.
• * 1.1525

  Casina, Act. 2. Scen. 8.
• * 1.1526

  Vide Paul. Zacchiae Quae. medico-legal. lib. 5. tit. 1. quaest. 2. Lib. 2. de Con∣viv. cap. 25. vide Athenaeū lib. 1. Deip. cap. 25.
• * 1.1527

  lib. 3. Saturnal. cap. 13
• * 1.1528

  15. Metamorph.
• * 1.1529

  de Re cibar. lib. 8. cap. 1.
• * 1.1530

  11.
• * 1.1531

  Horat. ubi supr••••.
• * 1.1532

  12.
• * 1.1533

  13.
• * 1.1534

  1.
• * 1.1535

  1. Cor. 14. 26.
• * 1.1536

  Ephes. 4. 29.
• * 1.1537

  2.
• * 1.1538

  Vide ult. caput 2. libri.
• * 1.1539

  Can. 29.
• * 1.1540

  Lib. 3. cap. 17.
• * 1.1541

  3.
• * 1.1542

  Ephes. 4. 16.
• * 1.1543

  2 Corin. 10. 8.
• * 1.1544

  2 Cor. 13. 10.
• * 1.1545

  4.
• * 1.1546

  Rule 1, 2, 3, 4▪ of this chapter.
• * 1.1547

  5.
• * 1.1548

  6.
• * 1.1549

  7.
• * 1.1550

  Lib. 1. contr. Ma••cion. Dial. adv. Luciferianos.
• * 1.1551

  Cap. 1.
• * 1.1552

  In Can. 82. Synod. 6. in Trullo.
• * 1.1553

  8.
• * 1.1554

  Epist. 119. cap. 19.
• * 1.1555

  S. Cyprian∣de lapsis: & epist. 56.
• * 1.1556

  9.
• * 1.1557

  10.
• * 1.1558

  11.
• * 1.1559

  22••. q. 91. art. 2.
• * 1.1560

  Quaest. 107. ad Orthod.
• * 1.1561

  in Psalm. 150.
• * 1.1562

  lib. 1. Ep. 457.
• * 1.1563

  ubi suprá
• * 1.1564

  in Psalm.
• * 1.1565

  12.
• * 1.1566

  13.
• * 1.1567

  Juven. Sat. 6.
• * 1.1568

  14.
• * 1.1569

  15.
• * 1.1570

  16.
• * 1.1571

  Platina in vita Pii 2••. & Sabel∣licus Ennead. 10. lib. 6. in c. cum olim. de cleric. con∣jugat.
• * 1.1572

  Vide etiam Sleidan. lib. 3.
• * 1.1573

  A••t. 23.
• * 1.1574

  De Planctu Ec∣clesiae lib. 2. art. 73.
• a 1.1575

  Cap. 20. lib. 4. de Eccles.
• b 1.1576

  Controvers. 15. sub initio.
• c 1.1577

  Lib. 7. de just. & jur. q. 6. art. 1.
• d 1.1578

  Gravam. 75, & 91.
• e 1.1579

  De vita spirit. animae, sect. 4. corol. 14. prop. 3.
• f 1.1580

  De invent. ••erum lib. 5. c. 4.
• g 1.1581

  Lib. de con∣versione ad cl••∣ricos, cap. 20.
• h 1.1582

  part. 2. tit. 46.
• i 1.1583

  183. lect. in Sapient.
• k 1.1584

  De corrupto Eccles. statu.
• l 1.1585

  De reforma∣tione Eccles.
• m 1.1586

  Opusc. contr. Clericos con∣cubinar. concl. ult.
• * 1.1587

  1 Cor. 7.
• * 1.1588

  17.
• * 1.1589

  In actis concil. Nicen. Paris. impress. cap. 3. p. 170. Acta ipsa è Vaticana Bibl. prodierū••; latina facta sunt ab Alfonso Pi∣sano & Rober. Balforeo Scoto.
• a 1.1590

  Hist. l. 1. cap. 4.
• b 1.1591

  Lib. 2. cap. 14.
• c 1.1592

  Verb. Paph∣nutius.
• d 1.1593

  Lib. 8. c. 19.
• e 1.1594

  Cap. Nicena, dist. 31.
• f 1.1595

  Hist. Eccl. lib. 1. cap. 6.
• g 1.1596

  Cap. 122.
• h 1.1597

  Cap. 41.
• * 1.1598

  Haeres. 67. they were their gallants,* 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 apud Epiphan. haeres. 63.
• * 1.1599

  Epist. 62.
• * 1.1600

  Orat. 17, & Orat. 18. edit. Savil.
• * 1.1601

  Videat lector qui velit plura de sensu hujus vocabuli & Canonis, Ga∣brielem Vasquiū in 3. disp. 247. c. 4. & Micha∣••lem Medinam lib. 2. de conti∣nentia, c. 21. & Georgium Calixtum de conjug. Cleric. p. 174.
• * 1.1602

  De vita spirit, animae u•••• supra.
• * 1.1603

  Epist. 43. ad Chromatium
• * 1.1604

  1 Cor. 7. 7. Matth. 19. 11.
• * 1.1605

  Ad Demetri∣ad. virg.
• * 1.1606

  In Jeremiam lib. 2. cap. 7.
• * 1.1607

  Philippicâ 18.
• * 1.1608

  Epist. 8.
• * 1.1609

  Lib. 6. haeres. 60.
• * 1.1610

  In Levit. l. 15.
• * 1.1611

  Lib. de agone Christian. cap. 31.
• * 1.1612

  Contra Jovin. lib. 1.
• * 1.1613

  De convers. ad Clericos cap. 29.
• * 1.1614

  Epist. 15.
• * 1.1615

  Extrem. libro de vera Virgin.
• * 1.1616

  Baptista Man∣tuan. in vita Divi Hilarii.
• * 1.1617

  In Matth. tract. 24.
• * 1.1618

  18.
• * 1.1619

  19.
• * 1.1620

  De S. Virginit. c. 16.
• * 1.1621

  Ad Philadelph.
• * 1.1622

  Lib. 7. Strom.
• * 1.1623

  Lib. 1. c. 11.
• * 1.1624

  Greg. Naz. verba ex transl. Volaterrani.
• * 1.1625

  S. Chrysost. hom. 21. in Gen.
• * 1.1626

  20.
• * 1.1627

  1 Cor. 7. 34.
• * 1.1628

  Auson.
• * 1.1629

  In fun. Gorgō.
• * 1.1630

  In fun. Gorgō.
• * 1.1631

  Stromat. 3.
• * 1.1632

  Inter Epist. Augustini. Epist. 27. & 29.
• * 1.1633

  ••uaest. Ve••. & N. Test. qu. 127.
• * 1.1634

  In 1 ep. Tim. hom. ••0.
• * 1.1635

  in 1 Cor. 7.
• * 1.1636

  Ad 14. Annal. n. 74.
• a 1.1637

  lib. de Planctu Eccl••s. 2. art. 15. A. D. 1330.
• b 1.1638

  in Johan. 16.
• c 1.1639

  4. dist. 27. art. 1. q. 3.
• d 1.1640

  hist. lib. 100.
• e 1.1641

  lib. 5. de Pro∣vident. Dei.
• * 1.1642

  21.
• * 1.1643

  26. qu. 2. cap. Sors.
• * 1.1644

  de Cleric. con∣jug. cum olim.
• * 1.1645

  22.
• * 1.1646

  dictinct. 31. c. Aliter.
• * 1.1647

  dist. 28. cap. 8.
• * 1.1648

  23.
• * 1.1649

  de Offic. lib. 1. cap. ult.
• * 1.1650

  1 Cor. 7. 2. Baron. A. D. 1059. & A. D. 1065.
• * 1.1651

  apud Baron. A. D. 1075.
• * 1.1652

  Matth. Paris Hist. Anglor. A. D. 1125.
• * 1.1653

  O bo••e Calixte, nunc omnis elerus edit te. Nam olim Presbyteri solent ••xoribus uti. Id praever∣tisti quondam cum Papa fuisti: Ergo tibi festum nunquam celebrabit honestum. Sic non nimis fa∣cunde, sed vere nimis questus est olim non nemo.
• † 1.1654

  Lib. 6. Hist. Angl. A. D. 970. Vide 27. q. 1. cap. ut lex. & Clem. cap. li••e∣ras de filiis Pres∣byter. & Inno∣cent. c. ut cleri∣corum. de vita & honestate cleric.
• * 1.1655

  24.
• * 1.1656

  lib. 6. const. Apost. cap. 17.
• * 1.1657

  25.
• * 1.1658

  26.
• * 1.1659

  in quodlib. contr. Luthe∣rum.
• * 1.1660

  27.
• * 1.1661

  Cap. 10.
• * 1.1662

  Tripart. hist. lib. 6. cap. 14.
• * 1.1663

  Orat. contr. Arianos.
• * 1.1664

  Dist. 31. C. aliter
• * 1.1665

  28.
• * 1.1666

  27. q. 1. cap. ut lex.
• * 1.1667

  Epist. 200.
• * 1.1668

  Epist. 201.
• * 1.1669

  Epist. 321. ad Johan. Fontem.
• * 1.1670

  Lib. 7. de Just. & jure q. 6. art. 2.
• * 1.1671

  Justinian. Nov. 123. cap. 13.
• * 1.1672

  Carm. de sua vita.
• * 1.1673

  Habetur 1. Dist. 3. c. Quoniam.
• * 1.1674

  29.
• * 1.1675

  Alexand. 3. cap. sanè de Cler. Conjug. Vide Cajetan. opusc. tom. 1. tract. 27.
• * 1.1676

  Lib. 1. ep. 11.
• * 1.1677

  Haeres. 60, & Haeres. 61.
• * 1.1678

  Epist. ad De∣metriad. Lib. de Bono conjugal. & habetur dist. 27. c. quidam.
• * 1.1679

  De Monogam.
• * 1.1680

  Epist. ad Ocean.
• a 1.1681

  Glossa in Dist. 34. can. Fraternitas han∣rem exhorruit. Ecce casus, ubi plus juris ha∣bet luxuria quam castitas: quia castus re∣pelleretur, si contraxisset cum secunda; sed fornicator non. Vide etiam S. August. Epist. 64.
• * 1.1682

  in locum Apost. 1 Tim. 3.
• b 1.1683

  ad Ocean. tom. 2. Lib. 3. cap. 2.
• * 1.1684

  Spalat. l. 2. cap. 10. n. 75.
• * 1.1685

  Tertull. ubi suprá.
• * 1.1686

  Serm. 66. in Cantica.
• * 1.1687

  Halach I sho••••. cap. 15.
• a 1.1688

  Quodl. 4. Art. 13.
• b 1.1689

  in Sent. 4. dist. 27. q. 4.
• c 1.1690

  in 3. part. tom. 3. disp. 24. cap. 5.
• * 1.1691

  Mantuan.
• * 1.1692

  1.
• * 1.1693

  lib. 2. Chap. 3. Rule 14.
• * 1.1694

  2.
• * 1.1695

  3.
• * 1.1696

  4.
• * 1.1697

  5.
• * 1.1698

  6.
• * 1.1699

  7.
• a 1.1700

  Lib. 3. cap. 40. & lib. 5. c. 20. lib. 4. cap. 63, & 43.
• b 1.1701

  Lib. 3. cap. 12.
• c 1.1702

  de Prae∣script. & contr. Marcion. l. 4.
• d 1.1703

  In prooem. l. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• e 1.1704

  Epist. ad Pompei.
• f 1.1705

  Ad S••rap. de Spir. S.
• g 1.1706

  Serm. cont. Sab. & Arrium.
• h 1.1707

  Haeres. 31.
• i 1.1708

  Adv. Lucifer.
• k 1.1709

  Contr. Faust. Manich. lib. 11. cap. 2.
• l 1.1710

  Cap. antepenult.
• * 1.1711

  Rule 14.
• * 1.1712

  1.
• * 1.1713

  2.
• * 1.1714

  lib. 3. de vi••a Constant. c. 6.
• * 1.1715

  de Synod.
• * 1.1716

  3.
• * 1.1717

  4.
• * 1.1718

  S. August. E∣pist. 48. & E∣pist. 111. Vide Gratian. dist. 9. Cyril. Hier. Catech. 4. S. Hieron. Ep. 19. & Ep. 76.
• * 1.1719

  Praefat. in comment. de Locis com. l. 7. c. 3. concl. 3, & 4.
• † 1.1720

  Concion. in Epist. ad Rom. cap. 14. pag. 606.
• * 1.1721

  5.
• * 1.1722

  1.
• * 1.1723

  lib. 3. cap. 7.
• * 1.1724

  de Rerum in∣ventor. l. 4. cap. 12.
• * 1.1725

  2.
• * 1.1726

  3.
• * 1.1727

  in Epist. & Consiliis theo∣logicis.
• * 1.1728

  4.
• * 1.1729

  5.
• * 1.1730

  apud Stobaeum
• * 1.1731

  6.
• * 1.1732

  7.
• * 1.1733

  Epist. 124. ad Alipium.
• * 1.1734

  ubi suprá.
• * 1.1735

  8.
• * 1.1736

  9.
• * 1.1737

  10.
• * 1.1738

  1.
• * 1.1739

  Hugo de S. Vi∣ctore lib. 1. de Sacram. c. 7.
• * 1.1740

  lib. 2. de Legib.
• * 1.1741

  Seneca l. 3. de Benef. c. 1.
• * 1.1742

  in lib. 2. Georg.
• * 1.1743

  In verbis per totam vitam parentes venerari maximè decet, levium enim volatiliumque verborum gravissima imminet poena. Plato. l. 4. de repub.
• * 1.1744

  2.
• * 1.1745

  l. 1. in fi. C. si rect. provi. in 2. lec.
• * 1.1746

  3.
• * 1.1747

  Ecclus. 3. 10.
• * 1.1748

  Ephes. 6. 2, 3.
• * 1.1749

  Ezek. 22. 7.
• * 1.1750

  Orpheus. Plato lib. 11. de Leg.
• * 1.1751

  4.
• * 1.1752

  5.
• * 1.1753

  Trinum. Act. 3.
• * 1.1754

  6.
• * 1.1755

  7.
• * 1.1756

  Plaut. Trinum. Act. 3.
• * 1.1757

  8.
• * 1.1758

  Trinum. ubi supr.
• * 1.1759

  Terent. Adelph Act. 1. Scen. 1.
• * 1.1760

  ibid.
• * 1.1761

  Prov. 28. 24.
• * 1.1762

  9.
• * 1.1763

  1.
• * 1.1764

  Si quis in∣•••••••••• fuerit in parente 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Magi∣stratuum s•••• in∣capax Xenoph. l. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & fact. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.1765

  2.
• * 1.1766

  Deater. 21. 18.
• * 1.1767

  3.
• * 1.1768

  § final. inst. de noxa. l. Divus. ff. ad leg. Pomp. de parricid. & toto tit. C. de his qui Parent. vel fil. occid.
• * 1.1769

  Hebr. 12. 9.
• * 1.1770

  Ecclus. 3. 8.
• * 1.1771

  Ephes. 6. 4.
• * 1.1772

  Coloss. 3. 21.
• * 1.1773

  Adelph. Act▪ 1. Sc. 1.
• * 1.1774

  lib. 5. Epist. 20.
• * 1.1775

  lib. 1. c. 14. de Clement.
• * 1.1776

  Declam. 259.
• * 1.1777

  Orat. pro Rosc. Amer.
• * 1.1778

  1.
• * 1.1779

  Sebast. Monti∣cul. de Patria potest.
• * 1.1780

  2.
• * 1.1781

  * Matth. 15. 6.
• * 1.1782

  1 Tim. 5. 17.
• * 1.1783

  Offic. 1.
• * 1.1784

  in l. Si libertis: §. manumissis: ff. de alim.
• * 1.1785

  In Luc. 18.
• * 1.1786

  l. Unic. C. de ingrat. liber.
• * 1.1787

  in vita Solon••
• * 1.1788

  3.
• * 1.1789

  4.
• * 1.1790

  Metamorph. 8.
• * 1.1791

  Iliad. 4.
• * 1.1792

  5.
• * 1.1793

  1.
• * 1.1794

  lib. 2. de Legib.
• * 1.1795

  Alciat. lib. 1. praeterm. in verb. sacra.
• * 1.1796

  Panormit. in cap. 2. de con∣vers. infid. & Baldus in l. item in pote∣state. ff. de ju∣person.
• * 1.1797

  2.
• * 1.1798

  Tit. 3. Com∣ment. in Ge∣nesin.
• * 1.1799

  3.
• * 1.1800

  4.
• * 1.1801

  1.
• * 1.1802

  2.
• * 1.1803

  3.
• * 1.1804

  4.
• * 1.1805

  1.
• * 1.1806

  2.
• * 1.1807

  lib. 10.
• * 1.1808

  de Anima c. 57.
• * 1.1809

  lib. 16. c. 5.
• * 1.1810

  3.
• * 1.1811

  lib. 10.
• * 1.1812

  4.
• * 1.1813

  1.
• * 1.1814

  2.
• * 1.1815

  lib. 2. cap. 7.
• * 1.1816

  idem ibid
• * 1.1817

  3.
• * 1.1818

  A. Gell. ibid.
• * 1.1819

  4.
• * 1.1820

  Plutarch. lib. de Vitios. vere∣cund.
• * 1.1821

  5.
• * 1.1822

  6.
• * 1.1823

  7.
• * 1.1824

  8.
• * 1.1825

  9.
• * 1.1826

  1.
• * 1.1827

  2.
• * 1.1828

  3.
• * 1.1829

  2. 2••. qu. 88. art. 9.
• * 1.1830

  Bellar. l. 2. de Monachis, c. 36.
• * 1.1831

  4.
• * 1.1832

  5.
• * 1.1833

  advers. Marcion.
• * 1.1834

  Can. 16.
• * 1.1835

  6.
• a 1.1836

  lib. 1. de Vir∣gin.
• b 1.1837

  Epist. 109. 110.
• * 1.1838

  •• Aug. Epist. ••d Bonifac. Comit.
• * 1.1839

  in quaest. fuse explic. q. 15.
• * 1.1840

  libr. de Provi∣dentia.
• * 1.1841

  lib. 5. cap. 95.
• * 1.1842

  tit. de iis qui pueros vel puel∣las occiderint, vel totonderint.
• * 1.1843

  7.
• * 1.1844

  Terent.
• * 1.1845

  8.
• * 1.1846

  lib. 6. de Asino a••reo.
• * 1.1847

  ad Uxotem.
• * 1.1848

  Ibid. l. 2. in fi.
• * 1.1849

  ff. de statu ho∣minum.
• * 1.1850

  Genes. 24.
• * 1.1851

  Judges 14. 2, 4.
• * 1.1852

  Exod. 34. 16. Deuter. 7. 3.
• * 1.1853

  1 Cor. 7.
• * 1.1854

  Andromach. Eurip.
• * 1.1855

  lib. de Patriarch.
• * 1.1856

  9.
• * 1.1857

  Xenoph. lib. 8. in Stich.
• * 1.1858

  Andria, Act. 5. Scen. 3.
• * 1.1859

  in respons. Ma∣trimon. Matth. Monachi.
• * 1.1860

  10.
• * 1.1861

  & habetur 30 q. 5.
• * 1.1862

  Can. 38. in Can. Patrum. in Graecor. Nomocan.
• * 1.1863

  et habetur 32. q. 2.
• * 1.1864

  in tit. de foe∣min. non con∣secrat. cap. 33, 36. q. 2. pla∣cuit.
• * 1.1865

  11.
• * 1.1866

  Ibid. Vide etiam Concil. Paris. 36. q. 2. 27. q. 2. nullus.
• * 1.1867

  12.
• * 1.1868

  13.
• * 1.1869

  Declam. 257, & 376.
• * 1.1870

  lib. 3. in La∣conic.
• * 1.1871

  in Erato, l. 6.
• * 1.1872

  14.
• * 1.1873

  c. tuae. de Spons. extr.
• * 1.1874

  vide Ascanium Clement. A∣merin. de pa∣tria potest. cap. 6. effect. 6.
• * 1.1875

  l. Divi fratres. ff. de jure pa∣tron.
• * 1.1876

  l. Filius 25. ff. de ritu Nupti∣arum. l. 3. §. Eman∣cipatus. ff. de cont. tab.
• * 1.1877

  Phalar. Epist. 143. cap. 9.
• * 1.1878

  Cap. 9.
• * 1.1879

  Ulpian. l. 3. §. si emancipa∣tus. ff. de bonor. possess. contr. tabulas. Hoc observant Giae∣ci ad l. 10. de sponsal. l. 28. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. tit. 1.
• * 1.1880

  in Can. Pasil. 38. in Can. PP.
• * 1.1881

  C. 1. extra. de conjug. servor.
• * 1.1882

  Gen. 26. 35.
• * 1.1883

  15.
• * 1.1884

  16.
• * 1.1885

  C. cum causam. de rapt. extra.
• * 1.1886

  Deuter. 22.
• * 1.1887

  lib. Sentent. 2. tit. 19. Idem dixitvetus Scho∣liastes ad Pau∣lum.
• * 1.1888

  Exod. 22. 16, 17.
• * 1.1889

  O sententiam necessitate con∣fusam•• parcit & s••vit, dissimu∣lat & animad∣ver••it. Tertull. 18, 9, 10, 11.
• * 1.1890

  Exod. 22.
• * 1.1891

  17.
• * 1.1892

  Quintilian. de∣clam. 376.
• * 1.1893

  18.
• * 1.1894

  ••jus autem po∣testatis. Inst. de potest. Patr. & l. nam in civium. & l. item in potesta∣te. ff. de his qui sant sui & ali∣eni juris.
• * 1.1895

  19.
• * 1.1896

  20.
• * 1.1897

  in Encomio.
• * 1.1898

  21.
• * 1.1899

  Homil. 11. in Levit.
• * 1.1900

  In Basi••ico.
• * 1.1901

  22.
• * 1.1902

  Vale. Max. l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.1903

  23.
• * 1.1904

  Cap. 81.
• * 1.1905

  24.
• * 1.1906

  25.
• * 1.1907

  l. oratione 16. §. 1. ff. de rit•• nuptiar. l. 3. D. eod.
• * 1.1908

  26.
• * 1.1909

  27.
• * 1.1910

  de clandest. Ma∣trim. impress. Paris. 1556.
• * 1.1911

  in Burchard. & in decretis.
• * 1.1912

  Idem dixit Lu∣cius 3. in C. cum causam de rapt. extra.
• * 1.1913

  28.
• * 1.1914

  Seneca controv. l. 3. c. 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.1915

  Ismeniae & Is∣men. 5.
• * 1.1916

  Epist. ad Pau∣lum.
• * 1.1917

  Orat. 2.
• * 1.1918

  in Genes. l. 4.
• * 1.1919

  29.
• * 1.1920

  Epist. 233.
• * 1.1921

  l. filia. 20. C. de inoffic. te∣stam. & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. lib. 28. c. 4. Constanti••n. Harm••nopul. Epitom. l. 4. tit. 7. §. 12.
• * 1.1922

  Liv. lib. 4.
• * 1.1923

  lib. 3. tit. 1. §. 7.
• * 1.1924

  in Abramio.
• * 1.1925

  lib. 1. de Sa∣cerdot.
• * 1.1926

  Origen. ubi supra.
• * 1.1927

  30.
• * 1.1928

  31.
• * 1.1929

  Andria, Act. 1. Scen. 5.
• * 1.1930

  ad 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.1931

  in Eclogis le∣gationum.
• * 1.1932

  32.
• * 1.1933

  Tacit. Annal. 3.
• * 1.1934

  Manuel Palae∣olog. orat. 7.
• * 1.1935

  a ••. §. 1. de his qui sui vel ali∣en. jur. Dec••am. 10.
• * 1.1936

  33.
• * 1.1937

  Senec. controv. 1. 6.
• * 1.1938

  lib. 2. c. 7.
• * 1.1939

  Matthaus Monachus legit 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ut filiū etiam compre•• 〈…〉〈…〉 malè, quia eo loci JC. 〈…〉〈…〉 qui∣tur de filio & filia, & de filio con∣troversia non erat. Harm••nopalo a. conscntiunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 lib. 28. tit. 1.
• * 1.1940

  in dial. Meretr.
• * 1.1941

  34.
• * 1.1942

  in Charidemo.
• * 1.1943

  l. D. Adrianus. ff. ad legem Pompeian. de partic. Advers. Mar∣cion.
• * 1.1944

  35.
• * 1.1945

  apud A. Gell. lib. 11. c. 4.
• * 1.1946

  Eurip. in Ar∣chelao.
• * 1.1947

  1.
• * 1.1948

  Cicero lib. 2. de Invent.
• * 1.1949

  2.
• * 1.1950

  Horat. l. 3. od. 24.
• * 1.1951

  3.
• * 1.1952

  Cap. in his. de verb. signif.
• * 1.1953

  l. 4. ff. de legib.
• * 1.1954

  lib. 4. de Tri∣nit.
• * 1.1955

  4.
• * 1.1956

  l. 19. ff. de legibus.
• * 1.1957

  Orat. pro Gae∣cin.
• * 1.1958

  Zonar.
• * 1.1959

  l. contra. ff. de legib. & l. Non dubium. C. de legib.
• * 1.1960

  5.
• * 1.1961

  l. Nominis. ff. de verb. signif.
• * 1.1962

  6.
• * 1.1963

  l. non aliter. ff. de legat.
• * 1.1964

  7.
• * 1.1965

  8.
• * 1.1966

  9.
• * 1.1967

  Dialecticorum verba nulla sunt publica; suis utuntur: & id quidem com∣mune omnium fere est artium. Cice••. lib. 1. Acad.
• * 1.1968

  10.
• * 1.1969

  11.
• * 1.1970

  Thucyd. l. 4.
• * 1.1971

  l. 67. ff. de reg. jur.
• * 1.1972

  l. ex conducto. §. Papinianus. ff. de usur. l. 66. de Judi∣ciis.
• * 1.1973

  lib. 7. cap. 9. Orat.
• * 1.1974

  l. perspexit. ff. Qui & à qui∣bus.
• * 1.1975

  l. cum filiofam, ff. de legat.
• * 1.1976

  12.
• * 1.1977

  l. cum quid. ff. de reb. credit.
• * 1.1978

  l. 9. ff. de regul. jur.
• * 1.1979

  13.
• * 1.1980

  l. inter stipulan∣tem. & l. si ita. ff. de ve••b. signif.
• * 1.1981

  cap. 2. §. sed neque. de trans∣lat. Episc.
• * 1.1982

  14.
• * 1.1983

  l. cum servus, §. scio. ff. de legat. & l. unum ex familia, §. si rem tuam. ff. cod.
• * 1.1984

  15.
• * 1.1985

  l. Titia. 38. §. fin. sup. de auro & argent. leg.
• * 1.1986

  Libertas omni∣bus rebus favo∣rabilior est. l. 38. ff. de re ju∣dicat.
• * 1.1987

  16.
• * 1.1988

  l. interpretatio∣ne. ff. de poenis.
• * 1.1989

  Habet aliquid 〈◊〉〈◊〉 iniquo omne ••agnum exem∣plum, quod con∣t••a singulos uti∣l••••••te publica re••enditur, di∣x•••• C. Cassius a∣pu•• Tacitum.
• * 1.1990

  17.
• * 1.1991

  l. 168. ff. de reg. jur.
• * 1.1992

  Philipp. 9.
• * 1.1993

  Claudian.
• * 1.1994

  apud Guicci∣ard. l. 16. Gall. Proverb. Qui trop em∣brasse, mal estreint.
• * 1.1995

  lib. 4.
• * 1.1996

  ad l. pen. ff. de poenis.
• * 1.1997

  apud Tacit. l. 14.
• * 1.1998

  18.
• * 1.1999

  1.
• * 1.2000

  2.
• * 1.2001

  c. cum qui∣dam. §. illi vero de jure.
• * 1.2002

  c. authorita∣tem. 15. q. 6. Gloss. magn. verb. absolvi∣mus.
• * 1.2003

  3.
• * 1.2004

  lib. 3. de Offic.
• * 1.2005

  l. jus a. §. de just. & jure.
• * 1.2006

  c. proposuit. de. concess. prae∣bend.
• * 1.2007

  4.
• * 1.2008

  lib. 1. de Offic.
• * 1.2009

  5.
• * 1.2010

  lib. 3.
• * 1.2011

  lib. 3. Confess. c. 8.
• * 1.2012

  Cassiodor. lib. 3. var. ep 46. l. Cum saluta∣tus. C. de sent. pass.
• * 1.2013

  6.
• * 1.2014

  l. ult. C. de legib.
• * 1.2015

  7.
• * 1.2016

  pro Ligario.
• * 1.2017

  Gunther. lib. 4.
• * 1.2018

  l. ult. ff. qui sa∣tisd. cog.
• * 1.2019

  lib. 1. Chap. 4.
• * 1.2020

  1.
• * 1.2021

  2.
• * 1.2022

  3.
• * 1.2023

  4.
• * 1.2024

  5.
• * 1.2025

  6.
• * 1.2026

  7.
• * 1.2027

  8.
• * 1.2028

  l. nulla. ff. de legibas.
• * 1.2029

  9.
• * 1.2030

  10.
• * 1.2031

  11.
• * 1.2032

  12.
• * 1.2033

  13.
• * 1.2034

  14.
• * 1.2035

  15.
• * 1.2036

  Ethic. l. 5. c. 10.
• * 1.2037

  ••••aut. Stich.
• * 1.2038

  ubi supra.
• * 1.2039

  16.
• * 1.2040

  17.
• * 1.2041

  18.
• * 1.2042

  19.
• * 1.2043

  Vide lib. 1. cap. 5, & 6
• * 1.2044

  20.
• * 1.2045

  21.
• * 1.2046

  22.
• * 1.2047

  23.
• * 1.2048

  24.
• * 1.2049

  25.
• * 1.2050

  Gloss. in cap. in poenis. 49. de reg. jur. in 6.
• * 1.2051

  26.
• * 1.2052

  l. non possunt. ff. deleg.
• * 1.2053

  l. nam. ff. eod.
• * 1.2054

  Glossa in legem praedict.
• * 1.2055

  27.
• * 1.2056

  Albertus Bo∣logneti Bonon. in Tract. DD.
• * 1.2057

  28.
• * 1.2058

  in declam. Pa∣tris.
• * 1.2059

  29.
• * 1.2060

  30.
• * 1.2061

  See Chapter 1. Rule 8. of this book.
• * 1.2062

  See Chapter 1. Rule 8. of this book.
• * 1.2063

  See Chapter 1. Rule 8. of this book.
• * 1.2064

  l. haeredes. §. 1. ff. de Testam.
• * 1.2065

  l. Cum lex. ff. de legib.
• * 1.2066

  31.
• * 1.2067

  32.
• * 1.2068

  33.
• * 1.2069

  ff. de leg.
• * 1.2070

  1.
• * 1.2071

  2.
• * 1.2072

  3.
• * 1.2073

  4.
• * 1.2074

  5.
• * 1.2075

  l. fin. C. de legib.
• * 1.2076

  6.
• * 1.2077

  1. q 7.
• * 1.2078

  1.
• * 1.2079

  2.
• * 1.2080

  3.
• * 1.2081

  4.
• * 1.2082

  5.
• * 1.2083

  6.
• * 1.2084

  7.
• * 1.2085

  1.
• * 1.2086

  Book. 2. Chap. 3. Rule 29. & Book 3. Chap. 4. Rule 15.
• * 1.2087

  2.
• * 1.2088

  de Coron. milit.
• * 1.2089

  c. 1. de consti∣tut. in 6.
• * 1.2090

  3.
• * 1.2091

  l. si de interpret. ff. de legibus.
• * 1.2092

  Vide Burgos de Paz. in l. 1. Tauri, num. 247.
• * 1.2093

  l. nam Impera∣tor. ff. cod.
• * 1.2094

  l. 1. C. quae sit longa consuet.
• * 1.2095

  cap. super eo. de cognat. spirit.
• * 1.2096

  4.
• * 1.2097

  l. 2. C. quae sit long. consuet.
• * 1.2098

  Non possepra∣scribi contra obedientiam. cap. cum non liceat. de prae∣script.
• * 1.2099

  5.
• * 1.2100

  cap. cum causa. de re judicata.
• * 1.2101

  glos. in cap. ad nostram. de consuet. verb. canonicis.
• * 1.2102

  6.
• * 1.2103

  l. de quibus. ff. de legib.
• * 1.2104

  ibid.
• * 1.2105

  Chap. 1. Rule 7.
• * 1.2106

  7.
• * 1.2107

  8.
• * 1.2108

  1.
• * 1.2109

  2.
• * 1.2110

  3.
• * 1.2111

  4.
• * 1.2112

  5.
• * 1.2113

  6.
• * 1.2114

  1.
• * 1.2115

  habetur 15. qu. 1. in princip. lib. De duabu•• animabus cap. 11.
• * 1.2116

  ibid. ubi suprá. cap. non est.
• * 1.2117

  2.
• * 1.2118

  lib. de fide con∣tra Manichaeos cap. 10.
• * 1.2119

  3.
• * 1.2120

  4.
• * 1.2121

  Ovid. Trist. lib. 4. El. 3.
• * 1.2122

  Sil. Ital. l. 9.
• * 1.2123

  5.
• * 1.2124

  6.
• * 1.2125

  S. Augusti〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 2. de peccator. merit. cap. 18. Vide etiam Prosper. lib. 1. de vocat. g••••tium cap. 8. & ad capi∣tula Gallor•••••• Sent. 6. & contra Col∣latorem, cap. ••••. & carmen d•• ingratis capp. 26, 2••. & ult. Vide etiam & Fulgent. lib. de incarnat. & gratiâ Christi. cap. 20. Gregorii lib. 18. moral cap. 21. & lib. 33. cap. 25. & V. B••••••m in Gen. 4. super verbis Do∣mini ad Cain. Sed super omnes videa∣tur 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Bernardi liber de gratia & li∣ber•• arbitrio: vide eundem serm. 81. in Canti••a.
• * 1.2126

  7.
• * 1.2127

  8.
• * 1.2128

  Hose. 9. 10.
• * 1.2129

  1 Cor. 6. 17.
• * 1.2130

  9.
• * 1.2131

  Job 21. Psal. 35.
• * 1.2132

  10.
• * 1.2133

  11.
• * 1.2134

  12.
• * 1.2135

  13.
• * 1.2136

  14.
• * 1.2137

  15.
• * 1.2138

  16.
• * 1.2139

  17.
• * 1.2140

  18.
• * 1.2141

  de Peccator. merit. & remiss. c. 18.
• * 1.2142

  19.
• * 1.2143

  Epist. 11. ad Augustin.
• * 1.2144

  homil. 27. in Evang.
• * 1.2145

  tom. 7. l. 3.
• * 1.2146

  20.
• * 1.2147

  Matth. 12. 36.
• * 1.2148

  in libr. Timo∣ris.
• * 1.2149

  In comment ad hunc locum.
• * 1.2150

  in Regul, bre∣vior. resp. ad interr. 23.
• * 1.2151

  Epist. 20. lib. 5
• * 1.2152

  Phaedr. fab. l. 2. 36.
• * 1.2153

  21.
• * 1.2154

  22.
• * 1.2155

  23.
• * 1.2156

  24.
• * 1.2157

  25.
• * 1.2158

  Gen. 48. 16.
• * 1.2159

  Isai. 4. 1.
• * 1.2160

  James 2. 7.
• * 1.2161

  26.
• * 1.2162

  Matth. 12. 30. Luk•• 11. 23.
• * 1.2163

  27.
• * 1.2164

  Marc. 9. 40. Luke 9. 50.
• * 1.2165

  28.
• * 1.2166

  29.
• * 1.2167

  30.
• * 1.2168

  31.
• * 1.2169

  32.
• * 1.2170

  33.
• * 1.2171

  34.
• * 1.2172

  35.
• * 1.2173

  John 15. 1, 2.
• * 1.2174

  Quintil. l. 8. 6.
• * 1.2175

  S. Greg. Homil. 7. in Evang.
• * 1.2176

  36.
• * 1.2177

  1.
• * 1.2178

  2.
• * 1.2179

  ff. de reg. ju. l. 152.
• * 1.2180

  3.
• * 1.2181

  4.
• * 1.2182

  5.
• * 1.2183

  lib. 2. Chap. 1. Rule 5.
• * 1.2184

  Vide Petrum Peckium ad c. 10. Ratihabiti∣onem. de regul. jur. in 6••0.
• * 1.2185

  6.
• * 1.2186

  Phaedr. fab. 10.
• * 1.2187

  7.
• * 1.2188

  de Bello civill▪ l. 1.
• * 1.2189

  Avian. fab.
• * 1.2190

  l. 167. §. 1. Qui ju••••u.
• * 1.2191

  l. 207. ff. de reg. jur. & Ulpian. lib. 1. ad segem Juliam & Pa∣piam. lib. 3.
• * 1.2192

  lib. 2. c. 7.
• * 1.2193

  8.
• * 1.2194

  l. 157. §. ad ea quae.
• * 1.2195

  l. 11. is qui in puteum. §. 6. si Tutoris jussu. ff. quod vi a••clam. l. 17. sed si unius. §. si jussu Domini. ff. de injuriis.
• * 1.2196

  Ecclus. 4. 22.
• * 1.2197

  9.
• * 1.2198

  2 Sam. 24.
• * 1.2199

  Horat.
• * 1.2200

  Martial.
• * 1.2201

  Serm. 8. de Benef.
• * 1.2202

  10.
• * 1.2203

  11.
• * 1.2204

  12.
• * 1.2205

  l. 142. ff. de reg. Jur.
• * 1.2206

  c. super eo. de cognat. spiri∣tuali.
• * 1.2207

  13.
• * 1.2208

  14.
• * 1.2209

  15.
• * 1.2210

  16.
• * 1.2211

  17.
• * 1.2212

  18.
• * 1.2213

  19.
• * 1.2214

  l. quidam. ff. de re judic. & l. Barbarius. ff. de offic. praetor.
• * 1.2215

  20.
• * 1.2216

  See Book 1. Chapt. 5. Rule 8. Numb. 17, 18.
• * 1.2217

  21.
• * 1.2218

  Plutarch. in apoph. Rom.
• * 1.2219

  22.
• * 1.2220

  cap. si quis vi∣duam. 50. di∣stinct. c. 2. de cler. pug. in duello. c. sicut dignum ••. cle∣ricos. de homici.
• * 1.2221

  Claudian. lib. 1. in Eutrop.
• * 1.2222

  23.
• * 1.2223

  Claud. ibid.
• * 1.2224

  24.
• * 1.2225

  Ephes. 4. 28.
• * 1.2226

  Phil. 4. 8.
• * 1.2227

  25.
• * 1.2228

  26.
• * 1.2229

  See lib. 2. Chap. 2. Rule 6. Numb. 31.
• * 1.2230

  27.
• * 1.2231

  Homil. 6. in Matth.
• * 1.2232

  Quem Deum hujus mundi vocat Apostolus: quem Deum scil. hujusmodi ludorum auth••rem indigitat Hieronymus.

  Vida Cremonensis, Poeta non incelebris, Mox verò gratum ludum mortalibus ipse Ostendit Deus, & morem certaminis hujus. Namque olim, ut perhibent, dilectam Scacc••ida, quá non Inter Serialas praestantior altera Nymphas, Compressit ripā errantem, & nil tale putantem, Dum pascit niveos herbosa ad flumina olores. Tum bicolor••m buxum dedit, atque pudoris Amissi pretium, vario ordine picturatum Argentique auriq••c gravem tabulam addit, usumque Edocuit; Nymphaeque etiam nunc servat honorem Et Nomen Ludus, celebrat quem maxime, Roma, Extremaeque hominum diversa ad littora gentes.
• a 1.2233

  in Phaedro.
• b 1.2234

  de alcatoribus
• * 1.2235

  Serm. de S. Mattkia.
• * 1.2236

  lib. 1. de Dae∣monol.
• * 1.2237

  Eurip.
• * 1.2238

  lib. 1. Origin. c. 67.
• * 1.2239

  28.
• * 1.2240

  Polymath. l. 8. c. 3. De prob. vol. 2. conc. 13. 6.
• * 1.2241

  Horat.
• * 1.2242

  lib. 3. Cod. Justin. tit. 43. & in Authen∣tic. tit. de Sa∣crosanctis E∣piscopis. §. inter∣dicimus.
• * 1.2243

  Horat. Ep. 1.
• * 1.2244

  ff. l. 11. tit. 5. de alcator. vide etiam Wesen∣bech. ibid.
• * 1.2245

  de Vita beara c. 7.
• a 1.2246

  de Alea.
• b 1.2247

  praxis. p. 507. c. 126. & alibi.
• * 1.2248

  29.
• * 1.2249

  Ovid. de r••∣med.
• * 1.2250

  lib. de Al••••••ri∣bus.
• * 1.2251

  de Christian. milite.
• * 1.2252

  Can. 79. Vide etiam can. 41, & 42. A∣postol.
• * 1.2253

  de vita & ho∣nestate Clericor. cap. Cleric. L. 6. c. 200.
• * 1.2254

  Vide etiam De∣cretum dist. 35. c. 8. Episcop. & de excessu prae∣latorum, cap. in∣ter dilectos.
• * 1.2255

  30.
• * 1.2256

  Horat. l. 2. Sat. 1.
• * 1.2257

  lib. 3. c. 21. l. 8. c. 8.
• * 1.2258

  Janus Rut∣gersius legit [in scnilibus] non [in scurrili∣bus] Pontanus [in serotinis lusibus] Scrive∣rius [inheroicis] alii [inseriis] unico verbo.
• * 1.2259

  † Alex. ab Alex.
• * 1.2260

  in Caesarib.
• * 1.2261

  Polyc. lib. 1. c. 5.
• * 1.2262

  31.
• * 1.2263

  32.
• * 1.2264

  Phaedrus. LIII
• * 1.2265

  Petrus Folle∣rius. Senec. de Brevit. vitae c. 13.
• * 1.2266

  33.
• * 1.2267

  Teren. Andria.
• * 1.2268

  S. Hieron. ep. ad Gaudent.
• * 1.2269

  Plaut. Persâ.
• * 1.2270

  34.
• * 1.2271

  Ovid.
• * 1.2272

  35.
• * 1.2273

  apud Sucton.
• * 1.2274

  36.
• * 1.2275

  lib. 3. Cod. tit. 43. Vide ibi Cuja∣cium, & Wesen∣bech. ff. l. 11. tit. 5. Cicer. ad At∣ticum. Ep. 13. l. 1.
• * 1.2276

  ib. 4. Ethic. c. 1.
• * 1.2277

  Specul. anim. c. 2. & in Sent. lib. 1. dist. 25. part. 2. art. 2. q. 1. in conclus. ad 4.
• * 1.2278

  Epist. 54. ad Macedon.
• * 1.2279

  ibid.
• * 1.2280

  1 Cor. 13.
• * 1.2281

  ubi supra.
• * 1.2282

  37.
• * 1.2283

  Juven. sat. 13.
• * 1.2284

  Plutarch. in Reg. & Imper∣apoph.
• * 1.2285

  38.
• * 1.2286

  Anton Gu••va∣ta. horol. Prine.
• * 1.2287

  per Anton. Guevata.
• * 1.2288

  orat. pro A••∣chia ••o••t.
• * 1.2289

  39.
• * 1.2290

  ad Attic. ep. 13. l. 1.
• * 1.2291

  in 2^â Philip∣pic.
• * 1.2292

  1.
• * 1.2293

  Vide Unum necessar. cap. 5. of Habitual sins.
• * 1.2294

  2.
• * 1.2295

  3.
• * 1.2296

  4.
• * 1.2297

  Mart. Ep. 42. l. 9.
• * 1.2298

  5.
• * 1.2299

  6.
• * 1.2300

  7.
• * 1.2301

  8.
• * 1.2302

  9.
• * 1.2303

  10.
• * 1.2304

  11.
• * 1.2305

  12.
• * 1.2306

  Lib. 3. Chap. 1. Rule 4.
• * 1.2307

  Quintil.
• * 1.2308

  Sententiar. 5.
• * 1.2309

  in Andria, act. 1. sc. 4.
• * 1.2310

  13.
• * 1.2311

  14.
• * 1.2312

  in Apologet. & in Exhortat. castit. & de Virg. velandis.
• * 1.2313

  15.
• * 1.2314

  Exod. 21. 12.
• * 1.2315

  1.
• * 1.2316

  Luke 21. 34.
• * 1.2317

  Unum necessar. cap. 5.
• * 1.2318

  2.
• * 1.2319

  3.
• * 1.2320

  4.
• * 1.2321

  lib. 22. contr. Faust. cap. 44.
• * 1.2322

  5.
• * 1.2323

  6.
• * 1.2324

  7.
• * 1.2325

  8.
• * 1.2326

  Bartol. in l. ex facto. in prin∣cip. ff. de vulg. & pupilla sub∣stit.
• * 1.2327

  9.
• * 1.2328

  10.
• * 1.2329

  11.
• * 1.2330

  Senec. Herc. Fur.
• * 1.2331

  1.
• * 1.2332

  1 Timoth. 4.
• * 1.2333

  Bo••th. lib. 3. de Consol. Phi∣los.
• * 1.2334

  Seneca.
• * 1.2335

  2.
• * 1.2336

  lib. 5. de Phi∣losoph. cap. 2.
• * 1.2337

  3.
• * 1.2338

  4.
• * 1.2339

  5.
• * 1.2340

  6.
• * 1.2341

  7.
• * 1.2342

  8.
• * 1.2343

  9.
• * 1.2344

  10.
• * 1.2345

  11.
• * 1.2346

  12.
• * 1.2347

  13.
• * 1.2348

  14.
• * 1.2349

  15.
• * 1.2350

  16.
• * 1.2351

  l. de Mendacio.
• * 1.2352

  lib. 6. Ethic. cap. 5.
• * 1.2353

  Epist. 98.
• a 1.2354

  in l. 6. Eth. c. 5.
• b 1.2355

  in Hippia minor.
• * 1.2356

  17.
• * 1.2357

  Sleidan. lib. 4.
• * 1.2358

  18.
• * 1.2359

  in Psal. 66. v. 18.
• * 1.2360

  1.
• * 1.2361

  2.
• * 1.2362

  l. 9. ff. de jur. & fact. ignor. & l. 20. ff. de aqua & aquae pluvi.
• * 1.2363

  l. 3. §. 2. ff. de injur.
• * 1.2364

  de Hippocrat. & Platon. placit.
• * 1.2365

  apud Stobaeu•••• in Physicis Eclogis.
• a 1.2366

  de Anima.
• b 1.2367

  de Nat. Hom. cap. 2.
• * 1.2368

  3.
• * 1.2369

  Lucret. l. 3.
• * 1.2370

  4.
• * 1.2371

  de Placit. philos. 5. c. 24.
• * 1.2372

  Diog. Laert. in Zenone.
• * 1.2373

  tit. 26.
• * 1.2374

  in 8. Eclog. Virgil.
• * 1.2375

  lib. 60. tit. 39.
• † 1.2376

  tit. 71.
• * 1.2377

  5.
• * 1.2378

  Vide 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. ubi supra. in Epit. leg. tit. ult. num. 21.
• * 1.2379

  lib. 10. de Ge∣nes. ad liter. cap. 13.
• * 1.2380

  lib. 11. cap. 18.
• * 1.2381

  lib. 18. cap. 3.
• * 1.2382

  l. 1. §. impuberi, ff. de Senat. Silan. habena.
• * 1.2383

  6.
• * 1.2384

  Declamat. 21.
• * 1.2385

  Quaest. 84.
• * 1.2386

  Epist. 57.
• * 1.2387

  Cicer. pro Cluent.
• * 1.2388

  7.
• * 1.2389

  l. 15. ff. de juris. l. Divus. ff. ad leg. Cornel.
• * 1.2390

  8.
• * 1.2391

  l. 5. Epist.
• * 1.2392

  9.
• * 1.2393

  Luke 23. 34. Acts 3. 17.
• * 1.2394

  John 9. 41.
• * 1.2395

  1 Tim. 1. Gal. 1.
• * 1.2396

  10.
• * 1.2397

  11.
• * 1.2398

  Gemara San∣hed••in cap. 8. Ad Iliad. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.2399

  Moral. l. 1. ad Eudem. c. 34. & Ethic. ad Nicom. l. 3. c. 3, & 4. Vide etiam Po∣litic. 2. cap. ult. & Rhetor. 2. cap. 27.
• * 1.2400

  Averroes in l. 3. Ethic. c. 5.
• * 1.2401

  ad Herennium 2.
• * 1.2402

  Tr••cul. Act. 4. Sc••n. 2.
• * 1.2403

  12.
• * 1.2404

  Aulul. Act. 4. Scen. 10.
• * 1.2405

  Orat. 3.
• * 1.2406

  13.
• * 1.2407

  14.
• * 1.2408

  qu. 59. in Genes.
• * 1.2409

  in l. 6. de R•• milit.
• * 1.2410

  15.
• * 1.2411

  Aulul. Act. 4. Scen. 7.
• * 1.2412

  16.
• * 1.2413

  Declamat. 22.
• * 1.2414

  17.
• * 1.2415

  See Rule 4. of this Chap. Num. 2.
• * 1.2416

  18.
• * 1.2417

  Homil. 5. in Genes. Homil. 44. in Genes. lib. 2. contr. Faust. Manic. cap. 44.
• * 1.2418

  lib. de Patri∣arch. cap. 6.
• * 1.2419

  19.
• * 1.2420

  20.
• * 1.2421

  21.
• * 1.2422

  22.
• * 1.2423

  l. Dolo. 5. C. de inutilib. sti∣pulat. & instit. de exceptionib. in initio.
• * 1.2424

  l. 13. ff. de acti∣onibus empti. in princ.
• * 1.2425

  lib. 3. Offic.
• * 1.2426

  l. in causae. §. Idem Pomp. ff. de minor. & l. item si. §. ult. ff. loc.
• * 1.2427

  l. si volun∣tate. C. de re∣scind. vend.
• * 1.2428

  1.
• * 1.2429

  2.
• * 1.2430

  Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 1.
• * 1.2431

  ibid.
• * 1.2432

  lib. 3. Chap. 1. Rule 2.
• * 1.2433

  3.
• * 1.2434

  ubi suprá. & lib. 2. Chap. 3. Rule 11.
• * 1.2435

  4.
• * 1.2436

  lib. 3 Metam
• * 1.2437

  lib. 5. Thebais.
• * 1.2438

  5.
• * 1.2439

  Dial. Me••etrie.
• * 1.2440

  6.
• * 1.2441

  7.
• * 1.2442

  8.
• * 1.2443

  lib••. singul. ad Marcellin. de Spir. & liter.
• * 1.2444

  in Epicte••um.
• * 1.2445

  lib. 11. Ep. 59.
• * 1.2446

  9.
• * 1.2447

  Seneca.
• * 1.2448

  10.
• * 1.2449

  Ethic. lib. 10. c. ult.
• * 1.2450

  11.
• * 1.2451

  Declamat. 22.
• * 1.2452

  ubi suprá.
• * 1.2453

  1.
• * 1.2454

  Matth. 6. 1.
• * 1.2455

  Lib. 5. Ethic. cap. 2.
• * 1.2456

  2.
• * 1.2457

  1 Cor. 10. 31.
• * 1.2458

  Coloss. 3. 17.
• * 1.2459

  3.
• * 1.2460

  Hist. Lausiac. c. 20.
• * 1.2461

  4.
• * 1.2462

  5.
• * 1.2463

  Plin. lib. 3. ep. 11.
• * 1.2464

  Seneca ep. 82.
• * 1.2465

  6.
• * 1.2466

  7.
• * 1.2467

  Ubi suprá.
• * 1.2468

  8.
• * 1.2469

  Book 1. ch. 5. rule 8.
• * 1.2470

  1.
• * 1.2471

  2.
• * 1.2472

  In reg. brevior. reg. 196.
• * 1.2473

  3.
• * 1.2474

  Vide Reginald. prax. lib. 12. cap. 3. n. 27.
• * 1.2475

  4.
• * 1.2476

  See Book 1. ch. 2. Rule 5.
• * 1.2477

  5.
• * 1.2478

  6.
• * 1.2479

  7.
• * 1.2480

  8.
• * 1.2481

  See Book II. chap. 1. rule 4.
• * 1.2482

  Epigr. l. 8. 54.
• * 1.2483

  9.
• * 1.2484

  10.
• * 1.2485

  Lib. 4. epist. 20.
• * 1.2486

  Lib. 5. ep. 14.
• * 1.2487

  Trinum.
• * 1.2488

  11.
• * 1.2489

  Vide lib. 2. ch. 3. rule 4.
• * 1.2490

  2.
• * 1.2491

  3.
• * 1.2492

  Avian. fab.
• * 1.2493

  4.
• * 1.2494

  5.
• * 1.2495

  6.
• * 1.2496

  Eu••t••th. in Iliad. 4.