An argument, shewing that a standing army is inconsistent with a free government and absolutely destructive to the constitution of the English monarchy

An ARGUMENT, shewing that a STANDING ARMY is inconsistent with a free Government, and absolutely de∣structive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy.

WHen I consider what a dismal Scene of Blood and Desolation hath appeared upon the Theatre of Europe during the Growth and Progress of the French Power, I cannot suffi∣ciently applaud and admire our thrice happy Situation, by which we have long enjoy'd an uninterrupted course of Peace and Prosperity, whilst our Neighbouring Nations have been miserably harassed by perpetual War: For lying open to continual Invasion, they can never enjoy Quiet and Secu∣rity, nor take a sound Sleep, but, Hercules like, with Clubs in their hands: So that these Halcyon Days which we enjoy amidst such an universal Hurricane, must be solely attributed to our Tutelar God Neptune, who with a Guard of winged Coursers so strongly intrenches us, that we may be said to be mediâ insuperabiles undâ, and not unfitly compar'd to the Earth, which stands fix'd and immoveable, and never to be shaken but by an internal Convulsion. And as Nature has been thus liberal to us in our Situation, so the Luxuriancy of our Soil makes it productive of numerous Commodities

fit for Trade and Commerce: And as this Trade renders us Masters of the Silver and Gold of the East and West with∣out our toiling in the Mine, so it breeds us multitudes of able-bodied and skilful Seamen to defend the Treasures they bring home, that even Luxury it self, which has been the Bane and Destruction of most Countries where it has been predominant, may in some measure be esteemed our Preser∣vation, by breeding up a Race of Men amongst us, whose manner of Life will never suffer them to be debauched, or enervated with Ease or Idleness. But we have one thing more to boast of besides all these Felicities, and that is, of being Free-men and not Slaves in this unhappy Age, when an universal Deluge of Tyranny has overspread the face of the whole Earth; so that this is the Ark out of which if the Dove be sent forth, she will find no resting place till her Return.

Our Constitution is a limited mix'd Monarchy, where the King enjoys all the Prerogatives necessary to the support of his Dignity, and Protection of his People, and is only abridged from the Power of injuring his own Subjects: In short, the Man is loose, and the Beast only bound; and our Government may truly be called an Empire of Laws, and not of Men; for every Man has the same right to what he ean acquire by his Labour and Industry, as the King hath to his Crown, and the meanest Subject hath his Remedy against him in his Courts at Westminster: No Man can be impri∣soned, unless he has transgressed a Law of his own making, nor be try'd but by his own Neighbours; so that we enjoy a Liberty scarce known to the antient Greeks and Romans.

And lest the extraordinary Power intrusted in the Crown should lean towards Arbitrary Government, or the tumul∣tuary Licentiousness of the People should encline towards a Democracy, the Wisdom of our Ancestors hath instituted a middle State, viz. of Nobility, whose Interest it is to trim

this Boat of our Commonwealth, and to skreen the People against the Insults of the Prince, and the Prince against the Popularity of the Commons, since if either Extream prevail so far as to oppress the other, they are sure to be over∣whelmed in their Ruin. And the meeting of these three States in Parliament is what we call our Government: for without all their Consents no Law can be made, nor a Pen∣ny of Money levied upon the Subjects; so that the King's Necessities do often oblige him to summon this Court, which is the Grand Inquest of the Kingdom, where the People speak boldly their Grievances, and call to account over∣grown Criminals, who are above the reach of ordinary Justice: so that the Excellence of this Government consists in the due ballance of the several constituent Parts of it, for if either one of them should be too hard for the other two, there is an actual Dissolution of the Constitution; but whilst we can continue in our present Condition, we may without Va∣nity reckon our selves the happiest People in the World.

But as there is no degree of Human Happiness but is ac∣companied with some Defects, and the strongest Constitu∣tions are most liable to certain Diseases; so the very Excel∣lence of our Government betrays it to some Inconveniences, the Wheels and Motions of it being so curious and delicate that it is often out of order, and therefore we ought to apply our utmost Endeavours to rectify and preserve it: and I am afraid it is more owing to the accident of our Situation, than to our own Wisdom, Integrity or Courage, that it has yet a Being; when we see most Nations in Europe over-run with Oppression and Slavery, where the Lives, Estates and Liber∣ties of the People are subject to the lawless Fancy and Am∣bition of the Prince, and the Rapine and Insolence of his Officers; where the Nobility, that were formerly the bold Assertors of their Countries Liberty, are now only the En∣signs and Ornaments of the Tyranny, and the People Beasts

of Burden, and barely kept alive to support the Luxury and Prodigality of their Masters.

And if we enquire how these unhappy Nations have lost that precious Jewel Liberty, and we as yet preserved it, we shall find their Miseries and our Happiness proceed from this, That their Necessities or Indiscretion have permitted a stand∣ing Army to be kept amongst them, and our Situation rather than our Prudence, hath as yet defended us from it, other∣wise we had long since lost what is the most valuable thing under Heaven: For, as I said before, our Constitution de∣pending upon a due ballance between King, Lords and Com∣mons, and that Ballance depending upon their mutual Occa∣sions and Necessities they have of one another; if this Ce∣ment be once broke, there is an actual Dissolution of the Go∣vernment. Now this Ballance can never be preserved but by an Union of the natural and artificial Strength of the King∣dom, that is, by making the Militia to consist of the same Persons as have the Property; or otherwise the Government is violent and against Nature, and cannot possibly continue, but the Constitution must either break the Army, or the Army will destroy the Constitution: for it is universally true, that where-ever the Militia is, there is or will be the Government in a short time; and therefore the Institutors of this Gothick Ballance (which was established in all Parts of Europe) made the Militia to consist of the same Parts as the Government, where the King was General, the Lords by virtue of their Castles and Honours, the great Commanders, and the Freeholders by their Tenures the Body of the Army; so that it was next to impossible for an Army thus constituted to act to the disadvantage of the Constitution, unless we could suppose them to be Felons de se. And here I will ven∣ture to assert that upon no other Foundation than this, can any Nation long preserve its Freedom, unless some very par∣ticular Accidents contribute to it; and I hope I shall make it

appear, that no Nation ever preserved its Liberty, that main∣tained an Army otherwise constituted within the Seat of their Government: and let us flatter our selves as much as we please, what happened yesterday, will come to pass again; and the same Causes will produce like Effects in all Ages.

And here I can't avoid taking notice of some Gentlemen who a few Years since were the pretended Patriots of their Country, who had nothing in their Mouths but the sacred Name of Liberty, who in the late Reigns could hardly afford the King the Prerogative that was due to him, and which was absolutely necessary to put in motion this Machine of our Government, and to make the Springs and Wheels of it act naturally, and perform their Function: I say, these Gentle∣men that could not with Patience hear of the King's ordinary Guards, can now discourse familiarly of twenty thousand Men to be maintained in times of Peace; and the odious Ex∣cuse they give for this infamous Apostacy is, that if they should not gratify the Court in this modest Request, another Party may be caressed who will grant this, or any thing else which is asked, and then they say matters will be much worse; as if Arbitrary Government was a different thing in their hands, from what it is in others, or that the Lineaments and Features of Tyranny would become graceful and lovely when they are its Valet de Chambres. But let them not de∣ceive themselves, for if they think to make their Court this way, they will quickly find themselves outflattered by the Party they fear, who have been long the Darlings of Arbi∣trary Power, and whose Principles as well as Practices teach them to be Enemies to all the legal Rights, and just Liber∣ties of their Native Country; and so these wretched Bu••glers will be made use of only to bring together the Materia〈…〉〈…〉 of Tyranny, and then must give place to more expert 〈…〉〈…〉i∣tects to finish the Building.

And tho we are secure from any Attempts of this kind du∣ring the Reign of a Prince who hath rescued us from a Captivity equal to what Moses redeemed the People of Israel from: A Prince whose Life is so necessary to the Preservation of Europe, that both Protestant and Popish Princes have forgot their antient Maxims, and laid aside their innate Animosities, and made it their common Interest to chuse him their Patron and Protector: A Prince in whom we know no Vices but what have been esteemed Vertues in others, viz. his unde∣served Clemency to his Enemies, and his exposing too much that Life upon which depends not only our Safety, but the Liberties of all Europe, and the Protestant Religion through the World: I say, was this most excellent Prince to be im∣mortal (as his Great and Glorious Actions) we ought in com∣mon Prudence to abandon all thoughts of Self-preservation, and wholly to rely on his Care and Conduct. But since no Vertue nor pitch of Glory will exempt him from paying the common Debt to Nature, but Death hath a Sythe which cuts off the most noble Lives; we ought not to intrust any Power with him, which we don't think proper to be conti∣nued to his Successors: and doubtless our great Benefactor will not regret this, or any thing else that can reasonably be demanded in order to compleat that Deliverance so far ad∣vanced by his invincible Courage and Conduct; for to set us, like Moses, within view of the promised Land, with a ne plus ultra, is the greatest of all Human Infelicities, and such I shall always take our Case to be, whilst a standing Army must be kept up to prey upon our Entrails, and which must in the hands of an ill Prince (which we have the misfortune frequently to meet with) infallibly destroy our Constitunion. And this is so evident and important a Truth, that no Le∣gislator ever founded a free Government, but avoided this Caribdis, as a Rock against which his Commonwealth must certainly be shipwrack'd, as the Israelites, Athenians, Corin∣thians,

Achaians, Lacedemonians, Thebans, Samnites, and Ro∣mans; none of which Nations whilst they kept their Liberty were ever known to maintain any Souldiers in constant Pay within their Cities, or ever suffered any of their Subjects to make War their Prosession; well knowing that the Sword and Soveraignty always march hand in hand, and there∣fore they trained their own Citizens and the Territories a∣bout them perpetually in Arms, and their whole Common∣wealths by this means became so many several formed Mi∣litias: A general Exercise of the best of their People in the use of Arms, was the only Bulwark of their Liberties; this was reckon'd the surest way to preserve them both at home and abroad, the People being secured thereby as well against the Domestick Affronts of any of their own Citizens, as against the Foreign Invasions of ambitious and unruly Neigh∣bours. Their Arms were never lodg'd in the hands of any who had not an Interest in preserving the publick Peace, who fought pro aris & focis, and thought themselves sufficiently paid by repelling Invaders, that they might with freedom return to their own Affairs. In those days there was no difference between the Citizen, the Souldier, and the Hus∣bandman, for all promiscuously took Arms when the publick Safety required it, and afterwards laid them down with more Alacrity than they took them up: So that we find amongst the Romans the best and bravest of their Generals came from the Plough, contentedly returning when the Work was over, and never demanded their Triumphs till they had laid down their Commands, and reduced themselves to the state of pri∣vate Men. Nor do we find that this famous Commonwealth ever permitted a Deposition of their Arms in any other hands, till their Empire increasing, Necessity constrained them to erect a constant stipendiary Souldiery abroad in Foreign Parts, either for the holding or winning of Provinces: Then Luxu∣ry increasing with Dominion, the strict Rule and Discipline

of Freedom soon abated, and Forces were kept up at home, which soon prov'd of such dangerous Consequence, that the People were forced to make a Law to employ them at a con∣venient distance; which was, that if any General marched over the River Rubicon, he should be declar'd a publick Ene∣my: and in the Passage of that River this following Inscripti∣on was erected; Imperator sive miles, sive Tyrannus armatus quisquis sistito, vexillum{que} arma{que} deponito, nec citra hunc am∣nem trajicito: and this made Cesar when he had presumed to pass this River, to think of nothing but pressing on to the total Oppression of the Empire, which he shortly after obtained.

Nor, as I said before, did any Nation deviate from these Rules but they lost their Liberty; and of this kind there are infinite Examples, out of which I shall give a few in several Ages, which are most known, and occur to every ones reading.

The first Example I shall give is of Pisistratus, who artifi∣cially prevailing with the Athenians to allow him fifty Guards for the Defence of his Person, he so improv'd that Number, that he seiz'd upon the Castle and Government, destroy'd the Commonwealth, and made himself Tyrant of Athens.

The Corinthians being in apprehension of their Enemies, made a Decree for four hundred Men to be kept to defend their City, and gave Tymophanes the Command over them, who overturned their Government, cut off all the principal Citizens, and proclaim'd himself King of Corinth.

Agathocles being the Captain-General of the Syracusians, got such an Interest in the Army, that he cut all the Se∣nators to pieces, and the richest of the People, and made himself their King.

The Romans for fear of the Teutones and Cimbri, who like vast Inundations threatned their Empire, chose Martus their General, and, contrary to the Constitution of their Govern∣ment,

continued him five Years in his Command, which gave him such opportunity to insinuate, and gain an Interest in their Army, that he oppressed their Liberty: and to this were owing all the Miseries, Massacres, and Ruins which that City suffered under him and Scylla, who made the best Blood in the World run like Water in the Streets of Rome, and turn'd the whole City into a Shambles of the Nobility, Gentry and People.

The same thing enabled Cesar totally to overthrow that famous Commonwealth; for the Prolongation of his Com∣mission in Gaul gave him an opportunity to debauch his Ar∣my, and then upon a pretended Disgust he marched to Rome, drove out the Senators, seiz'd the Treasury, fought then Forces, and made himself perpetual Dictator.

Olivaretto de Fermò desired leave of his fellow-Citizens, that he might be admitted into their Town with a hundred Horse of his Companions; which being granted, he put to the Sword all the principal Citizens, and proclaim'd himself their Prince.

Francis Sforza being General of the Milanese, usurped up∣on them, and made himself Duke of Millain.

After Christiern the Second King of Denmark had con∣quer'd Sweden, he invited all the Senators and Nobility to a magnificent Entertainment, where after he had treated them highly for two days, he most barbarously butcher'd them: None escaped this Massacre but the brave Gustavus Ericson, who was then a Prisoner; but he afterwards escaping through a thousand Difficulties, by his good Fortune, Courage and Conduct, drove the Danes out of Sweden, and restor'd the Swedes to their antient Kingdom. Nothing then was thought too great for their Generous Deliverer, every Mouth was full of his Praises, and by the Universal Voice of the People he was chosen their King; and to consummate the last Testi∣mony of their Gratitude, they trusted him with an Army:

but they soon found their Mistake, for it cost them their Li∣berty; and having granted that unum magnum, it was too late to dispute any thing else: His Successors having been pleased to take all the rest, and now they remain the mise∣rable Examples of too credulous Generosity.

The Story of Denmark is so generally known, and so well related by a late excellent Author, that it would be Imper∣tinence in me to repeat it; only this I will observe, that if the King had not had an Army at his Command, the No∣bles had never deliver'd up their Government.

Our Country man Oliver Cromwell turn'd out that Parlia∣ment under which he serv'd, and who had got Immortal Honour through the whole World by their great Actions; and this he effected by the Assistance of an Army, which must be allowed to have had as much Vertue, Sobriety, and publick Spirit, as hath been known in the World since a∣mongst that sort of Men.

The last Instance I shall give, is of a French Colony, as I remember in the West Indies, who having War with the neighbouring Indians, and being tired in their March with the extremity of Heat, made their Slaves carry their Arms, who taking that opportunity fell upon them, and cut them to pieces; a just Punishment for their Folly. And this will always be the fate of those that trust their Arms out of their own hands: for it is a ridiculous Imagination to conceive Men will be Servants, when they can be Masters. And as Mr. Harrington judiciously observes, Whatever Nation suf∣fers their Servants to carry their Arms, their Servants will make them hold their Trenchers.

Some People object, That the Republicks of Venice and Holland are Instances to disprove my Assertion, who both keep great Armies, and yet have not lost their Liberty. I answer, that neither keep any standing Forces within the Seats of their Government, that is, within the City of

Venice, or the great Towns of the United Provinces; but they defend these by their own Burghers, and quarter their Mercenaries in their conquered Countries, viz. the Vene∣tians in Greece, and the Continent of Italy, and the Dutch in Brabant and Flanders; and the Situation of these States make their Armies, so posted, not dangerous to them: for the Venetians cannot be attack'd without a Fleet, nor the Dutch be ever conquer'd by their own Forces, their Country being so full of strong Towns, fortified both by Art and Nature, and defended by their own Citizens, that it would be a fruitless Attempt for their own Armies to invade them; for if they should march against any of their Cities, 'tis but shutting up their Gates, and the Design is spoiled.

But if we admit that an Army might be consistent with Freedom in a Commonwealth, yet it is otherwise in a free Monarchy; for in the former 'tis wholly in the disposal of the People, who nominate, appoint, discard, and punish the Generals and Officers as they think fit, and 'tis certain Death to make any Attempt upon their Liberties; whereas in the latter, the King is perpetual General, may model the Army as he pleases, and it will be called High-Treason to oppose him.

And tho some Princes, as the Family of the Medices, Lewes the XIth, and others laid the Foundation of their Tyrannies without the immediate Assistance of an Army, yet they all found an Army necessary to establish them; or otherwise a little Experience in the People of the change of their Condi∣tion, would have made them disgorge in a day that ill-gotten Power they had been acquiring for an Age.

This Subject is so self-evident, that I am almost asham'd to prove it: for if we look through the World, we shall find in no Country, Liberty and an Army stand together; so that to know whether a People are Free or Slaves, it is ne∣cessary only to ask, Whether there is an Army kept amongst

them? and the Solution of that Preliminary Question re∣solves the Doubt: as we see in China, India, Tartary, Persia, Ethiopia, Turkey, Morocco, Muscovy, Austria, France, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Tuscany, and all the little Principalities of Ger∣many and Italy, where the People live in the most abandoned Slavery; and in Countries where no Armies are kept within the Seat of their Government, the People are free, as Po∣land, Biscay, Switzerland, the Grisons, Venice, Holland, Ge∣noa, Geneva, Ragusa, Algiers, Tunis, Hamborough, Lubeck, all the free Towns in Germany, and England and Scotland be∣fore the late Reigns. This Truth is so obvious, that the most barefac'd Advocates for an Army do not directly deny it, but qualify the matter by telling us, that a Number not ex∣ceeding fifteen or twenty thousand Men are a handful to so populous a Nation as this: Now I think that Number will bring as certain Ruin upon us, as if they were as many Mil∣lions, and I will give my Reasons for it.

It's the misfortune of all Countries, that they sometimes lie under an unhappy necessity to defend themselves by Arms against the Ambition of their Governours, and to fight for what's their own; for if a Prince will rule us with a Rod of Iron, and invade our Laws and Liberties, and neither be prevailed upon by our Miseries, Supplications, or Tears, we have no Power upon Earth to appeal to, and therefore must patiently submit to our Bondage, or stand upon our own Defence; which if we are enabled to do, we shall never be put upon it, but our Swords may grow rusty in our hands: for that Nation is surest to live in Peace, that is most capable of making War; and a Man that hath a Sword by his side, shall have least occasion to make use of it. Now I say, if the King hath twenty thousand Men before hand with us, or much less than half that Number, the People can make no Effort to defend their Liberties without the Assistance of a Foreign Power, which is a Remedy most commonly as bad

as the Disease; and if we have not a Power within our selves to defend our Laws, we are no Government.

For England being a small Country, few strong Towns in it, and those in the King's Hands, the Nobility disarmed by the destruction of Tenures, and the Militia not to be raised but by the King's Command, there can be no Force levied in any part of England, but must be destroy'd in its Infancy by a few Regiments: For what will three or four thousand naked and unarm'd Men signify against as many Troops of Mercenary Souldiers? What if they should come into the Field and say, You must choose these and these Men your Representatives; Where is your Choice? What if they should say, Parliaments are seditious and factious Assem∣blies, and therefore ought to be abolished; What is become of your Freedom? Or, if they should encompass the Parlia∣ment-House, and threaten if they do not surrender up-their Government, they will put them to the Sword; What is be∣come of the old English Constitution? These things may be, and have been done in several parts of the World. What is it that causeth the Tyranny of the Turks at this day, but Servants in Arms? What is it that preserved the glorious Commonwealth of Rome, but Swords in the hands of its Citizens?

And if besides this, we consider the great Prerogatives of the Crown, and the vast Interest the King has and may ac∣quire by the Distribution of so many profitable Offices of the Houshold, of the Revenue, of State, of Law, of Re∣ligion, and the Navy, together with the Assistance of a powerful Party, who have been always the fast and constant Friends to Arbitrary Power, whose only Quarrel to his Pre∣sent Majesty is, that he has knock'd off the Chains and Fet∣ters they thought they had lock'd fast upon us; a Party who hath once engag'd us in an unhappy Quarrel amongst our selves (the Consequence of which I dread to name) and

since in a tedious and chargeable War, at the vast expence of Blood and Treasure, to avoid that Captivity they had pre∣par'd for us: I say, if any one considers this, he will be con∣vinced that we have enough to do to guard our selves against the Power of the Court, without having an Army thrown into the Scale against us: and we have found oftner than once by too fatal. Experience the truth of this; for if we look back to the late Reigns, we shall see this Nation brought to the brink of Destruction, and breathing out the last Gasp of their Liberty; and it is more owing to our good Fortune, than to any Effort we were able to make, that we escaped the fatal Blow.

And I believe no Man will deny, but if Charles the First had had five thousand Men before-hand with us, the People had never struck a stroke for their Liberties; or if the late King James would have been contented with Arbitrary Power without bringing in Popery, but he and his black Guard would have bound us hand and foot before this time: But when their ill-contriv'd Oppression came home to their own Doors, they quickly shew'd the World how different a thing it was to suffer themselves, and to make other People suffer, and so we came by our Deliverance; and tho the late King had the Nobility, Gentry, Clergy, People, and his own Army against him, and we had a very wise and coura∣gious Prince nearly related to the Crown, and back'd by a powerful State for our Protector, yet we account this Revo∣lution next to a Miracle.

I will add here, that most of the Nations I instanced before were inslaved by small Armies: Oliver Cromwell lest behind him but 17000 Men; and the Duke of Monmouth, who was the Darling of the People, was suppress'd with two thou∣sand; nay, Cesar seiz'd Rome it self with five thousand, and fought the Battel of Pharsalia, where the Fate of the World was decided, with twenty two thousand; and most of the

Revolutions of the Roman and Ottoman Empires since were caused by the Pretorian Bands, and the Court-Janizaries; the former of which never exceeded eight, nor the latter twelve thousand Men: And if no greater Numbers could make such Disturbances in those vast Empires, what will double the Force do with us? And they themselves confess it, when they argue for an Army; for they tell us we may be surprized with ten or fifteen thousand Men from France, and having no regular Force to oppose them, they will over∣run the Kingdom. Now if so small a Force can oppose the King, the Militia, with the united Power of the Nobility, Gentry and Commons, what will an equal Power do a∣gainst the People, when supported by the Royal Authority, and a never-failing Interest that will attend it, except when it acts for the Publick Good?

But we are told this Army is not design'd to be made a part of our Constitution, but to be kept only for a little time, till the Circumstances of Europe will better per∣mit us to be without them. But I would know of these Gentlemen, when they think that time will be? Will it be during the Life of King James, or after his Death? Shall we have less to fear from the Youth and Vigor of the pretended Prince of Wales, than now from an unhappy Man sinking under the load of Age and Misfortunes? Or, will France be more capable of offending us just after this tedious and con∣sumptive War, than hereafter when it has had a breathing time to repair the Calamities it has suffer'd by it? No: we can never disband our Army with so much safety as at this time; and this is well known by these Conspirators against their Country, who are satisfied that a Continuation of them now, is an Establishment of them for ever: for whilst the Circumstances of Europe stand in the present Posture, the Argument will be equal to continue them; if the State of Europe should alter to the advantage of France, the Reason

will grow stronger, and we shall be told we must increase our Number: but if there should be such a turn of Affairs in the World, that we were no longer in apprehension of the French Power, they may be kept up without our As∣sistance; nay, the very Discontents they may create shall be made an Argument for the continuing of them. But if they should be kept from oppressing the People, in a little time they will grow habitual to us, and almost be∣come a part of our Constitution, and by degrees we shall be brought to believe them not only not dangerous, but ne∣cessary; for every body fees, but few understand, and those few will never be able to perswade the Multitude that there is any danger in those Men they have lived quietly with for some Years, especially when the disbanding them will (as they will be made believe) cost them more Money out of their own Pockets to maintain a Militia: and of this we have had already an unhappy Experience. For Charles the Second being conniv'd at in keeping a few Guards (which were the first ever known to an English King besides his Pensioners, and his Beef-eaters) he insensibly increased their Number, till he left a body of Men to his Successor great enough to tell the Parliament, he would be no longer bound by the Laws he had sworn to; and under the Shelter and Protection of these he raised an Army that had put a Period to our Government, if a Complication of Causes (which may never happen again) had not presented the Prince of Orange with a Conjuncture to assert his own and the Na∣tion's Rights. And tho we have so lately escaped this Preci∣pice, yet Habit has made Souldiers so familiar to us, that some who pretend to be zealous for Liberty, speak of it as a Hardship to his present Majesty, to refuse him as many Men as his Predecessors; not considering that the raising them then was a Violation of our Laws, and that his Government is built upon the Destruction of theirs, and can no more

stand upon the same Rubbish, than the Kingdom of Heaven be founded in Unrighteousness.

But the Conspirators say, we need be in no apprehensions of Slavery whilst we keep the power of the Purse in our own hands, which is very true; but they do not tell us that he has the power of raising Money, to whom no one dares re∣fuse it.

Arma tenenti Omnia dat qui justa negat.

For 'tis as certain that an Army will raise Money, as that Money will raise an Army; but if this course be too despe∣rate, 'tis but shutting up the Exchequer, and disobliging a few Tally-Jobbers (who have bought them for fifty per Cent. discount) and there will be near three Millions a Year ready cut and dry'd for them; and whoever doubts whether such a Method as this is practicable, let him look back to the Reign of Charles the Second: And I am afraid the Officers of the Exchequer have not much reason to value themselves for their Payments in this Reign; at least the Purchasers of the Annuities are of that opinion, and would be apt to entertain some unseasonable Suspicions, if they had not greater Secu∣rity from his Majesty's Vertue, than the Justice of the Ministers. But if we could suppose (whatever is the fate of other Countries) that our Courtiers design nothing but the Publick Good, yet we ought not to hazard such unusual Vertue, by leading it into Temptation, which is part of our daily Duty to pray against. But I am afraid we don't live in an Age of Miracles, especially of that sort; our Heroes are made of a coarser Allay, and have too much Dross mix'd with their Constitutions for such refin'd Principles: for in the little Experience I have had in the World, I have ob∣served most Men to do as much Mischief as lay in their Power, and therefore am for dealing with them as we do

with Children and mad Men, that is, take away all Wea∣pons by which they may do either themselves or others an Injury: As I think the Sheep in Boccaline made a prudent Address to Apollo, when they desired, that for the future Wolves might have no Teeth.

When all other Arguments sail, they call to their Assis∣tance the old Tyrant Necessity, and tell us the Power of France is so great, that let the Consequence of an Army be what it will, we cannot be without one; and if we must be Slaves, we had better be so to a Protestant Prince than a Popish one, and the worst of all Popish ones the F—King. Now I am of Mr. Johnson's Opinion, that the put∣ting an Epithet upon Tyranny is false Heraldry; for Pro∣testant and Popish are both alike; and if I must be a Slave, it is very indifferent to me who is my Master, and there∣fore I shall never consent to be ruled by an Army, which is the worst that the most barbarous Conquest can impose upon me; which notwithstanding we have little reason to fear whilst we keep the Seas well guarded.

It is certain there is no Country so situated for Naval Power as England. The Sea is our Element, our Seamen have as much hardy Bravery, and our Ships are as numerous, and built of as good Materials as any in the World: Such a Force well applied and managed is able to give Laws to the Universe; and if we keep a competent part of it well arm'd in times of Peace, it is the most ridiculous thing in nature to believe any Prince will have thoughts of invading us, unless he proposes to be superiour to us in Naval Power: For the Preparations necessary for such an Undertaking will alarm all Europe, give both to us and our Confederates time to arm, and put our selves in a posture of Defence. And whoever considers that the Prince of Orange with six hundred Ships brought but fourteen thousand Men, and the mighty Spanish Armado (then the Terror of the World)

imbark'd but eighteen thousand, he will be assured that no Invasion can be so sudden upon us, but we shall have time to get ready our whole Fleet, bring some Forces from Scotland and Ireland, and prepare our own Militia if there shall be occasion for it; especially in times of Peace, when we shall have the liberty of all the Ports of France, and shall or may have Intelligence from every one of them.

But they tell us such a Wind may happen as may be fa∣vourable to our Enemy, and keep us within our own Ports; which I say, as France lies to England, is almost impossible: for if we lie about Falmouth, or the Land's end, no Fleet from Brest or the Ocean can escape us without a Miracle; and if the design be to invade us from any Port in the Channel, a very few Ships (which may safely lie at An∣chor) will certainly prevent it: nor is it to be conceived that that cautious Prince will be at a vast Expence for the Contingency of such a Critical Wind, or will send an Army into a Country where their Retreat is certainly cut off, when the failing in any part of his Design will bring a new War upon him, which lately cost a third part of his People, a great many large Countries and strong Towns, with all the Honour he had heaped up by his former Victories, to get rid of.

And here I must confess, that the misapplication of our Naval Force (which is our known Strength) for these last eight Years, is the strongest, as it is the most usual Argu∣ment against me: which unriddles a Mystery I did not un∣derstand before, tho I never was so foolish as to believe all the Errors of that kind were the Effects of Chance or Ignorance, or that losing so many Opportunities of destroy∣ing the French Fleet had not some extraordinary, tho occult Cause; and yet, notwithstanding the restless Attempts of our Enemies, and the paltry Politicks of our own wretched St—n, this Fleet triumphantly defended us, so that our

Enemies in eight Years War could not get one opportunity of invading our Country.

It's objected, that the Officers of our Fleet may be cor∣rupted, or that a Storm may arise which may destroy it all at once, and therefore we ought to have two Strings to our Bow. By which I perceive all their Fears lie one way, and that they do not care if they precipitate us into inevi∣table Ruin at home, to prevent a distant Possibility of it from France. But I think this Phantom too may be laid by a well-train'd Militia, and then all their Bugbears will vanish. This Word can be no sooner out, but there's a Volly of small Shot let fly at me: What! must we trust our Safety to an undisciplin'd Mob, who never dream'd of fighting when they undertook the Service; who are not inured to the Fatigue of a Camp, or ever saw the Face of an Enemy? And then they magnify Mercenary Troops, as if there was an intrinsick Virtue in a Red Coat, or that a Raggamuffin from robbing of Henroosts in two Campagns could be cudgel'd into a Hero. Tho I must confess the Conduct of the Court in industriously enervating this Force, does in some measure justify their Objections: For the detestable Policies of the last Reigns were with the utmost Art and Ap∣plication to disarm the People, and make the Militia useless, to countenance a standing Army in order to bring in Popery and Slavery; and if any Methods were proposed to make it more serviceable, the Court would never suffer them to be debated; and such Officers as were more zealous in exercising their Companies than others were reprimanded, as if they design'd to raise a Rebellion. And now the worthy Patriots of this Reign are taking Advantage of the traitorous Neglect and infamous Policies of the last. But why may not a Militia be made useful? Why may not the Nobility, Gentry, and Free-holders of England be trusted with the Defence of their own Lives, Estates and Liberties, without having Guardians

and Keepers assign'd them? And why may they not defend them with as much Vigour and Courage as Mercenaries who have nothing to lose, nor any other Tie to engage their Fidelity, than the inconsiderable Pay of Six-pence a day, which they may have from the Conqueror?

Why may not the Laws for shooting in Crossbows be changed into Firelocks, and a competent Number of them be kept in every Parish for the young Men to exercise with on Holidays, and Rewards offered to the most expert, to stir up their Emulation?

Why may not the whole Militia of England be reduced to sixty thousand, and a third part of those kept by turns in constant Exercise?

Why may not a Man be listed in the Militia till he be discharged by his Master, as well as in the Army till he be discharged by his Captain? And why may not the same Horse be always sent forth, unless it can be made appear he is dead or maimed?

Why may not the private Souldiers of the Army, when they are dispersed in the several parts of the Kingdom, be sent to the Militia? And why may not the inferiour Officers of the Army in some proportion command them?

I say, these and other like things may be done, and some of them are done in our own Plantations, and the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, as also in Poland, Switzer∣land, and the Country of the Grisons; which are Nations much less considerable than England, have as formidable Neighbours, no Sea nor Fleet to defend them, nothing but a Militia to depend upon, and yet no one dares at∣tack them: And we have seen as great Performances done formerly by the Apprentices of London, and in the late War by the Vaudois in Savoy, the Miquelets in Catalonia, and the Militia in Ireland, as can be parallel'd in History:

And so it would be with us, if the Court would give their hearty Assistance in promoting this Design; if the King would appear in Person at the Head of them, and give Rewards and Honour to such as deserve them, we should quickly see the young Nobility and Gentry appear magnificent in Arms and Equipage, shew a generous Emu∣lation in outvying one another in Military Exercises, and place a noble Ambition in making themselves serviceable to their Country: as antiently the Achaians and Thebans from being the most contemptible Nations in Greece, by the Conduct of Pelopidas, Epaminondas, and Philopemen, came to have the best disciplin'd Troops and most excellent Souldiers in the World.

They object, that such a Militia as this is a standing Army, and will be as dangerous, and much more chargable. I answer;

That there can be no danger from an Army where the Nobility and chief Gentry of England are the Commanders, and the Body of it made up of the Freeholders, their Sons and Servants; unless we can conceive that the Nobility and Gentry will join in an unnatural Design to make void their own Titles to their Estates and Liberties: and if they could entertain so ridiculous a Proposition, they would never be obeyed by the Souldiers, who will have a respect to those that send them forth and pay them, and to whom they must return again when their time is expired. For if I send a Man, I will as surely choose one who shall fight for me, as a Mercenary Officer will choose one that shall fight against me; and the late Governments are Witnesses to the truth of this, who debauched the Militia more than ever I hope to see it again, and yet durst never rely upon them to assist their Arbitrary Designs; as we may remem∣ber in the Duke of Monmouth's Invasion, their Officers durst not bring them near his Army for fear of a Revolt.

Nay, the Pensioner-Parliament themselves turn'd short upon the Court, when they expected them to give the finishing stroke to our Ruin.

To the last part of the Objection, That this Militia will be more chargable than an Army; I answer, That since (as I suppose) no Man proposes wholly to lay them aside, if we add the extraordinary Expence of maintaining twenty thou∣sand Men to the ordinary Charge of the Militia, it is much more than sufficient to make the latter useful. But if this Objection were true, it ought not to enter into Compe∣tition with the Preservation of our Laws and Liberties; for it is better to give a third part of my Estate, if it were necessary, than to have all taken from me.

And tho it should be granted, that a Militia is not as serviceable as an Army kept to constant Discipline, yet I believe these Gentlemen themselves will confess, that sixty thousand of them trained as before, are as good as twenty thousand of their standing Troops, which is the Question; for it's impossible to have them both useful at the same time, they being as incompatible as broad and clipt Money, never current together; and therefore the Court must de∣pend wholly upon a Militia, or else they will not depend upon them at all. And this by the way may silence that Ob∣jection, that we must keep our Army till the Militia be disciplin'd; for that will never be done whilst the Court has an Army: and the same Objection will be made seven Years hence as now; so that a small Army can be of no use to us, but to make our Fleet neglected, to hinder the Militia from being trained, and enslave us at home; for they are too few to defend us against an Invasion, and too many for the People to oppose.

I dare speak with the greater assurance upon this Sub∣ject, having the Authority of as great Men as the World hath produced for my Justification. Machiavel spends

several Chapters to prove, that no Prince or State ought to suffer any of their Subjects to make War their Pro∣fession, and that no Nation can be secure with any other Forces than a setled Militia. My Lord Bacon in several places bears his Testimony against a Standing Army, and particularly he tells us, that a Mercenary Army is fittest to invade a Country, but a Militia to defend it; be∣cause the first have Estates to get, and the latter to pro∣tect. Mr. Harrington hath founded his whole Oceana up∣on a trained Militia; and I have lately read a French Book, called a History of the Politicks of France, which says, Ensin si on veut ruiner Les Anglois il suffit de les obliger a tenir des Troupes sur pied. Nay, I believe no Author ever treated of a Free Government, that did not express his Abhorrence of an Army; for (as my Lord Bacon says) whoever does use them, tho he may spread his Feathers for a time, he will mew them soon after; and raise them with what Design you please, yet, like the West India Dogs in Boccaline, in a little time they will certainly turn Sheep-biters.

Perhaps it will be said, that the Artillery of the World is changed since some of these wrote, and War is become more a Mystery, and therefore more Experience is ne∣cessary to make good Souldiers. But wherein does this Mystery consist? not in exercising a Company, and obeying a few words of Command; these are Myste∣ries that the dullest Noddle will comprehend in a few Weeks. Nay, I have heard that the Modern Exercise is much shorter and easier than the Antient. But the great Improvements in War are in Regular Encamp∣ments, Fortification, Gunnery, skilful Ingineering, &c. These are Arts not to be learned without much La∣bour, and Experience, and are as much gained in the Closet as in the Field; and I suppose no Man will say, that

the keeping standing Forces is necessary to make a good Ingineer.

As to actual Experience in War, that is not essen∣tial either to a Standing Army or a Militia, as such; but the sormer may be without it, and the latter gain it according as they have opportunities of Action. 'Tis true, at present the Army hath been trained up in a long War, and hath gained great Knowledg: but these Men will not be lost when they are disbanded, they will be still in England; and if the Parliament does give them a Gratuity suitable to the Service they have done their Country, they will be ready to resume their Arms when∣ever occasion offers.

But I desire to know of these Patriots how comes an Army necessary to our Preservation now, and never since the Conquest before? Did ever the prevailing Party in the Wars of York and Lancaster attempt to keep up a Standing Army to support themselves? No: they had more Sense than to sacrifice their own Liberty, and more Honour than to enslave their Country, the more easily to carry on their own Faction. Were not the Spaniards as powerful, as good Souldiers, and as much our Enemies, as the French are now? Was not Flanders as near us as France? and the Popish Interest in Queen Elizabeth's time as strong as the Jacobite is now? and yet that most excellent Princess never dream'd of a Standing Army, but thought her surest Em∣pire was to reign in the Hearts of her Subjects, which the following Story sufficiently testifies. When the Duke of Alanson came over to England, and for some time had admired the Riches of the City, the Conduct of her Govern∣ment, and the Magnificence of her Court, he asked her amidst so much Splendor where were her Guards? which Question she resolved a few days after as she took him in her Coach through the City, when pointing to the

People (who received her in Crowds with repeated Ac∣clamations) These, said she, my Lord, are my Guards; These have their Hands, their Hearts, and their Purses always ready at my Command: and these were Guards in∣deed, who defended her through a long and successful Reign of forty four Years against all the Machinations of Rome, the Power of Spain, a disputed Title, and the perpetual Conspiracies of her own Popish Subjects; a Security the Roman Emperors could not boast of with their Pretorian Bands, and their Eastern and Western Armies.

Were not the French as powerful in Charles the Second and King James his time, as they are after this long and destructive War, and a less Alliance to oppose them? and yet we then thought a much less Army than is now contended for, a most insupportable Grievance; insomuch that in Charles the Second's Reign the Grand-Jury pre∣sented them, and the Pensioner Parliament voted them to be a Nusance, sent Sir Jos. W—son to the Tower for saying, the King might keep Guards for the Defence of his Person, and addressed to have them disbanded. And now our Apostates would make their Court by doing what the worst Parliament ever England saw could not think of without Horror and Confusion. They say the King of France was in League with our late Kings, so he is with us; and he would have broke it then, if he had thought it safe, and for his Interest as much as now. But they say we have more disaffected Persons to join with him; which I must deny, for I believe no King of England in any Age had deservedly more Interest than the present; and if during such an expensive War, in which we have consumed so much Blood and Treasure, paid such vast and unequal Taxes, lost so many thousand Ships, and bore a Shock by recoining our Money, which would have torn up ano∣ther Nation from its Foundation, and reduced it to its

antient Chaos, when most Countries would have sunk un∣der the misfortune, and repined at their Deliverance (as Men in Sickness commonly quarrel with their dearest Friends) I say, if at that time he had so great and uni∣versal an Interest, there can be no doubt but in times of Peace, when the People reap the Fruits of that Courage and Conduct he hath shewn in their Defence, he will be the most Beloved and Glorious Prince that ever filled the English Throne.

I will make one Assertion more, and then conclude this Discourse, viz. That the most likely way of restoring King James, is maintaining a Standing Army to keep him out.

For the King's Safety stands upon a Rock whilst it depends upon the solid Foundation of the Affections of the People, which is never to be shaken till 'tis as evi∣dent as the Sun in the Firmament, that there is a formed Design to overthrow our Laws and Liberties; but if we keep a Standing Army, all depends upon the uncer∣tain and capricious Humours of the Souldiery, which in all Ages have produced more violent and sudden Revo∣lutions, than ever have been known in unarmed Govern∣ments: For there is such a Chain of Dependence amongst them, that if two or three of the chief Officers should be disobliged, or have Intrigues with Jacobite Mistresses; or if the King of France could once again buy his Pensio∣ners into the Court or Army, or offer a better Market to some that are in already, we shall have another Rehearsal Revolution, and the People be only idle Spectators of their own Ruin. And whosoever considers the Composition of an Army, and doubts this, let him look back to the Roman Empire, where he will find out of twenty six Em∣perors, sixteen deposed and murdered by their own Ar∣mies; nay, half the History of the World is made up

of Examples of this kind: but we need not go any far∣ther than our own Country, where we have but twice kept Armies in time of Peace, and both times they turn'd out their own Masters. The first under Cromwell, expell'd that Parliament under which they had fought suc∣cessfully for many Years; afterwards under General Monk they destroy'd the Government they before set up, and brought back Charles the Second, and he afterwards dis∣banded them lest they might have turned him out again. The other Instance is fresh in every one's memory, how King James's Army join'd with the Prince of Orange, now our Rightful and Lawful King. And what could have been expected otherwise from Men of dissolute and debauched Principles, who call themselves Souldiers of Fortune? who make Murder their Profession, and enquire no farther into the Justice of the Cause, than how they shall be paid; who must be false, rapacious and cruel in their own De∣fence. For having no other Profession or Subsistence to depend upon, they are forced to stir up the Ambition of Princes, and engage them in perpetual Quarrels, that they may share of the Spoils they make. Such Men, like some sort of ravenous Fish, fare best in a Storm; and therefore we may reasonably suppose they will be better pleased with the Tyrannical Government of the late King, than the mild and gracious Administration of his Present Majesty, who came over to England to rescue us from Op∣pression, and he has done it, and triumphs in it in spight of his Enemies.

In this Discourse I have purposely omitted speaking of the lesser Inconveniences attending a Standing Army, such as frequent Quarrels, Murders and Robberies; the destructi∣on of all the Game in the Country; the quartering upon publick, and sometimes private Houses; the influencing of Elections of Parliament by an artificial distribution of

Quarters; the rendring so many Men useless to Labour, and almost Propagation, together with a much greater Destruction of them, by taking them from a laborious way of living to a loose idle Life; and besides this, the Insolence of the Officers, and the Debaucheries that are com∣mitted both by them and their Souldiers in all the Towns they come in, to the ruin of multitudes of Women, Dis∣honour of their Families, and ill Example to others; and a numerous train of Mischiefs besides, almost endless to enumerate. These are trivial as well as particular Grievan∣ces in respect of those I have treated about, which strike at the Heart's-blood of our Constitution, and therefore I thought these not considerable enough to bear a part in a Discourse of this nature: Besides, they often procure their own Remedy, working Miracles, and making some Men see that were born blind, and impregnable against all the Artillery of Reason; for Experience is the only Mistress of Fools: A wise Man will know a Pike will bite when he sees his Teeth, which another will not make discovery of but by the loss of a Finger.

What I have said here against Standing Armies, I would be understood of such as are the Instruments of Tyranny and their Country's Ruin, and therefore I need make no Apology to our own which was raised by the Consent of the Parliament in this just and necessary War, and next under God and our Great and Glorious Deliverer, have by their Bravery and Conduct preserved our Liberties, and the Protestant Religion through Europe. For if in future Reigns any Designs should be levelled against our Laws, we may be assured these Men would be discarded, and others promoted in their rooms who are fit for such Arbi∣trary Purposes.

Nor do I think it reasonable that our Army should be ruined by that Peace, which by their Courage and Fidelity

they have procured for their Country; and I doubt not but the Generosity and Gratitude of the Parliament will give them a Donative equal to their Commissions, which, when the Foreigners are paid and sent home, will amount to no extraordinary Sum; at most'tis but supposing the War to have six Months longer continuance, which is an easy Composition for the Charge of keeping them. But if there are any Gentlemen amongst them who think we can no otherwise express our Gratitude, but by signing and sealing our own Ruin, I hope we shall disappoint their Expecta∣tions, and not give the World occasion to tell so foolish a Story of us, as that we turn'd to grass one of the most powerful Monarchs in the World for breaking our Laws, that we have maintain'd an eight Years War at the Ex∣pence of forty Millions of Money, and the Blood of three hundred thousand Men, to justify the glorious Action we have done; that by it we preserv'd all Europe besides, and lost our own Liberties; at least I hope it shall not be said we consented to it.

FINIS.