An essay concerning obedience to the supreme powers, and the duty of subjects in all revolutions with some considerations touching the present juncture of affairs.

CHAP. II. Of Passive Obedience. (Book 2)

THerefore it is very evident, That whatever Rights or Liberties men did not part with to their Gover∣nors, those they have still retained in themselves; and no person can have a right to their Obedience in those things wherein they have given him no right to command; nor are they (which otherwise would be the consequence) obliged to pay him more obedience than they owe him, but may defend their Rights against any that has no right to take them away.

In the most Absolute Hereditary Government, if the Governor should endeavour to alienate it, or any of the essential parts of it to a Stranger, he may be justly oppo∣sed, because the People have not given him such a right, nor is a right to dispose of a Government, necessary to his governing them; but such an en∣deavour shall be interpreted so far good (because Acts are not so to be interpreted as to be of no effect) as is in his power to make it good; it shall be esteemed a good Resignation.

By the same, if not greater Reason, the King in a mixt Government may be opposed, if he should endeavour to alienate any of the parts of the Government, which are by the Legislative Power annexed to the Crown, as in England the Supremacy in Ecclesiastical Matters is; There the People may oppose the King, if he should attempt to separate the Supremacy from the Crown, especially if he should endeavour to make the Pope Supreme; because, if they did not oppose him in that Attempt, they must either be guilty of High Treason, in owning the Pope's Supremacy,

or be destroyed when the Pope's Supremacy is established, for refusing to be guilty of High Treason; it being Treason by the Laws to own his Supremacy. Whoever owns the Pope's Supremacy, is incapable of being himself Supreme in Ecclesiasticals; and he that cannot be Supreme in Ec∣clesiasticals, cannot be Supreme in Civils, because being uni∣ted by the Legislative, they cannot be enjoyed apart.

In a mixt Government, where the Legislative Power of King, Lords and Commons (which is the only Supream Power, because it gives Laws to all) is divided, part in the King, and part in the People; if either part invadeth the other's Right, the usurping part may be justly opposed, because it invadeth what is the Sovereign Right of ano∣ther.

None can have a share in the Legislative Power, but who must have a right to defend that Power; because any other than a Sovereign Right to the Legislative, to which all are Subject, would be nonsense; and whoever has the Execu∣tive Power, if he had not a share in the Legislative, would be subject to it. And he that is intrusted with the Execution of the Laws, can have no more Power than the Legisla∣tive has given him; and where the People have a share in the Legislative, they have the same Right to their Privileges, (viz.) the Laws of the Land, as the King has to his Prero∣gatives; because the Consent of both is equally necessary to the altering the Laws, as it was to the making of them.

In a mixt Government, a King, beyond the Limits of his Kingly Power, is so far from having a Right to Obedience, either Active or Passive, that by assuming such an Vnlimited Power, he loses all his Legal Power, which consists in Govern∣ing according to the Laws enacted by the Legislative; and by it abdicates the Government; for he that ceases to govern according to those Laws▪ by governing Arbitrarily and contrary to Law, ceases as much to govern in the eye and intent of the Law, as he that ceases to govern at all; and

by governing Arbitrarily (the Constitution admitting of no such Governor) destroys the very Essence of his King∣ly Power, and renounces (the only Right he has) his Le∣gal Right. For no person can have at the same time a Will to rule according to Law, and a Will to rule contrary to Law; and he that wills the latter, cannot will the former, and so willingly renounces his Legal Government; and by making his Will the Law, he assumes the whole Legislative Power to himself, which wholly destroys the former Go∣vernment; for a new Legislative is a new Form of Govern∣ment; and if the whole be destroyed, the share the King has in it must be so too, except a part can subsist, when the whole, by which and in which he enjoyed his part, is dis∣solved.

Whereever people have established a mixt Government, they are presumed to grant all that is necessary to maintain that Government; which could not be, if one part had not a Right to hinder the Encroachment of the other.

It is Nonsence to brag of the Happiness which people enjoy in living under a Limited Monarchy, if it had no other Limits than the Will and Pleasure of the King; be∣cause then he would be as Absolute as the French King or Grand-Siegneur, and his Subjects would be as mere slaves as the vilest of theirs, since they would hold their Lives and Properties by no other Tenure, than the Pleasure of the King who is absolute.

But it may be asked, Who shall judge between them, if either should usurp the Right that belongs to the other?

I answer, None can judge as a superior in whose sentence both sides must acquiesce, because that would suppose some one superior to the Supreme Legislative Power: Or if the Judges of the Land should have an Absolute Power to de∣termine in these matters, and people should be obliged to submit to whatever they decr••e, they could make either Party the Supreme Legislative Power, or themselves, by declaring themselves to be so.

None, as a Superior, can call him to an account who has a share in the Legislative; but he may be resisted as well as any other, that should invade the Sovereign Rights of others, with which he has nothing to do.

Where people have not parted wi••h their Rights, it must be presumed they have retained a Power to judge whether those Rights are invaded, or else the design of preserving those Rights would be to no purpose.

But it may be objected, Tho it be no Treason, or any manner of Injury▪ or Injustice, for People to defend their Rights against a King that has no Right to take them away, yet for their own sakes people are obliged to submit to his Arbitrary Government, because opposing him might create a War more destructive than all the effects of his Arbitrary Power. But what King would resign his Go∣vernment, rather than oppose a Rebel? And if a single person thinks he is not obliged to part with his Civil Right, how can he expect, that Millions (were it possi∣ble it could be for their common good) should part with theirs? Since too, every one of them has the same Right to their Privi••eges (the Laws of the Land) as he has to his Crown, why should they be more obliged to suffer their own rather than a Foreign Prince to destroy their Rights? Since the attempt is a greater Crime in him, because he breaks his Oath, and the Trust that is reposed in him, and is guilty of the highest Ingratitude to the People who have given him so much Power.

By the same Argument, good men ought not to resist Robbers and Pirates: And if a man should be obliged to quit all for fear of bloodshed, how bravely would the good of mankind be promoted, and what a blessed Peace would the world enjoy? which would consist in Violence and Rapine, and which would only be maintained for the inte∣rest of Robbers and Oppressors.

Whoever does but consider the Poverty, the Misery, the Hardship people undergo in Absolute Monarchies, where the generality not only want Conveniences, but even the Necessaries of Life, and how by Tyranical Government the Richest and most Flourishing Countries (as for in∣stance, those under the Turkish Empire) are depopulated and almost turned to desarts, so that the Inhabitants are thin and few, as well as wretched and barbarous; and who∣ever compares them with those that live under Mixt Go∣vernments, where the Inhabitants are generally above twenty to one to what the others are, abounding with all manner of Conveniences and Pleasures of life; or does but consider the happy condition that Greece and a great num∣ber of other places enjoyed when they were Free States; and what they now suffer; or has but read Bp. Burnet's Remarks on Italy, Rome, and Switzerland, must be convin∣ced, That it is not the Interest of a Nation to let their King be Arbitrary; and that they cannot pay too dear for pre∣serving their Liberties. In making themselves Absolute, Kings act against their own Safety, as well as the Good of the People, because a Mixt Government is not only best for the Subjects, bnt for the Security of Kings, They being oftner Deposed and Murthered (as all the Histories of the World do testify) in Absolute than in Limited Mo∣narchies.

Can any one think, that the United Provinces (in spite of the long War they had to maintain their Privileges) are not as Populous, Rich, and Potent, and upon all ac∣counts in as flourishing a condition, as they would have been, had they been possessed with the Doctrine of Passive Obedience, and tamely submitted to the Encroachments and Arbitrary Power of Spain?

Had the Doctrine of Passive-Obedience been all-along practised, Mankind would have been in a more slavish condition than any now are, that live under the most Ty∣ranical

Governments; it is the fear that people may by ill usage be provoked to violate this Doctrine, that keeps the greatest Tyrants within some bounds, and makes them go∣vern more mildly and moderately than otherwise they would. It is, I think, no great Argument of the Good∣ness of an Opinion, when the not observing it, or even the very probability of breaking it, has preserved mankind in a much better condition than they would have been, had the Supreme Powers been certain, that that Doctrine would have been inviolably observed.

The English, who are the freest Nation in the world, cannot consider the Happiness they enjoy, in comparison of those that live under Absolute Monarchies, without ha∣ving a just Veneration for their Noble Ancestors, who have (tho not without the expence of their best blood) secured to them those Liberties▪ they now enjoy: And the present Age would have strangely degenerated, had they not been as zealous to have transmitted the same down to their Po∣sterity.

Most of the European Nations were once Masters of the same Freedom the English still enjoy. Those great Swarms of people that came out of the North, and subdued most part of Europe, upon settling themselves in the Coun∣tries they conquered, made their Generals Kings, and their Chief Officers their Concilia Magna, or Parliamenta, with∣out whose Consent no Laws were made, or scarce any thing of Importance done: Which Government the English have best preserved, being a Nation too tenacious of their Liber∣ties to be Complimented out of them; and (as they to their Cost have found, who have attempted it) of too great a Courage to be Forced out of them.

It cannot then justly be concluded to be against the Pub∣lick Good of the Nation to oppose Arbitrary Government, because more lives might perhaps have been lost by it, than by the Tyranical Government of all the Kings since the

Conquest; because those Kings were not Absolute, and when they endeavour'd to be so, were always opposed. But had it not been thought lawful to oppose them, and they had been as Absolute as the Doctrine of Passive Obedience would have permitted them, I would ask whether then (for that is the true state of the question) the Nation would have been as Populous and as Rich as it is at present by pre∣serving its Liberties, and opposing all Usurpation? There is, I think, no reason to doubt, if Arbitrary Government had prevail'd, but that the Countrey would have been re∣duced to as poor and as beggarly a condition, and would as much have been depopulated as any Province under the Turkish Empire.

There can be no greater Argument than the universal Consent of the Nation, that what they so unanimously concurred in, was not against their Common Good; and nothing but a Danger as Universal as it was great, could make all people so desirous of a Revolution: And there could be no pretence from the Publick Good of not resist∣ing, when Slavery it self was not the end, but only in or∣der to extirpate an Heretical Nation; which all Popish Princes by their Religion are obliged to do; and there was no reason to suppose the late King (had not the Design been so notorious) less zealous than his Neighbours Where it is notorious that a King has a Design to enslave the Nation, there can be no great danger in opposing him; because it is im∣possible for him, (the Lands and Riches being in so many hands), to be able to influence so great a Number of the Gentry and Nobility, as shall be sufficient to oppose the Common Interest.

There is nothing more pernicious to Government, than to encourage those that publish such Doctrines as tend to destroy the Rights and Privileges of the people: Who are quick-sighted enough to find out the weak side of such Ar∣guments as tend to their hurt; and it makes them suspi∣cious

that some sudden Designs are carrying on against them, and prepares their minds to receive any ill impressi∣on against the Government. What happened in King Charles the First's time, is an undeniable Instance of this, where the encouraging and preferring almost none but such as preached up that Sensless Doctrine, created such Jealousies, Fears, and Mistrusts in the minds of the Peo∣ple, of whom too many were irritated by Persecution (for Passive-Obedience and Persecution, like Brethren in Iniquity, go hand in hand) that nothing but the Ruin of that Prince could satisfy their Jealousies. That Doctrine had like to have produced a more fatal Consequence in his Son's time, by encouraging him (who had the weakness to think, that those who when uppermost were Bigots for it, would sub∣mit to it when they themselves came to suffer) to invade the Rights and Liberties of the People.