The compleat courtier: or, The morals of the famous historian Cornelius Tacitus concerning flattery, &c. In above one hundred essays. Paraphras'd and illustrated with useful observations by the Sieur Amelo de la Houssaie and M. D'Ablancourt. Done out of French.

ESSAY LVXXIII.

THE most Favour'd of his en∣franchiz'd Slaves, and other Servants, laid before him the Pomp of Nero's Court, his Luxury, his Adulteries, his Divorces, and ince∣stuous Wedlocks, and all those other Pleasures of Imperial Reign, all which he thirst'd after, and which if he had the Courage, were his own; but if he trifled away his Op∣portunity, would be another's.

His principal Domestics, (says D'Ablan∣court) ceas'd not to lay before him the Luxury and Licence of Princes, and to upbraid him secretly, for abandoning to another, that which was in his power to seize as his own.

Thus we see the gay Allurements that Sycophants make use of to provoke the Appetites of Princes, and incense 'em to Luxury. This is that which they call, Releasing Kings from the Subjection of Ward∣ship; but indeed (says Mezeray) Is the putting them beside their Sences and their Reason. Otho had spent his Youth in De∣bauchery, and had insinuated himself into Nero's Favour and Confidence, by the imi∣tation of his Voluptuousness and Vices. Piso, on the other side, had always liv'd a sober Life, and without Scandal, but the severity of his Manners, which pleas'd Galba, displeas'd the old Court, which Nero had accustom'd to honour a Vo∣luptuous Prince, no less then former∣ly they were wont to reverence a Pru∣dent and Moderate Sovereign. There∣fore it was that Otho, who was of the same temper with Nero, and as such a one, desir'd by all the Courtiers, was so highly encourag'd by his Domestics, and his Friends, to take Possession of the Empire. For the looser and more extravagant sort of Courtiers are afraid of nothing more then a Vertuous and Vigilant Prince, be∣cause their Interest is incompatible with his Duty. The young King (says Meze∣ray, speaking of Charles VIII.) was natu∣rally

enclin'd to the study of Vertue, addicting himself, as much as his leisure would permit him, to the reading of good Authors, and to converse with learned Men. But the Syco∣phant, to whose humour, a serious and pru∣dent Prince is a burthensom Master, before the Year was out, plung'd him again into the love of Toys and Women.

I find moreover two or three things more to be observ'd upon the Choice which Galba made of Piso to succeed him, rather then Otho, who being the first who had declar'd himself for Galba, was in hopes to have been adopted for his Son. The first is, that Galba rather chose to expose himself to Otho's Resentment, to whom he was so highly oblig'd, then to advance to the Empire a Person, who was guilty of all Nero's Vices; consider∣ing, that would be of little benefit to the Publick-weal to have escap'd Nero's Vio∣lencies, should it relapse under the power of his Companion in Debauchery. The second thing is, that Vertuous Prin∣ces make it their chiefest Glory to choose a good Successor; whereas a bad Prince en deavours to find a worse then himself, to the end he may be miss'd, when gone. Augustus (said Galba to Piso) made Choice of a Successor out of his own Family, but I

choose mine out of the Commonwealth: Not that I am destitute either of Kindred or Friends, but because of all my own and thine, thou seem'st to me most worthy to be the Heir of my Fortune. My Age permits me not to do the Roman People any other kindness, but only to leave them a Vertuous Successor. But thou who art in the flower of thy Youth, hast it within thy power to bless 'em with a Ver∣tuous Prince and long Tranquility. The Younger Pliny tells us, that Nerva was belov'd and lamented by all good Men, for that he had made such Provision, that no body should have cause to miss him, and being a most worthy Prince himself, he was not afraid to make Choice of one that might exceed him. And in another Place he says, That a good Successor is a most evident Mark of the Divinity of the Prince that makes the Election.

The last thing is, the difference be∣tween the Advice which Princes give to their Successors, and that which Syco∣phants give to Princes. When a Prince admonishes another, 'tis his usual custom to tell him, that Sovereignty is a weighty Burthen, and a Condition above all others most subject to the Capriccio's of Fortune: That the Higher a man is exalted, the more in danger he stands of the Precipice:

That Power is never truly secure, when excessive, and rarely longer permanent then the Life of him that exercises it: That there is nothing in the World so unstable, or so difficult to preserve, as the Fame of Power that rests not on its proper foundation, of Justice and Rea∣son: That it is impossible for a Prince to know or act all things himself, and there∣fore had need of good Counsel and Assi∣stance: That his Ministers and He, trans∣acting unanimously together, the Public Affairs will be better manag'd: That he ought not to study Dominion over Slaves, but equal Government over Children and Subjects accustom'd to rational and not to blind Obedience: That Loyal Subjects never grudge to pay Taxes or Impositi∣ons, but ill brook the Violence, the Cru∣elty and Avarice of the Officers: That a Government cannot long subsist between unjust Command and forc'd Obedience. I do not Interest my self, said Tiberius, in in the Choice of Edils, Pretors or Con∣suls; something greater and more sublime is expected from a Prince; nor do I make use of Power, where I can act by Law. Then he goes on, that Liberality, when excessive, proves pernicious, as forcing to repair by Injustice, what Extravagancy

has dissipated; That Clemency advan∣ces the Reputation of Princes; and that having all things at their Command, there remains nothing for them to desire more, then only to Eternize their Happy Memories. These are the Temples, those the Noble Statues, said Tiberius, that I desire to be erected in your minds; for as for those that are built of Stone, should I deserve the hatred of succeeding Ages, they would be scorn'd, and soon defac'd.

On the other side, Sycophants infuse into the ears of Princes, that they have not only an Absolute Power, but a Uni∣versal Understanding, and that their Sub∣jects can pretend to nothing but only the Honour of a blind Obedience: That the Will and Pleasure of a Prince, is the Rule of Justice, and by consequence, that all the Actions of Kings are Infallibly Just: That a Prince who Governs according to Laws, is only a Precarious Prince; and that he who listens to the Advice of his Counsel, is a Pupil: That all ways and means whatever which conduce to the preservation of Authority, are honest and lawful, provided they be successful: That the Impov'rishing of the People, and keeping the Nobility Low, are the main Pillars of Imperial Power. That

Privileges, Exemptions and Moderate Taxes serve only to render the People untractable and mutinous; whereas they are supple, submiss and yielding, when they have nothing to lose: That Luxury, Adulteries, Revelling and choice of Wo∣men, are the Rewards of Principality: That it is of little importance to be be∣lov'd, but of great moment to be fear'd; for that Fear is supported by the dread of Punishment, which never ceases; but that Love is preserv'd only by a certain tie of Complaisance, which Men as often break, as fancy and humour inspire 'em: That Clemency is a dangerous Vertue, and Modesty fitting only for a Citizens Wife. And lastly, That Princes never need take any care what Posterity says of 'em, as being no competent Judge of the Truth or Falshood of those that applaud or discommend, since 'tis the Fate of Hi∣storians, to be always suspected either of Flattery or Malice.