The book of nature translated and epitomiz'd. By George Sikes.

Chap. 3.

Section. 1.

The generall difference of man from other creatures.

THe difference of man from other creatures is also general and special, as well as his a∣grement with them. A greater degree of know∣ledg is atteinable, by considering his difference from, or excellency above them, then by consi∣dering those things, faculties, powers, organs, and operations, wherein he agrees with them. The knowledg atteinable from his agrement with them, wil profit us little or nothing, unlesse we proceed also to take notice of his difference from them. In order to this, we are first to consider the difference that the three inferiour degrees of crea∣tures have from one another, which is also gene∣ral and special.

Their general difference hath bin already spo∣ken to. Things of the second degree excell those of the first, by having life, which is not to be found in the first. Things of the third, excell them both,

by having sense, which is not found in either of them. Man ha••s being, life, and sense, in a generall community or fraternity with them; and he has, over and above, reason and free-will, which none of them have. Herein lies his general difference from, or excellency above them all.

There are also special differences to be found amongst inferiour creatures, under each of the three general degrees. There are many distinct natures, species or kinds, under the same general degree.

• 1. Under the first, the elements differ in digni∣ty, nature, qualities, and scituation, one from another. Amongst metals, gold has a peculiar nature and excellency above silver; silver, above tinn; tinn, above lead, &c. Amongst stones, one is more excellent then another, by its peculiar nature, and specifical difference from others. Yet all these things do agree and meet together in one general degree of creatures, that have being only; not life, sense, or understanding.
• 2. Under the second general degree of things, that have being and life only, there are many also and great specifical differences. All the various kinds of trees and plants, have their peculiar na∣tures, distinct from one another.
• 3. In the third general degree of creatures, there are many kinds of beasts, birds, fishes, and creeping things, that have their peculiar natures, very different from one another.
• ...

• 4. In the fourth and highest generall degree, are no such special differences. We find only one nature or species; humane. All men are of one and the same nature, or kind. They differ only as di∣stinct individuals. One man may have many in∣dividual differences from, and excellencies above another, in his personal constitution, qualificati∣ons, acquirements, or gifts; but his nature is one and the same with his fellows. If God strip such a man of his accidental ornaments in mind or body, whereby he excell'd others, (as is familiar to ob∣servation) he does not thereby lose his nature; which demonstrates that those differencing inci∣dents to his person, advanc'd him not above the sphere of that nature, which all men partake of. When many peeces of cloth, equal in worth, are variously coloured, the different value of the su∣peradded tinctures makes them to be of different prices. But all such differences are accidental to the clothes. All men have the rational powers, called understanding and will, which equally dif∣ference them from all inferiour creatures. But ac∣cidental differences, incident to these rational powers, may render some men fit to ascend over the heads of others, into places of superiority.

Having thus taken notice of the differences that are found in the three inferiour orders of things, both general and special, let us now observe the difference that is found in the nature of man, from them all, which also is both general and special. 〈2 pages missing〉〈2 pages missing〉

is wholly delectable, and that in him alone is ab∣solute satisfaction to be had. He is an infinite, boundless good, and he is communicable to us, or capable to be enjoy'd by us. Yea, even his own infinite understanding and desire have absolute and compleat satisfaction in his own infinite being, and unutterably desireable goodnes.

2. Having thus ascended by the creatures, to some general knowledg of the creatour, as infi∣nite in wisdom, power, goodnes, and all possible perfections; let us descend again to the considera∣tion of ourselvs, and of our duty towards God. Man is generally differenced from brut's, by his understanding and will. All things then that we rightly conclude from this general difference, must be concluded from the due consideration of his understanding or will, or both together. What∣ever he is bound to doe, as a man, perteins to one or both of these powers. These ought he to use in such a way only, as is conducible to his own true good, perfection, and blessednes; and not against himself, to his own disadvantage, damage and destruction. Whatever any creature received from the hād of God that made it, it received to its own advantage, and ought to use it so. Inferiour crea∣tures fail not so to use it; and shall man only, the master-peece and lord of all the rest, miscarry in this great point? Each element enlarges itself as much as it can, and destroy's its contrary, but ne∣ver does any thing against itself. Things of the se∣cond

degree, trees and plants, do draw conveni∣ent nourishment from the earth and water, for their augmentation, growth, and support in life. They fix their roots in the earth, and multiply their kind. In like manner do things of the third degree, beasts, birds, fishes, and creeping things. They seek and lay hold on what's good for them; flie, avoid, and refuse what's hurtful; and multi∣ply themselvs by generation. And ought not man, the lord of all these things, carefully to improve what he has, to the glory of his maker, and his own true profit and advantage (which is insepera∣bly connexed therewith) as much as he can; and not at all against God, and consequently against himself, to his own detriment? If he do abuse them to his own ruine, he alone in the whole vi∣sible creation, act's contrary to the glory of God, to his own true good, to the order of the universe, and common law of nature in all creatures. He alone, for whose use and service the rest were made, does perversly deviate from the general or∣der and due course of nature, in all.

The rational powers of man, as they are more excellent then any thing that is found in inferiour creatures, so ought they more heedfully to be im∣proved, to the praise of him that gave them, and man's own true profit, advantage, joy, peace, con∣solation and blessednes; not against the honour of God, and so to his own damage. He ought to re∣sist those fleshly, foolish, and hurtfull lusts, which war

against his soul, and tend to the sinking and drowning of him in destruction and perdition. 1 Tim. 6. 9.

3. We may conclude from this general diffe∣rence of man from other creatures, by his under∣standing and will (which are given him for his own true profit and advantage) that his understan∣ding is able to se and conclude such truths, as are evidently conducible to his welbeing and com∣fort, and to oppose and reject the errours, contrary thereunto. T'is his true interest and advantage, that there is a God, infinitly powerful, wise, holy, just, and good; that there is a resurrection, and an eternal reward of just men; that God is able so to principle and qualify men, as to render them fit for such reward. These, with many other truths, which conduce to the true good and blessednes of man, may and ought, on that very account, to be owned and asserted. If the contraries thereunto be enterteined, owned, and asserted by him, his un∣derstanding which was given him to use for his profit, is abused to his ruine, against the law of na∣ture. He enterteins and own's false perswasions, destructive to his own being, enemies to his own soul; and so abuses his understanding, to his da∣mage, despondency, and ruine, that was given him to use for his profit and salvation. He does thereby, what in him lies, destroy and render void his own nature and all the rest, even the whole u∣niverse, whereas inferiour creatures do exactly use and improve their various natural powers to

their own advantage, and for the preservation of the universe.

4. By man's will and the freedom thereof, duly considered, may we yet attein a more distinct and ful knowledg of God, of ourselvs, and of our ob∣ligation and duty to God. Inferiour creatures have no power over their own operations. They act by natural impulse and necessity. Man ha's power to consider of any thing, and deliberate within him∣self, whether he were best to do it or no, before he does it. He know's his own works, and can judg of his own actions, whether they be good or evil. By the freedom of his will, he is lord of his own operations. His works may properly be called his own, as done by the choice of his own will. Other creatures may rather be said to be acted, then to act, being carried by such an instinct and impulse, planted in them by the creatour, as determin's them constantly one way, exclusive to any exer∣cise of deliberation or choice. Hence it follow's, that the works of man, being properly his own, are imputable to him; the works of inferiour crea∣tures, not so to them. They sin not, because they have no power to do any thing upon deliberation, and by choice. Hence also may we conclude, that the works of man are honourable and praise-wor∣thy, or culpable and shameful. The former are capable of approbation and reward: the latter, of detestation and punishment. The actions of man do leave behind them desert or guilt. They do

adorn and cloath, or stain, vitiate and corrupt him, accordingly as they are good or evil. The actions of other creatures have none of all these properties. Good actions do more and more dis∣pose and incline a man to good: evil ones do more deprave him, habituate and incline him unto evil. If man use not his understanding and will aright, in doing what he ought, he perverts what was given him for his good, to his own damage and confusion, and to the disturbance of the general order and harmony of the universe.

Four things do follow the works of man, desert, guilt, reward, punishment. Desert is the natural consequent of a good work; reward a consequent of desert. Guilt is the natural consequent of an evil work; and punishment is the certain consequent of guilt. The inseperable properties of the works of man, in distinction from the works of inferiour creatures, are, first; that they are his own; Second∣ly, that they are imputable to him; thirdly, that they leave merit or demerit, desert or guilt behind them; fourthly, that therefore reward or punish∣ment is due unto man, for them.

SECTION. III.

Another use or fruit of this general difference.

FOrasmuch as the rewards and punishments, due unto all the good and evil works of man,

are not dispensable by man; there must needs be some one above him, that can reward and punish him, in a suitablenes and correspondency to his works. This can be no other but God alone, who exactly know's all the works of all men, with all their aggravations and dimensions, to the full. If man can sin and deserve punishment, some one there is against whom he sin's, who know's all his sins, and can punish or pardon him. Both the fault, and the consequent guilt, obligation, or debt thereby contracted, do argue there is a God, that can punish man for his sins. This then is a good argument; man can sin, therefore there is a God; and this also; Man can do and deserve well, there∣fore there is a God, who is a rewarder of them that di∣ligently seek him. Heb. 11. 6. Thus from the works of man, as man, we may conclude there is a God, who is the only meet rewarder and punisher of his actions.

We may farther conclude from the works of men, and the recompence thereof, both wayes, in rewards and punishments, that the rewarder and punisher thereof is omniscient, omnipotent, and most just. He perfectly know's all the thoughts, intentions, desires, words, and actions of all men, that ever were, are, or shalbe. So can he exactly proportion rewards and punishments thereunto. He must be absolutely infallible in his knowledg of all the circumstances and aggravations of every step man makes, within or without, in thought,

word, or deed. Otherwise, how can he be exactly and absolutly just, in recompencing them? And how numberless are the thoughts, words, and actions of one mā, in a race of 40, 50 or 60 yeers, more or less? How innumerable then must all the works, words, desires and thoughts of many mil∣lions of men, in all places and ages of the world, needs be? And what then must he be, that know's all, in such sort, as exactly to proportion rewards and punishments thereunto? His understanding must be infinite, who is the infallible judg of all these matters. And he must also be omnipotent, that is able to perform, and effectually to dispense such rightly proportion'd rewards and punish∣ments unto all men, for their numberless thoughts, words, and actions, good or evil. Other∣wise, the due recompence of all may yet faile. As for the justice of God, shall not the judg of all the earth do right? can he do wrong? His will is the supream rule of all justice.

To sum up all then. Man, by the free exercise of his rational powers, can perform works good or evill. There is therefore some rewarder and punisher of all men: and he must be infinitly wise, powerful, and just; that every thought, word, and action of every man, may receive its due recompence.

SECT. IV.

The principal reward or punishment of man, is intellectual, spiritual, and invisible; not corporeal, sensible, or visible.

THe rational powers, by which man is distin∣guish'd from beasts, and other inferiour creatures, are the root of all such operations as de∣serve reward or punishment. These being intel∣lectual, invisible powers, the rewards and pu∣nishments must be so, too. The LIBERUM ARBI∣TRIUM, or power of working arbitrarily, in its true and full extent, comprehend's both the rational powers, understanding and will. The former dis∣cern's, judges, propounds; the latter chuses and executes. The joynt operation of both, is required in every free action: and therefore, as joyntly con∣sidered, are they the proper reception and subject of reward or punishment. The principal riches or treasures then of man, as wel as his punishment, must be spiritual and invisible, not corporeal, sen∣sible, or visible. They are also everlasting, as the powers that immediatly receive and possess them, are. The chief good of man, as man, consists not in any thing he has in common with beasts, and therefore not in any thing that can be perceived or received by such bodily senses and powers of life, as he hath in common with them. Conse∣quently,

it consist's not in any bodily delights or pleasures. Nor does the evil of man as man, prin∣cipally consist in bodily punishment. They then that place the chief good of man in things bodily, visible, or sensible, do embrace and teach a lie, de∣ceiving others and themselvs, to their own de∣struction.