for himself and all the rest. No inferiour creatures
can perform or understand any such matters.
From what man is furnished with, for the perfor∣mance
of all duty to God, may he certainly con∣clude
what ought to be done by him. If he can
know, love, fear, honour, glorify, praise, adore
or pray to God; if he can beleeve, hope, and
trust in God; he may conclude, that God is to be
known, lov'd, fear'd, honour'd, glorified, prais'd,
ador'd, beleev'd, hoped and trusted in. If he can
wholly delight himself in God, then is God
wholly delectable. If he can do well, God can
reward him: if ill, he can punish him. If he can
be guilty, God can be a judg. If he can ask par∣don,
God can give it. In like manner we may,
the other way, from the properties of God, argue
the duties of man. If God ought chiefly to be
loved, as infinitly most desireable, man ought
chiefly to love him. If he ought chiefly to be
fear'd, honour'd, prais'd, man ought to fear,
honour, and praise him. The like correspon∣dence
as is between the soul and body of man, is
between God and man, in this case. If the body
have eyes, ears, nose, &c: we may certainly con∣clude
that the soul has a power of seing, hearing,
smelling, &c. And if the soul have these powers,
the body ought to have such organs. The bodily
organs, without such faculties in the soul; or such
faculties of the soul, without such organs in the
body, would be useless and in vain. A man that