Nine cases of conscience occasionally determined by Robert Sanderson.

The CASE of the ENGAGEMENT.

SIR,

I Have hitherto been very sparing in de∣livering my opinion concerning the point now most in agitation, viz. Of the lafwulness or unlawfulness of Subscribing the Engagement: considering the mischiefs that must needs have followed, if it should be once noised abroad, that I had given forth any determi∣nation in so tickle a point. I could not but foresee on the one side, if I should condemn it as utterly unlawful, how I should be look∣ed upon by those that have all power in their hands, not as a refuser only, but a dis∣suader also of what they have thought fit to require: and on the other side, if I should allow it in any case lawful, what ill use would certainly be made thereof by mul∣titudes of people, apt to be so far scandali∣zed thereby, as either to swallow it whole without chewing, (that is, resting them∣selves upon the general determination of the lawfulness to take it hand over head,

without due consideration, either of the true meaning of it, or of other requisite cautions and circumstances) or else to con∣ceive themselves by so engaging, to be for ever discharged from the bond of their for∣mer Allegiance.

Yet since by your Letter, and by sending your servant therewith on purpose so many days journey, through unknown ways, and at this season of the year (especially as the weather hath proved since his coming forth) scarce passable, you have shewn your earnest desire to understand what my opinion is in this point; so great, both for difficulty and concernment; I could not think it fit, nor consistent with that civility which is to be used, especially towards Strangers, to send back your messenger without the return of some kind of answer: Wherein, albeit I shall not come up to the full, of what your Letter declareth to be your desire, viz. In giving a particular Judgment and estimate of the Eight several Arguments therein proposed, and the additional Quaere in the Postscript: yet you shall find something tending towards your satisfaction therein, by touching upon those points (so far as the straits of time would suffer) wherein the difficulty of the

whole business seemeth chiefly to consist.

First, then, it is to be considered, that Allegiance is a duty that every Subject, un∣der what form of Government soever, by the Law of Nature, oweth to his Country, and consequently to the Sovereign Power thereof. For the very same Law (which we may call the Law of Nature, at least in a large acceptation) which inclineth particu∣lar men to grow into one civil body of a Common-wealth, must necessarily withal, imprint a sense, and tacite acknowledgment of such a duty of Allegiance in every infe∣rior member of the body, unto the Caput Communitatis, or Sovereign Power, by which that Common-wealth is governed, as is necessary for the preservation of the whole body. So that the bond of Allegiance doth not arise originally from the Oath of Alle∣giance; as if those that had not taken the Oath, had a greater liberty to act contrary to the Allegiance specified in the Oath, than those that have taken it, have: or as if, in case the Oath should be quite laid aside, there should be no Allegiance due. But it is so intrinsecal proper, and essential a duty, and (as it were) fundamental, to the relation of a Subject, quâ talis, as that the very name

of a Subject doth, after a sort, import it; insomuch, that it hath thereupon gained, in common usage of speech, the stile of Natu∣ral Allegiance: Whence all these inferences will follow.

1. That the bond of Allegiance, (whether sworn or not sworn) is in the nature of it it perpetual and indispensable.

2. That it is so inseparable from the re∣lation of a Subject, that although the exer∣cise of it may be suspended by reason of a prevailing force, whilest the Subject is under such force, (viz. where it cannot be ima∣gined, how the endeavour of exercising it can be effectually serviceable to restore the Sovereign Power to the right owner, for the establishment of that Publick Justice and Peace wherein the happiness of Common∣wealths consisteth) yet no outward force can so absolutely take it away, or remove it, but that still it remaineth virtually in the sub∣ject, and obligeth to an endeavour (so soon as the force that hindred it is over) of actu∣ally exercising of it, for the advantage of the party, to whom of right it is due, and the advancement of the common good thereby, upon all fit occasions.

3. That no Subject of England, that

either hath, by taking the Oaths of Suprema∣cy, or Allegiance, acknowledged; or that not having taken either Oath, yet otherwise knoweth, or believeth, that the Soveraign Power in England, to whom his Natural Al∣legiance is due, is the King, his Heirs, and law∣ful Successors, can without sinning against his Conscience, enter into any Covenant, Promise, or Engagement, or do any other Act or Acts whatsoever, whereby either to transfer his Allegiance to any other party, to whom it is not of right due, or to put him∣self into an incapacity of performing the duties of his bounden Allegiance to his lawful Sovereign, when it may appear to be use∣ful and serviceable to him.

4. That therefore the taking of the late Solemn League and Covenant, by any Sub∣ject of England (notwithstanding the Pro∣testation in the Preface, that therein he had the Honour of the King before his eyes; and that express clause in one of the Articles of it, wherein he swore, The Preservation of the Kings Person and Honour) was an act as clear contrary to the Oath of Allegiance, and the Natural Duty of every Subject of Eng∣land; as the Assisting of the King to the ut∣most of ones power (which is a branch of the

Oaths) and the assisting against any person whatsoever, with his utmost power, those that were actually in Arms against the King (which was the very end for which that Covenant was set on foot) are contrary the one unto the other.

5. And that also for the same reason, no Subject of England, that hath taken the Oaths, and understandeth them, or is per∣suaded that the Sovereignty of this Realm doth of right belong to the King, his Heirs, and lawful Successors, can without sinning in like manner against his Conscence, take the Engagement now offered: if he so under∣stand the words, wherein it is expressed, as if they did contain in them, and require of the Promiser, an acknowledgment that the Supream Power of this Realm, whereunto the Subjects owe their bounden Allegiance, is rightly vested in those persons that now ex∣ercise it; or as if they did import an utter Abjuration, or renouncing of that Allegiance which was formerly held due to the King.

II. This being cleared, the next enquiry must be, Whether or no the words of the En∣gagement will reasonably bear such a con∣struction, as to the understanding of a ra∣tional

and conscientious man, may seem consistent with his bounden duty and Allegi∣ance to his lawful Soveraign? Whereof (I think) there need be no great question made, if it be well considered,

1. That all expressions by words, are subject to such ambiguities, that scarce any thing can be said or expressed in any words, how cautelously soever chosen, which will not render the whole speech capable of more constructions than one.

2. That very many men, known to be well affected to the King and his Party, and reputed otherways both learned and con∣scientious (not to mention the Presbyterians, most of whom, truly for my own part, when we speak of learning and conscience, I hold to be very little considerable) have sub∣scribed the Engagement; who in the judg∣ment of Charity, we are to prefume, would not so have done, if they had not been persuaded the words might be understood in some such qualified sense, as might stand with the duty of Allegiance to the King.

3. That (as you write) it is strongly re∣ported and believed, that the King hath given way to the taking of the Engage∣ment,

rather than that his good Subjects should lose their Estates for refusing the same. Which, as it is a clear evidence, that the King, and they who are about him, to advise him, do not so conceive of the words of this Engagement, as if they did necessarily import an abandoning of the Allegiance due to him: so 'tis (if true) a matter of great consideration towards the satisfaction of so many, as out of that fear only, have scrupled the taking of it. For the doing of that cannot be reasonably thought to destroy the Subjects Allegiance; which the King, who expecteth Allegiance from all his Subjects, advisedly, and up∣on mature deliberation alloweth them to do.

III. But all this being granted, that the words of the Engagement are capable of such construction; yet is not the Conscience thereby sufficiently secured, from justly scrupling at the taking thereof, unless it may yet further appear, that the Subject hath the liberty to make use of such a con∣struction; which is in effect the Quaere con∣tained in your Postscript, viz. Whether up∣on supposition, that the words of the En∣gagement

will bear more constructions than one, the subscriber may take it in his own sense, or is bound to take it in the impo∣sers sense? or, Whether it be necessary or expedient before he subscribe, to ask those that require his subscription, in what sense they require him to subscribe it? Upon the resolution of which Quaere, since (as I conceive) the last resolution of the Judg∣ment, wherein the Conscience is to acqui∣esce, doth principally depend; I shall en∣deavour to give you my thoughts therein, (wherein I acknowledge to have received much light and satisfaction from a Dis∣course written by a Learned, Judicious, and Pious friend, whereof I lately had the perusal, but for some reasons, not thought fit to be published) as distinctly, and clearly, as the time I have to do it in, will suffer.

1. First, then, for a man that is required of another to give Faith by some Oath, Pro∣mise, or other Engagement, to take it in a sense of his own, manifestly different (e∣ven in his own apprehension) from the o∣thers meaning, sufficiently expressed by words, according to the common custom of speech, and the nature of the business which it concerneth, is so gross a conceit,

that had not the impudence of the Jesuits, in maintaining the lawfulness of their e∣quivocations, and the sad experience of these late times, (wherein thousands have cheated themselves into perjury, by think∣ing to avoid it) evidenced the contrary, it might well have been thought a thing in∣credible, that any man of common under∣standing, should suffer his reason to be so infatuated by his affections, as to be de∣ceived thereby. For if such latitude of construction should be admitted in Promi∣ses, and other Obligations of that nature, intended for the Preservation of Faith amongst mankind, there would not re∣main any possible means, whereby for men to have assurance of one anothers mean∣ings. Wherefore I take that for a clear truth, That all Promises, and Assurances, wherein Faith is required to be given to another, ought to be understood, ad men∣tem imponentis, according to the mind and meaning of him to whom the Faith is to be given; so far forth as the meaning may reasonably appear, by the nature of the matter about which it is conversant, and such signification of the words, where∣by it is expressed, as according to the or∣dinary

use of speech amongst men, a∣greeth best thereunto. The reason where∣of is, because the Faith so required to be given, is intended to the behoof, and for the interest of him that requireth it; namely, to the end he may have the better assu∣rance from him that giveth the faith, that what is promised shall be accordingly per∣formed: which assurance he cannot have, if after his meaning, sufficiently declared by the words, it should yet be at the liberty of the Promiser to reserve another secret meaning in his own breast, differing there∣from.

2. But Secondly, what if the intention of the Imposer be not so fully declared by the words and the nature of the business; but that the same words may in fair con∣struction be still capable of a double mean∣ing, so as taken in one sense, they shall bind to More, and in another to Less. I conceive in such case it is not necessary, nor always expedient, (but rather for the most part otherwise) for the Promiser, be∣fore he give faith, to demand of the Impo∣ser, whether of the two is his meaning. But he may by the rule of Prudence, and that (for ought I see) without the violation

of any Law of Conscience, make his just advantage of that ambiguity, and take it in the same sense which shall bind to the Less. And this I ground upon the very same reason as before; For sith the Faith to be given, is intended to the behoof of him, to whom it is given, it concerneth him to take care that his meaning be expressed in such words as will sufficiently manifest the same to the understanding of a reasona∣ble man. Which if he neglect to do, no Law of Equity or Prudence bindeth the Promiser by an over-scrupulous diligence to make it out, whereby to lay a greater obligation upon himself than he need to do.

3. But then Thirdly, if it shall happen (as often it cometh to pass, when we have to deal with cunning men, and may possi∣bly be the Case now, and undoubtedly was so in the business of the Protestation, when the time was) That he that requireth the faith to be given, do of purpose so con∣trive words, that there may be left an ambiguity and latitude of sense therein; yea, and that it be very probable, and in a manner apparent, (upon the consideration of the point of interest, or other strong

presumptions arising from circumstances or otherwise) even to the apprehension of the Promiser himself, that he hath some farther reach in requiring that pro∣mise from him, some more remote and se∣cret intention than he is willing to disco∣ver. In that case what is to be done? I answer, That the Promiser in such case is no ways obliged in giving his Faith, to take notice of any such secret intention, but is at liberty to make use of that Lati∣tude of sense, which the other did rather chuse to leave undetermined, than to re∣strain, and so to turn the others cunning dealing to his own best advantage, by ta∣king it in the more favourable constructi∣on; and that which bindeth to less. For it is the declared intention only, (viz. That which the words, according to the com∣mon use of speech, do in relation to the nature of the subject, most naturally and properly represent to the understand∣ing of reasonable men, when they hear them) and not to the remote, secret, and reserved intent, which the Promiser is ob∣liged unto. The reason whereof is mani∣fest; because he that requireth Faith to be given from another, by words of his

own contriving, is ever presumed so to have determined the sense thereof, in the contrivance of the words, as may suffici∣ently declare what he intendeth the Pro∣miser should assure him to perform. If therefore he have not so determined the words, as to signifie the More; it is in all reason to be presumed, that he intended to oblige him but to the Less. For being at liberty to make his own choice of words, whereby to express his own meaning; who can think otherwise, but that he would make the choice with respect to his own Interest? And therefore, though he might have a secret desire, which he is loth to discover, that the Promiser should be bound to the More, and would be mar∣vellously well pleased, that he should so understand the words, as if they intend∣ded to bind him to the More: Yet since it had been so easie a matter for him, by ad∣ding or altering a few words, to have de∣clared that intent, if he had thought it conducible to his own ends; it will be presumed also, that it was out of respect of self-interest, that he forbare so to do, and chose rather to leave his meaning, in such general words, as will not exclude

the sense, which bindeth but to the Less; and consequently that his declared in∣tent obligeth to no more but to the Less only.

IV. To bring the matter yet closer, and to put it up to the present Cases, there are yet two things more to be done.

First, To shew what different constru∣ctions (the highest, I mean, and the lowest) the words of the Engagement are fairly capable of.

And Secondly, to find as well as we can, whether of two is more probably the meaning intended by the Imposers, to be declared by the words.

The words are these:

I do promise to be true and faithful to the Com∣mon-wealth of England, as it is now establi∣shed without King or Lords.

Wherein there are sundry ambiguities.

1. First, In the words true and faithful; by which may be intended, either the pro∣mise of that Fidelity and Allegiance (which was formerly acknowledged to be due to

the King, &c.) to be now performed to those that are presently possessed of the Su∣pream Power, as their right and due. Or else that promise of such a kind of fidelity, as Captives taken in the War, promise to their Enemies, when they fall under their power; viz. to remain true Prisoners of War, and so long as they are in their pow∣er, not to attempt any thing to their de∣struction.

2. Secondly, In the word Common-wealth, by which may either be meant, those per∣sons who are the prevalent party in this Kingdom, and now are possessed of, and do exercise the Supreme Power therein, as if the right of Soveraignity were vest∣ed in them: Or else, the whole entire Body of the English Nation, as it is a Civil Society or State within it self, distinguish∣ed from all other Foreign Estates. Taken in the former sense, the fidelity promised to the Common-wealth, relateth directly to the upholding of that party who are the present Governors de facto, and imports subjection to them as de jure: But taken in the latter, it relateth the safety of the Nation, and importeth no more as to the

present Governours, but to live peaceably under them de facto, and to yield obedi∣ence to them in things absolutely necessa∣ry for the upholding Civil Society with∣in the Realm; such as are the defence of the Nation against Forainers, the fur∣therance of Publick Justice, and the main∣tenance of Trade.

3. In the words as it is now established, &c. which may be understood either by way of approbation of what hath been done by way of abolishing Kingly Government, and the House of Peers, and placing all Authority and Power within this Realm, in the House of Commons. Or else 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 only, as a clause simply and barely reciting what manner of Govern∣ment it is that this Nation de facto, is now under; viz. a Government by the Commons only, without either King or House of Lords.

Which Ambiguities considered, The highest construction that can be reasonably made of the words, is to this effect. I acknowledge the Soveraign Power of this Nation, whereunto I owe Allegi∣ance and Subjection to be rightly stated in the House of Commons, wherein

neither King nor Lords (as such) have, or henceforth ought to have any share; And I promise that I will perform all Allegiance and Subjection thereun∣to, and maintain the same with my fortunes and life to the utmost of my power.

And the lowest construction that can be rea∣sonably made of the same words, is to this effect:

Whereas for the present, the Su∣preme Power in England, under which Power I now am, is actually possessed and exercised by the House of Commons, without either King or Lords; I promise that so long as I live under that power and protection, I will not contrive or at∣tempt any act of hostility against them: but living quietly and peaceably under them, will endeavor my self faithfully in my place and calling, to do what e∣very good member of a Common-wealth ought to do for the safety of my Coun∣try, and preservation of Civil Society therein.

V. Now cometh in to be considered in the last place the great Question, whether of the two constructions it is, (That which bindeth to the Most, or This which obligeth

to the Least, the words can well bear) that the formers of the Engagement did rather intend to declare by these words. They that think the former, want not probabi∣lity of reason to ground their persuasions upon. For they consider, that those who are presently possessed of the Supreme Power, are not minded to part with it if they can hold it. And that the likeliest way to hold it is, if they can possibly bring the whole people of England, or at least the far greatest part thereof, to acknow∣ledge that they are rightly possessed of it, and to promise Subjection and Allegi∣ance to them as such. And that there∣fore the Engagement, being purposely de∣vised and set on foot, as the fittest engine to expedite that work, must in all reason intend to oblige so far. Which being so contrary to their Judgement and persua∣sion, concerning the duty and Oath of Al∣legiance, I cannot blame those that so un∣derstand the words of the Engagement, if they abominate the very thought of ta∣king it.

But there wanteth not great probability of Reason on the other side, to induce us to believe that the latter and lower sense

is rather to be deemed the immediate, and declared intent of the Imposers, whatsoe∣ver cause of suspition there may be, that the former meaning may be more agreea∣ble to their secret, reserved, and ultimate intent; between which two, if there be any difference (as it is not impossible but there may be) the Engager is not concerned in it, or not yet: the Equivocation, if there be any in that, must be put upon the Im∣posers, not on the Promisers score. For thus believing there are amongst others these Probabilities.

1. That many prudent and conscienci∣ous men of the Royal Party, as well Di∣vines and Lawyers, as others, have thus understood it, who we presume would not for any outward respect in the world have taken it, if they conceived any more to have been intended in it.

2. That it hath often been affirmed, both publickly and privately in several parts of the Kingdom (if we may believe either common fame, or the reports of sundry credible particular persons) by those that have persuaded or pressed others to subscribe; that the same is the very true intent and meaning of it, and no other.

3. That if the Imposers had been minded to have declared an intent of binding to more they might easily have framed the words so as not to be capable of a constru∣ction binding to Less.

4. That (as is also credibly reported) whilst the form of the words was under debate, the opinion of those that would have had it set higher, was not followed, as held unseasonable; and the vote carried, for the more moderate expression wherein it now standeth.

5. That the Imposers, intending by the Engagement to secure themselves, especially against the designs and attempts of those men, who they knew (well e∣nough) held them for no other than Usur∣pers, must be in reason supposed to re∣quire no more assurance of them by the Engagement, than such as may and is usually given to Usurpers; which is, not an acknowledgment of their title, and a promise of Allegiance, but meerly a promise of living quietly, so long as they are under their power, and enjoy their protection.

6. That it is a received Maxim of Poli∣tical prudence, for all new Governours,

(especially those that either introduce a new form of Government, or come in upon a questionable title) to abstain from all harsh proceedings, even against those whom they know to be evil affected to their power, and not so much as to ex∣asperate them (though it be in the power of their hands to destry them) especially in the beginning of their Government; but rather to sweeten them into a better opinion of their persons, and to win up∣on them by Acts of Grace and Oblivion (for Remissiùs imperanti meliús paretur.) So as they may have but any tolerable kind of assu∣rance from them in the mean time, of living quietly and peaceably under them. We have no reason therefore to believe that the Imposers of this Engagement, who have acted the parts of the greatest Politicians, so perfectly and successfully hitherto, as to possess themseves so fully of the Supreme Power of so great and flourishing a Kingdom, in so few years, would be so impolitick as not to proceed by the same rules, that all wise and success∣ful persons have ever practised in the mana∣ging, and for the establishing of an acquired power.

VI. Out of all these premises together (weighing my Positive conclusion, either Affirmative or Negative, touching the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of subscri∣bing in universali) I shall declare my opi∣nion only in these few following particu∣lars.

1. That it is not lawful for any man to take the Engagement with a resolution to break it.

2. That therefore, whosoever thinketh the words of the Engagement do contain a promise of any thing which is not lawful for him to perform, cannot take it with a good conscience.

3. That whosoever so understandeth the words of the Engagement, as if they did oblige him to any thing contrary to his Allegiance, or render him unable to act according thereunto, upon any seasonable emerging occasion, cannot with a good conscience take it.

4. That if any man for any temporal benefit, or avoiding any temporal da∣mage, shall take the Engagement with a doubting conscience (that is, before he be persuaded in his Judgement, upon some probable ground of reason, that it

is lawful for him so to do) he sinneth therein.

5. That if any man after a serious de∣sire of informing himself as rightly as he can, what are the duties of his Allegiance on the one side, and what is most probably the meaning intended by the words of the Engagement on the other side, shall find himself well satisfied in this persuasion, that the performance in the mean time of what is required by the Engagement so understood, is no way contrary (for any thing he can discern for the present) to his bounden Allegiance, so long as he is un∣der such a force, as that he cannot exercise it; and likewise, that whensoever that force is so removed from him, or he from under it, as that he hath power to act according to his Allegiance, the Obliga∣tion of the Engagement of it self deter∣mineth and expireth: and out of these considerations, rather than suffer extreme prejudice in his Person, Estate, or necessary Relations, shall subscribe the Engagement, since his own heart condemneth him not, neither will I.

Sir, I have now two requests to you, which I doubt not but you will think rea∣sonable.

The one, that whatsoever use you shall please to make of these papers, or any thing therein contained, for your own, or any friends satisfaction; yet you would not deliver any Copies abroad, lest they should come to be printed, as some other papers of mine, written in this manner, have been without my know∣ledg. This I desire, both in respect of the danger I might incur from the displeasure of the Potent Party, if any such thing should come abroad; as also lest upon the consideration of some things here hinted, they might think the words of the En∣gagement too light, and might thence take occasion to lay some heavier Obli∣gation upon us, in words that should ob∣lige to More. The other request is, that since I have not any other perfect Copy of what now I send you, you would pro∣cure it to be transcribed for me; and ei∣ther the Copy so transcribed, or these very papers rather, when you have transcribed them, transmit inclosed in a Letter, or by some Friend that will be sure to deliver them safe, with his own hands, to my Son—in London, to whom I shall write shortly, that he may expect them.

Sir, I desire that my best respects may be presented, &c.—God endue us all with Grace and Wisdom fit for these evil times; to whose Mercy and Blessing commend us all, I rest,

B. P. Dec. 20. 1650.

Your Loving Friend and Servant.

Notes

• Senec. 1. D•• Clem. 24.