Sermons preached on several occasions to which a discourse is annexed concerning the true reason of the sufferings of Christ : wherein Crellius his answer to Grotius is considered / by Edward Stillingfleet ...

CHAP. 1. * 1.1

Of the Socinian way of interpreting Scripture. Of the uncer∣tainty it leaves us in as to the main articles of Faith, mani∣fested by an Exposition of Gen. 1. suitable to that way. The state of the Controversie in general concerning the sufferings of Christ for us. He did not suffer the same we should have done. The grand mistake in making punishments of the na∣ture of Debts; the difference between them at large discove∣red, * 1.2 from the different reason and ends of them. The right of punishment in God, proved against Crellius, not to arise from meer dominion. The end of punishment not bare Com∣pensation, as it is in debts; what punishment due to an in∣jured person by the right of Nature; proper punishment a result of Laws. Crellius his great mistake about the end of Punishments. Not designed for satisfaction of Anger as it is a desire of Revenge. Seneca and Lactantius vindicated against Crellius. The Magistrates interest in Punishment distinct from that of private persons. Of the nature of An∣ger * 1.3 in God, and the satisfaction to be made to it. Crel∣lius his great arguments against satisfaction depend on a false Notion of Gods anger. Of the ends of divine Punish∣ments, and the different nature of them in this and the fu∣ture state.

SIR,

ALthough the Letter I received from your hands con∣tained * 1.4 in it so many mistakes of my meaning and de∣sign, that it seemed to be the greatest civility to the * 1.5 Writer of it, to give no answer at all to it, be∣cause that could not be done, without the discovery of far more weaknesses in him, than he pretends to find in my di∣scourse: Yet the weight and importance of the matter may re∣quire

a further account from me, concerning the true reason of * 1.6 the sufferings of Christ. Wherein my design was so far from representing old Errors to the best advantage, or to rack my wits to defend them, as that person seems to suggest; that I aimed at nothing more than to give a true account of what upon a serious enquiry, I judged to be the most natural and genuine meaning of the Christian Doctrine contained in the Writings of the New Testament.

For finding therein such multitudes of expressions which to an unprejudiced mind attribute all the mighty effects of the Love of God to us, to the obedience and sufferings of Christ; * 1.7 I began to consider what reason there was why the plain and easie sense of those places must be forsaken, and a remote and Metaphorical meaning put upon them. Which I thought my self the more obliged to do, because I could not conceive if it had been the design of the Scripture, to have delivered the received Doctrine of the Christian Church, concerning the reason of the sufferings of Christ, that it could have been more clearly and fully expressed than it is already. So that supposing that to have been the true meaning of the several places of Scripture which we contend for; yet the * 1.8 same arts and subtilties might have been used to pervert it, which are imployed to perswade men that is not the true meaning of them. And what is equally serviceable to truth and falshood, can of it self, have no power on the minds of men to convince them it must be one, and not the other. Nay, if every unusual and improper acception of words in the Scri∣pture, shall be thought sufficient to take away the natural and genuine sense, where the matter is capable of it; I know scarce any article of Faith can be long secure; and by these arts men may declare that they believe the Scriptures, and yet * 1.9 believe nothing of the Christian Faith. For if the impro∣per, though unusual acception of those expressions of Christs dying for us, of redemption, propitiation, reconciliation by his blood, of his bearing our iniquities, and being made sin and a curse for us, shall be enough to invalidate all the arguments ta∣ken from them to prove that which the proper sense of them doth imply; why may not the improper use of the terms of Creation and Resurrection, as well take away the natural sense of them in the great Articles of the Creation of the World, and Resurrection after death? For if it be enough to prove * 1.10 that Christs dying for us, doth not imply dying in our stead; be∣cause sometimes dying for others imports no more than dying for some advantage to come to them; if redemption being some∣times used for meer deliverance, shall make our redemption by

Christ, wholly Metaphorical; if the terms of propitiation recon∣cilation, * 1.11 &c. shall lose their force because they are sometimes used where all things cannot be supposed parallel with the sense we contend for: why shall I be bound to believe that the World was ever created in a proper sense, since those persons against whom I argue, so earnestly contend that in those places in which it seems as proper as any, it is to be understood on∣ly in a metaphorical? If when the World and all things are said * 1.12 to be made by Christ, we are not to understand the production but the reformation of the World and all things in it, although the natural sense of the Words be quite otherwise; what ar∣gument * 1.13 can make it necessary for me not to understand the Creation of the World in a metaphorical sense, when Moses de∣livers to us the history of it? Why may not I understand in the beginning, Gen. 1. for the beginning of the Mosaical Dispen∣sation, as well as Socinus doth in the beginning, John 1. for the beginning of the Evangelical? and that from the very same argument used by him, viz. that in the beginning is to be un∣derstood of the main subject concerning which the author in∣tends to write, and that I am as sure it was in Moses concern∣ing the Law given by him as it was in St. Iohn, concerning * 1.14 the Gospel delivered by Christ. Why may not the Creation of the Heavens and the Earth, be no more than the erection of the Jewish Polity? since it is acknowledged, that by New Heavens and new Earth wherein dwelleth righteousness, no more is under∣stood than a new state of things under the Gospel? Why may not the confused Chaos import no more than the state of Igno∣rance and darkness under which the World was before the Law of Moses? since it is confessed that it signifies in the New Testa∣ment such a state of the World before the Gospel appeared? and consequently, why may not the light which made the first * 1.15 day be the first tendencies to the Doctrine of Moses, which be∣ing at first divided and scattered, was united afterwards in one great Body of Laws, which was called the Sun, because it was the great Director of the Iewish Nation, and therefore said to rule the day; as the less considerable Laws of other Nations are called the Moon, because they were to govern those who were yet under the night of Ignorance? Why may not the Firma∣ment being in the midst of the Waters, imply the erection of the Je•…•…ish State in the midst of a great deal of trouble, since it is confe••••ed, that Waters are often taken in Scripture in a Me∣taphorical * 1.16 sense for troubles and afflictions? and the Earth ap∣pearing out of the Waters, be no more but the settlement of that state aft•••• ••t•• troubles; and particularly with great elegancy a••ter 〈◊〉〈◊〉 p•…•…age through the Red Sea? And the production

of Herbs and living Creatures, be the great encrease of the Peo∣ple * 1.17 of all sorts, as well those of a meaner rank (and therefore called herbs) as those of a higher, that were to live upon the other, and sometimes trample upon them, and therefore by way of excellency called the Living Creatures? And when these were multiplied and brought into order, (which being done by steps and degrees, is said to be finished, in several days) then the State and the Church flourished and enjoyed a great deal of pleasure, which was the production of Man and Wo∣man, and their being placed in Paradise (for a perfect Man, notes a high degree of perfection, and a Woman is taken for the Church * 1.18 in the Revelations): But when they followed the Customs of other Nations which were as a forbidden tree to them, then they lost all their happiness and pleasure, and were expelled out of their own Country, and lived in great slavery and misery, which was the Curse pronounced against them, for violating the rules of Policy established among them. Thus you see how small a measure of wit, by the advantage of those ways of inter∣preting Scripture, which the subtilest of our adversaries make use of, will serve to pervert the clearest expressions of Scripture to quite another sense than was ever intended by the Writer of * 1.19 them. And I assure you, if that rule of interpreting Scripture be once allowed, that where words are ever used in a Meta∣phorical sense, there can be no necessity of understanding them in a proper; there is scarce any thing which you look on as the most necessary to be believed in Scripture, but it may be made appear not to be so upon those terms: for by reason of the paucity and therefore the ambiguity of the Original words of the Hebrew language, the strange Idioms of it, the dif∣ferent senses of the same word in several Conjugations, the want of several modes of expression which are used in other * 1.20 Languages, and above all the lofty and Metaphorical way of speaking used in all Eastern Countries, and the imitation of the Hebrew Idioms in the Greek translation of the Old Testa∣ment, and Original of the New, you can hardly affix a sense upon any words used therein, but a man who will be at the pains to search all possible significations and uses of those words, will put you hard to it, to make good that which you took to be the proper meaning of them. Wherefore although I will not deny to our adversaries the praise of subtilty and diligence, I cannot give them that, (which is much more praise worthy) * 1.21 viz. of discretion and sound judgement. For while they use their utmost industry to search all the most remote and Metaphori∣cal senses of words, with a design to take off the genuine and proper meaning of them, they do not attend to the ill conse∣quence

that may be made of this to the overthrowing those * 1.22 things, the belief of which themselves make necessary to salva∣tion. For by this way the whole Gospel may be made an Alle∣gory, and the Resurrection of Christ be thought as metapho∣rical as the Redemption by his Death, and the sorce of all the Precepts of the Gospel avoided by some unusual signification of the words wherein they are delivered. So that nothing can be more unreasonable than such a method of proceeding, unless it be first sufficiently proved that the matter is not ca∣pable of the proper sense, and therefore of necessity the im∣proper only is to be allowed. And this is that which Socinus * 1.23 seems after all his pains to pervert the meaning of the places in controversie, to rely on most; viz. That the Doctrine of satisfaction doth imply an impossibility in the thing it self, * 1.24 and therefore must needs be false; nay, he saith the infallibility of the Revealer had not been enough in this Case, supposing that Christ had said it, and risen from the dead, to declare his own Veracity; unless he had delivered it by its proper cau∣ses and effects, and so shewed the possibility of the thing it self. And the reason, he saith, why they believe their Doctrine true, is not barely because God hath said it, but they believe certainly * 1.25 that God hath said it, because they know it to be true; by knowing the contrary Doctrine to be impossible. The controversie then, concerning the meaning of the places in dispute is to be resolved from the nature and reasonableness of the matter contained in them: for if Socinus his reason were answerable to his confi∣dence, if the account we give of the sufferings of Christ, were repugnant not only to the Justice, Goodness and Grace of God, but to the nature of the thing; if it appear impossible, that mankind should be redeemed in a proper sense, or that God should be propitiated by the Death of his Son as a Sacrifice for * 1.26 sin; if it enervate all the Precepts of Obedience, and tends ra∣ther to justifie sins than those who do repent of them, I shall then agree, that no industry can be too great in searching Au∣thors, comparing places, examining Versions, to find out such a sense as may be agreeable to the nature of things, the Attributes of God, and the design of Christian Religion. But if on the contrary, the Scripture doth plainly assert those things, from whence our Doctrine follows, and without which no reasonable account can be given either of the expressions used therein, or of the sufferings of Christ; if Christs death did * 1.27 immediately respect God as a sacrifice, and were paid as a price for our Redemption; if such a design of his death be so far from being repugnant to the nature of God, that it highly manifests his Wisdom, Justice and Mercy; if it assert nothing but

what is so far from being impossible, that it is very reconcile∣able to the common principles of Reason, as well as the Free-Grace of God in the pardon of sin; if, being truly understood, it is so far from enervating, that it advances highly all the pur∣poses of Christian Religion, then it can be no less than a betray∣ing one of the grand Truths of the Christian Doctrine, not to believe ours to be the true sense of the places in controversie. And this is that which I now take upon me to maintain.

For our clearer proceeding herein, nothing will be more ne∣cessary, than to understand the true state of the Controversie; * 1.28 which hath been rendred more obscure by the mistakes of some, * 1.29 who have managed it with greater zeal than judgement; who have asserted more than they needed to have done, and made our Adversaries assert much less than they do: And by this means have shot over their Adversaries heads, and laid their own more open to assaults. It is easie to observe, that most of Socinus his Arguments are levelled against an opinion, which few who have considered these things do maintain, and none need to think themselves obliged to do it; which is, That Christ paid a proper and rigid satisfaction for the sins of men, considered under the notion of debts, and that he paid the very * 1.30 same, which we ought to have done; which in the sense of the Law, is never called Satisfaction, but strict payment. Against this, Socinus disputes from the impossibility of Christs paying the very same that we were to have paid; because our penalty was Eternal death, and that as the consequent of inherent guilt, which Christ neither did nor could undergo. Neither is it enough to say, That Christ had undergone Eternal death, unless he had been able to free himself from it; for the admission of one to pay for another, who could discharge the debt in much less time than the offenders could, was not the same which the Law * 1.31 required. For that takes no notice of any other than the per∣sons who had sinned; and if a Mediator could have paid the same, the Original Law must have been disjunctive; viz. That either the Offender must suffer, or another for him; but then the Gospel had not been the bringing in of a better Covenant, but a performance of the old. But if there be a relaxation or di∣spensation of the first Law, then it necessarily follows, that what Christ paid, was not the very same which the first Law required; for what need of that, when the very same was paid that was in the obligation? But if it be said, That the Dignity of the person * 1.32 makes up, what wanted in the kind or degree of punishment: This is a plain confession that it is not the same, but something equi∣valent, which answers the ends of the Sanction, as much as the same would have done, which is the thing we contend for. Be∣sides,

if the very same had been paid in the strict sense, there * 1.33 would have followed a deliverance ipso facto; for the release immediately follows the payment of the same: and it had been injustice to have required any thing further, in order to the discharge of the Offender, when strict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation. But we see that Faith and Repentance, and the consequences of those two, are made conditions on our parts, in order to the enjoying the be∣nefit of what Christ hath procured: So that the release is not immediate upon the payment, but depends on a new contract; made in consideration of what Christ hath done and suffered * 1.34 for us. If it be said, That by Christs payment we become his; and he requires these conditions of us; besides the contrariety of it to the Scriptures, which make the conditions to be required by him to whom the payment was made; we are to consider, that these very persons assert, that Christ paid all for us, and in our name and stead; so that the payment by Christ, was by a substitution in our room; and if he paid the same which the Law required, the benefit must immediately accrue to those in whose name the debt was paid: For what was done in the name of another, is all one to the Creditor, as if it had been done * 1.35 by the Debtor himself. But above all things, it is impossible to reconcile the freeness of remission, with the full payment of the very same which was in the obligation. Neither will it serve to say, That though it was not free to Christ, yet it was to us: For the satisfaction and remission must respect the same person; for Christ did not pay for himself, but for us, neither could the remission be to him: Christ therefore is not considered in his own name, but as acting in our stead; so that what was free to him, must be to us; what was exactly paid by him, it is all one as if it had been done by us; so that it is impossible * 1.36 the same debt should be fully paid and freely forgiven. Much less will it avoid the difficulty in this case to say, That it was a refusable payment; for it being supposed to be the very same, it was not in justice refusable; and however not in equity, if it answer the intention of the Law, as much as the suffering of the offenders had done; and the more it doth that, the less re∣fusable it is. And although God himself found out the way, that doth not make the pardon free, but the designation of the person who was to pay the debt. Thus when our Adversaries dispute against this opinion, no wonder if they do it success∣fully, * 1.37 but this whole opinion is built upon a mistake, that sa∣tisfaction must be the payment of the very same; which while they contend for, they give our Adversaries too great an ad∣vantage, and make them think they triumph over the Faith of

the Church, when they do it only over the mistake of some * 1.38 particular persons. But the foundation of this mistake, lies in the consideration of punishment, under the notion of debts, and that satisfaction therefore must be by strict payment in rigor of Law; but how great that mistake is, will appear in the subsequent discourse: but it cannot but be wondred at, that the very same persons who consider sins, as debts which must be strictly satisfied for, do withal contend for the absolute ne∣cessity of this satisfaction; whereas Socinus his Arguments would hold good, if sins were only considered as debts, and God as the meer Creditor of punishment, he might as freely part * 1.39 with his own right without satisfaction, as any Creditor may forgive what summ he pleases, to a person indebted to him; and no reason can be brought to the contrary, from that no∣tion of sins, why he may not do it. But if they be considered with a respect to Gods Government of the world, and the ho∣nour of his Laws, then some further account may be given, why it may not be consistent with that, to pass by the sins of men, without satisfaction made to them.

And because the mistake in this matter, hath been the foun∣dation of most of the subsequent mistakes on both sides, and * 1.40 * 1.41 the discovery of the cause of errours, doth far more to the cure of them, than any Arguments brought against them; and withal, the true understanding of the whole Doctrine of satis∣faction depends upon it, I shall endeavour to make clear the notion under which our sins are considered; for upon that, de∣pends the nature of the satisfaction which is to be made for them. For while our Adversaries suppose, that sins are to be looked on under the notion of debts in this debate, they assert it to be wholly free for God to remit them, without any satis∣faction. They make the right of punishment meerly to depend * 1.42 on Gods absolute Dominion; and that all satisfaction must be considered under the notion of compensation, for the injuries done to him, to whom it is to be made But if we can clearly shew a considerable difference between the notion of debts and punishments, if the right of punishment doth not depend upon meer Dominion, and that satisfaction by way of punishment, is not primarily intended for compensation, but for other ends, we shall make not only the state of the Controversie much clearer, but offer something considerable towards the resolu∣tion of it. The way I shall take for the proof of the difference * 1.43 between debts and punishments, shall be using the other for the Arguments for it. For besides, that those things are just in matter of debts, which are not so in the case of punishments; as, that it is lawful for a man to forgive all the debts which

are owing him by all persons, though they never so contu∣maciously * 1.44 refuse payment, but our Adversaries will not say so in the case of sins; for although they assert, That the justice of God doth never require punishment in case of Repentance, yet withal they assert, That in case of Impenitency, it is not only agreeable, but due to the nature and decrees; and * 1.45 therefore to the rectitude and equity of God not to give pardon. But if this be true, then there is an apparent difference between the notion of debts and punishments; for the Impenitency doth but add to the greatness of the debt: And will they say, it is only in Gods power to remit small debts, but he must * 1.46 punish the greatest? what becomes then of Gods absolute li∣berty to part with his own right? will not this shew more of his kindness to pardon the greater, rather than lesser offen∣ders? But if there be something in the nature of the thing, which makes it not only just, but necessary for impenitent sinners to be punished, as Crellius after Socinus frequently acknowledges, then it is plain, that sins are not to be consi∣dered meerly as debts, for that obstinacy and impenitency is only punished as a greater degree of sin, and therefore as a greater debt. And withal, those things are lawful in the re∣mission * 1.47 of debts, which are unjust in the matter of punish∣ments; as it is lawful for a Creditor, when two persons are considered in equal circumstances, to remit one, and not the other; nay, to remit the greater debt, without any satis∣faction, and to exact the lesser to the greatest extremity; but it is unjust in matter of punishments, where the reason and circumstances are the same, for a person who hath committed a crime of very dangerous consequence, to escape unpunished, and another who hath been guilty of far less to be severely executed. Besides these considerations, I say, I shall now * 1.48 prove the difference of debts and punishments, from those two things whereby things are best differenced from each other; viz. The different Reason, and the different End of them.

The different Reason of debts and punishments: The reason of debts is dominion and property, and the obligation of * 1.49 them, depends upon voluntary contracts between parties; but the reason of punishments is Justice and Government, and de∣pends not upon meer contracts, but the relation the person stands in to that Authority to which he is accountable for his actions. For if the obligation to punishment, did depend upon meer * 1.50 contract, then none could justly be punished, but such who have consented to it by an antecedent contract: If it be said, That a contract is implied, by their being in society with others; that is as much as I desire to make the difference appear,

for in case of debts, the obligation depends upon the voluntary * 1.51 contract of the person; but in case of punishments, the very relation to Government, and living under Laws doth imply it. And the right of punishment depends upon the obligation of Laws, where the reason of them holds, without any express contract, or superiority of one over another; as in the case of violation of the Law of Nations, that gives right to ano∣ther Nation to punish the infringers of it. Otherwise Wars could never be lawful between two Nations, and none could be warrantable, but those of a Prince against his rebellious subjects, who have broken the Laws themselves consented * 1.52 expresly to. Besides, in case of debts, every man is bound to pay, whether he be call'd upon or no; but in case of pu∣nishments, no man is bound to betray or accuse himself. For the obligation to payment in case of debt; ariseth from the injury sustained by that particular person, if another detains what is his own from him; but the obligation to punishment, arises from the injury the Publick sustains by the impunity 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of crimes, of which the Magistrates are to take care; who by the dispensing of punishments, do shew that to be true which Grotius asserts, that if there be any Creditor to be assigned * 1.53 in punishment, it is the publick good: Which appears by this, that all punishments are proportioned, according to the in∣fluence the offences have upon the publick interest; for the reason of punishment is not because a Law is broken, but be∣cause the breach of a Law tends to dissolve the community, by infringing the Authority of the Laws, and the honour of those who are to take care of them. For if we consider it, the measure of punishments is in a well ordered State, taken from the influence which crimes have upon the peace and interest of the community. No man questions, but that Malice, Pride * 1.54 and Avarice, are things really as bad as many faults, that are severely punished by humane Laws; but the reason these are not punished is, because they do not so much injury to the publick interest, as Theft and Robbery do. Besides, in those things wherein the Laws of a Nation are concerned, the ut∣most rigor is not used in the preventing of crimes, or the ex∣ecution of them when committed, if such an execution may endanger the publick more than the impunity of the offen∣ders may do. And there are some things which are thought fit to be forbidden, where the utmost means are not used to * 1.55 prevent them; as Merchants are forbidden to steal customs, but they are not put under an Oath not to do it. And when penalties have been deserved, the execution of them hath been deferred, till it may be most for the advantage of the

publick: as Ioabs punishment till Solomons Reign, though he deserved it as much in Davids. So that the rule commonly talked of, Fiat justitia & pereat mundus, is a piece of Pe∣dantry, rather than true Wisdom; for whatever penalty in∣flicted, brings a far greater detriment to the publick, than the forbearance of it, is no piece of Justice to the State, but the contrary, the greatest Law, being the safety and preservation of the whole body. By which it appears, that in humane Laws, the reason of punishment is not, that such an action is done, but because the impunity in doing it, may have a bad in∣fluence on the publick interest; but in debts, the right of Resti∣tution * 1.56 depends upon the injury received by a particular person, who looks at no more than the reparation of his loss by it.

We are now to consider, how far these things will hold in Divine Laws, and what the right of punishment doth result * 1.57 from there. For Crellius, the subtillest of our Adversaries, knowing how great consequence the resolution of this is, in the whole Controversie of Satisfaction, vehemently contends, That the right of punishment doth result from Gods absolute Dominion, and therefore he is to be considered as the offended party, and not as Governor in the right of inflicting punishment; for which his * 1.58 first Argument is, That our obedience is due to Gods Law, on the account of his Dominion; but when that is not performed, * 1.59 the penalty succeeds in its room, and therefore that doth belong to God on the same account: His other arguments are, from the compensation of injuries due to the offended party, and from Gods anger against sin, in which he is to be considered as the offended party: These two latter will be answered under the next head; the first I am to examine here. He therefore tells us, that the right of punishment belongs to Gods Dominion, because the reason of his Government of mankind is, because he * 1.60 is the Lord of them. But, for our better understanding this, we are to consider, although the original right of Government doth result from Gods Dominion; for therefore our obedience is due, because of his Soveraignty over us; yet when God takes upon him the notion of a Governor, he enters into a new rela∣tion with his creatures, distinct from the first as meer Lord. For he is equally Lord of all to whom he gives a being, but he doth not require obedience upon equal terms, nor governs them by the same Laws: Dominion is properly shewed in the exercise of power; but when God gives Laws according to which he will * 1.61 reward and punish, he so far restrains the exercise of his Domi∣nion to a subserviency to the ends of Government. If we should suppose, that God governs the world meerly by his Dominion, we must take away all rewards and punishments; for then the

actions of men, would be the meer effects of irresistable power, * 1.62 and so not capable of rewards and punishments; for there could be neither of these, where mens actions are not capable of the differences of good and evil, and that they cannot be, if they be the acts of Gods Dominion, and not of their own. But if God doth not exercise his full Dominion over rational crea∣tures, it is apparent that he doth govern them under another notion than as meer Lord, and the reason of punishment is not to be taken from an absolute right which God doth not make use of, but from the ends and designs of Government, which are his own Honour, the Authority of his Laws, and the good * 1.63 of those whom he doth govern. And Crellius is greatly mi∣staken, when he makes punishment to succeed in the place of the right of obedience; for it is only the desert of punishment, which follows upon the violation of that right, and as we assert, that the right of obedience is derived from Gods Soveraignty, so we deny not, but the desert of punishment is from the viola∣tion of it; but withal we say, that the obligation to punish∣ment depends upon the Laws, and Gods right to inflict punish∣ment (Laws being supposed) is immediately from that Go∣vernment which he hath over mankind: For otherwise, if the * 1.64 whole right of punishment did still depend upon Gods Domi∣nion, and the first right of Soveraignty, then al sins must have equal punishments, because they are all equal violations of the fundamental right of obedience; then it were at liberty for God to punish a greater sin, with a less punishment; and a lesser sin, with a greater: And lastly, this would make the punishment of sin, a meer Arbitrary thing in God; for there would be no reason of punishment, but what depended upon Gods meer will; whereas the reason of punishment in Scripture is drawn from a repugnancy of sin to the divine purity and holy∣ness, * 1.65 and not meerly from Gods power or will to punish; but if that were all the reason of it, there would be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing for the most vitious person to be re∣warded, and the most pious to be made everlastingly miserable. But who ever yet durst say or think so? From whence it ap∣pears that the relation between sin and punishment is no result of Gods arbitrary will; but it is founded in the nature of the things, so that as it is just for God to punish offenders, so it would be unjust to punish the most innocent person without any respect to sin. But if the right of punishment depends * 1.66 meerly on Gods Dominion, I cannot understand why God may not punish when, and whom, and in what manner he pleaseth; without any impeachment of his Justice, and therefore it is to be wonder'd at, that the same persons who assert the

right of punishment to be meerly in Gods dominion, should * 1.67 yet cry out of the injustice of one person being punished for anothers faults; for why may not God exercise his dominion in this case? yes, say they, he may his dominion, but he can∣not punish, because punishment supposes guilt, and cannot be just without it; how far that reaches, will be examined after∣wards; at present, we take notice of the contradiction to them∣selves which our Adversaries are guilty of, that they may serve their own hypothesis, for when we dispute with them, against absolute remission without satisfaction, then they contend that the right of punishment is a meer act of dominion, and God may * 1.68 part with his right, if he please; but when they dispute with us against the translation of punishment from one to another, then they no longer say that the right of punishment is an act of dominion, but that it is a necessary consequent of inherent guilt, and cannot be removed from one to another. And then they utterly deny that punishment is of the nature of debts; for one mans money, they say, may become anothers, but one * 1.69 mans punishment cannot become anothers: Thus they give and take, deny and grant, as it serves for their present purposes.

2. The different end of debts and punishments, make it appear * 1.70 * 1.71 that there is a difference in the nature of them; for the intention of the obligation to payment in case of debt, is the compensa∣tion of the damage which the Creditor sustains; but the in∣tention of punishment, is not bare compensation, but it is de∣signed for greater and further ends. For which we are to consider the different nature of punishments, as they are in∣flicted by way of reparation of some injury done to private per∣sons, and as they do respect the publick good. I grant, that private persons in case of injuries, seek for compensation of the damage they sustain, and so far they bear the nature of * 1.72 debts; but if we consider them as inflicted by those who have a care of the publick, though they are to see that no private persons suffers injury by another; yet the reason of that is not meerly that he might enjoy his own, but because the doing injuries to others tends to the subversion of the ends of Go∣vernment. Therefore, I can by no means admit that Posi∣tion of Crellius, that a Magistrate only punishes as he assumes the person of the particular mon who have received injuries from * 1.73 other; for he aims at other ends than meerly the compensa∣tion of those injured persons. Their great end is according to * 1.74 the old Roman Formula, nè quid Resp. detrimenti capiat: the reason of exacting penalties upon private men is still with a re∣gard to the publick safety. Supposing men in a state of nature no punishment is due to the injured person, but restitution of da∣mage,

and compensation of the loss that accrues to him by the * 1.75 injury sustained; and whatever goes beyond this, is the effect of Government, which constitutes penalties for preservation of the Society which is under Laws. But herein Crellius is our adversary, but with no advantage at all to his Cause; for he offers to prove against Grotius, that something more is due by an injury beyond bare compensation for what the other is suppo∣sed to lose by the right of nature; for saith he, in every injury there is not only the reall damage which the person sustains, but there is a contempt of the person implyed in it, for which as well as the former, he ought to have compensation. To which I an∣swer, * 1.76 1. That this doth not prove what he designs, viz. that pu∣nishment doth belong to the injured person in a state of Nature, beyond bare restitution, but that it is necessary, that men should not continue in such a state, that so they may be vindicated from that contempt, and others compelled to restitution. Both which, as they are punishments, are not in the power of the offended party as such, but shew that it is very reasonable there should be Laws and Governours, that private persons may be preserved in their just rights, and offenders punished for the vin∣dication not only of their honour, but of the Laws too. And * 1.77 Laws being established, the injured person hath right to no more, than the compensation of his loss; for that being forced upon the offending party, is a sufficient vindication of his ho∣nour. 2. If the contempt of a private person makes a compen∣sation necessary, how much more will this hold in a publick Magistrate; whose contempt by disobedience is of far worse consequence than that of a private person. And by this argu∣ment Crellius overthrows his main hypothesis, viz. that God may pardon sin without satisfaction; for if it be not only necessary, that the loss be compensated but the dishonour too; then so much * 1.78 greater as the dishonour is; so much higher as the person is; so much more beneficial to the world as his Laws are; so much more necessary is it that in order to pardon there must be a sa∣tisfaction made to him, for the affronts he hath received from men. And if the greatness of the injury be to be measured as Crellius asserts, from the worth and value of the thing, from * 1.79 the dignity and honour of the person, from the displicency of the fact to him, which he makes the measure of punishment; this makes it still far more reasonable, that God should have satisfa∣ction for the sins of men, than that men should have for the inju∣ries * 1.80 done them by one another; especially considering what the same Author doth assert afterwards, that it is sometime repugnant to justice, for one to part with his own right in case of injuries, & * 1.81 that either from the nature and circumstances of the things them∣selves,

or a decree or determination to the contrary, for the first * 1.82 he instanceth in case of not orious defamation; in which he saith, it is a dishonest and unlawful thing for a man, not to make use of his own right for his vindication, and for the other, in case of great obstinacy and malice. By both which, it is most apparent, that Crellius puts a mighty difference between the nature of debts, and punishments, since in all cases he allows it lawful for a person free, to remit his debts; but in some cases he makes it utterly unlawful for a person not to make use of his right for pu∣nishment. And withal if a private person may not part with his own right in such cases, how unreasonable is it not to assert the * 1.83 same of the great Governour of the world? and that there may be a necessity for him upon supposition of the contempt of him∣self and his Laws, to vindicate himself and his honour to the world, by some remarkable testimony of his severity against sin.

But Crellius yet urgeth another end of punishment which * 1.84 though the most unreasonable of all others, yet sufficiently proves from himself the difference of debts and punishments, which is, the delight which the injured person takes in seeing the offender punished. This he so much insists upon, as though he made it the most natural end of punishment, for saith he, among * 1.85 the Punishments which a Prince or any other free Person can in∣flict, revenge is in the first place, and the more there is of that in any thing, the more properly it is called a punishment; and he tells what he means by this ultio; viz. solatium ex alieno do∣lore, the contentment taken in anothers pain. But saith he, no * 1.86 man must object, that this is a thing evil in it self; for although it be forbidden us under the New Testament, yet in it self it is not unlawful for one that hath suffered pain from another to seek for the case of his own pain, by the miseries of him that injured him: and for this purpose, saith he, we have the Passion of * 1.87 Anger in us, which being a desire of returning injuries, is then satisfied when it apprehends it done. But how absurd and un∣reasonable this doctrine is, will be easily discovered, for this would make the primary intendment of punishment to be the evil of him that suffers it. Whereas the right of punishment is derived from an injury received, and therefore that which gives that right, is some damage sustained, the reparation of which is the first thing designed by the offended party: Though it take not up the whole nature of punishment. And on this account no man can justly propose any end to himself in anothers evil, but * 1.88 what comes under the notion of restitution. For the evil of ano∣ther is only intended in punishment as it respects the good of him for whose sake that evil is undergone. When that good may be obtained without anothers evil, the desire of it is unjust

and unreasonable: and therefore all that contentment that any * 1.89 one takes in the evil another undergoes, as it is evil to him, is a thing repugnant to humane nature, and which all persons con∣demn in others when they allow themselves in it. It will be hard for Crellius to make any difference between this end of pu∣nishment which he assigns, and the greatest cruelty; for what can that be worse than taking delight in making others misera∣ble, and seeing them so when he hath made them. If it be re∣plyed, that cruelty is without any cause, but here a just cause is supposed, I answer, a just cause is only supposed for the punish∣ment, but there can be no just cause for any to delight in the mi∣series * 1.90 of others, and to comfort themselves by inflicting or be∣holding them. For the evil of another is never intended, but when it is the only means left for compensation; and he must be guilty of great inhumanity, who desires anothers evil any further than that tends to his own good, i. e. the repa∣ration of the damage sustained; which if it may be had with∣out anothers evil, then that comes not by the right of na∣ture within the reason of punishment; and consequently where it doth not serve for that end, the comfort that men take in it is no part of justice, but cruelty. For there can be no * 1.91 reason at all assigned for it; for that lenimentum doloris which Crellius insists on is meerly imaginary, and no other than the Dog hath in gnawing the stone that is thrown at him; and for all that I know, that propension in nature to the retribution of evil for evil any further than it tends to our security, and the preservation for the future, is one of the most unreasonable Passions in humane Nature.

And if we examine the nature of Anger either conside∣red * 1.92 Naturally or Morally, the intention of it is not the re∣turning evil to another, for the evil received, but the secu∣rity * 1.93 and preservation of our selves, which we should not have so great a care of, unless we had a quick sense of inju∣ries, and our blood were apt to be heated at the apprehen∣sion of them. But when this passion vents it self, in doing others injury to alleviate its own grief, it is a violent and unreasonable perturbation; but being governed by reason, it aims at no more, than the great end of our beings; viz. Self-Preservation. But when that cannot be obtained with∣out anothers evil, so far the intendment of it is lawful, but no further. And I cannot therefore think those Philoso∣phers, * 1.94 who have defined Anger to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by whose Authority Crellius defends himself, when he makes * 1.95 anger to be a desi••e of revenge, did throughly consider what was just and reasonable in it, but barely what was natural,

and would be the effect of that passion, if not governed by * 1.96 reason. For otherwise Iul. Scaligers definition is much more true and justifiable, that it is appetitus depulsionis; viz. that whereby we are stirred up to drive away from us, any * 1.97 thing that is injurious to us. But because Crellius alledgeth a saying of Seneca, that would make vindicta of the nature of punishment, duabus de causis punire princeps solet, si aut se vindicet aut alium: We shall oppòse to this the sense of * 1.98 the same Author in this matter, which may sufficiently clear the other passage: For, saith he, Inhumanum verbum est, * 1.99 & quidem pro justo receptum, ultio, & a contumelia non * 1.100 differt nisi ordine: qui dolorem regerit, tantum excusati∣us peccat. And no man speaks with greater vehemency against the delight in others punishments than he doth; for he always asserts, the only reason of punishment, to be some advantage which is to come by it, and not meerly to satisfie anger, or to allay their own griefs, by seeing anothers: For, saith he, the punishment is inflicted, Non quia delectetur ul∣lius * 1.101 poena (proculest enim à sapiente tam inhumana feritas) sed ut documentum omnium sint: So that it is only the use∣fulness of punishment according to him, which makes it be∣come * 1.102 any wiseman; and so far from a satisfaction of his grief by anothers punishment, that he makes that a piece of inhu∣manity, not incident to any who pretend to wisdom. Nay, he denies, that a just punishment doth flow from Anger; for he that inflicts that, doth it, non ipsius poenae avidus sed quia oportet, not as desiring the punishment, but because * 1.103 there are great reasons for it: And elsewhere, Exsequar quia oportet, non quia dolet: he is far enough then from * 1.104 approving, that imaginary compensation of one mans grief by anothers. And he shews at large, that the weakest natures, * 1.105 and the least guided by reason, are the most subject to this an∣ger and revenge. And although other things be pretended, the general cause of it is, a great infirmity of humane na∣ture; and thence it is, that children and old men, and sick persons, are the most subject to it; and the better any are, the more they are freed from it:

—quippe minuti Semper & infirmi est animi, exiguique voluptas Ultio— * 1.106

He makes Cruelty to be nothing else, but the intemperance * 1.107 of the mind in exacting punishment; and the difference be∣tween a Prince and a Tyrant to lye in this, That one delights * 1.108 in punishing, the other never does it but in case of necessity,

when the publick good requires it. And this throughout his * 1.109 discourse, he makes the measure of punishment; who then could imagine, that he should speak so contradictory to himself, as to allow punishment for meer revenge, or the easing ones own griefs, by the pains of another? In the places cited by Crellius, (if taken in his sense) he speaks what commonly is, not what ought to be in the world; for he disputes against it in that very place, therefore that can∣not be the meaning which he contends for. The common de∣sign of punishments by a Prince, saith he, is either to vindi∣cate himself or others. I so render his words, because vin∣dicare, * 1.110 when it is joyned with the person injured, as here, vindicare se aut alium, doth properly relate to the end of pu∣nishment, which is asserting the right of the injured person; but when it is joyned with the persons who have done the in∣jury, or the crimes whereby they did it, then it properly sig∣nifies to punish. Thus Salust useth, Vindicatum in eos; and Cicero, In milites nostros vehementer vindicatum, and * 1.111 for the fact very frequently in him, maleficia vindicare: but when it relates to the injured person, as here it doth, it can∣not signifie meerly to punish; for then se vindicare would * 1.112 be to punish ones self, but to assert his own right in case of injury, though it be with the punishment of another: For Vindicatio, as Cicero defines it, est per quam vis & injuria & omnino quod obsuturum est defendendo aut ulciscendo * 1.113 propulsatur. So that the security of our selves in case of force or injury, is that which is called Vindication; which some∣times may be done by defence, and other times by punishment. And that Seneca doth mean no more here, is apparent by what follows; for in case of private injuries, he saith, poe∣nam si tutò poterit donet, he would have the Prince forgive * 1.114 the punishment, if it may be done with safety; so that he would not have any one punished, to satisfie anothers desire of revenge, but to preserve his own safety: And afterwards he saith, It is much beneath a Princes condition, to need * 1.115 that satisfaction which arises from anothers sufferings: But for the punishments of others, he saith, The Law hath esta∣blished three ends, the amendment of the persons, or making others better by their punishments, or the publick security, by taking away such evil members out of the body: So that in publick punishments, he never so much as supposes, that con∣tentment * 1.116 which revenge fancies in others punishments, but makes them wholly designed for the publick advantage. For the Laws in punishment do not look backward but forward; for as * 1.117 Plato saith, No wise man ever punished, meerly because men

had offended, but lest they should: For past things cannot * 1.118 be rec••••ed, but future are, therefore forbidden, that they may be prevented. So to the same purpose is the saying of Lactantius, produced by Grotius, Surgimus ad vindictam * 1.119 non quia laest sumus, sed ut disciplina servetur, mores cor∣rigantur, licentia comprimatur: haec est Ira justa. To which Crellius answers, That this signifies nothing, unless it can be proved, that no man may justly punish another, meer∣ly * 1.120 because he is wronged. If he means of the right to punish, we deny not that to be, because the person is wronged; but if he understands it of the design and end of punishment, * 1.121 then we deny, that it is an allowable end of punishments, any further than it can come under the notion of restitution, of which we have spoken already. When a Master (which is the instance he produceth) punisheth his servants, because they have disobeyed him: The reason of that punishment, is not the bare disobedience, but the injury which comes to him by it; the reparation of which he seeks by punishment, ei∣ther as to his authority, security or profit. But he adds, That where punishment is designed, for preservation of disci∣pline, and amendment of manners, and keeping persons in * 1.122 order, (which are the ends mentioned by Lactantius) it is where the interest of the person lies, in the preservation of thes••, and is thefore offended at the neglect of them. To which I answer, That the interest of such a one, is not bare∣ly the interest of an offended party, as such, but the interest of a Governor; and no body denies, but such a one may be an offended party: but the question is, Whether the design of punishment be meerly to satisfie him as the offended par∣ty, or to answer the ends of Government? For Crellius hath already told us, what it is to satisfie one as an offended party, * 1.123 that is, to ease himself by the punishment of others; but what ever is designed for the great ends of Government, is not to be considered under that notion, although the Go∣vernor may be justly offended at the neglect of them. And there is this considerable difference between the punishment made to an offended party, as such, and that which is for the ends of Government, that the former is a satisfaction to An∣ger, and the latter to Laws and the publick interest. For Crellius disputes much for the right of Anger in exacting pu∣nishments; the satisfaction of which, in case of real inju∣ry, * 1.124 * 1.125 he never makes unlawful, but in case that it be prohibited us by one, whose power is above our own: nay he makes it otherwise the primary end of punishment. So that anger is the main thing upon these terms to be respected in punish∣ment:

but where it is designed for the ends before mention∣ed, * 1.126 there is no necessity of any such passion as anger to be satisfied, the ends of punishment may be attained wholly without it: And publick punishment, according to Seneca, * 1.127 non ira sed ratio est, is no effect of anger, but reason; for, saith he, nihil minus quam irasci punientem decet: nothing less becomes one that punisheth, than anger doth; for all punishments being considered as Medicines, no man ought to give Physick in anger, or to let himself blood in a sury: A Magistate, saith he, when he goes to punish, ought to ap∣pear * 1.128 only vultu legis quae non irascitur, sed constituit, with * 1.129 the continuance of the Law, which appoints punishments without passion: The reason of which is, because the Law aims not primarily at the evil of the man that suffers punish∣ment, but at the good which comes to the publick by such sufferings. For the first design of the Law was to prevent any evil being done, and punishment coming in by way of Sancti∣on to the force of the Law, must have the same primary end which the Law it self had; which is not to satisfie barely the offended party for the breach, any further than that satisfaction tends to the security of the Law, and pre∣venting * 1.130 the violation of it for the future. The substance of what I have said upon this subject, may be thus briefly com∣prized, That antecedently to Laws, the offended party hath right to no more than bare reparation of the damage sustain∣ed by the injury; that the proper notion of punishment is consequent to Laws, and the inflicting of it is an act of Go∣vernment, which is not designed for meer satisfaction of the anger of the injured person, but for the publick good, which lies in preserving the authority of the Laws, the preventing all injuries by the security of mens just rights, and the vin∣dication * 1.131 of the dignity and honor of him, who is to take * 1.132 care of the publick good. For these Crellius himself acknow∣ledgeth, to be the just ends of punishments, only he would have the satisfaction a man takes in anothers evil, to come in the first place; wherein how much he is mistaken, I hope we have already manifested. Because the proper nature of pu∣nishment depending upon Laws, the Laws do not primarily design the benefit of private persons (supposing that were so) but the advantage of that community which they are made for. * 1.133

And in those cases wherein the Magistrate doth right to * 1.134 particular persons in the punishment of those who have inju∣red them, he doth it not as taking their person upon him, for he aims at other things than they do; they look at a bare

compensation for the injury received; but the Magistrate at * 1.135 the ill consequence the impunity of injuries may be of to the publick: they, it may be at the satisfaction of their disolea∣sure; but he at the satisfaction of the Laws; they at their own private damage; he at the violation of the publick peace. And from hence among those Nations who valued all crimes at a certain rate, in matters of injury between man and man, the injured person was not only to receive compensation for his wrong; but a considerable fine was to be paid to the Exche∣quer for the violation of the publick peace. This Taci∣tus * 1.136 observes among the old Germans, Grotius of the old Go∣thick * 1.137 Laws, and from them (as most of our modern Laws and Customs are derived) Lindenbrogius of the Salick, Aleman∣nick, Lombardick, Spelman of the Saxon, who tells us in case of murder there were three payments, one to the Kin∣dred, which was called Megbote; the second to the Lord, cal∣led Manbote, the third to the King, called Freda from the Ger∣man Frid, which signifies peace, it being the consideration paid to the King for the breach of the publick peace. And this, saith he, in all actions, was anciently paid to the King, because the peace was supposed to be broken, not by meer force, * 1.138 but by any injuries; and if the action was unjust, the Plain tiffe paid it; if just, the defendant. And the measure of it, saith Bignonius, was the tenth part of the value of the thing * 1.139 as estimated by Law; which by the Customs of the ancient Romans was deposited at the commencing of a suit by both, and only taken up again by him who overcame; and was by them called Sacramentum, as Varro tells us. And the same * 1.140 custom was observed among the Greeks too, as appears by Iulius Pollux, who tells us it was called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 among * 1.141 them, and in publick actions was the fifth part, in private * 1.142 the tenth. But that which was paid to the publick in case of murder, was among the Greeks called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the same with poena, for Hesychius tells us that is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and to the same purpose the Scholiast on Homer on those words, Iliad. 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by which the Original of the name poena, comes from a payment made to the publick, according to that known rule, interest reip. delicta puniri, that persons may see how much the publick safety is concern∣ed, that crimes be punished. From which and many other things which might be insisted on, Crellius his Hypothesis will * 1.143 appear to be false, viz. that when the Magistrate doth judge in the affairs of particular men, he doth it only as assuming the person of those men; whereas it appears from the reason of the thing, and the Custom of Nations, that the interest of the

Magistrate is considered as distinct from that of private persons, * 1.144 when he doth most appear in vindication of injuries. But all this is managed with a respect to the grand hypothesis, viz that the right of punishing doth belong only to the offended party as such, that the punishment is of the nature of debts, and the satisfaction by compensation to the anger of him who is offended. The falsity of which this discourse was design∣ed to discover.

Having thus considered the nature of punishments among men, we come more closely to our matter, by examining how far this will hold in the punishments which God inflicts on the * 1.145 account of sin. For which two things must be enquired into, 1. In what sense we attribute anger to God. 2. What are the great ends of those punishments God inflicts on men on the account of sin.

For the first, though our Adversaries are very unwilling to * 1.146 allow the term of punitive justice, yet they contend for a pu∣nitive anger in God, and that in the worst sense as it is appe∣titus vindictae: for after Crellius hath contended that this is the proper notion of anger in general; neither ought any one to say, he adds, that anger as other passions is attributed im∣properly * 1.147 to God; for setting aside the imperfections, which those passions are subject to in us, all the rest is to be attribu∣ted to him; taking away then that perturbation, and pain, and grief we find in our selves in anger, to which the abhor∣rency of sin answers in God, all the rest doth agree to him. I would he had a little more plainly told us what he means by all the rest, but we are to ghess at his meaning by what went before, where he allows of Cicero, and Aristotles definition of Anger, whereof the one is, that it is libido, or (as Crel∣lius * 1.148 would rather have it,) cupiditas puniendi, the other * 1.149 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. and himself calls it poenae appetitio, and in another place, that it may be as properly defined cupi∣ditas vindictae as cupiditas poenae, or affectus vindicandi, as well as puniendi: in all which places, he doth assert such an * 1.150 anger in God as supposes such a motion, or desire, or inclina∣tion to punish sin when it is committed, as there is in us when an injury is done us, only the perturbation and pain excluded. But he hath not thought fit to explain how such new motions or inclinations in the divine nature every time sin is commit∣ed, are consistent with the immutability and perfection of it; * 1.151 nor what such a kind of desire to punish in God imports, whe∣ther a meer inclination without the effect, or an inclination with the effect following: if without the effect, then ei∣ther because the sin was not great enough, or Gods honour

was not concerned to do it, and in this case the same reasons * 1.152 which make the effect not to follow, make the desire of it in∣consistent with the divine wisdom and perfection: or else be∣cause the effect is hindred by the repentance of the person, or some other way which may make it not necessary to do it; then upon the same reason the effect is suspended, the inclination to do it should be so too; for that must be supposed to be go∣verned by an eternal reason and counsel as well as his actions; unless some natural passions in God be supposed antecedent to his own wisdom and counsel, which is derogatory to the in∣finite perfection of God, since those are judged imperfections in our selves: If it be taken only with the effect following it, * 1.153 then God can never be said to be angry but when he doth pu∣nish, whereas his wrath is said to be kindled in Scripture, where the effect hath not followed; which if it implies any more than the high provocation of God to punish (as I suppose it doth not) then this inclination to punish is to be conceived distinct from the effect following it. But that conception of anger in God seems most agreeable to the divine nature, as well as to the Scriptures, which makes it either the punishment it self, as Crellius elsewhere acknowledges it is often taken so; or * 1.154 * 1.155 Gods declaration of his will to punish, which is called the re∣velation of the wrath of God against all unrighteousness of men, God thereby discovering the just displeasure he hath against sin; or the great provocation of God to punish, by the sins of men; as when his wrath is said, to be kindled, &c. By this sense we may easily reconcile all that the Scripture saith concerning the wrath of God; we make it agreeable to infinite perfection, we make no such alterations in God, as the appeasing of his anger must imply, if that imply any kind of commotion in him. And thus the grand difficulty of Crellius * 1.156 * 1.157 appears to be none at all, against all those passages of Scri∣pture which speak of appeasing God, of attonement, and recon∣ciliation, viz. that if they prove satisfaction, they must prove that God being actually angry with mankind before the suf∣ferings of his Son, he must be presently appeased upon his un∣dergoing them. For no more need to be said, than that God being justly provoked to punish the sins of mankind, was plea∣sed to accept of the sufferings of his Son, as a sufficient sacri∣fice of Attonement for the sins of the world, on considerati∣on of which he was pleased to offer those terms of pardon, * 1.158 which upon mens performance of the conditions required on their part, shall be sufficient to discharge them from that ob∣ligation to punishment which they were under by their sins. And what absurdity, or incongruity there is in this to any prin∣ciple

of reason, I cannot imagine. But our Adversaries first * 1.159 make opinions for us, and then shew they are unreasonable. They first suppose that anger in God is to be considered as a passion, and that passion a desire of revenge for satisfaction of it; and then tell us, that if we do not prove, that this desire of revenge can be satisfied by the sufferings of Christ, then we can never prove the doctrine of satisfaction to be true; whereas we do not mean by Gods anger any such passion, but the just declaration of Gods will to punish upon our pro∣vocation of him by our sins; we do not make the design of satisfaction to be, that God may please himself in the reven∣ging * 1.160 the sins of the guilty upon the most innocent person; be∣cause we make the design of punishment, not to be the satisfacti∣on of anger as a desire of revenge, but to be the vindication of the honour and rights of the injured person, by such a way as himself shall judge most satisfactory to the ends of his Go∣vernment.

2. Which is the next thing we are to clear: For which * 1.161 end we shall make use of the Concession of Crellius, That God hath prefixed some ends to himself in the Government of man∣kind; which being supposed, it is necessary, that impenitent * 1.162 sinners should be punished. What these ends of God are, he before tells us, when he enquires into the ends of Divine pu∣nishments, which he makes to be, security for the future, by mens avoiding sins, and a kind of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or pleasure which * 1.163 God takes in the destruction of his implacable enemies, and the asserting and vindicating his own right by punishing, and shewing men thereby, with what care and fear they ought to serve him; and so attains the ends of punishment proposed by Lactantius, and manifestation of the Divine Honor and Ma∣jesty, which hath been violated by the sins of men. All these * 1.164 we accept of, with this caution, That the delight which God takes in the punishing his implacable enemies, be not under∣stood of any pleasure in their misery, as such, by way of meer revenge; but as it tends to the vindication of his Right, and Honor, and Majesty; which is an end suitable to the Di∣vine Nature: but the other cannot in it self; have the notion of an end; for an end doth suppose something desirable for it self; which surely the miseries of others cannot have to us, much less to the Divine Nature. And that place which Crel∣lius insists on to prove the contrary, Deut. 28. 63. The Lord * 1.165 will rejoyce over you, to destroy you; imports no more, than the satisfaction God takes in the execution of his Justice, when it makes most for his honour, as certainly it doth in the pu∣nishment of his greatest enemies. And this is to be understood

in a sense agreeable to those other places, where God is said * 1.166 not to delight in the death of sinners; which doth not (as * 1.167 Crellius would have it) meerly express Gods benignity and mercy, but such an agreeableness of the exercise of those at∣tributes to Gods nature, that he neither doth nor can delight in the miseries of his creatures in themselves, but as they are subservient to the ends of his Government; and yet such is his kindness in that respect too, that he useth all means agreeable thereto, to make them avoid being miserable, to advance his own glory. And I cannot but wonder that Grotius, who * 1.168 had asserted the contrary in his book of Satisfaction, should in his books De Iure belli ac pacis, assert, That when God pu∣nisheth * 1.169 wicked men, he doth it for no other end, but that he might punish them: For which he makes use of no other ar∣guments, than those which Crellius had objecte•• ••gainst him; viz. The delight God takes in punishing, and t•…•… judgements of the life to come, when no amendment can be expected; the former hath been already answered, the latter is objected by Crellius against him, when he makes the ends of punishment, meerly to respect the community, which cannot be asserted of the punishments of another life, which must chiefly respect * 1.170 the vindication of Gods glory, in the punishment of unreclaima∣ble sinners. And this we do not deny to be a just punishment, since our Adversaries themselves, as well as we, make it ne∣cessary. But we are not to understand, that the end of Di∣vine punishments doth so respect the community, as though God himself were to be excluded out of it; for we are so to understand it, as made up of God as the Governor, and man∣kind as the persons governed, whatever then tends to the vin∣dication of the rights of Gods Honor and Soveraignty, tends to the good of the whole, because the manifestation of that * 1.171 end is so great an end of the whole.

But withal, though we assert in the life to come, the ends of * 1.172 punishment not to be the reclaiming of sinners, who had never undergone them, unless they had been unreclaimable; yet a vast difference must be made between the ends of punishments in that, and in this present state. For the other is the Reserve, when nothing else will do, and therefore was not primarily in∣tended; but the proper ends of punishment, as a part of Go∣vernment, are to be taken from the design of them in this life. And here we assert, that Gods end in punishing, is the ad∣vancing * 1.173 his honor, not by the meer miseries of his creatures, but that men by beholding his severity against sin, should break off the practice of it, that they may escape the punish∣ments of the future state. So that the ends of punishment here,

are quite of another kind, from those of another life; for * 1.174 those are inflicted, because persons have been unreclaimable by either the mercies or punishments of this life; but these are intended, that men should so far take notice of this seve∣rity of God, as to avoid the sins which will expose them to the wrath to come. And from hence it follows, That what∣soever sufferings, do answer all these ends of Divine punish∣ments, and are inflicted on the account of sin, have the pro∣per notion of punishments in them, and God may accept of the undergoing them as a full satisfaction to his Law, if they be such as tend to break men off from sin, and assert Gods * 1.175 right, and vindicate his honor to the world; which are the ends assigned by Crellius, and will be of great consequence to us in the following Discourse. * 1.176 * 1.177 * 1.178

Notes

• * 1.1

  B
• * 1.2

  C
• * 1.3

  D
• * 1.4

  §. 1. The introdu∣ction, con∣cerning the Socinian, way of interpre∣ting Scri∣pture.
• * 1.5

  E
• * 1.6

  A
• * 1.7

  B
• * 1.8

  C
• * 1.9

  D
• * 1.10

  E
• * 1.11

  A
• * 1.12

  John 1. 3, 10.
• * 1.13

  B
• * 1.14

  C
• * 1.15

  D
• * 1.16

  E
• * 1.17

  A
• * 1.18

  B
• * 1.19

  C
• * 1.20

  D
• * 1.21

  E
• * 1.22

  A
• * 1.23

  B
• * 1.24

  Socia. de Ser∣vat. Part. 2. Cap. 4. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.25

  C
• * 1.26

  D
• * 1.27

  E
• * 1.28

  §. 2. The state of the Contro∣versie in gene∣ral.
• * 1.29

  B
• * 1.30

  C
• * 1.31

  D
• * 1.32

  E
• * 1.33

  A
• * 1.34

  B
• * 1.35

  C
• * 1.36

  D
• * 1.37

  E
• * 1.38

  A
• * 1.39

  B
• * 1.40

  C
• * 1.41

  §. 3. Of the diffe∣rence of debts and punish∣ments.
• * 1.42

  D
• * 1.43

  E
• * 1.44

  A
• * 1.45

  No•• re••••pi••••n∣tib••s ••••mam ro•• conc••de••e, id d••m••m natu∣rae divinae, & decretis ejus & propterea rellitudi••i & aeq••itati debi∣tu•• est ac con∣••e••ta••e••m. So∣cin. de Servat. l. 1. c. 1. No•• resipis••ea∣tes ••oe••â non lio rare tum p••r se aequitati est admodum con∣s••nta••eum, & positis quibus∣da•• fi••ibus quos D••us sibi in re••••••dis ho∣minibus pr••∣sixit ••••••lo ne∣cessari••m. Crell. c. Grot. c. 2. sect. 29.
• * 1.46

  B
• * 1.47

  C
• * 1.48

  D
• * 1.49

  §. 4. The reason of humame pu∣nishment is the publick interest.
• * 1.50

  E
• * 1.51

  A
• * 1.52

  B
• * 1.53

  C
• * 1.54

  D
• * 1.55

  E
• * 1.56

  B
• * 1.57

  §. 5. The right of Divine pu∣nishment not meer Domi∣nion. Crell. Respons. ad Grot. cap. 2. sect. 1. &c.
• * 1.58

  C
• * 1.59

  p. 144.
• * 1.60

  D
• * 1.61

  E
• * 1.62

  A
• * 1.63

  B
• * 1.64

  C
• * 1.65

  D
• * 1.66

  E
• * 1.67

  A
• * 1.68

  B
• * 1.69

  Soc. de Servat. l. 3. c. 3. Prae∣••ect. c 18.
• * 1.70

  §. 6. 2. The end of punishments not bare com∣pensation as it is in debts. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.71

  C
• * 1.72

  D
• * 1.73

  Crell. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. G••ot. cap. 2. Sect. 2. p. 14••. Sect. 17. p. 162.
• * 1.74

  E
• * 1.75

  A
• * 1.76

  B
• * 1.77

  C
• * 1.78

  D
• * 1.79

  Crell. c. Grot. cap. 2. p. 174.
• * 1.80

  E
• * 1.81

  Sect. 29. p. 198.
• * 1.82

  A
• * 1.83

  B
• * 1.84

  §. 7. Of Crelli••s his great mistake about the end of punish∣ments. Crell. cap. 2. sect. 2 sect. 28.
• * 1.85

  C
• * 1.86

  P. 191.
• * 1.87

  D
• * 1.88

  E
• * 1.89

  A
• * 1.90

  B
• * 1.91

  C
• * 1.92

  §. 8. Of the nature of ang•••• and revenge in m••n, and whe∣ther punish∣ments are de∣signed to sa∣tisfie them.
• * 1.93

  D
• * 1.94

  E
• * 1.95

  Crell. c 2. sect. 22. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 177.
• * 1.96

  A
• * 1.97

  Exert. 313.
• * 1.98

  Seneca de Clem. l. 1. c. 20.
• * 1.99

  De Irâ. l. 2. c. 32.
• * 1.100

  B
• * 1.101

  De I••á l. 1. c. 6.
• * 1.102

  C
• * 1.103

  De Irâ. l. 1. c. 9. Cap. 12.
• * 1.104

  Cap. 13.
• * 1.105

  D
• * 1.106

  E
• * 1.107

  De Clem. l. 2. c. 4.
• * 1.108

  De Clem. l. 1. c. 11, 12.
• * 1.109

  A
• * 1.110

  B
• * 1.111

  Salust. in Cata∣lin. Cicero 7. v.
• * 1.112

  C
• * 1.113

  Cicero de Ia∣veat. 2.
• * 1.114

  D
• * 1.115

  De Irâ. l 1. c. 21.
• * 1.116

  E
• * 1.117

  Non praeteri∣ta sed futura intuebitur; nam ut Plato ait, remo pr••∣de••s punit quia pe••catum est, sed ne pec ••••••r. Sen. de Irâ. l. 1. c. 16.
• * 1.118

  A
• * 1.119

  Lact. de ira Dei. c. 17.
• * 1.120

  Cap. 2. sect. 13.
• * 1.121

  B
• * 1.122

  C
• * 1.123

  D
• * 1.124

  E
• * 1.125

  Cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 143. Sect. 13. p. 161.
• * 1.126

  A
• * 1.127

  Se••. de ••••a, l. 1. c. 14. & 15.
• * 1.128

  Cap. 16.
• * 1.129

  B
• * 1.130

  C
• * 1.131

  D
• * 1.132

  Quibus (sc. solatio & secu∣ritati) addi poss••nt honoris ac dign tatis, per iajuriam violatae, & ali∣quâ ratione im∣mi••••tae vi••di∣ciae, ass••••tioque juris nostri Crel. cap. 2. sect. 28. p. 191.
• * 1.133

  E
• * 1.134

  § 9. The Interest of the Magi∣strate in pu∣nishment di∣stinct from that of private persons.
• * 1.135

  A
• * 1.136

  D•••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ger∣man. c. 12. G•…•…. de. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. G••••h. i•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. a•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Go••h p. ••7. 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉 G•…•…. ad ••o••. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 A•…•…. F•…•… 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Gloss. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. F•…•…
• * 1.137

  B
• * 1.138

  C
• * 1.139

  Big••o••. not. i•• M•…•… •…•…m cap. 20.
• * 1.140

  ••••a ro. de. L. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. l••b. 4.
• * 1.141

  I•…•… Pollux. l 8.
• * 1.142

  D
• * 1.143

  E
• * 1.144

  A
• * 1.145

  B
• * 1.146

  §. 10. Of the nature of Anger in God; the sa∣tisfact on to be made to it. Crell. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 145. p. 177.
• * 1.147

  C
• * 1.148

  Cicer. T•…•…. 4. Arist. Rhet. l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.149

  D
• * 1.150

  Crell. c. 2. sect. 22 p. 177.
• * 1.151

  E
• * 1.152

  A
• * 1.153

  B
• * 1.154

  Crell. de verâ Relig. l. 1. c. 30.
• * 1.155

  C
• * 1.156

  Crell. cap. 7. sect. 3. p. 350.
• * 1.157

  D
• * 1.158

  E
• * 1.159

  A
• * 1.160

  B
• * 1.161

  §. 11. Of the ends of divine punish∣ments. Crell. c. 2 sect. 29. p. 129.
• * 1.162

  C
• * 1.163

  P. 195.
• * 1.164

  D
• * 1.165

  E
• * 1.166

  A
• * 1.167

  Ezek. 18. v. 23, 32. c. 33. 11.
• * 1.168

  Grot. de satis∣fact. c. 2. p. 43. Ed. 1617. Grot. de jure belli, &c. l. 2. c. 20. sect. 4.
• * 1.169

  B
• * 1.170

  C
• * 1.171

  D
• * 1.172

  §. 12. The ends of Divine pu∣nishments dif∣ferent in this and the future state.
• * 1.173

  E
• * 1.174

  A
• * 1.175

  B
• * 1.176

  C
• * 1.177

  D
• * 1.178

  E