bruitish stupidity, which if we will call peace the most insen∣sible parts of the creation do infinitely exceed us in it; but such a composure and settlement of our minds, which ariseth from a due consideration of things; and differs as much from the former temper as a vigorous and healthful state of body doth from the dull effects of a Lethargy. And such a peace as this no wicked man can ever have but upon one of these suppositions.
Either (1.) That Wickedness is but a meer name of dis∣grace set upon some kind of actions, but that really there is no such a thing as sin, or the differences of good and evil; or else,
(2.) Supposing there is such a thing as sin, it is ridiculous to believe there ever should be such a punishment of it as men are affrighted with;
(3.) Or Lastly, supposing there be a punishment of sin to come, it is madness to abstain from the present pleasures of sin for the fear of it. These being only the imaginable grounds a wick∣ed man can have any peace in his mind from; I shall parti∣cularly shew the falseness and the folly of them.
1. That there is no such thing as Sin or Wickedness in the world, and that the differences of good and evil are meerly ar∣bitrary things, and that those are names only imposed upon things by the more cunning sort of men to affright men from the doing some actions, and to encourage them to do others. But what a miserable case are those in, who can never enjoy any contentment in themselves unless all the differences of good and evil be utterly destroyed! We should conclude that mans condition desperate, who believes it impossible for him to have any ease in his mind, unless he could be transformed into the shape of a beast, or petrified into the hardness of a rock. These are things not utterly impossible, but yet they are possible in so remote a degree that it is all one to say, he can have no ease, as to say, that he expects it only upon those terms: But it is utterly inconsistent with the supposition of humane nature, or a being endued and acting with reason, to make all things equally good or evil. For what doth reason signifie as it re∣spects the actions of men, but a faculty of discerning what is good and fitting to be done, from what is evil and ought to be avoided? And to what purpose is such a faculty given us, if there be no such difference in the nature of things? Might not men with equal probability argue that there is no such thing as a difference in the things about which life and sense are con∣versant, as in those wherein reason is imploved? With what impatience would those men be heard who should assert that