Origines sacræ, or, A rational account of the grounds of Christian faith, as to the truth and divine authority of the Scriptures and the matters therein contained by Edward Stillingfleet ...

BOOK. III. (Book 3)

CHAP. I. Of the Being of God.

The Principles of all Religion lie in the Being of God and im∣mortality of the soul: from them the necessity of a particular Divine revelation rationally deduced; the method laid down for proving the Divine authority of the Scriptures. Why Moses doth not prove the Being of God, but suppose it. The notion of a Deity very consonant to reason. Of the nature of Idea's, and particularly of the Idea of God. How we can form an Idea of an infinite Being. How far such an Idea ar∣gues existence. The great unreasonableness of Atheism de∣monstrated. Of the Hypotheses of the Aristotelian and Epi∣curean Atheists. The Atheists pretences examined and re∣futed. Of the nature of the arguments whereby we prove there is a God. Of universal consent and the evidence of that to prove a Deity and immortality of souls. Of necessity of ex∣istence implyed in the notion of God, and how far that proves the Being of God. The order of the world and usefulness of the parts of it, and especially of mans body an argument of a Dei∣ty. Some higher principle proved to be in the world then mat∣ter and motion. The nature of the soul, and possibility of its subsisting after death. Strange appearances in nature not solvable by the power of imagination.

HAving in the precedent book largely given a ration∣al * 1.1 account of the grounds of our faith, as to the per∣sons whom God imployes to reveal his mind to the world; if we can now make it appear that those sacred records

which we embrace as Divinely inspired, contain in them no∣thing unworthy of so great a name, or unbecoming persons sent from God to deliver; there will be nothing wanting to justifie our Religion in point of reason to be true, and of reve∣lation to be Divine. For the Scriptures themselves coming to us in the name of God, we are bound to believe them to be such as they pretend to be, unless we have ground to question the general foundations of all religion as uncertain, or this particular way of religion as not suitable to those general foundations. The foundations of all religion lie in two things; that there is a God who rules the world, and that the souls of men are capable of subsisting after death; for he that comes unto God, must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of * 1.2 them that seek him; so that if these things be not supposed as most agreeable to humane reason, we cannot imagine upon what grounds mankind should embrace any way of religion at all. For if there be not a God whom I am to serve and obey, and if I have not a soul of an immortal nature, there can be no sufficient obligation to religion, nor motive in∣ducing to it: For all obligation to obedience must suppose the existence of such a Being which hath power to command me; and by reason of the promis••uous scatterings of good and evil in this life, the motives engaging men to the practice of religion, must suppose the certainty of a future State. If these things be sure and the foundations of religion in general there∣by firmly established, it will presently follow as a matter most agreeable to reason, that the God whom we are to serve should himself prescribe the way of his own worship; and if the right of donation of that happiness which mens souls are capab••e of be alone in himself, that he alone should declare the termes on which it may be expected; For man being a creature endued with a free principle of acting, which he is conscious to himself of, and therefore not being carried to his end by necessity of nature or external violence, without the concurrence of his own reason and choice, we must suppose this happiness to depend upon the performance of some con∣ditions on mans part, whereby he may demonstrate that it is the matter of his free choice, and that he freely quits all other interests that he might obtain the enjoyment of it.

Which conditions to be performed being expressions of mans obedience towards God as his Creator and Governour, and of his gratitude for the tenders of so great a happiness which is the free gift of his Maker, we cannot suppose any one to have power to prescribe these conditions, but he that hath power likewise to deprive the soul of her happiness upon non∣performance, and that must be God himself. But in order to mans understanding his duty and his obligation to obedience, it is necessary that these conditions must not be locked up in the Cabinet Council of Heaven, but mu•••• be so far declared and revealed, that he may be fully acqua••ted with those terms which his happiness depends upon; else his neglect of them would be excusable, and his misery unavoidable. Had man indeed remained without offending his Maker, he might still have stood in his favour upon the general terms of obe∣dience due from the creature to his Creator, and to all such particular precepts which should bear the impress of his Makers will upon them, beside which, the whole volume of the Creation without, and his own reason within would have been sufficient directors to him in the performance of his duty. But he abusing his liberty, and being thereby guilty of A••ostacy from God (as is evident by a continued propen∣sity to sin, and the strangeness between God and the souls of men) a particular revelation is now become necessary, that mankind may thereby understand on what terms God will be pleased again, and by what means they may be restored into his favour. And lastly, it not agreeing with the free and communicative nature of Divine goodness (which was the first original of the worlds Creation) to suffer all mankind to perish in their own folly, we must suppose this way for mans recovery to be somewhere prescribed, and the revelation of it to be somewhere extant in the world. So that from the general principles of the existence of God and immortality of the soul, we have deduced by clear and evident reason the necessity of some particular Divine revelation, as the Standard and measure of religion. And according to these principles we must examine what ever pretends to be of D••vine revelation; for it must be suitable to that Divine na∣ture from whom it is supposed to come, and it must be agree∣able

to the conditions of the souls of men; and therefore that which carries with it the greatest evidence of Divine reve∣lation, is, a faithful representation of the State of the case between God and the souls of men, and a Divine discovery of those wayes whereby mens souls may be fitted for eternal happiness. A Divine revelation then must be faithful and true in all its narrations; it must be excellent and becoming God in all its discoveries. And therefore all that can with any reason be desired for proof of the Divine authority of the Scriptures will lie in these three things. First, That the foundations of religion are of undoubted certainty, or that there ie a God, and that mens souls are immortal. Secondly, That the Scriptures do most faithfully relate the matters of greatest antiquity therein contained (which do most concern the history of the breach between God and man.) Thirdly, That the Scriptures are the only authentick records of those Terms on which happiness may be expected in another world.

I begin with the first of them, which concerns the ex∣istence * 1.3 of God and immortality of the soul; both which seem to be supposed as general Prolepses in the writings of Moses, and as things so consonant to humane nature, that none to whom his writings should come could be supposed to question them. And therefore he spends no time in the operose proving of either of these, knowing to how little purpose his writings would be to such who denyed these first principles of all religion. But beside this there may be these accounts given, why these main foundations of all religion are no more insisted on in the first books of the Scripture which contain the originals of the world. First, Because these were in the time of the writing of them believed with an universal consent of mankind. In those more early dayes of the world, when the tradition of the first ages of it was more fresh and entire, it is scarce imaginable that men should question the Being of a God, when the history of the flood and the propagation of the world after it by the Sons of Noah, and the burning of Sodom and Gomorrab were so fresh in their memories, as having been done so few Generations before them. And by what remains of any history of other Nations in those elder times men were

so far from Atheism, that Polytheism and Idolatry were the common practice of the world, as is most evident in all relations of the antient Chaldeans, Aegyptians, Phaenicians, and other Nations, who all supposed these two principles, as well as those who served the true God. And in all pro∣bability as men are apt to run from one extream to another, Polytheism was the first occasion of Atheism, and Idolatry of irreligion. And thence we finde the first appearance of Atheists to be in the most blind and superstitious age of Greece, when the obscene Poets had so debauched the common understandings of the people, as to make them believe such things concerning their Gods which were so incongruous to humane nature, that all who had any sense of goodness left, could not but loath and abhor such Deities. And therefore we finde all the flouts and jears of the reputed Atheists among them, such as Dionysius, Diagoras, Theodorus, Eu∣hemerus, Messenius and others, were cast upon their venerable Deities, which they so solemnly worshipped: who had been before as Euhemerus plainly told them, poor mortal men, and those not of the best reputation neither: and therefore as the Epicurean in Tully well sayes, omnis eorum cultus esset * 1.4 in luctu, the most suitable devotion for them had been la∣menting their death. Now when these common Deities were so much derided by intelligent men, and yet the order of the world seemed to tell them there was really a God, though those were none; those who had Philosophical wits, such as Democritus and Epicurus, set themselves to work to see if they could solve the Phaenomena of nature without a Deity, and therefore asserted the origine of the universe to be only by a fortuitous concourse of infinite little particles; but herein they befooled themselves and their greedy followers, who were glad to be rid of those anxieties of mind which the thoughts of a Deity and an immortal soul did cause within them. And although Lucretius in a bravado tells us of his Máster, that when mens minds were sunk under the burden of religion,

Humana ante oculos faede cum vita jaceret * 1.5 In terris oppressa gravi sub religione: Primum Graius homo mortalis tollere contr•• Est oculos ausus, primusque obsistere contrà.

that Epicurus was the first true Gyant who durst encounter the Gods, and if we believe him, overthrew them in open field;

Quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim Obteritur, nos exaequat victoria caelo.

Yet Cotta in Tully reports the issue of this battel quite other∣wise; for although the greatest triumph in this victory had been only to become like the beasts that perish; yet if we believe Cotta, Epicurus was so far from gaining any of his beloved case and pleasure by his sentiments, that never was School-boy more afraid of a rod, nor did any enemy more dread a Conqueror, then Epicurus did the thoughts of a God and death. Nec quenquam vidi qui magis ea quae timenda esse negaret, timeret; mortem dico & Deos. So hard it is for * 1.6 an Epicurean even after he hath prostituted his conscience, to silence it; but (whatever there be in the air) there is an Elactical power in conscience that will bear its self up not∣withstanding the weight that is laid upon it. And yet after all the labours of Epicurus, he knew it was to no purpose to endeavour to root out wholly the belief of a Deity out of the world, because of the unanimous consent of the world in it; and therefore he admits of it as a necessary Prolepsis or Anticip••tion of humane nature, quod in omnium animis deorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura, that nature its self had stamped a•• Idea of God upon the minds of men; cum enim * 1.7 non instituto aliquo, aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, manet at que ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est Deos esse, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cogni∣tiones habeamus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est, as Velleius the Epicurean argues. Since the belief of a Deity neither rise from custom nor was enacted by Law, yet is unanimously assented to by all man∣kind;

it necessarily follows that there must be a Deity, be∣cause the Idea of it is so natural to us. If it were thus ac∣knowledged in the Philosophical age of Greece, when men bent their wits to unsettle the belief of such things as tended to religion; how much more might it be esteemed a general principle of humane nature in those elder times, when not so much as one dissenter appeared that we read of among the more antient Nations? But Secondly, it was less need∣sul for Moses to insist much on the proof a Deity in his writ∣ings, when his very imployment and the history he wrote, was the greatest evidence that there was one. Could any of them question, whether there were a God or no, who had heard his voyce at mount Sinai, and had received a Law from him, who had been present at so many miracles which were done by Moses in Aegypt and the Wilderness? What more evident demonstration of God could be desired, then those many unparalleld miracles, which were wrought among them? And those who would not be convinced by them that there was a God, would certainly be convinced by nothing. Thirdly, It was unsuitable to the purpose of Mo∣ses to go about to prove any thing he delivered by the meer force of humane reason, because he writ as a person imployed by God; and therefore by the arguments on which they were to believe his Testimony in what ever he writ, they could not but believe there was a God that imployed him. And from hence it is that Moses with so much M••jesty and Authority begins the History of the Creation with In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth. There could be no greater evidence that there was an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God, then that the Universe was produced out of nothing by him, and what reason could there be to distrust his Testimony who relates it, who mani∣fested not only that there was a God, but that he was im∣ployed by him, by the miracles which he wrought: so that all our former discourse concerning the evidences of Divine revelation, are a most palpable demonstration of a Deity; for if there be such a power which can alter the course of nature when he please, the Being wherein it is, must needs be infi∣nite; which is the same which we mean by God.

But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as * 1.8 to any thing of Divine revelation, we want not sufficient evidence in point of reason to prove to them the existence of a Deity. In order to which, I shall clear these following pro∣positions.

1. That the true notion of a Deity is most agreeable to the faculties of mens souls, and most consonant to reason and the light of nature.

2. That those who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far less reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true.

3. That we have as certain evidence that there is a God, as it is possible for us to have, considering his nature.

That the true notion of God is most agreeable to the faculties * 1.9 of mens souls, and most consonant to reason and the light of nature: i. e. that the Idea of God, (or that which we con∣ceive in our minds when we think of God) is so far from being any wayes repugnant to any principle of reason within us, that it is hard to pitch on any other notion which hath sewer entanglements in it, to a mind so far Metaphysical as to abstract from sense and prejudice. I grant it very difficult, nay impossible, for those to have any true setled notion of a God, who search for an Idea of him in their fancies, and were never conscious to themselves of any higher faculty in their souls then meer imagination. Such may have imaginem Iovis or galeatae Minerva, as he in Tully speaks, some Idea of an Idol in their minds, but none of a true God. For we may as soon come by the sight of colours to understand the nature of sounds, as by any corporal phantasmes come to have a true Idea of God. And although sometimes an Idea be taken for that impression of things which is lodged in the P hantasie, yet here we take it in a more general sense, as it contains the representation of any thing in the mind; as it is commonly said in the Schools, that the Divine Intellect doth understand things by their Idea's, which are nothing else but the things themselves as they are objectively represented to the understanding. So that an Idea in its general sense in which we take it, is nothing else but the objective being of a thing as it terminates the understanding; and is the form of

the act of Intellection: that which is then immediately re∣presented to the mind in its perception of things, is the Idea or notion of it. Now such an Idea as this is, may be either true or false. For better understanding of which we must con∣sider that an Idea in the soul may be considered two wayes. 1. As it is a mode of cogitation or the act of the soul appre∣hending an object; now this way no Idea can be false; for as it is an act of the mind, every Idea hath its truth; for whe∣ther I imagine a golden mountain or another, it matters not here; for the one Idea is as true as the other, considering it meerly as an act of the mind. For the mind is as really im∣ployed about the one as the other; as the will is about an object whether it be feasible or no. 2. The Idea may be con∣sidered in regard of its objective reality, or as it represents some outward object; now the truth or falshood of the Idea lies in the understanding passing judgement concerning the outward object as existent which doth correspond to the Idea which is in the mind. And the proneness of the understand∣ings error in this case ariseth from the different nature of those things which are represented to the mind; for some of them are general and abstracted things, and do not at all suppose existence, as the nature of truth, of a Being, of cogi∣tation; other Idea's depend upon existence supposed, as the Idea of the Sun, which I apprehend in my mind because I have seen it; but besides these there are other Idea's in the mind which the understanding forms within its self by its own power as it is a principle of cogitation; such are those wh••ch are called entiarationis, and have no other existence at all but only in the understanding, as Chimaera's, Centaures, &c. Now as to these, we are to observe, that although the composition of these things together by the understanding, be that which makes these Idea's to be only fictitious, yet the understanding would not be able to compound such things, were they not severally represented to the mind; as unless we had known what a horse and a man had been, our minds could not have conjoyned them together in its apprehension. So that in these which are the most fictitious Idea's, we see, that al∣though the Idea its self be a meer creature of the understand∣ing, yet the mind could not form such an Idea but upon prae∣existent

matter, and some objective reality must be supposed in order to the intellectual conception of these Anomalous entityes. By which we see that that strange kind of omni∣potency which some have attributed to the understanding, lies not in a power of conceiving things wholly impossible, or fancying Idea's of absolute non-entityes, but in a kind of African copulation of such species of things together, which in nature seem wholly incompossible, (as the Schools speak) or have no congruity at all in the order of the universe. So that had there never been any such things in the world as matter and motion, it is very hard to conceive, how the un∣derstanding could have formed within its self the variety of the species of such things, which are the results of those two grand principles of the Universe. But because it is so im∣possible for minds not very contemplative and Metaphysical to abstract from matter, thence it is we are apt to imagine such a power in the understanding, whereby it may form Idea's of such things which have no objective reality at all. I grant those we call entia rationis have no external reality as they are such; but yet I say, the existence of matter in the world, and the corporeal phantasmes of outward beings, are the foundation of the souls conception of those entityes, which have no existence beyond the humane Intellect.

The great enquiry then is, how far this Plastick power of * 1.10 the understanding, may extend its self in its forming an Idea of God. That there is such a one in the minds of men, is evi∣dent to every one that consults his own faculties, and en∣quires of them, whether they cannot apprehend a setled and consistent notion of a Being which is absolutely perfect. For that is all we understand by the Idea of God; not that there is any such connate Idea in the soul, in the sense which con∣nate Idea's are commonly understood; but that there is a faculty in the soul, whereby upon the free use of reason it can form within its self a setled notion of such a Being, which is as perfect as it is possible for us to conceive a Being to be. If any difficulty be made concerning the forming such a notion in ones mind, let the person who scruples it, only enquire of himself, whether he judges all Beings in the world equal; whether a mushrome hath in it all the perfections which man

hath? which I suppose none, who have a minde within them can question. If then it be granted that man hath some perfections in him above inferiour creatures, it will be no mat∣ter of difficulty to shew wherein man exceeds other inferi∣our Beings. For is not life a greater perfection then the want of it? is not reason and knowledge, a perfection above sense? and so let us proceed to those things, wherein one man differs from another; for it is evident, that all men are not of equal accomplishments; is not then forecast and pru∣dence above incogitancy and folly? is not the knowledge of causes of things better then stupidity and ignorance? is not beneficence and liberality more noble then parsimony and narrowness of spirit? is not true goodness far above debauchery and intemperance? and are not all these far better, when they are joyned with such a power as hath no limits or bounds at all? Now then is it not possible for a mans mind, proceeding in its ordinary way of intellection, to form a notion of such a Being, which hath wisdom, goodness and power in it, without any limits and bounds at all, or any of those abatements which any of these perfections are found with in man? For it is unconceivable, that the mind of man can attribute to its self absolute perfection, when it cannot but see its own defects in those things it excells other creatures in; and supposing it had power, goodness, and knowledge far above what it hath; yet it cannot but say, that these per∣fections would be greater if it were alwayes possessed of them, and it were impossible that it should ever cease to be, or not have been. So that now joyning infinite goodness, wisdom and power, with eternity and necessity of existence, the result is the notion of a Being absolutely perfect. So that now who ever questions the suitableness of such a notion or Idea to the faculties of mens souls, must question the truth of his own faculties, and the method they proceed in, in their clearest conceptions and ratioeinations. And the mind of man may as well question the truth of any Idea it hath within its self, as of this we now discourse of. Nay it may be far sooner puzled in any of those Idea's, which are transmitted into the Phantasie by the impressions of corporeal Beings upon the Organs of sense, then in this more intellectual and ab∣stracted

Idea, which depends wholly upon the mind.

All the difficulty now is, whether this Idea of such an ab∣solutely * 1.11 perfect Being, be any thing else but the understand∣ings Plastick power, whereby it can unite all these perfections together in one conception, or doth it necessarily imply, that there must be such a Being really existent, or else I could never have formed such a setled notion of him in my mind? To this I answer, 1. It is as much as I desire at present, that the forming of such an Idea in the mind, is as suitable and agreeable to our faculties, as the forming the conception of any other Being in the world. For hereby it is most evident, that the notion of a God imports nothing incongruous to rea∣son, or repugnant to the faculties of our souls; but that the mind will form as setled and clear a notion of God, as of any thing which in the judgement of Epicurus, his infallible senses did the most assure him of. So that there can be no shadow of a pretence, why any should reject the Being of a God, because of the impossibility to conceive any such Being as God is. If to this it be objected, that such things are im∣plyed in this Idea, which make it unconceivable, in that all the perfections in this Being are supposed to be infinite, and infinity transcends our capacity of apprehension. To this I answer, 1. That those who deny infinity in God, must necessarily at∣tribute it to something else, as to infinite space, infinity of successions of ages and persons, if the world were eternal; and therefore it is most unreasonable to reject any notion for that, which it is impossible, but if I deny that, I must attri∣bute it to some thing else, to whose Idea it is far less proper then it is to Gods. 2. Least I should rather seek to avoid the argument then to satisfie it, I say, that though infinite as infinite cannot be comprehended, yet we may clearly and distinctly apprehend a Being to be of that nature, that no limits can be assigned to it, as to its power or presence; which is as much as to understand it to be infinite. The ratio formalis of infinity may not be understood clearly and di∣stinctly, but yet the Being which is infinite may be. Infinity its self cannot be on this account, because how ever positive we apprehend it, yet we alwayes apprehend it in a negative way, because we conceive it by denying all limitations and

bounds to it; but the Being which is infinite we apprehend in a positive manner, although not adaequately, because we cannot comprehend all which is in it. As we may clearly and distinctly see the Sea, though we cannot discover the bounds of it; so may we clearly and distinctly apprehend some perfections of God when we fix our minds on them, although we are not able to grasp them all together in our narrow and confined intellects, because they are Infinite. Thus we see that Gods Infinity doth not at all abate the clearness and di∣stinctness of the notion which we have of God; so that though the perfections of God are without bounds or limits, yet it bears no repugnancy at all to mens natural faculties to have a settled Idea of a Being Infinitely perfect in their minds.

To the Question I answer, It seems highly probable and far more consonant to reason then the contrary, that this Idea of * 1.12 God upon the mind of man, is no meerly fictitious Idea, but that it is really imprinted there by that God whose Idea it is, and therefore doth suppose a reality in the thing correspon∣dent to that objective reality which is in the understanding. For although I am not so well satisfied that the meer objective reality of the Idea of God doth exceed the efficiency of the mind, as that Idea is nakedly considered in its self, because of the unlimited power of the understanding in conception: Yet I say, considering that Idea in all the circumstances of it, it seems highly probable that it is no meer ens rationis, or fig∣ment of the understanding; and that will appear on these considerations. 1. This Idea is of such a nature as could not be formed from the understandings consideration of any cor∣poreal phantasms. Because whatever hath any thing of matter in it, involves of necessity many imperfections along with it; for every part of matter is divisible into more parts. Now it is a thing evident to natural light, that it is a greater perfection not to be divisible then to be so. Besides, corporeal phantasms are so far from helping us. in forming this Idea, that they alone hinder us from a distinct conception of it, while we at∣tend to them; because these bear no proportion at all to such a being. So that this Idea however must be a pure act of In∣tellection, and therefore supposing there were no other facul∣ty

in man but imagination, it would bear the greatest repug∣nancy to our conceptions, and it would be according to the principles of Epicurus and some modern Philosophers, a thing wholly impossible to form an Idea of God, unless with Epicu∣rus we imagine him to be corporeal, which is to say he is no God. Which was the reason that Tully said Epicurus did on∣ly nomine poncre, re tollere Deos, because such a notion of God is repugnant to natural light. So that if this Idea doth wholly abstract from corporeal phantasms, it thereby appears that there is a higher faculty in mans soul then meer imagi∣nation, and it is hardly conceivable whence a faculty which thus extends its self to an infinite object, should come but from an infinite Being: especially if we consider, 2. That the understanding in forming this Idea of God, doth not by distinct acts, first collect one perfection, and then another, and at last unite these together, but the simplicity and unity of all these perfections is as necessarily conceived as any of them. Granting then that the understanding by the observing of several perfections in the world, might be able to abstract these severally from each being wherein they were, yet whence should the Idea of the unity and inseparability of all these perfections come? The mind may, it is true, knit some things together in fictitious Idea's, but then those are so far from unity with each other, that in themselves they speak mu∣tual repugnancy to one another, which makes them proper entia rationis; but these several perfections are so far from speaking repugnancy to each other, that the unity and insepa∣rability of them is as necessary to the forming of this Idea, as any other perfection whatsoever. So that from hence it ap∣pears that the consideration of the perfections which are in the creatures, is only an occasion given to the mind to help it in its Idea of God, and not that the Idea its self depends up∣on those perfections as the causes of it; as in the clearest Mathematical truths the manner of demonstration may be necessary to help the understanding to its clearer assent, though the things in themselves be undoubtedly true. For all minds are not equally capable of the same truths; some are of quicker apprehension then others are; now although to slower apprehensions a more particular way of demon∣strating

things be necessary, yet the truths in themselves are equal, though they have not equal evidence to several per∣sons.

3. It appears that this is no meer fictitious Idea from the uniformity of it in all persons who have freed themselves from the entanglements of corporeal phantasms. Those we call entia rationis, we find by experienee in our minds, that they are formed ad placitum; we may imagine them as many wayes as we please; but we see it is quite otherwise in this Idea of God; for in those attributes or perfections which by the light of nature we attribute to God, there is an uniform consent in all those who have devested their minds of corporeal phantasms in their conceptions of God. For while men have agreed that the object of their Idea is a being absolutely per∣fect, there hath been no dissent in the perfections which have been attributed to it; none have questioned but infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, joyned with necessity of existence, have been all implyed in this Idea. So that it is scarce p••s∣sible to instance in any one Idea, no not of those things which are most obvious to our senses, wherein there hath been so great an uniformity of mens conceptions as in this Idea of God. And the most gross corporeal Idea of the most sen∣sible matter hath been more lyable to heats and disputes among Philosophers, then this Idea of a being Infinite and purely spiritual. Which strongly proves my present pro∣position, that this Idea of God is very consonant to natural light; for it is hardly conceivable that there should be so uni∣versal a consent of minds in this Idea, were it not a natural result from the free use of our reason and faculties. And that which adds further weight t•• this argument, is, that al∣though Infinity be so necessarily implyed in this Idea of God, yet men do not attribute all kind of Infinite things to God; for there being conceivable Infinite number, Infinite longi∣tude, as well as infinite power and knowledge, our minds rea∣dily attribute the latter to God, and as readily abstract the other from his nature, which is an argument this Idea is not fictitious, but argues reality in the thing correspondent to our conception of it. So much may suffice to clear the first pro∣position, viz. that the notion of a God is very suitable to the

faculties of mens souls, and to that light of nature which they proceed by in forming the conceptions of things.

Those who deny that there is a God, do assert other things * 1.13 on far less evidence of reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true. One would expect that such persons who are apt to condemn the whole world of folly in believing the truth of Religion, and would fain be admired as men of a deeper reach, and greater wit and sagacity then others, would when they have exploded a Deity, at least give us some more rational and consistent account of things, then we can give that there is a God. But on the con∣trary we find the reasons on which they reject a Deity so la∣mentably weak, and so easily retorted upon themselves, and the hypotheses they substitute instead of a Deity so precarious, obscure and uncertain, that we need no other argument to evince the reasonableness of Religion, then from the manifest folly as well as impiety of those who oppose it. Which we shall make evident by these two things. 1. That while they deny a Deity, they assert other things on far less reason. 2. That by those principles on which they deny a Deity, they must deny some things which are apparently true.

1. That they assert some things on far less reason then we do that there is a God. For if there be not an infinitely powerful God who produced the world out of nothing, it must ne∣cessarily follow according to the different principles of the Aristotelian and Epicurean Atheists, that either the world was as it is from all eternity, or else that it was at first made by the fortuitous concourse of Atoms. Now I appeal to the reason of any person who hath the free use of it, Whether either of these two Hypotheses, urged with the same or great∣er difficulties, &c. be not far more weakly proved, then the existence of a Deity is, or the production of the world by him.

1. They run themselves into the same difficulties which they would avoid in the belief of a Deity; and nothing can be a greater evidence of an intangled mind then this is: To deny a thing because of some difficulty in it, and instead of it to assert another thing which is chargeable with the very same difficulty in a higher degree. Thus when they reject a Deity,

because they cannot understand what infinity means; both these Hypotheses are lyable to the same intricacy in appre∣hending the nature of something Infinite. For according to the Epicureans, there must be an Infinite space, and what greater ease to the mind is there in conceiving an Idea of that then of an Infinite Being. And if the world be eternal, there must have been past an Infinite succession of ages, and is not the understanding as easily lost in this, as in an eternal Being which created the world? For if the course of Generations in the world had no beginning at all, (which necessarily follows upon the eternity of the world) then an infinite num∣ber of successions are already past, and if past then at an end, and so we find an Infinite which hath had an end, which is a consequence becoming one who avoids the belief of a Deity, because Infinity is an unconceivable thing. Besides if the number of Generations hath been Infinite, these two consequences will unavoidably follow, which the reason of any one but an Atheist would startle at, that one Infinite may be greater then another, and that the part is equal to the whole. For let him fix where he please in the course of Generations, I demand whether in the Great-grand-fathers time the succession of Generations was finite or Infinite; if finite, then it had a beginning; and so the world not eternal; if infinite, then I ask, Whether there were not a longer suc∣cession of Generations in the time of his great grand-children, and so there must be a number greater then that which was infinite; for the former succession was infinite, and this hath more Generations in it then that had; but if it be said that they were equal, because both infinite, then the succession of Generations to the Grand-father, being but a part of that which extends to his grand-children and posterity, the part is equal to the whole. And is not now the notion of an Infinite Being enough to stumble an Atheists reason, when it can so nimbly leap over so apparent contradictions? I insist not on this as an evident demonstration to prove a Deity, which pos∣sibly it may not amount to, because it may only demonstrate the impossibility of our understandings comprehending the nature of Infinity. But however it doth most evidently demonstrate the folly and unreasonableness of the Atheist who

rejects the Being of God on the account of his Infinity, when his understanding is more lost in apprehending an infinite succession of Generations which follows from his supposition of the eternity of the world. If then it be impossible, as it is, upon any principles whatsoever, to avoid the conception of somewhat infinite and eternal, either matter or space, or some Being, let any one appeal to his own reason whether it be not more agreeable to that, to attribute these perfecti∣ons to such a Being to whose Idea they necessarily belong, then to attribute them to this world in whose conception they are not at all implyed; but on the contrary they do far more puzzle our understandings then when we conceive them to be in God. If somewhat must have a continued duration, and be of an unbounded nature, how much more rational is it to conceive wisdom, power, and goodness to be conjoyned with eternity and infinity, then to bestow these attributes upon an empty space, or upon dull and unactive matter? It cannot be reason then, but some more base and unworthy principle which makes the Atheist question the Being of God, because his perfections are unconceivable, when accord∣ing to his own principles the most puzzling attributes of God return upon him with more force and violence, and that in a more inexplieable manner.

As the Atheist must admit those things himself which he rejects the Being of God for, so he admits them upon far * 1.14 weaker grounds then we do attribute them to God. If any thing may be made evident to mans natural reason concern∣ing the existence of a Being so infinite as God is, we doubt not but to make it appear that we have great assurance of the Being of God; but how far must the Atheist go, how heartily must he begg before his Hypothesis either of the fortuitous concourse of Atoms, or eternity of the world will be granted to him. For if we stay till he proves either of these by evi∣dent and demonstrative reasons, the world may have an end before he proves his Atoms could give it a beginning; and we may find it eternal, à parte post, before he can prove it was so á parte ante. For the proof of a Deity, we appeal to his own faculties, reason and conscience; we make use of argu∣ments before his eyes: we bring the universal sense of man∣kind

along with us: But for his principles, we must wholly alter the present stage of the world, and crumble the whole Universe into little particles; we must grind the Sun to powder, and by a new way of interrment turn the earth into dust and ashes, before we can so much as imagine how the world could be framed. And when we have thus far begged leave to imagine things to be what they never were, we must then stand by in some infinite space to behold the friskings and dancings about of these little particles of matter, till by their frequent rancounters and justlings one upon another, they at last link themselves together, and run so long in a round till they make whirl-pools enough for Sun, Moon, and Stars, and all the bodies of the Universe to emerge out of. But what was it which at first set these little particles of matter in motion? Whence came so great variety in them to produce such wonderful diversities in bodies as there are in the world? How came these casual motions to hit so luckily into such admirable contrivances as are in the Universe? When once I see a thousand blind men run the point of a sword in at a key-hole without one missing; when I find them all frisking together in a spacious field, and ex∣actly meeting all at last in the very middle of it; when I once find as Tully speaks, the Annals of Ennius fairly written in a heap of sand, and as Keplers wife told him, a room full of herbs moving up and down, fall down into the exact order of sallets, I may then think the Atomical Hypothesis probable, and not before. But what evidence of reason, or demon∣stration have we that the great bodies of the world did result from such a motion of these small particles? It is possible to be so, saith Epicurus; what if we grant it possible? can no things in the world be, which it is possible might have been otherwise? What else thinks Epicurus of the Generations of things now? they are such certainly as the world now is, and yet he believes it was once otherwise: Must therefore a bare possibility of the contrary make us deny our reason, silence conscience, contradict the universal sense of mankind by ex∣cluding a Deity out of the world? But whence doth it ap∣pear possible? Did we ever find any thing of the same nature with the world produced in such a manner by such a con∣course

of Atoms? Or is it because we find in natural beings, how much these particles of matter serve to solve the Phoe∣nomena of nature? But doth it at all follow, because now under Divine providence which wisely orders the world, and things in it, that these particles with their several affections and motion, may give us a tolerable account of many appear∣ances as to bodies, that therefore the Universe had its origi∣nal meerly by a concretion of these without any Divine hand to order and direct their motion? But of this more, when we come to the creation of the world; our design now is only to compare the notion of a Deity, and of the Atheists Hypo∣thesis in point of perspicuity and evidence of reason: of which let any one who hath reason judge. Thus we see how the Atheist in denying a Deity, must assert something else instead of it, which is pressed with the same, if not greater difficul∣ties, and proved by far less reason.

The Atheist by the same principles on which he denyes a God, * 1.15 must deny some things which are apparently true. Which will be evident by our running over the most plausible pretences which he insists upon.

1. Because the Being of God cannot be demonstrated. But how doth the Atheist mean it? is it because God cannot be demon∣strated to sense, that we cannot digito monstrari & dieier hic est, point at him with our fingers? It is a sign there is little of reason left, where sense is made the only Umpire of all kinds of Beings. Must all Intellectual Beings be proscribed out of the order of Nature, because they cannot pass the scrutiny of sense? And by the same reason all colours shall be dashed out because they cannot be heard; all noises silenced because they cannot be seen; for why may not one sense be set to judge of all objects of sense with far more reason, then sense its self be set as judge over intellectual Beings? But yet it is wisely done of the Atheist to make sense his judge; for if we once appeal to this, he knows our cause is lost; for as he said of a Physician when one asked him, whether he had any experience of him, no said he, Si periculum fecissem, non viverem; If I had tryed him, I had been dead ere now; so here, If God were to be tryed by the judgement of sense, he must cease to be God; for how can an infinite and

spiritual Being be discerned by the judgement of sense, and if he be not an infinite and spiritual Being, he is not God. But it may be the Atheists meaning is not so gross, but he intends such a demonstration to reason as that two and two make four, or that the whole is greater then the parts; with such a demonstration he would sit down contented. But will no less then this serve him? what becomes then of the worlds being made by a sortuitous concourse of Atoms? is this as evident, as that two and two make four? And will the Philosophical Atheist really believe nothing in nature, but what is as evident to him in material Beings, as that the whole is greater then the parts? By any means let Atheists then write Philosophy, that at last the clocks in London may strike together and the Philosophers agree; for I suppose none of them question that. But yet it is possible the Atheist may in a good humour abate some thing of this, and mean by de∣monstration such a proof as takes away all difficulties. If he means as to the ground of assent, we undertake it; if as to the object ap••rehended, we reject it as unreasonable, because it is impossible a Being infinite should be comprehended by us; for if it could, it were no longer infinite. But let us try this principle by other things, and how evident is it, that on this account some things must be denyed which himself will con∣fess to be true? for instance, that osprobrium Philosophorum, the divisibility of quantity, or extended matter into finite and infinite parts; let him take which side he please, and see whether by the force of the arguments on either side, if he hold to this principle, he must not be forced to deny that there is any such thing as matter in the world: and then we may well have an infinite empty space, when by the force of this one Principle, both God and matter are banished quite out of the world. But if the Atheist will but come one step lower, and by his demonstration intend nothing else but such a suf∣ficient proof of it, as the nature of the thing is capable of, he will not only speak most consonantly to reason, but may be in some hopes of gaining satisfaction. For it is most evident, that all things are not capable of the like way of proof, and that in some cases the possibility of the contrary must be no hindrance to an undoubted assent. What these proofs are, will

appear afterwards. I come to the next ground of the Atheists opinion, which is,

2. The weakness of some arguments brought to prove a Deity. But let us grant that some arguments will not do it, doth it therefore follow that none can do it? What if some have proved the Sun to be the center of the world, and the motion of the earth, by very weak arguments, will the Atheist therefore question it? what if Epicurus hath proved his Atomical hypothesis by some silly Sophismes, will the Atheist therefore rather believe the creation of the world then it? What if the Atheist may make himself sport at some stories of apparitions insisted on to prove a D••ity, doth it therefore follow there is no God, because some persons have been over∣credulous? What if some having more zeal then knowledge may attribute such things to Gods immediate hand, which may be produced by natural causes, doth it thence follow that God hath no hand in governing the world at all? What if fears, and hopes, and perswasi••ns, may depend much on prin∣ciples of education, must conscience then be resolved wholly into these? What if some devont melancholist may embrace the issues of his own imagination for the impressions of the Divine Spirit, doth it therefore follow, that religion is no∣thing but strength of fancy improved by principles of educa∣tion? what if some of the numerous proofs of a Deity were cut off, and only those made use of, which are of greatest force, would the truth suffer at all by that? I grant ad∣vantage is often taken against a thing more by one weak argument brought for it, then for it by the strongest proofs: but I say it is unreasonable it should be so; and were men rational and ingenuous it would not be so. Many times ar∣guments may be good in their order, but they are misplaced; some may prove the thing rational, which may not prove it true; some may shew the absurdity of the adversaries re∣jecting the thing, which may be not sufficient to prove it; now when men number and not weigh their arguments, but give them in the lump to the main question, without fitting them to their several places, they do more disservice to the main of the battel by the disorder of their forces, then they can advantage it by the number of them.

3. Another great pretence the Atheist hath, is, that religion is only an invention of Politicians, which they aw people with as they please, and therefore tell them of a God and another world, as Mothers send young children to school to keep them in better order, that they may govern them with the greater ease. To this I answer, 1. Religion I grant hath a great influence upon the well-governing the world, nay so great, that were the Atheists opinion true, and the world perswaded of it, it were impossible the world could be well governed. For the Government of the world in civil societies, depends not so much on force, as the sacred bonds of duty and allegiance, which hold a Nation that owns reli∣gion as true, in far surer obligations to endeavour the peace and welfare of a Nation then ever violence can do. For in this case only an opportunity is watched for to shake off that which they account a yoke upon their necks; whereas when mens minds are possessed with a sense of duty and obligation to obedience out of conscience, the rains may be held with greater ease; and yet the people be better managed by them, then by such as only gall and inrage them. So that I grant true religion to be the most serviceable principle for the governing of civil societies; but withal I say, 2. It were impossible religion should be so much made use of for the governing of people, were there not a real propensity and incli∣nation to religion imprinted on the minds of men. For as, did not men love themselves and their children, their estates and interests, it were impossible to keep them in obedience to Laws; but doth it follow, because Magistrates perswade people to obedience by suiting Laws to the general interest of men, that therefore the Magistrates first made them love themselves and their own concerns? So it is in religion, the Magistrate may make use of this propensity to religion in men for civil ends, but his making use of it doth suppose it and not instill it. For were religion nothing else in the world but a design only of Politicians, it would be impossible to keep that design from being discovered at one time or other, and when once it came to be known, it would hurry the whole world into confusion; and the people would make no scruple of all oaths and obligations, but every one would seek to do

others what mischief he could if he had opportunity, and obey no further then fear and force constrained him. Therefore no principle can be so dangerous to a state as Atheism, nor any thing more promote its peace then true religion; and the more men are perswaded of the truth of religion, they will be the better subjects, and the more useful in civil societies. As well then may an Atheist say there is no such thing as good nature in the world because that is apt to be abused, nor any such thing as love because that may be cheated, as that religion is nothing but a design, because men may make it stalke to their private ends. Thus we see how the Atheist by the force of those principles on which he denyes a God, must be forced to deny other things, which yet by his own confession are apparently true.

So I come to the third Proposition, which is, That we have * 1.16 as certain evidence that there is a God, as we can have consider∣ing his nature. When we demand the proof of a thing, our first eye must be to the nature of the thing which we desire may be proved; For things equally true, are not capable of equal evidence, nor have like manners of probation. There is no demonstration in Euclide will serve to prove that there are such places as the Indies: we cannot prove the earth is round by the judgement of sense; nor that the soul is im∣mortal by corporeal phantasmes. Every distinct kind of Be∣ing hath its peculiar way of probation; and therefore it ought not to be at all wondered at, if the Supreme and infinite Being have his peculiar way of demonstrating himself to the minds of men. If then we have as evident proofs of the existence of God, as we can have considering the infinity of his nature, it is all which in reason we can desire; and of that kind of proofs we have these following, For, 1. If God hath stamped an universal character of himself upon the minds of men. 2. If the things in the world are the manifest effects of infinite wisdome, goodness and power. 3. If there be such things in the world which are unaccountable without a Deity; then we may with safety and assurance conclude that there is a God.

1. That God hath imprinted an universal character of him∣self on the minds of men; and that may be known by two

things. 1. If it be such as bears the same importance among all persons. 2. If it be such as cannot be mistaken for the cha∣racter of any thing else.

1. I begin with the first, whereby I shall prove this cha∣racter to be universal, because the whole world hath con∣sented in it. This argument we may rely on with the greater security, because it was the only argument which retained the Deity in the ancient School of Epicurus; which could he have thought of as easie way of evading it, as he thought he had found out as to the Origine of the universe, he was no such great friend to the very name of a God, as to have re∣tained it as an Anticipation or Prolepsis of humane nature. And this argument from the universal consent of the world, was that which bore the greatest sway among the Philoso∣phers, who went by nothing but dictates of natural light, which they could not so clearly discover in any things, as in those which all mankind did unanimously consent in. Two things I shall make out this by. 1. That no sufficient ac∣count can be given of so universal a consent, unless it be sup∣posed to be the voyce of nature. 2. That the dissent of any particular persons is not sufficient to controul so universal an agreement.

1. That no sufficient account of it can be given, but only by asserting it to be a dictate of nature. In so strange a dissent as there hath been in the world concerning most of those things which relate to mankinde in common, as the models of government, the Laws they are ruled by, the particular rites and customs of worship; we have the greatest reason to judge that those common principles which were the foundations on which all these several different customs were built, were not the effect of any positive Laws, nor the meer force of princi∣ples of education, but something which had a deeper root and foundation in the principles of nature its self. A common and universal effect must flow from some common and universal cause. So the Stoick argues in Tully, If there were no God, * 1.17 non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmaretur diutur∣nitate remporis, nec una cum seculis aetatibusque hominum in∣veterare potuisset. It is strange to think that mankind in so many ages of the world should not grow wise enough to rid

its self of so troublesom an opinion as that was, of the Being of God, had it not been true.

We see in all the alterations of the world, other vain opi∣nions have been detected, refuted and shaken off; if this had been such, how comes it to remain the same in all ages and Nations of the world? Opinionum commenta delet dies, na∣turae judicia confirmat. It is a great discredit to Time to make it like a river in that sense, that it bears up only lighter things, when matters of greatest weight are sunk to the bottom and past recovery; This may pass for a handsom allusion, as to the opinions and writings of particular persons, but cannot be understood of such things which are founded on the uni∣versal consent of the world; for these common notions of hu∣mane nature are so suited to the temper of the world, that they pass down the strong current of Time with the same facility that a well built ship, though of good burden, doth furrow the Ocean. So that if we must adhere to the Allegory, it is easily replyed, that it is not the weight of things which makes them sink, but the unsuitableness of their superficies to that of the water; so we see a small piece of wood will sink, when a stately ship is born up; so such things which have not that agreeableness in them to the dictates of nature may soon be lost, but such as lye so even upon the superficies of the soul, will still float above the water, and never be lost in the swiftest current of Time. Thus we assert this univer∣sal consent of mankind, as to the existence of a Deity, to be a thing so consonant to our natural reason, that as long as there are men in the world it will con∣tinue.

But now it is hardly conceivable, according to the Prin∣ciples of Epicurus, how mankind should universally agree in * 1.18 some common sentiments; much less how it should have such an anticipation as himself grants of the Being of God. For if the soul be nothing else but some more active and vigor∣ous particles of matter (as Diogenes Laertius tells us, that his opinion was that the soul was nothing else but a Systeme * 1.19 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of the most smooth and round atoms) if so, it is very hard apprehending how any such things as anticipations or commctions can be lodged in

the soul? For if our souls be nothing else but some small sphaericall corpuscles which move up and down the body, as the Epicurean Philosophy supposeth, then all our knowledge and perception must depend on motion, which motion must be by the impression of external objects: which Lucretius ac∣knowledgeth and contends for.

Invenies primis à sensibus esse creatam Notitiam veri. * 1.20

If then our knowledge of truth comes in by our senses, and sensation doth wholly depend upon the impression of outward objects, what becomes of all common notions and of the Pro∣lepsis of a Deity? unless we suppose the knowledge of a Deity came in by sense, which Epicurus himself denyes when he attributes to the Deity not corpus, but quasi corpus, as * 1.21 Tully tells us, and therefore he is not a proper object of sense. So that it is impossible there should be any such thing as a na∣tural notion which may be the ground of universal consent among men, according to the doctrine of Epicurus. And therefore it stands to all reason in the world, that if our senses be the only competent Iudges of truth, men should differ about nothing more then such things which cannot be tryed by the judgement of sense; Such as the notion of a God is; (for where should men be more uncertain in their judgements, then in such thing which they have no rule at all to go by in the judging of?) but we are so far from find∣ing it so, that men are nothing so much agreed about the ob∣jects of sense, as they are about the existence of a Deity; and therefore we see this universal consent of mankind concerning a God, cannot be salved by the principles of those who de∣ny it; according to which no account at all can be given of any such things as universal or common no∣tions.

Neither can this universal consent of mankind be enervated * 1.22 with any greater probability by those Atheists who assert the eternity of the world, and resolve this consent wholly into meer tradition, such as the Fables of Poets were conveyed in from one to another. For I demand concerning this tradition,

Whether ever it had any beginning or no? If it had no be∣ginning, it could be no tradition; for that must run up to some persons from whom it first came; again, if it had no beginning, it was necessary that it should alwayes be, on the same accounts on which they make the world eternal. And if it be necessary, it must be antecedent to any free act of mans will which tradition supposeth; and so some false opinion would be found to be as necessary as the worlds being eter∣nal, (and by consequence, the worlds being eternal may be a necessary false opinion) but if any false opinion be once granted necessary, it then follows that our faculties are not true, and that nature is a necessary cause of some notorious falsity, which is the highest impeachment the Atheist could have laid upon his only adored nature; which must then have done that, (which Aristotle was ashamed to think ever na∣ture should be guilty of) which is something in vain; for to what purpose should man have rational faculties, if he be un∣der an unavoidable necessity of being deceived? If then it be granted that this tradition had once a beginning, either it be∣gan with humane nature, or humane nature did exist long be∣fore it; if it began with mankind, then mankind had a begin∣ning, and so the world was not eternal; if mankind did exist before this tradition, I then enquire in what time, and by what means came this tradition first to be embraced, if it doth not supppse the existence of a Deity? Can any age be men∣tioned in history, wherein this tradition was not universally received? and which is most to our purpose, the further we go back in history, the fuller the world was of Deities, if we believe the Heathen histories; but however no age can be instanced in, wherein this tradition began first to be believed in the world; we can trace the Poetick Fables to their true original, by the testimonies of those who believed them; we know the particular Authors of them, and what course they took in divulging of them; we find great diversities among themselves in the meaning of them, and many nations that never heard of them. But all things are quite otherwise in this tradition; we have none to fix on as the first Authors of it; if the world were eternal, and the belief of a Deity fa∣bulous, we cannot understand by what artifice a fabulous

tradition could come to be so universally received in the world, that no Nation of old could be instanced in by the inquisitive Philosophers, but however rude and barbarous it was, yet it owned a Deity. How could such a tradition be spread so far, but either by force or fraud? it could not be by force, because embraced by an unanimous consent where no force at all hath been used, and hath been so rooted in the very natures of those people who have been most tender of their liberties, that they have resented no indignity so highly, as any affronts they conceived to be offered to their gods. Nay, and where any persons would seem to quit the belief of a Deity, we find what force and violence they have used to their own reason and conscience to bring themselves to Athe∣isme, which they could not subdue their minds to any longer then the will could command the understanding, which when it gained but a little liberty to examine it self, or view the world, or was alarumed with thunder, earth-quakes, or vio∣lent sickness, did bring back again the sense of a Deity with greater force and power then they had endeavoured to shake it off with. Now had this tradition come by force into the world, there would have been a secret exultation of mind to be freed from it, as we see nature rejoyceth to shake off every thing which is violent, and to settle every thing ac∣cording to its due order. It is only fraud then which can be with any reason imagined in this case; and how unrea∣sonable it is to imagine it here, will appear to any one who doth consider how extreamly jealous the world is of being imposed upon by the subtilty of such who are thought to be the greatest Polititians. For the very opinion of their sub∣tilty makes men apt to suspect a design in every thing they speak or do, so that nothing doth more generally hinder the entertaining of any motion so much among vulgar people, as that it comes from a person reputed very politick. So that the most politick way of gaining upon the apprehensions of the vulgar, is by taking upon one the greatest appearance of sim∣plicity and integrity; and this now could not be done by such Polititians which we now speak of, but by accommodat∣ing themselves to such things in the people which were so con∣sonant to their natures, that they could suspect no design at

all in the matters propounded to them. And thus I assert it to have been in the present case, in all those Politick Go∣vernours who at first brought the world into both civil and Religious Societies, after they were grown rude and barbar∣ous; for as it had been impossible to have brought them into civil Societies, unless there had been supposed an inclination to Society in them, so it had been equally impossible to have brought them to embrace any particular way of Religion, unless there had been a natural propensity to Religion im∣planted in them, and founded in the general belief of the existence of a Deity. And therefore we never find any of the antient founders of Common-wealths go about to perswade the people, that there was a God, but this they supposed and made their advantage of it, the better to draw the people on to embrace that way of worship which they delivered to them, as most suitable to their own design. And this is plain∣ly evident in the vast difference of designs and interests which were carried on in the Heathen world upon this general ap∣prehension of a Deity. How came the world to be so easily abused into Religions of all shapes and fashions, had not there been a natural inclination in mens souls to Religion, and an Indeleble Idea of a Deity on the minds of men? Were then this propensity groundless, and this Idea fictitious, it were the greatest slurr imaginable which could be cast upon nature, that when the instincts of irrational agents argue something real in them; only man, the most noble being of the visible world, must be fatally carryed to the belief of that which never was. Which yet hath so great a force and awe upon man, that nothing creates so great anxieties in his life as this doth; nothing layes him more open to the designs of any who have an intent to abuse him. But yet further, these Politici∣ans who first abused the world in telling them there was a God, did they themselves believe there was a God or no? If they did, then they had no such end as abusing the world into such a belief. If they did not, upon what accounts did they believe there was none, when the people were so ready, to be∣lieve there was one? Was that as certain a tradition before that there was no God, as afterwards they made it to be that there was? If so, then all those people whom they perswaded

to believe there was a God, did before, all believe there was none; and how can it possibly enter into the reason of any man to think, that people who had been brought up in the belief that there was no God at all, nor any state after this life, should all unanimously quit the principles of education which tended so much to their ease and pleasure here, to believe there was a God and another life, and thereby to fill them∣selves full of fears and disquietments; meerly because their Rulers told them so? Again, if these Rulers themselves were so wise as not to believe a Deity, can we imagine there ever was such an age of the world vvherein it fell out so happily, that only the Rulers vvere wise, and all the subjects fools? But it may be, it vvill be said, that all who were wise themselves did not believe a Deity, but yet consented to the practice of Re∣ligion, because it was so useful for the Government of mankind; but, can it be thought that all these wise men vvhich vve must suppose of several ranks and degrees, (for Philosophers are not alvvayes States-men, nor States-men Philosophers) should so readily concurr in such a thing which tended most to the Interest of the Prince, and to the abuse of the world? Would none of them be ready to assert the truth, though it were but to make a party of their own, and discover to the people, that it was only the ambition and design of their Go∣vernours which sought to bring the people to slavery by the belief of such things which were contrary to the tradition of their fore-fathers, and would make their lives, if they believed them, continually troublesom and unquiet? Or if we could suppose things should hit thus in one Nation, what is this to the whole world which the Atheist here supposeth eternal? What, did all the Rulers of the world exactly agree in one moment of time, or at least in one age thus to abuse the world? Did the designs of Governours and the credulity of all people fall out to be so suitable together? But on the contrary, we do not find that Governours can have the judge∣ments of people so at their command, that they can make them to believe what they please; if it were so, we may well say with that Atheistical Pope, Heu quam minimo regitur mundus; What a twine thread will rule the world! But grant∣ing these things, (which any but an Atheist will say are im∣possible)

yet whence should it come to pass that the world which is generally led more by the opinions of their fore∣fathers then by reason, should so cancell that former tradition that there was no God, that no remaining foot-steps of it can be traced in any history of those times? Or did the Governors all consent to abolish all records of it? Publick and written I grant they might, but not those out of mens minds and me∣mories; which would have been for the ease of the minds of their posterity conveyed in some secret Cabala from Fathers to their Children. It may be it will be said, so it was, but men durst not profess it for fear of the Laws; but, it is not evident that the Laws of all the antient Common-wealths were so severe against Atheism; and withall how came some of the wisest and most Philosophical men of Greece and Rome to embrace the existence of a Deity as a thing far more conso∣nant to reason then the contrary opinion, and established their belief on such evidences from nature its self, that none of their Antagonists were able to answer them? It was not certainly the fear of Laws which made men rational and in∣quisitive into the natures and causes of things; and yet those who were such amidst the great Idolatries of the heathen, & being destitute of divine revelation, yet freely and firmly as∣sented to the existence of a Deity. Had it been only fraud and imposture which brought men to believe a God, whence came it to pass that this fraud was not discovered by these Philoso∣phers who were far better able by their nearness to those eld∣est times, and much converse abroad in other Nations (for some travelled into Aegypt, Chaldea, Persia, India, meerly to gain knowledge) to have found out such an imposture, had it been such, then any of our modern Atheists? Whence come these now in this almost decrepite age of the world to be the first smellers out of so great a design? By what means, what tokens and evidence came such an imposture to their knowledge? Because, forsooth, the world is still apt to be abused by a pretence of Religion; but he that doth not see how silly and ridiculous a Sophism that is, either by his own reason, or by what hath gone before, hath wit and reason little enough to be an Atheist. Some therefore who would seem a little wiser then the vulgar sort of Atheists (for it seems there

is a vulgus among them too, I wish it be more for their meanness then multitude) are so far convinced of the un∣reasonablenss of judging that the belief of a Deity came in by fraud, that finding it so general and universal, they attribute it to as general and universal a cause which is the Influence of the Stars. So true still is that of the Poet, Coelum ipsum pe∣timus stultitia; for by what imaginable influence come the stars to plant opinions in mens minds so deeply and univer∣sally? But yet further, is this opinion which is thus caused by the Stars, true or false? if the opinion be true, we have what we desire; if false, what malignant influence is this of the Stars so powerfully to sway men to the belief of a falsity? How far are the Stars then from doing good to mankind, when they are so influential to deceive the world; but then by what peculiar influence come some men to be freed from this general imposture? If the cause be so universal, the effect must be universal too. But if only the Nativity and continuance of some particular religions may be calculated by the Stars, (as Cardan and Vaninus Atheistically suppose) whence then comes the general propensity and inclination to Religion in all ages and Nations of the World? If it be then caused by the Heavens in general, it must be produced necessarily and universally, and so to be an Atheist, were im∣possible; if it be caused by the influence of some particular Stars, then when that influence ceaseth, the world would uni∣versally relapse into Atheism. So that there is no possible way of avoiding this universal consent of mankind, as an argument that there is a God, when all the pretences of the Atheist against it are so weak, ridiculous, and impertinent.

The only thing then left for him, is to deny the truth of the thing, viz. that there is such an universal consent; because * 1.23 some persons have been found in the world who have not agreed with the rest of mankind in this opinion. To this I answer, (which was the second particular for clearing this argu∣ment) that the dissent of these persons is not sufficient to ma∣nifest * 1.24 the consent not to be universal, and to arise from a dictate of nature. For I demand of the greatest Atheist, Whether it be sufficient to say, that it is not natural for men to have two legs, because some have been born with one, or that it is

not natural for men to desire life, (which the Atheist loves so dearly) because there have been so many who have taken away their own lives? If it be said that these are Monsters and Anomalyes in nature, and therefore not to be reckoned in the regular account of things, the same I may with as great reason say of Atheists, that they are to be dispunged out of the Census of such who act upon free principles of reason; because there may be some peculiar reasons given of their dissent from the rest of mankind in the denyal of a Deity. We see by the old Philosophers how far the affectation of Novelty, and am∣bition of being cryed up for no vulgar wits, may carry men to deny such things which are most common and obvious in the world. Is there any thing more plain and evident to reason, then that it implyes a contradiction for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time? and yet if we believe Aristotle, who largely disputes against them, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.25 There were some who af∣firmed that a thing might be and not be at the same time. What so evident in nature as motion, yet the Philosopher is well known who disputed against it, and thought himself subtile in doing so too? What are men more assured of, then that they live, and yet (if it be not too dogmatical, even in that to believe the Scepticks) it was a thing none could be assured of? What are our senses more assured of then that the snow is white, yet all the Philosophers were not of that opinion? Is this then sufficient reason on which to deny an universal consent, because some Philosophers opposed it, when it is most undoubtedly true which Tully sharply speaks of the antient Philosophers, Nihil tam absurdum quod non dixerit aliquis Philosophorum; there was no absurdity so great, but it found a * 1.26 Philosopher to vouch it! But in this case those Philosophers who questioned the existence of a Deity, though they were not for number to be compared with those who asserted it, yet were not so inexcusable therein, as our modern Atheists; because they then knew no other way of Religion, but that which was joyned with horrible superstition and ridiculous rites of worship; they were strangers to any thing of divine revelation, or to any real miracles wrought to confirm it, and to such a way of serving God which is most agreeable to

the Divine nature, most suitable to our reason, most effectual for advancing true goodness in the world. And although this most excellent Religion, viz. the Christian, be subject to ma∣ny scandals by reason of the corruptions which have been mixed with it by those who have professed it, yet the Religion its self is clear and untainted, being with great integrity pre∣served in the sacred records of it. So that now Athcism hath far less to plead for its self, then it had in the midst of the ignorance and superstition of the Heathen Idolatries. But, if we should grant the Athcist more then he can prove, that the number of such who denyed a Deity hath been great in all ages of the world; is it probable they should speak the sense of nature, whose opinion if it were embraced, would dissolve all tyes and obligations whatsoever, would let the world loose to the highest licentiousness without check or controul, and would in time overturn all civil Societies? For as Tully hath * 1.27 largely shewn, Take away the being and providence of God out of the world, and there follows nothing but perturbation and confusion in it; not only all sanctity, piety and devotion is destroyed, but all faith, vertue, and humane Societies too; which are impossible to be upheld without Religion, as not only he, but Plato, Aristotle, and Plutarch have fully demon∣strated. Shall such persons then who hold an opinion so contra∣ry to all other dictates of nature, rather speak the sense of nature then they who have asserted the Belief of a Deity, which tends so much to advance nature, to regulate the world, and to reform the lives of men? Certainly if it were not a dictate of nature that there was a God, it is impossible to conceive the world should be so constant in the belief of him, when the thoughts of him breed so many anxicties in mens minds, and withall since God is neither obvious to sense, nor his nature comprehensible by humane reason. Which is a stronger evidence it is a character of himself which God hath imprinted on the minds of men, which makes them so una∣nimously agree that he is, when they can neither see him, nor yet fully comprehend him. For any whole Nation, which have consented in the denyal of a Deity, we have no evidence at all; some suspicions it is true there were at first concerning some very barbarous people in America, but it is since evident

though they are grosly mistaken as to the nature of God, yet they worship something in stead of him, such as the Toupin∣ambors, Caribes, Patagons, Tapuiae and others; of the last of which Vossius from one Christophorus Arcissewski a Polo∣nian * 1.28 Gentleman who was among them, hath given a large account of their Religion, and the manner of their worship∣ping of their gods, both good and bad. And that which among these Indians much confirms our present argument, is, that only those who have been the most barbarous and savage Na∣tions, have been suspected of irreligion, but the more civi∣lized they have been, the more evident their sense of Reli∣gion. The Peruvians worship one chief God, whom they call Viracocha, and Pachacamak, which is as much as the Creator * 1.29 of heaven and earth. And of the Religion of the Mexicans, Lipsius and others speak. So that the nearer any have ap∣proached to civility and knowledge, the more ready they have been to own a Deity, and none have had so little sense of it, as they who are almost degenerated to Brutes; and whether of these two now comes nearer to reason, let any one who hath it judge.

Another great evidence that God hath imprinted a chara∣cter or Idea of himself on the minds of men is, because such * 1.30 things are contained in this Idea of God which do necessarily im∣ply his existence. The main force of this argument lies in this, That which we do clearly & distinctly perceive to belong to the nature and essence of a thing, may be with truth affirmed of the thing; not that it may be affirmed with truth to belong to the nature of the thing, for that were an empty Tautology, but it may be affirmed with truth of the thing its self, as if I clearly perceive upon exact enquiry, that to be an animal doth belong to the nature of man, I may with truth affirm that man is a living creature; if I find it demonstrably true that a Triangle hath three angles equal to two right ones, then I may truly affirm it of any Triangle; but now we assume, that upon the most exact search and enquiry, I clearly perceive that necessary existence doth immutably belong to the nature of God; therefore, I may with as much truth affirm that God exists, as that man is a living creature, or a Triangle hath three an∣gles equal to two right ones. But because many are so apt to

suspect some kind of Sophism in this argument, when it is managed from the Idea in mens minds, because that seems to imply only an objective reality in the mind, and that nothing can be thence interred as to the existence of the thing whose Idea it is, I therefore shall endeavour to manifest more clear∣ly the force of this argument, by proving severally the sup∣positions which it stands upon, which are these three. 1. That clear and distinct perception of the mind is the greatest evidence we can have of the truth of any thing. 2. That we have this clear perception that necessary existence doth belong to the nature of God. 3. That if necessary existence doth belong to Gods na∣ture, it unavoidably follows that he doth exist. Nothing can be desired more plain or full to demonstrate the force of this ar∣gument, then by proving every one of these.

1. That the greatest evidence we can have of the truth of a thing, is, a clear and distinct perception of it in our minds. For otherwise the rational faculties of mans soul would be wholly useless, as being not fitted for any end at all, if upon a right use of them, men were still lyable to be deceived. I grant the imperfection of our minds in this present state is very great, which makes us so obnoxious to errour and mis∣take; but then that imperfection lies in the pr••neness in mans mind to be led by interest and prejudice in the judgement of things; but in such things as are purely speculative and ratio∣nal, if the mind cannot be certain it is not deceived in them, it can have no certainty at all of any Mathematical demon∣strations. Now we find in our own minds a clear and conv••n∣cing evidence in some things, as soon as they are propounded to our understandings, as that a thing cannot be and not be at the same time; that, a non-entity can have no proper attributes; that, while I reason and discourse, I am; these are so clear, that no man doth suspect himself deceived at all in them. Besides, if we had no ground of certainty at all in our judging things, to what purpose is there an Idea of true and false in our minds, if it be impossible to know the one from the other? But I say not, that in all perceptions of the mind we have cer∣tain evidence of truth, but only in such as are clear and di∣stinct; that is, when upon the greatest consideration of the nature of a thing, there appears no ground or reason at all

to doubt concerning it; and this must suppose the minds ab∣straction wholly from the senses; for we plainly find that while we attend to them, we may judge our selves very cer∣tain and yet be deceived, as those who have an Icterism in their eyes, may judge with much confidence that they see things as clearly and distinctly as any other doth. Besides, there are many things taken for granted by men, which have no evidence of reason at all in them; Now if men will judge of the truth of things by such principles, no wonder if they be deceived. But when we speak of clear and distinct perception, we suppose the mind to proceed upon evident principles of reason, or to have such notions of things, which as far as we can perceive by the light of reason, do agree with the natures of the things we apprehend; if in such things then there be no ground of certainty, it is as much as to say our Faculties are to no purpose; which highly reflects either upon God or nature. It is a noble question, as any is in Philosophy, What is the certain 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the truth of things, or what ground of certainty the mind hath to proceed upon in its judgement of the truth of such objects as are represented to it? Nothing can render the Philosophy of Epicurus more justly suspected to any ••ational and inquisitive mind, then his making the senses the only certain conveyers of the truth of things to the mind. The senses I grant do not in themselves deceive any, but if I make the impressions of sense to be the only rule for the mind to judge by of the truth of things, I make way for the greatest impostures, and the most erring judgements. For if my mind affirms every thing to be in its proper nature ac∣cording to that Idea which the imagination hath received from the impressions upon the Organs of sense, it will be im∣possible for me ever to understand the right natures of things. Because the natures of things may remain the same, when all those things in them which affect the Organs of sense may be altered; and because the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter may make such an impression upon the senses, which may cause an Idea in us of that in the things themselves, which yet may be only in the manner of sensati∣on; As some Philosophers suppose it to be in heat and cold. Now if the mind judgeth of the nature of things according;

to those Idea's which come from the impressions made upon the Organs of sense; how is it possible it should ever come to a right judgement of the natures of things? So that in reference even to the grossest material beings, it must be the perception only of the mind which can truly inform us of their proper nature and essence. Besides there are many Idea's of things in the mind of man which are capable to have proper∣ties demonstrated of them, which never owed their original to our senses, and were never imported to the mind at the Keyes of the senses. Such are most Mathematical figures which have their peculiar properties and demonstrations; such are all the mutual respects of things to each other, which may be as certain and evident to the mind as its self is; now it is plain by this, that all certainty of knowledge is not conveyed by the senses; but our truest way of certain understanding the nature of any thing, is by the clear and distinct perception of the mind, which is founded on the Truth of our faculties; and that however we may be deceived when we do not make a right use of our reason, because of the imperfection of our present state; yet if we say our mind may be deceived when things are evident and clear to them upon plain principles of reason, it is highly to reslect upon that God who gave men ra∣tional faculties, and made them capable of discerning Truth from falshood.

2. That we have clear and distinct perception that necessity of existence doth belong to the nature of God. For which we are to consider the vast difference which there is in our notion of the nature of God, and of the nature of any other being. In all other beings, I grant we may abstract essence and exist∣ance from each other; now if I can make it appear, that there is evident reason, ex parte rei, why I cannot do it in the notion of God, then it will be more plain that necessity of existence doth immutably belong to his nature. It is manifest to our reason, that in all other beings which we apprehend the na∣tures of, nothing else can be implyed in the natures of them beyond bare possibility of existence; no, although the things which do apprehend, do really exist, because in forming an Idea of a thing, we abstract from every thing which is not implyed in the very nature of the thing; now existence be∣ing

only contingent and possible, as to any other being, it can∣not be any ingredient of its Idea, because it doth not be∣long to its essence; for we may fully apprehend the nature of the thing, without attributing existence to it. But now in our conception of a Being absolutely perfect, bare possibility or contingency of existence speaks a direct repugnancy to the Idea of kim; for how can we conceive that Being absolutely per∣fect, which may want that which gives life to all other per∣fections, which is existence? The only scruple, which mens minds are subject to in apprehending the force of this argu∣ment lies in this, Whether this necessary existence doth really belong to the nature of that being whose Idea it is, or else it be only a Mode of our conception in apprehending God? For clear∣ing of this, we must consider by what certain rules we can know when the composition of things together in the under∣standing, doth depend upon the meer operation of the mind, and when they do belong to the things themselves and their immutable nature. For which we have no rule so certain and evident as this is, that in those things which depend meerly on the act of the mind joyning together, the understanding cannot only abstract one thing from another, but may really divide them in its conceptions from each other: but in such things which cannot be divided from each other, but the essence of the thing is quite altered, it is a certain evidence that those things were not conjoyned by the meer act of the mind, but do immutably belong to the natures of the things themselves. As for instance, when I conceive a Triangle inscribed in a square, a man walking, a horse with wings, it is evident I may understand the natures of all these things without these affe∣ctions of them, because I can fully apprehend the nature of a Triangle without imagining a square, a man without walking, a horse without wings; thence it necessarily follows, that the joyning of these things together was meerly an act of the mind; but now I cannot conceive a Triangle not to have three angles equal to two right ones, nor a man that hath not rationality belonging to him; for if I divide these attributes from them, I destroy their natures; and therefore the joyning of these together is not any meer act of the mind, but these are such things as are implyed in the very notion of them,

and therefore immutably belongs to them. So now, when I conceive the notion of a body, I can imagine all perfections belonging to it, without conceiving it necessarily to exist; for it may be a body still, though it hath not its being from its self; but when I conceive a Being absolutely perfect, it is im∣possible to imagine it should have its being from any other; and if it be from its self, it must of necessity exist. For though the mind still be apt to doubt, whether existence in this Idea be only a mode of cogitation; yet that doubt may be easily removed, if the mind doth but attend to this, that at least possibility of existence doth belong to all those Beings which we have a clear Idea of in our minds; and the reason why we attribute bare possibility to them, is because we apprehend some reason in our minds which keeps us from attributing necessity of existence to them, as that it is not implyed in its nature, or that it doth depend on some other being, or that it wants infinite power, &c. Now all these reasons which make us attribute bare possibility of existence to any being, are taken away when we conceive a being absolutely perfect; for then existence is implyed among the number of perfections, and this being is dependent upon all others, and infinitely power∣full; so that nothing can hinder its existence; and therefore we must conclude that necessity of existence doth immutably belong to the nature and notion of God, and is not any mode only of our conception; because if we take away necessity of existence from God, we lose the notion of a Being absolutely perfect.

The third thing, that if necessary existence belongs to the nature of God, he doth exist, not only follows as a necessary conclusion from the other two, as the premises, but is in it * 1.31 self evident to any ones reason; for it implyes no less then a contradiction for a being to exist necessarily, and yet it be que∣stionable, Whether he doth exist or no? Thus much I suppose may suffice here to explain and enforce this argument; if any are yet unsatisfied, I referr them to those judicious Authors, who have made it their peculiar business to manage it, and vindicate it from all objections: Which falls in only here as an evidence that God hath imprinted a character of himself on the minds of men, seeing we have so clear and distinct an Idea

of such a being, from whom, if we take away necessity of existence, we destroy that notion which our minds have or an absolutely perfect Being. This is the first way whereby we ••an conceive an Infinite Being may make himself known to man∣kind, by imprinting an Indelible character of himself upon the soul, which can be attributed to none besides himself, without doing manifest violence to our own faculties, and suspecting our selves deceived in things which are most clear and evident to us.

I come to the second evidence which God hath given us of * 1.32 his own existence, which is the mark and impression which he hath left of an Infinite Wisdom and Counsel in the appearances which are in nature. There needs no great Criticism to find out the true Author of all the works of nature; the works themselves shew the Author as plainly, as if his effigies were drawn upon them. If the great curiosity and contrivance of any artificial engine speak the excellency of the Mechani∣cal wit of the framer of it; what ridiculous folly will it be to impute that rare mechanism of the works of nature to the blind and fortuitous motion of some particles of matter? Suppose a multitude of letters casually thrown together, should fall so handsomly in order, that we might read in them the names of Troja, Iuno, Aeneas, Dido, Turnus, Ascanius, or the like; is it possible for any to imagine that ever they should reach the grandeur, stile, matter and accuracy of the whole books of the Aeneids? So granting, that now matter being set in motion by a divine power, may by its continual agitation, at last produce some of the appearances of nature; yet what is this to the whole Universe, or the admirable con∣trivance of any one part in it? If these things had been the result of meer matter and motion, when once the particles of matter had been so united and settled together, as to produce any one species of animals in the world, (which it is almost unconceivable they should) yet we cannot think that if there had been but symmetry of parts enough for it meerly to subsist its self, and propagate more, there could have been any further attempt made by those Atoms which had been once settled in a determinate figure. How came it then to pass that there is not any one species of animals in the world,

but what hath such an order, symmetry and contrivance of parts which speaks more then meer necessity of subsistence; and therefore speaks them to be the effects or a suprenm Go∣vernour of the world, and not the products of meer matter? Is it possible that any, who is not before hand resolved to ex∣clude a Deity, should imagine that any particles of matter should fall into the exact form, order, motion, and serviceable∣ness to the world which the Heavenly bodies are in, without divine counsel and wisdom disposing of them? Tully tells us of a speech of Aristotle to this purpose; If we could suppose * 1.33 persons to have lived in some caverns of the earth, and to have enjoyed every thing there of pleasure, and riches, or whatever it is which we think makes mens lives happy, and had never been abroad upon the surface of the earth, but had only had some obscure report of an Infinite power and Being; and that after∣wards these persons should by an opening of the caverns wherein they were, come abroad into these parts of the world, and should suddenly behold the earth, Sea, and the Heavens, and observe the vastness of the clouds and violence of winds, and behold the bigness, beauty, and influence of the Sun, and how the day de∣pended upon his presence, and upon his withdrawing should view the face of the heavens again, (as it were the second course of nature) the order, and ornament of the Stars, the varieties of the light of the moon, their rising and setting, and their fixed, and immoveable courses, they could not hold from believing there was a Deity, and that these were the effects of his power. So vastly different are the free and natural emanations of our souls, from that which we force and strain out of our selves, by distorting and wringing those free principles of reason which God hath given us. When a few sorry experiments and some arbitrarious Hypotheses, must make us form other con∣ceptions of things, then the Majesty, order and beauty of them do naturally suggest to us: We see when once we can but ab∣stract our minds from those prejudices which continual con∣versation with the world brings upon us, by that speech of Aristotle, how readily our minds will frame an excellent com∣mentary upon those words of the royal Psalmist, The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the Firmament shews his bandy-work. To which purpose likewise those words of the

excellent Orator himself in another place are very observe∣able; Quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam * 1.34 stultè arrogantem, ut in se mentem & rationem putet inesse, in coelo mundóque non putet? aut ea quae vix summâ ingenii ra∣tione comprehendat, nulla ratione moveri putat? quem verb astrorum ordines, quem dierum noctiumque vicissitudines, quem mensium temperatio, quemque ea quae gignuntur nobis ad fruex∣dum, non gratume esse cogant, hunc hominem omninò numerare qui decet? What monstrous arrogancy would it be in any man to think there is a mind and reason in himself, and that there is none in the world? Or to think those things are moved without reason and understanding, which all that he hath is scarce able to comprehend? Neither can he deserve the name of a man, from whom the observation of the courses of the stars, the suc∣cession and order of seasons, and the innumerable benefits which he enjoyes in the world, does not extort gratitude towards that Being which ordered all these things. What a low opinion then had those more resined and generous spirits who went only upon principles of pure and undistorted reason, of those mean and ignoble souls which were inclined to Atheism; especially then, when Religion was so abused, that it was true of the wisest of them, what one said of Erasmus, Magis habuit quid fugeret quam quid sequeretur, they knew what to avoid, but not what they should embrace? And vet when they saw so much into the folly and superstition of Heathen worship, they saw the greatest reason still to adhere to the belief of a Deity, as may be clearly seen, especially in the second of those excellent Dialogues of Tully, de natura Deo∣rum. Where this particular argument to prove a Deity from the admirable contrivance of the works of nature, is mana∣ged with a great deal of ••loguence and reason, and by particu∣lar enumeration of most considerable parts of the Universe. So unbecoming a late Philosopher was that reason of his, why he waved the argument from the consideration of the world, to inferr a Deity, because the ends of God are unsearchable, as flowing from his Infinite wisdom. For what though God may conceal some things from men, which he intends, and are of no concernment for man to know, must therefore of necessity those ends of his be unsearchable in his works of Creation,

which referr so immediately to the advantage of lfe, and tend so much to the veneration of the Deity?

Nay the peculiar use and serviceableness of many parts of * 1.35 the Universe, especially of Animals, and chiefly of man, is so evident, that this hath been the main argument which hath induced some, otherwise Atheistical enough, to acknowledge and adore a Deity. And although the Epicureans be lamen∣tably puzzled to give any tolerable account of many other appearances in nature, yet they nowhere discover so much weakness and ignorance, as when they come to discourse De usu partium, about the contrivance of the parts of mans body. Whose opinion is thus briefly delivered by Lu∣cretius,

Nil ideo quoniam natum'st in corpore ut uti Possemus; sed quodnatum'st id procreat usum. * 1.36

i. e. that no-parts of mans body were designed for that use which they are imployed for, but the parts by chance fell into that form they are in, and men by degrees brought them to their present use and serviceableness. An opinion at first view so strangely unreasonable, that we cannot think Epicurus should have ever embraced it, had it not unavoidably followed upon his Hypothesis of all things in the Universe resulting only from a fortuitous concourse of Atoms: According to which he sup∣posed in man a different configuration of parts would hap∣pen, from the various agitation and concretion of those little particles which at first run together in the fashion of a man; and because that man had in him a more florid and vivacious spirit, made up of the most subtile and moveable Atoms, thence motion came into the several parts, suitable to the different conformation of them. And because those Atoms of which the soul is composed, are capable of sensation, thence it comes to pass, that it sees in the eye, hears in the ear, and smells in the nostrills. This is the most which is made of the opinion of Epicurus by the late sedulous vindicator of him, which yet himself calls intoleranda opinio; and it will appear to be so, not only as contradicting what God himself hath de∣livered concerning man, but what reason its self will easily

suggest from the consideration of the several parts of mans body. It must be confessed there were some Philosophers elder then Epicurus who were much inclined to this opinion, as Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and others; yet we find those who more narrowly searched into the natures of living creatures, were thereby brought to acknowledg a di∣vine providence which with a great deal of wisdom did order the several parts of animals, and adapted them to their pe∣culiar uses. And although Aristotle in his books de partibus animalium, hath said enough to refute the fond opinion of those Philosophers; yet none hath handled this argument with more exactness and accuracy, and with a more peculiar reflection on Epicurus, then Galen hath done in his excellent piece De usu partium. Which Gassendus thinks Galen writ with a kind of Enthusiasm upon him, (adeo totum opus vide∣tur * 1.37 conscriptum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) and so that all those seventeen books of his on that subject, are a kind of 119. Psalm in Philosophy, or a perpetual Hymn upon the praise of the great Creator, or a just Commentary on those words of the Psalm∣ist, Psal. 139. 14. I am fearfully and wonderfully made; marvellous are thy works, and that my soul knoweth right well. In the entrance of those books, Galen first shews the great variety of parts which is in several animals suitable to their several natures; the horse because of his swiftness and pride; hath the strongest hoofs and most curled main; the Lyon be∣cause of his fierceness and courage hath his strength lying in his teeth and paws; the Bull in his horns; the Boar in his tusks; the Hart and Hare being timerous creatures, their parts are made fittest for flight: but man, because he hath a principle of reason in him, hath no defensive or offensive wea∣pons in his body, but he hath hands to make use of both; which being joyned with and imployed by his reason, far ex∣ceed all those advantages which any other creatures have, being imployed not only to defend himself, but to build houses, make clothes, arms, nets, whatever is useful for himself, or hurtful to those creatures which he hath command over; but because man was made for society and civil converse, therefore his hands were not only imployed to defend himself or hurt other creatures, but for the mutual benefit and ad∣vantage

of mankind; for by these were Laws written, Tem∣ples built, all instruments of Arts framed; by them we enjoy the benefit of others wits, we can discourse with Plato, Ari∣stotle, Hippocrates, and other antients, though at such a di∣st••nce from us. Now that the configuration of parts is not the cause of the use of them afterwards; as the Lyons paw, of his courage, the Bulls horns of his fierceness, or the slen∣derness of the Hart of its fearfulness, appears by this, be∣cause the young ones of the several kinds of animals, before their parts are grown up, strive to make the same use of them which the others do. As Galen saith, he had often seen a Bull∣calf pushing with his head before any horns were grown out, and a Colt kicking when his hoofs were yet tender, and a young Boar defending himself with his jaws before he had any tusks; which is an evident argument that the parts were designed for the use, and not the use follow the parts. So, saith he, take three eggs, one of an Eagle, another of a Duck, and a third of a Serpent, and after they are hatched through a moderate heat, we shall find when they are but newly hatched, the two first will be striving to fly before they have wings, and the third endeavouring to creep away on its belly; and if you breed them up to greater perfection, and bring them into the open air, you will presently see the young Eagle mounting into the air, the Duck quoddling into a pool, and the Serpent creep under ground. Afterwards he comes particularly to handle the several parts of mans body, and first begins with the Hand, and shews in each part that it were impossible to have framed them with greater conveniency for their several uses then they have. The use of the hand is to take hold of any thing which man can use; now there being things of such different sizes which men may use, it had been impossible for the hand, if it had been one entire thing and undivided, that it could have held things greater or lesser then its self, but it must have been equal to it. But now as the fingers are placed and divided, they are equally fit for laying hold of objects of any size or quantity; For the least things, as a Barley corn, are taken up with the fore-finger and the thumb, things some∣what bigger are taken up by the same, but not by the extre∣mities of them as before; things somewhat bigger then these,

with the thumb, fore-finger and middle-finger, and so on by degrees, till at last the whole hand is used; so that the divisi∣on of the hand into fingers is necessary. Neither were this enough, but the very position of the fingers as they are, is ne∣cessary too; for they had been useless if they had been all divided in a right line; for the firmest hold is either circular or at least in two opposite points; but now this is provided for, by the position of the thumb which may equally joyn with any of the fingers in taking hold of any thing. After this, he largely shews the patticular necessity of the softness, round∣ness of the flesh, and nails on the tops of the fingers; and the special usefulness of these; and then comes to the bones of the fingers, how necessary they are for firm hold, and if there had been but one bone in each finger, they would have served only for those things which we take up when they are extended; but now seeing they have three several joynts, they are fitted for all kinds of things; for when we bow our fingers we use them as though they had no bones at all, and when we stretch them out, as though they were all but one entire bone; and the several inflections of the joynts serve for all kind of figures: and then he shews the necessity of the flesh within the fingers, and on either side of them, and upon them; and so with wonderful accuracy handles the magnitude, number, figure of the bones, and nature of the joynts of the fingers, and then the tendons and muscles belonging to the several fingers, which after he hath discoursed on through his first Book, he concludes it with the manifest inconveniency which would follow in the hand, were not every thing in it in that exact magnitude, position, and figure in which it is. With the same exactness he goes through all the parts of the body, handling in the second Book all that belongs to the arm, in the third the legs, in the fourth and fifth the Organs of nutrition, in the sixth and seventh the lungs, in the eighth and ninth the Head, in the tenth the peculiar and admirable fa∣brick of the eyes, in the eleventh the other parts of the face, in the twelfth the parts of the back, and so in the thirteenth, in the fourteenth and fifteenth the genitals, in the sixteenth the arteryes, veins, and nerves, and in the last the peculiar dis∣position and figure of all these parts, and the usefulness of

the whole design: Which is as great as can be in any work whatsoever, which is for us to take notice of the admirable wisdom of God in contriving the several parts of the body of man: So that, that whole book contains in it a most full and pregnant demonstration of a Deity, which every man carries about with him in the structure of his body, on which account men need not go out of themselves to find proof of a Deity, whether they consider their minds or their bodies, of which it may be more truly said, then Heraclitus of old did of his Stove, Etiam hic Dii sunt. So that of all persons, I should * 1.38 most wonder at those whose imployment particularly leads them to the understanding the parts and nature of mans body, if the proverb be not a great injury to them, since they have fuller insight into this demonstration of a Deity in the Fabrick of mans body, then many others who converse only with some jejune and sapless writings. And certainly, whatever is ima∣gined to the contrary by men of weak understandings, the best way to cure the world of Atheism is true Philosophy, or a search into the natures of things; which the more deep and profound it is, the more impossible will it be found to explicate all the phaenomena of nature by meer matter and Motion. It was wisely observed of a great person and Philosopher, that a narrow and slight inspection into nature, enclined men of weak heads to Atheism; but a more through-insight into the causes of things, made them more evidently see the necessary dependence of things on the great and wise Creator of them. A little knowledge of Philosophy is apt to make mens heads dizzy, and then in danger of falling into the gulf of Athe∣ism; but a more careful and diligent view of it, brings them into sobriety and their right wits again. Such a slight inspe∣ction had the followers of Epicurus into the nature of things; for when they found how in the present state of the world the various motion and configuration of the particles of matter would handsomly salve many appearances of nature, they drunk with the success, reel presently into an Infinite space, and there imagine they behold infinite worlds made of the concretion of Atoms, and ever since their eyes have been so dusted with these little Atoms, that they could see nothing else in the world but them. Which how gross and unreason∣able

it is, will appear, from our present subject; for who but Lucretius or Epicurus could ever think that our nostrils were at first fashioned as they are meerly by the violent impulse of the air within, which would force its self a passage out? But how came the air into the body before it was forced out? did it first break open the lips, make all that round cavity in the mouth, for a passage through the aspera arteria? but if when it was in, it would come out again, was not the mouth wide enough to let it go? or did the first man shut his mouth on purpose to finde another vent for the air? if so, how chance the force of the air did not carry away the epiglottis? or if it got safely up to the nose, how came it not to force a passage out about the eyes rather then to go down so low first? But if we believe these rare contrivers of mans body, all the inward vessels of the body were made by the course of water, as chan∣nels are; but how is it possible, to imagine that the Oesopha∣gus and the stomack should be so curiously contrived by the meer force of water? and that all the Intestines should be made only as channels to let it out again when it was once in? but how comes then such a kind of reciprocation and Perista∣ctick motion in those vessels? how come the several coats of them to be so firme? if it had been only a forced passage, it would have been direct and through the substance of the parts, as we finde it to be in all forced passages in the body of the earth. Besides, if the water received into the stomack forced the passage through the guts, how comes it not to run in the channel it had made for its self? or did it not like that passage when other things came into it, and therefore found out a more secret one into the bladder? but if that were made by the water, how came it to be so full of mem∣branes, and so subject to dilatation? Thus ridiculous will men make themselves, rather then shew themselves men in owning and adoring that infinitely wise and powerful God, who orders all things in the world according to the counsel of his Will. What can be more plain and evident then the peculiar use∣fulness of the several parts of mans body is? What other intent can be imagined that man is formed with a mouth, but only for taking in of nourishment, and for receiving and letting forth of air? or that an infant is so ready to open his

mouth, but that there are breasts and milk for him to suck in order to his nourishment? Why should the Oesophagus be so hollow and the stomack so wide, but that one was provided for the better conveyance of the meat down, and the other for the fermentation of it? whence come all the other vessels to be so conveniently placed, were it not for the distribution of nourishment into the several parts, or for conveying away the excrements of it? Can any one think that the several muscles and tendons should be placed in the more solid parts for any other end then for the better motion of them? or that the nerves should be derived from the brain into the several parts of the body for any other design then to be the instru∣ments of sense and motion? or that the continual motion of the heart should be for any other purpose, then for receiving and distribution of the blood through the arteries into the parts of the body? or that the eye with all its curious fabrick should be only accidentally imployed in seeing? These things are so plain, that however the Epicureans may more easily lose themselves and deceive others in explaining the appear∣ances of nature in some inanimate beings, yet when they come with their blind concourse of Atoms to give an account of the parts of animals, they miserably befool themselves and expose themselves only to contempt and pitty. It were easie to multiply examples in this kind, but I shall only mention one thing more, which is, if all the parts of mans body have no higher original then the concourse of Atoms in the first man and woman, by what were the umbilical vessels formed, whereby the Child in the womb receives its nourishment? by what atoms was the passage of the succus nutritius framed from the mother to the child? how come those vessels to close up so naturally upon the birth of the child, and it to seek its nourishment in quite another way? Will the particles of matter which by their concretion formed the first pair, salve this too? Thus still we see how impossible it is (to go no further then our selves) to give any tolerable account of things without an infinite power and Being which produced all these things, and hath left so plain an inscription of him∣self upon the works of nature, that none but those who shut their eyes can abstain from seeing it.

I come now to the third evidence of a Deity, which is, that * 1.39 there are some beings in the world which cannot depend upon matter or motion, i. e. that there are some spiritual and im∣material substances or Beings (for if the thing be acknow∣ledged, it is unbecoming a man to contend about words) the consequence of this for the proving a Deity, neither hath been nor I suppose will be denyed by such who question an infinite Being, the same principles leading to the denying and the proof of both, and immaterial Beings being the strongest proof that there is something above matter in the world. If there be then such things in the world which matter and motion cannot be the causes of, then there are certainly spi∣ritual and immaterial Beings, and that I shall make appear both as to the minds of men, and to some extraordinary effects which are produced in the world.

1. I begin with the nature of the soul of man. And herein I must confine my self to those arguments which directly prove my present purpose, and on that account must quit all those common arguments to prove the souls immortality from the attributes of God; for all these do suppose the existence of a Deity as already evident; neither can I rely with safety on the way which some have taken to prove the immortality of the soul meerly from the phoenomena of sensa∣tion, which they endeavour to prove cannot be performed by meer matter and motion; for granting all this, yet the ut∣most that can be proved by it is no greater immort••lity in our souls then in the souls of Brutes; and in the sense in which that is admitted, I suppose an Epicurean will not deny the soul of man to be immortal as Demonax in Lucian said, when he was asked whether the soul were immortal or no, it is (said he) but as all things else are; for those who make the soul to be nothing but some more subtile and active par∣ticles of matter, do not think that upon death they are an∣nihilated, but that only they are dispersed and dissipated, or in the Platonists phrase, may return to the soul of the world. These wayes I cannot think to be sufficient probations of such a spiritual and immaterial Being in man which we now en∣quire for, much less can I make use of so precarious and infirm an hypothesis as praeexistence, which makes men apt to suspect

the cogency of such reasons which tend to prove the immor∣tality of the soul, which are linked with a supposition, not only inevident either to sense or reason, but likewise needless and impertinent. For I know no one argument which doth di∣rectly prove the immateriality of the soul that doth in the least infer any necessity of praeexistence, but on the same ac∣counts it will prove the souls eternity. Being therefore thus at liberty to enquire into the nature of the soul considered in her self, our only way must be to finde out such peculiar properties in the soul of man, which cannot be salved on sup∣position there were nothing else but matter and motion in the world. Supposing then that all sensation in man doth arise from corporeal motion which is so strongly asserted by the modern Philosophers, and that the highest conceptions which depend on sense can amount no higher then imagi∣nation, which is evident; if it can then be proved that there is a principle of action in man which proceeds in a different way of operation then sensation does, and that there are such operations of the soul which are not imaginations, it will be then clear that there is a principle in man higher then matter and motion. Now although it be a task sufficiently difficult to explain the manner of sensation its self in a meer mecha∣nical way, supposing no higher principle then meer matter, yet it will appear far more difficult, nay impossible without a spiritual or immaterial Being to salve such appearances in man which transcend the power of imagination; which will appear by these following operations of the mind which every one who hath it, may finde within himself.

1. Correcting the errors of imagination. For if all our perceptions were nothing else but the images of corporeal things left in the brain, the judgement of the mind must of necessity be according to the impressions which are made upon the organs of sense. But now if our minds can and do form apprehensions of things quite different from those which are conveyed by sense, there must be a higher principle of know∣ledge in man then imagination is. For which the common instance of the just magnitude of the Sun is very plain; If we judge according to the image which is conveyed to the brain by our eyes, we can never imagine the Sun to be bigger then

he seems to us to be; nay though the sight be advantaged by the help of Telescopes, it cannot receive such an image or Idea of the Sun which answers to its just magnitude, viz that it is 160. times bigger then the earth. From whence now comes this apprehension of the bigness of the Sun above that proportion which can possibly come in at our senses? If it be said, that by the observation of the lessening of objects according to the proportion of distance, the mind may come to understand how much bigger the Sun may be then he seems, I grant it; but withall enquire how the imagination comes to have pro∣portions and distances which are me••r respects, and can have no corporeal phantasmes whereby to be represented to it; so that by this very way of ratiocination it is evident, that there is some principle in man beyond imagination. Again when the mind by ratiocination hath proceeded thus far and sindes the Sun to be so great, what Idea is there of this magnitude in the mind? the mind cannot six its self on any thing but it must have an Idea of it; from whence comes this Idea? not from corporeal phantasmes; for none of them could ever con∣vey the cue magnitude of the Sun to the mind, and there∣fore the forming of this Idea must be a pure act of Intellection which corrects the errors of imagination, and is a principle above it. So in the sight of a stick, when under water, the representation of it by the sense to imagination is as crooked, for corporeal motion carries things to the eye without any judgement upon them; the eye conveyes the image to the brain, and according to the rules of corporeal perception must pre∣sently take every thing for true which is conveyed thither; now from what principle is it that this error of our senses is correcteà? So in many other things wherein our imaginati∣ons are quite puzled, and when we go according to them, it is impossible to apprehend things as our reason tells us they are; thus as to the Antipodes, our imaginations are wholly of the mind of the ancients, that the Antipodes to us must needs be in danger of knocking their heads against the Stars, and if they go upon any thing, it must be their heads, and that that part of the Heavens which is in the other Hemisphere is below us; these are pertinacious srrors of imagination while we adhere to that, and are only corrigible by our reason which makes

it evident to be otherwise. Besides, there are many things our reason and understanding inform us that they may be, and yet our imaginations can form no Idea of them; let an Epicurean Philosopher try the power of his imagination in his Inane or Infinite empty space, and he will soon finde, that as strong as his Phancy is, it will soon tire and retreat as not being able to course through so unimaginable a Space. So for eternal duration our reason tells us the thing is possible, but when our imaginations begin to fardle up some conceptions of it, they are presently tying both ends together; which will make a strange Idea of eternity; the case is the same in the infinite divisibility of quantity, which Epicurus was some∣what aware of when he denied the thing. But how many Mathematical Problems are there which will jade our imaginations presently, and yet our reason stands still and assures us of the possibility of the things, as in two lines coming nearer still to each other, and yet never meeting, and in many other things, which most clearly evidence that there is a higher faculty in man which exceeds matter and motion, when it is able thus to correct the faults and to supply the defects of imagination.

2. Reflex acts of the mind upon its self argue a higher principle then imagination. That there are such things are * 1.40 evident to any one who hath any use of cogitation; and if any one doubt of it, his very doubting argues he hath reflex acts; for he could not doubt whether he had or no, but by reflection upon himself. Now that reflex acts should be caused through matter and motion, or through meer imagination, is uncon∣ceivable. For we see no matter can act upon its self; indeed one part of extended matter may act upon another, but not purely upon its self; the extremities of the fingers can never feel themselves, though they may touch each other; neither can imagination reflect on its self; for that proceeding upon corporeal images, must have such a representation from the senses of what it acts upon; now what image of its self can be conveyed to the imagination through the external organs of sense? The eye may see through the motion of the objects of sight pressing upon it; but how can it see that it sees? so the imagination receives the images conveyed to the brain; but

what shop hath it to make new ones in of its self, and so be guilty of the greatest Idolatry of worshipping its own Image? But though the imagination cannot thus reflect, yet we finde such a principle within us that is very apt to retire into its self, and recollect things which could never have been conserved so long in that shop of shadows the imagination. For if imagination be nothing else but as a modern Philosopher defines it, conception remaining, and a little and little decaying from and after the act of sense, like the motion of water after a * 1.41 stone is thrown into it, how is it possible that at so great a distance of years, as we commonly finde, the image of a thing may be retrieved with as much facility and freshness as to circumstances, as if it were but new done? and that account which he gives of remembrance is very weak and insufficient when he tells us, that remembrance is nothing else but the missing of parts, which every man expecteth should succeed after * 1.42 they have a conception of the whole. For according to this, it is impossible for the mind to retrieve any object without mutilation of it; and so there cannot possibly be a recollecting of all circumstances, when an object is once passed, and the motion begins to decay. But all this while, we understand nothing by what means this decaying motion should continue so long as our memory can fetch things back, or by what means an object when once passed, can be recovered again if memory be nothing else but decaying motion. Such perplexi∣ties must needs arise, when men will undertake to salve the inward operations of the soul by meer motion; but is it not evident that many times when the mind is imployed about other things, some phantasmes of things long ago past will come and present themselves to the mind, with as much clear∣ness as if new done? whereas if memory were decaying motion, the longer past, the more impossible would it be to recover any thing; but, do we not finde that many old men will better remember the circumstances of many things they did in their Childhood then a year or two before? Besides we see what quickness and vivacity there is in our intellectual faculties above corporeal motion, with what facility the mind turns it self from one object to another, how suddenly it rangeth the whole world, how it trips over mountains, crosseth the ocean,

mounts to the skies and at last quarryes upon its self, and all in the twinkling of an Intellectual eye? As quick as the eye of the body is, the mind far exceeds it, and can withdraw the imagination from attending the organs of sense; thus do men who have their minds much fixed, fix their eyes too; and yet afterwards can scarce tell themselves what they have looked on all that while. Sometimes the mind sits and com∣pares phantasmes together, and sports its self in sorting them into several ranks and orders, and making matches between such things which are sure to have no affinity with each other, which are thence called entia rationis or the creatures of the mind. And can all these and many other such opera∣tions which men are conscious to themselves of, be nothing else but the motion of some flegmatick matter, the reaction of the brain, and the meer effects of imagination?

3. The profound speculations of the mind argue a power far above imagination and corporeal motion. I wonder how Epicurus his soul, when if we believe him, it was made up of Atoms, could ever imagine an Infinite Vacuity? Could meer Atoms ever dispute whether they were Atoms or no? For I doubt not but Epicurus was fain to argue much against himself, before he could perswade himself to so stupendious a piece of folly? Were there nothing in man but meer corporeal motion, whence came the dispute, whether the soul were corporeal or no? Can Atoms frame Syllogismes in mood and figure? and meer matter argue pro and con, whe∣ther it be matter or something else? What kinde of aëreal particles were their souls compounded of, who first fancied themselves to be immaterial? What strange agitations of matter were those which first made men think of an eternal state? which thoughts have ever since so stuck upon these little sphaerical bodyes, that they could never yet disburden themselves of them: Whence come such amazing fears, such dreadful apprehensions, such sinking thoughts of their future condition in minds that would fain ease themselves by be∣lieving that death would put a period both to soul and body? whence on the other side come such encouraging hopes, such confident expectations, such comfortable prepossessions of their future state in the souls of good men, when their bodyes are

nearest to the grave? Seneca who was somewhat dubious sometimes as to the future condition of the soul, yet could tell his dear Lucilius with what pleasure he could think of it; and could elsewhere say of the soul, E•• hoc habet argumentum * 1.43 divinitatis suae quod illum divina delectant, nec ut alienis in∣terest sed ut suis: the soul had that mark of Divinity in it, that it was most pleased with Divine speculations, and conversed with them as with matters which nearly concerned it. And when it hath once viewed the dimensions of the heavens, contemnit domicilii prioris angustias, it was ashamed of the cottage it dwelt in; nay were it not for these speculations, non fuerat operae pr••tium nasci, it had not been worth while for the soul to have been in the body; and as he goes on, detrahe hoc inaestimabile bonum, non est vita tanti ut sudem, ut aestuem. Could there be now so great an Epicurisme in contemplation, were the soul of man of Epicurus his mould, a meer complexion of Atoms? would dull and heavy matter ever have delighted to have searched so much into the causes of things, to have gone over the world in its speculations, and found more sweetness in knowledge, then the little Epicure the Bee tasts in his choicest flowers? Epicurus his own Philosophy is a de∣monstration against himself; if his soul had not been of a purer nature then he fancied, he would never have made his study of Philosophy a part of his Epicurisme? Had his soul been such Atoms, as he fancied, when his brain had been well heated at his study, those more vivid and spirituous particles, like the spirits of wine had been in danger of evaporation, and leaving the more lumpish matter to compleat his work. Of all persons, I most admire that Philosophers who make so much use of their understandings, should so ungratefully requite them, and serve them like old horses, when they have made them do all the service they could, turn them into the high∣wayes and let them dye in a ditch. But yet all Philosophers have not been so unthankful; some have understood the worth of their souls and asserted it, if they have not used too high, i. e. Platonical expressions of it, making it a par∣ticle not of matter, but of the Divine nature its self, a lit∣tle Deity in a Cottage, that stayes here a while and returns

to that upper region from whence it came. As Manilius speaks,

An dubium est habitare Deum sub pectore nostro, In coelum que redire animas, caelóque venire? * 1.44

And while the soul is here in its cage, it is continually flutter∣ing up and down, and delighting to look out now at this part, and then at another, to take a view by degrees of the whole Universe; as the same Poet goes on

Quid mirum noscere mundum Si possunt homines, quibus est & mundus in ip sis: Exemplumque Dei quisque est in imagine parvâ?

The soul hath nothing more delightful to it then knowledge, and no knowledge so pleasing and satisfactory as of him whose image and superscription it bears, who makes himself most known to such as enquire after him;

Seque ipsum inculcat & offert Ut bene cognosci possit.

I conclude this with that of Seneca in that excellent Preface to his natural questions; O quam contempta res est homo nisi supra humana se erexerit! What a pittiful thing is man, were it not that his soul was apt to soar above these earthly things? And by this aptness to soar so high above these terrene objects, and to converse with so much freedome with spiritual Beings, as well as abstracted notions, we may cer∣tainly infer that our rational souls are of a far more noble and refined nature, then that more feculent principle of imagination which alwayes converses in faece Romuli, and can go no further then our senses carry it. And thus I have made good the first proof, that there is something above matter and motion in the world, which is from that immaterial Being which is in man. * 1.45

The next evidence which we have of a Being above matter

and motion, is from the extraordinary eff••cts which have been in nature. I speak not now meerly of such things which by their natures and effects are manifested to proceed from some Beings which bear ill-will to mankind, multitudes of which are related by men Philosophical and inquisitive, with such enumerations of circumstances, and particular evidences, that they are not meer impostures, that one may on the same grounds question any matter of fact which himself did not see, as such relations which are delivered by persons without interest or design, and such as were able to judge of the truth of circumstances; such are both ancient and modern Philo∣sophers, Physitians, Statesmen and others. Neither shall I insist on such prodigies which ofttimes presage revolutions in states, if we believe Machiavel himself, who in a whole chapter designedly proves it; and professeth himself utter∣ly * 1.46 to seek for the causes of them, unless they may be attri∣buted to some spi••its and Intelligences in the air which give the world notice of such things to come. But those things which I suppose have the most clear and undoubted evidence of true and undoubted miracles, (the matters of fact being affirmed by eye-witnesses who sealed the truth of them with their lives) are those recorded in the Holy Scriptures; which there are only two wayes to evade, either by question∣ing the truth of the things, which I suppose in the precedent book we have proved with as much rational evidence as any thing of that nature is capable of, or else that the things therein recorded might be salved without a Deity. For which only two wayes have been excogitated by Atheistical spirits, either attributing them to the power and influence of the Stars, the foundations of which fond and absurd opinion have been taken away by those many writers, who have rationally consuted the whole art of judicial Astrology; or * 1.47 else that they are done by the meer power of imagination, which is the way of Avicenna and some other Arabick writers, which is so wilde an effect of the power of ima∣gination, that nothing doth so much demonstrate the ir∣regular motions of it, as such an opinion doth; and is sufficiently derided and refuted by Pomponatius himself.

Now then it being an acknowledged principle in nature, that every thing continues in the course it is in, till something more powerful put it out, if then such things have been in the world, which have been real alterations of the course of nature, as the Suns standing still in the time of Joshua, then there must be something above matter and motion, and con∣sequently that there is a God.

CHAP. II. Of the Origine of the Universe.

The necessity of the belief of the creation of the world in order to the truth of Religion. Of the several Hypotheses of the Philosophers who contradict Moses: with a particular ex∣amination of them. The ancient tradition of the world con∣sonant to Moses: proved from the Ionick Philosophy of Thales, and the Italick of Pythagoras. The Pythagorick Cabbala rather Aegyptian then Mosaick. Of the fluid matter which was the material principle of the universe. Of the Hypothesis of the eternity of the world asserted by Ocellus Lucanus, and Aristotle. The weakness of the foundations on which that opinion is built. Of the manner of forming principles of Philosophy. The possibility of crea∣tion proved. No arguing from the present state of the world against its beginning shewed from Maimonides. The Platonists arguments from the goodness of God for the eternity of the world answered. Of the Stoical Hypothesis of the eternity of matter; whether reconcilable with the text of Moses. Of the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras con∣cerning the praeexistence of matter to the formation of the world. The contradiction of the eternity of matter to the nature and attributes of God. Of the Atomical Hypothesis of the Origine of the Universe. The World could not be produced by a casual concourse of Atoms proved from the nature and motion of Epicurus his Atoms, and the Phaeno∣mena of the Universe, especially the production and nature of Animals. Of the Cartesian Hypothesis, that it cannot salve the Origine of the Universe without a Deity giving motion to matter.

THE foundations of religion being thus established in * 1.48 the Being of God and the immortality of the soul, we now come to erect our super structure upon them, by assert∣ing the undoubted truth▪ and certainty of that account of the

world which is given us in the writings of Moses. Which beginning with the world its self leads us to a particular con∣sideration of the Origine of the Universe, the right under∣standing of which hath very great influence upon our belief of all that follows in the Word of God. For although we should assert with Epicurus the Being of a Deity, if yet with him we add that the world was made by a casual concourse of Atoms, all that part of Religion which lies in obedience to the Will of God is unavoidably destroyed. All that is left, is only a kind of Veneration of a B••ing more excellent then our own, which reacheth not to the government of mens lives, and so will have no force at all upon the generality of the world, who are only allured by hopes or awed by fears, to that which of their choice they would be glad to be freed from. Besides what expressions of gratitude can be left to God for his goodness if he interpose not in the affairs of the world? what dependence can there be on divine goodness, if it be not at all manifested in the world? what apprehensions can we have of Gods infinite Wisdom and Power, if neither of them are discernable in the Being of the world? And as the opinion of Epicurus destroys Religion, so doth that of Ari∣stotle which attributes eternity to the Universe, and a ne∣cessary emanation of it from the first cause, as light comes from the Sun; for if so, as Maimonides well observes, the whole Religion of Moses is overthrown, all his miracles are but * 1.49 impostures, all the hopes which are grounded on the Promises of God, are vain and fruitless. For if the world did of necessity exist, then God is no free agent; and if so, then all instituted Religion is to no purpose; nor can there be any expectation of reward, or fear of punishment from him who hath nothing else to do in the world, but to set the great wheele of the Heavens going. So much is it our concernment to enquire into the true Original of the world; and on what evidence of reason those opinions are built, which are so contrary to that account given of it in the very entrance of the B••oks of Mo∣ses. Wherein we read the true Origine of the world to have been by a production of it by the omnipotent Will and Word of God. This being then the plain assertion of Moses we come to compare it in point of reason, with all those several Hypo∣theses

which are repugnant to it, which have been embraced in several ages by the Philosophers of greatest esteem in the world. Which may be reduced to these four: 1. Such as suppose the world to have existed as it is from all eternity. 2. Such as attribute the formation of the world as it is to God: but withall assert the praeexistence and eternity of matter. 3. Such as deny any eternity to the world, but assert the Origine of it to have been by a casual concourse of Atoms. 4. Such as endeav••ur to explain the Origine of the Universe and all appearances of nature, meerly by the Mechanical Laws of the motion of matter.

I begin with those who asserted the eternity of the world as * 1.50 it is among whom Aristotle hath born the greatest name; who seems to have arrogated this opinion to himself; for when he enquires into the judgment of the Philosophers, who had writ-before him, he sayes of them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.51 all the Philosophers asserted that the world was made, though some one way, some another. And were this true which Aristotle-saith, it would be the strongest prejudice against his opinion; for if the world had been eternal, how should it come to pass, that the eldest Philosophers should so readily and unanimously embrace that opinion which asserted the production of the world? Was it not a strong presumption of the Novity of the Universe, that all Nations to whom the Philosophers resorted, had memorials left among them of the first Origine of things? And from hence it is observable, that when the humour of Philosophizing began to take the Greeks (about the XL. Olympiad when we may suppose Thales to flourish) the beginning of the world was no matter of dispute, but taking that for granted, the enquiry was out of what material principle the Universe was formed; of which Thales thus delivers his opinion in Tully; aquam * 1.52 dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem quae ex aqua cuncta fingeret; wherein he plainly distinguisheth the efficient from the material cause of the world. The prime efficient was God, the material principle water. It is a matter of some enquiry, whether the first principles of Philosophy among the Greeks, were not rather some traditional things conveyed to them from others, then any certain Theoryes

which they had formed from their own experiments and observations. The former is to me far the more probable on many accounts, but chiefly on this, that the first principles of the two founders of the chief sects of Philosophers, viz. the Ionick, and Italick, (for all the other were but the various issues of these two) did come so near to that which we have the greatest reason to believe to have been the most certain account of the Origine of the world. For this opinion of Thales seems to have been part of that universal tradition which was continued in the world concerning the first prin∣ciples of things: For I do not see any reason to aver with so much confidence, as some do, that those Philosophers who spake any thing consonantly to Moses, must presently con∣verse with the Iews, transcribe their opinions out of the Scriptures, or have it conveyed to them in some secret Cab∣bala of the Creation, as it is affirmed of Pythagoras and Plato, and may be with no less reason of Thales. But this I sup∣pose may be made evident to any considerative person, that those Philosophers of Greece who conversed most abroad in the world, did speak far more agreeably to the true account of things, then such who only endeavoured by their own wits to improve or correct those principles which were de∣livered by the other Philosophers. Which I impute not so much to their converse with the Mosaick writings, as to that universal tradition of the first ages of the world, which was preserved far better among the Phaenicians, Aegyptians, Chaldeans, and others then among the Greeks. For which we have this evident reason, that Greece was far more bar∣barous and rude in its elder times then those other Nations were, which had means of preserving some monuments and general reports of the first ages of the world when the Grae∣cians wanted them. And therefore we finde that Greece from its beginning shined with a borrowed light; and saw not by an extromission of rayes of knowledge from its self, but by an intromission of those representations of things which were received from other Nations. Those who formed Greece first into civil societies, and licked it into the shape of well ordered Commonwealths, were such who had been traders for knowledge into sorraign parts. To which pur∣pose

Diodorus Siculus informs us that Lycurgus and Solon, as well as the Poets, Orpheus, Musaeus, Melampus and Homer, * 1.53 and the Philosophers, afterwards Pythagoras, Plato and others, had gained most of their knowledge and wisdom out of Aegypt; nay, he saith in general, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. All those who were re∣nowned among the Greeks for wisdome and learning, did in an∣cient time resort to Aegypt, to be acquainted with their Laws and knowledge. On this account therefore we are not to seek for the ancient and genuine tradition of the world from the native and home-bred Greeks, such as Aristotle and Epi∣curus, but from those who took the pains themselves to search into those records which were preserved among the elder and more knowing Nations; And although the Na∣tions they resorted to, sought to advance their own reputa∣tion in the histories of their ancient times, of which we have already given a large account, yet they were more faithful in the account which they gave of the Origine of the whole Universe. For it appears from Diogenes Laertius that the Aegyptians did constantly believe, that the world had a be∣ginning, and was corruptible; that it was sphaerical and the Stars were of the nature of fire; that the soul was of an im∣mortal * 1.54 nature, and did pass up and down the world. Which Lacrtius cites from Hecataeus and Ariscagoras. So that we need not make Pythagoras acquainted with such a Cabbala of the Creation, which in all probability neither the Iews nor he ever dreamt of; we finde a fair account may be given of most of the opinions of Pythagoras, and whence he derived them, without forcing the words of Moses into such a sense, which the plainness and perspicuity of the writings of Moses argue them not capable to admit of. But I will not deny from those concurrent testimonies of Hermippus and Aristo∣bulus, * 1.55 besides Origen, Porphyrie, Clemens Alexandrinus, and others, that Pythagoras might have had opportunity of con∣versing with the Iews, (which it is most probable was in Chaldea after the Captivity, at which time Pythagoras was there among them) but that Pythagoras should converse with the successors of Elisha on mount Carmel, as V••ssius

thinks, or that Moschus the Sidonian Philosopher in Iambli∣chus should be Moses, as others fancy, or that praeexistence * 1.56 of souls should be part of the Mosaick Cabbala, or that the Pythagorick numbers, as they are explained by Nicomachus Gerasenus in Photius, should be adaequate to the dayes of the Creation Cabbalistically understood, are fancyes too extra∣vagant and Pythagorean to be easily embraced. If Pythago∣ras was circumcised, it was more for Love of the Aegyptians then the Iews, among whom he spent his twenty two years; if praeexistence of souls be a rational hypothesis, we may thank the Aegyptians for it, and not Moses; if numbers be so ex∣pressive of the work of Creation, we are beholding to the Arithmetical Hieroglyphicks of Aegypt for them. But al∣though Pythagoras might not be acquainted with such a Phi∣losophick * 1.57 Cabbala of the Creation, which none of the Iews as far as we can finde understood, till one more versed in Plato and Pythagoras then in the learning of his own Nation, viz. Philo of Alexandria, began first to exercise his wit on the text of Moses with Platonick notions; yet I shall easily grant that Pythagoras by means of his great industry and converse with the learned Nations, might attain to far greater knowledge of many mysterious things in natural Philosophy, and as to the Origine of the Universe, then any of the Homebred Philosophers of Grecce, or it may be then any one of the Nations he resorted to, because he had the advan∣tage of comparing the several accounts of them together, and extracting out that which he judged the best of them. And hence Plutarch tells us, that the first principles of the world according to Pythagoras, were these two, the one was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 an active and form∣ing * 1.58 principle, and that was God whom he called Mind (as Anaxagoras likewise did) the other was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 passive and material, which is, the visible world.

And thus we see these two renowned founders of the Ionick * 1.59 and Italick societies of Philosophers, both giving their concur∣rent Testimony with Moses as to the true Origine of the world, and not at all differing from each other; for thus Thales speaks in Diogenes Laertius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.60

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. God is the eldest Be∣ing, because unbegotten, the world the most beautiful, because it is Gods workmanship. To which those expressions of Plato in his Timaeus come very near (whose Philosophy was for substance the same with the Pythagorean) when he had be∣fore * 1.61 ascribed the production of the world to the goodness of God, which goodness of his did incline him to make all other things like himself. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For the most excellent Being cannot but produce the most excellent effects. And as to the material principle out of which the world was made, there appears no great difference between the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Thales, and the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Plato and Pythagoras; for Plato, when he tells us what a kind of thing the material principle was, he describes it thus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which as Chal∣cidius * 1.62 renders it, is motis importuno fluctuans neque unquam quiescens; it was a visible corporeal thing (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) which was never at rest, but in continual disorderly motion and agitation: which is a full explication, I suppose, of what Thales meant by his water, which is the same with that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or mixture of mud and water together, which others speak of as the Principle of the Universe; as Orphius in Athenago∣ras, and the Scholiast on Apollonius cited by Grotius and * 1.63 others. Which we have the more reason to believe, because the successors of Thales, Anaximander and Anaxagoras, ex∣press themselves to that purpose: Anaximander called the Sea 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the remainder of the Primitive moisture: and Anaxagoras sayes before the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or God set things in their order, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, all things were at first confused together: which must needs make that which Chalcidius tells us Numenius attributes to Pythagoras which his translator calls Sylvam fludiam, or fluid matter. * 1.64 Which is the same likewise with the Phaenicians 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which as appears by Eusebius, some call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, others 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some mud, or slime, others the putrefaction of watery * 1.65 mixtures, which they say was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the seedplot of the Creation and the Generation of things. Thus we see how Thales with the Phaenicians from whom he was de∣rived, as Laertius tells us and Pythagoras, with the Aegyp∣tians

and others concur with Moses, not only in the produ∣ction of the world, but in the manner of it, wherein is ex∣pressed a fluid matter which was the material principle out of which the world was formed, when we are told that the earth was without form and void, and the Spirit of God moved upon * 1.66 the face of the waters, i. e. that all at first was but fluid mat∣ter; for P. Fagius from R. Kimchi renders 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which fluid matter was agitated and moved by the Divine spirit, or the vis plastica mundi, so Chrysostom calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and so Drusirts and P. Fagius explain 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by motion or agita∣tion. And herein we have likewise the consent of those for••∣named excellent Philosophers, who attribute the Origine of particular things in the world to this agitation or motion of the fluid matter. For Chalcidius speaking not only of Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, but of Anaximenes, Heraclitus and others, sayes thus of them, omnesigitur hi—in motu positam rerum * 1.67 originem censuërunt: they all agreed in this, that the Origine of things was to be ascribed to the motion of the parts of matter. So the Phaenicians called this motion of the particles of matter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a dark and blustering wind. And how suitable this explication of the Origine of things from the motion of fluid matter is to the history of nature, appears by those many experiments by which mixt bodyes are shewed to spring from no other material principle then the particles of fluid matter. Of which you may read a discourle of that ingenious and learned Gentleman Mr. Boyle in his Sceptical Chymist. Only thus much may here suffice to have made it * 1.68 appear, that all those Philosophers who were most inquisitive after the ancient and genuine tradition of the world concern∣ing the first beginning of things, did not only concur with Moses in the main thing, that its beginning was from God, but in the particular circumstances of it, as to the fluid matter and the motion thereof. Concerning which I may yet add; if it be material, the Testimony of Homer in Plutarch,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.69

And in Chalcidius: Inque eadem sententia Homerus esse in∣venitur, cum Oceanum & Thetim dicat parentes esse geniturae; * 1.70

cumque jusjurandum Deorum constituat aquam, quam quidem ipse appellat Stygem, antiquitati tribuens reverentiam, & jure * 1.71 jaranao nihil constituens reverentius. To which purpose like∣wise Aristotle speaks in his Metaphysicks, that the reason * 1.72 why Styx was made the oath of the Gods, was because water was supposed to be the material principle of Things, which he saith was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a most an∣cient tradition concerning the Origine of the Universe. And tells us before, that some were of opinion 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the most ancient and remote persons and first writers of Theology, held this opinion of water being the first material principle of things.

Having thus made it appear what a consent there was be∣tween the ancient tradition of the world, and the writings of * 1.73 Moses concerning the Origine of the world; I now come to consider upon what pretence of reason this tradition came to be contradicted, and the eternity of the world asserted. For which we are to consider that the difference of the former Philosophers of the Ionick sect, after the time of Thales, as to the material principle of the world, one substituting air, ano∣ther fire instead of water, rendred the tradition its self suspected among other Philosophers, especially when the humour of innovating in Philosophy was got among them, and they thought they did nothing unless they contradicted their Masters; thence came that multiplicity of Sects pre∣sently among them, and that Philosophy which at first went much on the original tradition of the world, was turned into disputes and altercations, which helped as much to the finding out of Truth, as the fighting of two Cocks on a dunghil doth the finding out the Iewel that lyes there. For which, scrap∣ing and searching into the natures of things had been far more proper, then contentions & wranglings with each other; but by means of this litigious humour Philosophy from being a design grew to be a meer Art, and he was accounted the best Philosopher, not that searched further into the bowels of nature, but that dressed and tricked up the notions he had in the best posture of defence against all who came to oppose him. From hence those opinions were most plausible, not

which were most true, but which were most defensible, and which like Des-Cartes his second element, had all the Angles cut off, on which their adversaries might have an advantage of justling upon them, and then their opinions were account∣ed most pure when they were so sphaerical, as to pass up and down without interruption. From such a degeneracy of Philosophy as this we have now mentioned, arose the opinion of the eternity of the world; For the certain tradition of the world being now lost in a croud of Philosophers, whose main aim was to set up for themselves, and not to trade with the common bank, so that there could be no certain and con∣victive evidence given to a shuffling Philosopher that things were ever otherwise then they are, they found it most de∣fensible to assert that the world never had a beginning nor would have an end, but alwayes did and would continue in the State they were in. This opinion, though Aristotle seems to make all before him to be of another mind, yet was hatched as far as we can finde at first, under Pythagoras his successors by Ocellus Lu••anus, as appears by his book still extant 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the nature of the Universe; to whom Aristotle hath not been a little beholding, as Ludov. Nogarola hath in part manifested in his notes on Ocellus, although Aristotle had not the ingenuity of Pliny, agnoscere per quos profecerit. From Aristotle this opinion, together with his name, spread its self much farther, and became the opinion most in vogue among the Heathen Philosophers, espe∣cially after the rise of Christianity; for then not only the Peripateticks, but the modern Platonists, Plotinus, Apuleius, Taurus, Iamblichus, Alcinous, Proclus and others were all engaged in the defence of the eternity of the world, thinking thereby the better to overthrow Christianity. Hence came the hot and eager contests between Proclus, Simplicius, and Philoponus, who undertook to answer Proclus his eighteen arguments for the eternity of the world, and to charge Ari∣stotle with self-contradiction in reference to it. But no∣thing were they more troubled about then to reconcile the Timaeus of Plato with the eternity of the world, which they made to be a meer Hypothesis and a kind of Diagramme to salve providence withall; although the plain words of Pl••to

not only there but elsewhere do express, as far as we can judge by his way of writing, his real judgement to have been for the production of the world by God. For which purpose we have this observable Testimony in his Sophista, where he * 1.74 divides all manner of productions of things into divine and humane, and opposes the opinion that conceived all things to be produced by an eternal power, to the opinion of the vulgar which saith he, was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that all things were produced by a blind force of nature without any reason or counsel, to which he op∣poseth the other opinion, that they are made 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by a divine power with infinite reason and wisdom; and when Theaetetus expresseth himself in an Academical way as to either of these opinions, the hospes Eleatensis who there acts the part of the Philosopher, tells him, if he thought he were inclinable to the other opinion, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. He would undertake to make him confess the contrary by the evi∣dence of reason which he would bring. And we shall see what great reason there is for this opinion, when we consider what weak and infirm foundations the contrary is built upon. For all the arguments which either Ocellus, or Aristotle, or the modern Platonists make use of, are built on these follow∣ing suppositions which are all false. 1. That it is unconceivable that things should ever have been in any other state then they are. 2. That there is no other way of production but by Generation. 3. That God is no free agent, but produceth the world by necessity of nature.

1. That it is unconceivable that things should ever have been any otherwise then they are. The reason of which sup∣position * 1.75 was this, that the general conclusions of reason which they proceed upon in Philosophy, were taken up from the observation of things as they are at present in the world. Which is evident from the ground of Aristotles condemning the opinion of Empedocles who asserted the production of the world, and yet the incorruptibility of it. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which he accounts impossible and gives this as his reason. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.76 For, saith he, nothing else

can be rationally asserted, but what we finde to be in all things or at least in most; now because there could nothing be found in the world which was produced (i. e. by generation) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impossible it should be so with the Universe. By which we evidently see what the grand principles of reason among the Philoso∣phers were: viz. such observations as they had made from the present course of nature in the order of the Universe. From hence arose that strong presumption among them, which hath been so taken for granted, that it hath been looked on as a common notion of bumane nature, viz. exnihilo nihil fit, which was the main argument used by them to * 1.77 prove the eternity of the world: and by others to prove the praeexistence of matter. So Ocellus argues against both the dissolution and production of the world from this principle; if the world be dissolved, saith he, it must either be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, either into that which is, or into that which is not; it cannot be dissolved into that which is, because then the Uni∣verse cannot be destroyed; for that which is, is either the Uni∣verse or a part of it: neither can it be dissolved into that which is not, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For it is impossible that a thing should be made out * 1.78 of that which is not, or be dissolved into nothing. And Aristotle somewhere tells us, that it is a principle which all the writers of natural Philosophy are agreed in (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.79 that it is impossible for any thing to come out of nothing. But now when we observe upon what grounds this Principle was took up by these Philosophers, we have no reason to ad∣mit of it as an Universal standard of nature. For we finde by these Naturalists who thus asserted this principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the course of Generations in the world, or from the works of art, both which suppose matter praeexistent, and from these short collections they form this universal Maxime. And from hence when they discoursed of the manner whereby God did * 1.80 produce the world, their imaginations ran presently upon that which the Epicurean in Tully enquires after, quae mo∣litio? quaeferramenta? qui vectes? quae machinae? qui mi∣nistri

tanti oper is fuërunt? they apprehend God only as an Artificer that contrives the world first into a platform, and then useth instruments to erect it, and consequently still sup∣pose the matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of Balbus in Tully when he comes to discourse of the nature of God; in quo nihil est difficilius quam à consuetudine * 1.81 oculorum aciem mentis abducere; nothing is more difficult then to abstract our minds from the observations of this visible world when we se••k to apprehend the nature of the Deity. Thus we see upon what general grounds the Philosophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how insufficient any collections from the present order of the Universe are to de∣termine any thing concerning its production by. For sup∣posing a production of the world, several things must of ne∣cessity be supposed in it, different from what the present order of the world is; and it is an unreasonable thing to argue from a thing when it is in its greatest perfection, to what must al∣waies have been in the same thing; for by this means we must condemn many things for falsities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparent∣ly false. For which Maimonides useth an excellent fim litude. Suppose, saith he, one of exquisite natural parts, whose mother * 1.82 dies assoon as he is born, and his Father brings him up in an Island, where he may have no society with mankind till he be grown up to years of understanding, and that he never saw any female of either man or beast: Suppose now this person to en∣quire of the first man he speaks with how men are born, and how they come into the world. The other tells him, that every man is bred in the womb of one of the same kind with our selves, thus and thus formed; and that while we are in the womb we have a very little body, and there move, and are nourished, and we grow up by little and little till we come to such a bigness, and then we come forth into the world, and yet grow still till we come to such a proportion as we are of. Here presently this young man stops him and enquires, when we were thus little in the womb and did live, move, and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breath at our mouth and nostrils as we do now? did we not ease nature as now we do? If it be answered him, no; them he presently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring de∣monstrations

that it was utterly impossible it should be so. For, saith he, if either of us, cease breathing but for an hour, our motion and life is gone; how is it then possible for one of us though never so little, to live and move in the womb for so many months, when it is so close and shut up & in the middle of the body? If one of us, saith he, should swallow a little bird, it would resently dye as soon as it came into the stomack, how much more if it were in the belly? If we should be but for few dayes without eating and drinking, we could not live; how can a childe then continue so many months without it? Again if one doth eat and not void the excrements of what he eats, he will be kild with it in few dayes; how can it possibly be otherwise with a child? If it be replyed that there is a passage open in the belly at which the child receives his nourishment, he will presently say that it is as impossible as the other; for if our bellyes were so open, we should be quickly destroyed. And again if the child bath all its limbs perfect and sound, how comes it not to open its eyes, use the feet, mouth and hands as we do? And so concludes it impossible that man should ever be born after this manner. Much after this way, saith that excellent Author, do Aristotle and others argue against the production of the world; for if the world were produced, say they, it must have been thus and thus, and it is impossible that it should have been so: why? because we see things are otherwise now in the world. Which how infirme a way of arguing, it appears from the consideration of the former similitude, in which the argu∣ments are as strong to prove the impossibility of that which we know to be true; as in the case about which we dispute.

And this now leads us to the second false Hypothesis * 1.83 which the opinion of the worlds eternity was founded on, which is, that there is no other way of production but by Genera∣tion. Most of the arguments which are used by Ocellus and Aristotle against the production of the world, run upon this supposition, that it must be generated as we see things are in the world. So Ocellus argues 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 * 1.84

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Every thing that comes into being and is subject to dissolution, hath two observable mutations in it; the one is whereby it grows from less to greater, and from worse to better, and this is called Generation, and the height of this mu∣tation, perfection; the other begins from better to worse, and from bigger to less, and the conclusion of this is, corruption and dissolution. But now, saith he, if the world had a beginning, there would be such a mutation in it, and it would have grown by degrees greater till it had come to its perfection, and from thence it would sensibly decay till it came to dissolution; but no body hath ever observed such a mutation in the world, neither is there any appearance of it; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; but the world is semper idem, it varyes not nor alters any thing from its self. For which, he particularly instanceth in the courses, Symmetryes, figures, positions, intervals, proportions of motion which are in the world, which things are all capable of such a mutation, yet we see no such thing in the Universe, from whence he infers that the Universe was alwayes and will be as it is. Upon the same principle doth Aristotle dispute for the eternity of the world from the nature of his materia prima, because if the first matter were generated it must be generated of other matter and so in infinitum; and so he argues from the na∣ture of the Heavens that they are not capable of generation and corruption as other bodyes are. All which arguments signifie no more then this, that the world was not generated as Plants or Animals are; and who ever right in his wits asserted that it was? But do any of these arguments prove it impossible that God having infinite power should produce the Universe after another way then any of those things are produced in, which we observe in the world? For we assert an infinite and eternal Being which was the efficient cause of the world, who by his omnipotcut power produced it out of nothing, and continues it in its Being; which is well ex∣pressed by the author of the refutation of Aristotle in Iustin Martyrs works. We assert, saith he, one God who is eternal * 1.85 himself, that hath nothing else coaeval with himself, neither by way of subjection or opposition, whose power is so great that no∣thing

can hinder it, by which power he produced the world. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; which hath no other cause, either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his Will. Who sully answers in a Philosophical manner, the particular Allegati∣ons out of Aristotle, concerning the eternity of the world: his design being, as he saith, to shew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That the Greek Philosophers in their discourses concerning God and the creation, were very far from being as good as their word to observe the Laws of demonstration, but instead of them proceeded only upon opinions and conjectures. And as to this particular of the possibility of another way of production, besides that of generation, he proves it from Aristotles own opinion, from the equal necessity of the existence of matter, as of God. For, saith he, if God can produce any thing out of matter, which is as necessarily existent as himself, he may produce something out of nothing. For, the same repugnancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produced, * 1.86 the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent. How then can God produce something out of matter, which neces∣sarily exists, & not be able to produce something out of nothing? For if matter have its original from its self, how can it be subject to the power of another? And besides, if we ac∣knowledge God to have his being from himself, and on that account attribute infinite power to him, by the same reason we must attribute it to matter. But whatever hath in∣finite power in its self, hath a power upon something beyond its self; but if God and matter have it both, they can never have power upon each other, or without themselves. Which is a far greater absurdity then the meer asserting a power to produce something out of nothing, which is implyed in the very notion of infinite power; for if it be confined to any matter, the power is not infinite, because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no further then matter doth. So that a power of creation is implyed in the very notion of a Deity; and therefore it is a meer Sophism to argue because the world could not be generated, therefore

it could not be produced, unless any other way of production but by generation, be proved impossible.

A third false hypothesis they proceeded on was this, that the Being of the world was no effect of Gods will, but of the * 1.87 necessity of nature. For although the Philosophers we now speak of, did-assert a Deity, which in some sense might be called the cause of the world, yet they withall asserted that the world was Coaeval with God himself, and so though there might be some priority in order of causes between them, yet there was none in order of time, or duration, as we see the light, though it flows from the Sun, yet the Sun is never without light. This Aristotle he proves from the necessity of motion and time: For, saith he, what ever is moved, must be moved by something else, and cons••quently there must be a running in Infinitum; but this runs on a false supposition of the necessity of a continual Physical motion in things, which we deny, since God by his infinite power may give motion to that which had it not before; and so all that can be proved, is the necessity of some first cause which we assert, but no necessity at all of his continual acting, since he may cause motion when he please. And for Time continually existing, it denotes nothing real in its self existing, but on∣ly our manner of conception of the duration of things, as it is conceived to belong to motion; and so can argue nothing as to the real existence of things from all eternity. But the later Platonists look upon these as insufficient wayes of pro∣bation, and therefore argue from those attributes of God, which they conceive most necessary and agreeable to Gods nature; and by which the world was produced if at all: so that by the same arguments whereby we prove that the world was made by God, they prove it to have been from all eterni∣ty. It was well and truly said of Plato in his Timaeus, that the goodness of God was the cause of the production of the world; from which speech the more modern Platonists ga∣ther a necessity of the worlds eternity; for from hence they infer, that since God was always good, he must always have an object to exercise his goodness upon; as the Sun disperseth his light assoon as he is himself. True, were God of the nature of the Sun, it would be so with him; or were the Sun of

the nature of God, it would not be so with it. But there is this vast difference between them, that though God be essenti∣ally and necessarily good, yet the communications of this goodness are the effect of his Will, and not meerly of his nature; For were not the acts of beneficence and goodness in God the free acts of his will, man must be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his first existence in the world, but as long as it should continue, by meer necessity of nature without any intervention of the will or actions of men. And so there could be no such difference as that of good and bad men in the world; for if the lettings forth of Gods goodness to the world be so necessary, all men must be∣come necessarily good, if Gods goodness be so great as to be able to make men so; which I suppose will not be questioned. By this then we see that the communications of Gods good∣ness to the world are free, and depend upon the eternal counsels of his will, which is a depth too great for us to ap∣proach, or look into; by what necessity then, if God be a free Agent, and of Infinite wisdom, as well as goodness, must we either assert the eternity of the world, or fear to deprive God of his essential Goodness? Whereas to make the com∣munications of Gods goodness ad▪extra necessary, and there∣fore to make the world from eternity, that he might have an object to exercise his goodness on, is to take as much off from the Infinite perfection and self sufficiency of the divine nature as it would seem to flatter his goodness. For God can∣not be himself without his goodness; and if his goodness can∣not be without some creature to shew or display it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy without his creatures because these are necessary issues of his goodness; and consequently we make the Being of the creatures necessary to his Being God. Which is the highest derogation from the absolute per∣fection of the Divine nature. We assert then so much good∣ness in God, as none can be imagined greater; we assert, that it was the communication of this Divine goodness which gave being to the world; but withall we acknowledge God to be an Agent infinitely wise and free, who dispenseth this good∣ness of his in such a way and manner as is best pleasing to himself, though ever agreeable to his Nature. As God is

infinitely good in himself, so whatever he doth is suitable to this nature of his; but the particular determinations of the acts of Gods beneficence belong to the Will of God, as he is a most free and Independent Agent; so that goodness as it imports the necessary rectitude of the Divine Nature, implyes a perfection inseparable from the true Idea of God; but as it is taken for the expressions of Divine bounty to somewhat without, as the object of it, it is not implyed in our con∣ception of God, as to his nature, but belongs to the free de∣terminations of his Will. We cannot then, neither ought we to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of Gods bounty towards the whole universe, or any part of it, any further then God himself hath declared it to us. Now we see the world exists, we have cause to adore that goodness of God, which not only gave a Being to the Universe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for all the Creatures which he hath made in it. Which the Heathen was so sensible of, that the Stoick in Tully taking notice of the abundant provision which is made in the world, not only for * 1.88 mans necessity, but for delight and ornament, cryes out, ut interdum Pronaea nostra Epicurea esse videatur: Gods provi∣dence doth abundantly exceed mans necessity. We see then from this discourse, how unsafe and unsatisfactory (that I may not say bold and presumptuous) those arguments are, which are drawn from a general consideration of the Divine nature and Goodness, without regard had to the determinati∣ons of his Will, as to the existence of things in the world. It cannot certainly then be an argument of any great force with any candid enquirers after Truth and Reason, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that Pythagorean hypothesis of the praeexistence of souls, viz. That if it be good for mens souls to be at all, the sooner they are, the better; but we are most certain that the Wisdom and Goodness of God will do that which is best; and therefore if they can enjoy them∣selves before they come into these terrestrial bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not) they must be be∣fore they come into these bodies. Wherefore the praeexistence of souls is a necessary result of the Wisdom and Goodness of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, then he can to un∣derstand

it. I now seriously enquire of such who love rea∣son above Plato and Pythagoras, whether if the eternity of the world were put into the argument instead of the Prae∣existence of souls, this argument would not hold as strongly for that, as it doth for Praeexistence; and if I am bound to believe Praeexistence on this ground, I be not likewise bound to believe at least the souls of men eternal, if not the Uni∣verse. But how reconcileable the eternity of the world is to the Pythagorick Cabbala of the Creation, I am yet to un∣derstand. But if this Argument doth not at all infer the eternity of the world, as we have shewed it doth not, much less doth it praeexistence of souls.

We have thus far considered the first hypothesis, which is repugnant to Moses concerning the Origine of the Universe, * 1.89 which is that which asserts the eternity of the world as it is; we come now to the second, which attributes the Formati∣on of the world as it is, to God as the efficient cause, but attri∣butes eternity to the matter out of which the world was framed. I am not ignorant that some who would be taken for the Masters of reason, are so far from conceiving this Hypothesis to be repugnant to the text of Moses, that they * 1.90 conceive it to be the genuine sense of it, viz. that there was a praeexistent matter, out of which God formed the World. But I would willingly understand how Moses would have expressed that matter its self was created, sup∣posing it had been his intention to have spoken it; for al∣though the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may not of its self imply necessarily the production of things out of nothing, i. e. out of no prae∣existent matter; yet it is acknowledged by all that no word used by the Iews is more proper to that then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is; and P. Fagius cites it from R. Nachmani, that the Hebrew Language hath no other word to signifie such a production out of nothing but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, that because 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is sometimes used for no more then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, therefore the world was created out of praeexi∣stent matter; all that can rationally be inferd, is, that from the meer force and importance of that word the contrary can∣not be collected: but if other places of Scripture compared, and the evidence of reason, do make it clear that there could

be no praeexistent matter which was uncreated, then it will necessarily follow that creation must be taken in its proper sense. And in this sense it is evident, that not only Iews and Christians, but even the Heathens themselves understood Moses, as is plain by Galen, where he compares the opinion * 1.91 of Moses with that of Epicurus, and ingenuously confes∣seth that of Moses, which attributed the production of things to God, to be far more rational and probable then that of Epicurus which assigned the Origine of things to a meer casual concourse of Atoms: But withal adds, that he must dissent from both; and sides with Moses as to the Ori∣gine of such things as depend on Generation, but asserts the praeexistence of matter, and withall that Gods power could not extendits self beyond the capacity of the matter which it wrought upon. Atque id est, saith he, in quo ratio nostra ac Platonis, tum aliorum qui apud Graecos de rerum natura recte conscripserunt, à Mose dissidet. How true these words are, will appear afterwards. Chaleidius in his Commentaries on Plato's Timaeus, where he speaks of the Origine of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which in him is still translated sylva, and enquires into the different opinions of all Philosophers about it, takes it for granted that according to Moses, this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 had its production from God. Hebraei sylvam generatam esse confitentur; quo∣rum * 1.92 sapientissimus Moyses non humana facundia, sed divina, ut ferunt, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de geni∣tura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, juxta in∣terpretationem LXX. prudentium; Initio Deus fecit coelum & terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis & incompta. Ut ve∣ro ait Aquila: Caput rerum condidit Deus coelum & terram; terra porro inanis erat & nihil; vel nt Symachus; Ab exor∣dio condidit Deus coelum & terram. Terra porro fuit otio∣sum quid, confusumque, & inordinatum. Sed Origenes asse∣verat ita sibi ab Hebraeis esse persuasum, quod in aliquantum sit à vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuisse enim in exemplari, Terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia tamen haec in unum aiunt concurrere, ut & generata sit ••a quae subjecta est universo corpori, sylva, sermonesque ipsos sic interpretantur. Where we finde by the Testimony of Chalcidius an universal consent as to the production of the

universal corporeal matter by God; for that is all which is understood by his term of generata est. But this same author afterwards tells us, that by Heavens and Earth in the first verse of Genesis we are not to understand the visible Hea∣vens and earth: For, saith he, the Heavens which are called the firmament, were created after, and on the third day when the waters were separated, the dry Land appeared, which was called earth. Qui tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu, coe∣lum hoc quod videmus, & terram qua subvehimur, dici pu∣tant; porro qui altius indagant, negant, hoc coelum ab initio factum, sed secundo die. And therefore by the hea∣vens he understands incorpoream naturam, and by earth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or the primigenial matter. And this, saith he, appears by the following words, The earth was invisible, and without form; i. e. this corporeal matter, before it was brought into order by the power and wisdom of God, remained a rude and indi∣gested lump; and that which is so, might well be called in∣visible, and without form. And therefore it is called inanis and nihil, because of its capacity of receiving all forms, and having none of its own. Symmachus calls it otiosa & indi∣gesta; the former because of its inability to produce any thing of its self: the latter because it wanted a divine power to bring it into due order. That stupidity and admiration which Origen attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the Majesty of God, who was the orderer and contriver of it, siquidem opificis & auctoris sui majestate capta stuperet. Thus we see that according to Moses, the first matter of the world was produced by God, which is largely manifested by Origen against the Marcionists, a fragment of which is extant in his Philocalia; and by Tertullian against Hermogenes, and * 1.93 others, who from the opinion of the praeexistence of matter are called Materiarii.

Having thus cleared the sense of Moses, it is far more difficult to find out the true opinions of the ancient Philo∣sophers concerning the production or eternity of corporeal matter, there having been so great dissensions, not only about the thing its self, but about the opinions of some about it. For it is plain by Plutarchs 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as well as * 1.94 the discourses of the later Platonists, how eager some have

been to interpret Plato's Timaeus in favour of the eternity at least of matter, if not of the world. But although Plato doth assert therein a praeexistence of rude matter before the formation of the world, yet I see no reason why he should be otherwise understood then in the same sense that we be∣lieve a Chaos to have gone before the bringing the world in∣to the order it is now in. And in that sense may those pla∣ces in Plutarch be interpreted, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and so likewise those following words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; for the meaning may be no more then that Plato conceived that all the productions of the kinds of things which are in the the world, was out of a Praeexistent Hyle, the one spiritual and intelligible, out of which he sup∣posed souls to be formed, the other sensible and corporeal, out of which other Beings which were more gross and ma∣terial, were produced. So Chalcidius tells us, that both Py∣thagoras and Plato looked upon constitutionem sylvae to be opus providentiae: which I suppose relates not only to the bringing of matter into form, but to the production of * 1.95 matter its self. But after this he takes a great deal of pains to search out the true meaning of Plato concerning the Ori∣gine * 1.96 of Hyle, and mentions the great diss••nsions among the Platonists about it, and the obscurity of the Timaeus in it. To him therefore I refer the Reader: Who likewise brings in Numenius largely discoursing concerning the opinion of Pythagoras about it, who condemns all those, as not under∣standing Pythagoras, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate Hyle. These are his words, Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens, * 1.97 Pythagorae dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram, Deum quidem singularitatis nominasse Col. no∣mine appellasse, sylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem inde∣terminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, gene∣ratam esse dicere. Hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem, for∣mamque & ordinem nancisceretur, sine ortu & generatione; exornatam vero at que illustratam, à Digestore Deo esse gene∣ratam. Atque it a quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, aequaevum Deo, à quo

est ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim sententiaenon recte assccutos, putasse, dici etiam illam indeter∣minatam & immensam duitatem, ab una singularitate insti∣tutam, recedente à natura sua singularitate, & in duitatis ha∣bitum migrante. But however these Pythagoreans might be deceived, who thought the Unity its self became the Duity; yet it is evident by Numenius, that he looked on the unde∣termined and confused matter to have been coaeval with God himself and not produced by him. And if Numenius be as much to be credited in this as when he calls Plato Moses Atticus, then the Creation of Universal matter can be no part of Pythagoras his Philosophick Cabala. But whatever were the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the first origine of matter, we are certain that the Stoicks generally asserted the improduction of matter, and make that to be as necessary a passive principle for the Being of the world, as God is the active and efficient cause. So Diogenes Laertius reports of the Stoical principles concerning the Origine of the Universe: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.98 They make two principles of the * 1.99 Universe, one active, and the other passive; the passive, an essence without quality, called Hyle or confused matter; the active, the reason which acts in the other, which is God. These two principles Seneca calls causa & materia; ••sse vero debet, saith he, aliquid unde fiat; deinde à quo fiat, hoc causa est, illud * 1.100 materia. Although Seneca seems to make a query of it else∣where; quantum Deus possit? materiam ipse sibi formet, an * 1.101 datâ utatur? But Zeno is express in Stobaeus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The first essence of all is matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution. To the same purpose Chalcidius speaks, Stoici ortum sylvae rejiciunt, * 1.102 quin potius iosam & Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; D••∣um ut opificem; Sylvam ut quae operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentia praeditos facientem, & quod fit ac patitur, id corpus esse; diversa vero virtute; quia faciat, Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam ••sse.

Having now found out the certain assertors among the * 1.103

Heathen Philosophers of the eternity and improduction of matter as the passive principle of things, we come to examine the reason of this Hypothesis, and whether there were foun∣dation enough for this matter to subsist upon from all eter∣nity? It might be sufficient prejudice against this opinion, that it was built on the same infirm conclusions which that of the eternity of the whole world was, viz. that Maxime which Lipsius attributes to Demoeritus, but was embraced by all those Philosophers who denyed production of matter, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that no∣thing * 1.104 could be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing; which as we have already said, was only taken up from the established order of the Universe, and the manner of production of material Beings. But this is not all we have to charge this Hypothesis with; for,

1. It is repugnant to the natural notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an omnipotent power; For otherwise we de∣grade him to the imbecillity of finite creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God should give a Being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by Creation, viz. the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was pro∣d••ced. Now what repugnancy is there to any free princi∣ple of reason, that a power infinite should raise an Insect into Being without any passive principle out of which it was caused; and if an Infinite power can do that, it may as well produce the world out of nothing, else the power would not be Infinite; for it would have its bounds set, that thus far it could go and no further. Now if such a power in God implyes no contradiction in its self, I say the asserting the necessary existence of matter implyes a contradiction to this power. For, 1. A power to produce something out of nothing would be to no purpose, if a p••ssive principle or praeexistent matter be necessary to the production of any thing; and so that Be∣ing which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something, which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath a power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth ex∣tend

to the production of this matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not infinite, and so the same power is infinite and not infinite; which is another con∣tradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to the notion of a God to assert the necessary and eternal existence of matter.

2. If matter be unproduced, then necessary existence must be∣long to it as well as to God; and if necessary existence belongs to matter, infinite power must belong to it too; For what ever necessarily exists, is self-originated; what ever is self∣originated, could not by any cause whatsoever be hindered from Being; what cannot by any cause be hindered from Being, hath Infinite power; what hath Infinite power, may pro∣duce any thing, and is God, and so matter cannot be a meer passive principle, but must be an active, and so must be God himself, or else there must be more Gods then one. To an argument something of this nature Hermogenes in Tertullian replyes, that matter would not lose the name or nature of matter, because of its coeternity with God, neither could it * 1.105 be God meerly on that account, unless it had other things that were agreeable to the nature of God as well as that. But I have already shewed that necessary existence implyes other perfections going along with it: which is likewise thus proved by Tertullian in answer to Hermogenes; the reason of the imperfections which are to be seen in any creatures, is from hence, that they derive their Beings from a higher cause, who creates them in what order he pleases; but that which hath its original from its self, must on that account want those imperfections which other creatures in the world have; and therefore if necessary existence be of the nature of matter, all other perfections must belong to it too: and so there can be no superiority and inferiority between God and matter, because on both sides there will be necessary exi∣stence. Divinitas gradum non habet, utpote unica: and so * 1.106 the eternal existence of matter is repugnant to the unity of God.

3. It is repugnant to the Independency of God: for it makes God subject to matter, and not matter to God. For if God cannot produce any thing without praeexistent matter, the

matter is necessary to his action, and so God must depend on that which he can do nothing without; and so Gods using matter, is as Tertullian speaks, ex necessitate mediocritatis suae, to help him in the production of things. Nemo non subjici∣tur ci cujus eget ut possit uti, as he goes on. Thus matter * 1.107 at last is crept above the Deity, that God can do nothing without its aid and concurrence; and so as Tertullian sharply sayes, God is beholding to matter for ever being known to the world; grande beneficium Deo contulit ut haberet hodie per quam Deus cognosceretur, & omnipotens vocaretur, nisi quod jam non omnipotens, si non & hoc potens ex nihilo omnia proferre. Thus we see how irreconcilable this Hypothesis is with these Attributes of God.

4. It is repugnant to the immensity of God. For either God did exist separate from this eternal matter, or was conjoyned with it; if conjoyned with it, then both made but one Being, as Maximus, or Orig••n argues; if separate from it, then there must be something between them, and so there will be * 1.108 three real improduced things. If it be answered that they are neither conjoyned nor separate, but God is in matter as in his proper place, as the Stoicks asserted, it is easily replyed, that either then he is in a part of matter, or the whole mat∣ter; if in a part only, he cannot be immense; if in the whole as his adaequate place, how could he then ever frame the world? For either he must then recede from that part in which he was, and contract himself into a narrower compass that he might fashion that part of the world which he was about, or else he must likewise frame part of himself with that part of the world which he was then framing of, which consequence is unavoidable on the Stoical Hypothesis of Gods being corporeal and confined to the world as his proper place. And so much for this second Hypothesis concerning the Origine of the Universe, which supposeth the eternity of matter as coexisting with God.

I come now to that which makes most noise in the world, which is the Atomical or Epicurean Hypothesis, but will ap∣pear * 1.109 to be as irrational as either of the foregoing, as far as it concerns the giving an account of the Origine of the Universe. For otherwise supposing a Deity which pro∣duced

the world and put it into the order it is now in, and supremely governs all things in the world, that many of the Phaenomena of the Universe are far more intelligibly ex∣plained by matter and motion then by substantial forms, and real qualities, few free and unprejudiced minds do now scruple. But because these little particles of matter may give a tolerable account of many appearances of nature, that therefore there should be nothing else but matter and motion in the world, and that the Origine of the Universe should be from no wiser principle then the casual concourse of these Atoms, is one of the evidences of the proneness of mens minds to be intoxicated with those opinions they are once in love with. When they are not content to allow an Hypo∣thesis its due place and subserviency to. God and providence, but think these Atoms have no force at all in them unless they can extrude a Deity quite out of the world. For it is most evident that it was not so much the truth as the ser∣viceableness of this Hypothesis, which hath given it enter∣tainment among men of Atheistical spirits. Epicurus him∣self in his Epistle to Pythocles urgeth that as a considerable circumstance in his opinion that he brought no God down upon the stage to put things in order, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which his Paraphrast Lucretius hath thus rendered; * 1.110

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam Naturam rerum.

If this opinion then be true, the history of the Creation quite falls to the ground, on which account we are obliged more particularly to consider the reason of it. The Hypothesis then of Epicurus is, that before the world was brought into that form and order it is now in, there was an infinite empty space in which were an innumerable company of solid particles or Atoms of different sizes and shapes, which by their weight were in continual motion, and that by the various occursions of these all the bodies of the Universe were framed into that order they now are in. Which is fully expressed by Dionysius in Eusebius, and very agreeably to the sense of Epicurus in his

Epistles to Herodotus and Pythocles, and to what Plutarch * 1.111 reports of the sense of Epicurus, though he names him not (if at least that book be his which Muretus denyes) the words of Dionysius are these concerning the Epicureans, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. So that according to this opi∣nion, all the account we have of the Origine of the world, is from this general Rendes-vous of Atoms in this infinite space, in which after many encounters and facings about, they fell into their several troops, and made up that ordered Battalia which now the world is the Scheme of. It was not impru∣dently done of Epicurus to make the worlds infinite, as well as his space and Atoms; for by the same reason that his Atoms would make one world, they might make a thousand; and who would spare for worlds, when he might make them so easily? Lucretius gives us in so exact an account of the several courses the Atoms took up in disposing themselves into bodyes, as though he had been Muster-Master-General at that great Rendes-vous; for thus he speaks of his Atoms,

Quae quia multimodis, multis mutata per omne Ex Infinito vexantur percita plagis, * 1.112 Omne genus motus & caetus experiundo, Tandem deveniunt in taleis disposituras, Qualibus haec rebus consistit summa creata.

And more particularly afterwards;

Sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum * 1.113 Ex infinito jam tempore percita plagis, Ponderibusque suis consuërunt concita ferri, Omnimodisque coire, atque omnia pertentare, Quaecunque inter se possunt congressa creare; Ut non sit mirum, si in taleis disposituras Deciderunt queque, & in taleis venere meatus, Qualibus haec rerum ••enitur nunc summa novando.

Thus we see the substance of the Epicurean Hypothesis, that

there were an Infinite number of Atoms, which by their fre∣quent occursions did at last meet with those of the same na∣ture with them, and these being conjoyned together made up those bodyes which we see: so that all the account we are able to give according to this Hypothesis of all the Phaenomena of the Universe, is from the fortuitous concourse of the Atoms in the first forming of the world, and the different contexture of them in bodies. And this was delivered by the ancient Epicureans not with any doubt or hesitation, but with the greatest confidence imaginable. So Tully observes of Velleius the Epicurean, beginning his discourse, fidenter * 1.114 sane ut solent isti, nihil tam verens quam ne dubitare de aliqua re videretur; tanquam modo ex Deorum concilio, & ex Epi∣curi intermundiis descendisset: Confidence was the peculiar genius of that sect, which we shall see in them to be accom∣panied with very little reason.

For those two things which make any principles in Philo∣sophy * 1.115 to be rejected, this Atomical Hypothesis is unavoidably charged with: and those are, If the principles be taken up without sufficient ground in reason for them; and if they can∣not give any sufficient account of the Phaenomena of the world. I shall therefore make it appear, that this Hypothesis, as to the Origine of the Universe, is first, meerly precarious, and built on no sufficient grounds of reason. Secondly, That it cannot give any satisfactory account of the Origine of things.

1. That it is a precarious Hypothesis, and hath no evidence of reason on which it should be taken up; and that will be proved by two things. 1. It is such an Hypothesis as the Epicureans themselves could have no certainty of according to their own principles. 2. That the main principles of the Hy∣pothesis its self are repugnant to those Catholick Laws of na∣ture which are observed in the Universe.

1. The Epicureans according to their own principles could have no certainty of the truth of this Hypothesis. And that 1. Because they could have no certain evidence of its truth. 2. Because their way of proving it was insufficient.

1. That they could have no certain evidence of the truth of it, I prove from those criteria, which Epicurus lays down as the only certain rules of judging the truth of things by;

and those were sense, Anticipation and Passion. Let sense be never so infallible a ruie of judgement, yet it is impossible there should be any evidence to sense of the truth of this Hypothesis; and let him extend his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as long as he please, which was his great help for correcting the errors of sense, viz. as it was in the Roman court when the case was not clear, ampliandum est; So Epicurus would have the object represented every way it could be before he past his judgement; yet this prudent caution would do him no good for this Hypothesis, unless he were so wise as to stay till this world were crumbled into Atoms again, that by that he might judge of the Origine of it. There is but one way left to finde out the truth of things inevident to sense, (as by Epicurus his own confession all these Atoms are, which are now the component particles of bodyes; much more those which by their fortuitous concourse gave Being to the world) and that is, if something evident to sense doth apparently prove it, which is his way of proving a Vacuity in nature from motion; but though that be easily answered by prin∣ciples different from those of Epicurus, and more rational; yet that very way of probation fails him in his present Hypo∣thesis. For what is there evident to sense which proves a fortuitous concourse of Atoms for the production of things? nay if we grant him that the composition of bodyes is nothing else but the contexture of these insensible particles, yet this is far from being an evidence to sense, that these particles without any wise and directing providence should make up such bodyes as we see in the world. And here when we speak of the evidence of sense, we may well ask as the Stoick in Tully doth, whether ever Epicurus found a Poeme made by the casual throwing of letters together; and if a concourse of Atoms did produce the world, cur porticum, cur templum, cur domum, cur urbem non potest? why did it never produce * 1.116 a cloyster, a temple, a house, a city, which are far easier things then the world? I know Epicurus will soon reply, that things are otherwise in the world now then when it was first produced; I grant it, and from thence prove, that be∣cause no such thing ever happens in the world now, as a meerly casual concourse of Atoms to produce any thing, Epi∣curus

could have no evidence from sense at all to finde out the truth of his Hypothesis by. And as little relief can he finde from his second Criterium, viz. Anticipation; for by his own acknowledgement, all Anticipation depends on the senses, and men have it only one of these four wayes. 1. By * 1.117 incursion, as the species of a man is preserved by the sight of him. 2. By proportion, as we can inlarge or contract that species of a man either into a Gyant or Pygmy. 3. By si∣militude, as we may fancy the image of a City by resem∣blance to one which we have seen. 4. By composition, whereby we may joyn different images together, as of a horse and man to make a Centaure. Now though it be very questionable how some of these wayes belong to a Criterium of truth, yet none of them reach our case; for there can be no incursion of insensible particles as such upon our senses; we may indeed by proportion imagine the parvitude of them; but what is this to the proving the truth of the Hypothesis? Similitude can do no good, unless Epicurus had ever seen a world made so; the only relief must be from composition, and that will prove the Origine of the world by Atoms to be as true, as that there are Centaures in the world, which we verily believe. These are the only Criteria by which Epi∣curus would judge of the truth of natural things by (for the third, Passion relates wholly to things Moral and not Physi∣cal) and now let any one judge, whether the Hypothesis of the Origine of the Universe by Atoms can ever be proved true, either by the judgement of sense, or by Anticipation.

The way they had to prove this Hypothesis was insufficient; * 1.118 and that was by proving that the bodyes of the world are compounded of such insensible particles; Now, granting the thing, I deny the consequence; for what though the compo∣sition of bodyes be from the contexture of Atoms, doth it therefore follow; that these particles did casually produce these bodyes? nay doth it at all follow, that because bodyes upon their resolution do fall into insensible particles of different size, figure and motion, therefore these particles must be praeexistent to all bodyes in the world? For it is plain, that there is now an Universal lump of matter out of which these insensible particles arise, and whether they return on

the dissolution of bodyes; and all these various corpuscles may be of the same uniform substance only with the alteration of size, shape and motion; but what then? doth this prove, that because particular bodyes do now emerge out of the various configuration and motion of insensible paerticles of that matter which exists in the world, that therefore this whole matter was produced by the casual occursions of these Atoms? It will ask more time and pains then is usually taken by the Philosophers either ancient or modern, to prove that those things whatsoever they are, whether elements or par∣ticles out of which bodyes are supposed to be compounded, do exist separately from such compounded bodyes, and antece∣dently to them. We finde no Aristotelian elements pure in the world, nor any particles of matter destitute of such a size, figure and motion as doth make some body or other. From whence then can we infer either the existence of Ari∣stotles materia prima, without quiddity, quantity or quality, or the Epicurean Atoms without such a contexture as make up some bodyes in the world? Our profound Naturalist Dr. Harvey, after his most accurate search into the natures and Generation of things, delivers this as his experience and judgement concerning the commonly reputed elements or principles of bodyes. For speaking of the different opinions * 1.119 of Empedocles and Hippocrates, and Democritus, and Epi∣curus, concerning the composition of bodyes, he adds, Ego vero neque in animalium productione, nec omnino in ulla cor∣porum similarium generatione, (sive ea partium animalium, sive plantarum, lapidum, mineralium, &c. fuerit) vel con∣gregationem ejusmodi, vel miscibilia diversa in generation is opere unienda praeexistere, observare unquam potui. And after explaining the way which he conceived most rational and consonant to experience in the Generation of things, he con∣cludes his discourse with these words; Idemque in omni generatione furi crediderim; adeo ut corpora similaria mista, elementa sua tempore priora non habeant, sed illa potius ele∣ment is suis prius existant (nempe Empedoclis atque Aristotel is igne, aqua, aëre, terra, vel Chymicorum sale, sulphure, & Mercurio, aut Democriti Atomis) utpote natura quoque ipsis perfectiora. Sunt, inquam, mista & composita, etiam tempore

priora element is quibuslibet sic dictis, in quae illa corrumpuntur & desinunt; dissolvuntur scilicet in ista ratione potius quam re••psa & actu. Elementa itaque quae dicuntur, non sunt pri∣ora ist is rebus, quae generantur aut oriuntur; sed posteriora potius, & reliquiae mag is quam principia. N••que Aristoteles ipsemet aut alius quispiam unquam demonstravit, elementa in rerum natura separati•• existere, au•• principia esse corporum similarium. If then none of these things which bodyes are resolved into, and are supposed to be compounded of, either have been or can be proved to exist separate from and antecedent to those bodyes which they compound, what then becomes of all our company of Atoms which are supposed by their concourse in an Infinite space to be the Origine of the world? I know not where to finde them, unless dancing with the Schoolmens Chimaera's in a Vacuum, or in a space as empty as the Infinite one, viz. some Epicureans brains. Neither therein will they be much unlike their great master Epicu∣rus, if we believe the character which the Stoick in Tully gives of him, who saith he was homo sine arte, sine liter is, in∣sultans in omnes, sine acumine ullo, sine auctoritate, sine lepore. * 1.120 But allowing the Stoick some of that passion, (which he dis∣claimed so much) in these words; yet we may rather believe what Tully himself elsewhere speaks of Epicurus his senti∣ments, that they were none of them handsome or becoming a man. At ille quid sentit? saith he of Epicurus; and soon replyes, sentit autem nihil unquam elegans, nihil decorum; * 1.121 and in another place speaking of his Morals, he sayes, nihil generosum sapit atque magnificum, there was nothing noble and generous in him. Which censure of Epicurus, all the pains that P. Gassendus hath taken in the vindication of the life and opinions of Epicurus, hath not been able to wipe off. For although we should yeild what that learned man so much contends for, that all the calumnyes which were cast on Epicurus arise from the Antipathy between Zeno and the following Stoicks, and the School of Epicurus; yet all this will not make Epicurus to have been comparable with some other Philosophers for parts and judgement, whose principles have somewhat more generous and venerable in them, then the Morals of Epicurus had, taking them in their more re∣fined sense.

But it is not the Morality of Epiourus which we now en∣quire * 1.122 after; out business is to see how well he acquits himself in rendring an account of the Origine of the Universe with∣out a Deity. And so we come to consider the Hypothesis its self, whether it be rational or no, or consistent with the Catholick Laws of nature which appear in the world. Two things I shall here enquire into, which are the main principles of Epicurus, viz. the motion of these Atoms in the Infinite space, and the manner of the concretion of bodyes by the con∣course of these Atoms.

1. I begin with their motion; which Epicurus attributes to his Atoms without any hesitation, and yet never under∣takes to give an account of the Origine of that motion; which argues his whole Hypothesis to be extreamly precarious. The thing then, (which he must assume as his main principle, without which all his other do nothing) is, that motion doth inseparably belong to the least Atom or insensible particle; for without this there cannot be imagined any concourse of Atoms at all, much less any such contexture of bodyes out of them. But for one to say that Atoms move, because it is their nature to move, and give no other account of it, is so precarious, that it will never give the least satisfaction to an inquisitive mind. And it will be the least of all pardonable in the exploders of substantial forms and occult qualities, when the Origine of the whole world is resolved into an ••ccult quality which gives motion to Atoms. And herein the Atomists outdo the most credulous Peripateticks, seeing they lay the prime foundation of the world and of their own Philosophy together in a thing they can give no rational account of at all, which is, the motion of Atoms in an Infinite Vacuity. If it be replyed, which is all Epicurus hath to say, that the motion of Atoms depends upon their gravity; the question returns upon him with the same violence, how comes this gravity to belong to these Atoms in such an empty space, where there can be no impulsion from other bodyes, no at∣traction from any magnetick particles which are supposed to be the causes of the descent of heavy bodyes? nay, Epicurus himself takes away any center of that motion of Atoms; and yet attributes a necessary descent to his Atoms by vertue of

their gravity; and if a Philosopher may beg such things as these are, so repugnant to the Phaenomena of nature, without * 1.123 assigning any other reason for them, but that it is their nature, let us never venture Philosophizing more, but sit down in that contented piece of Ignorance which attributes the causes of every thing into specifick forms and occult qualityes. For this is so shameful a piece of beggery, that P. Gassendus doth more then once disclaim it, and in his discourse of motion doth prove an impossibility of motion in an Infinite empty space. Might not Epicurus then have saved his credit better by sitting down with the opinions of his fore-fathers, then thus to go a begging for such Hypotheses, which none, who are not resolved to be ignorant, will be rea∣dy to grant him?

But yet this is not all, but according to this fundamental principle of Epicurus, viz. that there is a principle of motion in every insensible particle of matter, he plainly overthrows another principle of his, which is the solidity and different magnitude of these Atoms. These particles are supposed so solid, that Dionysius in Eusebius tells us the account given why they are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because * 1.124 of their indissoluble firmness; and the different sizes of these Atoms is so necessary a principle, that from thence they un∣dertake to resolve many Phaenomena of the Universe: let us now see how consistent these things are with the insepara∣ble property of motion belonging to Atoms: For if there be particles of such different sizes, then it is plain that there are some particles which may not only be conceived to be bigger then others, but are really so; and so there must be more parts of matter imagined in this bigger particle then in another less; and if there be more parts, these parts may be conceived separate from each other, that this particle may be equal to the other; now then, I demand, if motion doth inseparably belong to the least particle of matter, how comes one to be bigger then the other? for herein we see that every particle is not in distinct motion; for there cannot but be more imaginable particles in an Atome of a bigger size then in a less; and if so, there must be some union of those imaginable particles in that bigger Atome; and how could

such an union be without rest, and what rest could there be if motion doth inseparably belong to every particle o•• mat∣ter? And so it must be in all those Atoms which are sup∣posed to have angles and hooks, in order to their better catching hold of each other for the composition of bodyes▪ how come these hooks and angles to be annexed to this Atom? for an Atom may be without them; whence comes this union, if such a principle of motion, be in each particle? if it be answered, that motion did belong to all these particles, but by degrees the l••sser particles hitting together made up these angled and hooked particles; I soon reply, that the difficulty returns more strongly; for if these angled and hooked par∣ticles be supposed necessary to the contexture and union of bodyes, how came those least imaginable particles ever to unite without such hooks and angles? And so the question will return in Infinitum. If then the solidity and indivisibili∣ty of these angled Atoms, doth depend on the union and rest of those lesser imaginable particles joyned together, then it is evident that motion is no inseparable property of all these particles, but some are capable of union, in order to the making of such hooks and angles, which are necessary for the contexture of bodyes; and where there is union and solidity, there is rest, which is at least accompanied with it, if it be not one of the great causes of it. And without which the Atomists of all other Philosophers will be least able to give an account of firmness in bodyes, when they make bodyes to consist of an aggregation of particles, by which it will be very hard finding a sufficient account of the difference between fluid and firm bodyes, unless it be from the quicker motion and agitation of the particles of fluid bodyes, and the rest of the small and contiguous parts that make up the firm body, * 1.125 according to that Catholick Law of nature, whereby things continue in the state they are in till some stronger force puts them out of it. The only thing which the Epicurean Atomists have left to give any account of the solidity of particles of such different sizes, is, the want of vacuity; for say they, the ground of divisibility of bodyes is the interspersion of a disseminated Vacuum; now where there is no vacuity, though the particles be of different siz••, yet they may be solid and indivisi∣ble.

But this is taken off by the instance produced against other persons by that ingenious & Honourable person M. Boyle in his Physiological Essayes, which is to this purpose; Sup∣pose * 1.126 two of these presumed indivisible particles, both smooth and of a Cubical figure should happen to lye upon one another, and a third should ch••nce to be fitly placed upon the upper of the two; what should hinder but that this Aggregate may by the vio∣lent knock of some other corpuscles be broken in the midst of the whole concretion, and consequently in the middlemost body? For suppose them as solid as may be, yet since corpuscles as hard as they, can be made very violently to knock against them, why may not those grate or break the middlemost corpuscles, or any of the others? And if there be a possibili∣ty of a breaking off these Cubical particles in the middle, then meer want of Vacuity is no sufficient account of their being indivisible. By this we see how far the Atomists are from giving any rational account of the Origine of the motion of the Atoms themselves without a Deity.

2. Supposing this motion to be granted them, yet they cannot give any satisfactory account of the manner of concre∣tion * 1.127 of bodyes by the casual occursions of these A••••ms moving in an infinite empty space. Which appears from those gross and extravagant suppositions of Epicurus, in order to the making these Atoms of his so hit together that they make up any bodyes by their contexture.

1. He supposeth as it were two regions, a superior and inferior in an infinite empty space, which hath no center at all in it, nor any body, from which to measure those respects of above and below; as appears by his Epistle to Herodotus, wherein he saith, these terms of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or upwards and downwards, must be conceived without any bounds or limits at all. So that though we conceive something superior, we must imagine nothing supreme, and so on the contrary. Whereby it is evident as Gass••ndus confesseth, that Epicurus thought the surface of the earth to be a plain, and this plain to be con∣tinued * 1.128 up in a level superficies to the heavens, and so to all that immense space of the Universe. So that all those heavy bodyes which should fall downwards in any parts of the widest distance on the earth, as in Europe, Asia, and Africa,

would never meet (if they continued their motion) in the center of the earth, but would continue their motion still in a parallel line; and so he imagined that which is said to be above as to us, was really the upper part of the world, and so the descent of his Atoms must necessarily be downwards towards the earth, according to the weight of them. And was not this a worthy Mathematical supposition, for one who would undertake to give an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity?

This motion of descent by reason of the gravity of Atoms would not serve his turn; for if the Atoms moved down∣wards thus in a parallel line, how was it possible for them ever to meet for the contexture of bodyes? Now for this purpose he invented a motion of declination; for finding the motion ad lineam, or ad perpendiculum as some call it, could not possibly produce those varieties of bodyes which are in the Universe, he supposed therefore the descent not to be in a perpendicular right line, but to decline a little, that so seve••al particles in their descent m••ght make some occursions one upon another. And this Epicurus added to Democritus; but therein as Tully observes, was very unhappy, that where he adds to Democritus, ea quae corrig••re vult, mihi quidem * 1.129 depravare videatur; that he mar'd what Democritus had said, by mending of it. The reason of which motion of decli∣nation, is thus given by Lucretius,

Quod nisi declinare solerent, omnia deorsum * 1.130 Imbris uti guttae caderent per Inane profundum; Nec foret offensus natus, neque plaga creata Principiis, it a nil unquam natura creasset.

It was obvious to object, that according to the principles of Epicurus, there could have been no concourse at all of Atoms in an infinite space, on the two grounds he went on, which were the natural descent of Atoms, and the aequi-velocity of the motion of all Atoms of what size so ever, which he like∣wise asserted (although one would think if gravity were the cause of motion, then the more gravity, the swister the mo∣tion would be) from hence, I say it were not easie to conceive

how the Atoms should embrace each other in a parallel line, if they fell down as Lucretius expresseth it, like drops of rain; and therefore they saw a necessity to make their motion de∣cline a little, that so they might justle and hit one upon an∣other. But this oblique motion of the Atoms, though it be the only refuge left to salve the Origine of things by a con∣course of Atoms, is yet as precarious and without reason as any other supposition of theirs whatsoever. Tully chargeth this motion of declination with two great faults, futility, and in••fficacy, quae cum res tota ficta sit pueriliter, tum ne efficit * 1.131 quidem quod vult. It is a childish fancy and to no purpose: For first, it is asserted without any reason at all given for it, which is unworthy a Philosopher; neither is it to any pur∣pose; for if all Atoms, saith he, decline in their motion, then none of them will stick together; if some decline, and others do not, th••s is as precarious as any thing can be imagined, to assign a diversity of motion in indivisible particles, which yet have all the same velocity of motion; and as Tully saith, Hoc erit quasi provincias atomis dare, quae recte, quae oblique f••ran∣tur: as though Epicurus were the General at this Rendes∣vous of Atoms, who stands ready to appoint every one his task and motion. This Plutarch tells us was the great charge against Epicurus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, be∣cause he introduced such a motion of declination out of nothing * 1.132 upon no pretence of reason. And Turnebus tells us, that the ground why they desired so small a declination, was because they were conscious to themselves, that it was founded upon no ground of reason; Et Epicurei sibi conscii culpae, timide eam ponebant, & minimam sibi post ulabant. To which purpose Turnebus cites those verses of Lucretius,

Quare etiam at que etiam paulum inclinare necesse est Corpora, nec plusquam minimum, ne fingere motus * 1.133 Obliquos videamur, & id res vera refutet. Namque hoc in promptu manifest unique esse videmus Pondera quantum in se est, non posse obliqua meare Esupero cum praecipitant, quod cernere possis. Sed nihil omnino recta regione viai Declinare, quis est qui possit cernere sese?

But this argument of Lucretius will hold if at all, further then this little declination (for it is no more they desire then as little as may be imagined, quo nihil possit fieri minus, Tully expresseth it) but if they may decline a little, why not a great deal more? nay it is impossible to conceive, but a little oblique motion at first will in an infinite space grow to be very oblique; for there is nothing to hinder the motion which way it bends; now if there be never so little motion of decli∣nation, the Atom will be inclined that way; and what then should hinder, but that the obliquity in a motion through a great space should at last come to be very great; there being no center at all to guide the motion towards, and the gravity not hindering this little declination? Therefore Tully asks that question, Cur declinet uno minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus? why only it declines one minime, and not two or * 1.134 three; for, saith he, it is no impulsion from any other Atom which makes it decline that one minime; neither is there any impediment in the space to hinder it from declining more; so that, as he well saith, optare hoc quidem est, non disputare, this is to beg Hypotheses and not to prove them, which is the thing we have proved Epicurus to do. Which was the first thing promised, viz. that this Hypothesis of Epicurus was very precarious, and is built on no foundation of reason.

2. It is unsatisfactory and insufficient, as well as precarious; for should we grant his two main principles, Atoms and his * 1.135 infinite empty space; yet we deny that ever his Atoms with all their occursions would ever produce those things which are in the Universe. To run through the noted Phaenomena of the Universe, and to shew how insufficient an account the Epicureans are able to give of them, from a fortuitous con∣course of Atoms, is a task too large to be here undertaken. There are only three things which I shall rather suggest, then insist upon, to see what miserable shifts the Epicureans are driven to for the salving of them, and shall then leave it with the reader to judge, what unmeasurable confidence it is in any to reject the Creation of the World for the sake of the Epicurean Hypothesis; and whether it be not the height of credulity, as well as infidelity, to believe the world ever to have been made by a fortuitous concourse of Atoms?

1. The great varieiy of appearances in nature, which are attributed to particles of the same nature, only with the alteration of size, shape, and motion. That some things in the world, should have no other reason given of them, may not only be tolerable, but rational, as in the objects and operations on the organs of sense, those affections which are mistaken for real qualities, &c. But that all those effects which are seen in nature should have no other cause but the different configuration and motion of Atoms, is the height of folly as well as impi••ty, to imagine that the particles of mat∣ter, as they are in men, should be capable of sensation, me∣mory, Intell••ction, volition, &c. meerly because of a diff••rent shape, size and motion from what they have in a piece of wood, is a riddle that requires a new configuration of Atoms in us to make us understand. May it not be hoped, that at least one time or other by this casual concourse of Atoms, the particles may light to be of such a nature in stones, as to make them flic; in plants, to make them all sensitive; and in beasts to make them reason and discourse? What may hinder such a configuration or motion of particles, if all these eff••cts are to be imputed to no higher principle? We see in other bodies what different appearances are caused by a sudden al∣teration of the particles of the matter of which they are compounded; why may it not fall out so in the things men∣tioned? neither can this be unreasonable to demand. 1. Be∣cause the motion of these particles of matter is casual still according to them; and who knows what chance may do? for the seminal principles themselves are, I suppose, accord∣ing to them of the same uniform matter with the rest of the world, and so are liable to different motion and configuration. 2. Because all particles of matter are supposed to be in con∣tinual motion, becaus•• of that disseminated Vacuity, which is presumed to be in the world, and because a Coacervate va∣cuity is not only asserted as possible, but as probably existent: I assume only then (that which is insisted on as probable) viz. that that space which lies between our Atmosphere and the Stars is empty of any other thing, but only the rayes of the Stars which pass through it; I then supposing it a va∣cuity, whether would not the particles of those bodies

which lie contiguous to that space presently dislodge from the bodies wherein they are, and begin a new Rendezvous of A∣toms there? for all Atoms are supposed to be in perpetual motion; and the cause assigned, why in solid bodies they do not flie away, is, because of the repercussion of other Atoms, that when they once begin to stir, they receive such knocks as make them quiet in their places. Now this cannot hold in the bodies contiguous to this space; for both those bodies are more fluid, and so there is no such knocking of particles to keep them at rest; but which is more, those which are contiguous have nothing at all to hinder them from motion, and so those particles will necessarily remove into that empty space where there is no impediment of their motion, and so the next Atoms to those must remove, because that space wherein the other were is made empty by their removal; and so the next, and so on, till not only the air, but the whole mass of the earth w••ll on supposition of such a vacuity be dissolved into its first particles, which will all mutiny in the several bodies wherein they are, and never rest till they come to that empty space, where they may again Rendez∣vous together. So dangerous is the news of Liberty, or of an empty space to these Democratical particles of the Uni∣verse. Neither can I see how a disseminated vacuity can salve the difficulty; for those particles of the most solid bodies, being in continual motion, and the ground of their union being reperc••ssion, it thence follows that towards that part where the disseminated vacuum is, the particles meeting with no such strokes may sairly take their leaves of the bo∣dies they are in, and so one succeed in the place of another, till the configuration of the whole be altered, and consequent∣ly different appearances and effects may be caused in the same bodies, though it results from seminal principles. So that according to the Atomical principles, no rational account can be given of those effects which are seen in nature. This Dionysius in Eusebius urgeth against the Atomists, that * 1.136 from the same principles without evident reason given for it, they make of the same uniform matter some things con∣spicuous to sense, others not, some short-lived, others ex∣treamly long-lived. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

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〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; What ground can there be assigned of so vast a difference between things if they be all of the same na∣ture, and differ only in size and shape? saith that excellent person, who there with a great deal of eloquence lays open ••he folly of the Atomical Philosophy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is a rare De∣mocraty of Atoms, saith he, where the friendly Atoms meet and embr••ce each other, and from thenceforward live in the closest society together.

2. Not only the variety, but the exact order and beauty of the world is a thing unaccountable by the Atomical hypo∣thesis. Were the whole world still a Hesiods Chaos (from the consideration of which Diogenes Laertius tells us Epi∣curus * 1.137 began to Philosophize) we might probably believe an agitation of particles (supposing matter created) might settle it in such a confused manner; but that there should be nothing else but a blind impetus of Atoms to produce those vast and most regular motions of the heavenly bodies, to order the passage of the Sun for so great conveniency of nature, and for the alternate succession of the seasons of the year, which should cut such channels for the Ocean, and keep that vast body of the water (whose surface is higher then the earth) from overflowing it, which should furnish the earth with such seminal and prolifick principles, as to pro∣vide food and nourishment for those Animals which live up∣on it, and furnish out every thing necessary for the comfort and delight of mans life; to believe, I say, that all th••se things came only from a blind and fortuitous concourse of Atoms, is the most prodigious piece of credulity and folly, that humane nature is subject to. But this part which con∣cerns the order and beauty of the parts of the Universe, and the argument thence, that it could be no blind fortuitous principle, but an Infinitely wise God, hath been so fully and * 1.138 judiciously handled by a learned Person already, that I shall rather choose to refer the Reader to his discourse then insist any more upon it.

3. The production of mankind is a thing which the Ato∣mists are most shamefully puzzled with, as well as the For∣mation of the internal parts of mans body, of which I have already spoken in the precedent Chapter. It would pitty one to see what lamentable shifts the Atomists are put to, to find out a way for the production of mankind, viz. That our teeming mother the earth, at last cast forth some kind of bags like wombs upon the surface of the earth, and these by degrees breaking, at last came out children, which were nourish∣ed by a kind of juyce of the earth like milk, by which they were brought up till they came to be men. Oh what will not A∣theists believe rather then a Deity and Providence! But least we should seem to wrong the Atomists, hear what Cen∣sorinus saith of Epicurus; Is enim credidit limo calefactos uteros nescio quos, radicihus terrae cohaerentes, primum in∣crevisse, * 1.139 & infantibus ex seeditis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura ministrante praebuisse; quos it a educatos & adultos, genus humanum propagasse. But because Lucretius may be thought to speak more impartially in the case, how rarely doth he describe it?

Crescebant uteri terrae radicibus apti, Quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerit aetas Infantum, fugiens humorem, aurasque petissens, Convertebat ibi natura foramina terrae, Et succum venis cogebat fundere apertis Consimilem lactis; sicut nunc foemina quaeque Quum peperit dulci repletur lacte, quodomnis Impetus in mammas convert itur ille alimenti: Terracibum pueris, vestem vapor, herbacubile Praebebat, multa & molli lanugine abundans.

Had Lucretius been only a Poet, this might have passed for a handsomly described Fable; but to deliver it for a piece of Philosophy makes it the greater Mythologie; that mans body was formed out of the earth we believe, because we have reason so to do; but that the earth should cast forth such folliculi as he expresseth it, and that men should be brought up in such a way as he describes, deserves a place among the

most incredible of Poetick Fables. But if Poets must be credited, how much more like a man did he speak, who told us,

Natus homo est; sive hunc divino semine fecit Ille opifex rerum, Mundi melioris crigo, Sive recens tellus, seductaque nuper ab alto Aethere, cognati retinebat semina coeli; Quam satus Iapeto mistam fluvialibus undis, Finxit in effigiem moderantum cuncta Deorum.

Thus have we considered the Epicurean Hypothesis, both as to the Principles on which it stands, and the suitableness of it to the Phaenomena of the Universe; and I suppose now there cannot be the least shadow of reason found from the Atomical Philosophy to make us at all Question that account of the Origine of the Universe, which ascribes it not to the fortuitous concourse of Atoms, but to the Infinite wisdom of a Deity. I conclude then this discourse of the Epicurean Hy∣pothesis with the words of Automedon in the Greek E∣pigram.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 * 1.140 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Learn to be wise; let Epicurus chase To find his Atoms, and his empty space.

I come now to the last Hypothesis mentioned, which un∣dertakes to give an account of the Origine of the Universe * 1.141 from the meer Mechanical Laws of motion and matter. Which is the Hypothesis of the late famous French Philosopher Mr. Des Cartes. For although there be as much reason as chari∣ty to believe that he never intended his Hypothesis as a foun∣dation of Atheism, having made it so much his business to assert the existence of a Deity and immateriality of the soul; yet because it is apt to be abused to that end by persons A∣theistically disposed, because of his ascribing so much to the power of matter; we shall therefore so far consider it as it un∣dertakes

to give an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity. His Hypothesis therefore is briefly this. He * 1.142 takes it for granted, that all the matter of the world was at first of one Uniform nature, divisible into innumerable parts, and divided into many, which were all in motion, from hence he supposeth. 1. That all this matter of which the Universe is composed, was at first divided into equal particles of an indif∣ferent size, and that they had all such a motion as is now found in the wo••ld. 2. That all these particles were not at first Sphae∣rical, because many such little Globes joyned together will not fill up a continued space, but that of what ever figure they were at first, they would by continued motion become sphaerical, because they would have various circular motions; for seeing that at first they were moved with so great force that one par∣ticle would be disjoyned from the other, the same force continu∣ing would serve to cut off all angles which are supposed in them, by their frequent occursions against each other; and so when the angles were cut off, they would become sphaerical. 3. He supposeth that no space is left empty, but when those round particles being joyned, leave some intervals between them, there are some more subtile particles of matter, which are rea∣dy to fill up those void spaces, which arise from those angles which were cut ••ff from the other particles to make them sphae∣rical; which fragments of particles are so little, and acquire thereby such a celerity of motion, that by the force of that, they will be d••vided into i••numerable little fragments, and so will fill up all those spaces which other particles could not en∣ter in at. 4. That those particles which sill up the intervals between the sphaerical ones, have not all of them the same cele∣rity of motion, because some of them are more undivided then others are, which filled up the space between three Globular par∣ticles when their angles were cut off, and therefore those particles must necessarily have very angular figures, which are unfit for motion, and thence it comes to pass that such particles easily stick together, and transfer the greatest part of their motion upon those other particles which are less, and therefore have a swifter motion; and because these particles are to pass through such tri∣angular spaces which lye in the midst of three Globular particles touching each other, therfore he supposeth them as to their breadth

and depth to be of a triangular figure, but because these par∣ticles are somewhat long; and the gl••bular particles through which they pass with so swift motion have their rotation about the poles of the heavens, thence he supposes that those triangu∣lar particles come to be wreathed. Now from these things being thus supposed, Des Cartes hath ingeniously and con∣sonantly to his principles undertaken to give an account of the most noted Phaenomena of the world, and those three sorts of particles mentioned he makes to be his three ele∣ments; the first is that subtile matter which was supposed to arise from the cuttings off the angles of the greater par∣ticles; and of this he tells us the Sun and fixed Stars consill, as those particles of that subtile matter being in continual ••o••ion have made those several vortices or aethereal whirlpools. The second element confists of the sphaerical particles them∣selves, which make up the Heavens; out of the third element which are those wreathed particles, he gives an account of the formation of the earth, and Planets, and Comets; and from all of them by the help of those common affections of matter, size, figure, motion, &c. he undertakes to give an account of the Phaenomena of the world. How far his principles do con∣duce to the giving mens minds satisfaction, as to the particu∣lar Phaenomena of nature, is not here our business to enquire, but only how far these principles can give an account of the Origine of the Universe without a Deity? And that it can∣not give a satisfactory account how the world was framed without a Deity, appears by the two grand suppositions on which all his elements depend, both which cannot be from any other principle but God. Those are, 1. The existence of matter in the world which we have already proved cannot be independent on God, and necessarily existent, and therefore supposing that matter existent and put into motion, would grind its self into those several particles by him supposed, yet this cannot give any account of the Origine of the Uni∣verse * 1.143 without a Deity. 2. The motion of the particles of mat∣ter suppose a Deity; for matter is no self-moving principle, as hath been fully demonstrated in several places by that judi∣cious Philosopher Dr. H. More, who plainly manifests that if motion did necessarily belong to matter, it were impossible

there should be Sun, or Stars, or Earth, or Man in the World; for the matter being uniform, it must have equal motion in all its particles, if motion doth belong to it. For motion being supposed to be natural and ••ss••ntial to matter, must be alike every where in it, and therefore every particle must be supposed in motion to its utmost capacity, and so every particle is alike and moved alike: and therefore there being no prevalency at all in any one particle above another in bigness or motion, it is manifest that this universal matter, to whom motion is so essential and natural, will be ineffectual for the producing of any variety of appearances in nature; for nothing could be caused by this thin and subtile matter, but what would be wholly imperceptible to any of our senses: and what a strange kind of visible world would this be? From hence then it appears that there must be an infinitely powerful and wise God, who must both put matter into motion, and regulate the motion of it, in order to the producing all those varieties which appear in the world. And this neces∣sity of the motion of matter by a power given it from God is freely acknowledged by Mr. Des Cartes himself in these words; Considero materiam sibi libere permissam, & nullum aliunde impulsum suscipientem, ut plane quiescentem; illa * 1.144 autem impellitur à Deo, tantundem motus five translationis in ea conservante quantum abinitio posuit. So that this great improver and discoverer of the Mechanical power of matter, doth freely confess the necessity not only of Gods giving mo∣tion in order to the Origine of the Universe, but of his conser∣ving motion in it for the upholding it: So that we need not fear from this Hypothesis the excluding of a Deity from being the prime efficient cause of the world. All the question then is concerning the particular manner, which was used by God as the ••fficient cause in giving being to the world. As to which I shall only in general suggest what Maimonides sayes of it. Omnia simul creata ••rant, & postea successive ab invi∣cem separata; although I am somewhat inclinable to that of * 1.145 Gassendus, majus ••st mundus opus, quam ut ass••qui mens hu∣mana illius molitionem possit: To which I think may be well applyed that speech of Solomon; Then I beheld all the work of God, that a man cannot finde out the work that is done under * 1.146

the Sun; because though a man labour to seck it out, yea fur∣ther, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to sinde it.

CHAP. III. Of the Origine of Evil.

Of the Being of Providence. Epieurus his arguments against it refuted. The nec••ssity of the belief of Providence in order to Religion. Providence proved from a consideration of the na∣ture of God and the things of the world. Of the Spirit of na∣ture. The great objections against Providence propounded. The first concerns the Origine of evil. God cannot be the author of sin if the Scriptures be true. The account which the Scri∣ptures give of the fall of man, doth not charge God with mans fault. Gods power to govern man by Laws, though he gives no particular reason of every Positive precept. The reason of Gods creating man with freedom of will, largely shewed from Simplicius; and the true account of the Origine of evil. Gods permitting the fall makes him not the author of it. The account which the Scriptures give of the Origine of evil, compared with that of Heathen Philosophers. The antiquity of the opinion of ascribing the Origine of evil to an evil principle. Of the judg∣ment of the Per••••ans, Aegyptians and others about it. Of Ma∣nichaism. The opinion of the ancient Greek Philosophers; of Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoicks; the Origine of evil not from the necessity of matter. The remainders of the history of the fall among the Heathens Of the malignity of Daemon••. Pro∣vidence vindicated as to the sufferings of the good, and impu∣nity of bad men. An account of both from natural light, ma∣nifested by Senec••, Plutarch, and others.

IT being now manifest not only that there is a God, but * 1.147 that the world had its Being from him; it thence follows by an easie and rational deduction, that there is a particular band of Divine providence, which upholds the world in its Being, and wisely disposeth all events in it. For it is a most

irrational and absurd opinion to assert a Deity and deny providence: and in nothing did Epicurus more discover the weakness and puerility of his judgment then in this. Indeed, if Epicurus had no other design in asserting a Deity, then (as many ancient Philosophers imagined) to avoid the imputa∣tion of direct Atheism; and yet to take away all foundations of Religion, he must needs be said to serve his Hypothesis well, though he did assert the Being of an excellent nature which he called God; while yet he made him sit as it were with his ••lbows folded up in the heavens, and taking no ••••gniz••nce of humane actions. For he well knew, that if the belief of Divine providence were once rooted out of mens minds, the thoughts of an excellent Being above the He••vens, would have no more aw or power upon the hearts and lives of men, then the telling men that there are I••wels of inestim∣able value in the Indies, makes them more ready to pay taxes to their Princes. For that Philosopher could not be ignorant, that it is not worth but power, nor speculation but interest that rules the world. The poor Tenant more re∣gards his petty Landlord, then the greatest Prince in the world that hath nothing to do with him; and he thinks he hath great reason for it; for he neither fears punishment nor hopes for reward from him; whereas his Landlord may dis∣possess him of all he hath upon displeasure, and may advan∣tage him the most if he gains his favour: Supposing then that there were such an excellent Being in the world which was compleatly happy in himself, and thought it an impair∣ing of his happiness to trouble himself with an inspection of the world; Religion might then be indeed derived à relegen∣do, but not à religando; there might be some pleasure in con∣templating his nature, but there could be no obligation to obedience. So that Epicurus was the first sounder of a kind of Philosophical Antinomianism, placing all Religion in a veneration of the Deity purely for its own ex••••llency without any such mercenary eye (as those who serve God for their own ends, as they say, are apt to have) to reward and punishment. And I much doubt that good woman whom the story goes of, who in an Enthusiastick posture ran up and down the strects with emblems in her hands, fire in the one

as she said to burn up Heaven, and water in the other to quench Hell, that men might serve God purely for himself, would if she had compassed her design, soon brought Prose∣lites enough to Epicurus, and by burning Heaven would have burnt up the cords of Religion, and in quenching Hell would have extinguished the aw and fear of a Deity in the world. Indeed the incomparable excellency and perfection which is in the Divine nature, to spirits advanced to a noble and generous height in Religion, makes them exceedingly value their choice, while they disregard what ever rivals with God for it; but were it not for those Magnetical hooks of obedience and eternal interest, there are few would be drawn to a due consideration of, much less a delight in so amiable and excell••••nt a nature. And it is impossible to con∣ceive, why God in the revelation of his Will should ever so much as mention a future punishment, or promise an eternal reward, were not the consideration of these things the sinews of Religion.

Which they whose design was to undermine the very foundations on which all Religion was built, understood far * 1.148 better, then those weak pretended advancers of Religion, who while in such a way they pretend to advance it, do only blow it up. For if men ought not to have an eye and respect to their own future condition, nor serve God on the account of his power to make our souls miserable or happy, much less ought men to serve God with any regard to his Providence, since the matters which Providence is employed about in this world are of infinitely less moment, then those which concern our future state. And if we are to have no eye on Divine providence in the exercise of Religion, we shall scarce be able to understand for what end God should take so much care of mankind, and manifest so much of his goodness to them, were it not to quicken them in their search after him, and excite them to the more chearful obedience to him. And when once we question to what end God troubles himself with the world, we are come next door to Epicurus, and may in few steps more delight in the flowers of his Garden. For this was his strongest plea against Providence, that it was beneath the Majesty and excellency of the Divine nature to stoop so low

and trouble himself so far, as to regard what was done on earth. This being one of his Ratae Sententiae or undoubted * 1.149 maximes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The Blessed and Immortal Being, neither hath any imployment himself, nor troubles himself with others. Which as Maximus Tyrius well observes, is rather a description of a Sardanapalus then a Deity; nay of a worse then a Sardana∣palus; for he in the midst of all his softness and effeminacy * 1.150 would yet entertain some counsels for the safety and good of his Empire; but Epicurus his D••ity is of so tender a nature, that the least thought of business would quite spoile his hap∣piness. This opinion of Epicurus made the more raised∣spirited Moralists so far contemn the unworthy apprehen∣sions which he entertained of the Divine nature, that they degraded him from the very title of a Philosopher in it, and ranked him beneath the most fabulous Poets, who had writ such unworthy things of their Gods, as is evident by the cen∣sures * 1.151 which Tully, Plutarch and others pass upon him for this very opinion. And they tell him that some of their own men were of a more noble and excellent spirit then Epi∣curus his Deity, who abhorred softness and idleness, and made it their greatest delight to do good to their Countrys. But Epicurus must needs make his God of his own humour (the usual flattery which men bear to themselves, to think that most excellent which they delight in most) as Xenophanes was wont to say of his horse, if he were to describe a God, it would be with a curled main, a broad chest, &c. and in every thing like himself. Had E icurus himself so little of an Athenian in him, as not to make it some part of his delight to understand the affairs of the world? or at least did he take no pleasure in the walks of his famous garden, nor to order his trees, and set his flowers, and contrive every thing for his own delight? Woul•• Epicurus then count this a part of his happiness? and is it inconsistent with the happiness of the Deity to take notice of the world and order all things in it for his own glory? Must so excellent a nature as Gods was, by his own acknowledgment, be presently tired with busi∣ness, when the more excellent any nature is, the more active and vigorous it is, the more able to comprehend and dspatch

matters of moment with the least disturbance to its self? Is it pleasure to a Nurse to fill the child with her milk? doth the Sun rejoyce to help the world with his constant light? and doth a Fountain murmur till it be delivered of its streams which may refresh the ground? and is it no delight to the Divine nature to behold the effects of his goodness upon the world? We see here then the foundation on which Epicurus went, viz. that his God must be like himself, or there must be none; and truly he might more suitably to his principles question his existence, then supposing his existence deny his Providence on such miserable accounts as these are, which yet are the chief which either Epicurus or Lucretius could bring against it, from the consideration of the Divine nature.

The which to any one who considers it, doth necessarily infer a peculiar eye and hand of Providence in the world. * 1.152 For can we imagine that a Being of Infinite knowledge should be ignorant of what is done in the world? and of Infinite power, should stand by and leave things to chance and fertune? which were at first, contrived and brought into Being by the contrivance of his Wisdom, and exercise of his Power. And where the foundation of existence lies wholly and solely in the power of an Infinite Being producing, the ground of continuance of that existence must lye in the same power conserving. When men indeed effect any thing, the work may continue, whatever become of him that did it; but the reason of that is, because what man doth, is out of matter already existent, and his work is only setting materials to∣gether; but now what God effects he absolutely gives a Being to, and therefore its duration depends on his conservation. What is once in its Being, I grant, will continue till some greater force then its self put it out of Being; but withall I add, that Gods withdrawing his Conservation is so great a force, as must needs put that Being which had its ex∣istence from his power, out of the condition it was in by it. The Light of the Sun continues in the air, and as long as the Sun communicates it, nothing can extinguish the light, but what will put out the Sun; but could we suppose the Sun to withdraw his beams, what becomes of the light then?

This is the case of all Beings, which come from an Infinite power; their subsistence depends on a continual emanation of the same power which gave them Being; and when once this is withdrawn, all those Beings which were produced by this power must needs relapse into nothing. Besides, what dependence is there upon each other in the moments of the du∣ration of any created Being? The mode of existence in a creature is but contingent and possible, and nothing is implyed in the notion of an existent creature, beyond meer possibility of existence; what is it then which gives actual existence to it? that cannot be its self, for it would be necessarily exi∣stent; if another then give existence, this existence must wholly depend upon him who gave it; for nothing can con∣tinue existence to its self, but what may give it to its self, (for it gives it for the moment it continues it) and what gives existence to its self, must necessarily exist, which is repugnant to the very notion of a created Being: So that either we must deny a possibility of non-existence, or annihilation in a crea∣ture, which follows upon necessity of existence, or else we must assert that the duration or continuance of a creature in its Being doth immediatly depend on Divine providence and Conservation, which is with as much reason as frequency said to be a continued Creation. But yet further; was an Infinite Wisdom, and power necessary to put things into that order they are in? and is not the same necessary for the Go∣verning of them? I cannot see any reason to think that the power of matter when set in motion, should either bring things into that exquisite order and dependence which the parts of the world have upon each other; much less that by the meer force of that first motion all things should continue in the state they are in. Perpetual motion is yet one of the desiderata of the world; the most exquisite Mechanism cannot put an engine beyond the necessity of being looked after; can we then think this dull, unactive matter, meerly by the force of its first motion should be able still to produce the effects which are seen in the world, and to keep it from tumbling, at least by degrees, into its pristine Chaos? It was an Infinite Power, I grant, which gave that first mo••ion; but that it gave power to continue that motion till the Consta∣gration

of the world, remains yet to be proved. Some there∣fore finding that in the present state of the world, matter will not serve for all the noted and common Phoenomena of the world, have called in the help of a Spirit of Nature, which may serve instead of a Man-midwife to Matter, to help her in her productions of things. Or, as though God had a Plurality of worlds to look after, they have taken care to substitute him a Vicar in this, which is this Spirit of Na∣ture. But we had rather believe God himself to be perpetu∣ally Resident in the world, and that the power which gives life, and being and motion to every thing in the world, is no∣thing else but his own providence; especially since we have learnt from himself, that it is in him we live and move and have our being. * 1.153

Thus then we see a necessity of asserting Divine Provi∣dence, * 1.154 whether we consider the Divine nature, or the Phae∣nomena of the world; but yet the case is not so clear but there are two grand objections behind, which have been the continual exercise of the wits of inquisitive men almost in all Ages of the world. The one concerns the first Origine of evil; the other concerns the dispensations of providence, whence it comes to pass that good men fare so hard in the world, when the bad triumph and flourish; if these two can be cleared with any satisfaction to reason, it will be the highest vindication of Divine Providence, and a great evidence of the Divinity of the Scriptures, which gives us such clear light and direction in these profound speculations, which the dim reason of man was so much to seek in.

I begin with the Origine of evil; for, if there be a hand of providence which orders all things in the world, how comes evil then into it, without Gods being the Author of it? Which is a speculation of as great depth as necessity, it highly con∣cerning us to entertain the highest apprehensions of Gods ho∣liness, and how far he is from being the author of sin; and it is likewise a matter of some difficulty so to explain the Origine of evil as to make it appear that God is not the au∣thor of it. I easily then assent to what Origen saith on this * 1.155 subject, when Celsus upon some mistaken places of Scrip∣ture had charged the Scripture with laying the Origine of

evil upon God; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. If any thing which calls for our en∣quiry be of difficult investigation, that which concerns the O∣rigine of evils is such a thing; and as Simplicius well be∣gins his discourse on this subject; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.156 The Dispute concerning the nature and origine of evil, not be∣ing well stated, is the cause of great impiety towards God, and perverts the principles of good life, an•• involves them in innumerable perplexities who are not able to give a rational ac∣count of it. So much then is it our great concernment to fix on sure grounds in the resolution of this important question, in which I intend not to lanch out into the depth and intrica∣cyes of it, as it relates to any internal purposes of Gods will, (which is beyond our present scope) but I shall only take that account of it which the Scripture plainly gives in re∣lating the fall of the first man. For the clearing of which I shall proceed in this method:

1. That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the author of sin.

2. That the account which the Scripture gives of the Ori∣gine of evil, doth not charge it upon God.

3. That no account given by Philosophers of the Origine of evil, is so clear and rational as this is.

4. That the most material circumstances of this account are attested by the Heathens themselves.

1. That if the Scriptures be true, God cannot be the author of sin. For if the Scriptures be true, we are bound without hesitation to yeild our assent to them in their plain and direct affirmations, and there can be no ground of suspending assent, as to any thing which pretends to be a Divine Truth, but the want of certain evidence, whether it be of Divine Reve∣lation or no. No doubt it would be one of the most effe∣ctual wayes to put an end to the numerous controversies of the Christian world (especially to those bold disputes con∣cerning the method and order of Gods decrees) if the plain

and undoubted assertions of Scripture were made the Rule and Standard, whereby we ought to judge of such things as are more obscure and ambiguous. And could men but rest contented with those things which concern their eternal happiness, and the means in order to it (which on that account are written with all imaginable perspicuity in Scripture) and the moment of all other controversies be judged by their re∣ference to these, there would be fewer controversies and more Christians in the world. Now there are two grand principles which concern mens eternal condition, of which we have the greatest certainty from Scripture, and on which we may with safety rely, without perplexing our minds about those more nice and subtile speculations (which it may be are uncapable of full and particular resolution) and those are, That the ruine and destruction of man is wholly from himself; and that his salvation is from God alone. If then mans ruine and misery be from himself, which the Scripture doth so much inculcate on all occasions; then without con∣troversie that which is the cause of all the misery of humane nature, is wholly from himself too, which is, sin. So that if the main scope and design of the Scripture be true, God cannot be the author of that, by which (without the intervention of the mercy of God) mans misery unavoidably falls upon him. For with what authority and Majesty doth God in the Scripture forbid all manner of sin? with what earnestness and importunity doth he woo the sinner to forsake his sin? with what loathing and detestation doth he mention sin? with what justice and severity doth he punish sin? with what wrath and indignation doth he threaten contumacious sinners? And is it possible, (after all this and much more, recorded in the Scriptures, to express the holiness of Gods nature, his hatred of sin, and his appointing a day of judgement for the solemn punishment of sinners,) to imagine that the Scri∣ptures do in the least ascribe the Origine of evil to God, or make him the Author of Sin? Shall not the judge of all the world do right? will a God of Infinite Iustice, Purity, and Holiness, punish the sinner for that which himself was the cause of? Far be such unworthy thoughts from our appre∣hensions of a Deity, much more of that God whom we believe

to have declared his mind so much to the contrary, that we cannot believe that and the Scriptures to be true to∣gether.

Taking it then for granted in the general, that God cannot be the author of sin, we come to enquire, whether the account * 1.157 which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil, doth any way charge it upon God? There are only two wayes, which ac∣cording to the history of the fall of man recorded in Scripture, whereby men may have any ground to question whether God were the cause of mans fall? either first, by the giving him that positive Law, which was the occasion of his fall; or secondly, by leaving him to the liberty of his own will. First, The giving of that positive Law cannot be the least ground of laying mans fault on God; because, 1. It was most suitable to the nature of a rational creature to be governed by Laws, or declarations of the Will of his Maker; For considering man as a free agent, there can be no way imagined so conso∣nant to the nature of man as this was, because thereby he might declare his obedience to God to be the matter of his free choice. For where there is a capacity of reward, and punishment, and acting in the consideration of them, there must be a declaration of the will of the Law-giver, according to which man may expect either his reward or punishment. If it were suitable to Gods nature to promise life to man up∣on obedience, it was not unsuitable to it to expect obedience to every declaration of his will; considering the absolute soveraignty and Dominion which God had over man as being his creature, and the indispensable obligation which was in the nature of man to obey whatever his M••ker did command him. So that God had full and absolute right to require from man, what he did as to the Law which he gave him to obey; and in the general we cannot conceive, how there should be a testimony of mans obedience towards h••s Creator, without some declaration of his Creators Will. Secondly, God had full power and authority, not only to govern man by Laws, but to determine mans general obligation to obedience to that particular positive precept by the breach of which man fell. If Gods power over man was universal and unlimited, what reason can there be to imagine it should not extend to

such a positive Law? Was it, because the matter of this Law seemed too low for God to command his creature? but what∣ever the matter of the Law was, obedience to God was the great end of it, which man had testified as much in that In∣stance of it as in any other whatsoever; and in the violation of it were implyed the highest aggravations of disobedience; for Gods power and authority was as much contemned, his goodness slighted, his Truth and faithfulness questioned, his Name dishonoured, his Maj••sty affronted in the breach of that as of any other Law whatsoever it had been. If the Law were easie to be observed, the greater was the sin of disobe∣dience; if the weight of the matter was not so great in its self, yet Gods authority added the greatest weight to it; and the ground of obedience is not to be fetched from the nature of the thing required, but from the authority of the Legisla∣tor. Or was it then because God concealed from man his counsel in giving of that positive precept? Hath not then a Legislator power to require any thing, but what he satisfies every one of his reason in commanding it? if so, what be∣comes of obedience and subjection? it will be impossible to make any probative precepts on this account; and the Le∣gislator must be charged with the disobedience of his subjects, where he doth not give a particular account of every thing which he requires; which as it concerns humane Legislators (who have not that absolute power and authority which God hath) is contrary to all Laws of Policy and the general sense of the world. This Plutarch gives a good account of, * 1.158 when he discourseth ••o rationally of the sobriety which men ought to use in their inquiries into the grounds and reasons of Gods actions; for, saith he, Physitians will give prescripti∣ons without giving the patient a particular reason of every cir∣cumstance in them: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Neither have humane Laws alwayes apparent reason for them, nay some of them are to appearance ridiculous; for which he instanceth in that Law of the Lacedaemonian Ephori 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to which no other reason was an∣nexed but this, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: they commanded every Magistrate at the entrance of his office

to ••have himself, and gave this reason for it, that they might learn to obey Laws themselves. He further instanceth, in the Roman custom of manumission, their Laws about testaments, Solons Law against neutrality in seditions, and concludes thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Any one would easily find many absurdities in Laws, who doth not consider the intention of the Legislator, or the ground of what he requires. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. What wonder is it if we are so puzled to give an account of the actions of men, that we should be to seek as to those of the Deity? This cannot be then any ground on the account of meer reason, to lay the charge of mans disobedience upon God, because he required from him the observance of that positive command of not eating of the forbidden fruit.

The only thing then left is, whether God be not lyable to this * 1.159 charge as he left man to the liberty of his will: And that may be grounded on two things, either that God did not create man in such a condition, in which it had been impossible for him to have sinned, or that knowing his temptation he did not give him power to resist it. If neither of these will lay any Imputation of the Origine of evil upon God, then God will appear to be wholly free from it. First, concerning mans being created a free agent; if the determination of the Schools be good that possibility of ••inning is implyed in the very notion of a creature, and consequently that impeccability is repugnant to the nature of a created Being; then we see a * 1.160 necessary reason, why man was created in a state of liberty; but endeavouring to shew that the grounds of our Religion are not repugnant to natural reason, I shall rather make use of the Testimony of such who professed to be followers of nothing else but reason and Philosophy. Among whom I shall make choice of Simplicius both ••or the reason he produce••h, and because he is farthest from any suspicion of par∣tiality, by reason of his known opposition to the Mosaick history of the Creation. He then in his Commentaries on * 1.161 Epictetus professedly disputes this very subject of the Origine

of evil, and after having rejected that sond opinion of two principles, one of good, and the other of evil, undertakes to give an account whence evil came into the world, which because it tends so much to the illustrating our present subject I shall give an account of. God, saith he, who is the ••ountain and principle of all good, not only produced things which were in themselves good, nor only those things which were of a middle nature, but the extreams too, which were such things which were apt to be perverted from that which is ac∣cording to n••ture, to that which we call evil. And that after those bodyes which were (as he supposeth) incorruptible, others were produced which are subject to mutation and corruption; and so after those souls which were immutably fixed in good, others were produced which were lyable to be perverted from it; that so the riches of Gods goodness might be displayed in making to exist all beings which were capable of it; and that the Uni∣verse might be perfect in having all sorts of Beings in it. Now, he supposeth, that all these Beings which are above this sub∣lunary world are such as are immutably good, and that the lowest sort of Beings which are lyable to be perverted to evil, are such which are here below. Therefore, saith he, the soul being of a more noble and immutable nature, while it is by its self, doth not partake of evil; but it being of a nature apt to be joyned with these terrestrial bodyes (by the provid••nce of the author of the Universe who produced such souls, that so both extreams might be joyned by the bonds of vital union) thereby it becomes sensible of those evils and pains which the body is subject to; but th••se things are not properly evils but rather good, considering our terrestrial bodyes as parts of the Universe which is upheld by the changes and vicissitudes which are in this lower world; W••••ch he largely discourses on to shew that those particular alterations which are in bodyes, do conduce rather to the perfection and beauty of the Universe, then are any real evils in it. But now, saith he, for the origine of those things which are properly evils, viz. moral evils, which are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 t••e lapses and errors of the humane soul, we are to consider, that there are souls of a more excellent nature then ours are, which are im∣mutally good; ••nd the souls of brutes are of a lower kinde then

ours are, and yet are middle between the rational and vegeta∣tive, having something in them parallel both to the appetites and evils which are in men, which will therefore be understood by an account of the other. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.162 The soul of man is nexus utrius{que} mundi, in the middle between those more excellent Beings which perpetually remain above, with which it partakes in the sublimity of its nature and understanding, and those inferiour terrestrical Beings with which it communicates through the vital union which it hath with the body, and by reason of that freedom and indifferency which it hath, it sometimes is assimilated to the one, sometimes to the other of these extreams. So that while it approacheth to the nature of the superior Beings, it keeps it self free from evil, but because of its freedom it may sometimes sink down into these lower things; and so he calls, the cause of all evil in the soul 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, its voluntary de∣scent into this lower world, and immersing its self in the faeculency of terrestrial matter. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For though the soul be of a kind of Am∣phibious nature, yet it is not forced either upwards or down∣wards, but acts either way according to its internal liberty. But, saith he, while the rational soul keeps that power which it hath in its hands over the body, and makes use of it only as an instrument for its own good, so long it keeps pure and free from any stain of evil; but when it once forgets the similitude it hath with the mor•• excellent Being, and throws away the Scepter of its power, and drowns it self in the body and brutish affections (preferring the pleasure of sense above that of reason) when it so far degenerates below the principles of reason, that in stead of commanding the brutish faculties it becomes a slave to them, then it conceives and brings forth evil; but this it doth not through any coaction or necessity, but through the abuse of that power and liberty which it hath; For the choice is a proper action of the soul its self; which he proves from hence, because

God and the Laws, and all good men, do not measure the good and evil of actions so much by the event, as by the will and intention of the person; and that punishment and reward have chiefly a respect to these. And therefore men are pardoned for what they do out of constraint and force, and the fault is ascri∣bed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not to him that did it, but to him that forced him to the doing of it. And so from hence he concludes, that because of the freedom of the will of man, nothing else can be said to be the author of evil properly, but the soul of man; and concludes that discourse with this ex∣cellent speech, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Having thus found out the true Origine of evil, let us cry out with a loud voice, that God is not the author of sin, because the soul freely doth that which is evil, and not God; for if thè soul were forced to do what it doth, one might justly lay the blame on God, who permits such a force to be offered it, neither could it be properly evil which the soul was constrained to; but since it acted freely, and out of choice, the soul must alone be ac∣counted the author and cause of evil. Thus we see that God cannot with any shadow of reason be accounted the author of evil, because he gave the soul of man a principle of in∣ternal freedom, when the very freedom of acting which the soul had, put it into a capacity of standing as well as falling. And certainly, he can never be said to be the cause of the breaking of a person, who gave him a stock to set up with, and supposed him able to manage it when he gave it him; in∣deed had not man had this freedom of will, he could not have fallen; but then neither had he been a rational Agent, which supposing no corruption, doth speak freedom of action. So that while we enquire after the Origine of evil we have no other cause to assign it to but mans abuse of that free power of acting which he had; but if we will be so curious as to enquire further, why God did create man with such a free∣dom of will, and not rather fix his soul immutably on good;

if the order of beings be no satisfactory reason for it, we can give no other then that why he made man, or the world at all, which was the good pleasure of his Will.

But secondly, supposing Gods giving man this freedom of will, doth not entitle him to be the author of evil; doth not * 1.163 his leaving man to this liberty of his in the temptation, make him the cause of sin? I answer no, and that on these ac∣counts.

1. Because man stood then upon such terms, that he could not fall but by his own free and voluntary act; he had a power to stand, in that there was no principle of corruption at all in his faculties, but he had a pure and undefiled soul which could not be polluted without its own consent: Now it had been repugnant to the terms on which man stood (which were the tryal of his obedience to his Creator) had he been irresistibly determined any way. Simplicius puts this questi∣on after the former discourse, Whether God may not be called the author of sin, because he permits the soul to use her liberty? but, saith he, he that says God should not have permitted this use of its freedom to the soul, must say one of these two things, ••ither that the soul being of such a nature as is indifferent to good or evil, it should have been wholly kept from the choosing evil, or else that it should have been made of such a nature that it should not have had a power of choosing evil. The first is ir∣rational and absurd; for what freedom and liberty had that been where there was no choice, and what choice could there have been where the mind was necessitated onely to one part. For the second we are to consider, saith he, that no evil is in its self de∣sirable, or to be chosen; but withall, if this power of determi∣ning its self ••ither way must be taken away, it must be either as something not good, or as some great evil; and who••ver saith so, doth not consider, how many things in the world there are, which are accounted good and desirable things, yet are no ways comparable with this freedom of Will. For it excells all sublunary Beings; and there is none would rather desire to be a Brute or Plant then man; if God then shewed his goodness in giving to inferior beings such perfecti••••s which are far below this, is it any ways incongruous to Gods nature and goodness to give man the freedom of his actions, and a self determining

power, th••ugh he permi••ted him the free use of it. Besides, as that author reason••, had God to prevent mans sin taken away the Liberty of his will, he had likewise destroyed the foundati∣on of all vertue, and the very nature of man; for vertue would not have been such, had there been no possibility of acting con∣trary; and mans nature would have been divine, because impec∣cable. Therefore, saith ••e, though we attribute this self-de∣termining power to God as the author of it, which was so neces∣sary in the order of the Universe, we have no reason to attribute the Origine of that evil to God which comes by the abuse of that liberty. For, as he further adds, God doth not at all cause that aversion from Good, which is in the soul when it sins, but only gave such a power to the soul, whereby it might turn its self to evil, out of which God might afterwards produce so much good, which could not otherwise have been without it. So conso∣nantly * 1.164 to the Scripture doth that Philosopher speak on this subject.

2. God cannot be said to be the author of sin, though he did not prevent the fall of man, because he did not withdraw be∣fore his fall any grace or assistance, which was necessary for his standing. Had there been indeed a necessity of superna∣tural grace to be communicated to man for every moment to continue him in his Innocency, and had God before mans fall withdrawn such assistance from him, without which it were impossible for him to ••ave stood, it would be very difficult freeing God from being the cause of the Fall of man. But we are not put to such difficulties for acquitting God from being the author of sin; for there appears no necessity at all for asserting any distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace in man before his Fall; that the one should belong only to a radical power of standing, the other to every act of good which Adam did; For if God made man upright, he certain∣ly gave him such a power as might be brought into act with∣out the necessity of any supervenient act of grace, to elicite that habitual power into particular actions. If the other were sufficient, it was sufficient for its end; and how could it be sufficient for its end, if notwithstanding that, there were no possibility of standing, unless efficacious help were superadded to it? God would not certainly require any

thing from the creature in his integrity, but what he had a power to obey; and if there were necessary further grace to bring the power into act, then the substracting of this grace must be by way of punishment to man, which it is hard to conceive for what it should be, before man had sinned, or e••se God must substract this grace on purpose that man might ••all, which would necessarily follow on this supposition, in which case Man would be necessitated to fall, veluti cum subductis columnis dom us necessario corruit, as one expresseth it, as a house must needs fall when the pillars on which it stood are taken away from it. But now if God withdrew not any effectual grace from man, whereby he must necessarily fall, then though God permit man to use his liberty, yet he can∣not be said to be any ways the author of evil, because man had still a posse si vellet, a power of standing, if he had made right use of his Liberty, and God never took from man his adjutorium quo potuit stare, & sine quo non potuit, as Divines call it, man enjoying still his power, though by the abuse of his Liberty he fell into sin; so that granting God ••o leave man to the use of his Liberty, yet we see God cannot in the l••ast be charged with being the Author of sin, or of the Origine of evil, by the History of the fall of man in Scripture: which was the thing to be cleared.

We come now in the third place to compare that account given of the Origine of evil in Scripture, with that which * 1.165 was embraced by Heathen Philosophers, in point of reason and evidence. There was no one inquiry whatsoever in which those who had nothing but natural light to guide them, were more to seek for satisfaction in, then this con∣cerning the Origine of evil. They saw by continual experi∣ence how great a Torrent of both sorts of evils, of sin and punishment, did over flow the world; but they were like the Egyptians, who had sufficient evidence of the overflowing their banks by the River Nile, but could not find out the spring or the head of it. The reason was, as corruption in∣creased in the world, so the means of instruction and know∣ledge decayed; and so as the Phoenomena grew greater, the reason of them was less understood; the knowledge of the History of the first Ages of the world, through which they

could alone come to the full understanding of the true cause of evil, insensibly decaying in the several Nations: Insomuch that those who were not at all acquainted with that History of the world which was preserved in Sacred Records among the Iews, had nothing but their own uncertain conjectures to go by, and some kind of obscure traditions which were preserved among them, which while they sought to rectifie by their interpretations, they made them more obscure and false then they found them. They were certain of nothing but that mankind was in a low and degenerate condition, and subject to continual miseries and calamities; they who cryed up the most the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or the self-determining power of the soul, could not certainly but strangely wonder, that a Principle indifferent to be carried either way, should be so almost fatally inclined to the worst of them. It was very strange that since Reason ought to have the command of Passions by their own acknowledgement, the brutish part of the soul should so master and enslave the rational, and the beast should still cast the rider in man, the sensitive appetite should throw off the power of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of that fa∣culty of the soul which was designed for the Government of all the rest. The Philosophers could not be ignorant what slaves they were themselves to this terrestrial Hyle, how easily their most mettalsom souls were mired in the dirt, how deep they were sunk into corporeal pleasures, that it was past the power of their reason to help them out. Nay when the soul begins to be fledged again, after 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or moulting at her entrance into the body, which Plato speaks of, and strives to raise her self above his lower world, she then feels the weight of such Plummets hanging at her feet, that they bring her down again to her former fluttering up and down in her Cage of earth. So Hierocles complains, that when reason begins to carry the soul to the perception of the most noble objects, the soul with a generous flight * 1.166 would soar above this world, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, were it not horn down to that which is evil by the force of passions, which hang like leads upon the souls feet. What a strange unaccountable thing must this needs be to those who beheld the constancy

of the effect, but were to seek for the cause of it? it could not but be clear to them that the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 they were wont to extoll so high, was (in the state man was now in) but a more noble name for slavery; when themselves could not but confess the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or inclination in the soul, was so strong to the evil; and could that be an even balance, where there was so much down-weight in one of the scales? unless they made, as some of them did, the voluntary inclinations of the soul to evil, an evidence of her liberty in this most dege∣nerate condition, as though it were any argument that the prisoner was the freer, because he delighted himself in the noise of his shackles. Neither was this disorder alone at home in the soul, where there was still a Xantippe scolding with Socrates, passion striving with reason; but when they looked abroad in the world, they could not but observe some strange irregularities in the Converse among men. What debaucheries, contentions, rapines, fightings, and destroying each other, and that with the greatest cruelty, and that fre∣quently among Country-men, Friends, nay relations, and kindreds! and could this hostility between those of the same nature, and under the most sacred bonds of union, be the result of nature, when even beasts of prey are not such to those of their own kind? Besides all this when they summed up the life of man together, and took an account of the weaknesses and follies of Childhood, the heats and extravagan∣cies of youth, the passions, disquietments, and disappointments of men in their strength and height of business, the inquie∣tude, aches, and infirmities of old age, besides the miseries which through every one of these all men are subject to, and few escape, into how small a sum will the solid pleasure and contentment of the life of man be reduced? Nay if we take those things in the world which men please themselves the most in enjoyment of, and consider but with what care they are got, with what fear they are kept, and with what cer∣tainty they must be lost, and how much the possession of any thing fails of the expectation of it, and how near men are upon the top of Tenariff to fall into the depth of the Sea, how often they are precipitated from the height of prosperi∣ty into the depth of adversity, we shall finde yet much less

that by the greatest Chymistrie can be extracted of real sa∣tisfaction out of these things. Whence then should it come that mens souls should so delight to seed on these husks, and to embrace these clouds and shadows instead of that real good which is the true object of the souls desire? They could ea∣sily see there was no pure, unmixed good in the world, but there was a contemperation of both together according to that of Euripides:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

There is a kind of continual mixture of good and evil in the world, which Socrates observed upon the rubbing of his thigh where the fetters made it itch, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.167 What a strange thing is that which men are wont to call pleasure, how near of kin is it to that which seems so contrary to it, pain?

Now the observing the strange and sudden vicissitudes of these things, and what near neighbours pain and pleasure * 1.168 were to each other, (so that there is frequently a passage out of one into the other) did yet more entangle them to give a clear account of the Origine of both these. Those who believed there was a God, who produced the world and ordered all things in it, did easily attribute whatever was good in the world to the Fountain of all goodness; but that any evil should come from him they thought it repugnant to the very notion of a Deity; which they were so far right in, as it concerned the evil of sin, which we have already shew∣ed God could not be the author of; but therein they shewed their ignorance of the true cause of evil, that they did no•• look upon the miseries of life as effects of Gods Iustice upon the world for the evil of sin. And therefore that they might set the Origine of evil far enough off from God, they made two different Principles of things, the one of good, and the other of evil; this Plutarch tells us was the most ancient and universal account which he could meet with of the ori∣gine of good and evil. To which purpose we have this ample

Testimony of his in his learned discourse, de Iside & Osiride, * 1.169 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Which words I have the more largely cited because they give us the most full account of the antiquity, universality and reason of that opinion which asserts two different principles of good and evil. It is a Tradition (saith he) of great an∣tiquity derived down from the ancient Masters of D••vine know∣ledge, and Formers of Commonwealths, to the Poets and Phi∣losophers, whose first author cannot be found, and yet hath met with firm and unshaken belief, not only in ordinary discourses and reports, but was spread into the mysteries and sacrifices both of Greeks and others, that the Universe did not depend on chance, and was destitute of a mind and reason to govern it; neither was there one only reason which sate at the stern, or held the reins, whereby he did order and govern the world; but since there is so much confusion and mixture of good and evil in the world, that nature doth not produce any pure untainted good; there is not any one who like a Drawer takes the liquor out of two several vessels, and mixeth them together, and after distri∣butes them; but there are two principles and powers contrary to each other, whereof one draoes us to the right hand, and di∣rects us straight forward, the other pulls us back, and turns us the other way; since we see the life of man so mixed as it is;

and not only that, but the world too, at least so much as is sub∣lunary and terrestrial, which is subject to many varieties, ir∣regularities, and changes. For if nothing he without a cause, and good cannot be the cause of evil, it necessarily follows, that as there is a peculiar nature and principle, which is the cause of good, so there must be another, which is the cause of evil.

But least we should think it was only a Sect of a kind of Heathen Manichees which held this opinion; he tells us to prevent that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, it was the opinion of the most, and wisest, of the Heathen. Now these two principles some (saith he) call two opposite Gods, whereof the one is the cause of good, and the other of evil; him they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: By this one would imagine that this very ancient Tradition was nothing else, but the true account of the Origine of evil, a little disguised. For the Scripture making the Devil the first author of evil himself, and the first sollicitor and tempter of man to it; who when God directed him straight forward, pull'd man back, and put him quite out of his way, by which means all the miseries of the world came into it. For while man kept close to his Maker, his integrity and obedience were to him what the vasa umbilicalia are to the child in the Womb; by them he received what ever tended to his subsistence and comfort; but sin cut those vessels asunder, and proved the Midwife of misery, bringing man forth into a world of sor∣row and sufferings: Now, I say, the Scripture taking such especial notice of one, as the chief of Devils, through whose means evil came into the world, this gave occasion to the Heathens when length of time had made the original Tradi∣tion more obscure, to make these two, God and the Daemon, as two Anti-gods, and so to be the causes, the one of all good, and the other of all evil. Which at last came to that (which was the Devils great design in thus corrupting the tradition) that both these Anti-gods should have solemn worship by Sacrifices, the one by way of impetration for be∣stowing of good, the other by way of Deprecation for avert∣ing of evil. Such Plutarch there tells us were the Oromasdes and Arimanius of Zoroastres which were worshipped by the Persians, the one for doing good, and the other for

avoiding evil; the one they resembled to light (or fire) the other to darkness and ignorance; what animals were good and usefull they ascribed to Oromasdes, and all venemous and noxious ones to Arimanius, whom Plutarch elsewhere calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the evil Daemon of the Per∣sians. The same Diogenes Laertius relates of the Magi, the Philosophers of Persia, that they made two distinct princi∣ples, * 1.170 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good and bad Daemon; for which he quotes Dinon, Aristotle, Hermippus, Eudoxus, and others. The same Plutarch makes to be the opinion of the ancient Greeks, who attribute the good to Iupiter Olympius, the bad to Hades; the Chald••ans, saith he, make the Planets their Gods, of which two they suppose the cause of good; two more of only a malignant influence, and other three to be indifferent to either. The same he affirms of the Egyp∣tians, that whatever was evil, and irregular, they ascribed to Typho; what was good, comely and usefull, they attri∣buted to Isis, and Osiris; to Isis as the passive, Osiris as the active principle.

Thus we see how large a spread this opinion of the Origine of evil had in the Gentile world; neither did it expire with * 1.171 Heathenism; but Manes retained so much of the Religion of his Country being a Persian, that he made a strange med∣ley of the Persian and Christian doctrine together. For that was his famous opinion of which St. Austin tells us; Is••e duo principia inter se diversa at que adversa, cade••que aeter∣na, & eterna hoc est, semper fuisse composuit; du••sque na∣turas at que substantias, boni scilicet & mali, sequens alios an∣tiquos haereticos, opinatus est. St. Austin thinks that Manes had h••s opinion concerning two principles from the ancient * 1.172 Hereticks, by whom I suppose he means the Marcicnists and Valentinians; but it seems more probable that Manes had his doctrine immediately from h••s Countrymen, though it be generally thought that Scythianus and Buddas were his masters i•• it. But from whomsoever it came, the opinion was me••rly Heathen, and not more contrary to Scripture then it is to reason; the former I medd•••• not with, that opinion being now extinct in the Christian world; I only briefly consider the unreasonableness of it, to shew what a far better

account of the Origine of evil the Scriptures give us, then was discovered by the Heathen Philosophers. For on both sides that opinion is repugnant to the notion of a Deity, so that while they would make two such Gods, they make none at all. For how can the principle of good be God, if he hath not Infinite power, as well as goodness? and how can he have infinite power, if he hath not the management of things in the world? and how can he have the management of things, if they be lyable to evil, which the other God which is the principle of evil may lay upon it; from which accor∣ding to this supposition, the principle of good cannot rescue it? So that they who hold this opinion cannot, as Sim••licius tells us, give God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the half of that infinite power which belongs to him; for neither can he keep the good creatures which he makes from the power of the evil Daemon, and therefore, if he loves them, must be in continual fears of the power of the contrary principle, nei∣ther can he free them from the evil which the other lays upon them; for then Gods power would be far greater then the evil Daemons, and so he could be no Anti-god. And on the other side the notion or Idea of an Infinitely evil Being, is in its self an inconsistent Idea; for it is an Infinite non∣entity, if we suppose his very Being to lie in Being evil, which is only a privation of goodness; and besides if he be Infi∣nitely evil, he must be infinitely contrary to the good Principle, and how can he be infinitely contrary which enjoys several of the same perfections which the other hath, which are infinity of essence and necessity of existence? Now if this Principle of evil be absolutely contrary to the other, it must be contrary in all his perfections; for what∣ever is a perfection, belongs to that which is good; and now if it be contrary in every perfection, Infinity of essence, and necessity of existence, being two, it must be as contrary as is imaginable to them, by which this evil Principle must be infi∣nitely defective in Being and existence, and so it will be an infinite non entity which yet exists, which is the height of contradiction. Again, if there be such a contrary prin∣ciple, which is the cause of all evil, then all evil falls out unavoidably, and by the power of this Infinitely evil prin∣ciple,

by which means not only all Religion, but all vertue and goodness will be taken out of the world, if this evil principle be infinite; and if not infinite, no Anti-god: and not only so, but all difference of good and evil will be taken away (and then what need making two such contrary prin∣ciples to give an account of the Origine of evil?) for when once evil becomes thus necessary, it loseth its nature as a moral evil; for a moral evil implyes in it a voluntary breach of some known Law; but how can that breach be voluntary, which was caused by an Infinite power in the most proper way of efficiency? and thus if all freedom of will be destroyed (as it is necessarily by this supposition) then no Government of the world by Laws can be supposed, and consequently no reward or punishment, which suppose liberty of action, and by this means all Religion, Laws, and Providence are banished out of the world, and so this evil Daemon will get all into his own hands, and instead of two contrary principles, there will be but one infinitely evil Demon. Which that there is not, appears by this, that not∣withstanding all the evil in the world there is so much good left in it, of which there would be none, if th••s evil Daemon had Infinite power. By this we see there cannot be a prin∣ciple infinitely evil; for while they go about to make two such contrary principles infinite, they make neither of them so, and so while they make two Gods, they take away any at all. So that this opinion of the Origine of evil, is manifestly absurd, irrational, and contradictions.

But all the Heathen Philosophers were not so gross as to * 1.173 imagine two such Anti-Gods with infinitely active power; but yet those who would not in terms assert it, might be driven to it by the consequence of their opinion concerning the Origine of evil, which did suppose a necessity of it in na∣ture, as flowing from that passive principle out of which the world was produced. Hence it was that Heraclitus as Plutarch tells us, attributed the Origine of all things to dis∣cord * 1.174 and antipathy, and was wont to say, that when Homer wished

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

that all contention were banished out of the world, that he did secretly curse the Origine of things and wished the ruine of the world. So Empedocles called the active principle wh••ch did good Harmony and Friendship, but the other

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

by which he makes it to be a quarrelsome, pernicious, and bloody principle. The same Plutarch tells us of those two renowned Philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato. Thence he tells us the Pythagoreans called the principle of good 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Unity, finite, quiescent, straight, uneven number, square, right and splendid; the principle of evil, they called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Binary, Infinite, moving, crooked, even, long of one side, unequal, left, obscure. The opinion of Plato he tells us is very obscure, it being his purpose to conceal it; but he saith in his old age in his book de Legibus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, without any if's or and's, he asserts the world to be moved by more then one principle, by two at the least, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The one of a good and benigne nature, the other contrary to it both in its nature and operations. Numenius * 1.175 in Chalcidius thus delivers the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato de originibus as he speaks; Igitur Pythagoras quoque, inquit Numenius, fluidam & sine qualitate sylvam esse censet; nec tamen ut Stoici naturae mediae, interque malorum bonorum∣que viciniam, sed plane noxiam; Deum quippe esse (ut etiam Platoni videtur) initium & causam bonorum, sylvam malo∣rum: so that according to Numenius, both Plato and Py∣thagoras attributed the origine of evil to the malignity of matter, and so they make evils to be necessarily consequent upon the Being of things. For thus he delivers expresly the opinion of Pythagoras; qui ait, existente providentia, mala quoque necessario substitisse; propterea quod sylva sit, & eadem sit malitia praedita: Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi ••••mas autumet. Unam beneficen∣tissimam; malignam alteram, sc. Sylvam. Igitur juxta Pla∣tonem

mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam Patris liberalitate collata sunt; mala vero, matris sylvae vitio cohaeserunt. But Plu∣tarch * 1.176 will by no means admit, that Plato attributes the Origine of evil meerly to matter; but he makes the principle of evil to be something distinct from matter, which he calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a confused, infinite, self-moving, stirring principle; which (saith he) he else where calls Necessity, and in his de Legibus plainly, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a disorderly and malignant Soul, which cannot be understood of meer matter, when he makes his Hyle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Without form or figure, and destitute of all qualities and power of operation: and it is impossible (saith he) that that which is of its self such an inert principle as matter is, should by Plato be supposed to be the cause and principle of evil, which he elsewhere calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Necessity which often resisted God and cast off his reins. So that according to Plutarch Plato acquits both God and Hyle from being the Origine of evil, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and therefore attributes it to that malignant spirit which moves the matter, and is the cause of all the disorderly mo∣tions in the world. But what this spirit should be, neither he nor any one else could ever understand; what darkness and ignorance then was there among the wisest of Philoso∣phers concerning the Origine of evil, when they were so consused and obscure in the account which they gave of it, that their greatest admirers could not understand them!

But though Plato seemed so ambiguous in his judgment of the Origine of evil, whether he should attribute it to the * 1.177 Hyle, or some malignant spirit in it, the Stoicks were more dogmatical, and plainly imputed the cause of evil to the per∣versity of matter. So Chalcidius tells us, that the Stoicks made matter not to be evil in its self as Pythagoras, but that it was indifferent to either; perrogati igitur unde mala? * 1.178 perversitatem seminarium malorum causati sunt: they made the perversity of matter the Origine of evil; but as he well observes, nec expediunt adhu•• unde••••psa perversitas cum juxta ipsos duo sint initia rerum, D•••••••• & sylva. Deus summum &

praecellens bonum; sylva, ut censent, nec bonum nec malum. They give no rational account whence this perversity of matter should arise, when according to the Stoicks, there are but two principles of things, God and matter, whereof the one is perfectly good, the other neither good nor evil. But this perversity they tell us is something necessarily conse∣quent upon the Generation of things. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, these are affections, (viz. the disorders in the world) which follow the Generation of things, as rust comes upon brass, and filth upon the body, as the counterfeit Trismegistus speaks; so Maximus Tyrius saith that evils in the world are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not any works of art, but the affections of * 1.179 matter. Non potest artifex mutare materiam, saith Seneca, when he is giving an account why God suffers evils in the world: and elsewhere gives th••s account why evils came into he world, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id in quo exercetur * 1.180 inobsequens arti est. So that the Origine of evil by this ac∣count of it lyes wholly upon the perversity of matter, which it seems was uncapable of being put into better order by that God who produced the world out of that matter which the Stoicks supposed to be eternal. And the truth is, the avoiding the attributing the cause of evil to God, seems to have been the great reason, why they rather chose to make it matter necessary and coexistent with God, and this was the only plausible pretence which Hermogenes had for following the Platonists and Stoicks in this opinion, that he might set God far enough off from being the author of sin; but I can∣not s••e what advantage comes at all by this Hypothesis, but it is chargeable with as many difficulties as any other. For, 1. It either destroyes Gods omnipotency, or else makes him the * 1.181 approver of evil, so that if he be not auctor, he must be assentator mali, as Tertullian speaks against Hermogenes, be∣cause he suffered evil to be in matter; for, as he argues, aut * 1.182 enim potuit emendare sed noluit. aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit infirmus Deus; si potuit & noluit, malus & ipse quia mal•• savit; & fic jam habetur ejus licet non instituerit, quia tamen si noluisset illud ess••, non esset; ipse jam fecit esse, quod noluit non esse, quo quid ••st ••urpius? si voluit esse quod ipse

noluit fecisse, adversum semetipsum egit, cum & voluit esse quod noluit fecisse, & noluit fecisse quod voluit esse. So that little advantage is gained for the clearing the true origine of evil by this opinion; for either God could have taken away evil out of matter but would not, or else would but could not; this latter destroyes Gods omnipotency, the former his good-ness; for by that means evil is in the world by his consent and approbation; for if God would not remove it when he might, the Being of it will come from him; when if he would have hindred it, it would not have been, and so God by not root∣ing out of evil, will be found an assertor of it; male si per vo∣luntatem; turpiter si per necessitatem, aut famulus erit mali Deus, aut amicus; if Gods will were the cause why sin was, it reflects on his goodness; if Gods power could not hinder it, it destroyes his omnipotency. So that by this opinion God must either be a slave or a friend to evil. 2. This principle * 1.183 overturns the foundations of Religion, and all transactions be∣tween God and mens souls in order to their welfare, because it makes evil to be necessarily existent in the world; which appears from hence in that evil doth result from the Being of matter, and so it must necessarily be, as matter is supposed to be; for whatever results from the Being of a thing, must be coexistent with it; and so what flows from what doth necessarily exist, must have the same mode of existence which the Being its self hath; as is evident in all the attributes of God, which have the same immutability with his nature: now then if evil did exist from eternity together with matter, it must necessarily exist as matter doth, and so evil will be invincible and unavoidable in the world; which if once granted, renders Religion useless, makes Gods commands un∣righteous, and destroyes the foundation of Gods proceedings in the day of judgment. 3. This opinion makes God not to be the author of good, while it denyes him to be the Author of evil. * 1.184 For either there was nothing else but evil in this eternal matter, or there was a mixture of good and evil; if nothing else but evil which did necessarily exist, it were as impossible for God to produce good out of it, as to annihilate the ne∣cessarily existent matter. If th••re were a mixture of good and evil, they were both there either necessarily or contin∣gently;

how could either of them be contingently in that which is supposed to be necessarily existent, and no free agent? If they be both there necessarily, 1. It is hard conce••ving how two such contrary things as good and evil, should both necessarily be in the same uniform matter. 2. Then God is no more the Author of good then of evil in the world; for he is said not to be the Auth••r of evil because it comes from matter; and so it appears good doth too, and so God according to this opinion, is no more the Author of good then he is of evil. But if it be said, that good is not in matter, but God pro∣duced that out of nothing: Then I reply, 1. If God did pro∣duce good out of nothi••g, why did he not produce matter out of nothing too; i•• he were so powerful as to do the one, there could be no de ect of power as to the other. What insufficiency is there in Gods nature for producing all things out of nothing, if he can produce any thing out of nothing? 2. If God did produce good out of evil, why could he not have removed all evil out of matter? for good could not be produced, but by the removing of some evil which was be∣fore that good, and so God might have removed all evil out of matter. And so by not doing it when he might, this opinion gives not the least satisfaction in point of reason for acquitting God from being the Author of sin, nor for clearing the true Origine of evil.

Thus we have now compared the account given of it in Scripture, with that given by the Heathen Philosophers, and * 1.185 find it in every thing more clear, rational and satisfactory then theirs is. Which doubtless is the reason, why the more modern Philosophers such as Hierocles, Porphyrie, Simplicius and others, though otherwise great opposers of Christianity, did yet in this side with the Scriptures and at∣tribute the original of evil, not to matter but to the Will of man. And whoever is seriously conversant with the writings of those Philosophers, who were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the sacred succ••ssion, out of the School of Ammonius at Alexandria, such as Plotinus, Porphyrius, Iamblichus and Hierocles, will find them wri•••• in a higher strain concerning many weighty and importan•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, as of the degeneracy of mens souls from God, and t••e way of the souls returning to

him, then the most sublime of the ancient Philosophers had done. Which speculations of theirs no doubt arose not so much from the School of Plato, and Pythagoras, as of that great restorer o•• Philosophy Ammonius of Alexandria; whose S••bolars Her••nnius▪ Origen and Plotinus were. Who living and dying a ••hristian, as Eusebius and Hierom assure us, whateve•• Porphyrius suggests to the contrary, did * 1.186 communicate to his S••holars the sublimer mysteries of Di∣vine rev••l••tion, toge••her w••••h the speculations of the anci∣en•• Philo••ophers: which Holstenius conceives he did with an adjuration o•• secrecy, which he tells us Porphyrius himself acknowledgeth, that those three Scholars of Ammonius, Herennius, Origen and Pl••tinus were under an obligation to each other not to reveal and discover, though it were after violated by them. It is an easie matter to conceive what an excellent improvement might be made of the ancient Platonick Philosophy by the advantage of the Scriptures, by one who was so well versed in both of them as Ammonius is supposed to have been; and how agreeable and becoming would that Philosophy seem which had only its rise from Plato, but its height and improvement from those rich and truly divine Truths which were inlaid with them? The want of ob∣serving this, viz. whence it was that those excellent dis∣courses in the later Platonists had their true original, hath given occasion to several mistakes among learned men: as first the over valuing of the Platonick Philosophy, as though in many of the discourses and notions of it, it seemed to some (who were more in Love with Philosophy then the Scri∣ptures) to outgo what is discovered therein concerning the same things. A most groundless and unworthy censure! when it is more then probable (and might be largely manifested, were it here a fit opportunity) that whatever is truly generous and noble in the sublimist discourses of the Plato∣nists, had not only its primitive rise, but its accession and improvement from the Scriptures, wherein it is still contained in its native lustre and beauty, without those paintings and impure mixtures which the su••••••mest truths are corrupted with in the Platonick writi••••. The reason of which is, though these Philosophers grew ••••ddenly rich through the

spoyles they had taken out of the Scriptures, yet they were loth to be known from whence they had them, and would seem to have had that out of their own gardens which was only transplanted from the Sacred writings. Therefore we find them not mentioning the Scriptures and the Christian doctrine without some contempt of its meanness and simplici∣ty; & what ever improvement they had gained by them, they would have it less taken notice of by professing their oppo∣sition to the Christians, as is notorious in those great Phi∣losophers, Porphyrius, Iamblichus, Hierocles, Simplicius and o••hers. It being their design to take so much and no more out of the Christian doctrine as they could well suite with their Plat••nick notions, by which means they so disguised the faces of the Truths they stole, that it were hard for the right owners of them to know them again. Which was the grand artifice of their great Master Plato, who doubtless by means of his abode and acquaintance in Aegypt about the time when the Iews began to flock thither, had more cer∣tain knowledge of many truths of grand importance, con∣cerning the Deity, the nature of the soul, the Origine of the world, then many other Greek Philosophers had; but yet therein lay his great fault, that he wrapt up and disguised his notions in such a fabulous and ambiguous manner, that partly it might be less known from whence he had them, and that they might find better entertainment among the Greeks, then they were ever like to do in their plain and native dress. Which Plato himself seems somewhere to intimate, when he saith, that what the Greeks received from the Barbarians, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they put it into * 1.187 a better fashion, i. e. they disguise it, alter and change it as they please, and put it into a Greek habit, that it might never be suspected to have been a Forraigner. Thence Tertullian speaks with a great deal of truth and freedom of such Philo∣sophers who did ingenii sitim de prophetarum fonte irrigare (as he expresseth it) that quenched their thirst after know∣ledge with the waters of Iordan (though they did not like * 1.188 Naaman, cure the lepro••ic of the head by washing in them) for as Tertullian saith, the•• came only ex negotio curiositatis, more to please the i tch o•• their curiosity then to cure it.

And wherein they seemed most to agree with the Scrip∣tures, their difference was beyond their agreement. Siqui∣dem * 1.189 vera quaeque & consonantia Prophetis aut aliunde com∣mendant, aut aliorsum subornant, cum maxima injuria ve∣ritatis quam efficiunt aut adjuvari falsis aut patrocinari. Whatever the Philosophers speak agreeable to the Scriptures, either they do not own whence they had it, or turn it quite ano∣ther way, whereby they have done the truth a great deal of in∣jury by mixing it with their corruptions of it, and making that little truth a plea for the rest of their errors. Neither was this only among the ancient Philosophers, but the Primitive Christians began to discern the underhand workings of such, who sought to blend Philosophy and Christianity together; for Tertullian himself takes great notice of such, who did, Veritatis dogmata ad Philosophicas sententias adulterare, suborn Christianity to maintain Philosophy; which makes him cry out, Viderint qui Stoicum & Platonicum, & Dia∣lecticum Christianismum protulerunt; by which we see what tampering there was betimes rather to bring Christianity * 1.190 down to Philosophy, rather then to make Philosophy truckle under the truth and simplicity of the Scriptures. Whether Ammonius himself, and some others of the School of A∣lexandria, might be guilty in this kind, is not here a place to enquire, though it be too evident in the writings of some, that they rather seek to accommodate the Scriptures to the Sentiments of the School of Plato, then to reform that by the Scriptures; but I say, however it were with those who were Christians, yet those who were not, but only Philoso∣phers, made their great advantage by it. For when they found what was reconcileable with the doctrine of Plato in the Scriptures, done already to their hands, by the endea∣vours chiefly of Ammonius and Origen, they greedily em∣brace those improvements of their Philosophy, which would tend so much to the credit of it, and as contemptuously re∣ject what they found irreconcileable with the dictates of their Philosophy. Now what an unreasonable thing is it, when what ever was noble and excellent in the Heathen Phi∣losophy was derivative from〈◊〉〈◊〉Scriptures, as the sacred Fount••in of it, that the meeting with such things should in

the least redound to the prejudice of the Scriptures from whence it was originally derived? when on the other side it should be a great confirmation to our faith as to the Scri∣ptures, that they who were professed Philosophers and ad∣mirers only of reason, did so readily embrace some of those grand Truths which are contained in the word of God.

For which we need no other instance, then that before * 1.191 us, concerning the Origine of evil, the making out of which will tend to the clearing the last thing mentioned concern∣ing it, which was that the most material things in it are attested by the Heathens themselves. And this honey which is gained out of the Lions mouth, must needs tast sweeter then any other doth. For it is a weak and groundless mistake on the other side, which is the second (which ariseth from meet∣ing things consonant to the Scriptures in the writings of Philosophers) presently to conclude from such things that they were Christians (as it is said some have lately done in the behalf of Hierocles.) For there being such clear ac∣counts given in Scripture of the grand difficulties and per∣plexities which the minds of men were troubled with, when these came to the knowledge of such who were of Philoso∣phick and inquisitive heads, we cannot but think they would meet with acceptation among them, especially if they might be made consistent with their former speculations. Thus it was in our present case concerning the Origine of evil, we have already beheld the lamentable perplexities the ancient Philosophers were in about it, what Maeanders they were lost in for want of a clue to guide them through them; now it pleased God after the coming of Christ in the fl••sh ••o de∣clare to the world the only way for the recovery〈◊〉〈◊〉souls and their eternal salvation, the news of which being spread so far that it soon got among the Philosophers, could not but make them more inquisitive concerning the state and condi∣tion of their souls, and when they had searched what the Philosophers had formerly discovered of it, their curiosity would presently prompt them to see what account of things concerning the souls of〈◊〉〈◊〉delivered by the preachers of this New Doctrine. B••〈◊〉〈◊〉they could not but presently

understand that they declared all mens souls to be in a most degenerate and low condition, by being so continually under the power of the most unreasonable and unruly passions, that they were estranged from God, and prone to fix on things very unsuitable to their nature, as to all which, their own inward sense and experience could but tell them that these things were notoriously true; and therefore, they en∣quire further how these things came to be so; which they receive a full account of in Scripture, that mans soul was at first created pure and holy and in perfect friendship with God, that God dealt bountifully and favourably with man; only expected obedience to his Laws; that man being a free agent did abuse his liberty, and disobeyed his Maker; and thence came the true 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the feathers of the soul where∣by it soared up to heaven, moulted away, and the soul sunk below its self into a degenerate and apostate condition, out of which it is impossible to be recovered without some extra∣ordinary expression of Divine Favour. Now what is there in all this account, but what is hugely suitable to principles of reason, and to the general experience of the world, as to those things which were capable of being tryed by it? And those Philosophers who were any thing ingenu••us and lovers of truth, could not but confess the truth of those things which we are now speaking of, viz. That mens souls are in a very degenerate condition; That the most rational account of it is, that man by the act of his own will brought himself into it; and that in order to the happiness of mens souls, there was a necessity of recovery out of this condition.

As to the degeneracy of the souls of men; This was the common complaint of those Philosophers, who minded the * 1.192 government of themselves, and the practice of vertue, espe∣cially of the Platon••sts and Stoicks. Seneca in all his moral Discourses, especially in his Epistles, may speak sufficiently in behalf of the Stoicks, how much they lamented the de∣generacy of the world. And the Platonists all complain of the slavery of the soul in the body, and that it is here by way o•• punishment for something which was done before; which makes me somewhat incurable to think, that Plato knew more of the lapse of 〈◊〉〈◊〉, then he would openly

discover; and for that end disguised it after his usual man∣ner in that hypothesis of prae-existence, which taking it Cabba∣listically (for I rather think the opinion of prae existence is so to be taken then the history of the Fall of man) may im∣port only this. That mens souls might be justly supposed to be created happy, but by reason of the Apostacy of mans soul from God, all souls now come into their bodies as into a kind of prison, they being enslaved to the brutish part within them, there having been such a true 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the soul being now deprived of her chiefest perfections in this her low and de∣generate condition. And it seems far more rational to me to interpret those persons opinions to a Cabbalistical, or an Allegorical sense, who are known to have designedly writ in a way obscure and ambiguous, then to force those mens ex∣pressions to Cabbala's, who profess to write a plain History, and that with the greatest simplicity and perspicuity; But it cannot but seem very strange that an hypothesis capable of being reconciled to the plain literal sense of the Scriptures (delivered by a person who useth great artifice and cunning to disguise his opinions, and sueh a person withall, who (by such persons themselves who make use of this opinion to that end) is supposed to have been very conversant with the writings of Moses) should be taken in its literal sense, as it really imports prae-existence of each particular soul in the g••ossest manner; and this should be made to be a part of the Philosophick Cabbala of the writings of such a person, who useth not the least artifice to disguise his sense, nor gives us anywhere the least intimation that he left behind him such plaited pictures in his History of the beginning of the world, that if you look straight forward, you may see a literal Cab∣bala, on the one side a Philosophical, and on the other a Moral. But now if we remove the Cabbala from Moses to Plato, we may finde no incongruity or repugnancy at all ei∣ther as to Plato his way of writing, or the consonancy of the opinion so interpreted to the plain genuine sense of Moses, if by Plato his opinion of the Prae-existence and descent of souls, be understood by the former the happy state of the soul of man in conjunct•••••• with God, and by the latter, the low and degenerate condi••••on which the soul is in, after A∣postacy from him. Which ••he later Platonists are so large and

eloquent in expressing; Porphyrie where he speaks of some∣things he counsels men to do, hath these words, But if we cannot do them, let us at least do that which was so much la∣mented of old, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.193 Let us at least joyn with our Fore-fathers in lamenting this, that we are compounded of such disagreeing and contrary principles, that we are not able to preserve divine, pure and unspotted Innocency. And Hie∣rocles fully expresseth his sense of the degeneracy of mankind * 1.194 in these words: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The most of men in the world are bad, and under the command of their passions, and grown impotent through their propensity to earth; which great evil they have brought upon themselves, by their wilfull Apostacy from God, and withdrawing themselves from that society with him, which they once enjoyed in pure light: which departure of mens souls from God, which is so hurtfull to the minds of men, is evident by their strong inclination to the things of this world. The same Author mentions, with much approbation, that speech of Heraclitus, speaking of those souls which are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which I cannot better render, then un∣declinably good, he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: We live their death, and die their life. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. for man is now fallen down from that blessed Region, and as Empedocles the Pythagorean speaks,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Which words cannot be better rendred, then in the words the Scripture useth concerning Cain, and he went from the presence of the Lord, and was〈◊〉〈◊〉fugitive in the earth, and under continual perplexiti••s. For the soul of man, ha∣ving

left 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (it is Hierocles his own expression) the pleasant meadow of truth (a fit descripti∣on * 1.195 of Paradise) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Through the violence of her moult∣ing, or deplumation, she comes into this earthly body, deprived of that blessed life, which she before enjoyed. Which he tells us is very consonant to Plato's sen••e o•• the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or de∣scent of souls, that when by reason of their impotency of fixing wholly ••on God they suffer 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 some great loss, and a deprivation of former perf••ctions (which I su••pose is me••nt by the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the ••••uls impotency of flying up above this earthly world) then they lapse into these terrestrial and mortal bodies. So Hierocles concludes with this excellent and Divine speech, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. As therefore by Apostacy from God, and the moulting of those feathers of our souls, whereby we may be raised up above this world, we have fallen into this place of mortals which is compassed about with evils: So by the casting off carnal affections, and by the growth of vertues like new Feathers to the Soul, we shall as∣cend to the place of pure and perfect good, and to the enjoy∣ment of a divine life. So much more becoming Christians do these excellent Philosophers speak of the degeneracy of mens souls, and the consequents of it, then some who would be accounted the followers of reason as well as of Christ, who make it so much of their business to extenuate the fall of man. Which we find those who were meer Philosophers, far more rational and ingenuous in, then those who pretend so highly to reason; but I think with as little of it as any, sup∣posing the Scriptures to be of Divine authority. But it is not here our businesse to consider the opinions of those who pretend to Christianity, but only of such who pretending only to reason, have yet consented with the doctrine of the Scriptures as the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Souls of men, that it lyes in an Apostacy from 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and have lost those perfections which they had before.

That mans will is the cause of his Apostacy; this we have already manifested at large from the testimony and reason * 1.196 of Simplicius, and Hierocles is as large and clear in it as the other, with expressions much of the same nature. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.197 Mans nature lying between those beings which perpetually cont••mplate G••a, and those which are un∣capable of it it sometimes ascends to those, and sometimes de∣scends to these, according as it observes or rejects the dictates of reason, and so by reason of the Indiff••rency of the will is lyable to take upon it the si•• ilitu••e of God or a be••••st. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And whoever throughly considers this, will easily understand, how men are the causes of their own evils, and become unhappy and miserable through their own choice and self wills. Which he brings in by way of explication of that truly golden Py∣thagorean verse,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Men are grown miserable through their ownfault. And after∣wards Hierocles excellently describes the nature of evil in these words, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Both our natural and contracted pra∣vity, is nothing els•• but the unnatural motion of our free wills: according to which saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. We dare to contradict the Laws of God ••et being sen∣sible how much we injure our selves when we ••o it and only look at this that we are able to cast off the reins of〈◊〉〈◊〉Laws from our necks. And he truly saith, that it is the greatest abuse of liberty to offend God, ••••en we either do what he for∣bids, or neglect what be〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. So that on both sides men bring misery upon themselves, by transgr••ssing the divine Law, both by not doing what they are commanded, and by doing what they are forbidden. So that he tully ascribes the Origine of evil to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as he calls it, the irregular motion of the will of man, which we have already shewed to be the doctrine of the Scriptures.

As to the necessity of the souls recovery from this con∣dition in order to her felicity, we have these Philosophers * 1.198 expressing their consent with the Scriptures; Porphyrius as St. Austin tells us in the end of his first book De regressu * 1.199 animae, doth acknowledge the necessity of a way of reco∣vering souls, which should be universal. Cum autem dicit Porphyrius, nondum receptam unam quandam sectam, quae universalem viam animae contineat liberandae,—nondum{que} in suam notitiam eandem viam historiali cognitione perlatam, proculdubio confitetur esse aliquam, sed nondum in suam venisse notitiam. But the necessity of the purgation of the soul in order to its felicity, is so largely and fully discoursed of by all the Platonists and Pythagoreans, that it will be needless to insist upon it. Thus far then we finde the account given of the Origine of evil in Scripture to be embraced by the sublimest of the Heathen Philosophers, as most rational and satisfactory; which was the thing to be proved.

Neither do we sind only the main of this account ac∣knowledged as rational, but we may trace some not obscure * 1.200 footsteps of the truth of the particular circumstances which concern the fall of man: among the Heathens such as the Devils envying of mans happiness, his disguising himself under the form of a serpent, and mans being thrown out of Paradise upon his fall.

1. The Devils envying the happiness of man. It hath been truly observed by a learned man, that the original of that * 1.201 very ancient opinion among the Heathen de invidia Daemonis had its rise from the history of the fall of man, which he hath made out so fully, that I shall the less need to prove it. And that there was an undoubted tradition of some malignant spirits which envyed the〈◊〉〈◊〉of mankinde, appears by that ample Testimony of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in his Dio mentioned by

the same Author; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Plutarch was much troubled to give an account of the apparitions which Brutus and Dio who were learned and Philosophical men were haunted withall; and doubts he can give no just account of it, un∣less he embraced that very ancient tradition (which yet seemed absurd and incredible,) viz. that there are certain wicked and malignant Daemons, which envy good men, and withstand their enterprises, by raising fears and troubles to them, that so they might hinder them in their pursuit of vertue; lest if they continue stedfast and unmovable in good, they should be at last partakers of greater felicity then they enjoy. There being then so ancient a tradition of such 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as the learned man mentioned hath more fully shewed in his notes on this place of Plutarch,) gives a great confirmation to the truth of what the Scripture reports concerning the Devils being so great an instrument in procuring the fall of man. To him therefore I refer the inquisitive reader, and shall only add to the Testimonies of him cited, that of Xeno∣crates in Plutarch de I side & Osiride, where he saith that the calamities of life and misfortunes men meet with, do not * 1.202 agree with that veneration which we have for the Deity and good spirits, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. But that there are in the air some great and potent Beings, which are of a surly and malignant nature, and rejoyce to do men all the mischief they can. Iamblichus in his answer to Porphyrius concern∣ing the Aegyptian mysteries, undertakes to give an account * 1.203 of these evil Spirits or Daemons, and that from them the Origine of evil in the world is; for thus he speaks, (as he is translated by Ficinus) Si verum est quod de Idolis diceba∣mus, improbisque Daemonibus, hinc sane exoritur multiplex origo malorum. Simulant enim Deorum praesentiam, daemo∣numque bonorum, ideoque〈◊〉〈◊〉suum jubent esse justum, ut ipsi videantur boni, sici••〈◊〉〈◊〉Dii; quoniam vero natura

sunt mali, rogati mala inferre, libenter inferunt, atque nobis ad injusta conducunt. Hi sunt omnino qui & in oraculis men∣tiuntur & fallunt, & turpia consulunt atque peragunt. By which we see he acknowledgeth some spirits who••e natures are wicked, and help men to do evil, and that these very spirits may sometimes command that which is good, lest they should be suspected to be what they are, of a wicked and malignant nature, which only design the ruine of men. By which we have a good account of whatever was commend∣able delivered by the Heathen oracles, which yet might come from the Devil still, by this confession of Iamblichus him∣self.

For the Devils appearing under the form of a serpent, It is very probably conjectured, that from hence it was that the * 1.204 Prince of those who contended with Saturn, was by that aenigmatical writer Pher••cydes Syrius called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Celsus who had so little ••kill in antiquity as to think that the history of Moses was as to many passages of it taken out of Heathen Fables, insists on this very story of Ophioneus as the ground∣w••rk of that relation in Genesis concerning the Fall. But Origen well answers him, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.205 See therefore if this rare Anti∣quary who charg••••h us with impi••••y in corrupting and alt••••ing the Heathen Fables, be not himself ••er•• justly chargeable with the same fault, not understanding the far greater antiquity of the writings of Mo••es, then either of Heraclitus or Pherecydes, or Homer himself which reports the story of that evil one which fell from heaven. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For the Serpent (from which O hioneus in Pherecydes de∣rived his name) which was the cause why man was cast forth of Paradise, doth intimate some such thing▪ while under a pre∣tence of Divinity, and of a〈◊〉〈◊〉condition〈◊〉〈◊〉fi st deceived the woman, and by her means〈◊〉〈◊〉man. C••lius Rhodiginus c••lls

this Ophioneus Daemonicum Serpentem, qui antesignanus fu••∣rit * 1.206 agminis à Divinae mentis placito deficientis. This Pherecydes as appears by Eusebius, had much converse with the Phaeni∣cians; where he purposely speaks concerning this Ophioneus. Now the Phaenicians as Eusebius likewise tells us, worshipped their God under the Form of a Serpent; which probably might be occasioned by the Devils ambition and Tyranny over men, that he would be worshipped among them in that very Form wherein he had done so much mischief to the world. It was very early in the world, when the Phaeni∣cians and Aegyptians did begin to adore their Gods under the Form of Serpents, for the beginning of it is attributed to Taautus by Eusebius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Neither was this only among the Phaenicians and Aegyptians, but whereever the Devil raigned, the Serpent was had in some peculiar veneration: thence Iustin Martyr saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the Serpent was the Symbol of * 1.207 adoration among them; and was the proper Indicium or note of a consecrated place as is evident by that of Persius,

Pinge duos angues; pueri sacer est locus. * 1.208

Thence the Scholiast on Aristophanes on that place in Plutus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, observes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so that where ever any God or Heroe was to be worshipped, there were Serpents painted to denote so much. So Orus Apollo saith of the Aegyptians, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they were wont to * 1.209 put the form of a golden basilisk to their Gods. Heinsius con∣ceives that the first worship of Apollo at Delphi was under the form of a Serpent, whether Nonnus tells us that Cadmus the Phaenician went upon his first coming into Baeotia, and from hence he derives the name Pytho from the Hebrew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifies a Serpent. Ut non dubitandum sit, saith he, quin Pythius Apollo, hoc est, Spurcus ille spiritus, quem Hebraei Ob & Abaddon, Hellenist•••• ad verbum 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, caeteri 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dixerunt, sub hac〈◊〉〈◊〉qua miseriam humano ge∣neri

invexit, primo cultus sit in Graecia. And which is fur∣ther observable, the Devil was alwayes ambitious to have the world think that the knowledge of good and evil was to come by the Serpent still; thence the famous oracle of Apollo here at Delphi; thence came the use of Serpents so much in Divination, thence 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies to divine from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Ser∣pent; and so among the Greeks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is taken in the same sense, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Serpent. So that excellent Glossographer Hesychius; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The Serpent was reckoned among the pedestria auspicia by the Romans; and Homer tells in that solemn divination concerning the Greeks success at Troy there appears,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.210

Which saith Heinsius, is an exact description of the Nachas; whom they would have so called from the marks on h••s back, which they accurately observed in divination. Thus we see how careful the Devil was to advance his honour in the world under that Form, wherein he had deceived mankind into so much folly and misery.

We meet with some remainders of mans being cast out of Paradise upon his fall among the Heathens. Origen * 1.211 thinks that Plato by his converse with the Iews in Aegypt, * 1.212 did understand the history of the fall of man, which he after his way aenigmatically describes in his Symposiacks. Where he brings in Porus the God of plenty feasting with the rest of the Gods; after supper Penia comes a begging to the door; Porus being drunk with Nectar, goes into Jupiters garden, and there falls asleep; Penia observing it steals to him, and by this deceit conceived by him. In this Fable of Plato, Origen takes notice what a near resemblance the garden of Iupiter hath to Pa∣radise, Penia to the Serpent which circumvented Adam, and Porus to man who was deceived by the Serpent. Which he conceives more probable because of Plato his custom, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to wrap up tho••e excellent things he knew under some fables because of the v••gar; for which he after speaks

of his custom in altering and disguising what he had from the Iews, lest he should too much displease the fabulous Greeks, if he should adhere too close to the Iews, who were so infamous among them. Some have thought the story of Paradise was preserved among the Heathens in the fable of the gardens of Adonis which comes near that of Eden; but what footsteps may be gathered of the truth of Scripture history in the Heathen Mythology, will appear afterwards. Thus much here then may serve to have manifested the ac∣count which the Scripture gives of the Origine of evil by the fall of man to be in its self rational, and attested by the con∣sent of such persons who cannot be suspected of any partiali∣ty to the Scriptures.

We come now to consider the other grand difficulty which * 1.213 concerns the Origine of evil and the truth of Divine provi∣dence together. Which is, that if sin be the cause of misery, and there be a God which governs the world; whence comes it to pass that the worst of men do so frequently escape suffer∣ings, and the best do so commonly undergo them? This hath been in all ages of the world where men have been Philoso∣phical and inquisitive, one of the great inquiries which the minds of men have been perplexed about. The true and full resolution of which question, depends much upon those grounds and principles which are discovered to us by Divine revelation in the Scriptures, concerning the grounds of Gods patience towards wicked men, the nature and end of suffer∣ings which good men are exercised with. And certainly this should very much commend the Scriptures to all sober and inquisitive persons, that they contain in them the most clear and certain grounds of satisfaction to the minds of men, in such things, wherein they are otherwise so irre∣solved: But of that afterwards; Our present business is to give an account of this difficulty from natural reason, which will be most satisfactorily done by the producing those grounds, from which they have resolved this question, cur malisben••, & bonis male, who either have not had, or at least owned any thing of Divine revelation. I begin with that which doth concern the prosperity and impunity of wicked men, which men have with mo•••• confidence insisted on, o••

this account, because all men could not but understand a general reason of sufferings, by reason there were none whose consciences could wholly acquit them of evil actions; but why persons notoriously wicked should live in impunity, when others suffer, that they were unable to give an ac∣count of. And this was the common pretence of Atheism, as Simplicius tels us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 * 1.214

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

It comes to pass, that such who have no grounded belief of a Deity, when they observe the miseries of good men, and the tranquillity and felicity of bad men, they regard not the com∣mon notions they have of a Deity, and are ready to cry out with the Tragaedian (or rather of Aristophanes in his Plutus)

Shall I not dare to say there are no Gods, When those do prosper who have injured me?

And it is observable; that the most of those who have taken occasion among the Heathens to question providence, have done it upon some remarkable injury which they have conceived to be done to themselves, and so we have ground to think that it was more passion and interest, then any clear reason which was the inducement to it. So Diagoras resolves to set up for an Atheist, because the perjured person was not struck dead in the place.

And Iason in Seneca when he sees Medea fly away after killing his children, cryes out,

Testare nullos esse qua veheris Deos. Thou tell'st the world there are no Gods that way Where thou dost fly.

And so Claudian, who largely reasons the case on both sides, for Providence and against it, at last tells us what it was which was the main cause of his doubts: viz. the long impunity of Rufinus,

Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum Absolvitque Deos.

Rufinus death doth clear the Gods, and set My mind at ease.

But because some carry it higher, as Cotta in Tully, who * 1.215 reasons the most (as became a Statesman) in reference to such persons who had been usefull or hurtfull to Common wealths, we may suppose there might be somewhat more of reason then interest in such argumentations; and yet even in those discourses we may still find that the main original of this quarrel against Providence was an over-high esteem of themselves, that they thought they deserved better from the Gods then to receive such injuries, or undergo such calami∣ties. Therefore Cotta cryes out on Providence, because such persons who were usefull to the Roman Commonwealth were destroyed when the enemies to it escaped, as though Providence had been only a Tutelar Deity of Rome, and had nothing to do elsewhere. Thence he cryes out, if there be Providence, why were the two Scipio's destroyed in Spain by the Carthaginians? Why was Maximus killed by Han∣nibal? Why were the Romans with Paulus ruined at Cannae? Why did Regulus undergo so much cruelty by the Carthagi∣nians? Why did not Africanus die in his own bed? Nay, saith he, to come nearer home, why is my Uncle Rutilius in banishment? Why was my friend Drusus killed in his own house? On the otherside, why did Marius die in peace, and the most cruel Cinna enjoy so long tranquillity? with many other instances of both sorts. But this is it which I take notice of these for, because we hereby see how common it is for men to questi•••• providence, more out of Passion and Interest, then ou•• of any solid grounds of reason.

Let us therefore appeal from persons who were particular∣ly * 1.216 engaged by some private interest in those passages, from whence they would infer that there was no providence, to such who stood by unconcerned, and made use of the free dictates of their reason in these cases. And such persons when they come to reason the case like Philosophers, and men out of passion, have given satisfactory and rational accounts why God in his wise Providence may sometimes suffer the worst of men, to go on in impunity, when good men may go through the troubles of this world. As,

1. God forbears wicked men, to propound the example of his goodnesse to their imitation, to teach them not to revenge their injuries too greedily on each other. This Plutarch, in that admirable discourse of his on this subject, insists on as * 1.217 his first reason, why God doth not presently punish wicked men. For, saith he out of Plato, God hath set forth ••im∣self in the midst of the world for our imitation; and true ver∣tue is nothing else but an imitation of the Divine nature. And therefore God, saith Plato, gave man the use of fight, that by the sight of the heavenly bodies, and the exact motions which are in them, men should learn 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that which was comely and orderly, and hate all disorderly and irregular motions; For as he excellently speaks: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. There is no greater benefit man can receive from God, then to attain true vertue by the imitation and pursuit of those perfections which are in him. And thence, saith Plutarch, God forbears to punish wicked men presently, not least if he should pu∣nish them he might do that he would repent of afterwards, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but that he might take away the fury and violence of men in re∣venging their injuries on each other, that they should not do it in wrath and anger, with as much eagerness as they sa∣tisfie their hunger and thirst, whereby they do, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, leap upon them who have injured them, with as much sury as a wilde beast upon his prey; but men should learn to imitate 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gods gentle∣nesse and patience, whereby he gives the offender time to

consider with himself what he hath done, before he doth severely punish him. As Plato when his Boy had angred him, stood still a while without striking him, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as he said, punishing himself first for his anger, before he would chastise the Boy for his fault; and Archytas when he saw how negligent his workmen had been, and began to be very angry with them, told them, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It is well for you that I am angry with you. Now saith Plutarch, if the consideration of this forbearance in men should tend to moderate mens heat and violence, how much more should the consideration of the leni••y and patience of God do it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and to account gentleness and forbearance to be an imitation of divine perfections. Now what can be more rational and agreeable to our apprchensions of a divine na∣ture then this is, that he should shew his goodness to all, and by his forbearance of so many, teach the world more meekness and gentleness towards each other? For if offen∣ces rise by the quality of the person against whom they are committed, no injuries can be so great in one man to ano∣ther, as those affronts are men put upon God by their con∣tinual provocations of him: And if God then be of so infinite patience to forbear such who have offended him, what ju∣stice and reason is there but that men should express more lenity and patience towards each other? So Hieroc•••••• excel∣lently speaks, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A good man imitates God in the measures of friend∣ship, who hates no man, and extends his loving kindnesse to all mankind. Of which Seneca likewise somewhere speaks. Ne Deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effusa benignitate sacri∣legi negligentesque corum deterrent; utuntur natura sua, & cuncta, interque illa, ipsos munerum suorum malos interpre∣tes juvant. The Divine Benignity extends its self to all, even to such as affront and dishonour them and abuse the gifts they bestow upon them. And since, there is so much truth and reason in that of Plato, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, It is the height of goodnesse to be like to God, we see what excellent reason there is for tha•• command of our Saviour,

Love your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the * 1.218 children of the highest; for he is kind unto the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye therefore mercifull, as your Father is mer∣cifull.

2. God forbears presently to punish wicked men, to give them time to become better. This the same excellent Mora∣list gives as another account of Gods patience, that thereby he gives them 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a space to repent as * 1.219 the Scripture calls it. For men, saith Plutarch, in their pu∣nishments look at nothing further then meer satisfying their revenge and malice, and that makes them pursue those that have offended them with so much rage and eagerness; but God, saith he, aims at the cure of those who are not utterly incu∣rable. To such he gives, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a time to reform in. Here he brings in the examples of such who were bad at first, and came afterwards to be changed from what they were; for which he instanceth in Cecrops, who was thence called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because from a cruel severe Prince, he became gentle and mild; and so Gelon and Hieron of Sicily, and Pisistratus the son of Hippocrates, who from being Usur∣pers became excellent Princes. If Miltiades, saith he, had been cut off while he acted the part of a Tyrant, or Cimon in his Incest, or Themistocles in his debaucheries, what had be∣come of Marathon, Eurymedon, Dianium, by which the Athenians got so great glory and liberty? and as he well ob∣serves, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Great Spi∣rits do nothing mean; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That sharp and active spirit that is in them can never lye at rest by reason of its vigour, but they are tossed up and down, as it were in a Tempest, till they come to a setled composed life. But as the multitudes of weeds argues the richness and softness of the ground, though for the sake of those weeds one not skild in husbandry would not account such ground worth looking after; so, saith he, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; great spirits usu∣ally bring forth no commenaable fruits at first; which we considering the danger and hurtfulness of, are presently for

cutting them down; but one that more wisely considers the generous nature which may lye under this ill fruit, waits time and leasure, till reason and age begins to master these head∣strong passions. And therefore according to the prudent Law of the Aegyptians, the woman with child must be re∣prieved till the time of her delivery.

3. God spares some wicked men from punishment to make them instruments of his justice in punishing others. Ev••ol•• 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Plutarch goes on, God spares some from punish∣ment that by them he might punish others. Which he supposeth to be the case of all Tyrants; and thereby Cotta's difficulty concerning Marius, Cinna, Sylla and those other cruel and Tyrannical persons, who had usurped authority among them, is clearly taken off: For Divine Providence might let those trees grow from whence he intended to take his rods to scourge others with all. God makes the same use of Tyrants (saith Plutarch) to common-wealths, that Physitians do of the gall of a Hyaena and other hurtful creatures, which may be good for curing some dangerous diseases; so may the Tyrannical severity and sharpness of such persons be con∣tinued 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, till the diseases of the Political body be cured by these sharp Medicines. Such a one was Phalaris to the Agrigentines, and Marius to the Romans: and the Oracle told the Sicyonians in express terms, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; the City wanted some severe discipline. Thence Totilas, when he found what strange success he had in his enterprises, called himself Flagellum Dei, and thought God raised him up on purpose to be a scourge for the sins of the world. And no doubt those strange passages of the Roman Common-wealth (which made Cato at least dispute providence, and say res divinas multum habere caliginis, when he saw Pompey successful as long as he served his ambition, but presently overthrown when he stood for the Common∣wealth) these things, I say, had a higher end then they looked at, which was to make both Pompey and Caesar the instruments of Divine justice to punish the Romans for their lusts, ambition and cruelty, which were never greater then in that age. Now then if God may justly punish offenders,

why may he not spare some to make them his instruments in the punishing of others, especially since after he hath used his rods he may cast them into the fire too? as was evident in the instance of Caesar, who after all his slaughters and tri∣umphs was murdered in the Senate, and that by some who had been as active as any for him. And herein divine justice, both as to the punishment of the persons and the means of it, hath been very remarkable in multitudes of instances, which every ones reading may afford him.

4. Therefore, another account why God may spare wicked men a great while, is, That divine providence might more remarkably be observed in the manner of their punishment afterwards. Plutarch tells us of Callippus, who was stabd by his enemies with the samd Dagger with which he had kild Dion under a pretence of friendship. And when Mitius the Argive was kild in a tumult, afterwards upon the day of a solemn shew, a brass statue in the market place fell upon his murderer and kild him there. But most remark∣able is the story of Belsus recorded by the same author, who having kild his Father and a long time concealed it, goes one night to supper to some Friends, and while he was there, thrusts up his spear into a swallows nest and pulls it down and kills the young ones; his Friends asking him the reason of so strange an action: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Do not you bear, saith he, how they falsly accuse me, and cry out that I have kild my Father? Which being by the persons present carried to the King, and the truth of it found out, he was executed for it. Such strange wayes doth providence some∣times use to shew how vigilant it is, even when we think it sleeps the most.

5. Though God spares the persons of wicked men, he doth not defer their punishment, when the thoughts of their evil actions is the greatest torment to them; Maxima peccat•• pena est, peccasse, as Seneca speaks. Sin bears its own punishment along with it. Wickedness is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the most exquisite contriver of misery, which fills the minds of those who commit it with continual con∣sternations, anxieties and perplexities of mind. But as that

often and deservedly cited author on this subject, Plutarch tells us, most men are in this like Children, who when they behold malefactors in the Theatres in their cloth of gold and purple robes, with their crowns on their heads dancing about, they admire them, and imagine them to be most hap∣py men, till they see them lashed and beaten, and fire come out from their brave apparel; so saith he, as long as men see others in their pomp and grandeur, they think them far from punishment, till they behold their execution, which saith he, is not so much the entrance of their punishment as the perfection of it. So that the longer the time of their lives is, the longer is the time of their punishment here; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; they are not punished when they grow old, but they are grown old in punishments. Cannot we say a person is punished while he is in prison and hath his fetters upon him, till his execution comes? nor that one that hath drunk poison, is a dying while he walks about till the cold comes to his heart and kills him? if we deny, saith he, that all the inquietudes, horrors and anxieties of mind which wicked men have, are no part of their punishment, we may as well say that a fish which bath swallowed the hook is not taken, because he is not fryed, or cut in pieces. So it is with every wicked man, he hath swallowed the hook when he hath committed an evil action (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) and his conscience within him, as he ex∣presseth it,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Which in the Prophets expression is, the wicked are like a troubled sea which casts forth nothing but mire and dirt. As * 1.220 Apollodorus dreamt, that he was flead, and boyled by the Scythians, and that his heart spake to him out of the Caul∣dron, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, I am the cause of all this. God deals by wicked men as Caligula was wont to say of those he commanded to be executed, ferit ut sentiant se mori, he so punishes them as to make them sensible of their punish∣ments. And as Tacitus speaks of cruel and wicked persons, quorum mentes si recludantur poss••nt aspici laniatus & ictus;

quando ut corpora verberibus, ita saevitia, libidine, malis con∣sult is animus dilaceretur. Wiekedness is the only fury which continually haunts and lashes those who delight in it, and leaves still behind it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, loathsome and terrible perturbations, secret gripings of conscience and self condemning thoughts for their folly and wickedness; like Lysimachus, who for extream thirst offered his Kingdom to the Getae to quench it, which when he had done, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. What a wretch was I (saith he) to lose such a Kingdom for so short a pleasure! And though wicked men be not sensible of the loss of a far more glorious Kingdom then this of Lysi∣machus, viz. that of heaven, yet they cannot but be sensible how much they have lost that Kingdom which every good man hath in the tranquillity of his spirit, and the command of his passions.

6. The time that God spares wicked men, is not so long as we think for. It is all one, as Plutarch saith, as if we should complain, that the malefactor was punished in the evening and not in the morning; Gods forbearance is but for a very little time, compared with his own duration. We measure God by the short hour-glass of our own time, when we are so ready to confine him to our measures. The time seems long to us, but it is as nothing in its self: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the whole life of man com∣pared with eternity is nothing. Besides all this time God suffers wicked men to live here, he hath them under safe custody; he doth but let them take the air within the prison-walls, or it may be they may play and sport themselves there, but there is no possibility of escaping out of the hands of Divine justice.

7. God forbears wicked men here, because the time is to come wherein God intends to punish them. This is the highest vindication of Divine Providence as to the present impunity of wicked men in the world, because this is not the proper season for the open execution of Iustice. There are but few in comparison whom Iustice causeth to be executed in the ••rison, of what are reserved for the general Assizes; God reserves them for a fair and open tryal, for the greater vin∣dication

of his honour and manifestation of his Iustice to the world. And although Gods judgements even in this world be sometimes so remarkable, that we cannot but see a hand of Providence in them, yet they are but few whom God doth so remarkably punish here to make us more firmly believe a day of judgement to come. Which though it be most clearly and fully revealed in Scripture, yet the Heathens themselves from meer reason have had such a perswasion of it, that they have given this as another great reason, why God did forbear to punish wicked men here, because he did reserve them for future punishment. For as the same Moralist speaks in the same discourse concerning the soul, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, this present life is the place of the souls * 1.221 combat, which when it hath finished, it then receives according to its performance of it. And as he before speaks, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The same reason which confirms providence, doth likewise confirm the immor∣tality of the soul; and if one be taken away, the other follows. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And if the soul doth subsist after death, it stands to the greatest reason that it should there receive either reward or punishment. Thus we see how far natural light and moral reason will carry men in the vindicating Divine Providence as to the present impunity of wicked men.

The other part which concerns the sufferings of good men is not of so great difficulty, because there are none so good * 1.222 as not to have a mixture of evil in them, and as they have a mixture of evil, so they have but a mixture of punishment; none lying under so great miseries here but withall they have some share in the comforts of this life. And therefore it is less wonder, that this part of Divine Providence which con∣cerns the sufferings of good men, hath not wanted some among the Heathen Moralists who have made it their design to vindicate it; which setting aside what Simplicius on Epictetus and many others have done, is fully performed by Seneca in his tract on this very s••••••••ct, ••••ur bonis male sit, cum sit Providentia, (as Muretu•••• restores the title of that

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book) wherein these following accounts are given of it.

1. God brings them up as his children under sharp discipline for their future benefit. A good man in Seneca's language, is discipulus Dei, aemulatorque, & vera progenies: which in the language of the Scripture is one taught of God, a follower of * 1.223 God, and one born of him. Now saith he, Parens ille magni∣ficus, virtutum non lenis exactor, sicut severi patres, durius educat. God who is the great Father of good men, keeps them under discipline while under age, and by hardship fits them for the practice of vertue. Thence he bids us take notice of the different indulgence of Fathers and Mothers to their Chil∣dren; the Father he hastens them to school, suffers them not to be idle on their playdayes, makes them toyle and some∣times cry; the Mother she is all for holding them in her lap, keeping them out of the Sun, and from catching cold, would not willingly have them either cry or take pains. Patrium habet Deus adversus bonos animum, & illos fortius amat. God bears the indulgence of a Father towards his chil∣dren and loves them with greater severity.

2. Good men receive benefit by their sufferings; quicquid evenit in suum colorem trahit, saith Seneca of a good man, which in the language of the Apostle is, every thing works together for his good. The sea loseth nothing, saith he, of its saltness by the rivers running into it, neither doth a good man by the current of his sufferings. And of all benefits which he receives, that of the exercise and tryal of his vertue and patience is most discernable. Marcet sine adversario virtus; as soon as Carthage was destroyed, Rome fell to Luxury: True wrestlers desire to have some to try their strength upon them; cui non industrio otium poena est? an active spirit hates idleness and cowardise; for etiamsi ceciderit, de genu pugnat, though his legs be cut off, he will fight on his knees.

3. It redounds to Gods honour when good men bear up under sufferings. Ecce par Deo dignum vir fortis cum mala fortu∣na compositus. It is a spectacle God delights to see, a good man combat with calamities. God doth in Seneca's phrase quosdam fastidio transire▪ passeth them by in a slight; an old wrestler scorns to contend with a coward, one who is vinci para∣tus,

ready to yeild up presently. Calamitates sub jugum mit∣tere proprium magni viri est, It argues a noble spirit to be able to subdue miseries.

4. It tends to the tryal and increase of their strength Seneca highly extols that speech of the Philosopher Demetrius, Nihil infelicius eo cui nihil unquam evenit adversi; non licuit enim illi se experiri. He is the most unhappy man who never knew what misery meant; for he could never know what he was able to bear. And, as he saith, to pass ones life away sine morsu animi, without any trouble, it is ignorare rerum naturae alteram partem, not to know what is upon the reverse of nature. Idem licet fecerint qui integri revertun∣tur ex acie, magis spectatur qui sancius redit. Though he that comes home sound might fight as well as he that is wounded, yet the wounded person hath the more pitty, and is most cryed up for his valour. The Pilot is seen in a tempest, a Souldier in battel, and a good man in sufferings. God doth by such, as Masters do by Scholars, qui plus labo∣ris ab his exigunt, quibus certior spes est: who set the best wits the hardest tasks.

5. God exerciseth good men with sufferings, to discover the indifferency of those things which men value so much in the world, when he denyes them to good men. Blindness would be hateful, if none were blind but such whose eyes were put out; and therefore Appius and Metellus were blind. Riches are no good things, therefore the worst as well as the best have them. Nullo modo magis potest Deus concupita traduce∣re, quam si illa ad turpissimos defert, ab optimis abigit. God could not traduce or defame those things more which men desire so much, then by taking them away from the best of men, and giving them to the worst.

6. That they might be examples to others of patience and constancy; For as Seneca concludes, nati sunt in exemplar, they are born to be patterns to others. If to these things we add what the Word of God discovers concerning the nature, grounds, and ends of afflictions, and that glory which shall be revealed, in comparison with which exceeding weight of glory these light and momentany afflictions are not at all to be valued, then we have a clear and full vindication of Divine

Providence, as to the sufferings of good men, as well as to the Impunity of such as are wicked. But how ever from hence we see how far the meer light of reason hath carryed men in resolving these difficulties concerning Gods Providence in the world, and what a rational account may be given of them, supposing evil of punishment to arise from sin, and that there is a God in the world, who is ready to punish the wicked and to reward the good: Which was the thing to be shewed.

CHAP. IV. Of the Origine of Nations.

All mankind derived from Adam, if the Scriptures be true. The contrary supposition an introduction to Atheism. The truth of the history of the flood. The possibility of an univer∣sal deluge proved. The flood universal as to mankind, whe∣ther universal as to the earth and animals; no necessity of asserting either. Yet supposing the possibility of it demon∣strated without creation of new waters. Of the fountains of the deep. The proportion which the height of mountains bears to the Diameter of the earth. No mountains much above three mile perpendicular. Of the Origine of fountains. The opinion of Aristotle and others concerning it discussed. The true account of them from the vapours arising from the mass of subterraneous waters. Of the capacity of the Ark for receiving the Animals from Buteo and others. The truth of the deluge from the Testimony of Heathen Nations. Of the propagation of Nations from Noahs posterity. Of the beginning of the Assyrian Empire. The multiplication of mankind after the flood. Of the Chronology of the LXX. Of the time between the flood and Abraham, and the advantages of it. Of the pretence of such Nations, who called them∣selves Aborigines. A discourse concerning the first plan∣tation of Greece, the common opinion propounded and re∣jected. The Hellens not the first inhabitants of Greece, but the Pelasgi. The large spread of them over the parts of Greece; Of their language different from the Greeks. Whence these Pelasgi came; that Phaleg was the Pelasgus of Greece, and the leader of that Colony proved from Epi∣phanius: the language of the Pelasgi in Greece Oriental: thence an account given of the many Hebrew words in the Greek language, and the remainders of the Eastern langua∣ges in the Islands of Greece, both which not from the Phae∣nicians as Bochartus thinks, but from the old Pelasgi. Of the ground of the affinity between the Jews and Lacedaemonians. Of the peopling of Amercia.

THE next thing we proceed to give a rational account * 1.224 of, in the history of the fi••••t ages of the world con∣tained

in Scripture, is the peopling of the world from Adam. Which is of great consequence for us to under∣stand, not only for the satisfaction of our curiosity as to the true Origine of Nations, but also in order to our believing the truth of the Scriptures, and the universal effects of the fall of man. Neither of which can be sufficiently cleared without this. For as it is hard to conceive how the effects of mans fall should extend to all mankinde, unless all man∣kind were propagated from Adam; so it is unconceivable how the account of things given in Scripture should be true, if there were persons existent in the world long before Adam was. Since the Scripture doth so plainly affirm, that God hath made of one blood all Nations of men, for to dwell on the face of the earth; Some Greek copyes read it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, leaving * 1.225 out 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which the vulgar Latin follows: the Arabick version to explain both, reads it ex homine, or as De Dieu renders it ex Adamo uno, there being but the difference of one letter in the Eastern languages between 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the one denoting blood, and the other man. But if we take it as our more ordinary copyes read it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, yet there∣by it is plain, that the meaning is not, that all mankind was made of the same uniform matter, as the author of the Prae-Adamites weakly imagined (for by that reason, not only mankind, but the whole world might be said to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the same blood, since all things in the world were at first formed out of the same matter) but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is taken there in the sense in which it occurs in the best Greek authors for the stock out of which men come: So Homer,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.226

Thence those who are near relations, are called in Sophocles, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; thence the name of Consanguinity for nearness of relation; and Virgil useth sanguis in the same sense,

Trojano à sanguine duci.

So that the Apostles meaning is, that however men now are

so dispersed in their habitations, and differ so much in lan∣guage and customs from each other, yet they all were originally of the same stock, and did derive their succession from that first man whom God created. Neither can it be conceived on what account Adam in the Scripture is called the first man, and that he was made a living soul, and of the * 1.227 earth, earthy; unless it were to denote that he was abso∣lutely the first of his kind, and so was to be the standard and measure of all that follows. And when our Saviour would reduce all things to the beginning, he instanceth in those words which were pronounced after Eve was formed, But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and * 1.228 female; for this cause shall a man leave Father and Mother and cleave unto his Wife. Now nothing can be more plain and easie then from hence to argue thus; those of whom those words were spoken, were the first male and female which were made in the beginning of the Creation; but it is evident these words were spoken of Adam and Eve: And Adam said, this is now bone of my bone, and flesh of my flesh: * 1.229 therefore shall a man leave his Father and his Mother and shall cleave unto his Wife. If the Scriptures then of the New Testa∣ment be true, it is most plain and evident that all mankind is descended from Adam; and no less conspicuous is it from the history of the Creation as delivered by Moses.

For how necessary had it been for Moses, when he was * 1.230 giving an account of the Origine of things, to have disco∣vered by whom the world was first planted, if there had been any such plantation before Adam; but to say that all the design of Moses was only to give an account of the Origine and history of the Iewish Nation, and that Adam was only the first of that stock, is manifestly ridiculous, it being so clear, that not only from Adam and Noah, but from Sem, Abraham, and Isaac came other Nations besides that of Iews. And by the same reason that it is said, that Moses only speaks of the Origine of the Iewish Nation in the history of Adam, it may as well be said that Moses speaks only of the making of Canaan, and that part of the heavens which was over it, when he describes the Creation of the world in the six dayes work. For why may not the earth in

the second ver. of Genesis be as well understood of the Land of Iudea, and the light and production of animals and vegetables refer only to that, as to understand it so in re∣ference to the flood, and in many other passages relating to those eldest times? But the Author of that Hypothesis an∣swers, That the first Chapter of Genesis may relate to the true Origine of the world and the first peopling of it, but in the second Moses begins to give an account of the first man and woman of the Iewish Nation. Very probable! but if this be not a putting asunder those which God hath joyned to∣gether, nothing is. For doth not Moses plainly at first give an account of the formation of things in the first six dayes, and of his rest on the seventh? but how could he be said to have rested then from the works of Creation, if after this followed the formation of Adam and Eve in the second Chapter? Besides if the forming of man mentioned, Gen. 2. 7. be distinct from that mentioned. Gen. 1. 27. then by all parity of reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the Generations of Heaven and earth mentioned, Gen. 2. 4. must be distinct from the Creation of the heaven and earth mentioned, Gen. 1. 1. And so if there were another Creation of heaven and earth belonging to the Iews in Gen. 2. we may likewise be∣lieve that there was a new Creation of man and woman in that Chapter distinct from that mentioned in the former. Again further, if there had been any such persons in the world be∣fore Adam, no doubt Adam himself was ignorant of them; or else it had been a false and ridiculous account which he gives of the name of his wife 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 because she was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the mother of all living. Not of all living things, for that * 1.231 had been a more proper description of a Ceres, or Magna Mater, or Diana multimammia, of our Grand-mother the earth, but certainly it extends to all of the kind, that all living creatures that are of humane nature came from her. So the Chalde•• Paraphrast understands it, she was called Hava, because she was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the mother of all the sons of men. And so the Arabick version, quia ipsa fuit mater omnis viventis rationalis. To which * 1.232 purpose our Learned Selden cites the version of the Mauritanian Iews, and the Persick of Tawasius.

But what ever the credit or authority of these versions be, this is most certain, that Adam had no reason at all to have given this name to his wife, as being the mother of all li∣ving, if there had been any of mankind existing in the world from other mothers, which had been long before Eve was formed. So that we find it plain and clear, that if the re∣port given of things in Scripture be true, the hypothesis of Prae-Adamites is undoubtedly false. And certainly who ever seriously considers the frequent reflections on the authority of the Scriptures which were cast by the author of that Fi∣ction, and his endeavouring on all occasions to derogate from the miracles recorded in it, may easily suspect the design of that Author was not to gain any credit to his opinion from those arguments from Scripture, which he makes shew of (which are pittifully weak and ridiculous) but having by the help of such arguments made his opinion more plausible, his hope was that his opinion would in time undermine the Scriptures themselves. When he had made it appear that the account given in the Scriptures of the plantation of the world was unsatisfactory, since there were men before A∣dam, which the Scriptures to please the Iewish Nation, take no notice of. So that after he had attempted to prostitute the Scriptures to his opinion, his next work had been to have turned them out of doors, as not of credit to be relyed on by any when they were so common to every opinion. But how impious, absurd and rude that attempt was upon the sacred and inviolable authority of the Scriptures, hath been so fully discovered by his very many not unlearned adversa∣ries, that it might seem needless so much as to have taken notice of so weakly grounded, and infirmly proved an o∣pinion, had it not thus far lain in my way in order to the clearing the true Origine of Nations according to the Scriptures. The main foundations of which fabulous opini∣on lying chiefly in the pretended antiquities of the Chaldae∣ans, Egyptians, and others, have been fully taken away in our first bsok, where our whole design was to manifest the want of credibility in those accounts of ancient times, which are delivered by Heathen Nations in opposition to the Scri∣ptures. There is nothing at all in Scripture from the Crea∣tion

of Adam to the flood which seems to give any counte∣nance to that figment, but only what may be easily resolved from the consideration of the great conciseness of the Mo∣saick History, in reporting that long interval of time which was between the fall of Adam, and the Flood; By means of which conciseness such things are reported as speedily done, because immediatly succeeding in the story, which asked a very considerable time before they could be effected, and besides all things which were done before the Flood, being all quite obliterated by it, and all the numerous posterity of Adam being then destroyed (only Noah and his Family ex∣cepted) to what purpose had it been any further to have reported the passages before the Flood, otherwise then thereby to let us understand the certainty of the succession of persons from Adam, and such actions in those times which might be remarkable discoveries of Gods providence and mans wickedness in it, which being most apparent at first in Cain and his posteriry, did by degrees so spread its self over the face of the then inhabited world, that the just God was thereby provoked to send a Deluge among them to sweep away the present inhabitants to make room for another Ge∣neration to succeed them.

This therefore we now come to consider, viz. the History of the flood, and the certainty of the propagation of the world * 1.233 from the posterity of Noah after the Flood. I begin with the History of the Flood its self, as to which two things will be sufficient to demonstrate the truth of it. 1. If there be no∣thing in it repugnant to reason. 2. If we have sufficient evi∣dence of the truth of it, from such who yet have not believed the Scriptures. There are only two things which seem questionable to reason concerning the flood; the first, is, concerning the possibility of the flood its self; the other is, concerning the capacity of the Ark for preserving all kinds of Animals. The only ground of questioning the possibility of such a Flood, as that is related in Scripture, hath been from hence, that some have supposed it impossible, that all the water which is contained in the ayr, supposing it to fall down, should raise the surface of water upon the earth a foot and a balf in height; so that either new waters must be created to

overflow the earth, or else there must be supposed a rare∣faction of the water contained in the Sea and all Rivers, so that it must take up at least fifteen times the space that now it doth; but then, they say, if the water had been thus ra∣rified, it could neithe•• have destroyed man nor beast, nei∣ther could Noabs Ark have been born up by it any more then by liquid ayre. To this therefore, I answer.

First, I cannot see any urgent necessity from the Scripture to assert, that the Flood did spread its self over all the sur∣face of the earth. That all mankinde (those in the Ark ex∣cepted) were destroyed by it, is most certain according to the Scriptures. When the occasion of the Flood is thus expressed, And God saw that the wickedness of man was great * 1.234 upon earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the Lord said, I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth. It could not be then any particular deluge of so small a Country as Palestine, which is here expressed, as some have ridiculously imagined; for we find an universal corruption in the earth mentioned as the cause; an universal threaten∣ing upon all men for this cause; and afterwards an universal destruction expressed, as the effect of this Flood. And all fl••sh died that moved upon the earth, and every man. And every living substance was destroyed which was upon the face * 1.235 of the ground, both man and cattell, and the creeping things, * 1.236 and the fowl of the Heaven, and they were destroyed from the earth, and Noah only remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark. So then it is evident that the Flood was universal as to mankind, but from thence follows no neces∣sity at all of asserting the universality of it as to the Globe of the earth, unless it be sufficiently proved that the whole earth was peopled before the Flood: which I despair of ever seeing proved. And what reason can there be to ex∣tend the Flood beyond the occasion of it, which was the cor∣ruption of mankinde? And it seems very strange that in so short an Interval, in comparison as that was from Adam to the flood, according to the ordinary computation, viz. 1656. years, and not much above two thousand, according to the largest, the world should then be fully peopled, when in so

much longer a space of time since the flood to this day, the earth is capable of receiving far more inhabitants, then now it hath. The only probability then left for asserting the universality of the Flood, as to the Globe of the earth, is from the destruction of all living creatures together with man; now though men might not have spread themselves over the whole surface of the earth, yet beasts and creep∣ing things might which were all destroyed with the Flood: For it is said, That all flesh died that moved upon the earth, both of fowl and of cattel, and of beast, and of every creep∣ing thing, that creepeth upon the earth, and every man. To what end should there be not only a note of universality ad∣ded, but such a particular enumeration of the several kinds of beasts, creeping things, and fowls, if they were not all destroyed? To this I answer. I grant as far as the Flood extended, all these were destroyed; but I see no reason to extend the destruction of these beyond that compass and space of earth where men inhabited: Because the punishment upon the beasts was occasioned by, and could not but be con∣comitant with the destruction of mankinde, but (the occasion of the deluge being the sin of man, who was punished in the beasts, that were destroyed for his sake, as well as in himself) where the occasion was not, as where there were animals, and no men, there seems no necessity of extend∣ing the Flood thither. But to what end then it will be repli∣ed, Did God command Noah with so much care to take of all kind of beasts, and birds, and creeping things into the ark with him, if all these living creatures were not destroyed by the Flood? I answer, because all those things were destroyed where ever the Flood was; suppose then the whole Conti∣nent of Asia was peopled before the Flood, which is as much as we may in reason suppose, I say, all the living creatures in that Continent were all destroyed; or if we may suppose it to have extended over our whole Continent of the anci∣ently known world; what reason would there be that in the opposite part of the globe, viz. America, which we sup∣pose to be unpeopled then, all the living creatures should there be destroyed because men had sinned in this? And would there not on this ••••p••osition have been a sufficient

reason to preserve living Creatures in the Ark for future propagation, when all other living creatures extant had been in such remote places as would not have been accessible by them in many generations, and those beasts growing wilde for want of Inhabitants, would not have proved presently serviceable for the use of men after the Flood? which was certainly the main thing looked at in the preservation of them in the ark, that men might have all of them ready for their use presently after the Flood, which could not have been, had not the several kinds been preserved in the Ark, although we suppose them not destroyed in all parts of the world.

All this proceeds on supposition that Animals were pro∣pagated * 1.237 much further in the world then men were, before the Flood. Which I confess seems very probable to me, on this account because the production of Animals is parallel in Genesis with that of Fishes, and both of them different from man; For God saith, Let the waters bring forth every * 1.238 moving creature that hathlife; viz. Fish, and Fowl; and ac∣cordingly it is said, that the waters brought forth abundantly every living creature after their kind, and every Fowl after his kind. Accordingly in the production of beasts, we read, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattel, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind, and it was so: But in the production of man, It is * 1.239 said, Let us make man in our own likeness. From hence I * 1.240 observe this difference between the production of animals, and of man, that in the one God gave a prolifick power to the earth and waters for production of the several living creatures which came from them; so that the seminal prin∣ciples of them were contained in the matter out of which they were produced, which was otherwise in man, who was made by a peculiar hand of the great Creator himself, who thence is said to have formed Man of the dust of the ground. * 1.241 Now therefore although there were but one Male and Fe∣male of mankinde at first•• which had a special formation by God himself; yet there is no reason we should conceive it to be so as to the production of oth••r living creatures, whe∣ther Fish, or Fowl, or Beasts; b••t the prolifick vertue be∣ing

by Gods power given to that material principle out of which they were formed, it may very well be supposed that many of the same kind were at first produced. For it seems very strange to imagine that in the whole Ocean there should be only two of a kind produced; but Fish and Fowl both arising from the water, we may have just reason to think, that the waters being separated before this prolifick vertue was communicated to the whole masse of waters, might in the several parts of the globe of the earth, bring forth both fish and fowl after their kinds. The same I say of the pro∣duction of Animals in the sixth days work, which are ranked into three sorts, Cattel, creeping things, and beasts of the earth after their kinds; now God saying, Let the earth bring forth her living creatures (and that after the waters had di∣vided some parts of the earth from other, so that there could be no passage for the cattel, creeping things, and beasts out of one part into another, without the help of man) it seems very probable that at least those parts of the earth which were thus divided from each other, did bring forth these several living creatures after their kinds, which did after propagate in those parts without being brought thither by the help of man. If now this supposi∣tion be embraced, by it we presently clear our selves of many difficulties concerning the propagation of animals in the world, and their conservation in the Ark, which many have been so much to seek for satisfaction in. As how the unknown kind of Serpents in Brasil, the slow-bellied creature of the Indies, and all those strange species of ani∣mals seen in the West Indies should either come into the Ark of Noah, or be conveyed out of it into those Coun∣tries which are divided from that Continent where the Flood was by so vast an Ocean on the one side, and at least so large a tract of Land on the other (supposing any passage but of one Continent into another, which yet hath not been dis∣covered.) Besides some kind of Animals cannot live out of that particular Clime wherein they are; and there are ma∣ny sorts of animals discovered in America, and the adjoyn∣ing Islands, which have left no remainders of themselves in these parts of the world. And it seems very strange that

these, should propagate into those remote parts of the world from the place of the Flood, and leave none at all of their number behind them in those parts from whence they were propagated. These things at least make that opinion very probable which extends the production of animals be∣yond that of mankinde in the old world, and that the Flood though it destroyed all mankinde, and every living creature within that compass wherein mankind inhabited, yet might not extend its self to those parts, and the animals therein, in which men had never inhabited. And by this means we need not make so many miracles as some are fain to do about the slood; and all those difficulties concerning the propagation of animals do of themselves vanish and fail to the groud. This is the first way of resolving the difficulty concerning the pos∣sibility of the Flood, by asserting it not to have been over the whole globe of the earth, but only over those parts where mankinde inhabited.

Secondly, Suppose the Flood to have been over the whole globe of the earth, yet there might have been water enough * 1.242 to have overwhelmed it to the height mentioned in Scrip∣ture. For which we are to consider that many causes con∣curred to the making of this Deluge; first, the air was con∣densed into clouds, and those fell down with continued force and violence, not breaking into drops, but all in a body (which Sir Walter Rawleigh parallels with the spouts of the * 1.243 West Indies) which are thence called the Cataracts or Flood-gates of heaven, God loosening (as he expresseth it) the power retentive which was in the clouds, and so the waters must needs fall in abundance, according to the ex∣pression in Iob, Behold he withholdeth the waters, and they * 1.244 dry up, also he sendeth them out, and they overturn the earth. Now, I say, although these waters falling down with so much fury and violence, as well as in so great abundance, might quickly destroy all living creatures; yet this was not all for God who held in the Ocean within its bounds, where∣by he saith to it, Thus far it shall go, and no farther, might then give it Commission to execute his justice upon the sinfull world: and to all this, we have another cause of the Deluge, which was, That the Fountains of the great

Deep were broken up. By which Vatablus, most probably * 1.245 understands, Immensam illam & profundam aquarum co∣piam quae est subter terram: That vast body of waters which lies in the bowels of the earth; now when all these fountains were broken up, and the waters within the earth rush out with violence and impetuosity upon it, it must needs cause an inundation so great as that is mentioned in the Scripture. For as that judicious Historian Sir W. Raw∣leigh observes, Let us consider that the earth had above * 1.246 21000. miles compass, the Diameter of the earth according to that Circle 7000. mile, and then from the Superficies to the Center 3500. mile; take then the highest mountain of the world, Caucasus, Taurus, Tenariff, or any other, and I do not finde, saith he, that the highest exceeds thirty miles in height: It is not then impossible, answering reason with reason, that all those waters mixed within the earth, 3500. miles deep, should be able to cover the space of 30. miles in height, which 30. miles upright being found in the depths of the earth 116. times; for the fountains of the great Deep were broken, and the waters drawn out of the bowels of the earth. But then withall, saith he, if we consider the proportion which the earth bears to the air about it, we may easily understand the possibility of the Flood, without any new Creation of waters; for supposing so much air to be con∣densed, and so turned into water which doth encompass the earth, it will not seem strange to men of judgement, yea but of ordinary understanding, that the earth (God so plea∣sing) was covered over with waters, without any new Crea∣tion. But this will yet appear more probable if the height of the highest mountains doth bear no greater a proportion to the Diameter of the earth, then of the 1670. part to the whole, supposing the Diameter of the earth to be 8355. miles, as P. Gassendus computes both. And it is more * 1.247 then probable, that men have been exceedingly mistaken, as to the height of mountains, which comes so far short of what Sir Walter Rawleigh allows to them, that the highest mountain in the world will not be found to be five direct miles in height taking the altitude of them from the plain they stand upon. Olympus whose height is

so extold by the Poets and ancient Greeks, that it is said to exceed the clouds, yet Plutarch tells us that Xenagoras mea∣sured * 1.248 it and sound it not to exceed a mile and a half perpendi∣cular and about 70. paces. Much about the same height Pliny saith that Dicaearchus found the mountain Pelion to be. The mount Athos is supposed of extraordinary height, because it cast its shadow into the Isle of Lemnos, which according to Pliny was 87. miles. yet Gassendus allows it but two miles in height; but Isaac Vossius in a learned discourse concerning the height of mountains in his notes on Pomponius Mela, doth not * 1.249 allow above 10. or 11. furlongs at most to the height of mount Athos. Caucasus by Ricciolus is said to be 51. miles in height: Gassendus allowing it to be higher then Athos or Olympus, yet conceives it not above three or four miles at most; but Vossius will not yeild it above two miles perpendicular, for which he gives this very good reason; Polybius affirms there is no mountain in Greece which may not be ascended in a dayes time, and makes the highest mountain there not to exceed ten furlongs; which saith Vossius, it is scarce possible for any one to reach unless he be a mountainer born; any other will scarce be able to ascend above six furlongs per∣pendicular; for in the ascent of a mountain every pace doth reach but to an hand breadth perpendicular; but if we do allow eight furlongs to a dayes ascent, yet thereby it will ap∣pear that the highest mountains in the world are not above twenty four furlongs in height, since they may be ascended in three dayes time: and it is affirmed of the top of mount Caucasus, that it may be ascended in less then the compass of three dayes, and therefore cannot be much above two miles in height. Which may be the easier believed of any other mountain, when that which is reputed the highest of the world, viz. the Pike of Teneriffe which the inhabitants call Pica de Terraria, may be ascended in that compass of time, viz. three dayes: for in the months of Iuly and Au∣gust (which are the only months in which men can ascend it, because all other times of the year snow lyes upon it, al∣though neither in the Isle of Teneriffe nor any other of the * 1.250 Canary Islands there be snow ever seen) the inhabitants then ascend to the top of it in three dayes time, which top of it is

not Pyramidal but plain, from whence they gather some sulphureous stones which are carryed in great quantities into Spain. So that according to the proportion of eight furlongs to a dayes journey, this Pike of Teneriffe will not exceed the height of a German mile perpendicular, as Varenius con∣fesseth, then which he thinks likewise, that no mountain in the world is higher. For what Pliny speaks of the Alpes being fifty miles in height, must be understood not perpendi∣cular, but in regard of the obliquity of the ascent of it; so that he might account so much from the foot of the Alpes to the top of them, and yet the Alpes in a perpendicular line not come near the height of a German mile. If then the highest mountains do not exceed much above three miles in height (for the Spaniards themselves affirm, that those lofty mountains of Peru, in comparison of which they say the Alpes are but like Cottages, may be ascended in four dayes compass) we see from hence then far greater probability, how the waters in the time of the general flood might overtop the highest mountains.

Especially if it be made evident that there is so great an Abysse of subterraneous waters, that the breaking open of * 1.251 the fountains of it may so much encrease the inundation arising from the clouds, and from the breaking in of the Ocean upon the main Land. And that there is such a mass of waters in the body of the earth is evident from the Origine of Fountains; for the opinion of Aristotle imputing them to the condensation of aire in the caverns of the earth, and that of other Philosophers ascribing them to the fall of rain-water received into such cisterns in the earth which are capable of receiving it, are both equally unsatisfactory, unless we sup∣pose a mass of waters in the bowels of the earth, which may be as the common stock to supply those Fountains with. For it is very hard, conceiving how meer aire should be so far condensed, as to cause not only such a number of Fountains, but so great a quantity of water as runs into the sea by those rivers which come from them, (as the river Volga is sup∣posed to empty so much water in a years time into the Caspi∣an Sea, as might suffi••e to cover the whole earth) by which likewise it is most eviden•• that there must be some subter∣ranean

passages in the Sea, or else of necessity, by that abun∣dance of water which continually runs into it from the ri∣vers, it would overflow and drown the world. And from this multitude of waters which comes from Fountains, it is likewise evident, that the Origine of Fountains cannot be meerly from such water which falls from the clouds, which would never suffice to maintain so full and uninterrupted a stream as many Fountains have: Especially if that be true which some assert, that rain-water doth never moisten the earth above ten foot deep, for of far greater profundity many Fountains are. And besides the rain-water runs most upon the surface of the earth, and so doth rather swell the rivers which thereby run with greater force in their passage to the Ocean, and doth not lodge it self presently in the earth, especially if it descends in a greater quantity which alone is able to fill such Cisterns supposed to be in the earth, especi∣ally in mountains, which may keep a stream continually running. Although therefore we may acknowledge that the fall of rain may much conduce to the overflowing and continuance of Fountains, as is evident by the greater force of springs after continued rains, and by the decay of many of them in hot and dry weather (which yet I had rather im∣pute to the Suns exhaling by his continued heat those moist vapours in the earth, which should continually supply the springs, then meerly to the want of rain) and by the rise of most great rivers from such Fountains which came from the foot of mountains; where the ground is supposed to be of so hard and consistent a substance, as stone, or chalke, or something of like nature which might help to the conserva∣tion of water there, from whence it after ran in streams to the Ocean (which was the great argument of the famous Peireskius for this opinion) although I say, these things may argue thus far, that rain-water doth much conduce to the * 1.252 preservation of springs, yet it cannot give a sufficient ac∣count of the Origine of them: Which with the greatest reason and probability is imputed to those subterraneous wa∣ters which pass up and down through the bowels of the earth. Some have fancyed the earth to be as one great animal, whose subterraneous passage's were like veins in the

body which received water out of the Sea, as the veins do blood out of the Liver; and that there are some kind of hot vapours in the earth which supply the place of vital spirits, which are diffused up and down the body through the arte∣ries. And that as in an animal there are some parts which upon the least prick do send forth blood, and others are more callous where the incision must be deeper before any blood appears; so it is in the earth; when it is opened in a right vein we find presently a spring of water; but if we chance to hit on a wrong place, we go deep and may find none; not that water is wanting, but we have not hit on the veins through which it runs. And thence as the blood with equal freedom and velocity ascends into the head as it runs into the legs, because it is equally dispersed into all the parts from the center of it; so in the body of the earth it is as natural for the water to ascend into the tops of mountains, as it is to fall down into the center of the earth. And that it is no more wonder to see springs issue out of mountains, then it is to see a man bleed in the veins of his forehead when he is let blood there. So in all places of the earth the parts of it are not disposed for apertion; for some of them are so hard and compact, that there seems to be no passage through them (which is the most probable reason, why there is no rain neither in those places, because there is no such exsudation of those moist vapours through the surface of the earth, which may yeild matter for rain, as it is in many of the san∣dy places of Africa, but usually mountainous Countryes have more large, and as it were Temple-veins through which the moist vapours have a free and open passage, and thence there are not only more frequent springs there, but clouds and rains too.) Now if this account of the Origine of springs in the earth be as rational as it is ingenious and handsome (and there is not much can be said against it, but only that then all fountains should be salt as the water is from whence they come) then we easily understand how the earth might be overflowed in the universal deluge; for then the fountains of the deep were broken up, or there was an universal open∣ing of the veins of the earth, whereby all the water contain∣ed in them would presently run upon the surface of the

earth, and must needs according to its proportion advance its self to a considerable height. But because the salving the difference of the water in springs from what it is in the Sea is so considerable a phaenomenon in our present case, I there∣fore rather take this following as the most rational account of the Origine of fountains. viz. That there are great cavi∣tyes in the earth, which are capable of receiving a consider∣able quantity of water, which continually runs into them from the Sea (which as it continually receives fresh sup∣plyes from the rivers which empty themselves into it, so it dispatcheth away a like quantity through those spongy parts of the earth under the Ocean, which are most apt to suck in and convey away the surplusage of water) so that by this means the Sea never swells by the water conveyed into it by the rivers, there being as continual a circulation in the body of the earth of the water which passeth out of the Ocean into the subterraneous cavernes, and from thence to the mountains, and thence into the Sea again; as there is a cir∣culation of blood in mans body from the heart by the arteryes into the exteriour parts, and returning back again by the veins into the heart. According to which we may imagine such a place in the heart of the earth like Plato's Bara∣thrum,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

As Plato in his Phaedrus describes it out of Homer, a long and deep subterraneous cavity. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Into which cavity all the rivers at last flow, and from which they again disperse themselves abroad. Now this Cavity of the earth thus fill'd with water supplyes the place of the heart in the body of the earth, from which all those several aquaeducts which are in the earth have their continual supply; but that which makes those passages of water which we call springs and fountains properly, I suppose, is thus generated; from those Cavityes fill'd with water in the earth by reason of the hot streams which are in the body of the earth, there are continually rising some vapours or little particles of water, which are

disjoyned from each other by the heat, by reason of which they attain a greater celerity of motion, and so pass through the inner pores of the earth till they come near the superficies of it. Which when they have approached to, they are beat back again by the cold which environs the surface of the earth, or at least are so arrested by the cold and condensed by it, that they lose the form of vapours and become per∣fect water again. Which water being now more gross, then while it was a meer vapour, cannot descend again through the same pores through which it ascended before, because these are not now capable of receiving it: And therefore it seeks out some wider passages near the surface of the earth, by which means it moves in an oblique manner, and is ready to embrace any other vapours which are arrested in the same manner; now when these are grown to a consider∣able body in the surface of a mountain, or a plain, and find a vent fit for them, there appears a proper fountain whose streams are still maintained by the same condensation of va∣pours, which when they are once come abroad are in con∣tinual motion whereby rivers are made, which are still find∣ing a passage through the declivity of the surface of the earth, whereby they may return to the Ocean again. Now according to this account, that grand Phaenomenon of the freshness of fountain water when the water of the Sea is salt, whence it originally comes, is sufficiently resolved. For meer transcolation may by degrees take away that which the Chymists call the fixed salt; and for the Volatile salt of it (which being a more spirituous thing, is not removable by distillation, and so neither can it be by transcolation) yet such an evaporation as that mentioned, may serve to do it, because it is evident that fresh water will fall from the clouds which hath risen from those vapours which have come out of the Sea; and besides these vapours or small particles of wa∣ter in their passage through the earth (especially when they come near the surface of it) do incorporate with other sweet vapours as those which come from rain and others, by which means they insensibly lose their former acidity and sharpness. But those fountains which do retain their former saltness, as there are many such in the world, may very probably ••••

supposed not to have come from these vapours condensed, but to be a kind of a breaking of vein in which the salt water was conveyed up and down the body of the earth. Now then considering that mass of waters and multitude of vapours arising thence which are in the earth, how easie is it for us to understand what the breaking open the fountains of the deep means in Scripture, and how by that means to∣gether with the falling down of the Cataracts of the clouds, and the letting loose of the Ocean, the whole earth might be overspread with an universal deluge. The possibility of which was the thing to be shewed.

The next thing we come to concerning the flood, is, the capacity of the Ark for receiving the several animals which * 1.253 were to propagate the world afterwards. Concerning which, two things are necessary to be understood, what the mea∣sure of the Ark was, and what the number of animals con∣tained in it. The measure of the Ark must be determined by the proportion of the cubit, which there is no reason at all to suppose either with Origen and others to have been the Geometrical cubit, which contains six ordinary cubits or nine feet, both because we find no mention at all of any such cubit in Scripture, and because the Fabrick of the Ark would have been of too vast a proportion; Neither yet is it probable, which Sir W. Rawlegh supposeth, that this cubit must be of a proportion as much exceeding ours as the stature of a Gyant doth ours, both because there is no cer∣tain evidence, either from Scripture or reason, that the pro∣portion of men then did generally exceed what is now; and besides this tends not in the least to make the thing more plain. For according to that proportion, we must then have imagined beasts to have been as well as men; for the horse must have been proportionably as great to have been serviceable to men of that stature, and so the Animals would have taken up as much more room in the Ark as the cubit is supposed to be bigger. I suppose then that Moses speaks of the cubit most in use in his own time, (for he writ so that they for whose use he writ might be easily able to under∣stand him) now this cubit by the consent of writers con∣tained a foot and a half in length; according to which pro∣portion,

supposing the Ark by Moses his description to have 300. cubits in length, 50. in breadth, and 30. in height, * 1.254 the whole capacity of the Ark according to the computation of Ioh. Bute•• comes to 450000. solid cubits. For the length of 300. cubts being multiplyed into the breadth of 50. * 1.255 cubits, and the product by the height of 30. cubits makes the whole Concavity 450000. Which Matthaeus Hostus reducing to the German measure, makes the longitude of the Ark to * 1.256 be 31. perches, 4. cubits, 5. fingers; the latitude 5 perches, 2. cubits, and 11. fingers; the altitude 3 perches, 1. cubit, 9. fingers; allowing to every perch 15. Roman feet. So that if we take a perch to contain 10. Hebrew cubits, which ex∣ceeds the former 11. fingers, the whole capacity of the Ark will be 450. cubical perches. And as he saith, Hujusmodi sane aedificii amplitudo capacissima est, & quamlibet magno animantium numero haud dubie sufficere pot uit, the Ark of so large a capacity might easily contain the several kinds of animals in it. Which will be easily understood, if according to our former supposition, only the animals of the inhabited part of the world were preserved in the Ark; but admit∣ting that all kinds of animals were there, there would be room enough for them and for provision for them. For which Sir W. Rawlegh gives a prudent caution, that men ought not to take animals of a mixt nature, as Mules and Hyaena's, nor such as differ in size and shape from each other, as the eat of Europe and Ownce of India, into the several species of animals. Sir W. Rawlegh following Buteo reckons 89. or least any be omitted, a 100. several kinds of beasts, and undertakes to demonstrate from a triple propor∣tion of all beasts to the Ox, Wolf, and Sheep, that there was sufficient capacity for them in the Ark. Hostus allows 150. several kinds of animals, yet questions not the caepacity of the Ark, but these things are so particularly made out by those learned Authors, especially by Buteo, that I shall ra∣ther refer the reader for further satisfaction to the Authors themselves, then take the pains to transcribe them.

I come now therefore to the evidence of the truth and * 1.257 certainty of this universal deluge, of which we have most clear and concurring Testimonies of most ancient Nations of

the world. For which purpose Grotius and others have at * 1.258 large produced the testimony of Berosus the Chaldean out of Iosephus, concerning the flood and the Ark in which Noah was preserved, of Abydenus out of Cyrill and Eusebius con∣cerning Xisuthrus, or Noahs sending out of the birds to see if the flood were asswaged, and of Alexander Polyhistor con∣cerning the preservation of animals in the Ark, of Plutarch concerning the sending out of the Dove, of Lucian de D••a Syria concerning the whole story, and so of Molon and Ni∣colaus Damascenus. Besides it is manifested by others, how among the Chaldeans the memory of Noah was preserved under the Fable of Oannes, which had par•• of a fish and part of a man, as is evident from the fragments of Apollodorus, Abydenus, and Alexander Polyhistor preserved in Eusebius his Greek Chronica; among the Chineses under the name of Puoncuus, who by them is said to have escaped alone with his Family out of the universal Deluge, saith Isaac Vossius, who supposeth Pu or Pi to be only a Prefix to the name, and so that Puoncuus is the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Martinius tells us, de diluvio mul••a est apud Sinicos Scriptores mentio, that the ancient writers of the Sinick history speak much of the flood. Iohannes de Lact tells out of Lescharbotus how constant the tradition of the flood is among the Indians, both in new France, Peru, and other parts. This being therefore so fully attested by the evident and apparent con∣sent of so many writers and historians, which did not own the authority of the Scriptures, I shall suppose this suffici∣ently proved, and proceed to the main thing which concerns the Origine of Nations, which is, the certainty of the propa∣gation of mankind from the posterity of Noah. Of which there is this strong and convincing evidence, that in all that account which the Scripture gives of the propagation of Nations from the Sons of Noah, there is some remainder in the history of that Nation to justifie the reason of the impo∣sition of the name from the names of the Nations themselves, which have preserved the original name of their founder in their own, as the Medes from Madai, the Thracians from Thiras, the Ionians from Iavan, the Sidonians from Sidon, the Philistins from Pelisthim, ••the Arcaeans, Aradians,

Elymaeans, Assyrians, Lydians, from Arki, Arrad, Elam, * 1.259 Assur and Lud, and many others produced by Grotius, Montanus, Iunius, and especially Bochartus, who with ad∣mirable industry and learning hath cleared all this part of sacred history, which concerns the reason of the imposition of the names of the people which were propagated from the posterity of Noah, and given a full & satisfactory account of the several places where the posterity of Noah seated them∣selves after the deluge. In stead of that therefore, I shall consider the pretences which can be brought against it, which are chiefly these three. 1. That the Chaldean Em∣pire seems to have greater antiquity then can be attributed to it by the history of Moses. 2. That the most learned Heathen Nations pretend to be self-originated, and that they came not from any other Country. 3. That no certain account is given from whence America should be peopled.

1. The History of the Assyrian Empire seems inconsistent * 1.260 with the propagation of the world from the sons of Noah; for the reign of Ninus and Semiramis is placed by many Chronologers within the first Century after the flood, which seems a manifest inconsistency with the propagation of man∣kind from the Sons of Noah; for it seems utterly impossible that the foundations of so great an Empire should be laid in so small a compass of time by the posterity of three per∣sons; and besides Ninus and Semiramis were not the first who began the Assyrian Empire; for Belus not only raigned fifty five years before Ninus, but according to the Chal∣dean Antiquities from Evechous, who they say first reigned among them, are reckoned 495. years. But admit that the beginning of the Assyrian Empire be placed so low as Peta∣vius and other Chronologers would have it, viz. in the year * 1.261 after the Flood, 153. yet the difficulty is only somewhat abated, but not removed; for it seems yet unconceivable that from three persons in 150. years, such multitudes should spring, as to make so large an Empire as that of Ni∣nus, and that within an hundred years after the Flood there should be such vast multitudes for the building the tower of Babel and dispersion up and down the world, so that ac∣cording

to the Hebrew computation, in the compass of 300. years, viz. about Abrahams time, the world was so fully peopled, that we read of several Kings encountering one another, by which it is evident the world had been peopled sometime before, or else there could not have been such potent Kings as some of them were at that time. This be∣ing the grand difficulty, to it I answer these things.

1. There is no such certainty of the beginning of the Assyrian Empire, as for the sake of that, to question the truth of the propagation of the world by the sons of Noah. I havealready largely manifested the want of credibility in the Chronology of the ancient Chaldeans, and that we have no certain grounds to rely upon in reference to it. Especial∣ly as to those seven first Babylonian Kings, which are cited out of Africanus by Eusebius, and Georgius Syncellus, viz. E∣vechous, Chomasbolus, Porus, Nechubes, Abius, Oniballus, Chinzirus, who are said to reign 225. years, two moneths; and alike fabulous, I suppose, is the other Dynasty of six Arabian Kings, whose Empire is said to have stood 215. years to the time of Belus, who expelled the Arabians and took the power to himself; And it is much more agreeable to reason to reject these two Dynastyes, which have no re∣cord of them left in any History of the Assyrian Empire, but only in Berosus, whose authority in this case hath been dis∣cussed already, then to follow our late excellent Primate of Armagh, who punctually sets down the reign of the Kings of these two Dynastyes, but cuts off at least eight Ages in the time of the Assyrian Empire from Ninus to Sardana∣palus, which time he confines to 496. years, and placeth Ninus in the 2737. year of the world, according to the * 1.262 Hebrew computation, and so to live in the time of the Iudges, and be cotemporary with Deborah: Which he builds only on a place in Herodotus, which relates not to the time between Ninias and Sardanapalus, but to the time of the de∣fection of the Mèdes from the Assyrian Empire, as Isaac Vos∣sius hath already shewed. We cannot then finde any cer∣tainty * 1.263 in the beginning of the Assyrian Empire, which may give us cause to question the propagation of the world from the posterity of Noah.

2. We have reason to think that there was a more then ordinary multiplication of the world from the sons of Noah after the Flood. For as God had before punished the world by destroying mankind in it by an extraordinary manner; so after the Flood, he doth in a particular manner bless Noah and his Sons, and said unto them, Be fruitfull and multi∣ply, and replenish the earth, which may well be thought to have then had an extraordinary effect. Severall ways have been attempted by learned men to make appear, to what a vast number the posterity of Noah would increase in the space of two of three hundred years after the Flood. Peta∣vius supposeth that the posterity of Noah might beget chil∣dren * 1.264 at seventeen, and that each of Noahs sons might have eight children in the eighth year after the flood, and that every one of these eight might beget eight more; by this means in only one Family as of Iaph••t in the year after the Flood 238. he makes a Diagramme, consisting of almost an innumerable company of men. Iohannes Temporarius, as * 1.265 our most learned Primate tels us, takes this way, that all of the posterity of Noah when they attained twenty years of Age had every year twins, on which supposition by Arith∣metical progression, he undertakes to make it appear, that in the 102. year after the flood, there would be of males and Females 1554420, but taking away the one half, be∣cause of the groundless supposition of twins, yet then in that time there would be 388605. males besides Females. Others suppose that each of the sons of Noah had ten sons, and by that proportion, in few Generations, it would amount to many thousands within a Century. Others insist on the pa∣rallel between the multiplication of the children of Israel in Egypt; that if from 72. men in the space of 215. years there are procreated 600000. how many will be born of three men in the space of an hundred years? some have said above 23000. but with what success in their Arithmetick I shall not determine. But whether all or any of these ways * 1.266 be sufficient, and satisfactory, we have yet cause to believe that there was a more then ordinary multiplication in the posterity of Noah after the flood.

3. If we embrace the account of those copies, which the

Septuagint followed in their version, all this difficulty is then ceased. For that account doth very much enlarge the times, and makes almost a thousand years between the Flood and Abraham, by which means there will be sufficient space gi∣ven for the propagation of mankind, the building the Tower of Babel, the dispersion of Nations, the founding the Assyrian Empire, the plantation of Egypt, China, and other places, all which seem to have been in that time, and to concur with that computation, as well as Iosephus doth, and the whole Primitive Church before Hierome, which cer∣tainly ought in no case to be disregarded.

The whole controversie concerning this part of the Chro∣nology of the world comes at last to this, whether it be more probable that the Iews, who lived under the second Temple (who then were the Trustees to whom were committed the oracles of God) whom the LXX. followed in their version, had the true reading, or the Talmudick Iews after their dispersion and banishment from their Country, when they were discarded by God himself from being his people, when he broke up house among them at the destruction of Ierusa∣lem and the Temple. But if the reader desire further satis∣faction concerning this difference of the Chronology of the LXX. from that of the present Hebrew copyes, he may con∣sult the learned dissertation of the late learned Bishop of * 1.267 Chester upon the LXX. and the later discourses of Isaac Vossius on this subject. Seting a side then the controversie between the present Hebrew copyes and the LXX. in point of integrity and incorruption which I meddle not with, I can∣not but subscribe to the judgement of our judicious histo∣rian, Sir W. Rawleigh: That if we look over all, and do not hastily satisfie our understanding with the first things offered, and thereby being satiated do slothfully and drowsily sit down, we shall find it more agreeable rather to follow the reckoning of the LXX. who according to some editions make it above 1072. years between the flood and Abrahams birth, then to take away any part of those 352. years given. For if we advisedly con∣sider the state and ceuntenance of the world such as it was in Abrahams time, yea before Abraham was born, we shall find that it were very ill done of us by following opinion without the

guide of reason, to pare the time over deeply between Abraham and the flood; because in cutting them too near the quick, the reputation of the whole story might perchance bleed thereby, were not the Testimony of the Scriptures supreme so as no ob∣jection can approach it; And that we did not follow withall this precept of St. Austin, that wheresoever any one place in the Scriptures may be conceived disagreeing to the whole, the same is by ignorance of misinterpretation understood. For in Abra∣hams time all the then known parts of the world were peopled: all regions and countryes had their Kings. Aegypt had many magnificent Cities, and so had Palestine and all bordering Countryes; yea all that part of the world be sides as far as India: and those not built with sticks, but of hewn stones, and defended with walls and rampiers, which magnificence needed a parent of more antiquity then those other men have supposed. And therefore where the Scriptures are plainest and best agreeing with reason and nature, to what end should we labour to beget doubts and scruples, or draw all things into wonders and mar∣vails? giving also strength thereby to common cavillers, and to those mens apish brains, who only bend their wits to find im∣possibilities and monsters in the story of the world and mankind. Thus far that excellent Historian, whose words deserve con∣sideration. Thus much for the first objection.

The second is, From the great pretence of several nations that they were self-originated, or came not from any other * 1.268 place. This was the pretence of the Aegyptians, Graecians, ancient inhabitants of Italy, and others. But how little rea∣son we have to give credit to these pretences, will appear on these accounts. 1. The impossibility in nature that man∣kind should be produced in such a way as they imagined, which we have manifested already in our discourse of the Origine of the universe. 2. That the Nations which pre∣tended this, were never able to give sufficient evidence of it to any other Nation which demanded it; which is manifest: by their want of any certain records of their ancient times, which is fully proved in our discourse in the first book of the want of credibility in Heathen histories. 3. The only prob∣able reason, which induced these Nations to make them∣selves Aborigines, was, because they supposed themselves to

be the first inhabitants of the Countryes they lived in, which although I may allow to the Aegyptians and some other ancient Nations, yet I cannot do it to the Hellens or Greeks, who most vainly and arrogantly pretended to it. Which because it may give more light into the greatest antiquities of Greece and some other Nations then hath been yet dis∣covered or taken notice of, and because it may further tend to clear the truth of the Scriptures as to the Origine of Nations, I shall more particularly enquire into the first Plantation of Greece. That it was first inhabited by some of Noahs posterity, is out of question with all those who pre∣fer the most ancient and undoubted records of Scripture be∣fore the fabulous impostures of mens brains. But by whose immediate posterity the Country of Greece was first inha∣bited, is not yet so clear as it hath been generally presumed to be, by most who had rather follow the dictates of others then spend time in such enquiries themselves: Which yet certainly are so far from being unworthy mens labour and industry, that nothing tends more clearly to advance the truth of Scripture-history, then the reconciling the anti∣quities of the elder Nations to what we find delivered of the plantation of the world from the posterity of Noah. As to this particular therefore of the first plantation of Greece, I shall first propound the opinion generally embraced among learned men, and then shew how far it is defective, and what other more true account may be given of it. It is evident from Moses, Gen. 10. 5. that the posterity of Ia∣phet took possession of the Isles of the Gentiles, i. e. accord∣ing to the Hebrew Idiome, not only such as are properly so calld, but all those Countries which lay much upon the Sea, being at any distance from Palestine, especially such as lay between the Ocean and Mediterranean Sea; and so both Greece and Italy come under the name of the Isles of the Gentiles. Among the sons of Iaphet none is conceived so probable to have first peopled Greece, as he whose name was preserved among the inhabitants of Greece with very little alteration. And so as the Medes from Madai, the Assyrians from Assur, the Thracians from Thiras, by the like Analogy the Ionians from Iavan. From which it is observable that

although among the Greeks themselves, the Ionians were but as one division of that people which inhabited Greece, yet other Nations comprehended all under the name of Ionians. For which we have sufficient evidence from Hesychius and the Scholiast on Aristophanes. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Hesychius; and more to this purpose the Scho∣liast * 1.269 speaks. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. For 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 with the Insertion of the Aeolick Digamma, (which is alwayes done when two vowels meet) is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. Iavones, and Stephanus Byhantius tells us, that from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 comes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and so Homer, * 1.270

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

And Dionysius Periegetes reckons up 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as one of the ri∣vers of Arcadia,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.271

And which much confirms this opinion, the Hebrew word for Iavan before the points added by the Masorites, viz.〈◊〉〈◊〉bears a perfect Analogy with the Greck 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in Scripture is taken for Greece; and so Dan. 8. 21. Alex∣ander is calld 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which the LXX. render 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Ioel 3. 6. You have sold my sons 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to the sons of Iavan, i. e. to the Greeks as it is generally understood. But as Iavan cannot be supposed to have come into these parts without his family, so it is generally presumed that there are no obscure footsteps left of Iavans eldest son, Elisha's seating himself in Greece. For from him Iosephus derives the name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, with whom the Jerusalem Para∣phrast concurs. Montanus from thence derives the name Elis, from whence he supposeth the Greeks are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.272 Bochartus finds the clearest remainders of Elisha in Elis the same with Pelopponesus, one part of which by Homer is called Alisium; thence Ezek. 27. 7. we read of the purple and searlet from the Isles of Elisha, which makes it most probable to be that part of Greece w••••ch lay upon the Jonian Sea, * 1.273 where the best purple next to the Tyrian was found, as the

learned Bochartus hath demonstrated from several Authors. This is now the substance of the generally received account concerning the plantation of Greece from the posterity of Noah. Which if it be taken as to that people which did at length possess Greece, I see no reason to disapprove it; but if it be extended to the first plantation of Greece, I see as little to embrace it. That we may therefore judge more freely of the first inhabitants of Greece, it is requisite we take an account of it from those who prosess themselves most versed in their own Antiquities, who may in a matter of this nature which is attested by the common consent of the most learned Antiquari••s of Greece, be the more credited, in that what they thus deliver, may be supposed to come from an ancient and undoubted Tradition.

It is evident therefore, from the judgement of the most * 1.274 learned and judicious even of the Greeks themselves, that Greece was first inhabited by a people by them called Bar∣barous, i. e. a people different from them in Language and manners. So Ephorus whom Poly••ius commends as the best writer of the Greek Antiquities, saith that Greece was inha∣bited by a barbarous people before the Hell••ns came into it. And 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Mil••sius cited by Str••o concerning Pelo••∣ponesus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Strabo himself not only believes of Pelopponesus but of all Greece that it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, anci••ntly a Plantation of Barbarians; the same is affirmed by Aristotle writing of the * 1.275 Commonwealth of the Tegeates concerning Arcadia, that be∣fore its being possessed by the Arcadians i•• was inhabited by a barbarous people, who because they were expulsed their Country, before moon rising, the Arcadians called themselves 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whether that be the ground of that vain∣glorious boast (of which many reasons are given by learned men) I here dispute not; it is sufficient that we find the Grecians were not the first who peopled any of these several places; which is likewise attested by Herodotus, Thucydides and others, whose testimonies we shall afterwards produce. It being then evident that the Grecians were not the first who inhabited that Country after from them called Greece, it follows to be inquired what this Barbarous people was and

from whence they came. Strabo hath given us in a large Catalogue of the names of many of them, as the Dryopes, Caucones, Leleges, besides the Aones, Tembices, Hyantes and many others; but these seem not to have been that ancient people, but rather some latter Castlings of the Carians, who as Thucydides tells us, did very often make inroads upon the quarters of Greece. That people which had the largest spread and greatest Antiquity, was the Pelasgi: thence Peloppone∣sus was anciently called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Stephanus Byzantius 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and Apollodorus saith, that the Pelopponesians were anciently called Pelasgi; and Euripides,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

And elsewhere,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

These Pelasgi were not only in Pelopponesus, but in Attica too, as appears by Strabo, where he saith the Nation of the * 1.276 Pelasgi did inhabit, and by the Athenians (that is after their mixture) they were called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Storks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for their frequent removals from place to place: and Pausanias mentions their being under the Acronoli at Athens: that they were in Thessaly, is evident from Hesy••hius. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; Arcadia seems to have th•• first or chief place of their residence; for the Arcadians who were accounted 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, do vindicate the foun∣der of this Nation, whom they call Pelasgus to themselves, and say he was an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 among them, that is, the fi••st who came into that Country; for all those whose original they knew not they called them Terrae filios, and genuinos terrae. * 1.277 Pausanias rightly conjectures that he was the first man among them, not as though he was alone, but because the Chief Ruler and Commander among them, and that brought them into the Country; but though they might fix

themselves about Arcadia, it is evident they spread further; for Menecrates Eleates in his book of the founders of Cities, * 1.278 affirms that all the Sea coasts of Greece called Ionica begin∣ning from Mycale, were first inhabited by the Pelasgi; nay we find them yet much higher up in Epirus, who were as Strabo tells us, the first founders of the famous Oracle of * 1.279 Dodona; for so Ephorus in him saith it was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and that these were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: thence the Poet,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

And Hesiod,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Strabo further makes it evident, that they were a barbarous people which lived about Dodona, from the description Homer gives of them,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Which Philostratus best interprets when he saith they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, such that thought * 1.280 the Gods were best pleased with their simplicity and severity of life, and therein far different from the Grecian humour. Suidas in Thessalicis (cited likewise by Strabo) saith that the Temple of Dodona was removed from Scotusa in Pelasgia in Thessaly, which is confirmed by Herodotus in Euterpe, where he largely speaks of the Temple and Oracle at Dodona. These Pelasgi confined not themselves to Greece neither, but were dispersed into the neighbour Islands, as Chios, Creet, Lesbos, Lemnos, Imbro, Samos, as will appear afterwards; and at last came into Italy, as is well known, and are thought to be the same with Tyrrhenians, and by some conceived to be the first founders of Rome. We see what a large spread the Pelasgi had over Greece, which was divided after the Hellens began to appear, into 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Hero∣dotus

witnesseth; and so these two appear to be a very different people from one another, and not the same under different names as is commonly thought.

Which sufficiently appears from their language, which was * 1.281 quite different from one another. So Herodotus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they used a barbarous language: i. e. a language not understood by the Hellens; who at first, had their chief residence in Thessaly, from whence by degrees they came forwards into Greece, as Thucydides shews. For although the name of Hellens at last spread its self over all the people of Greece, yet it was at first peculiar to that part of Thessaly called Pthiotis, and thence Homer calls them properly Hellens which followed Achilles from thence; and it appears by Homer that there was a City there called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which as Stephanus de Urbibus tells us was there built by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, although he will not have him to be Hellen the son of Deucalion, but the son of Pthius, wherein he is mistaken; For Thucydides plainly shews that it was from Hellen the son of Deucalion that the name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 came, and this Hellen lived in Pthiotis. But although they were first in Pthiotis, yet they dayly increasing in numbers and power, by degrees they got all Thessaly into their hands, of which one part was called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; afterwards under Dorus the son of Hellen they conquered Hestiaectis, that part of Thessaly which lyes under the mountains Ossa and Olympus; from thence they were beaten back by the Cadmeans into Pindus, where the Greeks were first called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as Herodotus tells us; from hence they went into Dryopis, and thence in∣to Pelopponesus, and there had the name Dorians; but be∣fore their coming hither, they had first secured themselves of Hellens lying between Thessaly and Pelopponesus, and there they dispossest the Pelasgi in all the Attickregion; who were now forced to submit or to fly; they who submitted, as most of them did, were incorporated into the Greeks, and became one people with them, and so by degrees lost that former language which was peculiar to themselves and wholly distinct from the Greek tongue. That the Hellens did thus gradually come into Pelopponesus, is evident from the names of people and placts common to Thessaly and Pelop∣ponesus

which came from hence, that though the Greeks left the Cities behind them, yet they carryed most of the names along with them. Thus the Achaei, Ionians, and Aeolians, and Dorians in Pelopponesus came from those of the same names in Thessaly; and so likewise the names of these follow∣ing regions and Cities were common to both, as Ellopia, Estiaea, Eretria, and Oropos, Graia, Larissa, Psophis, Iton, Occalia and very many others Salmasius seems to be of opinion, that the Pelasgi never used any language distinct * 1.282 from the Hellens; but besides that it is directly contrary to the testimony of Herodotus, the arguments he produeeth for it are very weak. The first is because the Pelasgi that went into Italy, did use the Greek tongue, from their calling Agylla Caere, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a word pronounced from one on the walls; and because the Arcades used only the Greek language in the Aeolian Dialect, which Evander carryed with him into Italy, and from which most of the old Roman language was derived. But doth not Herodotus expresly say, that after the mixture between the Greeks and Pelasgi these by degrees lost their own proper language and made use of the common Greek tongue? Yet afterwards too it is evident from Hero∣dotus in some places, as at Crotona, they did use a language different from the Greek. His other argument is, that the names of the eldest persons mentioned were originally Greek; but this is expresly denyed by Strabo who makes the con∣trary one of his strongest arguments, that the Barbarians did anciently inhabit Greece; and instanceth in Cecrops, Codrus, Aeoius, Cothus, Drymas, Crimanus. Thus we have abundantly proved against the common opinion, that Greece was not first peopled by the Hellens, or the posterity of Elisa, although these did afterwards come to the full possession of Greece.

It remains that we shew whence these Pelasgi came, and of whose posterity they were, and what the language was * 1.283 which was used by them. He that gave the name to this people according to the Grecian fables, was one Pelasgus, which none will wonder at among them, whose constant custom it was, (partly by reason of their Ignorance of the true account of their names, and partly by their pride that

they might not seem ignorant of any thing) when they meet with any names of people to find out some person near it who was the founder of them. Thus Artica from Actaeus, it being anciently called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Cranae from Cranaus, Aegialea from Aegialeus, Mauritania from Maurus, S••ythia from one S••ythes, Galataea from Galates, and thus in multitudes of other names. But from the name Pelasgi we may probably find out the true founder of the people, allow∣ing that variation which is usually caused through the Greeks melting the harsher words of the Eastern languages into a sound fit ••or their more delicate palats, as is evident in the comparing the names of the Prophets in Ebrew, with what they are in the Greek version. Thus the Pelasgi may with great probability be derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Pheleg; for which we have the concurrent testimony of two learned persons, Gro∣tius and Salmasius, who are contented to mention it, with∣out bringing much evidence of reason for it. What they * 1.284 only touch at, we shall endeavour to make out more at large; which we shall do by removing the great pre∣sumptions against it, and laying down the probabilities for it. The great presumptions lying against it are; for that the Isles of the Nations tell to the posterity of Iapheth, and that Phaleg lived with Eber in Chaldea. For the first, it must be acknowledged that the greatest part of the Countries lying upon the Ocean and Mediterrancan, were in the time when Moses wrote so inhabited; not that the habitations of the sons of Noah had their bounds and limits set them either by God or Noah, but that the posterity of Iaphet did chiefly address themselves to those parts which lay towards Europe; but yet not so, as to exclude any of the posterity of Sem, if their necessities for further room made it necessary for them to seek for habitations further abroad. For we can have no reason to think, that because the chief of Sems posterity did live together, therefore none of them went further off, which necessity would put them upon because of their great increase; for we read of Phaleg and others, that besides those in a direct line to Abraham (whose Genealogy it was Moses his great design to recount) they begat many other sons and daughters, which would make it necessary for * 1.285

them, to seek their habitations further abroad. And that Phaleg and Ragan did so, we have the express testimony of Epiphanius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.286 That from the age of Therah and then••e forward Ph••leg and Ragau di∣verted toward the Clime of Europe, to part of Scythia, and were joyned with those Nations from whi•••• the Thracians arose. Several things make this not so improbable as some have imagined it to be; for first, it is the constant acknow∣ledgement of all sober inquirers into the original of the Greeks, that Greece was first peopled from Scythia, and in∣deed almost all the N••tions in Europe have come out of that Country: besides there is evidence of it, even in the Gr••cian Fables; for Prometheus (from whom the Greeks derived themselves) is fan••yed by them to lie bound in mount Can∣casus, which must be suppos••d to be the Country from whence he came. Again it is evident already that the Hellens came not into Greece before it was peopled by the Pelasgi, and that these had different language and customs from one another; now then in all probability, although the posterity of Elisa might come first down from Scythia into those parts and seat themselves in Macedonia and Th••ssaly, where they had in probability more then room enough at first and a Country to their desire; they might be willing to permit the posterity of Phaleg to pass on fur∣ther; for in those first plantations we cannot otherwise conceive, but that the last comers must be the furthest goers; unless they had strength enough to drive the former inha∣bitants out of their seats whereof they were already possessed, as the Scythians did afterwards, and so the H••l∣lens; So then the posterity of Phaleg being forced to quit their own Country because of the multitude of inhabitants, must be supposed to take that course, where in probability they might find an empty seat fit for them to dwell in; thence they come towards Europe; for they saw how the po∣sterity of Sem did spread it self Eastward already, and Cham Southward, and coming to part of, that vast Country of Soythia, which was both already taken up and not so con∣venient

an habitation for them, they draw downwards to∣wards Thracia, and there the po••••erity of Thiras from whom the Thracians came had already possessed themselves; passing further into Thessaly, they find that already planted by some of the posterity of Elisa, but as yet but scant and thin of inhabitants; therefore they disperse themselves up and down through some part of Epirus, most part of Ellas, and some pass into Peloppon••sus, where they six themselves chiefly upon Arcadia, and thence spread up and down by degrees towards the Sea-side; for we cannot but think that the Maritime parts were the last peopled, partly for fear of another d••luge, partly for want of conveniency of Navigation most of their travels being by Land; and partly when Navigation grew more in use for fear of Pirates, who drove a great trade upon the Coasts of Greece in elder times, as is most evident from Thucydides in the beginning of his histo∣ry. Thus we have a reasonable account given of the P••lasgi their first coming into Greece, and how by degrees the Hel∣lens came to possess their Country, and what a fair pretence the Arcadians had to boast of the greatest antiquity, their Country being probably first peopled by the Pelasgi of any part of the whole Chersonese, and the seat of the leader of the whole company whom they call Pelasgus and the Scri∣ptures Phaleg.

Having thus far cleared the Antiquities of Grecce as to the first planters of it, whom we have evidenced to have been * 1.287 the Pelasgi, and these derived from Peleg, it will be no great difficulty to resolve what language they brought along with them, which must be supposed to be the same with that used in the family from whence Peleg or Phaleg came, as to the substance of it, although it might admit as great variation of Dialact from it as the Chaldee or Syriack doth. But this I will not only suppose, but offer these probabilities for the proof of it, the first is, the agreement of the ancient Greek language with the Hebrew in many of its primitive words; and here we have a most rational and probable ac∣count given of it; which is the Greeks mixing with the Pe∣lasgi, and both coming to be one people, they must needs retain many of the old words used by the Pelasgi in their

Greek language; which are evidently of an Eastern extra∣ction, the ground of which cannot with such probability be fetched from Cadmus and the Phoenicians, because it is not so easie admission of a forraign Language after the perfection of their own, unless by long tract of time, or great numbers overrunning the former people, neither of which can be so truly affirmed of Cadmus and his company; for they were soon driven out of Greece, he himself ending his dayes in Illyricum; neither was their spread so large as that of the Pelasgi, who were before possessors of the Countrey; and it is continually seen how impossible it is for any Conque∣rors, as the Greeks were, to bring their own language so in∣to a place, where some of the former people are suffered to live, and not to retain many of their old words among them, and so make the Language mixt of both, as it is in all Nati∣ons conquerd by the Romans; the Roman not being purely spoken by any, but corrupted with a mixture of the sormer Language in use among them. The second Argument is from the different pronunciation and dialects in use in the Greek Language; of which no account so likely can be gi∣ven, as the mixture with different Language. This is most evident in the Dorick Dialect; for the Dorians inhabiting probably where most of the Pelasgi had been, their pronun∣ciation and dialect comes the nearest to the Eastern of any of the Greeks: For in the Dorick dialect the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; or broad pronunciation, is most taken notice of: So he in Theo∣critus upbraids the Dorians, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they speake every thing very broad; which answers to the pro∣nunciation of the Eastern Languages; besides, the Dorick dialect delights much in adding a to the end of words, which besides that it is the custom of Eastern tongues, especi∣ally the Syriack, it doth much widen the pronunciation. The third Argument is from the remainders of the Eastern tongues in those places, especially where the Pelasgi had been. The Pelasgi are much taken notice of for their fre∣quent removes and travelling from one place to another; which I suppose was chiefly after the Hellens had conquerd the Countrey where they dwelt, then they were forced to go seek better habitations abroad; thence Strabo calls th••

Nation of the Pelasgi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: * 1.288 and elsewhere that they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they went up and down to great part of Europe; * 1.289 but we may suppose them to have made their first and chief resort to the neighbour Islands to Greece; where we shall see what evidence they left of their language there. The first Island we meet with them in, is Crecte; so Strabo speak∣ing of them, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; that a Colony of them lived in Creete, for which he vouchsa∣feth * 1.290 Homers authority:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.291 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

It is evident then that the Pelasgi were in Creete. Now most of the Cretan words are of an Eastern extraction, if we believe the learned Bochartus, who hath promised a dis∣course on that subject; besides Creete we find the P••lasgi in * 1.292 Chios, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Strabo, the inhabitants of Chios say that the Pelasgi of Thessaly were their first inhabitants; and here the forena∣med learned person hath derived the name Chios, the moun∣tain Pelinaeus, and the wine Arvisium, all from the Eastern languages. The next we find them in, is Lesbos, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.293 which from them was called Pelas∣gia, saith Strabo, whose name is likewise fetched out of the East. By Bochartus further we find them in Lemnos and * 1.294 Imbros; so Anticlides in Strabo, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; concerning whose names, see Bochar∣tus 82. I know that learned Author makes the Phoenicians the Authors of all these names, from no other ground gene∣rally, but because they are of an Eastern derivation; but according to what we have laid down, we may yield to the thing it self, and upon clearer grounds; for of some of these Islands he ingenuously confesseth he can find no evidence of the Phoenicians being in them Phoenices in his Insulis habi∣tasse nusquam legimus; but we find it very plain, that in * 1.295 those very Islands the Pel••sgi inhabited; and whether ac∣count

then be more probable, let the Reader judge. One thing more I shall insist on, which is the original of the Sa∣mothracian Mysteries: That these were as to their names from the Eastern languages, is now acknowledged by all learned men, the Cabiri being so evidently derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signisies strength and power, i. e. the Dii potes, so Cabiri is explained by Varro and Tertullian, and the par∣ticular * 1.296 names of the several Cabiri mentioned by the Scho∣liast on Apollonius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, are very handsomly explained by that learned and ex∣cellent * 1.297 Bochartus from the Eastern languages; only he will needs have them derived from the Phoenicians, whereas Herodotus expresly tells us that they were from the P••lasgi, whose words are these; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: And again, * 1.298 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. We see evidently by this, that the Samothracians derived their Mysteries from the Pelasgi; and without all question they had their names from thence, whence they derived their Mysteries: And to this purpose it is further observable, that as the old Hetrurians were certainly a Colony of the Pelasgi, upon their removal out of Greece; so Vossius observs that the old Hetruscan language (ferè •• Syris habet cuncta sacrorum nomina) hath almost all the sacred appellations * 1.299 from the Eastern Tongues. For which purpo••e it is further observable, which Grotius takes notice of, that the jus ponti∣sicum Romanorum was take••〈◊〉〈◊〉great part from the Hetrusci, & the Hetrurians had it ab H••braeis out of the Eastern parts.

By all which I cannot conceive but this opinion, not∣withstanding its novelty, is advanced to as high a degree of * 1.300 probability, as any that stands on the like foundations; and not only so, but is an excellent clue to direct us to the La∣byrinth of Antiquities, and gives us a fair account whence the Eastern Tongues came to be so much used among both the ancient Greeks and Hetrurians. One thing more this will help us to understand far better then any salvo hath been yet used for it; which is the affinity spoken of by Ari∣••s King of Lacedaemon, in his Letters to Onias, between the

Iewes and Lacedaemonians: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: which * 1.301 is explained by Iosephus thus: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: They had found in a book that the Jewes and Lacedemo∣nians were of the same stock, from their mutual relation to Abraham. Vossius thinks the Original of this was from those of the posterity of Anak, who came into Greece, and peo∣pled Sparta, and would seem to have been of the posterity * 1.302 of Abraham; or that they were partly of the posterity of Abraham by Agar or Cethura, and partly of the Canaa∣nites driven out by Ioshua: But how unlikely a thing is it (supposing Sparta peopled by the Canaanites, which yet is not evident) that they should give out themselves to be of that stock which they had been expelled their Country by? And for the true posterity of Abraham coming thither, as we have no ground for it but the bare assertion, so we have this strong evidence against it, that all that came from A∣braham were cirucumcised, as the Ishmaelites, Hagarens, &c. which we never read of among the Lacedaemonians. H. Grotius differs not much from the opinion of Vossius concer∣ning the ground of this kindred between the Iewes and Spartans: For in his notes on that place in the Maccabees, where it is spoken of, he gives this account of it. The Do∣rians, of whom the Spartans were a part, came from the Pelasgi; the language of the Pelasgi was different from that of the Greeks, as appears by Herodotus in his Clio: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Now the Pelasgi (saith he) are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dispersi, a scatterd Nation; thence he suppo∣seth these Pelasgi, or banished people, to have come from the Confines of Arabia and Syria, in which the posterity of A∣braham and Cethura had placed themselves. But 1. it is un∣certain whether the posterity of Abraham by Keturah were placed so near Canaan or no. I know Iunius endeavours to find the seat of all the sons of Cethurab in Arabia; but Mercer gives several not improbable reasons why he con∣ceives them placed not in the East of Canaan, but in the Eastern parts of the world. 2. We have no evidence at all of any remove of these sons of Abraham by Ceturah out of the

parts of Arabia, supposing them placed there; nor any reason why they should be banished thence. 3. That which was the badge of Abrahams posterity, was never that we read of in use among the Spartans, which was Circumci∣sion. Indeed in much later Ages then this we speak of, we read of a people among the Thracians who were circumci∣sed, whom the Greeks themselves judged to be Iewes. So Aristophanes brings the Odomantes in. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 * 1.303 (saith the Scholiast) i. e. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Whereby it is plain that Circumcision was in use among the Thracians; for these Odomantes were (saith the Scholiast) a people of Thrace. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It seems it was a tradition among them that they were Iewes. If so, it seems most probable that they were some of the ten Tribes, who were placed about Colchis, and the adjacent places: For Herodotus in Euterpe saith, that the Syrians that lived about the Rivers Thermodon and Parthenius, learned Circumcision from the Colchi, of whom he saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Only the Colchi, and Aegyptians, and Ae••hiopians had originally the custome of Circumcision. Or else these O••o∣mantes might be some of the dispersed Iewes in Armenia, where Strabo mentions a Region called Odomantis, and so they * 1.304 retained the name of the place from whence they came, after their removal into Thrace. But what ever these Odomantes were, they were far enough from the Spartans, who never were thus suspected of Iudaism, nor laught at for Circum∣cision. So that this opinion of Grotius on that account seems not very probable. Bochartus, who hath been so happy in many other conjectures, yet here gives out, unless it may depend upon the testimony of Claudius Iolaus in Ste∣phanus * 1.305 Bizantius, who fabulously derives the Iews from one Iudaeus Sparton, who went from Thebes along with Bacchus into the Wars; which Sparton they might confound with another Sparton the Son of Phoroneus, the Founder of Spar∣ta; which yet is rejected as a Fable by Pausanias in Laco∣ni••is. Surely the Lacedaemonians were very ambitious of kindred with the Iewes, that would claim it upon such

grounds as these, especially at such a time when the people of the Iewes were undet distress, and their kindred might be like to cost them so dear: And if they had never such a mind to have claimed kindred with the Iewes, they would certainly have done it upon a more plausible testimony then the fable of one Claudius Iolaus, that had neither sense nor r••ason in it; and yet supposing his Fable true, it had been no∣thing to the purpose, without the linking another F••ble to it, which was so gross, that even the Greeks themselves were ashamed of it, who were always the most daring forgers of Fables in the world. But let us see further what the Divine (as some have loved to call him) Ios. Scaliger saith to it: All * 1.306 that he saith, is only a wonder or two at it: Quid mag is mirum quàm Iacedaemonios ab Abraham prognatos ••sse, &c. and a refutation of an absurd opinion, that Oebalus the Father of Tyndareus, and Grandfather of Castor, Pollux, and Helen••, was the same with Ebal, mentiond Gen. 10. 28. which there can be no reason for, since Ebal was the Son of Ioctan, and so of another race from Abraham; and Ioctans Sons were placed Eastward, but chiefly Oebalus was within an hundred years before the destruction of Troy; but Phaleg, Un∣kle to Ebal, died 664 years before Oebalus in A. M. 1993. Thus far then we cannot find any plausible account of this claim of kindred; but though it be an endless task to make good all the claims of kindred in the world, especially to persons of power and authority, yet there being no visible interest or design which the Spartans could have in such a claim, especially at that time with a Nation generally ha∣ted and maligned by Heathen Idolaters, we cannot suppose but there must be some at least plausible ground for such a perswasion among them. What if we should conjecture that the Spartans might find in the Greck version of the Pentateuch, which was much spread abroad at that time among the Sons of Ishma••l, one whose name makes the nearest approach to their Cadmus, from whom they suppose themselves derived: for the youngest of Ishma••l sons was called K••demah, Gen. 25. 15 which the Syriack renders Kedem, the very name of Cadmus in the Eastern Tongues. But this being a light conjecture, I pass it by, and return

to the subject of our discourse, which gives a plausible ac∣count of the ground of this kindred. We have already shewed that the Pelasgi were the ••irst who peopled Greece (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is Strabo's expression of that Nation, that it spread over all Greece) and withall it appears that the chief Seat of the Pelasgi was in Arcadia, to which next adjoyns Laconica; and therefore in all pro∣bability was peopled by them; and besides, the Dorians sprang from the Pelasgi, and the Spartans were a part of the Dorians, as appears already out of Grotius; so that what kindred the Pelasgi had, was derived down to the Spar∣tans; and we have manifested that these Pelasgi were from Phaleg, and the Scripture tells us that Phaleg was the son of * 1.307 Eber, from whom Abraham came in a direct and lineal suc∣cession. And thus the Iewes coming from Abraham, and the Spartans by the Pelasgi from Phaleg, they both came out of the same stock: For so I••sephus expresseth it, not that the Lacedaemonians came from Abraham, but that the Iewes and they were both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, out of the same stock; and both had relation to Abraham; the Iewes as coming in a direct line, the Spartans as deriving from Phal••g, from whom Abraham came. And thus much may now〈◊〉〈◊〉cle••r the first Plantation of Greece, and to shew how conso∣nant it is to sacred Scripture; which I have taken the more pains in, because of the serviceableness of this discourse to that end, and to shew what use may be made of this kind of Learning, for vindicating the honour of the sacred Scri∣ptures.

The only thing remaining as to the Origine of Nations, is the peopling of that vast Continent of America, which I cannot think we have yet sufficient in••ormation, either con∣cerning the passages thither, especially East and North, or concerning any records the Indians have among themselves absolutely to determine any thing in it. It seems most pro∣bable that the several parts of it were peopled at several times, and from several parts, especially North and East; but to go about absolutely to determine from what Nation, in what Age, by what means they were first peopled, were a piece of as great confidence as ignorance, till we have

more certain discoveries of it. I choose therefore rather to refer the Reader to the bandyings of this Controversie in the * 1.308 many Writers about it, then to undertake any thing as to the decision of it. Only in the general it appears from the remaining tradition of the Flood, and many Rites and Cu∣stomes used among them, that they had the same original with us, and that there can be no argument brought against it from themselves, since some Authors tell us, that the eldest Accounts and Memoires they have, do not exceed 800. years backward; and therefore their Testimony can be of no va∣lidity in a matter of so great Antiquity, as the Origine of N••tions is.

CHAP. V. Of the Origine of the Heathen Mythology.

That there were some remainders of the ancient history of the world preserved in the several Nations after the dispersion. How it came to be corrupted: by decay of knowledge, in∣crease of Idolatry, confusion of languages. An enquiry into the cause of that. Difficulties against the common opinion that languages were confounded at Babel. Those difficul∣ties cleared. Of the fabulousness of Poets. The particular wayes whereby the Heathen Mythology arose. Attributing the general history of the world to their own Nation. The corruption of Hebraisms. Alteration of names. Ambi∣guity of sense in the Oriental languages. Attributing the actions of many to one person, as in Jupiter, Bacchus, &c. The remainders of Scripture history among the Heathens. The names of God, Chaos, formation of man among the Phaenicians. Of Adam among the Germans; Aegyptians, Cilicians. Adam under Saturn. Cain among the Phae∣nicians. Tubalcain and Jubal under Vulcan and Apollo. Naamah under Minerva. Noah under Saturn, Janus, Pro∣metheus and Bacchus. Noahs three sons under Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. Canaan under Mercury, Nimrod under Bacchus, Magog under Prometheus. Of Abraham and Isaac among the Phaenicians. Jacobs service under Apollo's. The 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a from Bethel. Joseph under Apis▪ Moses under Bacchus. Joshua under Hercules. Balaam under the ol•• Siolenus.

THE main particulars contained in the Scriptures con∣cerning the history of Ancient Times being thus far * 1.309 cleared, there remains only that evidence which there is of the truth of the historical part of those eldest times, in those footsteps of it which are contained in the Heathen Mytholo∣gy. For we cannot conceive, that since we have manifested that all mankind did come from the posterity of Noah, that all those passages which concerned the history of the world▪

should be presently obliterated and extinguished among them, but some kind of tradition would be still preserved, although by degrees it would be so much altered for want of certain records to preserve it in, that it would be a hard matter to discover its original without an exact comparing it with the true history its self from whence it was first taken. For it fared with this Tradition of the first ages of the world, as with a person who hath a long time travelled in forraign parts, who by the variety of Climes and Countries may be so far altered from what he was, that his own relations may not know him upon his return, but only by some certain marks which he hath in his body, by which they are assured, that however his complexion and visage may be altered, yet the person is the same still. Thus it was in this original tra∣dition of the world through its continual passing from one age to another, and the various humours, tempers, and designs of men, it received strange disguises and alterations as to its outward favour and complextion; but yet there are some such certain marks remaining on it, by which we find out its true original. Two things then will be the main subject of our enquiry here. 1. By what means the original tradition came to be altered and corrupted. 2. By what marks we may discern its true original, or what evidences we have of the remainders of Scripture history in the Heathen Mythology.

1. Concerning the means whereby the Tradition by degrees came to be corrupted. There may be some more * 1.310 general, and others more particular. The general causes of it were.

1. The gradual decay of knowledge and increase of Barba∣rism in the world; occasioned by the want of certain records to preserve the ancient history of the world in. Which we at large discoursed of in our entrance on this subject. Now * 1.311 in the decay of knowledge, there must needs follow a sudden and strange alteration of the memory of former times, which hath then nothing to preserve it, but the most uncertain re∣port of fame, which alters and disguiseth things according to the humours, and inclinations, and judgements of those whose hands it passeth through.

2. The gradual increase of Idolatry in the world: which began soon after the dispersion of Nations, and in whose age, we cannot at so great a distance and in so great obscuri∣ty precisely determine; but assoon as Idolatry came in, all the ancient tradition was made subservient in order to that end; and those persons whose memories were preserved in several Nations, by degrees came to be worshipped under diversities of names; and such things were annexed to the former traditions as would tend most to advance the greatest superstition in the world.

3. The Confusion of Languages at Babel, was one great reason of corrupting the ancient tradition of the world. For in so great variety (as suddenly happened) of languages in the world, it cannot be conceived but such things which might be preserved in some uniform manner, had all Nati∣ons used the same language, would through the diversity of Idiomes and properties of several tongues be strangely altered and disguised, as will appear afterwards. This alteratisn of languages in the world upon the confusion of tongues at Babel, brought as great a confusion into the original tradi∣tion, as it did among those who were the designers of that work.

And because this subject of the Original and cause of this diversity of languages among men, doth both tend to ex∣plain * 1.312 the present subject, and to clear the truth of Scripture history, I shall a little further enquire into it. Chiefly on this account, because it is pretended that such a confusion is needless which is delivered in Scripture, for the producing such diversities of languages, which would arise through meer length of time, & the varieties of Climes and customs in the world. But if we only speak concerning the sense of Mo∣ses about it, the enquiry is of greater difficulty then at first view it seems to be. For it is pretended that Moses nowhere speaks of a diversity of languages, as we understand it, but * 1.313 only of a confusion of their speech who were at Babel, which might well be although they all used the same language; that is, there might be a confusion raised in their minds, that they could not understand one another; their notions of things being disturbed, so that though they heard one word,

they had different apprehensions of it: some thinking it sig∣nified one thing and some another: as Iulius S••aliger tells us that the Iews he had conversed with, did not understand * 1.314 by it a multiplication of tongues; but only by that confusion their former notions of things by the same words were al∣tered. As if one called for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a stone, one by that word understands lime, another water, another sand, &c. this must needs produce a strange confusion among them, and enough to make them desist from their work. But supposing no such division of languages there, yet after their dispersion, which might be caused by the former confusion, by the different Laws, rites, and customs, commerce, and trading, and tract of time, there would have risen a division of their several tongues. But if there were such a division of tongues miraculously caused there (that as it is commonly said, all those who were of the same language, went together in their several companies) whence comes it to pass, that in their dispersisn we read of several families dispersed, which used the same language after their dispersion? as all the sons of Canaan mentioned, Gen. 10. 15, 16, 17, 18. used the Ca∣naanitish tongue: in Greece, Iavan and Elisa had the same language. In Aegypt Misraim and Pathrusim; in Arabia the sons of Ioctan and Chus; in Chaldaea Aram and Uz the inhabitants of Syria, Mash of Mesopotamia, Nimrod of Babylon, Assur of Assyria: whence comes it to pass if their several tongues were the cause of their dispersion, that these several heads of families should use the same tongue? An∣other reason against the common opinion, is this, wh••ch seems to have a great deal of force in it. If tongues were divided at Babel, as it is imagined; whence was it, that the nearer any Nation lay to those who had the primitive lan∣guage the Ebrew, they did participate more of that tongue then those who were more remote, as is plain in the Chal∣deans, Canaanites, Greeks, and others? whereas if their lan∣guages were divided at Babel, they would have retained their own language as well as others. This very argument pre∣vailed so far with the learned Is. Casaubon, as appears by his adversaria on this subject (published by the learned Dr. * 1.315 his son) as to make him leave the common opinion, and to

conclude the several tongues to be only some variations from the Ebrew, but yet so as many new words were invented too. Hence he observes that the Asiatick Greeks came nearer to the Ebrew then the European. And if this opinion hold true, it is the best foundation for deriving other languages from * 1.316 the Ebrew: a thing attempted by the same learned person, as you may see in the book forecited, and endeavoured by Guichardus, Avenarius and others. Thus we see there is no agreement in mens minds concerning the division of tongues at Babel.

But having set down this opinion with its reasons, I shall * 1.317 not so leave the received opinion, but shall first see what may be said for that, and leave the judgement concerning the probability of either to the understanding reader. And it seems to be grounded on these reasons. 1. That had it been left to mens own choice, there cannot be a sufficient reason assigned of the diversity of languages in the world. For there being one language originally in the world, whereby men did represent their conceptions to one another; we can∣not imagine that men should of themselves introduce so great an alteration, as whereby to take off that necessary society and converse with each other, which even nature it self did put men upon. Hence Calvin and others conclude * 1.318 that prodigii lo••o habenda est linguarum diversitas; because there having been that freedom of converse among men, it is not to be supposed they should of themselves cut it off to their mutual disadvantage. But to this it is said, that the long tract of time and diversity of customs might alter the language. I grant it much, but not wholly; and they would only therein differ in their languages, wherein their customs differed; so that there would remain still such an agreement as whereby they might understand each other; which it will be hard to find in many of the eldest languages. As for the length of time, though that doth alter much in reference to words and phrases, in which that of Horace holds true, Multa renascentur quae jam cecidere, &c. Yet it will be yet more difficult to find where meer length of time hath brought a whole language out of use, and another in the room of it. But that which I think deserves well to be con∣fidered

is this, that the greatest alteration of languages in the world hath risen from Colonyes of Nations that used another language; and so by the mixture of both together the language might be much altered; as the Hebrew by the Chaldees in Babylon; the Spanish, Italian and others by t••e * 1.319 Latin, as Breerwood shews; our own by the Normans and others. So that were there not a diversity of languages supposed, this enterfereing of people would bring no con∣siderable alteration along with it, no more then a Colony from New England would alter our language here. And as for another cause assigned of the change of languages, the difference of climates, which Bodin gives as the reason why the Northern people use consonants and aspirates so much, * 1.320 especially the Sax••ns, and those that live by the Baltick sea who pronounce thus, Per theum ferum pibimus ponum finum. And so R. D. Kimchi observes of the Ephraimites, Judg. 12. 6. that it was the air was the cause of their lisping, and calling it Sibboleth, as he there observes of the men of Sar∣phath, * 1.321 that is the French, that they could not pronounce Schin, but pronounced like Thau Raphe. But by these examples we see that this would cause only an alteration as to some letters and syllables, and rather as to the pronunciation then any variety of the language. So that we see that set∣ing aside the confusion of languages at Babel, there can be no reason sufficient assigned for the variety of languages in the world. 2. Though it be granted, that a confusion in their minds without distinct languages were enough to make them desist from their work, yet the context in that place, Gen. 11. doth infer a diversity of tongues, as will appear from the ante••dents and consequents; as from the first verse, where it is not conceivable why it should be there taken notice of as such a remarkable circumstance, that then they had but one language before they set upon this work, if there was not a diversity of tongues caused by the work they went about; but especially ver. 6. where God takes such notice of this very thing, that they had but one language, wherein they were so confident to carry on their work: therefore, ver. 7. when he would destroy their work by confounding their language, it must be by multiplying that language into

many more; for it must be taken in opposition to what is said in the other verse. And what is there added, their not un∣derstanding one anothers speech, seems to refer not to the in∣ward conceptions, as though they did not understand one anothers minds, but to the outward expressions, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 doth apparently relate to them further in ver. 8. this is set down as the cause of their dispersion, which had the tongue been the same afterwards as it was before, could have been no reason for it. Again some argue from the name Babel given to the place from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifies to confound and mingle things of several kinds together. So used Iudg. 19. 21. Esay 30 24. Iob 6. 5. &c. thence the name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the middle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 left out, as in Golgotha for Golgoltha, Kikal∣tha for Kilkaltha and others of a like nature. Besides, there seems to be somewhat in what is said, that the families were divided according to their tongues, Gen. 10. 5, 20, 31. which doth at least imply a diversity of tongues among them, the cause of which must be assigned by them who will not allow of the confusion and division of languages at Babel. Further, this seems most agreeable to Gods ••nd in making of them thus leave off their work, that there might be not only a present judgement upon them, but that which might remain to post••rity as a note of the folly of their Ancestors. Those who recede from the common opinion lest they should give advantage to Infidels by attributing that to a miracle, which might be done without, seem to be more wary then wise in it. For besides that it is certain that miracles may be in those things which might be effected otherwise by natural causes; when they are produced without the help of those causes, and in a space of time impossible to nature, and that it hath not been as yet proved how such diversity of tongues as is in the world would have been effected without such a miracle; it must be granted by them that there was a mi∣racle in it; and what greater difficulty there should be in the variety of languages, then in the signification of the same words, I understand not. But I see no necessity of asserting that every one of the families had a distinct language, and the common opinion of 70. or 72. as the Gr. families and as many languages, is now taken for a groundless fancy by

learned men; as is easily proved from the dividing Father and Children, whose families could not certainly be without * 1.322 them; and some supposed to be unborn then as Ioctans 13. Children; especially if we say as many do, that the Confusion was at the birth of Phaleg, and Ioctan was his younger brother, as the Iews generally do. To the last objection it may be replyed, that the agreement of languages in some radical words doth not infer the deriva∣tion of the one from the other, as is plain in the Persian and German in which learned men have observed so many words alike. And so by Busbequius of the inhabitants about * 1.323 Taunche Cheelsonese; and so in most of our modern tongues there may be some words alike without any such dependence or derivation. Again, though it be granted that the lan∣guages of them who were at Babel were confounded, yet it is not necessary we should say that all Noahs posterity were there. It is thought by some that they were chiefly Cham * 1.324 and his company; if so, then Sem and his posterity might re∣tain the language they had before, only with some variations. But this is very uncertain, unless we take it for Heber and Peleg, from whose vicinity other bordering Nations might make use of many of their primitive words; and for the Greeks, it will be granted that many of their words, especially the old Baeotick had affinity with the Hebrew; but it was from the Pelasgi at first and Cadmus the Phaenician after∣wards; the old Canaanitish language, being if not the pure Hebrew, yet a dialect of that tongue, as is proved by many learned men. But however these things be, it is not necessa∣ry to say that all Mother tongues so called, were then ex∣istent at that confusion; but the present curse did divide their languages who were there, and that all division of languages since, is to be looked upon as the effect of that curse.

It being thus manifested what a strange confusion of lan∣guages was caused in the world, we may thereby easily un∣derstand how the ancient tradition came to be corrupted and altered in the world.

Another reason of the alteration of the ancient tradition, * 1.325 was, the fabulousness of the Poets; for these made it their design to disguise all their ancient stories under Fables, in

which they were so lost, that they could never recover them afterwards. For the elder Poets of Greece being men of greater learning then generally the people were of, and be∣ing conversant in Aegypt and other parts, did bring in new reports of the ancient times which they received from the Nations they went to; and by mixing their own traditi∣ons and others together, and by suiting what was remaining of the ancient tradition to these, they must needs make a strange confusion of things together, and leave them much more obscure and fabulous then they found them. And here∣in all their cunning and subtilty lay in putting a new face on whatever they borrowed from other Nations, and making them appear among themselves in a Greek habit, that the former owners of those traditions could scarce challenge them as theirs under so strange a Metamorphosis. For those things which were most plain and historical in the Foun∣tains whence they derived them, they did so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 as Cle∣mens Alexandrinus speaks (or as Origen, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) * 1.326 wrap them up under so great Mythology that the Original Truths can hardly be discerned, because of that multitude of prodigious fables, with which they have inlaid them. But as great as their artifice was in the doing this, we may yet discern apparently many of those particular courses which were taken by them to disguise and alter the primitive tradition.

1. Attributing what was done by the great Ancestors of mankind to some persons of their own Nations. Thus the Thessalians make Deucalion to be the person who escaped the flood, and from whom the world was peopled after it. And whoever compares the relation of the flood of Deucalion in Apollodorus with that in the Scripture, might easily ren∣der Apollodorus his Greek in the language of the Scriptures, only changing Greece into the whole earth, and Deucalion * 1.327 into Noah, Parnassus into Ararat, and Iupiter into Iehova. On the same account the Athenians attribute the flood to Ogyges, not that the flood of Ogyges and Deucalion were particular and distinct deluges, which many have taken a great deal of needless pains to place in their several ages: But as Deucalion was of the eldest memory in Thessaly, so

was Ogyges at Athens, and so the flood as being a matter of remotest antiquity, was on the same account in both places attributed to both these. Because as mankind was sup∣posed to begin again after the flood, so they had among them no memory extant of any elder then these two, from whom on that account they supposed mankind derived. And on the same reason it may be supposed that the Assyrians at∣tribute the ••lood to Xisuthrus, whom they supposed to be a King of Assyria; but the circumstances of the story as deli∣vered by Alexander, Polyhistor, and Abydenus, are such as * 1.328 make it clear to be only a remainder of the universal flood which happened in the time of Noah. So the Thessalians make Prometheus to be the Protoplast; the Pelopponesians Phoroneus, as Clemens Alexandrinus tells us, whom Pho∣ronides the Poet calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Father of man∣kind. * 1.329 This may be now the first way of corrupting the an∣cient tradition, by supposing all that was conveyed by it to have been acted among themselves. Which may be imputed partly to their ignorance of the state of their ancient times, and partly to their pride, lest they should seem to come be∣hind others in matters of Antiquity.

2. Another fountain of Heathen Mythology, was, the taking the Idiome of the Oriental languages in a proper sense. For whether we suppose the ancient traditions were conveyed to them in the ancient Hebrew by the Pelasgi, or were delivered to them by the Phaenicians, or were fetched out of the Scriptures themselves (as some suppose, though improbably of Homer and some ancient Poets) yet all these several wayes agreeing in this, that the traditions were Ori∣ental, we thereby understand how much of their Mythology came by taking the Hebrew in a proper and literal sense without attending to the Idiome of the tongue. From hence Bochartus hath ingeniously fetched many Heathen Fables. Thus when Noah is said to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Gen. 9. 20. which in the Idiome of the Hebrew only signifies a husbandman, they took it in the proper sense for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and thence Saturne who was the same with Noah (as will ap∣pear afterwards) is made by Mythologists the husband of Rhea which was the same with the Earth. So the Gyants

making war against Heaven, was only a Poetital adumbra∣tion of the design at the building of Babel, whose top in the Scripture is said to reach 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which in the Hebrew signi∣fies * 1.330 only a great height; but to aggrandize the Story, was taken in the literal interpretation, that they attempted Heaven. So when they are said to fight against the Gods, Bochartus thinks it might be taken from that phrase of Nimrod, that he was a mighty hunter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 before the Lord we ren∣der it, but it sometimes signifies against the Lord. So what Abyd••nus saith of the Gyants, that they were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.331 those that came out of the earth, is supposed to be ta∣ken from that phrase Gen. 10. 11. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 è terra ipsa exiit. But far more likely and probable is that which learned men are generally agreed in concerning Bacchus his being born of Iupiters thigh, which is only an expression of that Hebraism 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 wherein coming out of the thigh * 1.332 i•• a phrase for ordinary procreation.

3. A third way observable, is, the alteration of the names in the ancient tradition, and putting names of like importance * 1.333 to them in their own language. Thus Iupiter, who was the same with Cham, was calld 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 fervere, incalescere. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Herodotus, him whom the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Aegyptians call Cham. So Iapheth, whose memory was preserved under Neptune, to whose portion the Islands in the Sea fell, was calld by the Greeks 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which comes (saith Bochartus) from the Punick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifies * 1.334 large and broad, which is the very importance of the He∣brew 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 thence in allusion to the name, it is said, Gen. 9. 27. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 God shall enlarge Iaphet. Thence the Epithetes of Neptune are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, all equally alluding to the name Iaphet. So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the Greek is of the same importance with the Heb. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Daemen, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to destroy. Thence we read, Deut. 32. 17. they sacrificed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to Devils. Canaan in the Hebrew signi∣fies a Merchant; thence Mercury, under whom the memory of Canaan the son of Cham was preserved, is derived by many from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to sell. Ceres, which was the Inventress of Agriculture, from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which imports

bread-corn. These and many others are produced by Vossius, Heinsius, Bochartus, and other learned men, which I insist not on, because my design is only digitos ad fontes intendere, and to make these handsome and probable conjectures, argumentative to our purpose, and to bind up those loose and scattering observations into some order and method, in which they have not yet appeared, nor been im∣proved to that end which I make use of them for.

4. When the Oriental phrases were ambiguous and equi∣vocal, they omitted that sense which was plain and obvious, and took that which was more strange and fabulous. From hence the learned Bochartus hath fetchd the Fable of the golden Fleece, which was nothing else but the robbing the Treasury of the King of Colchis; but it was disguised un∣der the name of the golden Fleece, because the Syriack word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both a Fleece and a Treasury. So the Bulls and Dragons which kept it, were nothing but the walls and brass gates; for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifies both a Bull and a Wall, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Brass and a Dragon. And so the Fable of the Brass-Bull in the mountain Atabyrius which foretold calamities, arose from the aequivocation of the Phoenician or Hebrew words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifie either Doctor augur, or bos ex are, a foreteller of events, or a brazen-Bull. From the like ambiguity of the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 arose the Fable of Iupiters stealing Europa in the form of a Bull, because the word ei∣ther signifies a Ship, in which he c••nveyed her away, or a Bull; or it may be the Ship had 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 bovis, as the ship St. Paul sailed in had Castor and Pollux, it being usual to call their Ships by the names of the signs they carried. From the like aequivocation in the Phoenician language doth Bo∣chartus fetch many other Heathen Fables, in his excellent piece de Phoenicum Coloniis, as particularly that of Arethu∣sa coming from Alpheus, which was from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Ship, be∣cause * 1.335 it was not far from an excellent Haven. And so he makes the Chimaera to be more then a meer ens rationis; for he takes the Chimaera which Bellerophon conquerd, to be on∣ly the people of Solymi, under their three Generals, Aryus, Trosibis, and Arsalus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that signifies a Lion. Trosibis was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the head of a serpent: Arsalus was 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 * 1.336

a young kid, and so the Chimaera consisted of the form of a Lion, a Goat, and a Serpent. Thus we see how easie a matter it was to advance the Heathen Mythology from the aequivo∣cation of the Oriental Languages, in which their Traditions were conveyed to them.

But yet a more prolifick principle of Mythology was by attributing the actions of several persons to one who was the * 1.337 first or the chief of them. Thus it was in their stories of Jupiter, Neptune, Mars, Mercury, Minerva, Iuno, Bac∣chus, and Hercules, which were a collection of the actions done by a multitude of persons, which are all attributed to one person. So Vossius tells us before the time of the Tro∣jan Wars, most of their Kings, who were renowned and * 1.338 powerful, were calld Ioves. Now when the actions of all these are attributed to one Iupiter of Cre••te, they must needs swell his story up with abundance of Fables. Vossius hath taken a great deal of pains to digest in an historical manner the stories of the several Iupiters, whereof he reckons two Argives, a third the Father of Hercules, a fourth a King of Phrygia, and two more of Cr••ete; to one of which, without any distinction, the actions of all the rest were ascribed, and who was worshipped under the name of Iupiter. And so be∣sides the ancient Neptune, who was the same with Iaphet, they sometimes understood any Insular Prince, or one that had great power at Sea; but besides these, there were two fa∣mous Neptunes among the Greeks, the one of Athens, the other the builder of the walls of Troy: Now the stories of all these being mixed together, must needs make a strange con∣fusion. So for Mars, besides that ancient one they had by the Oriental tradition, they had a Spartan, Thracian, and Arcadian Mars. What abundance of Mercuries are we told of by Tully? and of no less then five Minerva's. Eve∣ry * 1.339 angry, scornful jealous Queen would fill up the Fables of Iuno, who was equally claimed by the Argives and Samians. What contests were there between the Greeks and Aegypti∣ans concerning the Country of Bacchus, or Liber Pater, whose story was made up of many patches of the Oriental story, as will appear afterwards. ••he same may be said of Hercules. Now what a strange way was this to increase the

number of Fables? when they had one whose memory was anciently preserved among them, they attributed the acti∣ons of all such to him, who came near him in that which his memory was most remarkable for: And in those things which they did retain of the Eastern tradition, it was an usual thing to confound persons, places, and actions toge∣ther. So the story of Enoch and Methuselah is joyned to∣gether by Stephanus de Urbibus, under the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.340 who is said there to live above 300 years (which agrees with Enoch as the name doth) and that at his death the world should be destroyed by a Flood.; which agrees with Methuselah. So Abraham by Orpheus is calld 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which belongs to Isaac his Son; so the actions of Nimrod, Ninus, and Cham, are confounded together in their My∣thology. By these several wayes now we understand how the original tradition was by degrees corrupted and alterd in the Heathen Mythology.

I come now to the footsteps of Scripture-history which not withstanding these corruptions, may be discerned in the * 1.341 Heathen Mythology; which I shall methodically enquire af∣ter according to the series of Scripture-history. That the names given to God in Scripture were preserved among the Phoenicians, appears sufficiently by the remainders of the Phoenician Theology, translated by Philo Byblius out of San∣choniathon; wherein we read of the God 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which hath * 1.342 the same letters with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 besides which there we meet with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the same with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the most High, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the strong God; Beelsamen, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the God of Heaven, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the very name of God used in the beginning of Genesis so often. Besides, in those frag∣ments we have express mention of the Chaos, and the even∣ing following it, or the darkness on the face of the Deep; the Creation of Angels under the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 those beings which contemplate the Heavens; and the Creation of mankind 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 saith Bochartus, the voice of the mouth of God, which is by Gods word and in∣spiration, when it is expressed that God said, Let us make man, and that he breathed into him the breath of life. Af∣ter we read of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which properly agree

to Adam, who was made out of the Earth. Vossius con∣ceives that the memory of Adam was preserved among the * 1.343 old Germans, of whom Tacitus speaks, Celebrant antiquis carminibus Tuistonem Deum terra editum, & filium Man∣num, originem gentis, conditores{que}. Either by Tuisto Adam is understood, who was formed of the Earth, and by Man∣nus, Noah; or by Tuisto God may be understood, and by Mannus, Adam; to which conjecture may be added fur∣ther, that the same Author reports that some of the Ger∣mans sacrificed to Isis, which Vossius likewise conceives to be a remainder of the Hebrew Ischa. And so among the Aegy∣ptians it is with like probability conceived that Adam and Ischa were preserved under Osiris and Isis, as they were hi∣storically taken. In Cilicia, the City Adana is thought to have some remainder of the name of Adam; for the Greeks had no termination in M. therefore for Adam they pro∣nounced it Adan, and that from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and so the City Adana: Now that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 by Stephanus de Urbibus, is said to be the Son of Heaven and Earth. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. * 1.344 This Adanus, he tells us, was otherwise calld 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or Saturn, under whom the Greeks preserved the memory of Adam; for Diodorus, Thallus, Cassius Severus, and Cornelius Nepos, do all (as Tertullian saith) confess * 1.345 Saturn to have been a man; and according to their Fables, he must have been the first of men. Saturn was the Son of Heaven and Earth, and so was Adam; he taught men Husbandry, and was not Adam the first that tilled the ground? Besides, that power which Saturn had, and was deposed from, doth fitly set out the Dominion man had in the Golden Age of Innocency which he lost by his own folly. And Adams hiding himself from the presence of the Lord, gave occasion to the name of Saturn, from Satar to hide. We find something of Cain preserved in the Phoenician an∣tiquities, under the name of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first Countryman or Husbandman, who with his brother 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 built houses, and the first foundation of a City is attributed to Cain: And on that account Vossius conjectures that the memory of Cains wife was preserved under Vesta, both be∣cause * 1.346 she was the daughter of Saturn, i. e. of Adam, and

that she is said 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to find out first the way of building houses. That Tubal-Cain gave first occa∣sion to the name and worship of Vulcan, hath been very probably conceived, both from the very great affinity of the names, and that Tubal-cain is expresly mentiond to be an * 1.347 Instructer of every Artisicer in brass and iron; and as near relation as Apollo had to Vulcan. Iabal had to Tubal-Cain, who was the Inventer of Musick, or the Father of all such as handle the Harp and Organ, which the Greeks attribute to * 1.348 Apollo. And if that be true which Genebrard and others ascribed to Naamah, the sister of Iubal and Tubal-Cain, viz. that she was the Inventer of spinning and weaving, then may she come in for Minerva. Thus we see there were some, though but obscure footsteps preserved, even of that part of Scripture-history which preceded the Flood.

The memory of the Deluge it self we have already found * 1.349 to be preserved in the Heathen Mythology; we come there∣fore to Noah and his posterity. Many parcels of Noahs memory were preserved in the scatterd fragments of many Fables, under Saturn, Ianus, Prometheus, and Bacchus. Bo∣chartus insists on no fewer then 14 Parallels between Noah * 1.350 and the Heathen Saturn, which he saith are so plain, that there is no doubt but under Saturn Noah was understood in the Heathen Mythology. Saturn was said to be the com∣mon Parent of Mankind, so was Noah; Saturn was a just King, Noah not only righteous himself, but a Preacher of righteousness: The golden Age of Saturn was between Noah and the dispersion of Nations. In Noahs time all mankind had but one Language, which the Heathens extend under Saturn, both to men and beasts: The plantation of Vines attributed to Saturn by the Heathens, as to Noah by the Scriptures: The Law of Saturn mentiond by the Poets, that none should see the nakedness of the Gods without punishment; seems to respect the fact and curse of Cham, in reference to Noah. Saturn, and Rhea, and those with them are said to be born of Thetis, or the Oce••n, which plainly alludes to Noah and his company's escaping the Flood; thence a Ship was the symbol of Saturn, and that Saturn devoured all

his children seems to be nothing else but the destruction of the old world by Noahs flood. And not only under Saturn, but under Prometheus too was Noahs memory preserved. Diodo∣rus * 1.351 speaks of the great flood under Prometheus; and Prome∣theus implyes one that hath forecast and wisdom, such as Noah had, wher••by he foretold the flood and was saved in it, when others were Epimetheus's that had not wit to prevent their own destruction.

And no wonder if Promethus were Noah, that the forming mankind was attributed to him, when the world was peopled from him. Herodotus his saying that Asia was Prometheus his wife, might relate to the Country Noah lived in and our propagation from thence. Another part of Noahs memory was preserved under Ianus; the name of Ianus is most probably derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 because of Noahs planting a Vine, and Ianus was called Consivius, saith Macrobius à conserendo, boc est à propagine generis humani quae Iano autore conseritur; * 1.352 now to whom can this be so properly applyed as to Noah from whom mankind was propagated? And Ianus his be∣ing bifrons or looking 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 forward and backward, is not so fit an embleme of any thing as of Noahs seeing those two ages before and after the flood. And it is fur∣ther observable which Plutarch speaks of in his Roman questions, that the ancient coines had on one side the image of Ianus with his two faces, on the other 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the fore or hinder part of a ship, by which the memory of the Ark of Noah seems to have been preserved. Thus we see what An••logy there is in the story of Ianus with that of Noah, not that •• give credit to those fooleries which tell us of Noahs coming from Palestine with his son Iaphet into Italy and planting Colonies there, for which we are beholding to the spurious Ethruscan Antiquities; but all that I assert, is, that the story of Noah might be preserved in the eldest Colonyes, though disguised under other names as here in the case of Ianus. And on the same account that the name of Ianus is attributed to Noah, some likewise be∣lieve him to have been the most ancient Bacchus who was according to Diodorus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the first planter of * 1.353 Vines and instructer of men in making Wines; and besides

Bacchus his being twice born, seems only an adumbration of Noahs preservation after the flood, which might be account∣ed a second nativity when the rest of the world was de∣stroyed; and withall Philostratus in the life of Apollonius relates that the ancient Indian Bacchus came thither out of * 1.354 Assyria, which yet more fully agrees with Noah. So that from these scattered members of Hippolytus and these bro∣ken fragments of traditions, we may gather almost an entire history of all the passages concerning Noah.

As the story of Saturn and Noah do much agree, so the three sons of Noah and those of Saturn, Iupiter, Neptune, * 1.355 and Pluto have their peculiar resemblances to each other. Of which Vossius and Bochartus have largely spoken, and we have touched on already. Besides which this latter author * 1.356 hath carried the parallel lower, and finds Canaan the son of Cham the same with Mercury the son of Iupiter; as it was the curse of Canaan to be a servant of servants, so Mercury is alwayes described under servile employments; his wings seem to be the ships of the Phaenicians who were derived from Canaan, and his being the God of trade noting the great merchandize of the Phaenicians, and Mercuryes theevery noting the Pyracies, or at lest the subtilty and craft of the Phaenicians; he was the Father of eloquence and Astronomy, as letters and Astronomy came from the Phaenicians into Greece. The same author parallels Nimrod and Bacchus, and Magog and Prometheus together. The name of Bac∣chus is but a light variation of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Bar-chus, as Nimrod was the son of Chus, and Bacchus is called Nebrodes by the Greeks, which is the very name of Nimrod among them, and Bacchus is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which excellently interprets Nim∣rods being a mighty hunter, Bacchus his expeditions into India were the attempts of Nimrod and the Assyrian Em∣perors. On which account Vossius makes Nimrod or Belus the most ancient Mars; for Hestiaeus Milesius speaks of * 1.357 Enyalius which is Mars, his being in Sennaar of Babylonia. That the memory of Magog was preserved under Promethe∣us, these things make it probable, that Magog was the son of Iaphet, as Prometheus of Iapetus, and that the posterity of Magog was placed about Cau••asus, where Prometheus is

fained to lie: and the eating of Prometheus his heart, is only an interpretation of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which applyed to the heart signifies to wast away and be consumed. Thus far Bochartus.

The Phaenician antiquities seem to have preserved the memory of Abrahams sacrificing his son Isaac, by that place which Eusebius produceth out of Porphyries book concern∣ing the Iews; where he relates, how Saturn whom the Phae∣nicians call Israel, when he reigned in those parts, and had an only son called Jeoud of a Nymph called Anobret, being under some great calamity, did sacrifice that son of his being cloathed * 1.358 with a royal habit. Here we have a royal person called Israel, and that Abraham should be accounted a King in those elder times, is nothing strange, considering his wealth, and what petty royalties there were in those times. But Gro∣tius, and from him Vossius, do not think that Abraham was * 1.359 here called Israel, but that the transcriber of Eusebius meet∣ing with 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 supposed it to be a contraction of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and so writ it at length; it must be acknowledged that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is used in the Phaenician Theology for Saturn, but yet the circum∣stances of the story make the ordinary reading not improb∣able; neither is it strange, that Abraham should be called by the name of the people which he was the Progenitor of. That Isaac should be meant by his only son called Ieoud is most likely; for when God bids Abraham go sacrifice him, he saith, Take thy son, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 thy only son, J••hid is the same with * 1.360 the Phaenician Ieoud. That Sara is meant by An••bret, the original of the name implyes, which is as Bochartus derives it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Annoberest, that is, ex gratiâ concipiens, which * 1.361 the Apostle explains, Through faith Sara her self received strength to conceive seed. Now all the difference is, that which was only designed and intended by Abraham, was be∣lieved by the Phaenicians as really done, that it might be as a president to them for their 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sacrificing of men, a thing so much in use among the Phaenicians, and all the Colonyes derived from them, as many learned men have at large shewed. But besides this, there are particular testi∣monies concerning Abraham, his age, wisdom and know∣ledge, his coming out of Chaldea, and the propagation of knowledge from him among the Chaldeans, Phaenicians, and

Aegyptians, are extant out of Berosus, Eupolemus, and others * 1.362 in Iosephus and Eusebius, and from thence transcribed by many learned men, which on that account I forbear tran∣scribing as being common and obvious.

Some have not improbably conj••ctured, that the memory of Iacobs long peregrination and service with his Uncle La∣ban, was preserved under the story of Apollo his banishment and being a Shepherd under Admetus. For Callimachus reports that Love was the cause of Apollo's travails, as it was of Iacobs, and withall mentions a strange increase of Cattel * 1.363 under Apollo's care, answerable to what the Scripture re∣ports concerning Iacob. But it is more certain, that the memory of Iacobs setting up the stone he had rested on for a pillar, and pouring oyle upon it, and calling the place Bethel, * 1.364 was preserved under the annointed stones which the Phaeni∣cians from Bethel called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as hath been frequently observed by learned men; from whence came the custome * 1.365 of anointing stones among the Heathens, of which so very many have largely discoursed. Thence the proverb of a superstitious man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which Arno∣bius calls lubricatum lapidem & ex olivi unguine sordidatum. It seems the anointing the stones with oyle, was then the symbol of the consecration of them. The name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 for such a stone occurres in Hesychius, the Greek Etymolo∣gist, Damascius in Photius and others. That the memory of Ioseph in Aegypt was preserved under the Aegyptian Apis, hath been shewed with a great deal of probability by the learned Vossius, in his often cited piece of Idolatry, from the testimonies of Iulius Maternus, Rufinus, and Suidas, and from these three arguments. 1. The greatness of the benefit which the Aegyptians received by Ioseph; which was of that nature that it could not easily be forgot, and that no symbol was so proper to set it out as the Aegyptian Apis; because the famine was portended by lean Kine, and the plenty by fat; and Minucius at Rome for relieving the people in a time of famine, had a statue of a golden bull erect∣ed to his memory. 2. The Aegyptians were not backward to testifie their respect to Ioseph, as appears by Pharoahs rewarding of him; now it was the custom of the Aegyptians

to preserve the memories of their great Benefactors by some symbols to posterity; which were at first intended only for a civil use, although they were after abused to Superstition and Idolatry. 3. From the names of Apis and Serapis. Apis he conceives to be the sacred name of Ioseph among the Aegyptians, and is as much as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Father; so Ioseph * 1.366 himself saith he was as a Father to Pharoah. And Serapis, as Rufinus and Suidas both tell us, had a bushel upon his head, and Serapis is probably derived from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sor, which signifies a Bull, and A••is. So that by this means the story of Ioseph is attested by the Aegyptians superstitions, of which they can give no account so likely as this is.

Many things concerning Moses are preserved in the story of Bacchus, not that from thence we are to conclude that * 1.367 Moses was the Bacchus of the Greeks, as Vossius thinks, but they took several parts of the Eastern traditions concerning him, which they might have from the Phaenicians who came with Cadmus into Greece, while the memory of Moses was yet fresh among the Canaanites. In the story of Bacchus as Vossius observes, it is expresly said that he was born in * 1.368 Aegypt, and that soon after his birth he was put in an Ark, and exposed to the river, which tradition was preserved among the Brasiatae of Laconica: and Bacchus in Orpheus is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and by Plutarchde Iside & Osiride, Palaesti∣nus: and he is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which agrees to Moses, who besides his own Mother was adopted by Pharoahs daughter: Bacchus was likewise commended for his beauty as Moses was, and was said to be educated in a mount of Arabia called Nysa, which agrees with Moses his residence in Arabia fourty years; so Plutarch mentions 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 the ba∣nishments of Bacchus, and Nonnus mentions Bacchus his flight into the red sea: who likewise mentions his battels in * 1.369 Arabia and with the neighbouring Princes there. Diodorus saith, that Bacchus his army had not only men but women in it; which is most true of the company which Moses led. * 1.370 Orpheus calls Bacchus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and attributes to him 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whereby we understand Moses his being a Legislator, and that he delivered the Law in two tables Moses his fetching water out of a rock with his rod, is pre∣served

in the Orgia of Bacchus, in which Euripides relates that Agave and the rest of the Bacchae celebrating the Orgia, one of them touched a rock and the water came out: and in the same Orgia Euripides reports, how they were wont to crown their heads with Serpents, probably in memory of the cure of the siery Scrpents in the wilderness. A dog is made the companion of Bacchus, which is the signification of Caleb, who so faithfully adhered to Moses. To these and some other circumstances insisted on by Vossius, Bochartus * 1.371 adds two more very considerable ones; which are, that Nonnus reports of Bacchus that he touched the two rivers Orontes and Hydaspes with his thyrsus or rod, and that the rivers dryed, and he passed through them: and that his Ivy-staffe being thrown upon the ground crept up and down like a Serpent, and that the Indians were in darkness while the Bacchae enjoyed light; which circumstances considered will make every one that hath judgement say as Bochartus doth; ex mirabili ill•• concentu vel coecis apparebit priscos fabularum architectos e scriptoribus sacris multa ••sse mutua∣tos. From this wonderful agreement of Heathen Mythology with the Scriptures, it cannot but appear that one is a cor∣ruption of the other. That the memory of I••shua and Sampson was preserved under Hercules Tyrius, is made * 1.372 likewise very probable from several circumstances of the stories. Others have deduced the many rites of Heathen worship, from those used in the Tabernacle among the Iews. Several others might be insisted on as the Parallel between Og and Typho, and between the old Silenus and Balaam, both noted for their skill in divination, both taken by the water, Num. 22. 5. both noted for riding on an ass: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, saith Lucian of the old Silenus; and that * 1.373 which makes it yet more probable, is that of Pausanias 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which some learned men have been much puzled to find out the truth of; and this conjecture which I here propound, may pass at least for a probable account of it; but I shall no longer insist on these things, having I suppose, done what is sufficient to our pur∣pose, which is to make it appear what footsteps there are of the truth of Scripture-history amidst all the corruptions of Heathen Mythology,

CHAP. VI. Of the Excellency of the Scriptures.

Concerning matters of pure divine revelation in Scripture: the terms of Salvation only contained therein. The ground of the disesteem of the Scriptures is tacite unbelief. The Excellency of the Scriptures manifested as to the matters which God hath revealed therein. The excellency of the discoveryes of Gods nature which are in Scripture. Of the goodness and love of God in Christ. The suitableness of those discoveries of God to our natural notions of a Deity. The necessity of Gods making known himself to us in order to the regulating our conceptions of him. The Scriptures give the fullest account of the state of mens souls, and the corrupti∣ons which are in them. The only way of pleasing God dis∣covered in Scriptures. The Scriptures contain matters of greatest mysteriousness, and mest universal satisfaction to mens minds. The excellency of the manner wherein things are revealed in Scriptures, in regard of clearness, authority, purity, uniformity, and perswasiveness. The excellency of the Scriptures as a rule of life. The nature of the duties of Religion and the reasonableness of them. The greatness of the encouragements to Religion contained in the Scriptures The great excellency of the Scriptures, as containing in them the Cove••ant of Grace in order to mans Salvation.

HAving thus largely proved the Truth of all those passages of sacred Scripture which concern the history * 1.374 of the first ages of the world, by all those arguments which a subject of that nature is capable of, the only thing le••t in order to our full proving the Divinity of the Scriptures, is, the consideration of ••hose matters contained in it, which are in an espec••al ma••ne•• said to be of Divine Revelation. For those historical p••ssages, though we believe them as contain∣ed in the Scripture, to have been Divinely inspired as well as others; yet they are such things as supposing no Divine Revelati••n, might have been known sufficiently to the world,

had not men b••en wanting to themselves as to the care and means of preserving them; but those matters which I now come to discourse of, are of a more sublime and transcendent nature, such as it had been imp••ssible for the minds of men to reach, had they not been immediately discovered by God himself. And those are the terms and conditions on which the soul of man may upon good grounds expect an eternal happiness, which we assert the book of Scriptures to be the only authentick and infallible records of. Men might by the improvements of reason and the sagacity of their minds dis∣cover much, not only of the lapsed condition of their souls, and the necessity of a purgation of them in order to their felicity, but might in the general know what things are pleasing and acceptable to the Divine nature, from those differences of good and evil which are unalterably fixed in the things themselves; but which way to obtain any certain∣ty of the remission of sins, to recover the Grace and Favour of God, to enjoy perfect tranquillity and peace of conscience, to be able to please God in things agreeable to his will, and by these to be assured of eternal bliss, had been impossi∣ble for men to have ever found, had not God himself been graciously pleased to reveal them to us. Men might still have bewildred themselvs in following the ignes fatui of their own imaginations, and hunting up and down the world for a path which leads to heaven, but could have found none, unless God himself taking pitty of the wandrings of men had been pleased to hang out a light from heaven to direct them in their way thither, and by this Pharos of Divine Revela∣tion to direct them so to stear their course, as to escape splitting themselves on the rocks of open impieties, or being swallowed up in the quicksands of terrene delights. Neither doth he shew them only what sh••lves and rocks they must escape, but what particular course they must ste••re, what star they must have in their eye, what compass they must observe, what winds and gales they must expect and pray for, if they would at last arrive at eternal bliss. Eternal bliss! What more could a God of infinite goodness promise, or the soul of man ever wish ••or? A Reward to such who are so ••ar from deserving, that they are still prov••king; Glory

to such who are more apt to be ashamed of their duties, then of their offences; but that it should not only be a glorious reward, but eternal too, is that which though it infinitely transcend the deserts of the receivers, yet it highly discovers the infinite goodness of the Giver. But when we not only know that there is so rich a mine of inestimable treasures, but if the owner of it undertakes to shew us the way to it, and gives us certain and infallible directions how to come to the full p••ssession of it, how much are we in love with misery, and do we court our own ruine, if we neglect to hearken to his directions, and observe his commands!

This is that we are now undertaking to make good con∣cerning * 1.375 the Scriptures, that these alone contain those sacred discoveries by which the souls of men may come at last to enjoy a compleat and eternal happiness. One would think there could be nothing more needless in the world then to bid men regard their own welfare, and to seek to be happy; yet whoever casts his eye into the world, will find no counsel so little hearkned to as this, nor any thing which is more generally looked on as a matter trivial and impertinent. Which cannot arise but from one of these two grounds, that either they think it no great wisdom to let go their present hold as to the good things of this world, for that which they secretly question whe••her they shall ever live to see or no; or else that their minds are in suspense, whether they be not sent on a Guiana voyage to heaven, wh••ther the certainty of it be yet fully discovered, or the instructions which are given be such as may infallibly conduct them th••her. The first, though it hath the advantage of sense, fruition, delight, and further expectation; yet to a rational person who seriously reflects on himself, and sums up what (after all his troubles and disquietments in the procuring, his cares in keeping, his disappointments in his expectations, his fears of losing what he doth enjoy, and that vexation of spirit which attends all these) he hath gained of true contentment to his mind, can never certainly beleive that ever these things were intended for his happiness. For is it possible that the soul of man should ever enjoy its full and compleat happiness in this world, when nothing is ••ble to make it happy, but what is

most suitable to its nature, able to fill up its large capacity, and commensurate with its duration: but in this life the matter of mens greatest delights is strangely unsuitable to the nature of our rational beings; the measure of them too short for our vast desires to stretch themselves upon; the propor∣tion too scant and narrow to run parallel with immortality. It must be then only a Supreme, Insinite, and Eternal Be∣ing, which by the free communications of his bounty and goodness can fix and satiate the souls desires, and by the constant flowings forth of his uninterrupted streams of favour will alwayes keep up desire, and yet alwayes satisfie it. One whose goodness can only be felt by some tansient touches here, whose love can be seen but as through a lattice, whose constant presence may be rather wished for then en∣joyed, who hath reserved the full sight and fruition of himself to that future state when all these dark vails shall be done away, and the soul shall be continually sunning her self under immediate beams of light and love. But how or in what way the soul of man in this degenerate condition should come to be partaker of so great a happiness, by the enjoyment of that God our natures are now at such a distance from, is the greatest and most important enquiry of humane nature; and we continu∣ally see how successless and unsatisfactory the endea∣vours of those have been to themselves at last, who have sought for this happiness in a way of their own finding out; The large volume of the Creation, where∣in God hath described so much of his wisdom and po∣wer, is yet too dark and obscure, too short and im∣perfect to set forth to us the way which leads to eternal happinesse. Unlesse then the same God who made mens souls at first, do shew them the way for their recovery; as they are in a degenerate, so they will be in a desperate condition; but the same bounty and goodness of God, which did at first display its self in giving being to mens souls, hath in a higher manner en∣larged the discovery of its self, by making known the way whereby we may be taken into his Grace and Favour again.

Which it now concerns us particularly to discover, there∣by * 1.376 to make it appear that this way is of that peculiar excel∣lency, that we may have from thence the greatest evidence, it could come from no other Author but God himself, and doth tend to no other end but our eternal happiness. Now that incomparable excellency which is in the sacred Scrip∣tures, will fully appear, if we consider the matters contained in them under this threefold capacity. 1. As matters of Di∣vine Revelation. 2. As a rule of life. 3. As containing that Covenant of grace which relates to mans eternal hap∣piness.

1. Consider the Scripture generally, as containing in it matters of divine revelation, and therein the excellency of the Scriptures appeares in two things. 1. The matters which are revealed. 2. The manner wherein they are re∣vealed.

1. The matters which are revealed in Scripture, may be considered these three wayes. 1. As they are matters of the greatest weight and moment. 2. As m••tters of the greatest depth and mysteriousness. 3. As matters of the most universal satisfaction to the minds of men.

1. They are matters of the greatest moment and importance for men to know▪ The wisdom of men is most known by the weight of the things they speak; and therefore that wherein the wisdom of God is discovered, cannot contain any thing that is mean and trivial; they must be matters of the highest importance, which the Supreme Ruler of the world vouchsafes to speak to men concerning: And such we shall find the matters which God hath revealed in his word to be, which either concern the rectifying our apprehensions of his nature, or making known to men their state and con∣dition, or discovering the way whereby to avoid eternal misery. Now which is there of these three, which suppo∣sing God to discover his mind to the world, it doth not highly become him to speak to men of?

1. What is there which it doth more highly concern men to know then God himself? or what more glorious and ex∣cellent * 1.377 object could he discover then himself to the world? There is nothing certainly which should more commend the

Scriptures to us, then that thereby we may grow more ac∣quainted with God; that we may know more of his nature, and all his perfections, and many of the great reasons of his actings in the world. We may by them understand with safety what the eternal purposes of God were as to the w••y of mans recovery by the death of his Son; we may there see and understand the great wisdom of God; not only in the contrivance of the world, and ordering of it, but in the gra∣dual revelations of himself to his people, by what steps he trained up his Church till the fulness of time was come; what his aim was in laying such a load of Ceremonies on his people of the Iews; by what steps & degrces he made way for the full revelation of his Will to the World by speaking in these last dayes by his Son, after he had spoke at sundry times and di∣vers manners by the Prophets, &c. unto the Fathers. In the Scriptures we read the most rich and admirable discoveries of Divine goodness, and all the wayes and methods he useth in alluring sinners to himself, with what Majesty he com∣mands, with what condiscension he intreats, with what im∣portunity he wooes mens souls to be reconciled to him, with what favour he embraceth, with what tenderness he chasti∣seth, with what bowels he pitieth those who have chosen him to be their God! With what power he supporteth, with what wisdom he direct••th, with what cordials he refesheth the souls of such who are dejected vnder the sense of his displea∣sure, and yet their love is sincere towards him! With what profound humility, what holy boldness, what becoming di∣stance, and yet what restless importunity do we therein finde the souls of Gods people addressing themselves to him in prayer! With what cheerfulness do they serve him, with what confidence do they trust him, with what resolution do they adhere to him in all streights and difficulties, with what patience do they submit to his Will in their greatest extre∣mities! How fearful are they of sinning against God, how careful to please him, how regardless of suffering, when they must choose either that or sinning, how little apprehen∣sive of mens displeasure, while they enjoy the favour of God. Now all these things which are so fully and pathetical∣ly expressed in Scripture, do abundantly set forth to us

the exuberancy and Pleonasm of Gods grace and goodness to∣wards his people, which makes them delight so much in him, and be so sensible of his displeasure. But above all other discoveries of Gods goodness, his sending his Son into the world to die for sinners, is that which the Scripture sets forth with the greatest Life and Eloquence. By Eloquence, I mean not an artificial composure of words, but the gravity, weight, and perswasiveness of the matter contained in them. And what can tend more to melt our frozen hearts into a current of thankful obedience to God, then the vigorous reflection of the beams of Gods love through Iesus Christ up∣on us! Was there ever so great an expression of Love heard of! nay, was it possible to be imagined, that that God who perfectly hates sin, should himself offer the pardon of it, and send his Son into the world to secure it to the sinner, who doth so heartily repent of his sins, as to deny himself, and take up his cross and follow Christ! Well might the Apostle say, This is a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, * 1.378 that Iesus Christ came into the world to save sinners. How dry and sapless are all the voluminous discourses of Philoso∣phers, compared with this Sentence! How je••une and unsa∣tisfactory are all the discoveries they had of God and his good∣ness, in comparison of what we have by the Gospel of Christ! Well might Paul then say, That he determin'd to know no∣thing but Christ and him crucified. Christ crucified is the * 1.379 Library which triumphant souls will be studying in to all E∣ternity. This is the only Library which is the true 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that which cures the soul of all its maladies and distem∣pers; other knowledge makes mens minds giddy and flatu∣lent; this settles and composes them; other knowledge is apt to swell men into high conceits and opinions of them∣selves; this brings them to the truest view of themselves, and thereby to humility and sobriety: Other knowledge leaves mens hearts as it found them; this alters them and makes them better, so transcendent an excellency is there in the knowledge of Christ crucified above the sublimest specu∣lations in the world.

And is not this an inestimable benefit we enjoy by the * 1.380 Scripture, that therein we can read and converse with all

these expressions of Gods love and goodness, and that in his own language? Shall we admire and praise what we meet with in Heathen Philosophers, which is generous and hand∣some; and shall we not adore the infinite fulness of the Scriptures, which run over with continued expressions of that and a higher nature? What folly is it to magnifie those lean kine, the notions of Philosophers, and to contemn the fat, the plenty and fulness of the Scriptures? If there be not far more valuable and excellent discoveries of the Divine Nature and Perfections; if there be not far more excellent directions and rules of practice in the sacred Scriptures, then in the sublimest of all the Philosophers, then let us leave our full ears, and feed upon the thin. But certainly no sober & ra∣tional s••irit that puts any value upon the knowledge of God, but on the same account that he doth prize the discourses of any Philosophers concerning God, he cannot but set a value of a far higher on the word of God. And as the goodness of God is thus discovered in Scripture, so is his Iustice and Holin••ss; we have therein recorded the most remarkable judgements of God upon contumacious sinners, the severest denunciati∣ons of a judgement to come against all that live in sin, the exactest precepts of holiness in the world; and what can be desired more to discover the Holiness of God, then we finde in Scripture concerning him? If therefore acquaintance with the nature, perfections, designs of so excellent a Being as God is, be a thing desirable to humane nature, we have the greatest cause to admire the excellency, and adore the fulness of the Scriptures which give us so large, rational, and com∣pleat account of the Being and Attributes of God. And which tends yet more to commend the Scriptures to us, those things which the Scripture doth most fully discover concerning God, do not at all contradict those prime & com∣mon notions which are in our natures concerning him, but do exceedingly advance and improve them, and tend the most to regulate our conceptions and apprehensions of God, that we may not miscarry therein, as otherwise men are apt to do. For it being natural to men so far to love themselves, as to set the greatest value upon those ex∣cellencies which they think themselves most masters o••;

thence men came to be exceedingly mistaken in their appre∣hensions of a Deity, some attributing one thing as a perfe∣ction, another a different thing, according to their humours and inclinations. Thus imperious self-willed men are apt to cry up Gods absolute power and dominion as his greatest perfection; easie and soft-spirited men his patience and good∣ness; severe and rigid men his justice and severity; every one according to his humour and temper, making his God of his own complexion; and not only so, but in things remote enough from being perfections at all; yet because they are such things as they prize and value, they suppose of necessi∣ty they must be in God, as is evident in the Eicureans 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by which they excluded providence, as hath been alrea∣dy observed. And withal considering how very difficult it is for one who really believes that God is of a pure, just, and holy nature, and that he hath grievously offended him by his sins, to believe that this God will pardon him upon true repentance. It is thence necessary that God should make known himself to the world, to prevent our misconceptions of his nature, and to assure a suspicious, because guilty crea∣ture, how ready he is to pardon iniquity, transgession, and sin, to such as unfeignedly repent of their follies, and return unto himself. Though the light of nature may dictate much to us of the benignity and goodness of the Divine Nature, yet it is hard to conceive that that should discover further then Gods general goodness to such as please him; but no foundation can be gatherd thence of his readiness to pardon offenders, which being an act of grace, must alone be disco∣verd by his Will. I cannot think the Sun, Moon, and Stars are such itinerant Preachers, as to unfold unto us the whole Counsel and Will of God in reference to mans accep∣tance with God upon repentance. It is not every Star in the Firmament can do that which the Star once did to the wise men, lead them unto Christ. The Sun in the Heavens is no Parhelius to the Son of righteousness. The best Astronomer will never finde the day-star from on high in the rest of his number. What St. Austin said o•• Tullies works, is true of the whole Volume of the Creation, There are admirable things to be found in them; but the name of Christ is not legible there. The work of Redemption is not

engraven on the works of providence; if it had, a particular divine revelation had been unnecessary, and the Apostles were sent on a needless errand, which the world had under∣stood without their Preaching, viz, That God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing to men their trespasses, and hath committed to them the Ministry of Re∣conciliation. * 1.381 How was the word of reconciliation committed to them, if it were common to them with the whole frame of the world? and the Apostles Quaere elsewhere might have been easily answered, How can men hear without a Preacher? For then they might have known the way of salvation, with∣out * 1.382 any special messengers sent to deliver it to them. I grant that Gods long suffering and patience is intended to lead men to repentance, and that some general collections might be made from providence of the placability of Gods nature, and that God never left himself without a witness of his goodness in the world, being king to the unthankful, and doing good, in giving rain and fruitful seasons. But though * 1.383 these things might sufficiently discover to such who were apprehensive of the guilt of sin, that God did not act accord∣ing to his greatest severity, and thereby did give men encou∣ragement to hearken out & enquire after the true way of be∣ing reconciled to God; yet all this amounts not to a firm foun∣dation for faith as to the remission of sin, which doth suppose God himself publishing an act of grace and indempnity to the world, wherein he assures the pardon of sin to such as truly repent and unfeignedly believe his holy Gospel. Now is not this an inestimable advantage we enjoy by the Scriptures, that therein we understand what God himself hath discoverd of his own nature and perfections, and of his readiness to pardon sin upon those gracious terms of Faith and Repen∣tance, and that which necessarily follows from these two, hearty and sincere obedience.

2. The Scriptures give the most faithful representation of * 1.384 the state and condition of the soul of man. The world was al∣most lost in Disputes concerning the nature, condition, and im∣mortality of the soul before divine revelation was made known to mankind by the Gospel of Christ; but life and immor∣tality was brrught to light by the Gospel, and the future state

of the soul of man, not discoverd in an uncertain Platoni∣cal way, but with the greatest light and evidence from that God who hath the supreme disposal of souls, and therefore best knows and understands them. The Scriptures plainly and fully reveal a judgement to come, in which God will judge the secrets of all hearts, when every one must give an account of himself unto God, and God will call men to give an account of their stewardship here, of all the receits they have had from him, and the expences they have been at, and the im∣provements they have made of the talents he put into their hands. So that the Gospel of Christ is the fullest instrument of discovery of the certainty of the future state of the soul, and the conditions which abide it, upon its being dislodged from the body. But this is not all which the Scripture dis∣covers as to the state of the soul; for it is not only a prospe∣ctive-glass, reaching to its future state, but it is the most faithful looking-glass, to discover all the spots and deformities of the soul: And not only shews where they are, but whence they came, what their nature is, and whether they tend. The true Original of all that disorder and discomposure which is in the soul of man, is only fully and satisfactorily given us in the Word of God, as hath been already proved. The nature and working of this corruption in man, had never been so clearly manifested, had not the Law and Will of God been discovered to the world; that is the glass whereby we see the secret workings of those Bees in our hearts, the corrupti∣ons of our natures; that sets forth the folly of our imagina∣tions, the unruliness of our passions, the distempers of our wills, and the abundant deceitfulness of our hearts. And it is hard for the most Elephantine sinner (one of the great∣est magnitude) so to trouble these waters, as not therein to discover the greatness of his own deformities. But that which tends most to awaken the drowsie, sensless spirits of men, the Scripture doth most fully describe the tendency of corruption, that the wages of sin is death, and the issue of continuance in sin will be the everlasting misery of the soul, in a perpetual separation from the presence of God, and un∣dergoing the lashes and severities of conscience to all eterni∣ty.

What a great discovery is this of the faithfulness of God to the world, that he suffers not men to undo themselves without letting them know of it before-hand, that they might avoid it. God seeks not to entrap mens souls, nor doth he rejoyce in the misery and ruine of his creatures, but fully declares to them what the consequence and issue of their sinful practices will be, assures them of a judgement to come, declares his own future s••verity against contumacious sin∣ners, that they might not think themselves surprized, and that if they had known there had been so great danger in sin, they would never have been such fools as for the sake of it to run into eternal misery. Now God to prevent this, with the greatest plainness and faithfulness, hath shewed men the nature and danger of all their sins, and asks them before hand what they will do in the end thereof; whether they are able to bear his wrath, and wrestle with everlasting burnings? if not, he bids them bethink themselves of what they have done already, and repent & amend their lives, lest iniquity prove their ruine, & destruction overtake them, and that without remedy. Now if men have cause to prize and value a faith∣ful Monitor, one that tenders their good, and would pre∣vent their ruine, we have cause exceedingly to prize and va∣lue the Scriptures, which give us the truest representation of the state and condition of our souls.

3. The Scripture discovers to us the only way of pleasing God, and enjoying his favour. That clearly reveals the way (which man might have sought for to all eternity without particular revelation) whereby sins may be pardond, and whatever we do may be acceptable unto God. It shews us that the ground of our acceptance with God, is through Christ, whom he hath made a propitiation for the sins of the world, and who alone is the true and living way, whereby we may draw near to God with a true heart, in full assurance of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience. Through Christ we understand the terms on which God will shew favour and grace to the world, and by him we have ground of a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, access with freedome and boldness unto God. On his account we may hope not only for grace so

subdue our sins, resist temptations, conquer the devil and the world; but having fought this good fight and finished our course, by patient continuance in well doing, we may justly look for glory, honour, and immortality, and that crown of righteous∣ness which is laid up for those who wait in faith, holiness, and humility for the appearance of Christ from heaven. Now what things can there be of greater moment and importance for men to know, or God to reveal, then the nature of God, and our selves, the state and condition of our souls, the only way to avoid eternal misery and enjoy everlasting Bliss!

The Scriptures discover not only matters of importance, * 1.385 but of the greatest depth and mysteriousness. There are many wonderful things in the Law of God, things we may admire, but are never able to comprehend. Such are the eternal purposes and decrees of God, the doctrine of the Trini∣ty, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and the manner of the operation of the Spirit of God on the souls of men, which are all things of great weight and moment for us to understand and believe that they are, and yet may be unsearchable to our reason, as to the particular manner of them. What certain ground our faith stands on as to these things, hath been already shewed, and therefore I forbear insisting on * 1.386 them.

The Scripture comprehends matters of the most univer∣sal satisfaction to the minds of men; though many things do much exceed our apprehensions, yet others are most su••t∣able to the dictates of our nature. As Origen bid Celsus see, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, * 1.387 whether it was not the agreeableness of the principles of faith with the common notions of humane nature, that which prevailed most upon all candid and ingenuous auditors of them. And therefore as Socrates said of Heraclitus his books, What he understood was excellent; and therefore he supposed that which he did not understand was so too: so ought we to say of the Scri∣ptures, if those things which are within our capacity be so suitable to our natures and reasons, those cannot contradict our reason which yet are above them. There are many things which the minds of men were sufficiently assured that

they were, yet were to seek for satisfaction concerning them, which they could never have had without Divine revelation. As the nature of true happiness, wherein it lay, and how to be obtained, which the Philosophers were so puzled with, the Scripture gives us full satisfaction concerning it. True contentment under the troubles of life, which the Scripture only acquaints us with the true grounds of; and all the prescriptions of Heathen Moralists fall as much short of, as the directions of an Empirick doth of a wise and skilful Physitian. Avoiding the fears of death, which can alone be through a grounded expectation of a future state of happi∣ness which death leads men to, which cannot be had but through the right understanding of the Word of God. Thus we see the excellency of the matters themselves contained in this revelation of the mind of God to the world.

As the matters themselves are of an excellent nature, so is the manner wherein they are revealed in the Scriptures; * 1.388 and that,

1. In a clear and perspicuous manner; not but there may be still some passages which are hard to be understood, as being either prophetical or consisting of ambiguous phrases, or containing matters above our comprehension; but all those things which concern the terms of mans salvation, are de∣livered with the greatest evidence and perspicuiry. Who cannot understand what these things mean, What doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God? that without faith it is impos∣sible to please God; that without holiness none shall see the Lord; that unless we be born again, we can never enter into the Kingdom of heaven; these and such like things are so plain and clear, that it is nothing but mens shutting their eyes against the light can keep them from understanding them; God intended these things as directions to men; and is not he able to speak intelligibly when he please? he that made the tongue, shall he not speak so as to be understood without an infallible interpreter? especially when it is his design to make known to men the terms of their eternal happiness. Will God judge men at the great day for not believing those things which they could not understand? Strange, that

ever men should judge the Scriptures obscure in matters ne∣cessary, when the Scripture accounts it so great a judgement for men not to understand them. If our Gospel be hid, it is * 1.389 hid to them that are lost: In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, least the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ should shine unto them. Sure Lots door was visible enough, if it were a judgement for the men of Sodom not to see it; and the Scriptures then are plain and intelligible enough, if it be so great a judgement not to understand them.

2. In a powerful and authoritative manner; as the things contained in Scripture do not so much beg acceptance as command it: in that the expressions wherein our duty is concerned, are such as awe mens consciences and pierce to their hearts and to their secret thoughts; All things are open * 1.390 and naked before this Word of God; every secret of the mind and thought of the heart lyes open to its stroke and force, it is quick and powerful, sharper then a two-edged sword, piercing to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joynts and mar∣row, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. The word is a Telescope to discover the great Luminaries of the world, the truths of highest concernment to the souls of men, and it is such a Microscope as discovers to us the smallest Atome of our thoughts, and discerns the most secret intent of the heart. And as far as this light reacheth, it comes with power and authority, as it comes armed with the Majesty of that God who reveals it, whose authority extends over the soul and conscience of man in its most secret and hidden recesses.

3. In a pure and unmixed manner; in all other writings how good soever we have a great mixture of dross and gold together; here is nothing but pure gold, Diamonds without flaws, Suns without spots. The most current coynes of the world have their alloyes of baser mettals, there is no such mixture in divine Truths; as they all come from the same Author, so they all have the same purity. There is a Urim and Thumim upon the whole Scripture, light and perfection in every part of it. In the Philosophers we may meet, it may be, with some scattered fragments of purer mettal, amidst

abundance of dross and impure oare; here we have whole wedges of gold, the same vein of purity and holiness running through the whole book of Scriptures. Hence it is called the form of sound words; here have been no hucksters to corrupt and mix their own inventions with Divine * 1.391 Truths.

4 In an uniform and agreeable manner. This I grant is not * 1.392 sufficient of its self to prove the Scriptures to be Divine, because all men do not contradict themselves in their writ∣ings; but yet here are some peculiar circumstances to be con∣sidered in the agreeableness of the parts of Scripture to each other which are not to be found in meer humane writings. 1. That this doctrine was delivered by persons who lived in different ages and times from each other. Usually one age corrects anothers faults, and we are apt to pitty the igno∣rance of our predecessors, when it may be our posterity may think us as ignorant, as we do them. But in the sacred Scri∣pture we read not one age condemning another; we find light still increasing in the series of times in Scripture, but no reflections in any time upon the ignorance, or weakness of the precedent; the dimmest light was sufficient for its age and was a step to further discovery. Quintilian gives it as the reason of the great uncertainty of Grammar rules, quia non analogia demissa coelo formam loquendi dedit; that which he * 1.393 wanted as to Grammar, we have as to Divine Truths; they are delivered from heaven, and therefore are alwayes uniform and agreeable to each other.

2. By persons of different interests in the world. God made choice of men of all ranks to be enditers of his oracles, to make it appear it was no matter of State policy or particular interest which was contained in his word, which persons of such different interests could not have agreed in as they do. We have Moses, David, Solomon, persons of royal rank and quality, and can it be any mean thing, which these think it their glory to be penners of? We have Isaiah, Daniel and other persons of the highest education and accomplishments, and can it be any trivial thing which these imploy them∣selves in? We have Amos, other Prophets in the old Testa∣ment, and the Apostles in the New, of the meaner sort of

men in the world, yet all these joyn in consort together; when God tunes their spirits, all agree in the same strain of divine truths, and give light and harmony to each other.

3. By persons in different places and conditions; some in prosperity in their own country, some under banishment and adversity, yet all agreeing in the same substance of doctrine; of which no alteration we see was made either for the flattery of those in power, or for avoiding miseries and calamities. And under all the different dispensations before, under, and after the Law, though the management of things was different, yet the doctrine and design was for substance the same in all. All the different dispensations agree in the same common principles of religion; the same ground of acceptance with God, and obligation to duty was common to all, though the peculiar instances wherein God was served might be different according to the ages of growth in the Church of God. So that this great uniformity considered in these cir∣cumstances, is an argument that these things came originally from the same Spirit, though conveyed through different instruments to the knowledge of the world.

5. In a perswasive and convincing manner: and that these wayes. 1. Bringing divine truths down to our capacity, cloathing spiritual matter in familiar expressions and simili∣tudes, that so they might have the easier admission into our minds. 2. Propounding things as our interest, which are our duty: thence God so frequently in Scripture, recommends our dutyes to us under all those motives which are wont to have the greatest force on the minds of men: and annexeth gracious promises to our performance of them; and those of the most weighty and concerning things. Of grace, fa∣vour, protection, deliverance, audience of prayers, and eternal happiness; and is these will not prevail with men, what motives will? 3. Courting us to obedience, when he might not only command us to obey, but punish presently for disobedience. Hence are all those most pathetical and affectionate strains we read in Scripture. O that there were such a heart within them, that they would fear me and keep all my commandments alwayes, that it might go well with them, and with their children after * 1.394

them. Wo unto thee O Jerusalem, wilt thou not be made clean? when shall it once be? Turn ye, turn ye from your evil wayes, * 1.395 for why will ye dye, O h••use of Israel? How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? how shall I deliver thee Israel? how shall I make thee as Admah? how shall I set thee as Z••boim? mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thy * 1.396 children together, as a hen gathered her chickens under her wings, and ye would not? What Majesty and yet what sweet∣ness and condescension is there in these expressions? What obstinacy and rebellion is it in men for them to stand out against God, when he thus comes down from his throne of Majesty, and wooes rebellious sinners to return unto him that they may be pardoned. Such a matchless and unparal∣leld strain of Rh••torick is there in the Scripture, far above the art and insinuations of the most admired Orators. Thus we see the peculiar excellency of the manner wherein the matters contained in Scripture are revealed to us: thus we have considered the excellency of the Scripture, as it is a discovery of Gods mind to the world.

The Scriptures may be considered as a rule of life, or as a Law of God which is given for the Government of the lives * 1.397 of men, and therein the excellency of it lies in the nature of the dutyes, and the encouragements to the practice of them.

1. In the nature of the dutyes required, which are most becoming God to require, most reasonable for us to per∣form.

1. Most becoming God to require, as they are most suitable and agreeable to the Divine nature, the imitation of which in our actions is the substance of our Religion. Imitation of him in his goodness and holiness, by our constant endeavours of mortifying sin and growing in grace and piety. In his grace and mercy by our kindness to all men, forgiving the injuries men do unto us, doing good to our greatest enemies. In his justice and equity, by doing as we would be done by, and keeping a conscience void of offence towards God and towards men. The first takes in the dutyes of the first, the other the

duties of the second Table. All acts of piety towards God, are a part of Iustice; for as Tully saith, Quid aliud ••st pi∣et as nisi justitia adversus Deos? and so our loving God with our whole bearts, our entire and sincere obedience to his will, is a part of natural justice; for thereby we do but render un∣to God that which is his due from us as we are his creatures. We see then the whole duty of man, the fearing God and kee••∣ing his Commandements, is as necessary a part of Iustice, as the rendring to every man his own is.

2. They are most reasonable for us to perform, in that 1. Religion is not only a service of the reasonable faculties which are employed the most in it, the commands of the Scripture reaching the heart most, and the service required being a spiritual service, not lying in meats and drinks, or any outward observations, but in a sanctified temper of heart and mind, wh••ch discovers its self in the course of a Chri∣stians life; but 2. The service its self of Religion is reasona∣ble; the commands of the Gospel are such, as no mans reason which considers them, can doubt of the excellency of them. All natural worship is founded on the dictates of nature, all instituted worship on Gods revealed will; and it is one of the prime dictates of nature, that God must be uniuersally obeyed. Besides, God requires nothing but what is apparently mans interest to do; God prohibits no∣thing but what will destroy him if he doth it; so that the commands of the Scriptures are very just and reasonable.

2. The encouragements are more then proportionable to the difficulty of obedience. Gods commands are in themselves easie, and most suitable to our natures. What more rational for a creature then to obey his Maker? all the a••fficulty of religion ariseth from the corruption of nature. Now God to en∣courage men to conquer the difficulties arising thence, hath propounded the strongest motives, and most prevail∣ing arguments to obedience. Such are the considerations of Gods love and goodness manifested to the world by sending his Son into it to die for sinners, and to give them an example which they are to follow, and by his readiness through him to pardon the sins, and accept the persons of such who so re∣ceive

him as to walk in him; and by his promises of grace to assist them in the wrestling with the enemies of their salvati∣on. And to all these add that glorious and unconceivable reward which God hath promised to all those who sincere∣ly obey him; and by these things we see how much the en∣couragements over-weigh the difficulties, and that none can make the least pretence that there is not motive suffici∣ent to down-weigh the troubles which attend the exercise of obedience to the will of God. So that we see what a pe∣culiar excellency there is in the Scriptures as a rule of life, above all the precepts of meer Moralists, the foundation of obedience being laid deeper in mans obligation to serve his Maker, the practice of obedience being carried higher in those most holy precepts which are in Scripture, the reward of obedience being incomparably greater then what men are able to conceive, much less to promise or bestow.

The Excellency of the Scriptures appears as they contain in them a Covenant of grace, or the transactions between * 1.398 God and Man in order to his eternal happiness. The more memorable any transactions are, the more valuable are any authentick records of them. The Scriptures contain in them the Magna Charta of Heaven, an Act of pardon with the Royal assent of Heaven, a Proclamation of good-will from God towards men; and can we then set too great a value on that which contains all the remarkable passages between God and the souls of men, in order to their felicity, from the beginning of the world? Can we think, since there is a God in the world of infinite goodness, that he should suffer all mankind to perish inevitably without his propounding any means for escaping of eternal misery? Is God so good to men as to this present life; and can we think, if mans soul be im∣mortal, as we have proved it is, that he should wholly ne∣glect any offer of good to men as to their eternal welfare? Or is it possible to imagine that man should be happy in ano∣ther world without Gods promising it, and prescribing con∣ditions in order to it? If so, then this happiness is no free gift of God, unless he hath the bestowing and promising of it; and man is no rational agent, unless a reward suppose con∣ditions

to be performed in order to the obtaining it; or man may be bound to conditions which were never required him; or if they must be required, then there must be a revelation of Gods will, whereby he doth require them: And if so, then there are some Records extant of the transactions between God and man, in order to his eternal happiness: For what reason can we have to imagine that such Records, if once extant, should not continue still, especially since the same goodness of God is engaged to preserve such Records, which at first did cause them to be indicted. Supposing then such Records extant somewhere in the world of these grand transactions between God and mens souls, our business is brought to a period; for what other Records are there in the world that can in the least vye with the Scriptures, as to the giving so just an account of all the transactions between God and men from the foundation of the world? Which gives us all the steps, methods, and wayes whereby God hath made known his mind and will to the world, in order to mans eternal Salvation. It remains only then that we adore and magnifie the goodness of God in making known his Will to us, and that we set a value and esteem on the Scrip∣tures, as on the only authentick Instruments of that Grand Charter of Peace, which God hath revealed in order to mans Eternal Happiness.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Sect. 1.
• * 1.2

  Heb. 11. 6.
• * 1.3

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.4

  De Nat. Deor. l. 1•• cap. 38.
• * 1.5

  De rerum Nat. lib. 1.
• * 1.6

  De Nat. D••or. lib. 1••. cap. 86.
• * 1.7

  De Nat. Deor. lib. ••. cap. 44.
• * 1.8

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.9

  Prop. 1.
• * 1.10

  Sect. 4.
• * 1.11

  Sect. 5.
• * 1.12

  Sect. 6.
• * 1.13

  Sect. 7. Prop. 2.
• * 1.14

  Sect. 8. 2.
• * 1.15

  Sect. 9. 2.
• * 1.16

  Sect. 10. Prop. 3.
• * 1.17

  De Nat. Deor. l. 2.
• * 1.18

  Sect. 11.
• * 1.19

  Lib. 10. in v. Epic. v. Gassend. To. 2. l. 3. sect 3.
• * 1.20

  Lib. 4.
• * 1.21

  De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.
• * 1.22

  Sect. 12.
• * 1.23

  Sect. 13.
• * 1.24

  2.
• * 1.25

  Metaphys. lib. 4. c. 4.
• * 1.26

  De Nat. Deor. l. 3.
• * 1.27

  De Nat. D••or. l. 1. & De Legibus lib. 2.
• * 1.28

  Addend. ad lib. 1. De Idol. p. 2.
• * 1.29

  v. Acost••m lib. 5. c. 3. Lips. Monit. & exempl. Politic.
• * 1.30

  Sect. 14. 2.
• * 1.31

  vid. Des Cartes Me∣taphys. Me∣di••. & Resp. ad Object.

  D. H. More Antidote against Atheism, lib. 1. ch. 8.

  Append. ch. 5, 6, 7.
• * 1.32

  Sect. 15.
• * 1.33

  De Nat. Dcor. l. 2. c. 95.
• * 1.34

  De Legilus lib. 2.
• * 1.35

  Sect. 16.
• * 1.36

  Lucret. l. 4.
• * 1.37

  Gassend. To. 2. lib 2. sect. 3.
• * 1.38

  A••••sto••. de pa••t. A••im. l. 4.
• * 1.39

  Sect. 17. 3.
• * 1.40

  Sect. 18.
• * 1.41

  Hobbs Hu•• man. nature ch. 3. sect. 1.
• * 1.42

  Sect. 7.
• * 1.43

  Pres. ad Quaest. Natur.
• * 1.44

  Manil. l 4.
• * 1.45

  Sect. 19. 2.
• * 1.46

  Disput l. 1. cap. 56.
• * 1.47

  V. D. H. Mores My∣stery of Godl. l. 7. ch. 14, 15, 16, 17.
• * 1.48

  Sect. 1.
• * 1.49

  M••e N••-••••••h. p. 2. cap. 25.
• * 1.50

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.51

  Aristot. de Caelo l. 1. cap. 10.
• * 1.52

  De Na••••, Dcor. l. 1. cap. 25.
• * 1.53

  Biblioth. l. 1 V. Euseb. P••aep. ••vang. l. 10
• * 1.54

  Diog. Lacrt. proaem. p. 7.
• * 1.55

  V. Selde••. de jure nat. & geat. apud Ebrae∣os. l. 1. c. 2.
• * 1.56

  Voss. de Sectis Phi∣losoph. c. 6. sect. 5.
• * 1.57

  V. Math••m. Hieroglyph. Kircheri. To. 3 Occlip. Aegypt.
• * 1.58

  Plutarch. de plac. Philos. l. 1. cap. 3.
• * 1.59

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.60

  V. Thalet.
• * 1.61

  Plato i•• Timaeo. p. 1047. cd. Ficini.
• * 1.62

  Chalcid. Timaeus. p. 24. ed. Meurs.
• * 1.63

  Aanot. in l. 1. deVerit. Christ. Reli.
• * 1.64

  Chalcid. in Tim. p. 394.
• * 1.65

  Eus••b. Praep. Evang. l. 1. cap. 10.
• * 1.66

  Gen. 1. 2.
• * 1.67

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. in T••m. p. 378.
• * 1.68

  Sceptical Chymist. p. 115. &c.
• * 1.69

  Iliad. ξ.
• * 1.70

  Odyss. ξ. Chalcid. p. 378.
• * 1.71

  V. Meurs. in Chal. p. 37.
• * 1.72

  Metaphys. l. 1. c. 3.
• * 1.73

  Sect. 4.
• * 1.74

  Platon. So∣phist. p. 185. ed. Fic.
• * 1.75

  Sect. 5.
• * 1.76

  Arist. de coelo l. 16. cap. 10.
• * 1.77

  V. Laert. in vi••. Demo∣criti.
• * 1.78

  Ocellus Lu∣canus p. 16. cd. Commel.
• * 1.79

  Physi••. l. 4.
• * 1.80

  De Nat. l. 1.
• * 1.81

  De Nat. Deor. l. 2.
• * 1.82

  More N••∣voch. p. 2. c. 17.
• * 1.83

  Sect. 6. 2.
• * 1.84

  De Natur. Univer. p. 8.
• * 1.85

  Arislot. dogmat. evers. p. 111.
• * 1.86

  Justin. M••rtyr. op. p. 123.
• * 1.87

  Sect. 7. 3.
• * 1.88

  De Nat. Dcor. l. z.
• * 1.89

  Sect. 8.
• * 1.90

  V••lkelius de vera rel. l. 2. c. 4.
• * 1.91

  Galen de usa part. l. 11.
• * 1.92

  Chalcid. in T••m. p. 372.
• * 1.93

  Origen. Philoc. cap. 24. Tertul. ad. Her∣mog. per tot. Sect. 9.
• * 1.94

  De Animae procreat. •• Timaeo.
• * 1.95

  Chalcid. in Tim. p. 377
• * 1.96

  T. 401.
• * 1.97

  Pag. 393.
• * 1.98

  V. Zenon.
• * 1.99

  V. Lipsium in Physiol. Sto. l. 1. c. 4.
• * 1.100

  Epist. 65.
• * 1.101

  Presat. ad Nat Quaest. Eclog. Phy∣sic.
• * 1.102

  In Tim. p. 388.
• * 1.103

  Sect. 10.
• * 1.104

  Physiol. Stoic. l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.105

  vers. Her∣mog. c. 4.
• * 1.106

  Cap. 7.
• * 1.107

  Cap. 8.
• * 1.108

  Orig. Phi∣loc. c. 24.
• * 1.109

  Sect. 11.
• * 1.110

  Apud Diog. Laert. l. 10. Lucret. de Nat. l. 5.
• * 1.111

  Praep. Evang. l. 14 c. 22. p 421 ed. R. St.

  De Placitis Phil. l. 1. c. 4 A••not. in Senec. de provid.
• * 1.112

  De Nut. ret. l. 1.
• * 1.113

  L••b. 5.
• * 1.114

  De Nat. Deor. l. 1.
• * 1.115

  Sect. 12.
• * 1.116

  D: Nat. Dear. l. 2.
• * 1.117

  V. Gassen∣dum de Lo∣gica Epicu∣ri. Op To. 1. c. 7. Can. 7.
• * 1.118

  Sect. 13. 2.
• * 1.119

  D•• Gene∣rat. Anim. Exercit. 72.
• * 1.120

  De Nat. Deor. l. 2.
• * 1.121

  De Divi∣nat. l. 1. De Finibus lib. 1.
• * 1.122

  Sect. 14.
• * 1.123

  Physic. s. 1. l 3. c. 7.

  De appa∣rent. mag∣nitud. Solis bumilis & sublimis. Sp. 4. sect. 3.

  De motu. Physic. s. 1. l. 5. c. 2.

  Vep de mo∣tu impresse à motore translato. To. 3. op. Sect. 15.
• * 1.124

  Praep. Evangel. l. 14. c. 22.
• * 1.125

  V Des Car∣tes Princip. p. 2. art. 54, 55, 56.
• * 1.126

  History of Fluid. and Firmness. p. 202.
• * 1.127

  Sect. 16.
• * 1.128

  Physic. s. 1. l. 3. c. 7.
• * 1.129

  De Fin. l. 1
• * 1.130

  De rerum nat. l. 2.
• * 1.131

  De Fin. bon. et mal. lib. 1.
• * 1.132

  De Animae procreat. •• Timaeo.

  Tu••nebus in Ciceron. de Fato.
• * 1.133

  Lib. 2.
• * 1.134

  Lib. de Fato.
• * 1.135

  Sect. 17.
• * 1.136

  Prap. E∣vang. l. 14. c. 24.
• * 1.137

  Laert. l. 10.
• * 1.138

  D. H. More Antid. a∣gainst A∣theism, part 2.
• * 1.139

  Censor. de die Nat. c. ••.
• * 1.140

  Antholog. l. 1. c. 15.
• * 1.141

  Sect. 18.
• * 1.142

  Princip. p. 3. Art. 46. &c.
• * 1.143

  Antidote. b. 2. ch. 1.

  Immorta∣lity of the soul. b. 1. c. 11. s. 3. &c. Ep. 3 ad C••rtes. p. ••8
• * 1.144

  Resp. ad. ep. 3. H. Mori. p. 104.
• * 1.145

  More Ne∣voch. l. 2. c. 30.

  Physic s. 1. l. 7. c. 6.
• * 1.146

  Eccl. 8. 17.
• * 1.147

  Sect. 1.
• * 1.148

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.149

  Diog. Laer. l. 10.
• * 1.150

  Disserl. 29.
• * 1.151

  T••lly de F••aib. l. 1. De nat. D. or••. 2. ••lutarch advers. Co••••t.
• * 1.152

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.153

  Act. 17. 28
• * 1.154

  Sect. 4.
• * 1.155

  ••••g. c. Cels. l. 4. p. 207.
• * 1.156

  Comment. in Epictet. c. 34.
• * 1.157

  Sect. 5. 2.
• * 1.158

  De his qui sero puni∣untur a nu∣mine.
• * 1.159

  Sect. 6.
• * 1.160

  Vid. Thom. 1. p. q. 63. art. 1.

  Estium in sentent. l. 2, dist. 7. Sect. 9.
• * 1.161

  Com. in Epict. cap•• 34. p. 175.
• * 1.162

  Pag. 180. ed. Salon∣asii.
• * 1.163

  Sect. 7.
• * 1.164

  Pag. 186. 187••
• * 1.165

  Sect. 8.
• * 1.166

  ••ierocl: in aurea Carmina. p. 77.
• * 1.167

  Plat. in Pbaed.
• * 1.168

  Sect. 9.
• * 1.169

  Plutarch. de Isid. & Osir. p. 369. ed. Fr.
• * 1.170

  Plut. in Alex.

  Diog. La∣c••tius pro. em. ad vit. Phi∣losoph.
• * 1.171

  Sect. 10.
• * 1.172

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. de Heres. c. 46.
• * 1.173

  Sect. 11.
• * 1.174

  De Isid. & Osiride.
• * 1.175

  Chalcid. in Timae. p. 394.
• * 1.176

  De Anim•• procreat. c Timae ••.
• * 1.177

  Sect. 12.
• * 1.178

  Chalcid. in Tim. p. 39••.
• * 1.179

  M••xim. Tyrius Serm. 25. Seneca de Provid c. 5.
• * 1.180

  Prasat. ad natur. quaest.
• * 1.181

  1.
• * 1.182

  Tertul. ad:. Hermog. c. 10.
• * 1.183

  2.
• * 1.184

  3.
• * 1.185

  Sect. 13▪
• * 1.186

  Euseb. Ec∣cles. hist. l. 6. c••p. 19.

  H••rony. de Script. Eccl. De vit. & Script. Por∣phyr. c. 6.
• * 1.187

  Plato in Epinom.
• * 1.188

  Apol. c. 47.
• * 1.189

  Tertul. de A••••ma cap. 2.
• * 1.190

  De Pro∣script. ad∣vers. hae∣ret. cap. 7.
• * 1.191

  Sect. 14.
• * 1.192

  Sect. 15. 1.
• * 1.193

  De Absti∣nent. lib 3. Sect. 27.
• * 1.194

  Hierocl. in Pythag. Carm. p. 261.
• * 1.195

  Hierocles in Pythag. p. 254.
• * 1.196

  Sect. 16. 2.
• * 1.197

  In aur. Carm. p. 258.
• * 1.198

  3.
• * 1.199

  August de Civit. D••i l. 10. c. 33.
• * 1.200

  Sect. 17.
• * 1.201

  D. Casau∣bon Ori∣ginal of Temporal evils.
• * 1.202

  Plutarch. de Isid. & Osi••. p. 361.
• * 1.203

  Jamblichus de myster. p. 105.
• * 1.204

  Sect. 18. 2.
• * 1.205

  Orig c. Cels. lib. 6.
• * 1.206

  Antiq. lect. l. 2. c 7.

  Euseb. de Praep. Evang. l. 1▪ cap. 10.
• * 1.207

  Apolog. 2.
• * 1.208

  Satyr. 1.
• * 1.209

  Heins. Ari∣starch. p. 18. ed. 1627.
• * 1.210

  ••••••d. B.
• * 1.211

  3.
• * 1.212

  Origen. c. Cels. l. 4. p. 189.
• * 1.213

  Sect. 20.
• * 1.214

  Comment in Epictet. c. 38. p. 223.
• * 1.215

  Tully l. 3. de Nat. Deor.
• * 1.216

  Sect. 21.
• * 1.217

  Plutarch. de his qui sero pu••i∣untur à nu∣mine p. 550. ed. Fr.
• * 1.218

  Luk. 6. 35, 36.
• * 1.219

  Plutarch. p. 551. Rev. 2. 21.
• * 1.220

  Isa. 57. 31.
• * 1.221

  Plut. p. 561.
• * 1.222

  Sect. 22.
• * 1.223

  Senec. de Provid. c. 1
• * 1.224

  Sect 1.
• * 1.225

  Act. 17. 26.
• * 1.226

  Odyss. v.
• * 1.227

  1 Cor. 15. 45, 47.
• * 1.228

  Marke 10. 6, 7.
• * 1.229

  Gen. 2. 23. 24.
• * 1.230

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.231

  Gen. 3. 20.
• * 1.232

  Selden. de jure natur. & gent. l. 1. c. ••. p. 65
• * 1.233

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.234

  Gen. 6. 5, 7. ••
• * 1.235

  Gen. 7. 21.
• * 1.236

  23.
• * 1.237

  Sect. 4.
• * 1.238

  Gen. 1, 20, 21.
• * 1.239

  Ver. 24.
• * 1.240

  Ver. 26.
• * 1.241

  Gen. 2. 6.
• * 1.242

  Sect. 5.
• * 1.243

  Hist. of the World. 1 B. c. 7. sect. 6.
• * 1.244

  Job 12 15.
• * 1.245

  Gen. 7. 11.
• * 1.246

  ••••id.
• * 1.247

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. 2. ••p. Phys. sect. 3. ••1.
• * 1.248

  Plut. in Aemil••n. Plin. l. 2. c. 65.
• * 1.249

  Voss. in Pomp. Melā l. 2. c. 2. p. 115. &c.
• * 1.250

  V. Vareni∣um Geogr. General. l. 1 c. 10 prop. 3
• * 1.251

  Sect. 6.
• * 1.252

  V. Gassend. vit. Pereskii l. 3. p. 292.
• * 1.253

  Sect. 7.
• * 1.254

  Gen. 6. 15.
• * 1.255

  Buteo de arca Noe.
• * 1.256

  p. 93. Ho••tus de fabrica Arcae Noab∣••••. 66.
• * 1.257

  Sect. 8.
• * 1.258

  V. Grot. Annot. in l. 1. deVerit. r lig Christ. Vo••. Isago. Chronolog. dissert. 4. c. 2. & 3.

  Bochart. Geogr sacr. l. 1. c. 4.

  August. de Civit. Dei. l. 18 c. 12. & ibi. Lud. Viv. Euseb. Chr. p. 5. cd. 2.

  Scaliger. If. Voss. epist. ad Colvium. pag. 409.

  Martin. hist. Sinic. l. 1. p. 12.

  Joh. de Lact. de orig. gent. American. l. 1. p. 115.
• * 1.259

  Gro. Annot. ad l. 1. de Verit. Ari. Montan. Phaleg. Junius in Gen. 10. Bochart. Geogr. Sacr. p. 1.
• * 1.260

  Sect. 9.
• * 1.261

  Petav. de doctr. temp. l. 9 c 14. Tom. 2.
• * 1.262

  Vsser. An∣nales Vet. Test. A. M. 2737.
• * 1.263

  Castigat. adv. Hor∣nium. c. 10. Gen. 91.
• * 1.264

  Petav. de doctrin. temp. l. 9. c 14.
• * 1.265

  Usser. Chronol. Sacr. c. 5.
• * 1.266

  Horn. de∣sens. dissert. de aet. mun∣di. 6. 26.
• * 1.267

  Proleg. ad bibl. Poly∣glot. cap. 9. s. 58, 63, &c.

  Isaac Vossi∣us de LXX. I••••••rp. & 〈◊〉〈◊〉. History of the World. p. 1. b. 2. c. 1. s••ct. 7.
• * 1.268

  Sect. 10. 2.
• * 1.269

  〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉〈◊〉. Schol.〈◊〉〈◊〉Arist. Acharn••ns.
• * 1.270

  Stephanus de 〈◊〉〈◊〉. v. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Hom. l. u.
• * 1.271

  Dio••••••••u. 416.
• * 1.272

  Ar. Mon∣tan. Phaleg. ••. 24.
• * 1.273

  Bochart. Phal••g. l. 3. cap. 10.
• * 1.274

  Sect. 11.
• * 1.275

  Geogr. l. 7. V. cho isst. in Apollo∣nium l. 4. v. 262.
• * 1.276

  Geogr. l. 9.
• * 1.277

  In Arcad.
• * 1.278

  Strabo. l. 13
• * 1.279

  Lib. 7.
• * 1.280

  In Imag••
• * 1.281

  Sect. 12.
• * 1.282

  De Hellen. p. 315.
• * 1.283

  Sect. 13.
• * 1.284

  Grot. not. in lib. 1. de jur. b••l. &c. cap. 3. Sal••de Hel∣len.
• * 1.285

  Gen. 11. 19, 21.
• * 1.286

  D•• Seyth••s. ep. ad. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. & 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• * 1.287

  Sect. 14.
• * 1.288

  Lib. 5.
• * 1.289

  Lib. 12.
• * 1.290

  Lib. 5.
• * 1.291

  O••ly 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 175.
• * 1.292

  De Phoen. Col. l. 1. c. 15.
• * 1.293

  Lib. 1. c. 9.
• * 1.294

  Geogr. p. 2. l. 1. c. 12.
• * 1.295

  Lib. 1. c. 9.
• * 1.296

  De spect. c. 8.
• * 1.297

  Lib. 1. c. 12.
• * 1.298

  Lib. 2.
• * 1.299

  De Idol. l. 2. c. 57.

  A••not. in Mat. 12. 1.
• * 1.300

  Sect. 15.
• * 1.301

  1 Machab. 12 21.

  Antiq. l. 13. c. 9.
• * 1.302

  De Idol. l. 1. c. 13.
• * 1.303

  Achar••ens. Act. 1. sc. 4
• * 1.304

  Geogr. l. 11.
• * 1.305

  De Phoe∣ni••. Col. l. 1. c. 22.
• * 1.306

  Canon. 1. sag. p. 332.
• * 1.307

  Gen. 11. •• 17, 28.
• * 1.308

  Vi Grotium Joh. de La∣••••, Horn. de Orig. Gent. American.

  V. Manass•• Be•• Israel. Spes Israe∣lis. Et Spizzel. dc Israeli••is America∣••is.
• * 1.309

  Sect. 1.
• * 1.310

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.311

  Book 1 c 1. Sect. 16.
• * 1.312

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.313

  V. Mer. Ca∣saub. de 4. linguis. p. 3. &c.
• * 1.314

  Exercit. in Cordan. 259. sect. 1.
• * 1.315

  Diatrib. de L. Heb. p. 17, 18.
• * 1.316

  Pag. 47.
• * 1.317

  Sect. 4.
• * 1.318

  Aan••t. in Gen. 11. 1, 2.
• * 1.319

  Enquiries. cap. 5, 6.
• * 1.320

  Metned. hist. cap. 9.
• * 1.321

  May••r. P. odr. Chal∣da••sm. c. 1.
• * 1.322

  ••oca. G••or. l. 1. c. 15.

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 dia••. sect. 54.

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. diat. sect. 68.
• * 1.323

  ••••ps. cent. 3. ep. 44.

  Busbeq. ••p. 24.
• * 1.324

  Mayer. Philol. sacr. p. 2. c. 6.
• * 1.325

  Sect. 5. 4.
• * 1.326

  Stromat. 6. c. Cels. l. 4.
• * 1.327

  Apollod. bibliot••. lib. 1. p. 19••
• * 1.328

  Apu l Cyril. c. Julian. lib. 1.
• * 1.329

  Strom. l. 1.
• * 1.330

  Gen. 11. 4.
• * 1.331

  Apud Eu∣seb. Praep. Evang l 9.
• * 1.332

  Gen 46. 6.
• * 1.333

  3.
• * 1.334

  Phal••g. l. 1. cap. 1.
• * 1.335

  Canaan. l. 1. cap. 28.
• * 1.336

  Canaan cap. 6.
• * 1.337

  Sect. 6. 5.
• * 1.338

  De Idol l. 1.
• * 1.339

  Cice. o l. 3. de Natur. D.
• * 1.340

  Steph. V. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.341

  Sect. 7.
• * 1.342

  V. Scaliger. not. in fr. Graec. Selden. de Diis Syris. Bochart. Cana. l. 2. c. 2.
• * 1.343

  De Idol. l. 1. cap. 38. Tacit. de mor. b. Ger∣man.
• * 1.344

  Stephanus V. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.345

  Apolog. c. 10.
• * 1.346

  Voss. de I∣dol. l. 1. cap. 17.
• * 1.347

  Gen. 4. 22.
• * 1.348

  4. 21.
• * 1.349

  Sect. 8.
• * 1.350

  Phal••g. l. 1. cap: ••.
• * 1.351

  Biblioth. l. 1
• * 1.352

  V Mayer. Philol. sacr. p. 3. c. 5.
• * 1.353

  Biblioth. l. 5
• * 1.354

  Philostr. c. 4
• * 1.355

  Sect. 9.
• * 1.356

  Voss. dcIdol. l. 1. c. 18.

  Boch. Pha∣leg. l. 1. c. 1. Cap. 2.
• * 1.357

  De Idol. l. 1. c. 16.
• * 1.358

  V. Scaliger. not. ad sr. Gr.
• * 1.359

  Grot. in Deut cr. c. 18. v. 10.

  Voss. de Ido. l. 1. c. 18.
• * 1.360

  Gen. 22. 1.
• * 1.361

  De phenic. col. l. 2. c. 2. Heb. 11. 11
• * 1.362

  Joseph. An∣tiq l. 1. c 7.

  Euseb. Prep. Evang. l. 9. cap. 16. Sect. 10.
• * 1.363

  Callimach. Hymn. in Apollo.
• * 1.364

  Gen. 28. 18
• * 1.365

  Scalig. not. in sr. Gr. Bochart. Can. l. 2. c. 2 Seld. dcDiis Svris.

  V. Heins. in Clem. Alex. Str. 7. Casaub. ad Theophr. p. 295. Herald. ad Arnob. l. 1.

  Colvium ad Apul. Florid. Ouzel. ot Elmenhorst. ad Minuci. De Idolola. l. 1. c. 29.
• * 1.366

  Gen. 45. 8.
• * 1.367

  Sect. 11.
• * 1.368

  De Idol. l. 1. c. 30.
• * 1.369

  Dion. l. 20.
• * 1.370

  Bibl. l. 4.
• * 1.371

  Canaan. l. 1. cap. 18.
• * 1.372

  De Idol. l. 1 c. 26. p. 138. p. 169.
• * 1.373

  De Dcor. C•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 10. Eliac••ōv. 2. p. 203.
• * 1.374

  Sect. 1.
• * 1.375

  Sect. 2.
• * 1.376

  Sect. 3.
• * 1.377

  Sect. 4.
• * 1.378

  1 Tim. 1. 15.
• * 1.379

  1 Cor. 2. 2.
• * 1.380

  Sect. 5.
• * 1.381

  2 Cor. 5. 18, 19.
• * 1.382

  Rom. 10. 14.
• * 1.383

  Act. 14 14. Luke. 6. ••5, 36.
• * 1.384

  Sect. ••.
• * 1.385

  Sect. 7. 2.
• * 1.386

  Book 2. ch. 8. sect. 5, 6, 7. 3.
• * 1.387

  C. Cels. l. 3. p. 135.
• * 1.388

  Sect. 8. 2.
• * 1.389

  2 Cor. 4. 3, 4.
• * 1.390

  Heb. 4. 12, 13.
• * 1.391

  2 Tim. 1. 13.
• * 1.392

  Sect. 9.
• * 1.393

  Quintil. l. 1. c. 6.
• * 1.394

  Deut. 5. 29.
• * 1.395

  ••er 13. 27.

  Ezek. 33. 11.

  Hos. 11. S.
• * 1.396

  Mat. 23. 37
• * 1.397

  Sict. 10. 2.
• * 1.398

  Sect. 11.