The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr. Locke's letter, concerning some passages relating to his Essay of humane understanding, mention'd in the late Discourse in vindication of the Trinity with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late Socinian pamphlet.

Postscript.

I Had no Thoughts of adding a Postscript to my Answer, as you had done to your Letter; but be∣fore the Sheets were wrought off, there was sent to me a new Socinian Pamphlet, wherein there are Reflections (and little more) on my late Treatise in Vindication of the Trinity. The rea∣son I had to joyn my short Animadver∣sions on that to these Papers, was the advantages he takes from the abstracted Notion of Nature against the Doctrine of the Trinity, which was the thing I told you, I apprehended to be of dan∣gerous Consequence in it.

But before I come to that, I cannot but take notice of their very different way of Writing from yours, which is Grave and Civil, but theirs is trifling, and too scurrilous in matters of Re∣ligion, for which I had so justly re∣buked them before, but it seems to ve∣ry little purpose: which makes me apt to think, their greatest Hopes still are in

such Readers, who love to see Matters of Religion ridiculed; and the Persons who are concerned to defend them ex∣posed to Scorn and Contempt. This was that I told them, which gave such a Relish to their late Pamphlets, as though nothing would go down with such vitiated Palats, that had not a Mixture of this Assa soetida with it. But because in the Conclusion of his Pamphlet, he charges me as well as o∣thers, with using them unjustly as well as roughly. I shall give a Tast of this man's decent manner of Writing. The first thing he insists upon against me, is, That I openly profess my Method, that I will prove First, then Secondly, then Thirdly, then Fourthly and Fifthly. And what harm is there in using the plainest Method in a nice and intricate Subject? Should I go about to justifie this, by the Rules of the ancient and best Ma∣sters of Writing in Arguments of such a Nature? That would be shewing too much regard to such pitifull Cavilling. But methinks these men should not ob∣ject this Method against us, of First, Secondly and Thirdly, who had before charged us with brutal and inexcusable Ignorance in Counting or Numbring. But

he goes on. And now beloved first of the first. Have I any words like these? No matter for that. But this serves well enough for the Farce; when the design is to ridicule the Form and Way of mo∣dern Sermons; which he knew was an acceptable Subject to his Men of Wit, as he calls them. If they be really so, they cannot but despise such Fooling in serious matters. And our Modern Ser∣mons are such, both as to the Structure and Reason of them, as will bear the Cen∣sures of Men of Judgment, (as well it may be, as of any Age) but his Men of Wit, who love Religion in no dress, will always have something or other in Sermons to find fault with. And our Author was hard put to it to bring in this smart Reflection on Modern Ser∣mons to please his Friends, which was very remote from a Debate about the Trinity.

The next thing is, (for I must not say Secondly) That my Way of Writing is too obscure; and that he could not take my Meaning under two or three Readings. Which to please his Men of Wit, he fa∣cetiously expresses after this manner; And when I have strained my Iaws and hazarded my Teeth to break the Shell,

most commonly it proves nothing but a Shell, that I am tempted to renounce Nuts for ever. And I think he will do wise∣ly in it. I am certain, I was so far from affecting Obscurity, that I endea∣voured to put the darkest points into as good a Light, as I could; and I am a∣fraid he sometimes shut his Eyes, that he might complain of the darkness of the Room.

I dare not go so far as Thirdly; and therefore come to consider the main parts of his Pretence to answer my Book.

As to the Contents of my Book, he saith. I shew, that neither Antiquity, nor Reason, nor Scripture is at all for them, they are all against them. Where∣in he is very much in the right. And I shall now examine what he hath said, to take off any part of the Charge.

He begins with Antiquity, and very fairly takes it for granted, That for 4000 Years, The Doctrine of the Uni∣tarians was the true Doctrine: but he observes, That I make the Doctrine of the Trinity to have been a part of the Cabala or Oral Tradition among the Iews; upon which he cries out, Where is Con∣science, or is Religion nothing but a Name?

Why, what's the matter? How comes Conscience and Religion to be so deeply concerned, whether the Jews had any Anticipation of the Trinity among them? But he saith, I do not believe the Iewish Cabala, no more than the Alchoran, and yet I produce the Authority of it: and he adds, That it was a Fiction of the Pharisees; and that it is a Prevarication in me to mention it as the unwritten Word of God. I am afraid his Cracking of Nuts hath put him into some Disorder, and made him cry out, without any other Cause but the Pain of his Teeth. Where did I ever give the least Cause to suspect my owning the Iewish Cabala, as the unwritten Word of God? All that I said was this. The Socinians had said, That Christ was called the Word, because he was the Bringer or Messenger of God's Word. To which I answer'd, That the Jews were to understand it in the Sense it was known among them: which was for a Divine Subsistence, as I proved from the Chaldee Paraphrast, and the Testi∣monies of Philo the Alexandrian Iew, who lived so near our Saviour's time. Here is not a Word of the Pharisaical Cabala, which every one knows to have been about Traditional Customs, which

they laid as much weight upon, as up∣on the Law of God, if not more. But the Chaldee Paraphrast was in very great Esteem, as giving the true Sense of the Scripture, and for that only I produced it. And what answer doth he give to the Testimonies out of it? He saith, They relate either to the Law, or to the Command of God to Moses, or to the Power of God. But I shew'd that Rittan∣gel, who managed the Debate on this Argument with a learned Vnitarian, proved to his plain Conviction, that these places could be understood of no∣thing but a Divine Subsistence. But he mightily triumphs, that the most per∣tinent Place is false printed; for it is set down, Gen. 20.21. and he tells us, There are but 18 Verses in that Chapter; but a Man of common Ingenuity would suspect an Error in the Press in such a case; and if he had pleased to have look'd on Gen. 28.21. he might have have found 22 Verses, and the Words in the 21. Therefore, saith he, so much for Chaldee and Cabala, despised by all learn∣ed Men, Iews as well as Christians; and never used but when the People are to be gulled with noisy Nothings. One would hardly think it possible such mean stuff

as this should pass for an answer, a∣mong any that pretend to Sense or Knowledge. For how can he deny the sense of the Chaldee Paraphrast, when Philo the Alexandrian Iew concurs in that Interpretation, as is evident by multitudes of places in him? Did I not expresly mention his Testimony as con∣curring with the other? Why not a word said to it? Did I not add the Con∣sent of Eusebius concerning the Jews owning the Divinity of the Messias, till they fell off from it in opposition to the Christians? And are these but noisy Nothings to gull People with? Let what will become of the Dispute between the Pharisaical Jews and the Karaites; those who know any thing of these Matters, do know that I went upon other grounds; viz. whether the Israelites did receive from God an Oral Law, which they are bound to observe as much as the written Law, and to interpret the written Law, and the force of its ob∣ligation by it. And this I never men∣tion'd or intended to plead for it. And as to the 13 ways of Cabalistical Inter∣pretations, I look on them as groundless and frivolous things; but the thing I aimed at, was only this, There are cer∣tainly

places of the Old Testament, which speak of the Messias as the Son of God; Thou art my Son, &c. and call him Lord, The Lord said unto my Lord. The question is, what the Sense of these places was, and how they are to be ap∣plied to Christ? Now if it appear, that the most ancient Jews did understand them in such a manner, as to apply them to a Second Subsistence in the Di∣vinity, we have great reason to follow that Sense, which is so agreeable to the New Testament; and about this we have no manner of Reason to despise the Sense of the ancient Jews, and e∣specially of the Chaldee Paraphrast, who asserts a second and a third Subsistence in the Divinity. And this he could not but find without any danger to his Iaws, was the only thing I intended.

The next thing in point of Anti∣quity which he contests, is about the Nazarenes: That Name, I said, was at first common to all Christians, as is plain from Act. 24.5. afterwards it was ap∣plied to the Jewish Christians at Pella and Decapolis; and to such as admitted no Gentiles to their Communion, but kept to the Ceremonies of the Law; and of these I said they might be all

Ebionites; but I utterly denied it of such as were Members of the Catholick Christian Church, as it was made up of Iews and Gentiles. This Distinction he calls a pure figment, but answers not one of the Reasons I brought for it; although I proved from uncontroulable Evidence, that they made two different Bodies, had different Rules of Faith; and that the Church of Ierusalem did hold the Divinity and Pre-existence of our Saviour. And is all this Cabala too, and only to be used when People are to be gulled with noisy Nothings? i. e. with empty Pleroma's, and silent Thunder∣claps. The Alogians were theirs, for any thing I know in all respects; and I will give them Theodotion, and Paulus Samosatenus, and Photinus. But I think not much to their comfort; the two latter were most certainly condemned by the Christian Church; and whether the former were a mere Iewish Proselyte, or an Ebionite is not worth contending about; since S. Ierom makes him to translate the places about our Saviour like a Jew, and Aquila like a Christian; which shews how mean an opinion he had of his Sincerity.

I proved the condemning Paulus Sa∣mosatenus while they were under the power of Zenobia, to be a plain evidence of the sense of the Christian Church against his Doctrine; at a time when no interest could be supposed to sway them. To this he gives a twofold An∣swer, (1.) That be sure it is false, that they were then under the power of Zenobia. But how can we be sure it is false, when I brought proof it was true, and he an∣swers nothing at all to it? But it seems, all is Cabala and noisy Nothings that stand in his way. (2.) He saith, They were all Hereticks. A very short Answer. But how is this proved? For a little proof looks well sometimes, and a man must not always say, be sure it is so. Well, here is a plain proof; they differ'd from the Council of Nice about Homoou∣sios. But I had before given a full An∣swer to that, p. 42. to which he gives not the least reply, viz. that they took it in two different Senses.

As to Lucian, I leave it to the Rea∣ders Judgment, if he compares what I have said, and what he answers together, and whether he thinks it probable that the Arians should forge a Creed under his Name at Antioch; if he continued in

the Doctrine of Paulus Samosatenus, which was contrary to it.

This is all, he saith, that seems con∣siderable in point of Antiquity; and whether he hath said any thing really considerable about it, let the Reader judge.

Come we now to the point of Scri∣pture, which is the main point in the case. For I had declared, p. 112. that our Faith as to the Trinity, is built up∣on that; and that there are many pla∣ces of Scripture, of which no tolerable Sense can be given without it. And therefore I examined the Sense the V∣nitarians gave of the most remarkable Places, and shew'd the Weakness and Inconsistency of it, and then in an en∣tire Chapter proved our Doctrine from the Form of Baptism delivered by our Sa∣viour, as it was always understood in the Christian Church. This I think was a very plain and easie Method of proving our Doctrine.

And what now saith our Vnitarian to all this? Truely, I have met with few Answers like it. In short, he saith, That for his part, he is enough perswaded without further arguing the Matter, that I have spent my Breath against a Rock.

This is just the Popish way of answering by Infallibility and super hanc Petram. But in neither case can I see the least ground for such mighty Confidence. Alas for them! they say, That if we write against their Interpretations of Scri∣pture, they are not at leisure to wipe off every small Soil that may happen to be scatter'd in their Books. Not at Lei∣sure! Whence have come all those Swarms of pestilent Books which have come abroad of late Years among us, to spread their infectious Doctrine over the Nation? And now are they not at Leisure to defend them? And at the same time have Leisure enough to run into other Matters, about which there may be more Colour for Cavil∣ling. So that this cannot be the true Reason, and I leave the Reader to judge what it is.

The last thing is the point of Reason; and here he finds Leisure enough to ex∣patiate. But I shall keep to that point, upon which he supposes the whole Con∣troversie to turn, which is, whether the difference between Nature and Per∣son, which we observe in Mankind, do so far hold with respect to the Divine Nature, that it is a Contradiction to

say, there are three Persons and not three Gods?

And there are several things I propo∣sed, in order to the clearing of this Mat∣ter, which I shall endeavour to lay down as distinctly as I can; and I shall not be Hector'd or Banter'd out of that which I account the most proper Me∣thod, although it happen to be too ob∣scure for our Men of Wit to understand without Hazard of their Iaws.

The Principles or Suppositions I lay down are these;

• I. Nature is One and Indivisible in it self, whereever it is.
• II. The more perfect any Nature is, the more perfect must its Unity be.
• III. Whatever is affirmed of a most perfect Being, must be understood in a way agreeable to its Perfection.
• IV. It is repugnant to the Perfection of the divine Nature, to be multiplied into such Individuals as are among Men; because it argues such a dependence and separation, as is inconsistent with the most perfect Unity.
• ...

• V. To suppose three distinct Persons in one and the same Indivisible Divine Nature, is not repugnant to the Divine Perfections; if they be founded on such relative Properties, which cannot be confounded with each other, and be in themselves agreeable to the Divine Na∣ture.
• VI. Whether there be three such di∣stinct Persons or not, is not to be drawn from our own Imaginations, or Simili∣tudes in created Beings, but only from the Word of God, from whom alone the Knowledge of it can be communi∣cated to Mankind.

Let us now see how he proves, that since there is no Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common human Nature, it must be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the same divine Nature. He offers at no less than de∣monstrative Reason, p. 58. c. 2. but I have always had the most cause to fear the Men that pretend to Infallibility, and Demonstration. I pass over his Mysteri∣ous Boxes, as Trifles fit only to enter∣tain his Men of Wit, and come immedi∣ately

to his demonstrative Reason, is it be to be met with. It comes at last to no more than this, that Human Na∣ture, and Angelical Nature, and Camel Nature have no Existence but only in our Conception; and are only Notions of our Minds; but the Persons in the same rati∣onal Being are not mere Metaphysical Per∣sons or Relative Properties, but they are such as necessarily suppose distinct Substan∣ces as well as distinct Properties. But in the Trinity, the Nature is a really existing Nature, 'tis a Spiritual Substance, and endued with a great number of Divine Attributes, not an abstracted or mere no∣tional imaginary Nature; and the Divine Persons are not distinct Substances or real Beings, but Properties only in a real Be∣ing and in an infinite Substance. This is the force of the Demonstration. But now if I can make it appear, that every Na∣ture is not only One and Indivisible in it self, but endued with Essential Attri∣butes and Properties belonging to it as such, then it will be evident, that Na∣ture is not a mere Abstracted Notion of our Minds, but something which really exists somewhere; and then the Founda∣tion of this demonstrative Reason is taken away. And I appeal to any Persons

that consider things, whether the Hu∣man, Angelical, and Camel Nature (as he calls it) do not really differ from each other, and have such Essential Pro∣perties belonging to them as cannot a∣gree to any other Nature? For else it must be a mere Notion and Fiction of the Mind, to make any real difference between them. But if Human Nature and Camel Nature do essentially differ from each other, then every Nature hath its Essential Unity and Properties which cannot belong to any other, and that without any act of our Minds. And if every Nature is really and essen∣tially different from another, it must have an Existence somewhere indepen∣dent on our Notions and Conceptions.

It may be said, That no such Nature doth really exist by it self, but only in the several Individuals. But that is not the present Question, where or how it exists, but whether it depend only on our Imaginations or the acts of our Minds; and if it doth so, then there can be no real and essential Difference in the Natures of Men and Beast, which I think none who have the Understand∣ing of a Man can imagine.

But really existing Natures, he saith, are in such Persons, as necessarily suppose distinct Substances, as well as distinct Pro∣perties; and if they existed only in a common Nature, as the Humanity, and had not also distinct Substances, they would never make distinct Persons.

I do allow, that in created and de∣pendent Beings, there must be distinct Substances to make distinct Persons; but he ought to have given an account what that is which makes distinct Persons' ne∣cessarily to suppose distinct Substances. For the Nature is One and Indivisible in them all; or else every Individual must make a new Species, which is an Ab∣surdity I suppose he will not be fond of. If there be then one and the same Nature in the Individuals, whence comes the difference of Substances to be so neces∣sarily supposed? If it be from Diversity, Dissimilitude, Dependence and separate Existence, as I asserted, then these Rea∣sons can hold only in created Beings; and where they cannot hold, as in the Divine Nature, why may there not be a distinction of Persons founded on re∣lative Properties, without any distincti∣on of Substances, which is repugnant to the perfect Unity of the Godhead?

What demonstrative Reason, nay, what probable Argument hath he offer'd a∣gainst this?

He takes notice p. 60. of what I had said about the distinction of Personality and Person; and that Personality is original∣ly only a particular Mode of Subsistence; and a Person besides the relative Pro∣perty takes in the divine Nature toge∣ther with it. And what Demonstration have we against this? So far from it, that he falls to Tristing again to keep his Men of Wit in good Humour. So much for Madam Personality, now for Sir Per∣son. Is this a decent way of Writing about these Matters; to begin with the Talk of demonstrative Reason, and to end with Burlesquing, and turning them into Ridicule? If this be an agreeable Enter∣tainment for his Men of Wit, it shews that they deserve that Character, as well as he doth that of a Demonstrator.

But this sportfull Gentleman hath found something else to play with, viz. that my Notion of three Subsistences without three Substances is really nothing but Sabellianism. But I had already said so much for the clearing of this, both in the Preface and the Book it self, that I need not to add one Word about it, un∣less

he had suggested some new demon∣strative Reason to prove it. Which he is far enough from. All that he saith, is, That they must be called Fools as well as Sabellius, if they asserted Relative Pro∣perties, or any Properties that were in no Essence. But the Author of the Dis∣course of Real and Nominal Trinitarians, (to whom he is no Stranger) had said That the Sabellians held that the Father, Son and Spirit are but only three Names of God given to him in Scripture by occasi∣on of so many several Dispensations towards the Creature, and so he is but one subsi∣sting Person and three Relative Persons. If this be true, here are Relative Proper∣ties indeed relating to a Divine Essence: but how? not as to any Internal Rela∣tions of Father, Son and Holy Ghost; but as to External Dispensations, which are another kind of Relative Properties.

This is all that I can find in this last Effort, that relates to my self: As to what concerns others, they are very able to defend themselves, and particu∣larly as to Dr. S. and Dr. Sh. I must still say I think them much his Superiours as to Wit and Learning, (for of them I spake without the least Respect to my self, how∣ever he makes it a Complement to my self

and them, I know not for what Reason, unless it be that I speak of those a∣gainst whom they had written with In∣solence and Scorn.) But I hope they will shew themselves so much his Supe∣riours too in Wisdom and Discretion, as not to renew their Quarrels upon his Provocations, for he doth what in him lies to inflame them; and he thought it, (and I do not blame him for it) the best service he could do to his sinking Cause.

WORCESTER, April 26, 1697.

E. W.

FINIS.