The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CARNEADES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Masters.

CARNEADES (successour of Egesinus) was ofa 1.1 Cyrene, whenceb 1.2 Cicero saith, he was an acute person, as being an African. Hee was sonne of Epicomus, or Philocomus. Apollo∣dorus, as cited by Laertius, affirmeth he died in the 162. Olympiad; but there is a mi∣stake in the Text; for the words of Apollodo∣rus relate doubtlesse to the time of his birth, which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the first year of 162. Olympiad. Florus (cited byc 1.3 Plutarch) addes, he was born on the 7^th day of Tharlegion, at what time the Car∣nean Festivalls were celebrated at Cyrene, whence perhaps he took his name.

This time falling after the Callippical period, we shall compute it according tod 1.4 Petavius his method, which although it be not exempt from question, yet is better then that of Scaliger, whose method is not reconcileable to Ptolomy's observations.

The fourth of the 164. Olympiad, was

Of the Julian period	4585.
Epoche of the Callippick period	4383.
Which subducted, there remains	202.
Subduct two perionods more	152.
remains	50.

The year propounded therefore is the 50^th of the third peri∣od. The Neomenia of He••atombaeon, Iune 26. which is the 177^th day of the Iulian year; the 7^th of Thargelion (according to Petavius) at that time was the 302. of the Attick year.

To	177.
adde	302.
Summe	479.
Subduct	365
Remains	114.

The 114^th day of the Julian year is the 24^th of April, on which fell the 7^th of Thargelion; which, the Dominicall Letter being B. fell on Sunday, Proleptically taken.

e 1.5 He was Disciple to Egesinus the Academick, andf 1.6 learned Lo∣gick of Diogenes the Stoick, whence in arguing he would many▪ times say, If I have concluded right, the cause is my own; if not right, Diogenes must return the ••ina he had of me; which was the price the Dialectick Philosophers took.

CHAP. II.

How he constituted the new Academy.

HE succeeded Egesinus in the School, and is by Cicero reckon'd the fourth from Arcesilaus, (who constituted the middle Aca∣demy, introducing a suspension of Assent, grounded upon the un∣certainty of things:) Carneades, constituted the new Academy, maintaining the same kind of suspension, with no lesse eagerness; yet upon more moderate grounds:* 1.7 for he held that the incompre∣hensibility of things, proceeded not from the nature of the things themselves, as Arcesilaus maintained; for as much as every thing really existeth in it self, and if any thing be affirmed or denied of another, it is true or false, as to the thing it self; but the things themselves remaining firm, we derive from them a Phantasia and similitude, which for the most part like false messengers lie and deceive us. To all true things there some false adjoined, and those so like, that, there is no certain note of Judication and assent, wherefore we cannot perceive any thing to be true.

But he was nothing lesse rigid as to the Academicall suspen∣sion, for* 1.8 he denied that any thing could be perceived, not so much as that very maxime; Nothing can be perceived, arguing thus. All Phantasmes are of two kinds; the first included the perceptible, and imperceptible; the second kind, the probable; and the improbable. Those which are contrary to sense and evi∣dence,

pertain to the former division; against the latter we ought not to say any thing. Wherefore there is no Phantasie fol∣lowed by perception, but by approbation many; for it were con∣trary to nature that nothing should be probable.

More fully* 1.9 Sextus Empericus. Carneades, saith he, did not on∣ly oppose the Stoicks, but all that went before him, as to judg∣ment. His first and common argument against all, is, that, by which he showeth absolutely, that there is nothing from which truth can be judged; not reason, not sense, not phantasy, nor any things, for all these in a word deceive us. His second argument is that whereby he shewes, that although there be something that doth judge, yet it cannot exist without an affection from evidence. For an animall differeth from inanimate things by the sensitive faculty, it apprehendeth thereby both it selfe and ex∣ternall things; but sense remaining immovable, impassible, and immutable, is not sense, nor apprehendeth any thing, but being changed, and after some manner affected by incursion of evi∣dents, then it declareth things. In that affection therefore of the soul which ariseth from evidence, we are to seek that which judgeth. This affection is declared when that appeareth from which it proceedeth, which affection is nothing else but phan∣tasy. Phantasy therefore is a certain affection in an animall, which sheweth both it selfe and some others, as when we see any thing, our sight is affected in some manner, so, as it was not before that act of seeing. By this alteration we apprehend two things: First, the alteration it selfe, that is the phantasy. Second∣ly, that from which this alteration proceeds, the things visible. The like in the rest of the senses. As therefore light manifesteth it selfe and all things in it, so phantasy being the chiefe guide of knowledge in an animall, must like unto Light, manifest both it selfe, and that evident object which effecteth it. But because it doth not alwaies shew that which is true, but often erreth and differeth from the thing whence it proceedeth, like ill messen∣gers, it necessarily followeth that all phantasies cannot leave a judgment of truth, but only if it be true. Again, because there is no phantasie so true, but it may be false; and of all phantasies that seem true there are some false, which differ little from them, that which judgeth must consist in common phantasy of true and false. But the common phantasy of these comprehen∣deth not, and if it comprehendeth not, neither is there any thing that judgeth. And if phantasy have not a judicative power, neither can reason judge, for that is derived from phantasy, and justly: For, that whereof it judgeth, ought first to appear unto it; but nothing can appear but through sense void of reason; therefore neither sense void of reason; nor reason it selfe is that which judgeth.

Thus disputed Carneades against all other Philosophers, to shew there is not any thing that judgeth. But, being demanded what judgeth, as to the leading of life and acquisition of beati∣tude, he hath recourse to probable phantasy; and together with probable, undistracted and circumcurrent, their differences these. Phantasy is the phantasy of somthing, viz. of that of which it is made, and of that in which it is made: That of which it is made is the externall sensible object; that in which, the Man. It hath two relations, one to the object phancyed, the other to the phan∣tasm derived from that object. From the relation to the object it is either true or false; true, when it agreeth with the object; false, when it disagreeth: From its relation to the phantasme, there is one which seemeth true, another false. That which see∣meth true is by the Academicks called Emphasis, and probability, and probable phantasie; that which seemeth not true is called Apemphasis, improbability, and not-p••obable phantasy. For, neither that which seemeth false, and is such; nor that which is true, and seemeth not such, have any thing in their nature perswasive. But, of these phantasies, that which is manifestly false, and seemeth not true, limiteth the judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewise produceth from that which is, but differs from it, such as was that of the fury proceeding from Electra to Orestes. Of that which seemeth true, one kinde is tenuious, as that which is in a thing so little, as that it is not visible, either because it takes not up room enough, or by reason of the weak∣nesse of sight, which receiveth things confusedly, and not di∣stinctly. The other is that which hath this common property with the true, that it seemeth to be very true. Now of these, the tenuious, loose, remisse phantasy cannot be that which judgeth; for that which cannot clearly manifest it selfe, nor the thing that effected it, cannot attract us, nor invite assent; but that which seemeth true and is manifest enough, that, according to Carneades, is the judge of truth.

This being that which judgeth, it hath a great latitude, and being extended into another species, hath a more probable and vehemently effective phantasy. Probable is taken three waies; first, for that which is true, and seemeth true; secondly, for that which is false, and seemeth true; thirdly, for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth must be that phantasy which seemeth true, which the Academicks call pro∣bable. Sometimes the false incurreth; so that it is necessary to use the common phantasy of true and false; yet, not because that more seldome incurreth, I mean that which imitateth the truth, we are not to give credit to that which is for the greater part true, whereby it happeneth our judgment and actions are for the most part directed.

That which first and commonly judgeth, Carneades held to be this. But forasmuch as phantasy sometimes is not of one kinde, but like a chain, one dependeth on another, there must therefore be a second judge, which is probable and undistracted phantasy. As he who receiveth the phantasy of a man, necessarily receiveth the phantasy of such things as are about him, and without him; of the things about him, as colour, magnitude, figure, motion, speech, cloathing, shooes; of things without him, as aire, light, day, heaven, earth, companions, and the like. When therefore none of these phantasies seems false, but all agree in seeming true, we credit it the more. That such a one is Socrates we be∣lieve, because he hath all those things which Socrates useth to have, as colour, magnitude, figure, gesture, cloak, in none of these disagreeing with it self. And as some Physitians argue a man to be in a feaver, not from one symptome, as from a high pulse, or great heat, but from the concurrence of that heat with the pulse, as also from ulcerous touch, rednesse, thirst, and the like, all agreeing together. So the Academick maketh a judgment of truth, from a concurrence of phantasies, and when none of all the phantasies that joyne in the concurrence retract him as false, he saith, that which incurreth is true.

That there is a credible undistracted concurrence, is manifest from Menelaus: Having left in his ship an image of Helene which he had brought from ••roy, as if it had been Helene her selfe, lan∣ding at the Island Pharos, he there met with the true Helene, and from her attracted a true phantasy, but would not believe that phantasy, being distracted by the other, which told him, that he had left Helene in the Ship. Such is undistracted phantasy there∣fore, which likewise seemeth erroneous, for as much as there are some more undistracted then others. Of undistracted phanta∣sies, that is most credible and perfect which maketh a judg∣ment.

Moreover, there is a circumcurrent phantasy, the form where∣of is next to be declared. In the undistracted we only enquire whether none of those phantasies which joyne in concurrence, attract us as false, but that they all seem true, and not impro∣bable. But in that which is made by concurse, which useth cir∣cumcurrence, strictly examines every phantasy which is in that concurrence, as in Assemblies, when the people take account of every particular person that stands for the Magistracy, whe∣ther they deserve that power and right of judging. In the place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the judgment is made, the distance and intervall, figure, time, manner, affection, and operation, each of which we examine strictly. That which judgeth, whether the sight be dimme, for if it be, it is too weak for judgment; that which is judged,

whether it be not too little; that through which, whether the air be obscure; the distance, whether it too great; the medium, whether confused; the place, whether too wide and vast; the time, whether too suddain; the affection, whether not phrene∣tick; the operation, whether not unfit to be admitted. For if all these be in one, that which judgeth is probable phantasy, and to∣gether, probable, undistracted, and circumcurrent. Wherefore as when in life we enquire concerning some little thing, we exa∣mine one witnesse; when we enquire into somthing of greater consequence, we examine more; but when of a thing most ne∣cessary, we examine each of the witnesses by the joynt testimony of all. So saith Carneades, in light, inconsiderable matters, we make use of probable phantasy, only for judgment; in things of some moment, of undistracted phantasy; in things that concern well and happy living, circumcurrent phantasy.

And as in things of great moment they take diverse phanta∣sies, so in different circumstances they never follow the same; for they say, they attend only probable phantasy in such things wherein the circumstance of time alloweth not a strict exami∣nation: As for instance. The enemy pursues a man; he comming to a Cave, takes a phantasy, that there are some enemies there lying in wait: transported by this phantasy as probable, he shunneth and flyeth from the Cave, following the probability of that phantasy, before he accuratly and diligently examine, whe∣ther there really be any enemies in ambush in that Cave or no. Probable phantasy is followed by circumcurrent, in those things in which time allowes a curious examination of each particu∣lar, to use judgment upon the incurrent thing. As a man com∣ing into a dark room, and seeing a rope rolled up, thinking it to be a serpent, he flies away; but afterwards returning, he exa∣mines the truth, and perceiving it not to stir, begins to think it is not a serpent; but withall considering, that serpents are somtimes frozen or nummed with the cold, he strikes it with his staffe: and having thus by circumcurrence examined the phan∣tasy which incurred to him, he assenteth, that the phantasy he had taken of that body as a serpent is false. And again, as I said, when we manifestly behold, we assent that this is true, having first over-run in our thoughts that our senses are all entire, and that we behold this waking, not in a dream; that the air is per∣spicuous, and a convenient distance from the object. Hereby we receive a creditable phantasy, when we have time enough to examine the particulars concerning the thing seen. It is the same in undistracted phantasy, which they admit, when there is nothing that can retract us, as we said of Menelaus. Hitherto Sextus.

Yet,* 1.10 though nothing can be perceived, a wise man may assent

to that which is not perceived; that is, he may opini••nate; but so as he knoweth himself to opinionate, and that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived.

He asserted the ultimate end to be the enjoyment of naturall principles,* 1.11 which, saith Cicero, he maintained, not that he really thought so, but in opposition to the Stoicks.

He read the Books of the Stoicks very diligently,* 1.12 and disputed against them with so good successe, that it gave him occasion to say; If Chrysippus had not been, I had not been.

Clitomachus used to say of him, he could never understand what he really held;* 1.13 for he would somtimes argue on one side, some∣times on the other; and by the calumny of his wit, saith Cicero, many times deride the best causes. Of the Sorites used by him, see Sextus Empiricus.

CHAP. III.

Vpon what occasion he was sent on an Embassy to Rome

a 1.14 THE Athenians being fined by the Romans about 500. Ta∣lents, at the suit of the Or••pians and Sicyonians, for destroy∣ing Oropus a City of Baeotia, sent three Philosophers on an Embassie to the Romane Senate, to procure a mitigation of this fine, which had been imposed upon them without hearing their defence; Carneades the Academick, Diogenes the Stoick, and Critolaus the Pe∣ripatetick. About the time of this Embassy there is much disagree∣ment amongst Authors. Agellius saith, they came after the second Punick War, and maketh Ennius later then their coming; which Petavius justly conceiveth to be false, for as much as Enni∣us died in the 585^th year from the building of the City. But Cice∣ro affirmeth this Embassy to have been when P. Scipio and M. Marcellus were Consuls, which was the 599^th year. Pausanias reckoneth it upon the 603^d year of the City, which Casaubone approveth.

Each of these Philosophers, to shew his learning, made choice of severall eminent parts of the City, where they discoursed be∣fore great multitudes of people to the admiration of all. The E∣loquence of Carneades was violent and rapid; that of Critolaus, neat and smooth, that of Diogenes modest and sober. Carneades one day disputed copiously concerning justice before Galba and Cato,* 1.15 the greatest Orators of that time. The next day he subverted all he had said before by contrary Arguments, a••d took away that Justice which he had so much commended. This he did the bet∣ter

to confute those, that asserted any thing. That dispute where∣by he overthrew Justice is recorded in Cicero by L. Furius.

To these three Philosophers resorted all the studious young men,* 1.16 and frequently heard and praised them. chiefly the sweetnesse of Carneades, which was of greatest power and no lesse fame then power, attracting eminent and benigne hearers, filled the City with noise like a great wind; and it was reported that a Grecian person qualified to admiration, attracting all, had infu∣sed a serious affection into the young men, whereby forgetting other divertisements and pleasures, they were carried on as it were with a kind of madnesse to Philosophy. This pleased all the Romans, who gladly beheld their Sonns instructed in Greek learning by such excellent men. Onely Cato at the first noise of Admiration of the Greek Learning, was troubled, fearing the young men should apply themselves that way, and so preferre the glory of eloquence before Action and Military discipline. The fame of Philosophers encreasing in the City, and C. Acilius, (whom Agellius and Macrobius call Caecilius) an eminent person, having at his own request been the Interpreter of their first Ora∣tion to the Senate; Cato (who was then very old) under a fair pretence, moved, that these Philosophers might be sent out of the City, and coming into the Senate-house, blamed the Magi∣strates, that they had so long suffered such Ambassadors to con∣tinue amongst them without any answer, who were able to per∣swade them to any thing: wherefore he first desired that some∣thing might be determined concerning their Embassie, that they might be sent back again to their own Schools, and instruct the Sons of Graecians, and that the Romane youth might, as they did before, apply themselves to the observance of their own Laws and Magistrates. This he did not out of anger to Carneades, as some thought, but out of an ambitious aemulation of the Greek huma∣nity and Literature.

CHAP. IV.

His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

HE was a person infinitely industrious, lesse conversant in Physick then Ethick,* 1.17 and so studious that he neglected to cut his hair and nailes. Valerius Maximus saith, hee was so studious, that when he lay down at meales, his thoughts were so fixt, that he forgot to put his hand to the Table, and that Melissa, who lived with him as a wife, was fain to put him in mind thereof, and help him.

He was so e••inent for Philosophy, that the Oratours them∣selves would many times break up their schools and come and hear him.

He had a great and loud-voice, whereupon the Gymnasiarch sent to him not to speak so loud, whereto he answering, send me the measure by which I should speak; the other wisely and appositely repli'd, you have a measure, your Hearers.

He was sharply invective, and in argument almost invincible. He avoided feasting, out of the reason we mentioned, his great studiousnesse.

One named Mentor a Bythinian, as Phavorinus saith, who had endeavoured to seduce a Mistris that he kept, coming into the school, he presently jeasted at him, in turning these words of Homer,

Hither comes one oppress'd with hoary years, Like Mentor in his voice and looks appears, Who from the School I charge you turn away.

The other rising up, reply'd,

He thus proclaim'd, the rest did streight obey.

Being to dispute with Chrysippus, he purg'd himself by white Hellebore to sharpen his wit, lest any corrupt humours in his stomach might oppresse the vigour and constancy of his mind.

He compared Dialectick to the fish Polypus,* 1.18 which when its claws grow long, bites them off; so Logicians, growing subtle, confute their own assertions.

He advised men in their greatest prosperity to be mindfull of a change,* 1.19 for that which is unexpected is most grievous.

He said the Sons of rich men and Kings learn nothing well but Riding,* 1.20 for their Masters flatter them; they who contest with them, willingly yield to them; but a horse considers not whether a private man or a Prince, a poor man or a rich bee on his back, but if he cannot rule him, he throws his Rider.

He seemed to be extreamly averse from death,* 1.21 whence he of∣ten said, the same Nature which hath put us together will dissolve us; and hearing that Antipater dyed by drinking poison, he was a litle animated by his constancy in death, and said, then give me too, they asking what, VVine, saith he,

In the midst of the night he was struck blind,* 1.22 and knew not of it, but waking, bid his servant bring a light; the servant did so, telling him he had brought one, then, said he, read you.

CHAP. V.

His Death and Writings.

HE lived according to Laertius 85. years, or according to Cice∣cero. 90. The words of* 1.23 Apollodorus that he died in the fourth year of the 162^d Olympiad, which falleth upon the 626^th year from the building of Rome, may easily be evinced to be false, by the greatest part of the Circumstances of his life; particularly from this; that Antonius in Cicero saith, when hee went Pro∣Consull into Asia, he found Carneades the Academick at Athens, who opposed all in dispute, according to the manner of his Sect. The year of Antonius's Pro-Consulship was the 652. year from the building of Rome. But this account as we said before, is to be applyed to the time of his birth, from which the 85^th falleth upon the first year of the 184^th Olympiad, the 90^th upon the 2^d of the 185^th.

Laertius saith, at his death there was a great Eclipse of the Moon, which some interpreted to proceed from a Sympathy with his losse. Upon this Eclipse I conceive Petavius grounded his computation of Carneades's death, when he saith,* 1.24 it was upon the first year of the 163. Olympiad. May 2. ••er: 2. hora. 5. 46. at A∣thens. But there being a mistake of the year, there is consequent∣ly a greater in the account of the feria and hour.

Carneades, as Cicero saith, wrote four Books of Suspension of Assent. He wrote likewise▪ Epistles to Ariarathes King of Cappado∣cia, the only monument left behind him, extant in Laertius's time. Whatsoever else went under his name, Laer••ius saith, was writ∣ten by his Disciples, of whom hee had many, the most eminent Clitomachus.

There are remembred two more of this name, one a Philoso∣pher, Disciple to Anaxagoras, mentioned by Suidas; the other an Epigrammatick Poet, mentioned by Laertius.

Notes

• a 1.1

  L••ert.
• b 1.2

  Acad. qu••••t. 4.
• c 1.3

  Sympo••. quapot ••. 1.
• d 1.4

  Do••tr. 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ p.
• e 1.5

  Laert.
• f 1.6

  Cic. Acad. quaest. 4.
• * 1.7

  Numen. apud. Euseb.
• * 1.8

  Cic. Acad. quaest. 4.
• * 1.9

  Adv. Mathem.
• * 1.10

  Cic. Acad. quaest. 4.
• * 1.11

  De ••in. lib. 2.
• * 1.12

  Laert.
• * 1.13

  Cic. Acad. quaest. 4.
• a 1.14

  Plut vit. Cat. Agel. 7. 14. Ma••r. Satur. 1. 5.
• * 1.15

  Lactant. de Inst. lib. 51▪
• * 1.16

  Plut.
• * 1.17

  Lib. 8. c. 7.
• * 1.18

  Stob. Ser. 212.
• * 1.19

  Plut. de tranp. anim.
• * 1.20

  Plut de adul. & Am. dis.
• * 1.21

  Laert.
• * 1.22

  Laer••.
• * 1.23

  Lae••••.
• * 1.24

  Doct. temp.