Sect. III.
IT is the Property of every desiderative Vertue, that He who desires, possesseth in part the thing he desires, in part not: for, if he were wholly deprived of its Possession, he would never de∣sire it: this is verified two waies. First, nothing is desired unlesse it be known; and to know a thing is in some part to possesse it. So Aristotle,* 1.1 The Soul is all, because it knowes all. And in the Psalmist God saith, All things are mine, I know them. Secondly, there is al∣waies some convenience and resemblance betwixt the desirer and desired: Every thing delights and preserves it selfe by that, which by naturall affinity is most conformable to it; by its con∣trary is grieved and consum'd. Love is not betwixt things un∣like; Repugnance of two opposite natures is naturall hate. Hate is a repugnance with knowledge. Hence it followeth, that the na∣ture of the desired, is in some manner in the desirer; otherwise, there would be no similitude betwixt them: yet imperfectly; else it were vain for it to seek what it entirely possesseth.