The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. IV.

DIALECTICK.

Of the Iudiciary part.

WHereas there is somthing that judgeth, somthing which is judged, it is necessary also that there be somthing which is made of both these, properly called Iudgement. This Judgement may not unfitly be termed Judiciary, but more commonly that which judgeth. This is twofold; one, from which; another by which judgement is made. That is intellect; this the naturall Organ ac∣commodated for judgement; primarily of true things; seconda∣rily of false; neither is it any thing but naturall reason. To explain this more fully, of things which are, a Philosopher who judgeth the things themselves, may be called a Iudge; reason likewise is a Iudge, by which truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

Reason is twofold, one incomprehensible and true; the other is never deceived in the knowledge of those things which are. The first is in the power of God, not of man, the second in that of man also. This likewise is twofold, the first Science, and scientifick reason; the second Opinion. The first hath certitude,

and stability, as being conversant in things certain and stable. The second, similitude of truth and opinion, as being conversant in things subject to mutation. Of science in Intelligibles, and opini∣on in sensibles, the principles are Intellection and Sense.

Sense is a passion of the soul by the mediation of the body, first, declaring a passive faculty; When through the Organs of sense, the species of things are impress'd in the soul, so, as they are not defac'd by time, but remain firm and lasting, the conservation thereof is called Memory.

Opinion is the conjunction of memory and sense; for, when some object occurreth, which can first move the sense, thereby sense is effected in us, and by sense memory. Then again is the same thing objected to our sense, we joyne the precedent with the consequent sense, and now say within our selves, Socrates, a Horse, Fire, and the like: This is termed opinion, when we joyne the precedent memory with the late sense; when these agree within themselves, it is a true opinion, if they disagree, a false; for, if a man, having the species of Socrates in his memory, meet with Plato, and think, by reason of some likenesse betwixt them, he hath met Socrates again, and afterwards joyne the sense of Plato, which he took, as it were, from Socrates, with the memory which he preserved of Socrates, there will arise a false opinion.

That wherein sense and memory are formed, Plato compareth to a tablet of wax, but when the soul by cogitation reforming these things, which are conceived in opinion by memory and sense, soo∣keth upon these as things from which the other are derived: Plato sometimes calleth this a picture and phantasie. Cogitation he calleth the soules discourse within her selfe: Speech, that which ••loweth from the Cogitation through the mouth by voice. Intel∣lection is an operation of the Intellect, contemplating first Intelli∣gibles. It is two-fold, one of the soul, beholding Intelligibles be∣fore she cometh into the body; the other of the same, after she is immers'd in the body: The first is properly called Intellection; the other, whilst she is in the body, is termed naturall knowledge, which is nothing but an intellection of the soul consined to the body. When we say, Intellection is the principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competible to the soul in her separate state, and, as we said, is then called Intellection, now naturall Knowledge. The same Plato termeth simple Know∣ledge, the wing of the soul; sometimes Reminiscence.

Of these simple Sciences consisteth Reason, which is born with us, the efficient of naturall Science; and as reason is two-fold, Scientifick, and opinionative, so Intellection and Sense. It is like∣wise necessary that they have their objects, which are Intelligibles and Sensibles: And for asmuch as of Intelligibles, some are Primary, as Idaeas, others Secondary, as the Species, that are in matter, and cannot be separated from it. Intellection likewise, must be two-fold,

one of Primaries, the other of S••condaries. Again, foras∣much as in Sensibles, some are Primary, as qualities, colour, whitenesse, others by accident, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as fire: in the same manner is Sense, first, of Primaries, second, of Secondaries. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not with∣out Scientifick knowledge, by a certain comprehension without discourse. Secondaries the same scientifick reason judgeth, but not without Intellection. Sensibles, as well Primary as Seconda∣ry sense, judgeth, but not without opinionative reason. That which is concrete, the same reason judgeth, but not without sense. And since the Intelligible world is the Primary Intelligi∣ble, the sensible something concrete, the first Intellection judgeth with reason, that is, not without reason: The other opinionative reason not without sense, whereas there is both contemplation and action; right reason discerneth not in the same manner those which are subject to contemplation, and those which are sub∣ject to action: In contemplation it considereth what is true, what false; in things that belong to action, what is proper, what im∣proper, what that is which is done. For, having an innate know∣ledge of that which is good and honest, by using reason, and ap∣plying it to those naturall notions, as to certain rules, we judge whether every thing be good or bad.