The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of Passions.

IN justice is so great an ill, that it is better to suffer wrong then to do wrong; for one belongeth to a wicked man, the other to a weak man: both are dishonest, but to do wrong is worse, by how much it is more dishonest. It is as expedient that a wicked man be punished, as that a sick man should be cured by a Physici∣an; for all chastisement is a kind of medicine for an offending Soul.

Since the greater part of Vertues are conversant about passi∣ons, it is necessary that we define passion. Passion is an irratio∣nall motion of the Soul, arising out of some good or ill; it is call∣ed an irrationall motion, because neither judgments nor opini∣ons are passions; but motions of the irrationall parts of the Soul. For in the irrationall part of the Soul, there are motions, which though they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our pow∣er. They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will; for somtimes it falleth out, that though we know things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing, expetible nor avoidable, yet we are drawn by them, which could never be if such passions were the same with Judgement. For we reject judgement when we disapprove it whether it ought to be so or otherwise. In the definition is added, arising from some good or some ill, because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these, no passion is ever excited in us. All passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill. If we see good present, we rejoice, if future, we de∣sire. On the conrrary, if ill be present, we grieve, if imminent, we fear.

The simple affections, and, as it were, elements of the rest are

two; Pleasure and Grief; the rest consist of these. Neither are fear and desire to be numbred among the principall passions, for he who feareth, is not wholly deprived of pleasure, nor can a man live the least moment, who despaireth to be freed or eased of some ill. But it is more conversant in grief and sorrow, and therefore he, who feareth, sorroweth. But he who desireth, like all those who desire or expect somthing, is delighted; insomuch as he is not absolutely confident; and hath not a firm hope he is grieved. And if desire and fear are not principall passions, it will doubtlesse follow, that none of the other affections are simple; as anger, love, emulation and the like; for in these, Pleasure and Grief are manifest, as consisting of them.

Moreover of Passions, some are rough, others mild, the mild are those, which are naturally in men, and if kept within their bounds, are necessary and proper to man, if they exceed, vitious. Such are Pleasure, Grief, Anger, Pitty, Modesty; for it is proper to man to delight in those things which are according to Nature, and to be grieved at their contraries. Anger is necessary to repell and punish an injury. Mercy agreeth with Humanity. Modesty teacheth us to decline sordid things. Other passions are rough, and praeternaturall, arising from some depraved or perverse custom. Such are excessive laughter, joy in the misfortunes of others, ha∣tred of Mankind. These, whether intense or remisse, after what manner soever they are, are alwaies erroneous, and admit not a∣ny laudable mediocrity.

As concerning Pleasure and Grief, Plato writeth thus. These passions are excited in us by Nature. Grief and sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature; Pleasure to those who are restored to the proper constitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the naturall state of man to consist in a mean betwixt Pleasure and Grief, not moved by either, in which state we live longest. He asserteth severall kinds of Pleasure, whereof some re∣late to the Body, others to the Soul. Again, of Pleasures some are mix'd with grief, some are pure. Again, some proceed from the remembrance of things past, others from hope of things to come. A∣gain, some are dishonest, as being intemperate and unjust; others moderate, and joyned with good, as joy for good things, and the Pleasure that followeth Vertue. Now because most Pleasures are naturally dishonest, he thinks it not to be disputed whether Pleasure can be simply and absolutely a good, that being to be accounted poor and of no value, which is raised out of another, and hath not a principall primary essence. For Pleasure cohereth even with its contrary Grief, and is joyned with it, which could not be, if one were simply good, the other simply ill.