The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. XXVII.

ETHICK.

Of the chief Good, and of Virtues.

WE must next give a short account of Plato's Ethicks. That which is worthy of all honour, and is the Supreame good, he conceived not easie to be found, and if found, not safe to be declared. For this reason, he communicated the contempla∣tion of the chief good to very few, and those of his most intimate acquaintance, of whom his judgement made choice for this pur∣pose. But our good, if we examine his books dillgently, we shall find he placed in the knowledge of the first good, which may rightly be called God, and the first mind. For all things which men call good, he conceiveth to be called good in this respect, for as much as they derive somthing from that good, as all sweet and hot things are termed such from some participation of the first sweet, and first hot. Of those things which are in us, only the mind and reason have a similitude of the first good. Wherefore he calleth our good, Fair, Venerable, Amiable, Proporti∣onate, and lastly Beatitude. Of those which are commonly call∣ed good, as health, beauty, strength, there is none good, unlesse it be employed towards the practise of Vertue. For being separa∣ted from Vertue, they are like matter only, and to those who make ill use of them only ill. Yet these Plato sometimes calleth mortal goods. Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst humane goods, but amongst the divine and immortall. Whence he asserteth that the souls of true Philosophers are replenish'd with vast admirable goods, and after the dissolution of their mortall body, are admit∣ted to the table of the Gods, and with them walk over and sur∣vey the field of Truth, because they did see they used the utmost endeavours of their Soules to know it, and esteemed it the most precious of all things, by the benefit whereof they illustrated and excited their mind as a lost or blinded sight, preferring the con∣servation thereof before many corporeall eyes. Foolish men are like those who lead all their life in some Cave under ground, where they never saw the light of the Sun, but only some empty thin shadows of such bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which seeing, they think they see true bodies. As these, if ever they should be brought out of darknesse into the clear light, would questionlesse despise all things which they saw before, and them∣selves much more, as having been absolutely deceived; So they who rise up out of the darknesse of this life to those things which are divine and fair, in all likelyhood will contemn what be∣fore they most esteemed, and love more vehemently this contem∣plation.

Thus it appeareth, that only what is good is honest, and that Vertue sufficeth to Felicity,

Moreover, that good and fair consist in knowledge of the first good, he declareth in whole volumes. As concerning those which are good by participation, he speaketh thus in his first Book of Laws. Good is twofold, Humane and Divine, &c. If anything be disjoyned from the first good, and void of the essence thereof, that is called good by the foolish, which in Euthydemo, he affirm∣eth to be a greater ill to the Possessor.

That he conceiveth the Vertues to be eligible in themsel••es, is manifest, in as much as he affirmeth that only to be good which is honest, which he demonstrateth in many Dialogues, particu∣ly in those of the Common-wealth.

Hence he conceiveth that man to be most happy and blessed, who hath attained the Science we mentioned; yet not in respect of the honours which attend such a person, nor of any other re∣ward; for though he be unknown to all men, and such things, as are commonly accounted Ills, as, dishonour, banishment and death happen unto him; he is notwithstanding happy. On the contrary, a man who wants this knowledge, though he possesse all things commonly esteemed good, riches, power, health, strength, and Beauty, he is nothing the more happy.

He asserteth an ultimate end, conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of be∣ing such. This he expounds variously, somtimes as in Theaeteto) he affirms our resemblance to God to consist in being prudent, just, and holy; wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible celerity from hence to those. This flight is the resem∣blance to God, as much as is possible: The similitude consisteth in Prudence, Justice, and Sanctity; somtimes in Justice only, as in his last Book of the Common-wealth. For a man is never deser∣ted by God, whilst he endeavoureth to be just, and by the very act of Vertue, as much as man is capable of, he is rendred like unto God. In Phaedone he asserteth, that this resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice, thus. Are not they blessed and happy, and from hence shall go into the best place, who have practised the popular civill Vertue which they call Temperance and Iustice? A∣gain, somtimes he affirmed, that the end of life is to be like unto God, somtimes to follow God, as when hee saith, God indeed according to the old saying, containing the beginning, midale and end of all things, &c. Somtimes he joyneth both toge∣ther, as when he saith, The Soul following God, and being rendred like unto him, &c. The principle of Utility is good it self; but this is said of God, therefore the end conformable to the principle, is to become like unto God, to the Celestiall, or rather supercelestiall God, who hath not Vertue, but is more excellent then all Ver∣tue. Wherefore it is rightly said, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; misery, is a per∣versity

of the Genius, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Beatitude is a good habit of the Genius.

This similitude to God we shall obtain, if we enjoy convenient nature; in our manner, education and sense, according to Law, and chiefly by reason, and discipline, and institution of wisdom, withdrawing our selves as much as possible from humane affairs, and being conversant in those things only which are understood by contemplation: the way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanse the Demon that is in us, is to initiate our selves into higher disciplines, which is done by Musick, Arithmetick, Astronomy and Geome∣try, not without some respect of the body by Gymnastick, where∣by it is made more ready for the actions both of Warre and Peace.