The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

THat the Soul is immortall Plato proveth by these Arguments. The Soul to every thing, wherein it is, conferreth life, as be∣ing naturally innate in her self, but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death, but what is such is immortall.

The Soul being immortall, is likewise incorruptible, for it is an incorporeall essence which cannot be changed substantially, and is only perceptible by the Intellect, not by the eyes, and is uniform. Hence it must be simple, neither can be at any time dissolved or corrupted. The body is contrary, for it is subject to sight and other senses, and as it is compounded, so shall it again be dissolved, and it is multiform. When the Soul adhereth to those things which are preceptible by Intellect, it acquieseeth; Now to that by whose presence she is disturbed, she cannot possi∣bly be like, wherefore she is more like to those things which are perceptible by Intellect; but what is such is by nature incorrup∣tible and perishable.

Again, the Soul naturally doth preside over the body, not the body over the Soul, but that which by nature ruleth and com∣mandeth is of kin to Divinity, wherefore the Soul being next un∣to God, must be immortall, not subject to corruption.

Again, Contraries which have no medium, not by themselves, but by some accident are so ordered by Nature, that they may be mutually made of one another. But that which men call life is contrary to that which they call death; as therefore Death is a separation of the Soul from the body; so islife a conjuncti∣on of the Soul with the body, praeexistent to the Body. But if she be praeexistent, and shall subsist after the body, it followeth that she be sempiternall, for there cannot any thing be imagined whereby she may be corrupted.

Again, if learning be Reminiscence, the Soul must be immor∣tall, but that it is reminiscence we prove thus: Learning cannot otherwise consist then by remembrance of those things we for∣merly know. For, if from Singulars we understand Universalls, how could we discourse by singulars which are infinite? or how from a few perceive Universalls? we should therefore necessarily be deceived, as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth; or how could the notions themselves have the reason of principles. By reminiscence therefore, from some few which we have conceived in our mind, we understand the rest, and from some occurrent particulars we remember those which we knew long before, but were then given over to oblivion, when the Soul first descended into the Body.

Again, if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper ill, nei∣ther can it be destroy'd by that or any other, nor simply by any ill, and being such, shall remain uncorrupted.

Again, that which is moved in it self, as being the principle of motion in those things which are moved, is alwaies moved; that which is such is immortall; but the Soul is moved of it self, that which is moved of it self is the principle of all motion and gene∣ration; and a principle is expert of generation and corruption, wherefore the Soules of men and of the Universe it self are such, for both partake of the same mistion. He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in her self, because it hath an innate life, alwaies ope∣rating by its power.

That rationall Soules are immortall, may clearly be asserted out of Plato; but whether the irrationall be such seemeth doubt∣full; yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantasie, not endued with reason or judgement, neither do they contem∣plate any thing, or discern, or collect from it, nor can they dis∣cern ills, but generally understand nothing, nor are of the same nature with those Soules which have Intellect and Reason, but are capable of dying and being corrupted. For as much as they are immortall, it followeth that they are put into bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio's, and transmigrate into severall bodies as well humane as others, either according to some certain numbers which they expect, or by the wil of the Gods, or for intemperance of life, or for love of the Body. For

the Body and Soul have a kind of affinity, as Fire and Brimstone.

Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a dijudicative faculty, called Gnostick, and impulsive to some action, called Pa∣rastatick, which faculties being likewise in humane Soules, be∣come changed as soon as they come into the bodie, the assistent into the concupiscible, the impulsive into the Irascible.