CHAP. XI.
Of Qualities.
THat Qualities are incorporeall, may be proved thus: every bo∣dy is a Subject, quality is not a Subject but an accident, there∣fore quality is not a body. Again, no body is in a subject; every quality is in a Subject, therefore quality is not a body. Again, quality is contrary to quality, but no body as no body is contrary to a body; therefore qualities are not bodies. To omit, that it is most agreeable to reason, that as matter is void of quality, so quality should be void of matter, aud if quality be void of matter, it must likewise be void of corporeity, for if qualities were bo∣dies, two or three bodies might be together in the same place, which is absurd.
Qualities being incorporeal, the maker of them must be incorpo∣reall also; moreover there can be no efficients, but in corporeals, for bodies naturally suffer and are in mutation, not continuing alwaies in manner nor persevering in the same state. For when∣soever they seem to effect any thing, we shall find that they suffer it long before. Whence as there is something which wholly suffe∣reth, so must there bee somthing which wholly acteth; but such only is incorporeall.
Thus much concerning principles as far they relate to Theolo∣gy; we proceed next to Physicall contemplations.