The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. VI.

Of his Philosophy.

THales (saith Laertius) is by many affirm'd to be the first that made disquisitions upon Nature.* 1.1 Cicero (who taught the Greek Philosophy first to speak Latine,) acknowledges Thales to be the first Author thereof.* 1.2 Strabo saith, that he first of the Grecians made enquiry into naturall Causes and the Ma••hematicks.* 1.3 Plutarch calls him Inventor of Philosophy; Iustine Martyr,* 1.4 The most anti∣ent of Philosophers; Tertullian, first of Naturall Philosophers;* 1.5 Lactan∣tius, * 1.6 the first that made enquiry after Naturall Causes.

Sect. 1. That Water is the Principle of all things.

IN his disquisition of the naturall Causes of things, he concei∣ved Water to be the first Principle of all naturall Bodies, whereof they consist, and into which they resolve. His reasons (as deliver'd by * 1.7 Plutarch, and repeated by* 1.8 Stobaeus) these.

First, because naturall Seed, the Principle of all living creatures, is humid; whence it is probable that humidity is also the principle of all other things.

Secondly, because all kinds of Plants are nourish'd by moisture; wanting which, they wither and decay.

Thirdly, because Fire, even the Sun it self and the stars are nourish'd and maintain'd by vapours proceeding from Water, and consequently the whole world consists of the same. Whence Homer supposing all things to be engendred of water, saith,

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 The Ocean whence all things receive their birth.

In pursuit (* 1.9 as Aristotle saith) of this opinion, he assign'd water the lowest place, holding (according to* 1.10 Seneca) that the whole Earth ••••oats, and is carried above the water, whether that we call the Oce∣an or great Sea, or any simple moisture of another nature, or a moist ele∣ment. By this water (saith he) the earth is sustained as a great ship, which presseth upon the water that bears it up, because the most weighty part of the world cannot be upheld by the Air, which is subtle and light. Thus is* 1.11 Aristotle to be explain'd, who saith, Thales held, that the Earth being capable of swimming, resteth as wood or the like; now of such things, none suim upon Air, but upon Water.

Upon this ground it was that he held Water (as Laertius saith) to be the cause of Earthquakes. Thus* 1.12 Seneca; He holds that the Globe of the Earth is upheld by water, and carried as a bark, and floateth by the mobility thereof, at such time as it is said to quake. One of his rea∣sons alledged by* 1.13 Seneca, is this, because in all extraordinary moti∣ons thereof some new Fountains commonly issued, which if they incline to one side, and shew their keel asidelong, gather water, which, if it chance the burden they bear be overweighty, raiseth it selfe higher towards the right or left side.

From the testimony of Homer, by which Thales (according to Pluta••ch and Iustine Martyr) defended this Tenet (that water is the principle of all things) it is manifest it was deliver'd, (though imperfectly) by other Grecians before Thales; Plutarch * 1.14 else where producing this Authority of* 1.15 Hesiod.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉— Of all things Chaos was the first—

addeth, the greater part of antient Philosophers called water Chaos 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 from dissusion. The Scholiast of* 1.16 Apollonius upon these words.

—〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 The Earth of slime was made,

affirms (citing Zeno) that the Chaos whereof all things were made according to Hesiod was water, which setling became slime, the slime con∣dens'd into solid Earth, to which adde this testimony of* 1.17 Orpheus.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Of Water slime was made:

This opinion they borrow'd from the Phoenicians, with whom the Grecians had a very antient correspondence. Linus came from thence; Orpheus had his learning from thence; as Thales is conceived to have done likewise, which appears clearly in * 1.18 Numenius, an antient Philosopher, who cites the very words of Moses for this opinion, The spirit of God moved on the face of the wa∣ters. There is an eminent place in* 1.19 Eusebius to prove this; the divi∣nity of the Phoenicians asserts the principle of this world to be a dark spi∣rituall air, or the spirit of dark air, and Chaos troubled and involv'd in darknesse; that this was infinite and a long time had no bound, but (say they) the spirit being moved with the love of his own principles, there was made a mixtion, which nexure was called love; this was the begin∣ning of the production of all things; but the spirit it self had no generati∣on, and from this connexion of the spirit was begotten 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which some call slime, others corruption of watery mistion, and of this was made the seed of all creatures, and the generation of all things.

Nor were the Indians ignorant of this, as Megasthenes delivers their opinion.* 1.20 They are of the same mind in many things with the Grecians, as that the world had beginning, and shall have end; that God its Maker and Governour goes quite through it; that all things had diffe∣rent beginnings, but that of which the world was made was water.

The word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Principle, because with Philosophers it in∣cludes the efficient cause, and consequently understood singly excludes the rest, that being the most noble, hath given occasion to some to mistake Thales, as is by acknowledging no other prin∣ciple, he consequently accounted Water to be God; but that Thales understands by Principle only the material Cause, we may easily gather from Plutarch,* 1.21 who condemneth Thales for confounding a Principle with an Element, and for holding them to be both one; Wheras (saith he) there is great difference; Elements are cōpounded, Prin∣ciples are neither compounded, nor are any compleat substance, & truly water, air, earth, fire we term elements, but principles we call other natures, in this respect that there is nothing precedent ••to them, wherof they are engendred.

For otherwise, if they were not the first, they would not be Principles, but that rather should be so termed whereof they were made. Now certaine things there are precedent whereof Earth and water are compounded, viz. The first informe matter, and the forme it selfe and privation. Thales therefore erres, affirming Water to be both Element and principle of all things. Thus we see by Plutarch, that the objection can, onely be as to the name, not to reason of the name; for the distinction of principle and element being not used in that time, Thales by principle, meant nothing of the efficient cause which is most certaine from Aristotle.* 1.22 Thales, saith, he affirmes water to be the prin∣ciple: wherefore he held the earth to be above the water; perhaps hee conceived so, because he saw that the nutriment of all things is humid, that heat it selfe consists thereof, and that every creature lives thereby; He held that of which things are made to be the principls of all things, for these reasons he was of this opinion, as also because the seeds of all things are of a humid nature, and water is the principle of things humid.

Sect. 2. Of God.

TErtullian saith,* 1.23 that Thales to Croesus, enquiring concerning the Deity, gave no certaine accompt, but desired severall times of de∣liberating to no effect. He seemes to reflect upon the same or a like story to that which is reported of Simonides and Hieron.

But what the opinion of Thales was concerning God, may bee gather'd from two Apothegmes cited by Laertius, repeated with this glosse by* 1.24 Clemens Alexandrinus; And what are not those the sayings of Thales that are derived from hence, That God is glorifi'd for ever and ever, and he openly confesseth that he is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hee who knoweth Hearts. For Thales being demanded what God was, that (saith he) which hath neither beginning nor end. Another asking of a man might doe ill and conceale it from God. How saith he, when a man that thinkes it cannot? Men ought to think (sayes* 1.25 Cicero in his name) that the Gods see all things.

He acknowledged God the first of beings, and Author of the world, asserting (according to Laertius) that the most antient of all things is God, ••or he is not begotten; that the fairest is the world, for it is his work. This is confirmed by Cicero.* 1.26 Thales the Mile••ian (saith he) who first enquired into these things, said, that water was the principle of things, but that God was that mind which formed all things of water. If Gods may be without sence and mind, why did he joyn the mind to water•• why water to the mind, if the mind can subsist without a body? Thus Cice∣ro who understands Thales to intend the materiall principle to be co-eternall with the efficient; which Thales himselfe seems not to mean, when he declared God to be the first of Beings. But that the Mens of ••naxagoras, for the annexing of which to mat∣ter, he was so much famed, was no more then what he borrowed from Thales, the words of Cicero make good.

He affirmed that God by the immutable decree of his provi∣dence governs the world. Thales (saith Stobaeus) being demanded what was most strong, answered Necessity, for it rules all the world. Neces∣sity is the firm judgment and immutable power of providence. Hither we must likewise referre what is cited under his name by the same Stobaeus, that the first mover is immovable, which* 1.27 Aristotle hath bor∣row'd from him, not owning the Author.

Something imperfectly was before delivered by Orpheus, con∣cerning God, alledged by* 1.28 Clemens Alexandrinus and others; but as Cicero saith; Thales was the first among the Grecians, who made any search into these things; and that he brought it out of Aegypt, the Grecians themselves deny not,* 1.29 for they acknowledge, that they received the names of their Gods from thence, and beleeved the Aegyptians to be the first, who looking up to the world a∣bove them, and admiring the nature of the universe, reflected upon the Deity.

Sect. 3. Of Daemons.

THales (saith* 1.30 Plutarch) with Pythagoras, Plato, and the Sto∣icks hold, that Daemons are spirituall substances, and the He∣ro's souls separated from the bodies, of which sort, there are two, good, and bad, the good Hero's are the good souls, the bad, the bad. The same or∣der * 1.31 Athenagoras attests to be observed by Thales, ranking the three degrees thus: First, that of the immortall Gods, next Dae∣mons, thirdly Heroes: This was followed by Pythagoras, that the Gods were to be prefered in reverence before Daemons, Hero's before men.

He affirm'd (as Stobaeus saith) the world to be full of these Daemons. This is thought the meaning of that of* 1.32 Aristotle, repeated by Cicero, Thales thought that all things were full of Gods. The same assertion Laertius ascribes to Pythagoras,* 1.33 that all the aire is full of souls,* 1.34 which are Hero's and Daemons.

This opinion was asserted by the Greeks, before the time of Thales, particularly by Hesiod; but whether that be argument enough, to deny, that Thales had it from the Aegyptians, I que∣stion; that they held it in the same manner, we may learn by * 1.35 Iamblichus. Besides, Pythagoras and Plato (whom Plutarch joynes in this Tenet with Thales) drew their learning from the same fountain.

Sect. 4. Of the Soul.

PLutarch and Stobaeus say, that Thales first affirm'd the soul to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a selfe moving nature.* 1.36 Aristotle that he calls it 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in respect to the motion it gives to other things,* 1.37 in which are included both parts of the definition of the* 1.38 Platonists, a sub∣stance,

having within it selfe a power to move it selfe and other things: which Plato argues to this effect: The first of motions is that whereby a thing moves it self••; the second, that whereby it moves another: every thing that moves it selfe, lives; every living thing lives, because it moves it selfe, the resore the power of selfe motion is the essence of that substance which we call the soul, which soul is the cause of the first generation and motion of things which are, nere, and shall be; and of all their contraries, as of all transmutation, the principall of motion, and therefore more antient than the body, which it moves by a second motion. And afterwards declares these to be the names of the souls motion, to will, to consider, to take care, to consult, to judge rightly, and not rightly, to joy, to grieve, to dare, to fear, to hate, to love, and the like. These which are the first mo∣tions, and suscipient of the second corporall, bring all things into aug∣mention, and d••cre••se, conversion, or cond••mnation, and descretion, or rarefaction. This opinion first raised by Thales, was entertained in the schooles with the assent of* 1.39 Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Plato, till exploded by Aristotle,* 1.40 whose chief arguments a∣gainst it were these. 1. That nothing is moved but what is in place, nothing in place but what hath quantity, which because the soul wants, none of the foure kinds of motion (viz. Lation, Alteration, diminution, accretion) are competible (perse) to her. Secondly, that selfe motion is not essentiall to the Soul, because she is moved accidentally, by externall objects. The first, if un∣derstood of Circumscription, not only denies the motion of all things, that are definitively in place, as spirits, but of the high∣est sphear, if compared with Aristotles definition of place; yet that some of these species of motion, though in a different ex∣traordinary manner, are competent to the soul, and not acci∣dentally, may be argued 1. From the further diffusion of the soul, according to the augmentation of the body. 2. From intel∣lection, which is acknowledg'd a perfection, and consequently a kind of alteration, which that Thales understood to be one of the soul's motions, is clear from that Apothegme ascribed to him by L••ertius, the swiftest of things is the mind, for it over-runs all things: Whence* 1.41 Cicero (confessing almost in the very words of Thales, that nothing is swifter then the mind, that no swiftnesse may compare with the swiftnesse of the mind) would interpret the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of Aristotle, a continued and perpetuall motion.

The second reason may be questioned by comparing the acts of the memory, and reminiscence; the first occasion'd by exterior things, yet objective only, so that the motion is within her selfe; but by the other she moves her selfe, from a privation to a habit, without the help of any exterior.

It is worth notice, that among these and other reasons al∣ledg'd by* 1.42 Aristotle to destroy this assertion, one is the possi∣bility of the resurrection of the body; but this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

From the second part of the difference in the definition (viz.

from moving other things) Thales argued, that the Load-stone, and Amber had soules; the first because it drawes Iron, the second Straw. He further (saith Laertius) asserted those things we count inoni∣mate, to have souls, arguing it from the loadstone and Amber: the reason of which latter example,* 1.43 Aldobrandinu•• falsely interprets its change of colour, and jarring as it were at poison: But* 1.44 Aristotle more plainly, for of those whom we mentioned, Thales seems to have taken the soul to be something 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, apt to move, since he affirmed a stone to have a soul, because it moved Iron.

He asserted likewise the soul (of man) to be immortall, and ac∣cording to* 1.45 Cherilus, was the first that held so.* 1.46 Cicero ascribes the originall of this opinion to Pherecydes, but it rather seems to have been brought by Thales from the Egyptians; that they held so* 1.47 Herodotus attests.

Sect. 5. Of the World.

THales held,* 1.48 that there was but one world, and that* 1.49 made by God; which truth was follow'd by all Philosophers, as* 1.50 Ari∣stotle confesseth, untill he rejected it, to defend, by the cont••a∣rie an assertion equally false, that the world is everlasting, which could not be, saith he, if it had beginning.

That* 1.51 the world being Gods work, is the fairest of things, whatsoever disposed in lively order, being a part thereof, for which reason Pytha∣goras (according to* 1.52 Plutarch) called it first 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

That night is elder then day. This circumstance of the creation was held likewise by* 1.53 Orpheus, and Hesiod, who had it from the Phoenicians: for this reason the* 1.54 Numidians,* 1.55 Germans,* 1.56 and * Gaules reckoned by nights.

That the* 1.57 world is animated, and that* 1.58 God is the soul thereof, dif∣fus'd through every part, whose divine moving vertue penetrats through the element of water. Thus explain'd by the Hermetick Philosophers; ••he divine spirit who produc'd this world out of the first water, being infus'd as it were, by a continuall inspiration into the works of nature, and diffus'd largely through, by a certain secret, and continuall act, moving the whole, and every parti∣cular according to its kind, is the soul of the world.

That the* 1.59 World is contained in place. This agrees with the de∣finition of place by space; but they who with Aristotle define place a superficies, though they hold the parts of the world to be in place, are forced to deny the whole to be so.

That in the world there is no vacuum,* 1.60 in which (as Plut••rch ob∣serves) all Philosophers agree, who affirm the world to be ani∣mated, and govern'd by providence; the contrary defended by those who maintain that it consisteth of Atomes, is inanimate, not governed by providence.

That* 1.61 matter is fluid and variable.

That* 1.62 Bodies are passible and divisible, in infinitum, and continuous as are also a line, supers••cies, place, and time.

That* 1.63 mistion is made by composition of the elements.

That * the starrs are earthly, yet fiery;* 1.64 the Sun earthly. They who affirm the starres to be fiery, saith * Aristotle, hold so, as conceiving the whole superiour body to be fire.

That the Moon is of the same nature with the Sun, that she is illu∣minat••d by him. Plutarch, and Stobaeus affirm this to be first held by Thales, though Eudemus cited by Theon ascribe it to Anaximan∣der.

That the monthly occulations of the Moon are caused by the neer∣ness of the Sun shining round her.

That there is but* 1.65 one earth,* 1.66 round, in fashion of a Globe,* 1.67 seated in the midst of the world, to which relates that speech ascribed to him by Cleodemus, that, if the earth were taken out of the world, there must of necessity follow a confusion of all things.

That* 1.68 the overflowing of Nilus is caused by the Etesian (yearly) winds, which rise with the Dog star,* 1.69 after the summer solstice, and beginning to b••ow from the North, spread (as* 1.70 Aristotle de∣scribes them) into remote quarters. These (saith* 1.71 Pluta••ch) blowing directly against Aegypt, cause the water so to swell, that the sea driven by these winds, entereth within the mouth of that River, and hindereth it, that it cannot discharge it selfe freely into the Sea, but is repulsed. Where∣upon (addes* 1.72 Diodorus Siculus) it overflowes Aegypt, which lyeth low and levell. But this reason, though it seem plausible, is easily disproved; for if this were true, all the Rivers which are discharged into the Sea, opposite to the Etesian winds, should have the same overflowing. Thus Diodorus in his excellent discourse upon this subject, which concludes with the opinion of Agatharchides, that it is occasion'd by rain, coming from the mountaines of Ethiopia.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Apud Lactant. & de Natura Deor. 1.
• * 1.2

  Lib. 14.
• * 1.3

  De plac. phil. 1. 3.
• * 1.4

  Paraenes. ad. Graec.
• * 1.5

  Apologet.
• * 1.6

  De fals. rel. 1. 5.
• * 1.7

  Placit. philot. 1. 3.
• * 1.8

  Eclog. phys. 1. 13.
• * 1.9

  Metaph. 1. 3.
• * 1.10

  Natur. quast. 6. 6.
• * 1.11

  Metaphys. 1. 3
• * 1.12

  Nac. quaest. 3. 13.
• * 1.13

  Nat. quaest. 6.
• * 1.14

  Ignis an aqu•• ••tilior?
• * 1.15

  Theogon.
• * 1.16

  Argonant. 4.
• * 1.17

  Cited by A∣thenog••ras.
• * 1.18

  Porphyr. de antro. Nymph.
• * 1.19

  Prae••ar. Evangel. 1. 10.
• * 1.20

  Strab. lib. 15.
• * 1.21

  De placit. philot. 1. 2.
• * 1.22

  Metaphys. 1. ••.
• * 1.23

  Ap••loge••. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. gent. 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.24

  Stromat. 5.
• * 1.25

  De legib. 2.
• * 1.26

  De natur. de or 〈◊〉〈◊〉
• * 1.27

  Physic. ••. 7.
• * 1.28

  Admonit. ad gent.
• * 1.29

  Herodot. lib. 2.
• * 1.30

  Placit. Phi∣los. 1. 8.
• * 1.31

  Apolog.
• * 1.32

  De anim••. 1. 8.
• * 1.33

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 legib. 2.
• * 1.34

  Vit. Pythag.
• * 1.35

  De myster. Egypt. sub initi••
• * 1.36

  De plac. Phil. 4. 2.
• * 1.37

  De anima. 1. 2.
• * 1.38

  Plato in timae.
• * 1.39

  Stob. Ecl. phys. lib. 1.
• * 1.40

  Arist. de anima. l. 2.
• * 1.41

  Tuscul. quast. ••.
• * 1.42

  De anima. 1. 3.
• * 1.43

  In Laert.
• * 1.44

  De anima. 1. 2
• * 1.45

  Laert.
• * 1.46

  Tusc. quaest. 1.
• * 1.47

  Lib. 2.
• * 1.48

  Plutarch. de plac. phil. 2. 1.
• * 1.49

  Laert.
• * 1.50

  De Coclo. 1. 1••. 12.
• * 1.51

  Laert.
• * 1.52

  De plac. phil. 2. 1.
• * 1.53

  Timoth.
• * 1.54

  Damascen.
• * 1.55

  Tacit. de mor. Germ.
• * 1.56

  Caesar de bell•• Gail. ••.
• * 1.57

  Laert.
• * 1.58

  Plut. de plac. phil.
• * 1.59

  Laert. Plut. s••pt. sap. conviv.
• * 1.60

  Plut de plac. phil. 1. 18.
• * 1.61

  Plut. de plac. phil. 1. 9.
• * 1.62

  Plut. de pla phil. 1. 16.
• * 1.63

  Plut. de plat. phil. 2. 13. Achill. Ta••. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Arat.
• * 1.64

  De c••el••. 2. 7. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 de plac. phil. 2. 28.
• * 1.65

  Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 9.
• * 1.66

  Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 10.
• * 1.67

  Plut. de plac. phil. 3. 11.
• * 1.68

  Sept. sap. conviv
• * 1.69

  Laert.
• * 1.70

  Meteor. 2. 6.
• * 1.71

  De plac. phil.
• * 1.72

  Lib. 1.