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ARistippus returning at length to his own Country, Cyrene, pro∣fessed P••ilosophy there, and instituted a Sect calleda 1.1 Cyrena∣ick from the Place, by someb 1.2 Hedonick, or voluptuous from the Do∣ctrine. c 1.3 They who followed the institution of Aristippus, and were called Cyrenaick, held thus.
They rejected Physick and natural disquisitions from the seeming incomprehensibility thereof. Logick they handled because of its great usefulnesse. But Meleager and Clitomachus affirm they despi∣sed both Physick and Dialectick alike, as unusefull, for that with∣out these, a man who hath learned what things are good, what cvil, and able to discourse wel, and to shake off superstition and the fear of death.
d 1.4 THey held that the Senses inform not alwaies truly,e 1.5 that nothing extrinsecall can be perceived, those things only can be perceived, which are felt by inward touch, as grief and pleasure, neither know wee what colour any thing is, nor what sound it makes, but only that we feele our selves affected after such a manner; thatf 1.6 Passions are comprehensive; that objects not comprehensi••e. Thatg 1.7 nothing judgeth but by interi∣our permotion, and the judgement of true and false consisteth in inward touch.
h 1.8 Sextus Empericus more fully. They assert that passions or af∣fections are the Judges and the only things that may comprehend, & not fallacious; but of those things which cause passions, there is nothing which is comprehensible, or that may not deceive us. For, that we are made white or affected with sweet, may be said ex∣pressly and firmly, but that the thing which causeth this affection is white or sweet, cannot in like manner be asserted. For it is po∣ssible that we be affected with whiten••sse from a thing that is not white, and with sweetnesse from a thing that is not sweet; as to him who is dimsighted or hath the yellow jaundies, all things seem yellow to one, duskish to the other, and he who pincheth his eye, thinketh he sees things double, he who is mad fancies two Thebes's, two Suns; in all these, they that are so affected, to wit, with yellownesse or duskishnesse, or duplicity, is true, but that the thing which moveth them is yellow or duskish, or double, is conceived to be false: So it is most consonant to reason, that wee comprehend nothing more then our own passions. For we must hold that the things seen are either the passions themselves, or the causes of those passions; if we say our passions are the things seen, we must likewise affirm all things seen, to be true and compre∣hensive; if we say the things seen are the causes of those passions, we must confesse all things seen to be false and incomprehensible. For that passion which happeneth to us, showeth us its self and nothing more, so that to speak truly, the passion or affection it self is the only thing that is apparent to us, and for that reason, in their proper affections none erre, but in the externall object, all. The first are comprehensive, the second incomprehensive, the
soul being weak in the discernment thereof, by reason of places, intervalls, motions, mutations, and many other causes.
Hence they assert, that there is not in man any one common thing which judgeth, but they impose common names on the judgments; all commonly name white and sweet, but somthing common that is white and sweet they have not, for evey man apprehends his own affection. Now whether the same affection happeneth to any one, and to him that is next him from white, neither is he able to say, as not receiving the affection of the o∣ther, neither can the other that is next him say, as not receiving his affection. There being therefore no common affection in us, it were a rash thing to assert, that whatsoever seemeth such to me, seemeth also such to him that is next me; for perhaps my constitution is such as to be whitened from that which externally incurreth, another hath his sense so ordered, as that he is affe∣cted otherwise. That therefore which is seen and appeareth is not common.
That by reason of the differing constitutions of the sense we are not moved alike nor in the same manner, is manifest from those who have the Iaundies, and those that are purblinde, and those that are affected according to Nature. For as from the same object, some are so affected as to be black, others red, others white; so is it likewise consonant to reason, that they who are affected according to nature, by reason of the different constitution of senses, are not moved alike by the same things, but one way the white, another way the black, another way he whose eyes are blew, another way he whose eyes are black, whence we impose common names on things, having our selves proper and particu∣lar affections.
TO these assertions (continueth Sextus Empericus) concerning the Judicatories, agreeth what they assert concerning Ends. Of Affections, some are pleasant, some harsh and troublesome, some mean; the harsh and troublesome are ill, whose end is griefe; the pleasant, good, whose end, which cannot be deceived, is plea∣sure; The mean are neither good nor ill, whose end is neither good nor ill, which is an affection between pleasure and griefe. Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things, and we live say they, observing evidence and liking, evidence in the rest of the affections, liking, in pleasure.
Laertius saith, they assert two passions or affections, Griefe and Pleasure; pleasure, a soft smooth motion; griefe, a harsh motion. One pleasure differeth not from another pleasure, nor is one pleasure sweeter then another pleasure; this pleasure is coveted by all living creatures, the other shunned.
They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end, as Panaetius saith in his book of Sects, not catastematick permanent pleasure, which consisteth in privation of griefe, and a quiet void of all disturbance, which Epicure held.
The End differeth from Beatitude; for the End is some particu∣lar pleasure; Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular pleasures, wherein are included both the past and future. Again, particular pl••asure is expetible in it selfe, felicity, not in it selfe, but for particular pleasures.
That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest, in that from our first infancy, without any instruction of others, we naturally aime thereat, and having obtain'd it, seek nothing else. Moreover, we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary, griefe.
Pleasure is good, though proceeding from the most sordid dis∣honest thing, as Hippobotus in his Book of Sects; for, although the action be dishonest, yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it selfe, and good.
Indolence, which Ep••cure held, they esteem not pleasure, nor want of pleasure, griefe, for both these consist in motion; but In∣dolence and want of pleasure consists not in motion, for Indolence is like the state of a sleeping man.
They hold, that some men may not desire pleasure, through perversity of minde.
All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall pleasures and pains; for from the simple prosperity of our Coun∣try or our selfe, we are affected with joy.
But neither the remembrance of past goods, nor expectation of future compleat pleasure, as Epicure thought; for by time and expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved.i 1.9 Pleasure, accor∣ding to Aristippus, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, consisteth only in one part of time, the present; for the remembrance of past pleasures, or expectati∣on of the future, is vain and frivolous, and nothing appertaineth to beatitude; but that only is good which is present. With those pleasures which he received heretofore, or shall receive hereaf∣ter, Aristippus said, he was nothing at all moved, the first being gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is come, is uncertain. Hencek 1.10 he argued, that men ought not to be folicitous either about things past or future, and that not to be troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit. He also advised to take care only for the present day, and in that day, only of the present part thereof, wherein something was done or thought; for he said, the present only is in our power, not the past or ••uture, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.
Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing, for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation, and those who lament truely, we hear with displeasure. This priva∣tion of pleasure and griefe they called mean states.
The pleasures of the body are much better then those of the soule, and the pains or griefs thereof much worse; for which reason those who offend actually, are most grievously punished.
To grieve, is more unnaturall to us, to delight, more naturall; for which reason, much more care is requisite for the ordering of one then of the other; yet, many times we reject things which effect pleasure, as being grievous; so that the concurrence of pleasures which effecteth beatitude, is very difficult.
Moreover they hold, that every wise man doth not live plea∣santly, nor every wicked man unpleasantly, but so for the most part; for it is enough that a man be affected and reduced by inci∣dence of one single pleasure.
They held, thatl 1.11 Griefe is the greatest ill; that griefe is not ef∣fected by every ill, but by the unexpected and unforeseen; that one man is more grieved then another.
They assert, that Riches are efficient causes of pleasure; yet, not expetible in themselves.
m 1.12 ALL good consisteth in Pleasure, Vertue it selfe is only lau∣dable, as being an efficient cause of pleasure.
n 1.13 Nothing is just, honest, or dishonest by Nature, but by Law and Custome; yet a good man will do nothing that is evill, be∣cause of the censure or esteem which would fall upon his acti∣ons, ando 1.14 that such a one is wise.
Prudence is a good, yet not expetible in it selfe, but for the sake of those things which proceed from it.
A friend is to be embraced for the use we may have of him, as the body cherisheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth found.
Of Vertues, some are in the unwis••e. Corporeall exercise conduceth to the acquisition of Vertue. A wise man is not subject to En••y, Love, or Superstition, for all these proceed from the vanity of Opinion; but, he is subject to Griefe or Fear, as being Naturall accidents.
Eaert.
Galen. Hist. Phil.
Laert.
Laert.
Cicer. Acad. Quest. lib. 4.
Laert.
Cic.
advers. Mathom.
Athen. deipn. 12.
Ael. var. Hist. lib. 14. 6.
Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4.
Cic. de. Offic. 3.
Laert.
So Casaubon reads, but doubt∣lesse there is a def••ct in the Text.