They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end, as
Panaetius saith in his book of Sects, not catastematick permanent
pleasure, which consisteth in privation of griefe, and a quiet void
of all disturbance, which Epicure held.
The End differeth from Beatitude; for the End is some particu∣lar
pleasure; Beatitude is that which consisteth of all particular
pleasures, wherein are included both the past and future. Again,
particular pl••asure is expetible in it selfe, felicity, not in it selfe,
but for particular pleasures.
That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest, in that from our
first infancy, without any instruction of others, we naturally
aime thereat, and having obtain'd it, seek nothing else. Moreover,
we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary, griefe.
Pleasure is good, though proceeding from the most sordid dis∣honest
thing, as Hippobotus in his Book of Sects; for, although the
action be dishonest, yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it
selfe, and good.
Indolence, which Ep••cure held, they esteem not pleasure, nor
want of pleasure, griefe, for both these consist in motion; but In∣dolence
and want of pleasure consists not in motion, for Indolence
is like the state of a sleeping man.
They hold, that some men may not desire pleasure, through
perversity of minde.
All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall
pleasures and pains; for from the simple prosperity of our Coun∣try
or our selfe, we are affected with joy.
But neither the remembrance of past goods, nor expectation
of future compleat pleasure, as Epicure thought; for by time and
expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved. Pleasure, accor∣ding
to Aristippus, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, consisteth only in one part of time,
the present; for the remembrance of past pleasures, or expectati∣on
of the future, is vain and frivolous, and nothing appertaineth
to beatitude; but that only is good which is present. With those
pleasures which he received heretofore, or shall receive hereaf∣ter,
Aristippus said, he was nothing at all moved, the first being
gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is
come, is uncertain. Hence he argued, that men ought not to be
folicitous either about things past or future, and that not to be
troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit. He also
advised to take care only for the present day, and in that day,
only of the present part thereof, wherein something was done or
thought; for he said, the present only is in our power, not the past
or ••uture, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever
it will come.
Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing,
for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation, and
those who lament truely, we hear with displeasure. This priva∣tion
of pleasure and griefe they called mean states.