The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

THE SECOND PART. (Book 2)

CHAP. I.

ETHICK, and the parts thereof.

a 1.1 THE Morall part of Philosophy is divided into these pla∣ces; Of appetite, Of good and ill; Of passions, Of Virtue, of the End; Of the first aestimation, of Actions, Offices, exhortations and de∣hortations.

Thus distinguisheth Chrysippus, Archidemus, Zeno of Tarsis, A∣pollodorus, Diogenes (the Babylonians) Antipater▪ and Possidonius. But Zeno the Cittiean, and Cleanthes, as being more antient, were lesse accurate in their manner of treating upon these things.

CHAP. II.

Of Appetite.

THE consideration of Ethick, beginneth properly from Appetite.a 1.2 Appetite is moved by Phantasie of an Office, for it is the impulsion of the soul to somthing.

Appetite in rationall and irrationall Creatures is different; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is not rationall appetite, but a species of rationall appetite. Rational appetite is defined an impulsion of the intellect to the doing of somthing. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is a species of practick appetite, being an impulsion of the Intellect to somthing future. Hence appetite is taken four waies, for rationall and irrationall inclination, and for rationall and irrationall aversion. To these may be added the

habit of Appetition, which is likewise called appetite, the Ori∣gine of all appetitive acts.

Of practick appetite there are many species, of which are

• 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Designation.
• 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an appetite before appetite.
• 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an action before action.
• 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an appetite to somthing now existent.
• 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a will by ratiocination,
• 6. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a Will before Will.
• 7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an appetite joined with reason.
• 8. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a spontaneous Will.

CHAP. III.

Of first naturall Appetite.

a 1.3 THe first appetite of a living creature is to preserve it self, this being from the beginning proper to it by nature, as Chrysippus in his first Book of Ends, who affirmes that the care of our selves, and consciousnesse thereof, is the first property of all living Crea∣tures. For, Nature producing a living Creature, intended either to alienate it from it self, or to commend unto its own care; but the first is not likely; it followeth therefore, that Nature com∣mendeth to every thing the preservation of it selfe, whereby it repulseth whatsoever is hurtfull, and pursueth what is convenient.

b 1.4 As soon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to it self; commended to the con••erva∣tion of it self and its own state, and to the election of such things as may preserve its state, but alienated from destruction, and from all such things as may destroy it. This is manifest in as much as before the accession of pleasure or grief, young creatures de∣sire those things which conduce to their wellfare, and refuse the contrary, which would not be, if they did not love their own state, and fear destruction. Neither could they desire any thing without having some sense of themselves, whereby they love themselves, and what belongs to them. Hence it is manifest, that the principle of this love is derived from themselves.

c 1.5 Whereas some must hold the first appetite of a living crea∣ture to be that of pleasure, that is false.d 1.6 The greater part of Stoicks conceive that Pleasure is not to be placed amongst the na∣turall principles of love to our selves, for if nature had so ordered it, many dishonest things would have followed.e 1.7 Pleasure is an after-accession, when as Nature enquiring by it self into it self, receiveth those things which are agreeable to its constitution, af∣ter

which manner living creatures are exhilarated, and plants sprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no difference betwixt plants and living creatures, that whereas plants are ordered without appetite or sense, there is in living creatures, something according to the nature of plants: But, there being over and a∣bove in living creatures, an innate appetite, whereby they go to those things that are proper for them, the naturall part in them is governed by the appetitive.

f 1.8 That we naturally love those things which are first propo∣sed unto us by nature, may be argued from hence, in that there is no man, if both were put to his choice, but had rather have all his limbs able and sound, rather then uselesse and imperfect. These comprehensions we conceive fit to be acquired for their own sake, because they have in themselves something, as it were, complex, including Truth. This is discernable in young ones, whom we see delighted, though it nothing concernes them, if they themselves finde out any thing by reason. Even the Arts we conceive to be assumed for themselves, aswell because in these there is something worthy assumption, as because they consist of knowledge, and contain somethings constituted by reason and power.

CHAP. IV.

Of Appetites consequent to the first.

a 1.9 THus according to the first innate principles of Nature, those things which are according to nature being expetible in themselves, their contraries avoidable in themselves, the first office is to conserve it selfe in the state of nature, the next, to ob∣tain those things which are according to nature.

Here beginneth good to be first understood, for it is the first conciliation of man to things according to nature. This Good, as soon as man receiveth intelligence or notion thereof, and seeth the order and concord of Offices, he esteemeth far above those things which he formerly loved, and by rationall knowledge collecteth, that herein is placed the chief good of man, laudable and expetible in it selfe. To this chiefe good, which consisteth in homologie or convenience, all honest actions having reference, honesty it selfe, which is reckoned amongst the good, though it rise afterward, is notwithstanding alone expetible in its own power and dignity. But, of those which are the first objects of nature, none is expetible in it selfe.

Now whereas offices proceed from the first naturall objects, they must necessarily be referred to the same; so as all Offices tend to the fulfilling of the first naturall appetites; yet, not so,

as if therein consisted the ultimate good. Honest action is in the first conciliation of nature, for it is consequent, and ariseth as we said afterward; yet, it is according to nature, and much more allective then all that go before it.

And seeing that all offices proceed from the first naturall ap∣petites, even wisdome it selfe must be derived from thence like∣wise. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to another, more esteemeth him to whom he is recommended, then the person which recommended him: so it is not strange, that we being recommended to wisdome by the first naturall appetite, afterwards more esteem that wisdome, then those things whereby we arrived at it. And as our limbs are given to us for a certain reason of living, so the appetition of the soul is given, not for every kinde of life, but for one certain form of living; so likewise reason and perfect reason. For, as action is proper to a Player, motion to a Dancer; yet, not any, but one certain kinde: so the life that is to be acted, is in one certain kinde, not in any, which kinde we call convenient and consentaneous. Wisdome is not like the art of a Pilot, or a Physician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the extream, that is, the effection of the Art be in the Art it selfe, and not ex∣trinsecall. There is another similitude betwixt Wisdome and these Arts, for in them are those things which are done rightly; yet, are not all the parts whereof they consist contained therein. Things done rightly, or Rectitudes, contain all numbers of ver∣tue; for, only wisdome is wholly converted into it selfe, which is not in other Arts. But, improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician, compared with the ultimate of Wisdome: For, wis∣dome includeth Fortitude and Justice, and judgeth all things that happen to man to be below it, which happen••th not in o∣ther Arts: but, none can hold these vertues which we last men∣tioned, unlesse he affirm, there is nothing that is different, but honest and dishonest.

CHAP. V.

Of Good and III.

HItherto of Appetites, we come next to their Objects. a 1.10 Things (according to Zeno) are whatsoever participate of Essence. Of things, some are good, some ill, some indifferent.

b 1.11 Good is severall waies defined by the Stoicks▪ but their defi∣nitions tend all to one end.c 1.12 Good is profit, or that which diffe∣reth not from profit. Profit is vertue, and vertuous action, not different from profit is •• vertuous man, and a friend. For ver∣tue being a quodammodotative Hegemonick, and vertuous acti∣on

being an operation according to vertue, is plainly profit. A vertuous man and a friend is not different from profit; for pro∣fit is a part of Vertuous, as being the Hegemoniack thereof. Now the wholes are neither the same with their parts, for a man is not a hand, nor different from their parts, for they subsist not without parts; wherefore the whole is not different from its parts, and consequently, a vertuous man being the whole, in respect of his Hegemoniack, which is profit, is not different from profit.

Good is by some defined that which is expetible in it selfe; by others, that which assisteth to felicity, or compleateth it: by e 1.13 Diogenes, that which is absolute by nature; [or,f 1.14 that which is perfect, according to the nature of a rationall creature.] The consequent thereof is a beneficient motion, or state absolute in nature.

Whereas things are known, either by use, or conjunction, or similitude, or collation, by this fourth kinde is the knowledge of good; for when from those things which are according to na∣ture, the minde ascendeth by collation of reason, then it attain∣eth the notion of good.

h 1.15 Good is known and named, not by accession, increase, or comparison with other things, but by its proper power. For as Hony, though it be most sweet, yet, in its proper kinde of tast, not comparative to any other, we perceive it to be sweet: So this good of which we speak, is that which is most to be esteem∣ed, but that estimation consisteth in the kinde, not the magni∣tude. For, estimation being neither amongst the good nor ill, whatsoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kinde. Different therefore is the proper estimation of vertue, which consisteth in the kinde, not in increase.

i 1.16 To Good belongeth all vertue, as Prudence, Justice, Tempe∣rance, Fortitude, and whatsoever participates of those, as ver∣tuous actions and persons.k 1.17 Accessions hereto are joy, cheerful∣nesse, and the like.

l 1.18 Ills are the contrary vices, as Imprudence, Injustice, Intem∣perance, Pusillanimity, and whatsoever participates of vice, as vicious actions and persons.m 1.19 The accessions hereunto are dis∣content, affliction, and the like.

n 1.20 Of Goods, some, as we have said, are Vertues, others not-ver∣tues, as, Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of Ills, some are Vices, as those already mentioned; others not-vices, as Griefe and Fear.

Again,o 1.21 of Goods, some are continuall in all the vertuous, and at all times; such is all vertue, sounde sence, wise appetition, and the like. Others are intermissive, as joy, hope, and prudent counsell, which are not in all the wise, nor at all times.

In like manner of Ills, some are continuall in all, and alwaies

in the imprudent, as all vice, and imprudent sence, and impru∣dent appetite: Others intermissive, as griefe, fear, and impru∣dent answer, which are not alwaies in the wicked, nor at all times.

p 1.22 Again, of Good there are three kinds: The first from which pro∣fit commeth, as from its first cause, such is vertue: The second, by which profit commeth, as vertue, and vertuous action: The third that which may profit, as vertue, and vertuous actions, and a vertuous man, and a friend, and the Gods, and good Demons. q 1.23 Thus the second signification includeth the first, and the third, both the first and second.

r 1.24 In like manner of Ills, there are three kinds: First, that from which hurt originally proceedeth, as vice: Secondly, that by which hurt commeth, as vicious actions: Lastly, and most large∣ly, whatsoever is able ••o hurt.

f 1.25 Again, of Goods, some are in the Soul, as vertue, and vertuous actions: some without the Soul, as a true friend, a good Country, and the like: some neither within nor without the soul: as good and vertuous men.

t 1.26 In like manner of Ills, some are within the Soul, as vices, and vicious actions; some without the Soul, as, imprudent friends, e∣nemies, and the like; some neither within nor without the Soul, as wicked men, and all that participate of vice.

u 1.27 Of goods within the Soul, some are habits, some affections, some neither habits nor affections. The vertues themselves are affecti∣ons, their studies habits, nor affections, their acts neither habits nor affections.

x 1.28 In like manner of Ills, some are affections, as vices; some ha∣bits only, as infirmities of minde, and the like; some neither ha∣bits nor affections, as vicious actions.

y 1.29 Again, of Goods, some are finall, some efficient, some both fi∣nall and efficient. A friend, and the benefits arising from him, are efficient goods. Fortitude, magnanimity, liberty, delectation, joy, tranquillity, and all vertuous actions are finall goods. Both efficient and finall (as all vertues) as they perfect felicity, they are efficient, as they constitute it as parts thereof, finall.

z 1.30 In like manner of Ills, some are finall, some efficient, some both. A friend, and the dammages incurred by him, are effi∣cient. Fear, basenesse, servitude, stupidity, frowardnesse, griefe, and all vicious actions, are finall: participant of (are vices) as they procure misfortune they are efficient, as they constitute it as parts thereof, finall.

a 1.31 Again, of goods, some are expetible in themselves, not desired for the sake of any other: Others are preparatory to some other, called effectively expetible. The expetible in themselves are (according to Diogenes) of two kinds: 1. Ultimately expetible, as Beatitude. 2. Those which have in them the cause of being expetible, as every good hath.

Again, of goods some are necessary to Bea••titude, as all Vertues and their Acts, others not-necessary, as Joy, delectation, and study. In like manner of Ills, some are necessary to Infelicity, as all the Vices and their Acts, others not-necessary thereunto, as, all passi∣ons and infirmities of the soul, and the like.

c 1.32 Again, of goods, some consist in motion, as Joy •• delectation and the like; some in affection, as quiet imperturbation; Of those which consist in affection, some are likewise in habit, as the Ver∣tues; others in affection only as the former. Neither consist the Vertues only in habits, but other Acts likewise, changed by a Vertuous man, in a manner, into Vertue. Of these goods which are in habit, are those we call studies, as love of Learning, and the like. For these arts by their affinity with Vertue lead directly to our chief end.

Again,d 1.33 of goods some are absolute, as Science, others relative, as honour, be••evolence, friendship, and the like.

e 1.34 Science is a certain infallible comprehension by reason. It is ta∣ken three waies. First, for a System of Sciences conjoined toge∣ther in a good man; Secondly, for a System of artificiall Sciences, having a certainty. Lastly, for a demonstrative infallible habit of phantasies by reason.

f 1.35 Friendship, is a community of life and consent of studies. The kinds thereof are six.

• 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a friendship amongst known persons.
• 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, amongst Familiars.
• 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, amongst those of the same age.
• 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, towards strangers.
• 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, amongst kinred.
• 6. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from Love.

g 1.36 Again of goods, some are simple, as knowlege, others mixt, as, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good use of Children conformable to nature, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good use of old age conformable to nature, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good use of life conformable to Nature.

Exemption from grief, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and conservation of order, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are the same with, as the mind is with prudence, and communion with goodnesse; yet are otherwise referred, which is observable likewise in the other Vertues. Hence are the same distinctions appliable to ill.

h 1.37 Every good is beneficiall, opportune, conducible, usefull, commen∣dable, fair, helpfull, eligible, just.

Beneficiall, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as conferring that whereby we receive benefit.

Opportune, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as comprising that whereof we stand in need.

Conducible, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as, resolving into it self the means, as the gaine acquired by traffick exceeds the charge.

Usefull, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as conducing to our profit.

Commendable, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from the use.

Fair, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as proportioned to the necessities of the receiver.

Helpfull, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as it relieves us.

Eligible, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as being in reason to be preferred.

Iust, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as being conformable to Law.

i 1.38 On the contrary, every ill is unbeneficiall, importune, incon∣ducible, unusefull, uncommendable, foul, un••elpful, avoidable, and unjust.

k 1.39 Perfect good, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, fair, because it is absolute in all numbers required of Nature, and perfectly proportionate.

l 1.40 Of fair, (or honest) there are four species, Iust, valiant, tempe∣rate, knowing; in these are honest actions consummated.

m 1.41 Likewise of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, foul (or dishonest) are four species, unjust, cowardly, dissolute, foolish.

n 1.42 Honest, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, fair, first, because it renders those who are endued therewith worthy of praise; Secondly, because it is most suitable to its proper work; Thirdly, because it is an orna∣ment; we say, a wise man is only good and fair.

o 1.43 Only that which is good is fair or honest: so Hecato in his third Book of Good; and Chrysipp••s of Fair. This is Vertue, and what participates thereof, which is all one, as to say, that, whatsoever is good is honest likewise, and reciprocally whatsoever is honest is good.

p 1.44 That what is honest only is good, is proved thus. Whatsoever is good is laudable, whatsoever is laudable is honest; therefore whatsoever is good is honest. Again, there is no good which is not expetible, nothing expetible which is not pleasant and amia∣ble, therefore approveable, therefore laudable, therefore honest. Again, no man can glory in a life that is miserable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the happy, but to glory relateth onely to that which is honest, therefore honest life is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath some eminent mark of renown & glory, for which he is justly stiled happy, the same may be said of the life of such a man, whence if a happy life consist in honesty, only that which is honest is to be esteemed good. Moreover, what man can be termed constant, firm, magnanimous, unlesse wee grant that paine is not an ill? For, hee who reckoneth death a∣mongst the Ills cannot but fear it; so no man in any thing can neglect and contemn that which he accounteth ill. This being granted, the next assumption is this, he who is magnanimous and valiant, despiseth, as if they were nothing, all things that can arrive to man, whence it followeth, that nothing is ill which is not dishonest, and this sublime, excellent magnanimous person, ac∣counting all humane things below him, confideth in himself and his own life past and future, knowing that no ill can happen to a wise man. Whereby wee see that what is honest only is good, which is to live happily and honestly.

q 1.45 On the other side, nothing is good, but what is honest; for, who is, or ever was so fervently covetous, and of such disordi∣nate affections, that the same things, for the attainment whereof he would perpetrate any wickednesse, he had not much attain'd unto (setting aside all punishment) without all that wicked means? What advantage or fruit do we aim at, in desiring to know those things which are hidden from us, how they are moved, and by what causes agitated in heaven? Who is so sa∣vage, so obdurate to naturall studies, that he abhorres things worthy knowledge, receives them without pleasure or some be∣nefit, and values them at nothing? Who is there, that when he heareth of the actions, speeches, counsels of magnanimous per∣sons, eminent in all vertue, is not affected with any pleasure? Who is there, that being instituted in an honest family, and in∣genuously educated, is not offended at dishonesty, though it bring no hurt to him? Who is there, that lookes without trouble upon such as live impurely and flagitiously? Who doth not hate fordid, vain, light, frivolous persons? If dishonesty were not in it selfe avoidable, why should men, when they are in the dark, or in a Wildernesse, abstain from any thing that is evill; but, that the very deformity and dishonesty thereof de∣terrs them? Nothing therefore is more clear, then that honest things are expetible in themselves, and dishonest things avoida∣ble in themselves.

Hence it followeth, that what is honest, is more estimable then those mean things which accrue by it. And when we say, that folly, temerity, injustice, and intemperance are avoidable, in respect of those things which are consequent to them, it con∣tradicts not the former assertion, that what is dishonest only is ill, because they relate not to the hurt of the body, but, to dis∣honest actions which proceed from vice.

r 1.46 All good is equall, and every good is highly expetible, and admits neither increase, nor decrease.s 1.47 Here commeth in a great controversy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, which though Carneades affirm to be only verball, Cicero holdeth to be more in things then words.

t 1.48 The Peripateticks hold, that all goods are requisite to hap∣py life; the Stoicks, that whatsoever is worthy estimation, com∣pre••iendeth happy life. Those holding pain to be an ill, it fol∣lowes, that a wise man cannot be happy upon the rack. These, who account not pains among the ills, hold, that a wise man continueth happy in the midst of torments: For, if some bear those pains with greater courage for their Country, or some lighter cause, opinion, not nature increaseth or diminisheth the power of the pain. Again, the Peripateticks asserting three kinds of good, affirm a man to be so much the more happy, the fuller he is of externall corporeall goods; or, in the Stoicks expression,

he who hath most corporeall estimables, is most happy, for as much as by them, Beatitude is compleated. On the contrary, the Stoicks hold, that those goods which they call of nature, make not by their frequency a life more happy, or are more ex∣petible, or more estimable: For then wisdome being expetible, and health expetible, both together would be more expetible then wisdome alone; whereas either being worthy estimation, both are not more worthy of estimation then wisdome alone. For the Stoicks, who hold health to be estimable, but place it not amongst the goods, hold likewise, that no estimation is to be preferred before vertue. From this, the Peripateticks dissent, asserting, that an honest action without pain, is more expetible, then the same action with pain; the Stoicks otherwise. For, as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun, and as a drop of wa∣ter is lost in the vastnesse of the Aegean Sea, and as in the riches of Croesus the accession of one farthing, and one step in the way between this and India; so in that end of all good which the Stoicks assert, all the estimation of corporeall things must ne∣cessarily be obscured, overwhelmed, and perish, by the splen∣dour and magnitude of vertue. And as opportunity 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is not made any thing greater by production of time, for whatso∣ever is opportune hath its measure; so right affection, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the good it selfe placed in it, that it be conformable to na∣ture, admitteth no accession of encrease. For as that opportu∣nity, to those of which we speak, are not made greater by pro∣duction of time, for which reason the Stoicks conceive, that a happy life is not more to be desired, if it be long, then if it be short; and they use this simile: As it is the praise of a shoe to fit the foot, neither are many shoes preferred before two, nor the greater before the lesse: So in those things, whose good is confined to opportunity and convenience, neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer, nor the lon∣ger before the shorter. Nor do they argue acutely, who say, if long health be more to be esteemed then short, then likewise a long use of wisdome, more then a short; they understand not, that the estimation of health is judged by space, that of vertue by opportunity; as if they should say likewise, a good death, or a good labour to a woman in travell, is better long then short: So that they see not, that some things are more esteemed for their shortnesse, others for their length.

CHAP. VI.

Of Eupathies.

a 1.49 AS soon as any object is presented to us, which seemeth good, Nature [as we said] drives us on to the acquisition thereof, which, being done constantly and prudently, is called Will; imprudently and excessively, Desire.

b 1.50 Moreover, while we are so moved, that we are in some good, that happeneth also two waies, when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to reason, this is called Joy; when vainly and excessively, Pleasure.

c 1.51 In like manner, as we desire good things by nature, so by nature we decline the ill: This declination, if done according to reason, is called Caution, if without reason, Fear.d 1.52 Caution is only in a wise man, of fear he is not capable.

Hence it appeareth, that there are three kinds of good affections of the minde, callede 1.53 Eupathies, orf 1.54 Constancies; Ioy, Caution, Will.

1.g 1.55 Ioy is contrary to pleasure, as being a rationall elevation of the minde.

2. Caution is contrary to fear, as being a rationall declination of ill.

3. Will is contrary to desire, as being a rationall appetite.

These are the primarie Eupathies; and as under the primary passions are comprehended many subordinate passions; so are there secondary Eupathies subordinate to those.

Under Ioy are 1. Delectation: 2. Cheerfulnesse: 3. Aequanimity.

Under Caution, 1. Respect: 2. Cleernesse.

Under Will are, 1. Benevolence: 2. Salutation: 3. Charity.

Notwithstanding that Eupathies and passions are contrary;* 1.56 yet are there but three Eupathies, though there are foure passions; for, there is no Eupathie contrary to Grief.

CHAP. VII.

Of Passions.

a 1.57 FRom falsities proceedeth a perversitie of Intellect, hence spring up severall passions, and causes of disorder.

b 1.58 Zeno defineth passion, a praeternaturall motion of the Soul, (or asc 1.59 Cicero renders it, a commotion of the Soul, a••erse from right reason, against Nature.) Others more briefly, a more vehement appe∣tite. More vehement they call that, which recedeth from the constancy of Nature,d 1.60 and is contrary to nature; wherefore all passion is an excessive stupide desire.

e 1.61 The kinds of passion arise from two opinionated goods, and two opinionated evils, so they are four. From the good, desire and plea∣sure; pleasure from present good, desire from future, from the ill, fear, and grief, fear, from the future, grief, from the present, for these things, whose coming we fear, when they do come, grieve us. Pleasure and desire arise from an opinion of good things, desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good, pleasure rejoyceth when wee have obtained what we de∣sire. Thusf 1.62 desire and fear go formost, that to apparent good, this to apparent ill, pleasure and grief follows; pleasure, when we attain what wee desire,* 1.63 griefe, when wee incurre what wee fear.

g 1.64 All passions arise from Iudgement and Opinion, whence they are more strictly defined, (that it may appear not only how vici∣ous they are, but also that they are in our power) thus;

h 1.65 Grief is a fresh opinion of present ill, wherein it seemeth fit that the mind be contracted and dejected, ori 1.66 a contraction of the soul caused by ••pinion of present ill.

k 1.67 Pleasure is a fresh opinion of present good, wherein it seemeth good that the mind be exalted, orl 1.68 an irrational elevation of mind to somthing that seemeth eligible.

m 1.69 Fear is an opinion of imminent ill, which seemeth to be in∣tolerable; or a contraction of the soul disobedient to reason, cau∣sed by expectation of ill.

n 1.70 Desire is an opinion of good to come, that if it were present, it were fit for our use, oro 1.71 an appetite disobedient to Reason, caused by the opinion of consequent good.

These four are, as Hecato saith, primary passions, under each of which there are subordinate passions, severall species belong∣ing to their proper genus.

Under Grief are these kinds,

p 1.72 Envy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, invidentia; a grief at the prosperity of others, q 1.73 which doeth no hurt to him that envieth,* 1.74 for some men desire to see their neighbours suppress'd, that themselves might be ad∣vanced above them. For if a man grieve at the prosperity of ano∣ther whereby he is dammaged, hee is not properly said to envy, as that of Hector to Agamemnon; but he who is nothing dam∣mag'd by the prosperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly envieth.

r 1.75 Aemulation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (not here taken for the imitation of Vertue, for that is laudable) a grief that another man enjoyeth that which we desire and want, or as Laertius, a grief for another's felicity, which we wish to our selves, and an aemulation thereof as greater then our own.

s 1.76 Iealousie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, obtrectation, a grief lest another enjoy what we (t 1.77 love and) possesse.

u 1.78 Compassion, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 misericordia, a grief for the misery another

suffers undeservedly,y 1.79 for no man compassionates the punish∣ment of a parricide or Traytor.

y 1.80 Anguish, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, anger, an oppressive grief.

z 1.81 Mourning, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Luctus, grief for the death of a friend that was dear to us.

a 1.82 Wailing, Moeror, a grief accompany'd with Tears.

b 1.83 Trouble, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, aerumna, a laborious piercing grief.

c 1.84 Sorrow, Dolo••, a vexatious grief, perhaps the same which in Sto∣baeus is termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a grief with conflict of Spirit.

d 1.85 Lamentation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a grief with thoughtfulnesse,e 1.86 proceeding from and encreasing by consideration and discourse.

f 1.87 Molestia, a permanent grief.

g 1.88 Affliction, a grief with corporeall torment.

h 1.89 Desperation, a grief without any hope of amendment.

i 1.90 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an urgent grief attended by difficulty.

k 1.91 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a grief taking away the voice.

l 1.92 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an irrationall grief corroding, and hindring us from enjoying the present.

Under Pleasure are,

m 1.93 Malevolence, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Pleasure at anothers Ill, without any good to our selves. This hath no reall subsistence; for no good man was ever known to rejoyce at the harm of another.

n 1.94 Delectation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a pleasure affecting and soothing the mind by the Ear, and in like manner by the eye, touch, smell or tast, which are all of one kind.

o 1.95 Iactation, a boasting Pleasure, with insolent behaviour.

p 1.96 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an inclination of the mind to dissolutenesse.

q 1.97 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the dissolution of Vertue.

r 1.98 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a pleasure from things not expected.

s 1.99 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Pleasure caused by sight, without deceit.

Under Fear, are

t 1.100 Dread, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear causing 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

u 1.101 Sloth, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Pigritia, a fear of future action, or susception of labour.

* 1.102 Shame, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear of ignominy.

y 1.103 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear of some unusuall phantasie.

z 1.104 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear with losse, or trepidation of voice.

a 1.105 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear of somthing uncertain, or a fear of offending or falling.

b 1.106 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear of Gods or Demons.

c 1.107 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fear of some grievous thing.

d 1.108 Terrour, a fear, which by striking the mind causeth rednesse, palenesse, trembling, or gnashing of the teeth.

e 1.109 Timor, a fear of approaching ill.

f 1.110 Pavor, a fear thrusting the mind out of its place.

g 1.111 Examinatio, a fear consequent, and as it were companion to Pavor.

h 1.112 Conturbatio, a fear, which disperseth all our thoughts.

i 1.113 Formido, a permanent fear.

k 1.114 The Passions subordinate to desire, are generally two, Anger and Love.

l 1.115 Anger is a desire of taking revenge upon those by whom wee conceive our selves wronged.

m 1.116 The species thereof are,

n 1.117 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or as Cicero, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 excandescentia, anger beginning.

o 1.118 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, anger encreasing.

p 1.119 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, ••odium, anger inveterate.

q 1.120 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, inimicitia, anger watching the occasion of revenge.

r 1.121 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, anger breaking forth into action.

s 1.122 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a desire, whereby we wish ill to another, with conti∣nuall progression.

t 1.123 Malice, Discordia, a bitter anger, with utmost hatred, conceived in the Heart.

u 1.124 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a desire conversant in difference of opinions.

* 1.125 Love is an impulsion of good wil for apparent beauty,y 1.126 where∣by it is distinguished from the love of the vertuous, which is a voluntary susception of labour for true beauty. The species of Love are,

z 1.127 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, indigentia, an (inexpleble) desire, of that which wee want, and being separated from it, in vain incline to it.

a 1.128 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, desiderium, a desire to see that which is not present. They b 1.129 distinguish these two thus; Desire is of those things which are said, or praedicated of any thing which they call Categoremes, as to have riches, to take honours; Indigence is of the things them∣selves, as of honours, of money.

c 1.130 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, desire of conversation of that which is absent.

d 1.131 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, desire of Pleasure.

e 1.132 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, desire of Riches.

f 1.133 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, desire of glory.

g 1.134 In all these passions there is opinion.h 1.135 Opinion is a weake assent.i 1.136 Hence passions, (as Chrysippus in his Book of passions affirmes) are Judgements; for Avarice is an opinion, or false judgement that money is good; drunkennesse, and intemperance, are the like.k 1.137 Opinion is likewise sudden from the contractive motion of an unreasonable elation of mind, unresonable and prae∣ternaturall, in as much as it is not obedient to reason. For every passion is violent, wherefore oftentimes, though we see in those that are transported by passion, the inconvenience thereof; yet notwithstanding the same persons that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a head-strong horse, and therefore properly may use that saying:

Against my Iudgement Nature forceth me, Meaning by judgement the knowledge of right things for man is carried beyond nature by passion, to transgresse naturall reason and right.

l 1.138 All those who are led by passion, are diverted from reason, but in another manner then those who are deceived. For the de∣ceived, as for example, They who think Atomes to be the prin∣ciples of all things, when they come to know that they are not, change their judgement: but, those that are in passion, although that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give way to any passion in the Soule; yet, they do not put them off, but are led on by their passions, untill they come to be subject to their ty∣rannicall sway.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Sicknesse and Infirmities.

a 1.139 THE fountain of all passions is Intemperance, which is a totall defection from the minde, and from right reason, so averse from the prescription of reason, that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled, or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth appetites, and causeth them to obey right reason, and preserveth the considerate judgments of the minde; so Intemperan••e, the enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and enciteth the state of the Soul. Thus griefes, and fears, and the rest of the passions, all arise from this. For, as when the blood is corrupt, or flegme, or choler aboundeth, sicknesses and infirmi∣ties arise in the body: so the disorder of ill opinions, and their repugnance to one another, devesteth the Soule of health, a••d troubleth it with diseases.

b 1.140 By passions the minde becommeth indisposed, and as it were sick. Sicknesse of minde, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is an opinion and desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible; but, is not such, as love of women, of wine, of mony. These 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have likewise their contraries in the other extream, as hatred of women, of wine, of men.

c 1.141 This sicknesse of minde happening with imbecillity, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, infirmity. For, as in the body there are infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there inFirmities in the minde, as love of glory, love of pleasure. And as in bodies, there is a propensity to some particular diseases; so in the minde, there is a proclivity 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to some particular pas∣sions, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, propensity to envy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, propensity to unmer∣cifulnesse, and the like.

d 1.142 In this place, much pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, chiefly by Chrysippus, to compare the sicknesses of the minde with those of the body.

Passion (for as much as opinions are inconstantly and turbu∣lently

tossed up and down) is alwaies in motion, and when this fervour and concitation of the minde is inveterate, and, as it were, setled in the veines and marrow, then ariseth sicknesse and infirmity, and those aversions which are contrary to those infirmities and diseases. These differ only intentionally, but re∣ally are the same, arising from desire and pleasure; for, when mony is desired, and reason not immediately apply'd, as a So∣cratick medicine, to cure that desire, the evill spreadeth through the veines, and cleaveth to the bowells, and becommeth sick∣nesse and infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The name of this sicknesse is avarice. In like manner arise other sicknesses, as, desire of glory, desire of wo∣men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the rest of sicknesses and infirmities. Their contraries arise from fear, as, hatred of women, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hatred of mankinde, inhospitality, all which are infirmities of the minde, arising from fear of those things which they flie and shun.

Infirmity of minde is defined, a vehement opinion, inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a thing not to be desired, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. That which ariseth from aver∣sion, is defined a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a thing that ought not to be shunn'd, as if it ought to be shunned. This opinion is a judging our selves to know what we have not.

Under Infirmity are these species, Love of mony, of honour, of women, of curious meats, and the like. Love of mony, Avarice, is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. In the like manner are all the rest defined.

Aversions are defined thus, Inhospitality is a vehement opi∣nion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, that guests ought to be shunned. In like manner is defined hatred of women∣kinde, such as was that of Hippolitus; and of man-kinde, as that of Timon.

As some are more prone to one sicknesse then to another; so are some more inclinable to fear, others, to other passions; in some is anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others choler, which differeth from anger; for it is one thing to be chol••rick, another to be angry, as anxiety differs from griefe; for all are not anxious who are sometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved alwaies: as there is a difference betwixt ebriety and e∣briosity, and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be amorous.

This propensity of severall persons to severall sicknesses, is called, from an analogy to the body, Infirmity, whereby is un∣derstood a propensity to be sick: but in good things, because some are more apt to some goods then to others, it is stiled Facility, in ill things Proclivity, implying a lapsion; in neuters it hath the former name.

As there is sicknesse, infirmity, and defect in the body, so in the minde. Sicknesse is the corruption of the whole body. Infir∣mity is sicknesse with some weaknesse. Defect is, when the parts of the body disagree with one another, whence ariseth pravity, distortion, deformity of the limbs; so that those two, sicknesse and infirmity, arise from the confusion and trouble of the health of the whole body; defect is seen in perfect health. But, in the minde, sicknesse is not distinguish'd from infirmity, but by co∣gitation only.

Vitiosity is a habit or affection, inconstant in it selfe, and oft differing in the whole course of life; so that in one by corruption of opinions, is bred sicknesse and infirmity; in the other, incon∣stancy and repugnance. For, every vi••e hath not disagreeing parts, as of them who are not far from wisdome, that affection is different from it selfe, as being unwise, but not distorted nor depraved.

Sicknesses and infirmities are parts of vitiosity; but, whether passions are parts thereof also, it is a question. For vices are per∣manent affections, passions are moving affections, so that they cannot be parts of permanent affections.

And as in all things the Soul resembleth the Body, so in good likewise. In the body, the chie••est are beauty, strength, health, foundnesse, agility; so likewise in the minde. And as the good temper of the body is, when those things whereof we consist a∣gree well among themselves: so the health of the Soule is, when the judgments and opinions thereof agree. This is the vertue of the Soul, which some affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soule obedient to the precepts of Temperance, and obsequious there∣unto, not having any speciousnesse of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wiseman; yet, there is one kinde of health of the soul, which is common also to the unwise, when by the care of Physicians, the distemper of the minde is removed.

And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs, toge∣ther with a sweetnesse of colour, which is called Beauty; so in the soule, equality, and constancy of opinions, and judgments fol∣lowing vertue, with a certain firmnesse and stability; or, inclu∣ding the very power of vertue, is called Beauty.

Likewise, correspondent to the powers, nerves, and efficacity of the body, in the same termes are named the powers of the Soul. Agility of body is called quicknesse, the same commenda∣tion is ascribed to wit, in respect, that the Soul overrunneth ma∣ny things in a short time.

Only there is this difference betwixt Soules and bodies: Strong soules cannot be assaulted by diseases, strong bodies may•• but, the offensions of bodies may happen without any fault, those of the Soule cannot, all whose sicknesses and passions pro∣ceed from contempt of reason, and therefore are in men only;

for, though beasts do somethings like this, yet, they fall not into passions.

Betwixt acute and obtuse persons, there is this difference, the ingenious, as Corinthian Brasse rusteth, slowly falling into sick∣nesse, and more quickly got out of it: the dull do not so, neither doth the soul of an ingenious person fall into every sicknesse and passion; for, there are not many things extreamly savage and cruell, and some also have a shew of humanity, as compassion, griefe, fear.

But, the infirmities and sicknesses of the minde are lesse easi∣ly rooted out, then those great vices which are contrary to the vertues; for, the sicknesses remaining, the vices may be taken away, because the sicknesses are no sooner healed, then the vices are removed.

CHAP. IX.

Of Vertue and Vice.

a 1.143 VErtue is a convenient affection of the Soul, throughout all life.

Of vertues there are three kinds: The first generall, taken for any perfection of a thing, as of a Statue: The second arec 1.144 Scien∣ces, or contemplative, which, according to Hecaton, consist in spe∣culation, as Prudence and Iustice.d 1.145 The third not-sciences, or not-contemplative, which are considered as consequent to the specu∣lative; as, health, strength, hope, joy, and the like. Health is conse∣quent to Temperance, a theoretick vertue, as strength to the building of an Arch. They are called not-contemplative, because they require no assent, but are by after-accession, and common even to the wicked, as health and strength.

Vice is the contrary to vertue, fore 1.146 the rationall creature is perverted sometimes by the perswasion of exteriour things, sometimes by the counsell of those with whom he converseth, contrary to nature, who gives us inclinations unperverted.

Of vices therefore there are two kinds: The firstf 1.147 ignorance of those things whereof vertues are the knowledge; as, impru∣dence, intemperance, injustice: The second not-ignorances; as, pusillanimity, imbecillity.

g 1.148 Panaetius asserteth two vertues, Theoretick and Practick: o∣thers three, Rationall, Naturall, Morall. Pessidonius foure; Clean∣thes, Chrysippus, and Antipater more; Apollodorus one only, Pru∣dence.

h 1.149 Of vertues, some are primary, others subordinate. The prima∣ry are foure, Prudence, Temperance, Fortitude, Iustice; the first con∣versant in offices, the second in appetite, the third in tolerance, the fourth in distribution.

i 1.150 Prudence is the Science of things that are to be done, and not to be done, and neuter, or the knowledge of good, bad and neu∣ter in civill life.k 1.151 The Vertues subordinate to Prudence are five.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,l 1.152 The Science of things that are to be done, how thy may be done beneficially.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.153 The Science of comprehending things to be effected.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.154 The Science of finding out our office.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.155 The Science of attaining the scope in every thing.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.156 The Science of finding out the issues of things.

m 1.157 Temperance, is the Science of things expetible, avoidable and neuter. Under Temperance are these species.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,n 1.158 the Science of time and order for the weldoing of things.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,o 1.159 the Science of honest and dishonest motions.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,p 1.160 the Science of avoiding just blame.

q 1.161 Fortitude, is the Science of things grievous, not grievous and neuter, the species under it these.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,r 1.162 a Science tenacious of right reason.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,s 1.163 a Science persisting in right judgement.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,t 1.164 a Science whereby we trust that no ill shall happen to us.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,u 1.165 the Science of overcoming those things which happen to the good and bad.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.166 a Science of the Soule which renders her invin∣cible.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,y 1.167 the Science of going through to the attainment of that which we propose to our selves.

z 1.168 Iustice is the Science of distributing to every one according to his desert; under Justice are four subordinate vertues.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,a 1.169 The Science of worshiping the gods.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Science of well-doing.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Science of equality in community.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Science of contracting honestly with others.

b 1.170 In like manner of Vices, some are 〈◊〉〈◊〉, others subordinate to the primary. The primary vices are, Imprudence, Intemperante, Pusillanimity, Injustice.

c 1.171 Imprudence is the ignorance of things good, ill and neuter; and the ignorance of things to be done, not to be done, and neuter.

Intemperance is the ignorance of things expetible, avoidable and neuter.

Pusillanimity is the ignorance of things grievous, not grievous and neuter.

Injustice is the ignorance of distributing to every one according to his deserts.

d 1.172 The subbordinate vices to these are correspondent to the se∣condary vertues, as, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which are defined answerably to their opposite vertues.

e 1.173 These vertues are perfect, and consist in contemplation; but, there are other vertues, which are not arts, but faculties; con∣sisting in exercise, as, health of the Soul, integrity and strength thereof, and pulchritude. For, as the health of the body is a good temperature of hot, cold, dry, and moist; so the health of the soul is a good temperature of the doctrines in the soul. And as the strength of the body consisteth in a tension of the nerves; so the strength of the soul in a proper extension▪ thereof to judg∣ment and action. And as the beauty of the body is a symmetry of all the parts to one another, and to the whole: so the beauty of the soule is the symmetry of the reason and parts thereof, to the whole, and to one another.

f 1.174 All those vertues which are Sciences and Arts; have com∣mon theorems, and the same end, wherefore they are (asg 1.175 Zeno saith) inseparable, connexed to one another, as Chrysippus, Apol∣lodorus and Hecaton affirm. He who hath one, hath all (saith h 1.176 Chrysippus) and he who doth according to one, doth according to all. He who hath vertue, is not only contemplative, but also practick of those things which are to be done. Things which are to be done are either expetible, tolerable, distributible, or re∣tainable; so that whosoever doth one thing wisely, doth another justly, another constantly, another temperately; and so is both wise, magnanimous, just, and temperate.

i 1.177 Notwithstanding, these vertues differ from one another by their heads: For, the heads of prudence are, to contemplate and do well, that which is to be done in the first place, and in the second, to contemplate what things are to be avoided, as ob∣structive to that which is to be done. The proper head of tem∣perance is to compose our own appetites in the first place, and to consider them; in the second, those under the subordinate vertues, as being obstructive and divertive of appetites. The heads of Fortitude 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the first place, to consider all that we are to undergo; in the second, other subordinate vertues. The heads of justice are in the first place, to consider what every one deserves, in the second, the rest. For all vertues consider the things that belong to all, and the subordinate to one ano∣ther. Whence Panaetius saith, it is in vertue as in many Archers, who shoot at one mark distinguished by divers colours: every one aims at the mark, but one proposes to himselfe the white line, another the black, and so of the rest. For, as these place their ultimat end in hitting the mark, but every one proposes to himselfe a severall manner of hitting: so all vertues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to nature for their end, but severall persons pursue it severall waies.

k 1.178 As vertues are inseparable, so are they the same substanti∣ally with the supream part of the soul, in which respect all vertue is said to be a body, for the Intellect and Soul are a body, for the soul is a warm spirit innate in us. Therefore our soul is a living creature, for it hath life and sence, especially the su∣pream part thereof, called the Intellect. Wherefore all vertue is a living creature, because it is essentially the Intellect. And therefore 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for that expression is consequent to this assertion.

l 1.179 Between vertue and vice there is no medium (contrary to the Peripateticks, who assert a mean progression betwixt vertue and vice) for all men have a naturall appetite to good: and as a stick is either straight or crooked, so man must be either just or unjust; but cannot be either more or lesse just or unjust.

m 1.180 That vertue may be learned, is asserted by Chrysippus, in his first book of the End, and by Cleanthes, and Possidonius in his Ex∣hortations, and Hecaton, because men of bad are made good

n 1.181 That it may be lost is likewise affirmed by C••rysippus, deny'd by Cleanthes. The first ••aith, it may be lost by drunkennesse or madnesse: the other, that it cannot be lost, by reason of the firm comprehensions of the soul.

o 1.182 Vertue is in it selfe vertue, and not for hope or fear of any externall thing. It is expetible in it selfe, for which reason, when we do any thing amisse, we are ashamed, as knowing that only to be good, which is honest.

q 1.183 In vertue consisteth Felicity, for the end of vertue is to live convenient to nature. Every vertue is able to make a man live convenient to nature: for, man hath naturall inclinations for the finding out of Offices, for the composure of Appetites, for tolerance and distribution. Vertue therefore is selfe-sufficient to Beatitude, as Zeno, Chrysippus, and Hecaton assert. For if, ••aith he, magnanimity, as conceiving all things to be below it selfe, is selfe-sufficient, and that be a part of vertue, vertue it selfe, which despiseth all things that obstruct her, must also be selfe-sufficient to Beatitude. But Panaetius and Possidonius deny, that vertue is selfe-sufficient, affirming, that it requireth the assi∣stance of health, strength, and necessaries; yet, they hold, that vertue is alwaies used, as Cleanthes affirms, for it cannot be lost, and is alwaies practised by a perfect minde which is good.

s 1.184 Justice is not by nature, but by prescription, as law and right reason: Thus Chrysippus in his book of honest.

t 1.185 Vertue hath many attributes, it is called

• 1. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a good, because it leadeth us to right life.
• 2. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is approved without any controversy, as being most excellent.
• 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is worthy of much study.
• 4. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it may justly be praised.
• ...

• 5. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it inviteth those who desire it.
• 6. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it conduceth to goodnesse of life.
• 7. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is usefull.
• 8. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is rightly expetible.
• 9. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because being present it profiteth, being absent, it it doth not.
• 10. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it hath an use that exceeds the labour.
• 11. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it.
• 12. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it takes away all want.
• 13. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because it is common in use, and extendeth to all the uses of life.

CHAP. X.

Of the End.

a 1.186 THe end is that, for whose sake all offices are done, but it self is not done for the sake of any: or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred, it selfe is referred to no∣thing.

b 1.187 The end is taken three waies: First, for the finall good, which consisteth in rationall conversation: Secondly, for the scope, which is convenient life, in relation thereto: Lastly, for the ultimate of expetibles, unto which all the rest are referred.

c 1.188 Scope and end differ; for scope is the proposed body, which they who pursue Beatitude aim at. Felicity is proposed as the scope, but the end is the attainment of that felicity. If a man throw a spear or an arrow at any thing, he must do all things that he may take his aim aright, and yet so, as to do all things whereby he may hit: So when we say, it is the ultimate end of man to obtain the principles of nature, we imply in like manner, he must do all things necessary to taking aim, and all things like∣wise to the hitting of the mark; but, this is the last, the chiefe good in life, that as to be selected, notdesired.

Reason being given to rationall creatures, for the most per∣fect direction, to live according to reason, is in them to live ac∣cording to nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence e 1.189 Zeno first (in his discourse of human nature) affirmes, that the end is, to live conformably, that is, to live according to one reason concordantly, as on the contrary, savage Beasts that are alwaies at difference, live miserably.

The followers of Zeno,f 1.190 conceiving his expression not full e∣nough, enlarged it. First, Cleanthes his successor, added, to na∣ture, making it up thus, The End is to live conformably to Nature, which is to live according to vertue: for nature leads us to vertue.

Thus Cleanthes in his book of Pleasure, and Possidonius, and Heca∣ton in his book of Ends.

g 1.191 Chry••ippus, to make the expression of Cleanthes more clear, expounds it thus, To live according to expert knowledge of things which happen naturally: For our natures are parts of the Universe, our end therefore is to live conformably to nature, which Chry∣sippus, in his first book of Ends, expounds, both our own proper human nature, and likewise the common nature of the Uni∣verse. But Cleanthes allowes only common nature to be follow∣ed, and not the particular. To live according to this knowledge, is all one, as to live according to vertue, not doing any thing forbidden by our common Law. Right Reason, which is cur∣rent amongst all, being the very same that is in God, the Go∣vernour of all. The vertue therefore, and beatitude of a happy man, is, when all things are ordered according to the correspon∣dence of a mans Genius, with the will of him who governs the Universe.

h 1.192 Diogenes defineth the end, A good use of reason, in the election and refusall of naturall things, choosing those that are according to na∣ture, and refusing those that are repugnant to nature. So likewise Antipater.

Archidemus defineth it, To live, performing compleatly all offices, choosing of those things which are according to nature, the greatest and most principall, and not to be able to transgresse them.

Panaetius, to live according to the appetites given us by nature.

Possidonius, to live contemplating the truth and order of the Uni∣verse.

i 1.193 Thus by living according to nature, the Stoicks understand three things: First, to live according to the knowledge of those things which happen by nature. This is Zeno's end, to live con∣venient to nature. Secondly, to live, preserving all, or the grea∣ter part of mean offices. This exposition differeth from the for∣mer; for that is a Rectitude, proper only to a wise man, this is the office of a progressive, not perfect person, which may like∣wise be to the foolish. The third is, to live in enjoyment of all, or the greater part of those things which are according to na∣ture. This is not constituted in our action, for it consisteth of that kinde of life which enjoyeth vertue, and of those things which are according to nature, and are not in our power.

k 1.194 The chiefe good therefore, is to live suitably to the know∣ledge of those things which arrive by nature, elective of those which are according to nature, and rejective of those which are contrary to nature.l 1.195 This is to live conveniently and conforma∣bly to nature, when the soul entring into the path of vertue, walketh by the steps and guidance of right reason, and follow∣eth God. That which in other arts is artificiall, is here epige∣matick and consequent.

m 1.196 This end is Beatitude. Beatitude, by Zeno. is defined a good course of life, which definition is used likewise by Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and all their followers, who affirm Beatitude to be no∣thing but happy life.

Fair and good, and Vertue, and that which participates of Vertue are equivalent termes, whence it followes thatn 1.197 Beatitude is all one with living according to Vertue.o 1.198 And as Good, and Virtue admit no degrees of increase or diminution, neither doth the ul∣timate end of all good and Virtue increase or diminish. For, as they who are drowned, are no more able to breath, though they are nearer the top of the water then they who are in the bottom; nor a little whelp, the time of whose sight approacheth, see any more then one that is newly litter'd; so he, who hath made some little progresse in Vertue, is no lesse in misery then he who hath made none.

CHAP. XI.

Of Indifferents.

OF things as we have said, some are good, some ill, some in∣different. a 1.199 To deny this difference of things, would be to confound all life, as Aristo doth, neither could there be any functi∣on or act of wisdom, since that, if amongst those things which ap∣pertain to life there were no difference, no election were re∣quisite.

Good and ill, as we said, are these things which are honest or dishonest. Of these hitherto. Betwixt both these, there are some things which conferre nothing to happy or unhappy life, called Indifferents.b 1.200 To profit is a motion or state proceeding from Vertue; To hurt is a motion or state proceeding from Vice; but Indifferents neither profit nor hurt, such are life, health, pleasure, Beauty, Strength, riches, honour, Nobility, and their contraries; death, sicknesse, grief, deformity, imbecillity, poverty, dishonour, meannesse and the like. Thus Hecaton in his seventh Book of Ends, and Apollodorus in his Ethicks, and Chrysip∣pus. These therefore are not goods, but indifferents. For, as the property of Heat is to warm, not to cool, so is it of good to profit, not to hurt. But health and wealth doe not hurt more then they profit, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Again, that which we may use ill as well as well, is not good; but health and wealth may be used ill as well as well, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Yet P••ssidonus reckons these a∣mongst goods. But Hecaton in his 19^th of Good, and Chrysippus of Pleasure, will not allow Pleasure a good: For pleasures are dishonest, but nothing dishonest is good.

c 1.201 Moreover, Riches, as Diogenes con ceiveth, have not only this power that they guide to Pleasure and good health, but that they comprise them. They do not the same in Vertue nor in o∣ther arts, whereto mony may be a guide, but it cannot contain them. Thus if Pleasure or health were good, riches likewise should be numbred amongst the good, but if wisdom be good, it followeth not that riches likewise be good, nor that any thing which is not reckoned amongst the good, not that which is good can be contained by any thing which is not amongst the good. And also for this reason, because Sciences and comprehensions of things, by which Arts are produced, move appetition; but riches are not reckoned among the good, it ••olloweth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much l••sse any Vertue, for Vertue requireth far more study and exercise then Art, and compriseth the firmnesse, stability, and constancy of all life, which Art doth not.

d 1.202 Things are said to be indifferent in three respects; First, if they move neither appetite nor aversion, as, if the starres be of e∣ven number, or to have even or uneven hairs on our head, to stretch out the finger this way or that way, to take up straw and the like. Secondly, things are said to be indifferent which move appetite and aversion equally, not one more then the other; as in two pieces of Silver of equall value, no way different, which to him who comes to make choice of either, are indifferent. There is an appetition to the election of one, but not more of this then of that. The third kind of indifferents are those which are neither good nor ill, expetible nor avoidable, conducing neither to hap∣pinesse nor unhappinesse. In this sense all things are called in∣different, which are betwixt Vertue and Vice, as health, wealth, strength, glory, and the like; for we may be happy without these, though their use hath some relation to happinesse, their abuse to unhappinesse. In this sense whatsoever we may somtimes use wel, other times ill, is indifferent, which kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.

e 1.203 Again, of Indifferents some are Naturall, and move appe∣tite, as health, strength, soundnesse of sense and the like; some Praeternaturall which move avertion, as sicknesse, infirmity, and the like; some Neuter, which move neither appetite nor aversion, as the constitution of the soul and body, one capable of receiving Phantasies, the other wounds.

f 1.204 Of naturall and praeternaturall indifferents, some are primary, others by participation. Primary naturall Indifferents are motions or affections convenient with reason, as health and strength. Par∣ticipant are those by which that motion or affection is communi∣cated, as a healthfull body, ••ound sense.g 1.205 Praeternaturall Indiffe∣rents are the contrary to these.

CHAP. XII.

Of Estimation.

a 1.206 EStimation 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is a certain concurrence with convenient life, which concernes all good.b 1.207 Estimation is two-fold; one, a mediate power or use concurring with life according to nature; such we call health or wealth, as far as they conduce to life, ac∣cording to nature. The other is the valuation of the Estimator, imposed by him who is skilfull in such things.

c 1.208 Again, Estimation is taken three waies: First, for absolute do∣nation: Secondly, for return of approbation: Thirdly, as Antipater calls it, Elective, by which, when some things are proposed, we rather choose these then those; as health before sicknesse, life be∣fore death, and riches before poverty. In like manner, disestima∣tion is taken three waies, the termes only changed to the contra∣ry. Donation according to Diogenes, is a judgment, that a thing is according to nature, or conferreth use thereto. Approbation is in in man, not in things. Election only in the goood, not the indiffe∣rent.

d 1.209 Hence followeth another distinction of indifferents, whereof some are preserred, some rejected, some neither preferred nor re∣jected. Preferred are those, which though they are indifferents, have neverthelesse a sufficient reason why they are to be had in estimation, as health, soundnesse of sense, exemption from griefe, glory, and the like. Rejected are those, which are not worthy a∣ny estimation, as poverty, sicknesse, and the like. Neuter are those, which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the finger.

These termes preferred, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and rejected, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, were invented by Zeno, upon this ground:c 1.210 As when we speak of the Court, no man ••aith, the King himselfe is preferred to dignity, but those who are in some honour, next and second to him in rank: so when we speak of life, we call not those things which are in the first place, the preferred or promoted, but those which are in the second: and so likewise in the rejected. Now forasmuch as good hath the first place, it followes, that what is preferred, is neither good nor ill. [No good is reckoned amongst the preferred, because that hath the greatest estimation; but the preferred having the second estimation, approacheth somewhat to the nature of good. It is called preferred, not that it condu∣ceth to Beatitude, but in respect of the rejected.] We define it thus: an Indifferent with mean estimation; for it could not be, that nothing should be left in mean things, that is according to, or contrary to nature, neither being left, that nothing should be placed in them, which is sufficiently estimable, this being gran∣ted,

that there is not somthing preferred. Rightly therefore this distinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this smile. As if we should suppose our ultimate end, to be so to cast the dy that it may chance right, the dy that shall be so to cast as to fall right, must have some thing preposed and preferred to∣wards its end; and on the other side the contrary, yet the pre∣position of the dy, nothing conduceth to that end; to those which are preferred, relate indeed to the end, but nothing pertain to the power and nature thereof.

f 1.211 Of the preferred some are in the Soul, as ingenuity, art, pro∣gression and the like; some in the body, as life, health, strength, a∣bility, soundnesse, beauty: some externall, as riches, honour, no∣bility and the like.

g 1.212 In like manner of the rejected, some are in the Soul, as he be∣tude, ignorance; some in the body, as death, sicknesse, infirmity, maim, deformity. Some externall, as poverty, dishonour and meannesse.

Likewise of the Neuter, some are in the Soul, as imagination, assent; some in the body, as whitenesse, blacknesse, some externall, which having no estimation or use, are of little value.

Those which are preferred in the Soul, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more worth then those of the body, or the externall, as to have a good disposition of mind, is better then to have a good disposition of body.

h 1.213 Again, of the preferred, some are preferred for themselves, as ingenuity, countenance, state, notion, and the like; some for o∣thers, because they effect somthing, as Riches, and Nobility; some both for themselves and others, as health, strength, soundnesse▪ ability: for themselves, as being according to Nature; for others as affording no small benefit.

i 1.214 As concerning Reputation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Chrysippus and Diogenes af∣firm, that being separated from utility, we should not so much as stretch out our finger for it. But those who followed them, not able to withstand Carneades, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for it selfe, and that it was proper for an ingenuous man freely educated, to desire to be well spoken of by his Parents, kinred, and good men, and that for the thing it self, not for the use there∣of, adding, that as we provide for Children, though to be born after our death; so we must provide for future reputation after death, even for its own sake separated from all use.

k 1.215 In like manner of the rejected, some are rejected for themselves, some for others, some both for themselves and others, which appears by the rule of Contraries.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Actions and Offices.

OF those Actions which proceed from appetite, some are offices, some praeter-offices, some neuter.

b 1.216 Office is that which is preferred, and hath a good reason for the doing thereof, as being convenient to life; or, as others, Of∣fice is whatsoever reason requireth to be done, as, to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our friends. Zeno first gave it this name, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Office, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is an action conformable to the dictates of nature, and extends even to plants, and irrationall living creatures, for offices may even be observed in those.

Praeter-office is an action, which reason requireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to dis∣agree with our Friends, to despise our Country, and the like.

Neuter are those actions which reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a straw.

b 1.217 Of Offices, some are perfect, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Rectitudes, acti∣ons done according to vertue; as, to do wisely, to do justly: O∣thers not-rectitudes, actions which have not a perfect office, but a mediate; as, to marry, to go an Embassy, to discourse, and the like.

Of rectitudes, some are in things requisite, others not: Of the first kinde are, to be wise, temperate, and the like: of the second, those which are not requisite to the being such. In like manner are praeter-offices divided.

Again, of Offices some are ordinary, as, to have a care of our selves, of our limbs, and the like: Some extraordinary, as, to maim our selves, throw away our goods. Accordingly is it of praeter-offices.

Again, of O••fices, some are continuall, as, to live vertuously: some intermassi••e, as, to question, answer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of praeter-o••fices.

c 1.218 Office is a mean thing, placed neither amongst the good, nor their contraries; for, there is something in this approvable, so as a right reason may be given for it, as done approvably. That which is so done is office. And forasmuch as in those things which are neither vertues nor vices, there is somthing which may be of use, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifest, that a wise man doth something in these mean things; he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his office so to do; but, a wise∣man is never deceived in judgment, therefore there is an office in mean things. Again, we see there is something which we call a thing rightly done, or a Rectitude, but that is a perfect office;

therefore there is an inchoat office; as, if it be a Rectitude justly to restore a depositum, to restore a depositum must be a simple restitution without the additionall terme, is an office.

d 1.219 And since it is not to be doubted, but that in mean things, some are to be performed, others rejected, whatsoever is done in that manner, is comprehended in common office, whence it is manifest, that all men by nature lov••ng themselves, as well the foolish as the wise, will take those things which are according to nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one com∣mon office of the wise and unwise, conversant in mean things.

All offices proceeding from these, it is justly said, that to these are referred all our thoughts, even the forsaking of life, or con∣tinuing in it. In whom most things are according to nature, the office of that person is to remain in life, in whom there are, or are foreseen to be more things contrary to nature, his of∣fice is to forsake life, although he be happy, and of a fool to con∣••tinue in life, although he be miserable; for that good, and that ••ll, as we have often said, are things that follow afterwards. The first principles of naturall appetite, fall under the judgement and election of a wise man, and is as it were the matter subje∣cted to wisdome. Thus the reason of continuing in life, or for∣saking it, is to be measured by all those things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy vertue, obliged to continue in life, nor they who live without vertue to die, and it is often the office of a wise man, to part with his life, even when he is most happy, if it may be done opportunely, which is to live conveni∣ently to nature. This they hold, that to live happily, depends on opportunity; for wisdome commandeth, that a wise man, if it be required, should part with his life. Wherefore vice not ha∣ving power to bring a cause of voluntary death, it is manifest, that the office even of fooles, who are likewise wretched, is to continue in life, if they are in the greater part of those things, which we hold to be according to nature. And forasmuch as going out of life and continuing in it be alike miserable, neither doth continuance make his life more to be avoided. We say not therefore without cause, that they who enjoy most naturalls, should continue in life.

Hitherto it appertaines to know, that the love of Parents to∣wards their Children is the effect of nature, from which begin∣ning, we may track all mankinde, as proceeding from thence. First, by the figure and parts of the body, which declare, that nature carefully provided for procreation. Neither can these two agree, that nature orders procreation, and takes no care that those which are procreated should be loved: For even in beasts the power of nature may be seen, whose care when we behold in bringing up of their young, me thinks we hear the

very voice of nature her selfe. Wherefore as it is manifest, that we abhor pain by nature, so it is likewise apparent, that we a••e dr••ven by nature to love those we have begotten.

Hence ariseth a common naturall commendation of men a∣mongst men, that it behooveth a man not to seem alienate from man, for this very reason, because he is man. For, as among the parts of the body, some are made only for themselves, as the eyes and ears; others assist towards the use of the other parts, as the thighes and hands: so though some huge beasts are born only for themselves; yet, that ••hell fish which is called patula prima, and the pinnoteres, so named from keeping its shell, which shut∣teth it selfe up so close, as if it taught others to look to them∣selves: as also Ants, Bees, Storks, do something for the sake of others. Much neerer is the conjunction of mankinde, so that we are inclined by nature to Conventions, Counsells, Cities.

e 1.220 Whatsoever is produced upon the earth, is created for the use of man; but, men are generated for men that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow nature our leader, and to bring forth common benefit to the publick, by mutuall offices, by giving, by receiving, by arts, by en∣deavours, and by faculties, to unite the society of man with man.

f 1.221 The world is governed by the power of God; it is as it were, a common City of men and Gods, and each of us is a part of the world, whence it followeth by nature, that we should prefer the common benefit before our own. For as Lawes prefer the safety of the generall before that of any particular; so a good and wise man conformable to Law, not ignorant of civill office, taketh more care for the benefit of the gene∣rall, then of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who be∣traies his Country more to be condemned, then he who de∣serts the common benefit or safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth death for the Common-wealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dea∣rer to us then our selves. And because that speech is esteemed inhuman and wicked of those who affirm, they care not when they are dead if all the earth were set on fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewise to provide for those who shall hereaf∣ter be, even for their own sake. From this affection of the soul, whence proceed Wills and commendations of dying persons, as also, forasmuch as no man will live solitary in a desart, even with the greatest abundance or plenty, it is easily understood, that we are born for conjunction, congregation, or naturall com∣munity, we are impelled by nature to benefit others the most that we can. All these are offices, chiefly by teaching and communi∣cating the reasons of prudence, so that it is not easie to finde one, who will not communicate to some other what he knoweth him∣selfe.

Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but also to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lyons, for their heifers with great force & impetuosity; so they who abound in wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of Hercules and Bacchus) are incited by nature to preserve mankind. Likewise, when Iupiter is stil'd Op••imus and Maximus, Salutaris, ••hospitalis, Stator, we hereby expresse that the safety of mankind is under his tuition. But we cannot expect, if we our selves are vile, abject, and neglected amongst our selves, that we should be dear to the immortall Gods, and loved of them. As therefore wee make use of our limbs, before that we have learnt for what cause of utility we have them, so are we conjoined and consociated amongst our selves by Nature to civill community, which if it were o∣therwise, neither would there be any room for Justice or good∣nesse.

Yet though there are mutuall Chains betwixt man and man, man hath no common right with beasts, [g 1.222 by reason of our dissi∣militude, as both Chrysippus and Possidonius assirm] for all other things saith Chrysippus, were made for men and the Gods, but they for community and society one with another, so that men may make use of Beasts for their benefit without doing any wrong.

Moreover, since the nature of man is such, that there is a cer∣tain civill right betwixt him and all mankind, he who preserveth that right, is just, who transgresseth it, unjust. But as in a Thea∣ter, though it be common, that room which a man possesseth, is justly said to be his place; so this civill right in a City and the World doth not repugne to the propriety of particular per∣sons.

In order to the conservation of all society, conjunction, and dear••••sse betwixt man and man, emoluments and detriments 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which benefit or hurt must be common a∣mongst them, and not only common but equall. Convenients and Inconvenients, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, must be common, but not equall. Those which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore must necessarily be equall; convenient and in∣convenient are ranked amongst the preferred and rejected, and therefore cannot be equall: Emoluments and detriments are common, but rectitudes and sins not common.

Herein Friendship is requisite, as being one of those things which benefit. Some affirm, that a good man ought to be as much concern'd for his friend as for himself; others, that every man ought to be most concern'd for himself. Yet these latter confesse, that it is contrary to Justice, whereunto we are born, to take a∣way any thing from another, and assume it to our selves.

Neither can friendship be contracted, nor Justice performed

for private respects and advantages, for then these advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Justice or friendship be at all, unlesse they were expetible in themselves. Justice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wise man, not only to do an injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure those who are our friends, or have deserved well of us; Equity cannot be separated from Utility; whatsoever is equall and just, is like∣wise honest, and reciprocally; whatsoever is honest, is equal and just.

h 1.223 Panaetius, who discoursed most accurately of Offices, propo∣seth three kinds wherein men use to deliberate or consult of Offi∣ces. First, when they doubt, whether that of which the question is, be honest or dishonest. Secondly, whether it be profitable or unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the shew of honesty be repugnant to that which seems profitable.

i 1.224 Next the Gods, we are to reverence our Parents and Brethren. k 1.225 As concerning the buriall of Parents, Chrysippus saith, it ought to be done in the most simple manner. For the body, as the Nails, teeth, or hair, thereof nothing pertaineth to us, and therefore ought not to be used with any curiosity or respect. Flesh, if it bee usefull, ought to be converted into aliment (though it were a part of our own body, as the foot) as is proper to it; if uselesse, put under ground, or thrown into some remote place, without more respect then wee have of our nailes or haire when cut off.

l 1.226 Concerning the Office of the Buyer, and the Seller, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Antipatet his Disciple differ. Antipater holds that all must be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth; Diogenes that the Seller as far as is appointed by civill Law, ought only to tell the faults, and to conceal the rest, for as much as he in ••elling desireth to sell to his best advantage.

Hecaton in his sixth Book of Offices, is full of these questions, as whether a good man in a dearth may give over house-keeping. He dis∣putes it on both sides, but concludes that the office is directed ra∣ther by profit then humanity.

He question••, whether if at Sea, a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the casting out of somthing, we should rather cast over-board a horse of great price, or a slave worth little. In this case, private interest leads one way, humanity another.

If a ••ool in a shipwrack catch hold of a plank, may a wise man wrest it from him if he can? He saith, hee may not, for it is injurious. What may the Master of the Shippe? May not he take his own? No; no more then h•• may throw a Passenger out of the Ship, because it is his own, into the Sea. For untill they come to the place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Masters, but the Passengers.

What if two Shipwra••k'd persons light upon one plank, and both pl••••k at it, should one give it over to the other? yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, should live, either for his own sake or the Com∣mon-wealth. But what if these be alike in both? There will be no contention, but either as it were by lot, or mication with the fingers (giuoco della mora) one will give place to the other.

What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the publick treasury, should the Son reveal it to the Magistrates? It were a great wickednesse. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be called into question. But is not our Country before all Offices? yes, but it is for the good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

What if a Father should aim at possession of the ••yranny, on endeavour to betray his Country, shall the Son keep his Cou••sell? He shall beseech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he shall accuse him, yea, threaten; and lastly, if the matter shall tend to the destruction of the Country, he shall preferre the safety of the Country before that of his Father.

If a wise man receive Counterfeit money for good, if afterwards hee know it to be counterfeit money, may he pay it where he ows anything for good? Diogenes saith he may, 〈…〉〈…〉 may not.

If a man sell Wine that will not last, and know it to be such, ought hee to declare it or no? Diogenes thinks he is not obliged, Antipater con∣ceives a good man must. These are as it were cases of Contro∣versie amongst the Stoicks.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Praeteroffices.

a 1.227 As every perfect Office in a rational Creature is a Rectitude, and alwaies compleat in all numbers; so every Praeter-office in a rationall creature is a sin. A sin is that which is done contrary to right reason, or in which somthing of Of••ice is omit∣ted by a rationall Creature.b 1.228 A good deed is the command of the Law. Sin the prohibition of the Law. Hence it is that the Law forbiddeth fools and mad men many things, but prescribeth them nothing, because they are not capable of doing any thing wel.

c 1.229 All sinns are impiety, as being a resisting of the will of the Gods. The Gods love Vertue and its works; they hate vice and its works. Every sin therefore displeaseth them, and consequent∣ly is impiety.

d 1.230 All sins are equall (so Chrysippus in the first of his morall questions, and Persieus, and Zeno) though not alike, for they flow from one fountain, as it were of vice, and the judgment is the

same in all, but by the externall object by which that judgment is made, they are rendred unlike. That they are equall is evident from this: If there be not one truth more truth then another, nor one falshood more falshood then another, neither is one deceit more deceit then another, nor one sin more sin then another. He who is distant from Canobus a hundred furlongs, and he who is distant but one furlong, are both alike not at Canobus: so he who sins more, and he who lesse, are both alike not in the right way.

Yet, though sins are equall, there are some differences in them, forasmuch as some proceed from an obdurat incurable af∣fection, others from an affection not obdurat nor incurable. And though every lie is equally a lie, yet all men do not lie e∣qually; but, every sin is equally sin, for every sin consisteth in lying. Thus Chrysippus, Persaeus, and Zeno: But Heraclides of Tar∣sis, friend to Antipater, and Athenodor••s hold, that sins are une∣quall.

CHAP. XV.

Of wise or vertuous Persons. Paradoxes.

THere are (according to Zeno) two kinds of men, the wise or vertuous, and the vicious. The wise make use of vertue through the whole course of their life, the vicious of vice.

a 1.231 Of the wise there are two sorts, one in perfection consum∣mate; the other in progression, procedent: Of the first are these following paradoxes to be understood;b 1.232 not that the Stoicks positively affirm there ever was such a one in nature (forc 1.233 Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus were great and venerable persons, yet, did not attain the height of human nature) but, that such a one might possibly be.

d 1.234 A wise man is void of passion, for he cannot fall. There is ano∣ther kinde of person void of passion likewise, a wicked man that is obdurate and inflexible.

e 1.235 A wise man is void of pride, honour and dishonour are alike to him. There is another kinde of person void of pride, a wic∣ked man, equally inclinable to dishonour as to honour.

f 1.236 A wise man is austere, for he neither speaketh for complai∣sance, nor admitteth any thing spoken in that kinde. There is another sort of austere persons, which resemble ••oure wine, not fit for drinking, but for medicines only.

g 1.237 A wise man is sincere, for he taketh care, that he be not thought better then he is, by reason of some specious show, and withall to expresse whatsoever good he hath, without any Rhe∣toricall glosse.

h 1.238 A wise man is not pragmaticall; for he declines the doing of ••∣ny thing that is beyond his office.

i 1.239 A wise man is ••••ver drunk, although he drink wine▪ for he ne∣ver sinneth, but doth all things according to Vertue 〈◊〉〈◊〉

k 1.240 A wise man is never mad, yet somtime•• strange phantasies may occurre to him through melancholy or deliration, not according to the reason of eligibles, but praeternaturall.

l 1.241 A wise man is never grieved; for grief, according to Apollodo∣rus, is an irrationall contraction of the Soul.

m 1.242 A wise man is divine: for he hath God with himself; but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wicked man is an Atheist. An Atheist is taken two waies, for him who is an Enemy to the Gods, and for him, who believeth there are no Gods: which all wicked men do not.n 1.243 A wicked man is impious, because he doth all things according to Vice, as the good according to Vertue; and he who hath one vice hath all. He is an Enemy to the Gods, for emnity is the discord of life, as amity is the concord. The wicked differs from the Gods in his course of life, and therefore is an Enemy to them, for they account all their Enemies who are contrary to them. The wicked are contrary to the good, God is good, therefore the wicked are Enemies to God.

o 1.244 A wise man is religious, for he is skilfull in all divine rites. Re∣ligion is the Science of divine worship. Hee sacrificeth to the Gods, and is pure, detesting all sin, holy and just in Divine things.

P 1.245 A wise man only is a Priest, skillfull in Sacrifices, busi∣nesse of the Temple, expiations, and other things proper to the Gods.

q 1.246 A wise man only is a Prophet, endued with the Science of those signs which are communicated by Gods or Demons which belong to humane life. In him therefore are all kinds of vaticination, as well by dreams, birds, and other things.

r 1.247 A wise man reverenceth and loveth his Parents and Brethren, next the Gods. He hath likewise an innate love of his Children, which the vicious hath not.

s 1.248 A wise man ought to apply himself to some office in the Commonwealth (according to Chrysippus) unlesse otherwise diverted; For he will encourage Vertue, and suppresse Vice,t 1.249 especially in those Com∣monwealths which are far from perfection. Hee ought to make Laws, instruct men, prescribe rules. To which is opposite, study of popularity, specious deceit, prescription of things unprofitable, which are not competible to a wise man.

u 1.250 A wise man ought to marry (as Zeno in his Common-wealth) that he may have Children.

x 1.251 A wise man doth not opiniona'e or think; but believe or know, for he never assents to any falsity.y 1.252 Ignorance is an infirm assent; he thinks all firmly. There are two kinds of opinion, one an

assent to things not comprehended, the other a weak beliefe. Neither of these are in a wise man, for he never assented with∣out comprehension, and then alwaies firmly, for nothing is hid∣den from him, otherwise he might have a false opinion. There∣fore he is never diffident. Faith is proper to a wise man, for it is a firm existimation. A Science is a firm habit, therefore a wic∣ked man doth neither know nor believe.

z 1.253 A wise man must imitate the Cynicks: for Cynicisme is the nea∣rest way for vertue, as Apollodorus in his Ethick:a 1.254 Others say, a wise man ought to continue in that Sect, if he have been thereof; but if he have not, to enter into it.

b 1.255 A wise man may upon occasion eat mans flesh. Of this already a∣mongst the Offices.

c 1.256 A wise man only is free, the wicked are slaves; for liberty is the power of doing according to our own judgment. Servitude is a privation of the power of doing according to our own judg∣ment. There is another kinde of servitude which consisteth in subjection, a third in being possess'd and subjected, to which is opposed vicious domination.

d 1.257 A wise man only is a King: For Monarchy is a principality sub∣ordinate to none, which only consists in the wise, as Chrysippus in his treatise, That Zeno used words properly. For (saith he) a Prince must know both good and bad, which none of the wicked knoweth.e 1.258 Dominion and the kinds thereof, Monarchy, Magistracy, Generalship, Admiralty, and the like, are only pro∣per to a wise man; therefore the wise only command, though not actually, yet potentially.

f 1.259 A wise man only is proper to be a Magistrate, Iudge, and Oratour; but not any of the wicked.

g 1.260 A wise man is void of sin; for he cannot fall into errour.

h 1.261 A wise man is innoce••t, and uninjurious, for he cannot hurt ei∣ther himselfe or others,i 1.262 nor receive, nor do any injury: For, injury is a hurtfull injustice, which is not competible to a wise man, although he may be unjustly assaulted: for he having with∣in himselfe all good and vertue, is not capable of vice or harme.

k 1.263 A wise man is not mercifull, nor pardons any, remitting no∣thing of the punishments inflicted by Law, as knowing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding the offence, and that who∣soever sinneth, sinneth out of his own wickednesse. A wise man therefore is not benign, for he who is benign, mitigates the ri∣gour of Justice, and conceives the punishments inflicted by Law to be greater then they ought: But, a wise man knoweth the Law to be good, or a right reason, commanding what is to be done, and what not.

l 1.264 A wise man nothing wonders at those things which seem Parado∣xall, as Charon's Cave, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, and hot springs, and ebullitions of fire.

m 1.265 A wise man will not live in a desart, for he is communicative by nature, and practick, and will undertake exercise to streng∣then his body.

n 1.266 A wise man will pray, requesting good things of the Gods, as Possidonius affirmes, in his first of Offices, and Hecaton in his thir∣teenth of Paradoxes.

o 1.267 A wise man only is a friend: Friendship is only amongst the wise, for in them only is an unanimity as to things that concern life and community, so as our friends may make use of them as freely, as we our selves. Unanimity is the Science of common good. A friend is expetible in himselfe. Plenty of friends is a good: but, amongst the wicked, there is no friendship; for friend∣ship being reall and not faigned, it is impossible it should consist without faith and constancy. But, in the wicked, there is infi∣delity, and inconstancy, and hostility, and therefore not friend∣ship, but some externall connexions, whereby necessity or opi∣nion ties them together.

p 1.268 A wise man doth all things well, as we say, all Pipes play the Ismenian tune well.q 1.269 He doth all things wisely, temperately, prudently, modestly, and according to the other vertues, throughout the whole course of his life. A wicked man doth all amisse, sinning in the whole course of his life, inconstant by na∣ture, often grieved by his own ill actions, wretched and trou∣bled, for as much as he is vexed at the thing done, so much is he angry at himselfe for being the Author of it.

r 1.270 A wise man lo••eth (s 1.271 (••vertuously) those, whose beauty expresse their inward vertue. Thus Zeno, Chrysippus, and Apollodorus affirm. For love is an impulsion of benevolence, raised from beauty, which love is not of conjunction, but of friendship. For this reason, Zeno, though he were in love with Thrasonides, a young woman that was in his power, yet, suppress'd his affection be∣cause she was averse from him. This Chrysippus calls the love of friendship, it is no way discommendable, for beauty is the flower of vertue.

t 1.272 A wise man upon ••••casion will die voluntarily for his Country and friends; or, in case he seized by some excessive pain, losse of his senses, or incurable diseases.

u 1.273 A wise man is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, fo•• he compasseth that which is propo∣sed; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for he is every way augmented; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for he hath attained the just height of wisdome; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for he is invincible, and insuperable. The wicked are the contrary.

x 1.274 A wise man profiteth the wise, and is mutually profited by all the wise, though not friends or acquaintance, for betwixt them there is a concord and community of goods, and he who benefiteth another, benefiteth likewise himselfe. A wicked man neither conferreth nor receiveth benefits; for one is to move towards vertue, the other is to be moved towards vertue.

y 1.275 A wise man is a good O••conomist, skilfull to 'acquire wealth. Oeconomist is a habit active, and contemplative in the businesse of a family, Oeconomy is the ordering of expences, works, and possessions; the Science of acquisition is a reason whereby wealth is attained, which some account in indifferents, others in good. But no wicked man is a good Oeconomist, since only a wise man knoweth from whence, how, and how far gain may be a ••quired.

z 1.276 A wise man only is perfect, for he wanteth no vertue; a wic∣ked man is imperfect, for he hath no vertue. Therefore the wise are alwaies happy, the wicked miserable; which happi∣nesse, according to Chrysippus, differs nothing from that of God, nor is l••sse expetible. The wicked partake of no good, because vertue and that which partakes thereof is good, and those things which are convenient and requisite are proper only to the wise, as the contraries to the wicked.

a 1.277 A wise man is only rich; for good is true riches, and ill true poverty: a wicked man is poor, not having the means to become rich.

b 1.278 A wise man is only obedient; the wicked can neither obey nor command.

c 1.279 A wise man only is honourable; for honour is the reward of vertue, the wicked wanting this, are justly dishonourable.

d 1.280 A wise man only is ingenuous and noble, according to some of the Stoicks; but, others deny it, referring these not to nature, but institution only, according to the proverb, Custome is a second Nature. So that ingenuity is an habit of nature or insti∣tution apt to vertue; Nobility is a habit of descent or institution, apt to vertue.

e 1.281 A wise man is pleasing, p••rswasive, opportune, and sincere; for he is expert in every thing, affable in conversation, and helpfull to the publick: The wicked are the contrary.

f 1.282 A wise man is the best Physician, for he hath considered his con∣stitution, and those things which are requisite for his health.

g 1.283 A wise man may lawfully part with his life, the wicked cannot, because in their life they never acquire vertue, nor eschew vice. But life and death are limited by offices, and their contraries.

h 1.284 A wise man will accept of Empire, and ••ohabit with Princes; but not unlesse he porceive it may be done without danger, and to much advantage.

i 1.285 A wise man never lyeth; for he who speaketh a falshood is not properly said to lie, unlesse it be with intent to deceive. A lie may be used many waies without assent, as in War against ene∣mies, or in the like necessity.

k 1.286 A wise man neither deceiveth, nor is deceived, for he never sin∣neth, he useth not his sight, hearing, or any other sense ill. He is not suspicious, nor repenteth, for both these are proper to

fallacious assent. He can no way be chang'd or erre, or opinio∣nate.

l 1.287 A wise man only (though not all wise men) is happy in Children, in old age, in death.

m 1.288 A wise man doth nothing contrary to his appetite, for all such things are done with a privation, and nothing adverse unfore∣seen happeneth to him.n 1.289 But in the primitive time, there was some wise man that did not desire or will any thing, because that those things which were then present, were not sufficient to be required by him.

o 1.290 A wise man is meek, for meeknesse is a habit whereby things are done meekly, not breaking forth into Anger.

p 1.291 A wise man is peacefull and modest. Modesty is the Science of de∣cent motion; tranquillity the order of natural motions. The con∣trary to these are seen in the wicked.

q 1.292 A wise man is free from all Calumny; he calumniates none, and is not calumniated by any; for Calumny is a lying imputation of fained friends, to which the wise are not liable, for they are true friends; the wicked are, for they are feigned.

r 1.293 A wise man delayeth 〈◊〉〈◊〉 bing, for delay is an omission of Office through slothfulnesse, of which Hesiod,

Nothing deferre a year, a month, a day, He fights aginst himself that doth delay.

f 1.294 A wise man can only incite, and be incited to Vertue, a fool can∣not, for he neglecteth praecepts, and goeth no further then the words, not proceeding to Action. A wicked man is not desirous to hear or learn, as not being capable by reason of his imprudence of what is rightly said; whence it followeth, that he can neither be incited nor incite to Vertue. He that is capable to be incited, or to incite, must be prepared by Philosophy, which is not com∣petible to a wicked man, for he who diligently heareth Philoso∣pher, is not prepared to Philosophy, but ••e who expresseth their doctrine in their life and actions. This no wicked man can do, for he is prepossess'd by Vice. If he should be incited, Vice would pull him ba••k; but none that is vicious incited to Vertue, as none sick to health.

t 1.295 Every wicked man is an exile, wanting Law and Country, for both these are good. That a City or Country is good, Cleant••es proveth thus. If there be a habitation, where those, who fly for succour, find justice, it is good, but a City is such a habitation, therefore a City is good. A City is taken three waies; for a habitation, for a convention of men, and for both. In the two latter significati∣ons it is called good.

u 1.296 Every wicked man is r••stick, for rusticity is ignorance of Laws and civill manners. A wicked man refuseth to live according to Law, and is hurtfull as a savage Beast.

x 1.297 A wicked man is tyrannical, cruell, violent, and in••urious, when∣soever he gets an occasion.

y 1.298 A wicked man is ungratefull, not obliging nor requiting; for he doth nothing by Friendship.

z 1.299 A wicked man is not perseverant, for perseverance is the Science of obtaining our purpose, not being deterred by labour.

a 1.300 A wicked man is not capable of the right of donation. Donation is the good bestowing of estimation, but nothing that is good is competible to the wicked.

b 1.301 E••ery wicked man is delighted with his wickednesse, which wee may perceive not so much by his discourse, as actions, which showes that he is carried on to wickednesse.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Laert,
• a 1.2

  Stob. eclog. Ethic.
• a 1.3

  Laert.
• b 1.4

  Cic. de sin. 3.
• c 1.5

  Laert.
• d 1.6

  Cic. sin 3.
• e 1.7

  Laert.
• f 1.8

  Cic. ••in. 3.
• a 1.9

  Cic. de ••in. 3.
• a 1.10

  Stob.
• b 1.11

  Cic. de sin. 3.
• c 1.12

  Sext. Empir. ••yrrh. 3. 20.
• e 1.13

  Cic. de finib. 3.
• f 1.14

  Laer••
• h 1.15

  Cic••de finib. 3.
• i 1.16

  Laert. Stob.
• k 1.17

  Laert.
• l 1.18

  Laert. Stob.
• m 1.19

  Laert.
• n 1.20

  Stob:
• o 1.21

  Stob.
• p 1.22

  Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrth. hypot. 3. 21.
• q 1.23

  Sext. Empir.
• r 1.24

  Laert. Stob.
• f 1.25

  Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 23.
• t 1.26

  Laert. Stob.
• u 1.27

  Laert. Stob.
• x 1.28

  Laert. Stob.
• y 1.29

  Laert. Stob. Cic. de finib. 3.
• z 1.30

  Laert. Stob.
• a 1.31

  Stob.
• c 1.32

  Stob.
• d 1.33

  Stob.
• e 1.34

  Stob.
• f 1.35

  Stob.
• g 1.36

  Laert. Stob.
• h 1.37

  Laert. Stob.
• i 1.38

  Stob.
• k 1.39

  Laert.
• l 1.40

  Laert.
• m 1.41

  Laert.
• n 1.42

  Laert▪
• o 1.43

  Laert.
• p 1.44

  Cic. de sin. 3.
• q 1.45

  Cie. ibid.
• r 1.46

  Laert.
• s 1.47

  Cic. de fin. 3.
• t 1.48

  Cic. ibid.
• a 1.49

  Cic. Tusc. q••aest. lib. 4.
• b 1.50

  Cic. ibid.
• c 1.51

  Cic. ibid.
• d 1.52

  Cic. ibid. Laert.
• e 1.53

  Laert.
• f 1.54

  Cic.
• g 1.55

  Laert.
• * 1.56

  Cic. Tusc. q••aest.
• a 1.57

  Laer••.
• b 1.58

  Laert.
• c 1.59

  Tusc. quaest. 4.
• d 1.60

  Laert.
• e 1.61

  Cic. ibid.
• f 1.62

  Stob.
• * 1.63

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, &c. so supply the▪ Text.
• g 1.64

  C••••. ibid.
• h 1.65

  Cic.
• i 1.66

  Stob.
• k 1.67

  Cic.
• l 1.68

  Laert.
• m 1.69

  Cic.
• n 1.70

  Cic.
• o 1.71

  Stob.
• p 1.72

  Laert. Cic.
• q 1.73

  Cicer.
• * 1.74

  ••lut. Cont. Stoic.
• r 1.75

  Cic.
• s 1.76

  Laert.
• t 1.77

  Cic.
• u 1.78

  Laert.
• y 1.79

  Cic.
• y 1.80

  Laert. Cic.
• z 1.81

  Cic. Stob.
• a 1.82

  Cic.
• b 1.83

  Cic. Laert.
• c 1.84

  Cic.
• d 1.85

  Cic.
• e 1.86

  Laert.
• f 1.87

  Cic.
• g 1.88

  Cic.
• h 1.89

  Ci••.
• i 1.90

  Laert.
• k 1.91

  Stob.
• l 1.92

  Laert.
• m 1.93

  Cic Laert. whe••ce supply Stobaeus where (pleasure being omit∣ted) these are applyed to a wrong head.
• n 1.94

  Cic. Laert.
• o 1.95

  Cic.
• p 1.96

  Laert.
• q 1.97

  Laert.
• r 1.98

  Stob.
• s 1.99

  Stob.
• t 1.100

  Laert. Stob.
• u 1.101

  Laert Stob.
• * 1.102

  Laert. Stob.
• y 1.103

  Laert.
• z 1.104

  Laert.
• a 1.105

  Laert.
• b 1.106

  Stob.
• c 1.107

  Stob.
• d 1.108

  Cic.
• e 1.109

  Cic.
• f 1.110

  Cic.
• g 1.111

  Cic.
• h 1.112

  Cic.
• i 1.113

  Cic.
• k 1.114

  Stob.
• l 1.115

  Laert. Cic.
• m 1.116

  Stob.
• n 1.117

  Laert.
• o 1.118

  Laert.
• p 1.119

  Cic. Stob.
• q 1.120

  Cic. Stob. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 are confounded by Laertius.
• r 1.121

  Stob.
• s 1.122

  Laert.
• t 1.123

  Cic.
• u 1.124

  Laert.
• * 1.125

  Stob.
• y 1.126

  Laert.
• z 1.127

  Laert. Cic.
• a 1.128

  Stob.
• b 1.129

  Cic.
• c 1.130

  Stob.
• d 1.131

  Stob.
• e 1.132

  Stob.
• f 1.133

  Stob.
• g 1.134

  Stob.
• h 1.135

  Laert. Cic.
• i 1.136

  Laert.
• k 1.137

  Stob.
• l 1.138

  Stob.
• a 1.139

  Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4.
• b 1.140

  Laert. Stob. Cic.
• c 1.141

  Laert. Stob. Cic.
• d 1.142

  Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4.
• a 1.143

  Laert.
• c 1.144

  Stob.
• d 1.145

  Stob.
• e 1.146

  Laert. Stob.
• f 1.147

  Laert.
• g 1.148

  Laert.
• h 1.149

  Laert.
• i 1.150

  Laert.
• k 1.151

  Stob.
• l 1.152

  Laert. Stob.
• * 1.153

  Stob.
• * 1.154

  Stob.
• * 1.155

  Stob.
• * 1.156

  Stob.
• m 1.157

  Stob. by whom correct Lae••tius, who ••pplies this de∣finition to Tem∣perance.
• n 1.158

  Stob.
• o 1.159

  Stob.
• p 1.160

  Stob.
• q 1.161

  Stob.
• r 1.162

  Stob.
• s 1.163

  Stob.
• t 1.164

  Stob.
• u 1.165

  Stob. Laert.
• * 1.166

  Stob.
• y 1.167

  Stob.
• z 1.168

  Stob.
• a 1.169

  Stob.
• b 1.170

  Laert.
• c 1.171

  Stob. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ so supply the Text.
• d 1.172

  Stob.
• e 1.173

  Stob.
• f 1.174

  Stob.
• g 1.175

  ••lut. repugn. Stoic.
• h 1.176

  Plut. repugn. Stoic.
• i 1.177

  Stob.
• k 1.178

  Stob.
• l 1.179

  Stob.
• m 1.180

  Ldert.
• n 1.181

  Stob.
• o 1.182

  L••e••••
• q 1.183

  Lae••••.
• s 1.184

  Laert
• t 1.185

  Stub.
• a 1.186

  St••b.
• b 1.187

  Stob.
• c 1.188

  Stob.
• e 1.189

  Stob.
• f 1.190

  Stob.
• g 1.191

  St••••.
• h 1.192

  Stob.
• i 1.193

  Ci••••de fin•• 4.
• k 1.194

  Cic. de fi••••. 2.
• l 1.195

  Philo. Iud mel 〈◊〉〈◊〉.
• m 1.196

  Stob.
• n 1.197

  Stob.
• o 1.198

  Cic.
• a 1.199

  Cic. dc finib. 3.
• b 1.200

  Laert.
• c 1.201

  Cic de finib. 3
• d 1.202

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 22. whence supply Laertius and Stob••us.
• e 1.203

  Stob.
• f 1.204

  Stob.
• g 1.205

  Stob.
• a 1.206

  Laert.
• b 1.207

  Stob.
• c 1.208

  Stob.
• d 1.209

  Laert. Stob. Sext. Empir. Pyrrb. hyp: 3. 24.
• c 1.210

  Cic. de fin. 3.
• f 1.211

  Laert Stob.
• g 1.212

  Laert. Stob.
• h 1.213

  Stob.
• i 1.214

  Cic. de finib. 3.
• k 1.215

  Stob.
• b 1.216

  Laert. Cic. de ••••nib. 3.
• b 1.217

  Stob.
• c 1.218

  Cic de sin. 3.
• d 1.219

  Cic. de finib. 3.
• e 1.220

  Cic. offic. 1.
• f 1.221

  Cic. de sin. 3.
• g 1.222

  g Laert.
• h 1.223

  Cic. offi••. lib. 1. and again, lib. 3.
• i 1.224

  Laert.
• k 1.225

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hypot. 3. 25.
• l 1.226

  Cic. de offic. lib. 3.
• a 1.227

  St••b.
• b 1.228

  ••lut. de re∣pugn.. Stoic.
• c 1.229

  S••••b.
• d 1.230

  ••lut. de re∣pugn. Stoic.
• a 1.231

  Sen••••.
• b 1.232

  Cic. in Laert.
• c 1.233

  Quintil. lib. 12.
• d 1.234

  Laert.
• e 1.235

  Laert:
• f 1.236

  Laert. Stob.
• g 1.237

  Laert.
• h 1.238

  Laert. Plut. de repugn. Stoic. citing Chrysippus.
• i 1.239

  Laert. St••b
• k 1.240

  Laert.
• l 1.241

  〈◊〉〈◊〉
• m 1.242

  Laert.
• n 1.243

  Stob.
• o 1.244

  Laert.
• P 1.245

  Laert.
• q 1.246

  Stob.
• r 1.247

  Laert.
• s 1.248

  Laert.
• t 1.249

  Stob.
• u 1.250

  Laert. Cic. de finib. 3.
• x 1.251

  Laert.
• y 1.252

  y s ••cb
• z 1.253

  Laert Cic. de finib. lib. 3.
• a 1.254

  Stob.
• b 1.255

  Laert.
• c 1.256

  Laert. Cicer. Paradox.
• d 1.257

  Laert.
• e 1.258

  Stob.
• f 1.259

  Laert.
• g 1.260

  Laert.
• h 1.261

  Laert.
• i 1.262

  Stob.
• k 1.263

  Laert. Stob.
• l 1.264

  〈◊〉〈◊〉
• m 1.265

  Laert.
• n 1.266

  Laert.
• o 1.267

  Laert. Stob.
• p 1.268

  Laert.
• q 1.269

  Stob.
• r 1.270

  La••••t. Cic. Tuse. qu••st. 4.
• s 1.271

  Cic. de ••in. 3.
• t 1.272

  Laert.
• u 1.273

  Stob.
• x 1.274

  Stob.
• y 1.275

  Stob.
• z 1.276

  Stob.
• a 1.277

  Stob.
• b 1.278

  Stob.
• c 1.279

  Stob.
• d 1.280

  Stob.
• e 1.281

  Stob.
• f 1.282

  Stob.
• g 1.283

  Stob,
• h 1.284

  Stob.
• i 1.285

  Stob.
• k 1.286

  Stob.
• l 1.287

  Stob.
• m 1.288

  Stob.
• n 1.289

  Stob.
• o 1.290

  Stob.
• p 1.291

  Stob.
• q 1.292

  Stob.
• r 1.293

  Stob.
• f 1.294

  Stob.
• t 1.295

  Stob.
• u 1.296

  Stob.
• x 1.297

  Stob.
• y 1.298

  Stob.
• z 1.299

  Stob:
• a 1.300

  Stob.
• b 1.301

  Stob.