The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Sicknesse and Infirmities.

a 1.1 THE fountain of all passions is Intemperance, which is a totall defection from the minde, and from right reason, so averse from the prescription of reason, that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled, or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth appetites, and causeth them to obey right reason, and preserveth the considerate judgments of the minde; so Intemperan••e, the enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and enciteth the state of the Soul. Thus griefes, and fears, and the rest of the passions, all arise from this. For, as when the blood is corrupt, or flegme, or choler aboundeth, sicknesses and infirmi∣ties arise in the body: so the disorder of ill opinions, and their repugnance to one another, devesteth the Soule of health, a••d troubleth it with diseases.

b 1.2 By passions the minde becommeth indisposed, and as it were sick. Sicknesse of minde, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is an opinion and desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible; but, is not such, as love of women, of wine, of mony. These 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, have likewise their contraries in the other extream, as hatred of women, of wine, of men.

c 1.3 This sicknesse of minde happening with imbecillity, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, infirmity. For, as in the body there are infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there inFirmities in the minde, as love of glory, love of pleasure. And as in bodies, there is a propensity to some particular diseases; so in the minde, there is a proclivity 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to some particular pas∣sions, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, propensity to envy, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, propensity to unmer∣cifulnesse, and the like.

d 1.4 In this place, much pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, chiefly by Chrysippus, to compare the sicknesses of the minde with those of the body.

Passion (for as much as opinions are inconstantly and turbu∣lently

tossed up and down) is alwaies in motion, and when this fervour and concitation of the minde is inveterate, and, as it were, setled in the veines and marrow, then ariseth sicknesse and infirmity, and those aversions which are contrary to those infirmities and diseases. These differ only intentionally, but re∣ally are the same, arising from desire and pleasure; for, when mony is desired, and reason not immediately apply'd, as a So∣cratick medicine, to cure that desire, the evill spreadeth through the veines, and cleaveth to the bowells, and becommeth sick∣nesse and infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The name of this sicknesse is avarice. In like manner arise other sicknesses, as, desire of glory, desire of wo∣men, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the rest of sicknesses and infirmities. Their contraries arise from fear, as, hatred of women, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, hatred of mankinde, inhospitality, all which are infirmities of the minde, arising from fear of those things which they flie and shun.

Infirmity of minde is defined, a vehement opinion, inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a thing not to be desired, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. That which ariseth from aver∣sion, is defined a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a thing that ought not to be shunn'd, as if it ought to be shunned. This opinion is a judging our selves to know what we have not.

Under Infirmity are these species, Love of mony, of honour, of women, of curious meats, and the like. Love of mony, Avarice, is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be desired. In the like manner are all the rest defined.

Aversions are defined thus, Inhospitality is a vehement opi∣nion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, that guests ought to be shunned. In like manner is defined hatred of women∣kinde, such as was that of Hippolitus; and of man-kinde, as that of Timon.

As some are more prone to one sicknesse then to another; so are some more inclinable to fear, others, to other passions; in some is anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others choler, which differeth from anger; for it is one thing to be chol••rick, another to be angry, as anxiety differs from griefe; for all are not anxious who are sometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved alwaies: as there is a difference betwixt ebriety and e∣briosity, and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be amorous.

This propensity of severall persons to severall sicknesses, is called, from an analogy to the body, Infirmity, whereby is un∣derstood a propensity to be sick: but in good things, because some are more apt to some goods then to others, it is stiled Facility, in ill things Proclivity, implying a lapsion; in neuters it hath the former name.

As there is sicknesse, infirmity, and defect in the body, so in the minde. Sicknesse is the corruption of the whole body. Infir∣mity is sicknesse with some weaknesse. Defect is, when the parts of the body disagree with one another, whence ariseth pravity, distortion, deformity of the limbs; so that those two, sicknesse and infirmity, arise from the confusion and trouble of the health of the whole body; defect is seen in perfect health. But, in the minde, sicknesse is not distinguish'd from infirmity, but by co∣gitation only.

Vitiosity is a habit or affection, inconstant in it selfe, and oft differing in the whole course of life; so that in one by corruption of opinions, is bred sicknesse and infirmity; in the other, incon∣stancy and repugnance. For, every vi••e hath not disagreeing parts, as of them who are not far from wisdome, that affection is different from it selfe, as being unwise, but not distorted nor depraved.

Sicknesses and infirmities are parts of vitiosity; but, whether passions are parts thereof also, it is a question. For vices are per∣manent affections, passions are moving affections, so that they cannot be parts of permanent affections.

And as in all things the Soul resembleth the Body, so in good likewise. In the body, the chie••est are beauty, strength, health, foundnesse, agility; so likewise in the minde. And as the good temper of the body is, when those things whereof we consist a∣gree well among themselves: so the health of the Soule is, when the judgments and opinions thereof agree. This is the vertue of the Soul, which some affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soule obedient to the precepts of Temperance, and obsequious there∣unto, not having any speciousnesse of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wiseman; yet, there is one kinde of health of the soul, which is common also to the unwise, when by the care of Physicians, the distemper of the minde is removed.

And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs, toge∣ther with a sweetnesse of colour, which is called Beauty; so in the soule, equality, and constancy of opinions, and judgments fol∣lowing vertue, with a certain firmnesse and stability; or, inclu∣ding the very power of vertue, is called Beauty.

Likewise, correspondent to the powers, nerves, and efficacity of the body, in the same termes are named the powers of the Soul. Agility of body is called quicknesse, the same commenda∣tion is ascribed to wit, in respect, that the Soul overrunneth ma∣ny things in a short time.

Only there is this difference betwixt Soules and bodies: Strong soules cannot be assaulted by diseases, strong bodies may•• but, the offensions of bodies may happen without any fault, those of the Soule cannot, all whose sicknesses and passions pro∣ceed from contempt of reason, and therefore are in men only;

for, though beasts do somethings like this, yet, they fall not into passions.

Betwixt acute and obtuse persons, there is this difference, the ingenious, as Corinthian Brasse rusteth, slowly falling into sick∣nesse, and more quickly got out of it: the dull do not so, neither doth the soul of an ingenious person fall into every sicknesse and passion; for, there are not many things extreamly savage and cruell, and some also have a shew of humanity, as compassion, griefe, fear.

But, the infirmities and sicknesses of the minde are lesse easi∣ly rooted out, then those great vices which are contrary to the vertues; for, the sicknesses remaining, the vices may be taken away, because the sicknesses are no sooner healed, then the vices are removed.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4.
• b 1.2

  Laert. Stob. Cic.
• c 1.3

  Laert. Stob. Cic.
• d 1.4

  Cic. Tusc. quaest. 4.