The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Actions and Offices.

OF those Actions which proceed from appetite, some are offices, some praeter-offices, some neuter.

b 1.1 Office is that which is preferred, and hath a good reason for the doing thereof, as being convenient to life; or, as others, Of∣fice is whatsoever reason requireth to be done, as, to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our friends. Zeno first gave it this name, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Office, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. It is an action conformable to the dictates of nature, and extends even to plants, and irrationall living creatures, for offices may even be observed in those.

Praeter-office is an action, which reason requireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to dis∣agree with our Friends, to despise our Country, and the like.

Neuter are those actions which reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a straw.

b 1.2 Of Offices, some are perfect, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Rectitudes, acti∣ons done according to vertue; as, to do wisely, to do justly: O∣thers not-rectitudes, actions which have not a perfect office, but a mediate; as, to marry, to go an Embassy, to discourse, and the like.

Of rectitudes, some are in things requisite, others not: Of the first kinde are, to be wise, temperate, and the like: of the second, those which are not requisite to the being such. In like manner are praeter-offices divided.

Again, of Offices some are ordinary, as, to have a care of our selves, of our limbs, and the like: Some extraordinary, as, to maim our selves, throw away our goods. Accordingly is it of praeter-offices.

Again, of O••fices, some are continuall, as, to live vertuously: some intermassi••e, as, to question, answer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of praeter-o••fices.

c 1.3 Office is a mean thing, placed neither amongst the good, nor their contraries; for, there is something in this approvable, so as a right reason may be given for it, as done approvably. That which is so done is office. And forasmuch as in those things which are neither vertues nor vices, there is somthing which may be of use, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifest, that a wise man doth something in these mean things; he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his office so to do; but, a wise∣man is never deceived in judgment, therefore there is an office in mean things. Again, we see there is something which we call a thing rightly done, or a Rectitude, but that is a perfect office;

therefore there is an inchoat office; as, if it be a Rectitude justly to restore a depositum, to restore a depositum must be a simple restitution without the additionall terme, is an office.

d 1.4 And since it is not to be doubted, but that in mean things, some are to be performed, others rejected, whatsoever is done in that manner, is comprehended in common office, whence it is manifest, that all men by nature lov••ng themselves, as well the foolish as the wise, will take those things which are according to nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one com∣mon office of the wise and unwise, conversant in mean things.

All offices proceeding from these, it is justly said, that to these are referred all our thoughts, even the forsaking of life, or con∣tinuing in it. In whom most things are according to nature, the office of that person is to remain in life, in whom there are, or are foreseen to be more things contrary to nature, his of∣fice is to forsake life, although he be happy, and of a fool to con∣••tinue in life, although he be miserable; for that good, and that ••ll, as we have often said, are things that follow afterwards. The first principles of naturall appetite, fall under the judgement and election of a wise man, and is as it were the matter subje∣cted to wisdome. Thus the reason of continuing in life, or for∣saking it, is to be measured by all those things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy vertue, obliged to continue in life, nor they who live without vertue to die, and it is often the office of a wise man, to part with his life, even when he is most happy, if it may be done opportunely, which is to live conveni∣ently to nature. This they hold, that to live happily, depends on opportunity; for wisdome commandeth, that a wise man, if it be required, should part with his life. Wherefore vice not ha∣ving power to bring a cause of voluntary death, it is manifest, that the office even of fooles, who are likewise wretched, is to continue in life, if they are in the greater part of those things, which we hold to be according to nature. And forasmuch as going out of life and continuing in it be alike miserable, neither doth continuance make his life more to be avoided. We say not therefore without cause, that they who enjoy most naturalls, should continue in life.

Hitherto it appertaines to know, that the love of Parents to∣wards their Children is the effect of nature, from which begin∣ning, we may track all mankinde, as proceeding from thence. First, by the figure and parts of the body, which declare, that nature carefully provided for procreation. Neither can these two agree, that nature orders procreation, and takes no care that those which are procreated should be loved: For even in beasts the power of nature may be seen, whose care when we behold in bringing up of their young, me thinks we hear the

very voice of nature her selfe. Wherefore as it is manifest, that we abhor pain by nature, so it is likewise apparent, that we a••e dr••ven by nature to love those we have begotten.

Hence ariseth a common naturall commendation of men a∣mongst men, that it behooveth a man not to seem alienate from man, for this very reason, because he is man. For, as among the parts of the body, some are made only for themselves, as the eyes and ears; others assist towards the use of the other parts, as the thighes and hands: so though some huge beasts are born only for themselves; yet, that ••hell fish which is called patula prima, and the pinnoteres, so named from keeping its shell, which shut∣teth it selfe up so close, as if it taught others to look to them∣selves: as also Ants, Bees, Storks, do something for the sake of others. Much neerer is the conjunction of mankinde, so that we are inclined by nature to Conventions, Counsells, Cities.

e 1.5 Whatsoever is produced upon the earth, is created for the use of man; but, men are generated for men that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow nature our leader, and to bring forth common benefit to the publick, by mutuall offices, by giving, by receiving, by arts, by en∣deavours, and by faculties, to unite the society of man with man.

f 1.6 The world is governed by the power of God; it is as it were, a common City of men and Gods, and each of us is a part of the world, whence it followeth by nature, that we should prefer the common benefit before our own. For as Lawes prefer the safety of the generall before that of any particular; so a good and wise man conformable to Law, not ignorant of civill office, taketh more care for the benefit of the gene∣rall, then of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who be∣traies his Country more to be condemned, then he who de∣serts the common benefit or safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth death for the Common-wealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dea∣rer to us then our selves. And because that speech is esteemed inhuman and wicked of those who affirm, they care not when they are dead if all the earth were set on fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewise to provide for those who shall hereaf∣ter be, even for their own sake. From this affection of the soul, whence proceed Wills and commendations of dying persons, as also, forasmuch as no man will live solitary in a desart, even with the greatest abundance or plenty, it is easily understood, that we are born for conjunction, congregation, or naturall com∣munity, we are impelled by nature to benefit others the most that we can. All these are offices, chiefly by teaching and communi∣cating the reasons of prudence, so that it is not easie to finde one, who will not communicate to some other what he knoweth him∣selfe.

Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but also to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lyons, for their heifers with great force & impetuosity; so they who abound in wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of Hercules and Bacchus) are incited by nature to preserve mankind. Likewise, when Iupiter is stil'd Op••imus and Maximus, Salutaris, ••hospitalis, Stator, we hereby expresse that the safety of mankind is under his tuition. But we cannot expect, if we our selves are vile, abject, and neglected amongst our selves, that we should be dear to the immortall Gods, and loved of them. As therefore wee make use of our limbs, before that we have learnt for what cause of utility we have them, so are we conjoined and consociated amongst our selves by Nature to civill community, which if it were o∣therwise, neither would there be any room for Justice or good∣nesse.

Yet though there are mutuall Chains betwixt man and man, man hath no common right with beasts, [g 1.7 by reason of our dissi∣militude, as both Chrysippus and Possidonius assirm] for all other things saith Chrysippus, were made for men and the Gods, but they for community and society one with another, so that men may make use of Beasts for their benefit without doing any wrong.

Moreover, since the nature of man is such, that there is a cer∣tain civill right betwixt him and all mankind, he who preserveth that right, is just, who transgresseth it, unjust. But as in a Thea∣ter, though it be common, that room which a man possesseth, is justly said to be his place; so this civill right in a City and the World doth not repugne to the propriety of particular per∣sons.

In order to the conservation of all society, conjunction, and dear••••sse betwixt man and man, emoluments and detriments 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which benefit or hurt must be common a∣mongst them, and not only common but equall. Convenients and Inconvenients, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, must be common, but not equall. Those which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore must necessarily be equall; convenient and in∣convenient are ranked amongst the preferred and rejected, and therefore cannot be equall: Emoluments and detriments are common, but rectitudes and sins not common.

Herein Friendship is requisite, as being one of those things which benefit. Some affirm, that a good man ought to be as much concern'd for his friend as for himself; others, that every man ought to be most concern'd for himself. Yet these latter confesse, that it is contrary to Justice, whereunto we are born, to take a∣way any thing from another, and assume it to our selves.

Neither can friendship be contracted, nor Justice performed

for private respects and advantages, for then these advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Justice or friendship be at all, unlesse they were expetible in themselves. Justice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wise man, not only to do an injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure those who are our friends, or have deserved well of us; Equity cannot be separated from Utility; whatsoever is equall and just, is like∣wise honest, and reciprocally; whatsoever is honest, is equal and just.

h 1.8 Panaetius, who discoursed most accurately of Offices, propo∣seth three kinds wherein men use to deliberate or consult of Offi∣ces. First, when they doubt, whether that of which the question is, be honest or dishonest. Secondly, whether it be profitable or unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the shew of honesty be repugnant to that which seems profitable.

i 1.9 Next the Gods, we are to reverence our Parents and Brethren. k 1.10 As concerning the buriall of Parents, Chrysippus saith, it ought to be done in the most simple manner. For the body, as the Nails, teeth, or hair, thereof nothing pertaineth to us, and therefore ought not to be used with any curiosity or respect. Flesh, if it bee usefull, ought to be converted into aliment (though it were a part of our own body, as the foot) as is proper to it; if uselesse, put under ground, or thrown into some remote place, without more respect then wee have of our nailes or haire when cut off.

l 1.11 Concerning the Office of the Buyer, and the Seller, Diogenes the Babylonian, and Antipatet his Disciple differ. Antipater holds that all must be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth; Diogenes that the Seller as far as is appointed by civill Law, ought only to tell the faults, and to conceal the rest, for as much as he in ••elling desireth to sell to his best advantage.

Hecaton in his sixth Book of Offices, is full of these questions, as whether a good man in a dearth may give over house-keeping. He dis∣putes it on both sides, but concludes that the office is directed ra∣ther by profit then humanity.

He question••, whether if at Sea, a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the casting out of somthing, we should rather cast over-board a horse of great price, or a slave worth little. In this case, private interest leads one way, humanity another.

If a ••ool in a shipwrack catch hold of a plank, may a wise man wrest it from him if he can? He saith, hee may not, for it is injurious. What may the Master of the Shippe? May not he take his own? No; no more then h•• may throw a Passenger out of the Ship, because it is his own, into the Sea. For untill they come to the place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Masters, but the Passengers.

What if two Shipwra••k'd persons light upon one plank, and both pl••••k at it, should one give it over to the other? yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, should live, either for his own sake or the Com∣mon-wealth. But what if these be alike in both? There will be no contention, but either as it were by lot, or mication with the fingers (giuoco della mora) one will give place to the other.

What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the publick treasury, should the Son reveal it to the Magistrates? It were a great wickednesse. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be called into question. But is not our Country before all Offices? yes, but it is for the good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

What if a Father should aim at possession of the ••yranny, on endeavour to betray his Country, shall the Son keep his Cou••sell? He shall beseech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he shall accuse him, yea, threaten; and lastly, if the matter shall tend to the destruction of the Country, he shall preferre the safety of the Country before that of his Father.

If a wise man receive Counterfeit money for good, if afterwards hee know it to be counterfeit money, may he pay it where he ows anything for good? Diogenes saith he may, 〈…〉〈…〉 may not.

If a man sell Wine that will not last, and know it to be such, ought hee to declare it or no? Diogenes thinks he is not obliged, Antipater con∣ceives a good man must. These are as it were cases of Contro∣versie amongst the Stoicks.

Notes

• b 1.1

  Laert. Cic. de ••••nib. 3.
• b 1.2

  Stob.
• c 1.3

  Cic de sin. 3.
• d 1.4

  Cic. de finib. 3.
• e 1.5

  Cic. offic. 1.
• f 1.6

  Cic. de sin. 3.
• g 1.7

  g Laert.
• h 1.8

  Cic. offi••. lib. 1. and again, lib. 3.
• i 1.9

  Laert.
• k 1.10

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hypot. 3. 25.
• l 1.11

  Cic. de offic. lib. 3.