The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

About this Item

Title
The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.
Author
Stanley, Thomas, 1625-1678.
Publication
London :: Printed for Humphrey Moseley and Thomas Dring :
1656.
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Subject terms
Philosophy, Ancient -- Early works to 1800.
Philosophy -- History.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A61287.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 1, 2024.

Pages

Page 84

CHAP. XII.

Of Estimation.

a 1.1 EStimation 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is a certain concurrence with convenient life, which concernes all good.b 1.2 Estimation is two-fold; one, a mediate power or use concurring with life according to nature; such we call health or wealth, as far as they conduce to life, ac∣cording to nature. The other is the valuation of the Estimator, imposed by him who is skilfull in such things.

c 1.3 Again, Estimation is taken three waies: First, for absolute do∣nation: Secondly, for return of approbation: Thirdly, as Antipater calls it, Elective, by which, when some things are proposed, we rather choose these then those; as health before sicknesse, life be∣fore death, and riches before poverty. In like manner, disestima∣tion is taken three waies, the termes only changed to the contra∣ry. Donation according to Diogenes, is a judgment, that a thing is according to nature, or conferreth use thereto. Approbation is in in man, not in things. Election only in the goood, not the indiffe∣rent.

d 1.4 Hence followeth another distinction of indifferents, whereof some are preserred, some rejected, some neither preferred nor re∣jected. Preferred are those, which though they are indifferents, have neverthelesse a sufficient reason why they are to be had in estimation, as health, soundnesse of sense, exemption from griefe, glory, and the like. Rejected are those, which are not worthy a∣ny estimation, as poverty, sicknesse, and the like. Neuter are those, which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the finger.

These termes preferred, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and rejected, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, were invented by Zeno, upon this ground:c 1.5 As when we speak of the Court, no man aith, the King himselfe is preferred to dignity, but those who are in some honour, next and second to him in rank: so when we speak of life, we call not those things which are in the first place, the preferred or promoted, but those which are in the second: and so likewise in the rejected. Now forasmuch as good hath the first place, it followes, that what is preferred, is neither good nor ill. [No good is reckoned amongst the preferred, because that hath the greatest estimation; but the preferred having the second estimation, approacheth somewhat to the nature of good. It is called preferred, not that it condu∣ceth to Beatitude, but in respect of the rejected.] We define it thus: an Indifferent with mean estimation; for it could not be, that nothing should be left in mean things, that is according to, or contrary to nature, neither being left, that nothing should be placed in them, which is sufficiently estimable, this being gran∣ted,

Page 85

that there is not somthing preferred. Rightly therefore this distinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this smile. As if we should suppose our ultimate end, to be so to cast the dy that it may chance right, the dy that shall be so to cast as to fall right, must have some thing preposed and preferred to∣wards its end; and on the other side the contrary, yet the pre∣position of the dy, nothing conduceth to that end; to those which are preferred, relate indeed to the end, but nothing pertain to the power and nature thereof.

f 1.6 Of the preferred some are in the Soul, as ingenuity, art, pro∣gression and the like; some in the body, as life, health, strength, a∣bility, soundnesse, beauty: some externall, as riches, honour, no∣bility and the like.

g 1.7 In like manner of the rejected, some are in the Soul, as he be∣tude, ignorance; some in the body, as death, sicknesse, infirmity, maim, deformity. Some externall, as poverty, dishonour and meannesse.

Likewise of the Neuter, some are in the Soul, as imagination, assent; some in the body, as whitenesse, blacknesse, some externall, which having no estimation or use, are of little value.

Those which are preferred in the Soul, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more worth then those of the body, or the externall, as to have a good disposition of mind, is better then to have a good disposition of body.

h 1.8 Again, of the preferred, some are preferred for themselves, as ingenuity, countenance, state, notion, and the like; some for o∣thers, because they effect somthing, as Riches, and Nobility; some both for themselves and others, as health, strength, soundnesse▪ ability: for themselves, as being according to Nature; for others as affording no small benefit.

i 1.9 As concerning Reputation, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Chrysippus and Diogenes af∣firm, that being separated from utility, we should not so much as stretch out our finger for it. But those who followed them, not able to withstand Carneades, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for it selfe, and that it was proper for an ingenuous man freely educated, to desire to be well spoken of by his Parents, kinred, and good men, and that for the thing it self, not for the use there∣of, adding, that as we provide for Children, though to be born after our death; so we must provide for future reputation after death, even for its own sake separated from all use.

k 1.10 In like manner of the rejected, some are rejected for themselves, some for others, some both for themselves and others, which appears by the rule of Contraries.

Notes

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