The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS. (Book 1)

The First PART. (Book 1)

CHAP. I.

Of PHILOSOPHY in generall, and particularly of DIALECTICK.

a 1.1 WISDOME is the Science of things divine and humane; Philosophy is the exercitation of convenient Art: Conve∣nient is only and supream vertue. Of Vertues in the most generall sence there are three kinds, Naturall, Morall, Rationall; for which cause Philosophy likewise hath three parts, Physick, E∣thick, Logick: Physick, when we enquire concerning the World, and the things in the world: Ethick is employ'd about humane life: Logick is that part which concerns reason, which is also called Dialectick.b 1.2 Thus Zeno the Cittiean first divided it in his book of Speech, and Chrysippus in his first book of Speech, and in his first of Physicks; and Apollodorus Ephillus in his first book of Introductions into Doctrines; and Eudromus in his morall Institutions; and Diogenes the Babylonian, and Possidonius. These parts Apol∣lodorus calleth Places; C••rysippus and Eudromus species, others ge∣nus's.

That Logick is a part of Philosophy distinct from the rest,

(wherein all the Stoicks agree) is proved by two arguments•• the first this:c 1.3 Every thing which useth another; if that which the thing using, useth, be neither part nor particle, nor part of part of any other, it must be part or particle of the thing using; as medicine useth the art of prescribing diet, which art being neither part nor particle of any other, is consequently a part or particle of Medicine; of part, as to the cure, of particle, as to the practise.

d 1.4 Philosophy; is conversant about Logick; Logick therefore is either a part or particle of Philosophy; but, a particle it is not, for it is not a part either of the Contemplative or the Active. That which is a particle of any thing, ought to have the same matter and scope, with that whereof it is a part: Logick hath neither of these common with Active Philosophy; the matter whereof is humane things, and moderation of Appetite, the common scope, what in them is to be embraced or shunned: but, the matter of Logick is propositions, the scope, to demonstrate by a composure of propositions, that which necessarily falls out upon the collection. Neither is Logick a part of the Contem∣plative, the matter whereof is things divine, the end, contem∣plation of them: now, if it be not a part, either of the Contem∣plative or the Active, it is not a particle of Philosophy, but e∣qually separate from both these, and consequently it must be a part of it.

e 1.5 The second Argument is thus. No Art frameth its own In∣struments, if therefore Philosophy make Logick, it is not its In∣strument, but part thereof.

f 1.6 Philosophy, is by some compared to a field which produceth all manner of fruit; Physick to the soil and tall trees, Ethick to to the mature pleasant fruit, Logick to the strong fence. Others liken it to an Egge; Ethick to the yolk, which some affirm to bee the Chicken; Physick to the white, which is the nourishment of the Chicken; Logick to the outside or shell, Possidonius, (because the parts of Philosophy are inseparable from one another, but plants are distinct from the fruits, as walls from hedges) chuseth rather to compare Philosophy to a living creature, Physick to blood and flesh, Logick, to bones and nerves, Ethick to the soul. (Thus Sextus Empiricus, by whom, perhaps, Laertius is to be corrected, who saith, They likened Ethick to the Flesh, Physick to the Soul) Lastly, they compare Philosophy to a City, well fortified and govern'd according to Reason.

g 1.7 Some affirm, that none of these parts are distinct from the rest, but, all intermingled with one another, for which reason, they deliver them confusedly. The greater part place Logick first, Ethick next, Physick last; because the minde ought first to be fortified for the keeping of those things which are committed to it; so, as it be not easily expugnable. The Dialectick place is

a fortification for the minde. Secondly, to describe the contem∣plation of manners, that they may be reformed, which is safely undertaken, when the Logicall power is first laid down. Lastly, to induce the contemplation of Nature, for that is more divine, and requireth a more profound attention. This methodh 1.8 Pit∣tarch affirmes to have been observed by Chrysippus, adding that of Physick, the last part, is that which treateth of God; for which reason they call the precepts of Religion 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 It seemes therefore, that there is some mistake in Laertius, who of those who place Logick first, Physick next, and Ethick next, and Ethick last, citeth Zeno in his Book of Speech, and Chrysippus, and Archedemus, and Ea∣dromus. But Diogenes the Ptolemaean (continueth he) begins with Ethick: Apollodorus puts Ethick in the second place; Panaetius and Possidonius begin with Physick, as Phanias, companion of Possidonius affirms, in his first of Possidonius's dissertations.

i 1.9 Of Logick, Cleanthes assigneth six parts, Dialectick, Rhetorick, Ethick, Politick, Physick, Theologick: Some affirm, these are not parts of Logick, but of Philosophy it selfe: so Zeno of Tursis. The Logicall part is by some divided into two Sciences, Rhetorick and Dialectick; some add the definitive part, some divide the definitive part into that which concernes invention of truth (by which the differences of Phantasies are directed) and that which concernes knowledge of truth; for things are comprehended by notions.

k 1.10 Rhetorick is the science of well speaking, by dilating upon the thing comprehended. Dialectick is the science of well speaking, (that is true and consentaneous) or well disputing by question and answer. It is defined by Possidonius, the science of true, false, and neuter.

l 1.11 Rhetorick is of three kinds, deliberative, judiciall, demonstra∣tive: The parts of Rhetorick are Invention, Stile, Disposition, Pro∣nunciation: Rhetoricall Speech is divided into Proem, Narration, Confutation, Epilogue.

m 1.12 Dialectick is necessary, and a virtue within its species, con∣taining other vertues; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a Science whereby we are taught when to assent, and when not; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a firm reason, whereby we resist appearances, and are not led away by them: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a fortitude of reason, which keeps us from being tran∣sported with the adverse opinion: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a habit directing phantasies to right reason.

n 1.13 Dialectick is a Science or certain comprehension, or a habit, not erring by reason in reception of phantasies; but, without Dialectick, a wise man cannot be infallible in reason; for by this, we discern the true, false, and probable, and distinguish the ambiguous.

CHAP. II.

Of the Instruments and rules of Iudgment.

a 1.14 IN the first place, they put the discourse concerning phanta∣sies and sence, as a Judicatory, whereby the truth of things is discerned.

b 1.15 The Senses (according to Zeno, who made many alterations in Dialectick, and asserted many things of the Sences that were wholly new) are joyned by a certain kinde of extrinsecall impul∣sion, termed Phantasy. To these phantasies received by the senses, is added an assention of the minde, which is placed in us volunta∣ry. The phantasie, when seen, is comprehensible; when received and approved, comprehension, and, if so comprehended, as that it cannot be plucked away by reason, Science.

c 1.16 Judgment is a perspection which discerneth a thing.

d 1.17 That which judgeth is taken two waies: 1. By which we say, somethings are, others are not, these are true, those are false. 2. Of Essence only; and this is understood three waies, commonly, properly, and most properly. Commonly, for every measure of comprehension, in which sense, even those things which judge naturally, have this appellation, as sight, hearing, tast. Properly, for every artificiall measure of comprehension; thus a cubit, a ballance, a ruler, a pair of compasses, are called things that judge; but sight, and hearing, and the other common instruments of sense, are not. Most properly, for every measure of comprehension of a thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which sence, those things which belong to the actions of life, are not said to be things judging, but the logicall only, and those which dogmaticall Philosophers alledge for the invention of truth.

The Logicall is subdivided into that from which, that by which, and the application or habitude. From which, the man; by which, the sense: the third is the application of phantasie or sight. For as in the Staticks, there are three things which judge, the weigh∣er, the ballance, and position of the ballance: The weigher is the judge from which, the ballance the judge by which, the position of the ballance, as it were a habitude. And again, as to discern right or oblique things is required, an Artificer, a Ruler, and the application thereof; in like manner in Philosophy are required those three things mentioned to the discernment of true and false: the man from whom the judgment is made, is like the weigher or artificer; to the ballance and ruler answer sense and cogitation, by which the judgment is made; to the habitude of the forenamed instruments, the application of phantasy, by which a man commeth to judge.

e 1.18 The Iudge of truth, they affirm to be comprehensive phantasy,

that is, proceeding from that which is: so Chrysippus in the 12^th of his Physicks, and Antipator, and Apollodorus. But Boethus holds many judicatories, the minde, and sence, and appetite, and science; from whom Chrysippus dissenting in his first Book of Reason, af∣firmeth the Judicatories to be Sense and Anticipation. Anticipa∣tion is a naturall notion of Universalls. Others of the more anti∣ent Stoicks (as Possidonius saith in his Book of Iudgments) assert right reason to be the Judicatory.

CHAP. III.

Of Sense.

a 1.19 DIalectick is derived from corporeall senses; for, from thence, the soul conceiveth notions (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) of those things which are explained by definition, and from thence is propaga∣ted and connexed the whole reason of Learning and Teaching.

b 1.20 Sense is a spirit, proceeding from the supream part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.

c 1.21 Whatsoever things are comprehended, are manifestly com∣prehended by sense; all conceptions of the minde depend upon sense.

d 1.22 Comprehension made by the senses is true and faithfull, (ac∣cording to Zeno) for as much as nature hath given it as a rule for science, and principle of her selfe.

e 1.23 Nothing is more clear then this 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 evidence; there can∣not be any speech more perspicuous.

f 1.24 Of Sensibles and Intelligibles, some are true, but, not dire∣ctly sensible; but, by relation to those things which are next, as falling under Intelligence.

CHAP. IV.

Of Phantasy.

In the first place (saitha 1.25 Diocles the Magnesian) they put the reason concerning Phantasie and Sense, as a judgment, whereby the truth of things is discerned. It is phantasie as to its genus, and likewise in as much as the reason of assent, comprehension, and intelligence (which is more excellent then the rest) consists not without Phantasy; for phantasy goeth first, then the minde endued with elocution, declareth by words what it suffers from the phantasy.

b 1.26 Phantasy is so called from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, light; for as light sheweth it selfe, and with it selfe all those things which are contained

within it; so phantasy sheweth it selfe, and that which maketh it.

c 1.27 Phantasy is an impression in the Soul: Cleanthes addes, an im∣pression by depression and eminence, as that impression, which is made in Wax by a Seal.

Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd; for 1. saith he, When the soule first apprehends a triangle and a square, it will follow, that the same body, at the same time, must have in it selfe seve∣rall figures, which is absurd. Again, whereas many phantasies are together consistent in us, the Soul must have divers figures, which is worse then the former: He therefore conceived, that Zeno used the word Impression, for Alteration, meaning thus: Fantasy is an alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer ab∣surd, that the same body (many severall phantasies being at the same time consistent in us) should receive severall alterations. For, as the aire receiving at once innumerable different percus∣sions, hath presently many alterations; so the supream part of the soule, receiving various phantasies, doth something which hath proportion and conformity thereto.

Some object that this exposition is not right; because, though every phantasy is an impression and alteration in the Soul; yet, every impression or alteration of the Soul is not phantasy: as when the finger smarts or itches, and the hand is rubbed, there is then an impression and alteration in the soul; but it is not phantasy, because it is not in the supream part of the soul.

They answer, That in saying, an impression in the Soul, is im∣plyed as in the Soul as fully, as if we should say, phantasy is an impression in the Soul as in the Soul; as when we say, the white in the eye, we imply, as in the eye; that is, the white is in a cer∣tain part of the eye, which all men have so by nature. So when we say, Phantasy is an impression in the Soul, we imply the im∣pression to be made in the supream part thereof.

Others more elegantly answer, that the word Soul is taken two waies, either for the whole, or for the principall part: when we say, man consists of soul and body; or, that death is a separa∣tion of the soul from the body, we mean properly the supream part, wherein properly consists the motion and goods of the Soul. When Ze••o therefore calleth Phantasy an impression in the Soul, he is not to be understood of the whole Soul, but, of part thereof; as if he should say, Phantasy is an alteration of the supream part of the Soul.

To this interpretation, some object thus: Appetition, Assen∣tion, and Comprehension are alterations in the supream part of the soul; but, these differ from phantasy, that being a certain kinde of perswasion and affection, whereas this is more operati∣on then appetition, therefore the definition is not good, being competible to many other things.

They answer by recourse to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (impliances) that a defi∣nition is understood to be in all. As he who saith, Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendship, im∣plyeth amongst young people; so when we say, that phantasy is an alteration in the supream part of the soul, we imply by per∣swasion; for, alteration is not made by operation.

d 1.28 Of Phantasies there are many kinds, some are sensible, others not-sensible. Sensible are those which are received through one or more of the sences: Not-sensible are those which are received through the minde, as of incorporealls, and other things com∣prehended by reason. The sensible formed from things that are, are made with concession and assent. There are also apparitions of phantasies, proceeding from things which are.

Again, some are rationall, others irrationall; rationall, those of reasonable creatures; irrationall, those of unreasonable. The ra∣tionall are intelligence, the irrationall have no name.

Again, some are artificiall, others in-artificiall; for, an Image is considered by an Artist one way, by him that is not an artist ano∣ther way.

e 1.29 Again, some are probable, some improbable: The probable are those which make an easie motion in the soul; as, It is now day, I discourse, and the like. The Improbable are of a contrary na∣ture, averting us from assent; as, it is day, the Sun is not above the earth; if it is dark, it is day. Both probable and improbable are those, which, by relation to other things, are sometimes such, as in doubtfull speeches, neither probable nor improbable are such, as these, The staires are even, the staires are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantasies, some are true, some are false, some are neither true nor false. True are those, whose predication is true, as, It is day, 'tis light: False, whose predica∣tion is false; Both true and false, as happened to Orestes in his mad∣nesse, meeting Electra; that he met something, it was true, for it was Electra; but, that it was a fury, was false. Neither true nor false are those which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not such as the Species in all respects: as, of men, some are Grecians, some are Barbarous; but, man in generall is not Gre∣cian, for then all men must be Grecians, neither barbarous, for the same reason.

Of true Phantasies, some are comprehensive, others are not-comprehensive. Not-comprehensive are those which happen through sicknesse, or perturbation of minde; many being troubled with frenzie or melancholly, attract a true phantasy which is not comprehensive, even from that which extrinsecally occurrs ca∣sually, for which reason, they neither assert it often, nor assent unto it. Comprehensive phantasie is that which is impressed and signed by that which is, and conformable to that which is, so as it cannot be of that which is not.

To comprehensive phantasie three conditions are requisite▪ 1. That it arise from that which is; for many phantasies arise from that which is not, as in mad men. 2. That it be conforma∣ble to that which is; for some phantasies are from that which is, but represents the similitude of that which is not: as Orestes de∣rived a phantasie from that which was, viz. from Electra, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the furies. Comprehensive phantasie must be conformable to that which is, and so impressed and signed, as that it may im∣print artificially all the properties of the thing phancied, as Gravers touch all the parts of those things which they imitate, and the impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and per∣fectly beareth all its characters. Lastly, that it be without im∣pediment; for sometimes comprehensive phantasie is not credi∣table, by reason of outward circumstances; as when Hercules brought Alcestis taken out of the Earth, to Admetus, Admetus drew from Alcestis a comprehensive phantasie, but did not cre∣dit it; for, he consider'd, that she was dead, and therefore could not rise again, but, that sometimes Spirits appear in the shape of the deceased.

f 1.30 Phantasy, Phantaston, Phantasticon, and Phantasme, according to Chrysippus, differ thus: Phantasy is a passion made in the Soul, which sheweth it selfe, and that which made it; as, when with our eyes we see white, it is a passion engendred by sight in the Soul, and we may call this a passion, because the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us: the like of smelling and touching.

Phantaston is that which maketh phantasie; as the white and the cold, and whatsoever is able to move the Soul, that is phan∣taston.

Phantasticon is a frustaneous attraction, a passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing; as in those who sight with shadowes, or extend their hands in vain: for, to phantasy is objected phan∣taston, but phantasticon hath no object.

Phantasme is that, to which we are attracted by that frustra∣neous attraction, which happens in melancholy, or mad persons; as Orestes in the Tragedy, when he saith,

Bring hither, Mother, I implore, These snakie bloodie Maids no more, Whose very lookes wound me all o're.

This he saith in his madnesse, for he saw nothing: wherefore Electra answers him,

Ah quiet in thy bed (unhappy) lie: Thou seest not what thou thinkst before thy eye.

CHAP. V.

Of True and Truth.

a 1.31 TRUE (according to Zeno) is that which is impressed in the minde from that whence it is, in such manner, as it cannot be from that which is not: or, as others,b 1.32 True is that which is, and is opposed to something: False is that which is not; yet, is opposed to something also.

Truth and true differ three waies, by Essence, by Constitution, by Power. By Essence, for truth is a body; but, true is incorporeall, for it is a dicible 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and therefore incorporeall. On the con∣trary, Truth is a body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things. All Science is in some measure the supream part of the Soul, which supream part is a body: therefore truth in ge∣nerall is corporeall.

By Constitution; True is conceived to be something uniforme and simple by nature; as, It is day, I discourse. Truth, as being a Science, consisteth of many things, by a kinde of conservation. Wherefore as a People is one thing, a Citizen another; a Peo∣ple is a multitude consisting of many Citizens; but, a Citizen is no more then one. In the same manner differeth truth from true. Truth resembleth a People, true a Cittizen; for, truth consisteth of many things collected, true is simple.

By Power; for true doth not absolutely adhere to truth: A fool, a child, a mad-man, may speak something true, but, cannot have the Science of that which is true. Truth considers things with Science, insomuch that he who hath it is wise; for, he hath the Science of true things, and is never deceived, nor lyeth, although he speak false, because it proceedeth not from an ill, but, good affection.

CHAP. VI.

Of Comprehension.

a 1.33 COmprehension (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) was first used in this sence by Zeno, by a metaphor taken from things apprehended by the hand;b 1.34 which allusion he exprest by action. For, shewing his hand with the fingers stretched forth, he said, such was Phantasy: then bending them a little, said, such was Assent; then compressing them, and clutching his fist, such was Comprehen∣sion.

c 1.35 Comprehension is a firm and true knowledge, non-compre∣hension the contrary; for some things we only think that we

see, hear, or feel, as in dreams and frenzies; other things we not only think, but, truly do see, or hear, or feel. These latter, all (but the Academicks and Scepticks) conceive to fall under firm knowledge, the other, which we imagine in dreams or frenzy are false.

d 1.36 Whatsoever is understood, is comprehended by the minde, one of these two waies, either by evident incursion (which Laer∣tius calls by sense) or by transition from evidence (Laertius, collecti∣on by demonstration) of which latter there are three kinds, by Assimilation, by Composition, by Analogy.

By incurrent evidence is understood white and black, sweet and soure.

By Transition, from evidents: by Assimilation is understood So∣crates by his Picture: by Composition, as of a horse and a man is made a Centaure; for putting together the limbes proper to both species, we comprehend by phantasy that which was neither horse nor man, but a Centaur compounded of both.

By Analogy, things are understood two waies; either by aug∣mentation; or, when from common ordinary men, we by aug∣mentation phansy a Cyclops, who not like

Men that with Cares gifts are fed: But, some tall hill erects his head.

Or by Diminution, as a Pigmey.e 1.37 Likewise the Center of the earth is understood by analogy from lesser Globes.

To these kinds add,f 1.38 Comprehension by transference, as eyes in the breast; by contrariety, as death; by transference, as dicibles and place; by privation, as a man without hands; just and good are understood naturally.

CHAP. VII.

Of Assent.

a 1.39 THese things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now speake a little of Assent, and appro∣bation, termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not that is not a large place, but the grounds thereof have been already laid: For when we explai∣ned the power that was in the senses, we likewise declared, that many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses, which cannot be done without Assent. Moreover, seeing that be∣twixt an inanimate and an animate being, the greatest difference is, that the inanimate doth nothing, the animate doth something, we must either take away sense from it, or allow it assent, which is within our power. When we will not have a thing either to

perceive or assent, we in a manner take away the soule from it; for as it is necessary, that the scale of ballance which is laden should tend downwards; so is it that the soule should yeeld to things that are perspicuous.

b 1.40 Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie, yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause, it hath not (according to Chrysippus) this principall reason, not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation (for it is ne∣cessary that assent be moved by phantasie) but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by impulsion, then of their owne nature, the Cylinder seemes to rowle, and the Cone to turne round. As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility; so the objected phantasy imprinteth, and as it were sealeth in the soule its species, yet the assent is in our power, and that (as we said in a Cylinder) extrinsecally impelled, the motion is conti∣nued by its own power and nature.

c 1.41 Phantasies, wherewith the mind of man is presently affected, are not voluntary or in our own power, but inferre themselves by a kind of violence, approbations (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) by which these phantasies are knowne and judged, are voluntary, and made ac∣cording to our arbitrement. So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven, or by the fall of any thing, or sudden newes of some dan∣ger or the like; it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through op∣nion perceived of any ill, but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions, which praevert the office of the mind and reason. But presently the same wise man approveth not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, those dreadfull phantasies, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. but rejects and refuses them, nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull. Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men: The unwise, when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind, thinke them to be tru∣ly such as they appeare, and receiving them as if they were just∣ly to be feared, approve them by their assent, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion:) But a wise man sudden∣ly changing colour and countenance, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, assents not, but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment, which he al∣waies had of these phantasies, as nothing dreadfull, but terrify∣ing only with a false shew, and vain fear.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Notions.

a 1.42 FRom Sense, the rule of Science, Notions are imprinted in the Soul, by which, not only principles, but larger waies to reason are found out.

b 1.43 A man when he is born, hath the supream part of his Soul, like unto clean paper, upon which every notion is inscribed. The first manner of inscription is by the Senses; as for example: They who perceive a thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the memory thereof; but, when they have conceived ma∣ny remembrances of one species, then they say, they have ex∣perience, for experience is a multitude of similitudes.

Of Notions, some are naturall, which are in such manner as we we have said, and without Art: Others gained by learning and industry: These are properly called Notions, the other Anticipa∣tions. The reason for which we are called rationall, is said to be perfected by anticipations in the first seven years.

Intelligence is the phantasme of the intellect of a rationall creature; for phantasm, when it lighteth upon a rationall Soul, is then called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Intelligence, a word taken from the In∣tellect. For, to other Creatures there happen not phantasmes, to the Gods only and to us these are incident. Those which belong to us, are Phantasmes, as to their genus, Notions, as to their species; as denaries and staters, when paid for transportation, are called Naula.

c 1.44 Common notions are planted in all men, (in which they all agree together) one is not repugnant to another; for, who holds not, that good is profitable, and ought to be chosen with ut∣most endeavours? Who holds not, that what is just, is fair and well-beseeming? Whence then proceed contentions and diffe∣rences? to wit, from the application of first notions to singular things.

d 1.45 These Notions, and whatsoever is of this kinde, which right reason conformeth in us, being long examined, are true, and suitable to the natures of things.

CHAP. IX.

Of Science and Opinion;

a 1.46 THat which is comprehended by Sense, Zeno call'd Sense, and if so comprehended, as not to be plucked away by reason, Science, otherwise Ignorance; from which proceedeth

Opinion, which is weak and common, to the false and unknown.

b 1.47 These three are joyned together, Science, Opinion, and Comprehension, which borders upon the other two. Science is a firme, stable, immutable comprehension with reason: Opinion, an infirm, weak, assent: Comprehension, which commeth be∣tween both, is an assent to comprehensive phantasy. Compre∣hensive phantasy is true, in such manner, that it cannot be false. Therefore Science is in wise men only, Opinion in fooles, Com∣prehension is common to both, as being that by which truth is judged;c 1.48 and is for this reason reckon'd by Zeno, neither a∣mongst the right (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) nor amongst the bad (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) but betwixt science and ignorance, affirming, that this only is to be credited.

CHAP. X.

Of Voice, Speech, and Words.

a 1.49 These three are joyned to one another; that which is sig∣nified, that which signifieth, and the contingent. That which signifieth is the voice, as Dion: That which is signified, is the thing it selfe declared by the voice; it is that which we ap∣prehend, and is present in our cogitation. The contingent is the outward subject, as, Dion himselfe.

b 1.50 Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth, and that which is signified,c 1.51 is divided into two places: one, of Significats; the other of Voice. The place of significats is divided into phantasies, and subsistents on phantasie, dicibles, axioms, &c.

In the other place, concerning Voice, is declared literall Voice, the parts of speech, the nature of Solaecisms and Barbarisms, Poems, Ambiguities, Song, Musick, and (according to some) definitions and divisions.

d 1.52 The phantasies of the minde precede speech, (Of these there∣fore we have already treated) then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking, declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie; For this reason,e 1.53 the consideration of Dialectick, by the joynt consent of all, seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice.

f 1.54 Voice is aire percussed, the proper sensible object of hearing, (as Diogenes the Babylonian, in his Art of Voyce.) The voice of a living sensitive creature, is aire percussed with appetite; the voice of man is articulate, proceeding from the minde: at his four teenth year it is perfected.

Speech (asg 1.55 Diogenes saith) is a literate voice; as, It is day. Word is a significative voice, proceeding from the minde. Lan∣guage is a speech according to the variety of Nations, whereof

each useth its peculiar dialect; as the Attick saith, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the Ionick 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Voice and Speech differ, in that voice is a sound, but speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for word is al∣waies significative; but, speech sometimes signifieth nothing, as Blitri, which is no word. To speak and to pronounce differ: voices are pronounced, but things only are spoken:h 1.56 for, to speak is to pronounce a significant voice of a thing that is said.

i 1.57 Hence Chrysippus saith, that he who beginneth to speak and pronounce words, before he can put them in their right place, doth not speak, but thinketh that he speaks; as, the Image of a man is not a man: so in Crowes, Dawes, and Children, when they first begin to speak, the words which they say are not words. He only speaketh, who knoweth to put a word in the right place.

They (particularlyk 1.58 Zeno)l 1.59 took much pains in the invention and expli••ation of words,m 1.60 wherein they distinguished very subtlely. Hence Cicero calleth the Stoicks Architects of words. Ammonius, the Grammarians, followers of the Stoicks.

n 1.61 The Elemen••s of speech are the 24 Letters. Letter is taken three waies: First, for the character of figure which is formed. Secondly, for the element or power: Thirdly, for the name, as A. Of the Elements, seven are Vowels 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 six Mutes, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

o 1.62 Of speech there are five parts, as Diogenes saith in his Book of Voice, and Chrysippus (p 1.63 at first they reckon'd but foure, separa∣ting the Articles from the Conjunctions, afterwards the latter Stoicks, dividing the Appellatives from the Nounes, made them five) Noun, Appellation, Verb, Conjunction, Article. (Antipater in his Book of Speech added the medium) Appellation (as Diogenes saith) is a part of speech signifying a common quality; as, Man, Horse. Noune a part of speech denoting a proper quality; as Di∣ogenes, Socrates. Verbe (as Diogenes saith) a part of speech signi∣fying a thing, which is predicated of one or more things, in∣composed; or, as some say, an Element of speech without cases, whereby the parts of speech are connected; as, I write, I speak. Conjunction is a part of speech without cases, conjoyning the parts of speech. Article is an element of speech, having cases; distinguishing the kinds and numbers of Nounes; as, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

q 1.64 Every word, by reason of that which it signifieth, calleth foure necessary things into question, its origine, power, declination, ordination.

As concerning the first, which the Greeks call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, they conceived, that names were given by nature: the first pronoun∣ced voices, imitating the things themselves, from which the names were afterwards imposed, by wh••ch reason, they derive Etymologies, conceiving that there is not any word, for which

there cannot be given a certain reason. They therefore studious∣ly enquired whence words are deduced, much pains was taken, first, by Zeno, then by Cleanthes, afterwards by Chrysippus, to give a reason of commentitious fables, and to explain the causes of words, why they are called so and so.

This beginning is to be sought, untill we arrive so far, as that the thing agree in some similitude with the sound of the word, as when we say, tinkling of brasse, the neighing of horses, the bleating of sheep, the gingling of chains: These words by their sound, expresse the things which are signified by them.

But, for as much as there are things which found not, in these the similitude of touching hath the same power: As, they touch the sense smoothly or harshly, the smoothnesse or harshnesse of letters in like manner touch the hearing, and thereby occasio∣neth their names. As when we say smooth, it sounds smoothly: so, who will not judge harshnesse to be harsh by the very word? It is smooth to the ear when we say pleasure; harsh, when we say crux, a crosse: the things themselves make good the sound of the words. Honey, as sweetly as the thing it selfe affects our tast, so sweetly doth the name touch our hearing: Soure, as harsh in both. Wool and Bryars, as the words are to the hearing, the things are to the touch. These are conceived to be the infancy, as it were, of words, when the sense of the thing concords with the sense of the sound.

From hence proceeded the licence of naming, according to the similitude of the things among themselves: as when, for ex∣ample, crux, a crosse, is therefore so called, because the harsh∣nesse of the word concords with the harshnesse of the pain which the crosse affecteth. But, Crura, thighes, are so called, not from harshnesse of pain; but, because in length and hardnesse, they are, in respect of the other limbs, like unto the wood of a crosse. Hence it comes to abuse, that the name usurped, not of a like thing, but, as it were neer: for what likenesse is there be∣tween the signification of little and minute, when as that may be little, which not only is nothing minute, but is somewhat grown; yet, by reason of a certain neernesse, we say minute for little. But, this abuse of the word is in the power of the spea∣ker; for, he may use the word little, and not minute. This ex∣ample belongs to that which we will shew, when we call that a fish-pond which hath no fish in it, nor any thing like a fish: It is denominated from fishes, by reason of the water, wherein fishes live. So the word is used by translation, not from similitude, but a certain kinde of vicinity. And if any one should say, that men in swimming resemble fishes, and that from thence a fish-pond is so named, it were foolish to refuse it, since that neither is repugnant to the nature of the thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the purpose, which we cannot dilucidate by one

ex∣ample, how much the origine of the word, which is taken from vicinity, differs from that which is derived from similitude.

From hence there is a progression to the contrary. Lucus is thought to be so named, quod minime luceat; and bellum, quòd res bella non sit; and soedus, quòd res foeda non sit. But, if we derive p••rcus, as some do, à soeditate, it returnes to that vicinity, when that which is made, is named from that by which it is made.

For this vicinity is very large, and divided into many parts, either by efficience, as this word procus à foeditate; from which likewise foedus: or by effect, as puteus, so named, because the ef∣fect thereof is potatio: or by that it containeth, as urbs ab orbe, be∣cause in a place which they liked, they first made a track about it with a plough, as Virgil saith of Aeneas,

—Urbem designat Aratro.

Or by that which is contained, as if horreum were derived from hordeum; or by abuse, as hordeum for wheat, or the whole from a part, as mucro, which is the point for the whole sword; or a part from the whole; as capillus quasi capitis pilus. What need we go a∣ny further? whatsoever else can be reckoned, we may see the origin of the word contained, either in the similitude betwixt things and sounds, or in the similitude betwixt things them∣selves, or in vicinity, or contrariety, which origine we cannot pursue beyond similitude.

But this we cannot do alwaies, for there are innumerable words, the reasons of which ly••hid. To the infancy, or rather stock and seed of such words, beyond which, no origine is to be sought, neither if a man do enquire can he finde any, they proceed in this manner: The syllables, in which v hath the place of consonant, as in these words, venter, vafer, velum, vinum, vo∣mis, vulnus, have a thick, and as it were, a strong sound, which the very custome of speaking confirmeth, when from some words we take them away, lest they should burden the eare; for which reason we say amâsti, rather then amavisti, and abiit, not abi••it, and innumerable of the same kinde. Therefore when we say Vis, the sound of the word having, as we said, a kinde of force, suiteth with the thing which it signifieth. Now from this vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, because they are vi∣olent, vincula seem to be named, and vimen, quo aliquid vincia∣tur. Thence vites, because they claspe about those things by which they grow. Hence also by similitude, Terence calls a crooked old man vietum. Hence the Earth, worn into winding paths by the feet of passengers, is called via; but if via be so named, quasi vi pedum trita, the origine returnes to the vicinity: But let us sup∣pose it derived from the similitude it hath with vitis, or vimen, that is, from its winding, one asketh me why it is called via?

I answer, from the windings and crookednesse thereof, which the antients called vietum; thence the rounds of a wheel vietos. He demands, how vietum comes to signifie winding? I answer, from the similitude of vitis, a Vine: He requires whence vitis is so named? I say, because it doth vincere those things which it comprehends. He questions whence vincere is derived? We say, à vi: He asks, whence vis? We give this reason, because the word in its robust and forcible sound agreeth to the thing which it signifieth. He hath nothing more to demand.

t 1.65 In like manner, in this word Ego, as Chrysippus observes, in pronouncing the first syllable, we depresse the under-lip, as if it were to point to our selves, then by motion of the beard we point to our own breasts: of whichu 1.66 Nigidius hath given more instances, in his Grammaticall Commentaries.

The second question concerning words, is of their power, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of significants; whencex 1.67 Chrysippus divided Diale∣ctick into two parts, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, of significants and significats. Here they enquire, how many waies every thing may be said, and how many waies a thing said may signifie.

Here is examined the ambiguity of words:y 1.68 Ambiguity (or amphiboly) is a word signifying two or more things, naturally, and properly, according to the language of the Nation, in such manner, that many senses may be collected from the same words, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which one way signifies, the pot fell thrice, another way, the she-minstrell fell.

z 1.69 Every word (according to Chrysippus) is by nature ambigu∣ous, for the same may be taken two or more waies:y 1.70 Neither is that any thing to the purpose which Hortensius calumniates in Cicero, thus, They affirm that they hear ambiguities acutely, ex∣plain them clearly. The same persons hold, that every word is ambiguous; how then can they explain the ambiguous by the ambiguous, that were to bring a candle not lighted into the dark. This is ingeniously and subtlely said, but like that of Scaevola to Antonius, you seem to the wise to speak acutely, to fooles truly: for what else doth Hortensius in that place, but by his ingenuity and facetiousnesse, as an intoxicating cup, bring darknesse upon the unlearned. For, when they say, every word is ambiguous, it is understood of single words. Ambiguities are explain'd by disputation; no man disputeth by single words, none therefore explaineth ambiguous words by ambiguous words. And yet seeing that every word is ambiguous, no man can ex∣plain the ambiguity of words, except by words, but those con∣joyned and not ambiguous. As when we say, every Souldier hath two feet, it doth not follow, that a whole Regiment of Souldiers that have two feet, should have in all but two feet. So when I say, every word is ambiguous, I do not say, a sen∣tence, nor a disputation, although they are woven of words.

E∣very ambiguous word therefore may be explained by inambi∣guous disputation.

The third question is concerning Declination, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉z 1.71 Some follow Analogie, others Anomaly: Analogie is a like declination of like, in Latine proportio. Anomaly is an inequa∣lity, following the customes of declinations.a 1.72 Chrysippus wrote six bookes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, shewing, that like things are noted with unlike words, and unlike things with like words.

The last question is concerning Ordination, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉b 1.73 Upon this subject Chrysippus wrote two bookes (Laertius reckons more) whose scope is not Rhetoricall, but Dialectick, as will easily appear to the Reader: Of the Syntax of Axiomes: of true and false Axiomes: of possible and impossible: of contingent, and transient, and ambiguous, and the like, which confer nothing to single speech, or pleasure, or grace to elocution.

c 1.74 There are five excellencies of speech, Propriety, Perspicuity, Succinctnesse, Decorum, Elegance. Propriety is a proper phrase, ac∣cording to Art, not after the common expression.

Perspicuity is, when that which is intended is delivered clear∣ly.

Succinctnesse is, when that only is comprised which is necessa∣ry to the thing.

Decorum, is a conformity to the thing.

Elegance is an avoiding of vulgar phrase.

d 1.75 Amongst the faults of speech is Barbarisme, a phrase not in use with the best persons; and Sol••ecisme, a speech incoherently framed.

CHAP. XI.

Of Definition and Division.

a 1.76 DEfinition (according to Antipater in his book of Definitions) is speech by Analysis pronounced adaequately; or (as Chrysippus in his book of Definitions) an answer to this Question, what a thing is.

b 1.77 Those definitions are vicious which include any of those things which are not in the things defined, or not in all, or not in some; so as if we should say, A man is a rationall creature, or, a mortall grammaticall creature; seeing that no man is immortall, and some men are not Grammarians, the definition is faulty.

c 1.78 We must therefore, when we take those things which are common to the things we would define, and others prosecute them so far, untill it becomes proper, so as not to be transferrible to any other thing; as this. An inheritance is riches, adde which by the death of some person falleth to another, it is not yet a definition,

for riches may be held many other waies, as well as by Inheri∣tance; adde one word, by right of Law; now the thing will seeme disjoyned from community; so that the definition is thus explained. Inheritance is riches, which by the death of some person fal∣leth to another by right of law: It is not yet enough, therefore adde, neither bequeathed by will, nor detained by possession, and it is perfect.

d 1.79 Of definition there are two kinds; one of things which are; the other of things which are understood. Those things which are, we call such as may be seen or touched, as a field, house, a wall, and the like. On the other side, we say those things are not, which cannot bee touched or shewn, as possession, gardianship, nation, kindred, which have not any body, yet there is some conformity in the understanding which we call notionall, whereby in argu∣mentation they may be explained by definition. This latter kind is rather called Description, a speech, which by the exterior fi∣gure of the things bringeth us to the things themselves, or a Definition simply expressing the power of a definition.

e 1.80 Againe, of definitions, some are of partitions, others of divi∣sions. Of partitions, when the thing proposed is torne (as it were) into pieces, as if we should say the Civill Law is that which con∣sisteth in Lawes, Senators, things judged, the authority of Law∣yers, Edicts of Magistrates, manners and Equity.

The definition of divisions comprehendeth all species which are under the genus defined, thus. Abalienation is of that thing which is in our power, or a deliverance of it into the power of another, or a concession by Law, amongst whom those things may be done by civill right.

f 1.81 Division is a section of the genus into its immediate species; as, of living creatures, some are rationall, some irrationall.g 1.82 This therefore is an ill division, of men, some are Grecians, some Egyptians, some Persians, some Indians; for the next species are not disparate, but opposite, we must therefore say thus; Of men, some are Greci∣ans, some Barbarians, and again, by subdivision of Barbarians, some are Aegyptians, some Persians, some Indians, which likewise is in the division of things that are. For those which are good and bad are different to us, those who are intermediate betwixt good and bad are indifferent to us. The division therefore ought not to be so, but rather thus: Of things that are, some are indifferent, others different, of the different, some are good, some are ill; For this division is like unto that which saith, of men, some are Grecians, others Barbarians; of Barbarians, some are Aegyptians, some Persians, some Indians; the other is likewise; Of men, some Graecians, some Aegyptians, some Persians, some Indians.

Hence it followeth, thath 1.83 perfect division hath an universall power; for he who divideth thus; Of men, some are Grecians, others Barbarians, saith as much as this, if there are any men, they are either Grecians or Barbarians, for if there be any man,

who is neither Greek nor Barbarian, the division must necessa∣rily be ill, the universall false. Wherefore when we say, of things that are, some are good, some ill, some intermediate, it is as much (according to Chrysippus) as this universall: if there be any things that are, they are either good, or ill, or indifferent. But this universall is false, if any thing false be subjected to it: For, if two things be subjected, one good, the other ill; or, one good, the other indifferent, in this expression of those things which are, one kinde is good, that is true, but this, these are good, is false, for they are not good, for one is good, the other ill. And again, these are ill, is false, for they are not ill, but only one of them. The like in indifferents; for, it is false that these are indifferents, as that these are good or ill.

i 1.84 There are three forms of division, anti-division, sub-division, partition. Anti-division is a distribution of the genus into species by the contrary; as for example, by negation, as of things that are, some are good, others not good.

Sub-division is division upon a division: as, of things that are, some are good, others not good; of the not-good, some are ill, o∣thers indifferent.

Partition, is a distribution of the genus into places (according to Crinis) as of goods, some belong to the Soule, others to the Body.

CHAP. XII.

Of Genus, Species, &c.

a 1.85 GENUS is a comprehension of many Notions referred to one, as, a living creature, for this includes all living crea∣tures. Notion is a phantasie of the minde, not any thing existent or qualitative, but, as it were, something existent, and qualita∣tive; as the notion of a horse, no horse being present.

Species is that which is contained under the Genus; as, under living creature is contained man.

Most generall, is that which is a Genus, but hath no Genus: Most speciall, that which is a Species, but hath no Species.

To this place of Voice belong likewise, as we said, the consi∣deration of Poem and Poesy. Poem (according to Possidonius, in his introduction to Speech) is a speech in meeter or rhithme, not prose, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Poesy is a significant Poem, with designe, containing the imitation of things divine and human.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Things.

NOtions, words, and things, as we have said, are conjoyned together. From notions we came to words, from words we come now to the things themselves: By Notions Things are per∣ceived. a 1.86 Those are said to be Things which are dicible.b 1.87 The Stoicks by a new name call things 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Contingents, because we desire that things might befall us, and that we might obtain them.c 1.88 Contigents therefore is the subject it selfe, beyond the no∣tion or word, as Dion.

d 1.89 They comprehend all things under one common Genus, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, somewhat;e 1.90 placing this Genus above all, the reason this: In nature somethings are, somethings are not. For, those things which are not, but only incur in the minde, as Centaurs, Gy∣ants, and whatsoever else is formed by false cogitation, hath some image, although it hath no substance. Even Negatives are in being. Somewhat therefore is more generall then Ens, which is understood only of Corporealls.

f 1.91 Things are subdivided into foure Genus's, Subjects, and qua∣litatives, & quodammodotatives in themselves, and quodammodotatives as to others.g 1.92 Thus the Stoicks treating more strictly and subtilly of these things, contract the Predicaments into a lesser number, taking some of those things which they diminished, but with some alteration.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Subjects.

a 1.93 THere is not any thing besides 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Subject: The dif∣ferences concerning this are nonsubsistent.

b 1.94 Subject is two-fold; one, which is called the first subject, such is matter, expert of all qualities, which Aristotle calleth a body potentially. The other, that which is affected with quality, as Brasse, and Socrates, with those things which are in them, or praedicated by them.

CHAP. XV.

Of Qualitatives.

a 1.95 QUalitatives have a subsistence, and are separate from their subjects. For qualities (as all other accidents) are bodies, seeing that according to Zeno, nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeall, nor can that which is incorporeall effect any thing; whatsoever effecteth is a body. Effective quality therefore is a body. Matter is expert of quality, but qualities are not expert of matter.

b 1.96 Quality is the habit of that which is qualitative. Qualitative is taken three waies: First, for whatsoever hath difference, whe∣ther it be motion or habit, and whether hardly or easily separa∣able. In this sence, not only he who is wise, but he who stretch∣eth out his hand are qualitative. The second signification in∣cludes not motions but habits only, which they define qualita∣tive, that is, which hath a difference endued with habit, as a wise man, or an armed man. Of these, some are adaequate, to the measure of their pronunciation and consideration; others not adaequate. These they omit, those which are adaequate, equall, and permanent, they call qualitative; as, a Grammarian, and a wise man; neither of these exceeds, or falls short of his quality. Likewise a lover of meat, and a lover of wine, being in act such, as a glutton, and a drunkard, because they make use of those parts which serve to this end, are so called: so that if any man be a glutton, he is consequently a lover of meat; but, if he be a lo∣ver of meat, he is not therefore immediately a glutton; for, being destitute of those parts which he useth in eating, he wanteth the act, but not the habit. Quality is adaequated to qualitative in this last sence.

c 1.97 All qualities are either causes, and then they are called formes; or effects, and then they are generally called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, habitu∣alls, which word Antipater extends as large, as the common ac∣cident, both of things corporeall and incorporeall, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, some∣what. Of habitualls there are foure kinds, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, when they reside in the minde; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, when they fall from the minde into the voice; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ when by the mo∣tion of the minde, they are praedicated of any thing; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, when they happen to subjects.

d 1.98 Habits are only things united, but those which are conjoyned by contiguity, as a Ship; or by distance, as an Army; in these there can be no habit, nor one thing spirituall above all, nor one reason, whereby they may come to subsist within one habit.

It is common to quality of corporeall things to be the diffe∣rence of their substance,* 1.99 no•• taken severally, but contracted into one notion and property of the minde, nor by time or strength

reduced to form, but by its own tality, according to which the generation of the qualitative subsists.

Power (a species of quality) is that which hath and giveth the faculty of exercising many accidents,* 1.100 as prudence giveth the faculty of walking prudently, and discoursing prudently: or, ac∣cording to some, Power is that which giveth the faculty of ex∣ercising many accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the acts subjected unto it. What Aristotle called naturall Power,* 1.101 they name Aptitude.

Habits are intended and remitted,* 1.102 dispositions cannot be in∣tended or remitted. Thus the straightnesse of a wand, although it may easily be discomposed and bent, is a disposition, for straightnesse cannot be intended or remitted. Likewise the ver∣tues are dispositions, not in respect of their firmnesse and con∣stancy, but because they cannot admit of degrees of more and lesse: but, Arts must either have firmnesse, or not be dispositions. Thus habitude is taken in the latitude of the species, disposition in the chief perfection of the species, and in that which is the most it can be, whether it be easily alter'd (as the straightnesse of a wand) or not.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Quodammodotatives.

THe third kinde of things are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Quodammodotatives. a 1.103 They differ from Qualitatives, because matter is other∣wise affected by habits, otherwise by Quodammodotatives, in this or that manner. Moreover Qualitatives are Quodammodotatives as to matter, and conversant therein; but properly, quodammo∣dotatives are conversant in qualitatives.b 1.104 Again, as habitualls may be said to extend further then habits, so quodammodota∣tives are larger then qualitatives: for quodammodotatives extend even to those things which are quodammodotatives as to others, and include them; but qualitatives consist only in those which make a difference.

c 1.105 This place Boethius conceives to have the power of habit. Habit chiefly and universally is taken three waies: First, to be to it selfe, and according to it selfe: Secondly, in respect to another: Thirdly, of another to it. That which is considered as to it selfe, pertaines to quodammodotatives; as, armed, for it is a habit of ones selfe to ones selfe. That which is to another, pertaines to relati∣on; for, a Father, or a right hand, are said, according to a ha∣bit, not of themselves to themselves, but of them to another. But that which is of another to us, as of an armed man, being the habit of another to us, pertaines to habit.

To this head they reduce quantitatives and quantity, and their

species, place, time, and some species (according to Aristotle) of quality, figure and form; as also action, passion, site, habit.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Quodammodotatives as to others.

THe last genus of things is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quodammodotatives as to others.a 1.106 Of these there are two kinds, Relatives, and quo∣dammodotative-Relatives. The Relatives are opposed and distingui∣shed from those which are by themselves, and absolute. The quodammodotative-relatives are opposed to those which have a dif∣ference, as for example, Sweet and Sowre, and whatsoever is of the like kinde, are relatives; but quodammodotative-relatives, are as the right side, father, and the like; for, they have a difference, in that they are characteriz'd by differences, according to some species. As therefore there is one notion of those which are by themselves, and absolute, another of those which are conside∣red with difference: so some things are relatives; others quo∣dammodotative-relatives. The consequence of conjunctions in these is contrary; for, with those which are by themselves, co∣exist those which have a difference; for, those which are by themselves have some differences, as white and black. But, those which are by themselves, coexist not with those which have a difference. Sweet and bitter have differences, whereby they are characterized; yet, they are not absolute, but relatives. But, those which are quodammodotative-relatives, being contrary to those which have differences, are likewise relatives. For, the right side, and a Father, besides that they are quodammodota∣tive, are likewise relatives: but, sweet and bitter being rela∣tives, have a difference, whereby they are contrary, being quo∣dammodotative relatives. Those which are quodammodotative relatives, it is impossible should be by themselves, and absolute, or by difference; for they depend solely upon relative habit. Relatives therefore are not by themselves, for they are not ab∣solute; yet, are they according to difference, because they are distinguished by some character. To expresse this more clearly, Relatives are those, which by their proper character respect an∣other; quodammodotative-relatives are those which use to hap∣pen to another, but not without mutation and alteration of those things which are about them; yet, with respect of some∣thing externall. If therefore any thing with difference respect another, it is only relative, as, habit, science, and sence: but, if it respect another, not out of inherent difference, but in pure ha∣bit, it is quodammodotative-relative. For, a Father, and right side, to their consistence, require some externall things, for as

much as there being no mutation made in them, he is no longer a Father, his Son being dead, and the right side is no longer so, after he is risen, in respect of whom it was said to be such; but, sweet and bitter will not alter, unlesse their power be likewise changed. If therefore quodammodotative are changed in habit to another, although they receive no passion in themselves, it is manifest they have their being in the habit alone, not in diffe∣rence.

a 1.107 This genus was first introduced by Aristo,b 1.108 who defined quodammodotative relatives to be those, whose being is the same with their quodammodotative being to one another: And so also An∣dronicus defines them.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Dicibles.

TO the place concerning things and significats, belongeth that concerning Dicibles, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to which true and false is common.a 1.109 Dicible is that which con••isteth according to ratio∣nall phantasy.b 1.110 Rationall phantasy is that, by which what is com∣prehended by phantasy, may be expressed by speech. Every thing that may be said, ought to be said, for from thence is de∣rived the denomination.

c 1.111 Dicible is a mean betwixt notion and thing. Dicibles are notions, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but not meerly and simply notions, d 1.112 which in as much as they are the principles of science, and are intelligences, are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪ but, in asmuch as they reside in the minde, are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and are genus's and species, in which manner, being ready for expression, they are called dicibles, and pertain to the enunciative faculty of the soule. For, whatsoever is said, if it be so considered as it is said of something, they are Categorems; if so, as it breaketh forth in∣to voice, and with voice, they are words, if retained in the minde, ready to break forth, they are dicibles. Dicible therefore is a word, and yet signifies not a word, but that which is un∣derstood in the word, and is contained in the minde.

e 1.113 Of Dicibles there are two kinds, the defective, and the per∣fect. The defective are those which an imperfect enunciation, not compleating the sentence, but requiring something to fol∣low; as writeth, for we ask, who? To this kinde belongeth Ca∣tegorems, which are praedicated of other things.

The perfect are such as have a perfect enunciation: Of these there are two kinds: The first peculiarly called perfect, which though they compleat the sentence, yet, signifie neither true nor false. Of these there are many kinds, as Interrogation, percontati∣on,

imperative, adjurative, optative, imprecative, or execrative, substitutive, hypotheticall, compellative, like to, or transcending an axiome, and dubitative.

Interrogation is that which is a perfect sentence, but requireth an answer, as, Is it day? for this is neither true nor false; so that it is day, is an axiom, is it day? an interrogation.

Percontation is a thing for which we cannot answer significant∣ly, as in Interrogation, yes: but as thus, he dwelleth in such a place.

Imperative is a thing, in speaking whereof, wee command, as,

Go thou to the Inachian stood. f 1.114 Adjurative, as witness thou Earth.

Optative, which he we speak wishing, as,

Great Iove who dost in Ida reign, The Victory let Ajax gain.

Imprecative, or execrative, as,

As on the ground this wine I poure, So may the Earth his blood devour.

Substitutive, or expositive, as, let this be a right line.

Hypotheticall, as, supposing the Earth to be the Centre of the Globe of the Sun.

Compellative is a thing in speaking which we call another,* 1.115 as,

Atrides, Agamemnon, King of men.

Like to, or transcending an axiom, is that which hath an axio∣maticall manner of speaking; but because it superabounds in some particle or affection, it is not ranked amongst axioms, as,

How beautious is thy Virgin-Train! How like to Priam's Son, that swaine!

Dubitative is a thing different from an axiom, which, whoso∣ver speaks, maketh a doubt, as,

Then are not life and grief of kin? all these are neither true nor false.

The other kind of perfect dicibles which compleat the Sen∣tence▪ affirmeth or denyeth, and is either true or false. It is call∣ed axtom.

CHAP. XIX

Of Categoremes.

a 1.116 CAtegoreme is that which is praedicated of another, or a thing construed with one or more, or (as Apollodorus) a de∣fective dicible, construed with the right case, to make an axiom.

b 1.117 Whatsoever is praedicated of another, is praedicated of the name of the case; and both these are either perfect, as that which is praedicated, and together with the subject sufficient to make an Axiom. Or they are de••ective, and require some addition, to make thereof a perfect praedicate.

If that which is praedicated of a name, make an axiom, it is a Categorem, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a congruity, as walke••h, for example, So∣crates walketh.

But if it be predicated of the case, (whereby transitions are made from one person to another, wherein it is necessary, that some oblique case, be likewise pronounced with the right, they are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as an addition to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (or asc 1.118 Pris∣cian renders it, lesse then congruities) as, Cicero saved his Country.

Again, if that which is praedicated of some nown, require a case of some other nown to be added to make up the axiom, so as the construction bee made of two oblique cases, they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, incongruities, or, according to Ammonius, lesse then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as, it pleases me to come to thee; whether the nounes onely or the words require it.

d 1.119 Again, of Categoremes, there are four kinds, right, supine, neuter, and reciprocally active and passive. Right are those which have a motion tending to another, and are construed with one of the oblique cases, for the making of a Categorem, as heareth, seeth, discourseth.

Supine are those which are consider'd from habit to an agent, and is construed with a passive particle, as, I am heard, I am seen.

Neuter, as those which are neither way, as, to be wise, to walk.

Reciprocally, active and passive are those, which seem supines but are not, for they are acts, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for therein is included 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

The right (or nominative) case, is so called by the Stoicks, whom the Grammarians follow, because it falleth directly from the no∣tion which is in the mind. Oblique cases are the Genitive, Dative and Accusative.

CHAP. XX.

Of simple Axioms.

a 1.120 AXiom is that which is either true or false, or a thing perfect by it selfe, negative, or affirmative, as far as it extends; or, (according to Chrysippus, in his dialectick definitions) Axiom is that which affirmeth or denyeth as far as it extends; as, Dion walketh. It is called Axiom 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, because assent is either given to it or not: for he who saith, it is day, assenteth thereunto. If it be day, the axiom is true, if it be not, false.

b 1.121 Of Axioms, the first and most proper difference is of the simple and not simple (thus divided by Chrysippus, and Archidemus and Athenodorus, and Antipater, and Crinis.)

c 1.122 Simple axioms are those which consist neither of one axiom twice taken, nor of different axioms, neither by one or more con∣junctions; as, It is day, 'tis at night, Socrates disputes.d 1.123 Of simple axioms there are many kinds, Apophatick, or negative, arnetick, or universally negative; steretick, or privative; categorick, or prae∣dicative; categoreutick, or indicative; indefinit and mediate.

e 1.124 N••gative axioms are those, in which a negatiue particle is proposed; as, If this is, that is not. But if the negation be of the lat∣ter part of the Axiom, the other part not being negative, then the axiom is not negative, but praeicative; as, It happeneth to some pleasure not to be good. This therefore declareth what happeneth to the thing, and therefore is praedicative.f 1.125 A species of nega∣tive axiom, is the supernegative, when, between the parts con∣nected and copulated by two affirmations, a praeposition with a negation is interposed, and that very negation denyed; as, If it is day, it is not light. Of the same kinde are all those, wherein nega∣tion is proposed to negation; as, It is not both day, and not light.

g 1.126 Uni••ersally negative axioms are those, which consist of an u∣niversall negative particle, and a Categorem; as, no man walketh.

h 1.127 Privative are those which consist of a privative particle, and an axiom in power, as, he is inhuman.

i 1.128 Praedicative are those, which consist of a right ca••e and a Ca∣tegorem; as, Dien walketh.

k 1.129 Indicative, orl 1.130 definitive is that which consists of a demon∣strative right case, and a Categorem; as, this man walketh.

m 1.131 Indefinit is that, which consists of one or more indefinit par∣ticles; as, a certain man walketh, he is moved.

n 1.132 Intermediate are of this kinde, a man si••teth, or a man walketh; a certain man walketh is indefinite, for it determines no single per∣son; that man sitteth is definite, Socrates sitteth is intermediate; for it is not indefinite, because it determines the species, nor de∣finite,

because it is not pronounced with demonstration, but it is intermediate betwixt both.

o 1.133 An indefinite axiom, as, some one sitteth, is true, when the thing definite is true; as, he sitteth; but, if none of the singulars do sit, the indefinite axiom is not true, that some one sitteth.

CHAP. XXI.

Of not-simple Axioms.

a 1.134 NOt-simple axioms are those, which are in a manner double, consisting of one axiom diversified, or of axioms: of one axiom dversified; as, if it be day, it is day: of axioms, as, if it be day, 'tis light.

b 1.135 In not-simple axioms, that which immediately followeth the conjunction if, or whereas, is called the Antecedent, the first, or the beginning; the rest is called the ending, or Consequence, or second. Notwithstanding that the axiom be pronounced by inversion; as, It is light, if it be day; for in this, the ending or consequence, is, it is light, although it be spoken first; the antecedent, it is day, although it be put in the second place; for it immediately followeth the conjunction if.

The Lawes and rules of Consequents are these: 1.c 1.136 From true followeth true; as, if it be day, it followeth that it is light. 2. From false followeth false; as, if this be false that it is night, this is likewise false, it is dark. 3. From false followeth true, as from this, the Earth flyeth, followeth, the Earth is. 4. From true doth not follow false; for from this, the Earth is, it follow∣eth not, that the earth flies.

d 1.137 Of not-simple propositions there are many kinds, Connex, Adnex, Conjunct, Causall, Declarative of the more, and Declarative of the lesse.

e 1.138 Connex (according to Chrysippus in his Dialectick, and Diogenes in his Dialectick Art) is that which consists of the connective conjunction, if; which conjunction declareth, that the consequent is second to the first; as, if it be day, it is light. Of a diversified axiom, and the conjunction if, consisteth this connex, If it be day, it is day, these are properly right axioms. Of different axioms, and the conjunction whereas, this, if it is day, 'tis light. f 1.139 Connex axioms are called also tropicall, because they turn from the antecedent to the consequent.

The rules of connex axioms are these:f 1.140 That is a true connex, wherein the contrary of the consequent is repugnant to the an∣tecedent, as, if it is day, 'tis light; for, that it is not light, the con∣trary to the consequent, is repugnant to, it is day, the antece∣dent. A false connex is that wherein the contrary to the conse∣quent

is not repugnant to the Antecedent; as this, if it is day, Dion walks; for, that Dion walketh not, is not repugnant to, it is day.

g 1.141 Adnex (which some reckon as a species of the connex) ac∣cording to Crinis, in his Dialectick, is an axiom connected by the conjunction whereas, beginning with an axiom, and ending with an axiom; as, whereas it is day, it is light, the conjunction sheweth, that the second is a consequent of the first, and that the first is subsistent.

The rules of adnex axioms are these:h 1.142 That is a true adnex, which beginneth from true, endeth in that which is consequent; as, whereas it is day, the Sun is over the earth. False is that, which beginneth from false, or endeth not consequently; as, whereas it is day, Dion walketh, if this be said when it is not day.

i 1.143 A conjunct axiom is that, which is knit together by Con∣junctions copulative; as, it is both day, and it is light. The rules thereof are these: That is a right conjunction wherein all things are true; as it is day, and it is light. That is false, which hath something false. An axiom which hath neither conjunction nor disjunction, is to be taken in the sense of the speaker; for con∣junction is sometimes taken for disjunction; as, to me, and my heir.

A disjunct axiom is that which is disjoyned,* 1.144 by a disjunctive conjunction; as, either it is day, or it is night. This conjunction sheweth, that one of the axioms is false.

All things that are disjoyned,* 1.145 are repugnant to one another, and their opposites likewise are repugnant. Of all things that are disjoyned, one must be true, the rest false, otherwise nothing at all is true, or all, or more then one are true, either those which are disjunct, will not be repugnant, or those which are opposite to them will not be contrary to one another, then the disjunct will be false, and is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as this is, in which the opposites are not contrary; either thou runnest, or walkest, or standest, for they are repugnant to one another, but their opposites are not repugnant, because not to walk, and not to stand, and not to run, are not contrary in themselves; for, those things are said to be contrary, which cannot be true to∣gether. But you may at the same time neither walk, nor run, nor stand. Every disjunction therefore is not only true, but ne∣cessary; for if of contraries there could be a false conjunction, no disjunction could be true.

A Causall axiom is that which is connected by this conjuncti∣on, because, as because it is day, 'tis light; for the first is, as it were cause of the second. The rules thereof are these: A causall conjunction is true, when beginning from true, it endeth in the consequent, and cannot have the antecedent for its consequent; as because it is day, 'tis light: but this axiom, it is light, doth not follow from the other, it is day.

A false causall is that which either beginneth from false, or endeth in that which is not consequent, or whose antecedent may be the consequent, as, because it is night, Dion walkes.

An Axiom declarative of the morel, is that which is construed with this conjunction, more, as it is more day then night. Declara∣tive of the less, is contrary to the former, as, it is less day then night.

CHAP. XXII.

Of contrary Axioms.

COntrary Axioms are those which are repugnant to one ano∣ther,* 1.146 according to truth and falsehood, whereof one affirm∣eth, the other denyeth, as, it is day, it is not day. Only Negatives are contrary, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and opposite, and repugnant, for onely in contraries one proposition is true, the other false. The other three kinds of contraries alledged by Arist••tle, are pronounced without a conjunction. Whatsoever is pronounced without a conjunction, is neither true nor false, for true and false belongeth to axiom. Axiom is a speech which consisteth in the conjunction of some thing, wheras of Aristotle's other three kinds of contraries, none are conjunct but simple, as black and white, double and sin∣gle, sight and blindness.

Adverse are (as likewise defined by Aristotle) those which in the same kind are most distant. Nothing that is pronounced by negation is adverse, (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) to another, for then the adverse to Vertue will be not Vertue, and to Vice not Vice, and under not Vertue will be included many other things beside vice, even, a stone, a horse, and whatsover is beside Vertue; under not vice, will be found Vertue and all other things. Thus all things would be adverse to one, and the same the adverse to Vertue and Vice. Moreover if Vertue were not adverse to Vice, but to not-vice, the intermediate will be adverse both to good and bad, which is absurd.

The rules of contraries are these. 1.* 1.147 Contrariety is princi∣pally in acts, habits, and the like. 2. Categorems and qualitatives are called as it were contrary. Prudently and imprudently in some manner lead to things contrary, but contraries absolutely are in things: and prudence is so immediately contrary to impru∣dence, not this to that:

Contraries are either distunctive or sul disjunctive, disjunctive as when wee say, it is either day or night. Sul disjunctive are of two kinds, either in whole, betwixt universalls, as every living creature either doth or suffereth, no living Creature either doth or suffereth; or in part, betwixt particulars; as he either sitteth or walketh; he nei∣ther sitteth nor walketh.

The rules of contraries are these; of Disjunctives one being asserted, the other is necessarily taken away; one being taken a∣way, the other is necessarily asserted.

Of subdisjunctives in whole, both cannot be true, both may be false; both cannot be affirmative, both cannot be negative.

Of subdisjunctives in part, both may be true, because they are taken in part.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Possible and Impossible, Necessary and Vnnecessary, Probable, Paradoxall and Reasonable axioms.

a 1.148 MOreover of axioms some are possible, others impossible; some necessary, others not unnecessary. A possible Axiom is that which is susceptible of a true praedication, without obstruction from those things, which, though externall, are yet contingent with the thing it self; as Diocles lives. Impossible is that which can never be susceptible of truth, externalls oppugning it, as, the Earth flies. Necessary is that which is so true, as that it cannot any way receive a false praedication, or, may receive it, but those things which are extrinsecall, will not permit that it be true, as Vertue profiteth. Not-necessary is that which may be either true or false, exteriour things not obstructing it, as Dion walks.

b 1.149 These future repugnants and their parts are according to the same manner, as the present and the past. For, if it be true that the thing either shall be or shall not be, it must be either true or false, because futures are determined according to these; as, if a Navy is built to morrow, it is true to say that it shall be built, but if it be not, it is false to say that it shall be built, because it will not be, therefore it will either be or not be, and consequently one of the two is false.

Concerning possibles and necessaries, there is great difference betwixt Diodorus and Chrysippus.c 1.150 Diodorus holds that only to be possible which either is, or will hereafter bee. That which neither is, not ever shall be is impossible. As for me to be at Corinth is possible, if I ever were there, or ever shall be there, but if I never was there, nor ever shall be there, it is impossible. That a Boy shall be a Grammarian is not possible, unlesse here∣after he come to be one.

d 1.151 On the contrary, Chrysippus held, that those things which nei∣ther are nor ever shall be, are yet possible to be, as, to break a gemme, though it never come to be broken.c 1.152 Moreover that from possibles an impossible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true connex: If Dion be dead, He (pointing to Dion) is dead: The

antecedent, if Dion be dead is possible, because it may at some time be true that he shall be dead; but this Axiom, he is dead, is impossible: for Dion being dead, the Axiom likewise is abolish∣ed, that he is dead, seeing he is no longer that man, capable of be∣ing demonstrated by the pronoune, He, for, he, is a demonstrati∣on of a living creature. If therefore Dion being not yet dead, this word, He, may be said of him, being dead, it cannot be said, he is dead. So that in this place, he is dead, is impossible. For it were not impossible, if, some time after the death of Dion, of whom it was before praedicated in the connex whilst he lived, it might be again praedicated, he is dead; but because that cannot be, it is im∣possible, that, he is dead, should be praedicated of him.

To conclude,d 1.153 some held with Diodorus, that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity. That to impossible there followeth not a possible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor shall bee true. Others (as Cleanthes and Antipater) that somthing is possi∣ble that neither is nor shall be; that to possible followeth not im∣possible, and that which is past, is not true of necessity. Others, that somthing is possible which is not true; that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity, and that to possible followeth also im∣possible.

Furthermore of Axioms, some aree 1.154 probable, some paradoxall, some reasonable. A probable Axiom is that which perswadeth us by a specious show to assent unto it; as, whatsoever bringeth forth another is a mother; which is falfe, for the hen is not the mother of the egge.

f 1.155 Paradoxall Axioms are those which seem true onely to the wise,g 1.156 contrary to the opinon of all others.h 1.157 These are likewise in other Arts, besides Philosophy; for what is stranger then to prick the eyes for the recovery of sight? If we say this to one ig∣norant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? It is not there∣fore strange, that such things as are true in Philosophy should seem paradoxes to the unlearned.

i 1.158 A reasonable Axiom, is that which hath many conditions re∣quisite to the truth thereof, as, I shall live to morrow.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Reciprocall Axioms.

HItherto of the contrariety and repugnance of Axioms. Now of their consent and agreement, whereby one followeth and is correspondent to another, either according to truth or falshood, by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, reciprocation.

Of Reciprocation there are three kinds: the first 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,

perversion, a migration into false; the second 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, conversion, a migration into true; the third 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, equipollence, into the same.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Signes.

TO the place of Axioms appertain likewise Signes.a 1.159 Signe is an axiom antecedent, in a true connex, and having power to detect the consequent.

b 1.160 Signe is taken two waies: Commonly, for whatsoever fal∣leth under any sence, and signifieth something that proceedeth from it: and Properly, for that which declareth a thing, which is not manifest.

Things which are certain require no signe,* 1.161 for they are com∣prehended of themselves; neither those which are wholly un∣certain, for they can no way be comprehended;* 1.162 but, those only, which are uncertain in time, or by nature, may be comprehen∣ded by signes, but not by the same. Things that are uncertain in time, are comprehended by commemorative signes; things un∣certain by nature, are comprehended by demonstrative.

Of signes therefore, some are demonstrative, others communi∣cative. A communicative signe is that which is so neer to the thing, that together with the signe the thing it selfe appeareth, into the knowledge whereof the signe bringeth us, as smoak, which when we see, we know it proceeds from fire. A demon∣strative signe is that, which not being observed before with an evident signe, leads us by that to the knowledge of the thing; as when a female hath milk, we presently know that she hath brought forth.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Reasons or Arguments.

DIalectick is the discipline of speech, concluded by reason. Reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, sometimes called also Argument, and Interro∣gation, is, according toa 1.163 Crinis, that which consists of one or more sumptions, and an assumption, and an inference; as,

If it be day, it is light. But it is day: Therefore it is light.

• Sumption.
• Assumption.
• Inserence.

The Reason of the Stoicks differs from the Syllogismes of Aristo∣tle in three respects:b 1.164 First, a Syllogisme, according to Aristotle, cannot have lesse then two propositions, a reason may have but one; as, Thou livest, theresore thou breathest: which kinde Antipa∣ter calls 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Secondly, in Syllogismes, something besides that which is granted in the premises; but in Reasons, the con∣clusion may be the same with both, or either of the sumptions. The first are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as,

If it is day, it is day. But it is day: Therefore it is day.

c 1.165 The second are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as,

It is either day, or not day. But, it is not day, Therefore it is not day.

d 1.166 Lastly, in Syllogismes, the conclusion must necessarily fol∣low, by reason of the premises, whereas there are three kinds of reasons which have not this property: The first, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, al∣ready mentioned: The second 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not methodically conclusive reasons; as

The first is greater then the second. The second is greater then the third: Therefore the first is greater then the third.

This concludes necessarily, but not Syllogistically, unlesse this proposition be put in the first place: What is greater then another, is greater also then that which is lesse then that other. Of the same kinde is that Theorem in the first of Euclid's Elements, This line is equall to that, therefore this line is likewise equall to that, which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this univer∣sall proposition, Those which are equall to a third, are equall to one another.

The third kinde of reasons, from which Syllogism differeth by this property, aree 1.167 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, redundant reasons, and those of two kinds: The first are such as have a superfluous sumption; as,

Every just thing is honest, Every honest thing is good, Every good thing is expetible in it self; Therefore every just thing is good.

The second are those in which the proper conclusion is not in∣ferr'd, but something consequent, or accident, as that argument of Epicure:

Whatsoever is dissolved hath not sence, Whatsoever hath not sense pertaineth not to us: Therefore death pertaineth not to us.

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, Therefore whatsoever is dissolved pertaineth to us.

In a reason or argument, the sumption 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and the assumption f 1.168 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (termed by Aristotle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉), are axioms received by consent of the adversary, for construction of that which is cal∣led Inference 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (by Aristotle 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, conclusion) because it is inferr'd from the rest.

g 1.169 Of sumption and assumption according to Chrysippus, there are foure differences: The first Scientifick: The second Exercitative, or (as Aristotle calls it) Dialectick: The third Probable and Rhetori∣call: The fourth Sophistick.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of conclusive Reasons.

a 1.170 OF Reasons there are two kinds, conclusive, and not-conclusive. Conclusive reasons are those, in which the Sumptions being granted, from the concession thereof, the Inference seemeth to follow.

Conclusive reasons, in respect of their matter, are of two kinds, true and false. True are those, which from true sumptions collect a true inference. Not-true the contrary.

The Lawes and rules of true and false reasons, are these: 1. Truth is consequent to truth: as, If it is day, it is light. 2. False is consequent to false: as, If it be false that it is night, it is likewise false that it is dark. 3. False is consequent to true: as, Earth, if it flies is earth. 4. False is not consequent to true: for, because it is earth, it is not therefore consequent that it flies.

Again, of true reasons, some are demonstrati••e, others not-demonstrative. A demonstrative reason is that, which by things that are certain, or perspicuous, collecteth that which is uncertain and lesse perspicuous: as, If sweat issue through the skin, we may un∣derstand pores; but sweat issues through the skin, therefore we may un∣derstand pores.

Not-demonstrative are contrary: as, If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light. Herein the inference, it is light, is certain.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Syllogistick Conclusive Reasons, or Syllogisms.

COnclusive reasons, as to their from likewise, are of two kinds; Syllogistically conclusive, and not Syllogistically conclusive. a 1.171 Syllogistically-conclusive Reasons (or Syllogismes) are those which either cannot be more concluded, or whereof one or more of the sumptions are reduced to those which cannot be concluded again; as, if Dion walks, he is moved.

Syllogismes (by which the Stoicks understand only the tro∣picall, or hypotheticall,) are of three kinds, connex, disjunct, con∣junct.

b 1.172 A connex Syllogism is, when two are so connected in them∣selves, that one is the antecedent, the other the consequent, in such manner, as, if the antecedent be asserted, the consequent follow∣eth, and the consequent being taken away, the antecedent is like∣wise taken away, as, if it be day, it is not night, this antecedent is true, therefore it followeth, it is night. This kind of Syllogisme pertains to the first and second moods. In the first it is called from Position of the antecedent, to Position of the consequent; in the second, from negation of the antecedent, to negation of the consequent. The Lawes concerning the truth, or falshood of these Syllogismes are the same with those of connex axioms.

Of connex Syllogismes there are two kinds; connex in them∣selves, as, if it is light, it is ligh••, but it is light, therefore it is light; and connex by others; as, if it is day, it is light, but it is day, therefore it is light.

A conjunct Syllogisme, is,c 1.173 when we deny somthing conjunct, and to these adde another negation, and of these take the first, that what remains be taken away, as,d 1.174 it cannot be that a Lega∣cy is money, and money not a Legacy; but a Legacy is money, therefore money is a Legacy.

e 1.175 A disjunct Syllogism is that in which there cannot be more then one thing true, or, that in which if one be, the other is not, or, if one be not, the other is, as, It is either day or night, but it not night, therefore it is day; for one being asserted, the other is taken away, and so on the contrary.f 1.176 The evidence of this Syllogisme Chrysippus conceives to be so great, that even dogs have knowledge thereof. For coming to a place where there are three waies, if by the sent they find that the Beast hath not gone in two of them, they run directly to the third without senting, as if they argued thus, the Beast went either this way, or that way, or that way, but neither this way nor that way, therefore that way: The Laws of disjunct Syllogismes are the same as those of disjunct Axioms.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Moods.

a 1.177 SYllogistick, conclusive Reasons are disposed into Moods. Of Moods there are two kinds, the first simple, properly called a Mood, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, defined a kind of figure of the Reason, as thus,

If the first is, the second is, But the first is, Therefore the second is.

(It is observable by the way, that the Stoicks for letters used numbers.) The other compounded, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as being con∣sistent of both reason and Mood, as,

If Plato liveth, Plato breatheth, But the first, Therefore the second.

This is used in a long Syntax, that it be not necessary to speak a long assumption, or a long inference, but they abbreviate them thus, but the first, therefore the second.

Of Moods or Tropes there are two kinds, one of indemonstra∣bles, so termed, not that they cannot be demonstrated, but be∣cause they conclude so evidently, that they need not be repr••∣ved; the other of demonstrables.

Of Indemonstrable Moods, there are (according to Chrysippus) five, according to* 1.178 others more or lesse.

The first, wherein every reason consists of a connex, and an an∣tecedent from which beginneth the connex, and the consequent is inferred, as,

If the first, then the second, But the first, Therefore the second.

The second indemonstrable is, which, by the consequent of the connex, and the contrary of the consequent, hath a conclusion contrary to the antecedent, as,

If it is day, 'tis light, But it is night, Therefore, it is not day.

The third is, that which by a negative complication, and one of those which are in the complication, inferrs the contrary to that which remains, as,

Plato is not both dead and alive, But Plato is dead, Therefore Plato is not alive.

The fourth is that which by a disjunctive, and one of those which is in the disjunctive, concludeth the contrary to that which remains, as,

Either it is the first or second, But it is the first, Therefore it is not the second.

The fift is that wherein the whole reason is connected by a disjunctive, and one of those which are in the disjunctive of the contrary, inferreth the rest, as,

Either it is night, or it is day, But it is not night. Therefore it is day.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of not-Syllogistick-conclusive Reasons.

a 1.179 REasons not-syllogistically-conclusive (which are likewise especi∣ally called (as their genus) conclusive in opposition to Syllo∣gismes) are those which conclude not by way of Syllogisme, as,

It is false, that it is both night and day, But it is day, Therefore it is not night.

And this of Chrysippus.

Whatsoever is good is laudable, Whatsoever is laudable is honest, Therefore whatsoever is good is honest.

These not-syllogistick, or categorick-conclusives, are frequently used by the Stoicks (as by Zeno in Cicero) but immethodically,

not reduced to Mood and figure. Those they applyed onely to tropicall reasons•• as in which consisteth the sole way and order of inference. The Categoricall are not Syllogi••ines, because in them somthing is ever omitted, and therefore they are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, immethodically conclusive; as in that argument of Chrysippus last mentioned, two assumptions, and an inference are omitted, for it ought to be thus,

If it be good, it is laudable, But it is good, Therefore it is laudable.

And again,

If it be laudable, it is honest, But it is laudable, Therefore it is honest.

Hence are derived those reasons which are called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, adjic••ent and adject, consisting of propositions con∣tinually assumed without conclusions. Adject are those whose conclusion is omitted; Adjicient, those whose d••monstrative pro∣position is omitted, as,

The first of every second, The second of every third, The third of every fourth, Therefore the first of every ••ourth.

In this adject, the conclusion is omitted, which is, therefore the first of every third

CHAP. XXXI.

Of not-conclusive Reasons.

a 1.180 NOt-conclusive Reasons are those, whose opposite to the infe∣rence is repugnant to the connexion of the sumptions: b 1.181 They are of four kinds. 1. By incoherence. 2. By redundance. 3. By being in an ill figure. 4. By defect.

By incoherence, when the propositions have no conjunction or communion with one another, nor with the inference, as,

If it is day, it is light, But corn is sold, Therefore it is light.

For neither, it is day, hath any communion with, Corn is sold. nor both of them together, with, it is light; but each dependeth upon somthing else.

By redundance, when somthing is assumed to the proposition extrinsecall and superfluous, as,

If it is day, it is light, But it is day, and Vertue profiteth, Therefore it is light.

For Vertue profiteth is superfluously assumed with the other pro∣position, the inference depending upon the other two.

By being in an ill figure, as, this is a right figure,

If the first, the second, But the first is, Therefore the second.

But this,

If the first, the second, But not the second,—

Is not conclusive, not that in this figure, there cannot be reason which may collect truth from truth, for that it may do as thus,

If there are four, six are eight, But three are not four, Therefore six are not eight.

But because there may be some ill reasons in it, as this,

If it be day, 'tis light, But it is not day, Therefore it is not light.

By defect, when there want one of the collective propositions, as,

Riches are either ill or good, But riches are not good; Therefore they are ill.

For in the disjunct there wanteth this, or indifferent, so that to be perfect the sumption should be thus, Riches are ill, or good, or indifferent.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of fallacious Reasons or Sophismes.

BY Dialectick are discerned true and false reasons: the latter are Sophismes, proper to Sophists, who dispute for vain-glory, or gain; as true reasons are to Logicians, whose end is only to finde out truth.

Of fallacious reasons there are many kinds; the Quiescent rea∣son, or Sorites, the Lying, the Inexplicable, the Sluggish, the Do∣minative, the Vailed, Electra, the Horned, the Crocodilite, the Reci∣procall, the Nullity, the Defective, the Mower, the Bald, the Occult, the Negative.

a 1.182 Sorites, named from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a heap, is,b 1.183 when from things evident∣ly true, by short mutations, the dispute is brought to things evi∣dently false:c 1.184 as, Are not two few? are not three so likewise? and four, and so on to ten? But, two are a few, therefore ten.d 1.185 It is called also 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, the quiescent reason,e 1.186 because the way to withstand it is by stopping, and witholding the assent.

The lying reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is a captious argument, not to be dissolved. Of this, see the life of Eubulides.

f 1.187 The inexplicable reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, so called, from the intri∣cate nature thereof, not to be dissolved, wherefore it seems to be the same with the lying, and perhaps the genus to most of those which follow.

The sluggish reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, is manifested by this exam∣ple: g 1.188 If it be decreed that you shall recover of this sicknesse, you shall recover whether you take Physick or not. Again, if it be decreed you shall not recover, you shall not recover, whether you take Physick or not: Therefore it is to no purpose to take Physick. This argument is justly termed fluggish, faith Cicero, because by the same reason, all action may be taken away from life.

The Dominative reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; of this already in the life of Diodorus.

The vailed reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Of this, and Electra, and the Horned reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in the life of Eubulides.

The Crocodilite, so named from this Aegyptian fable:h 1.189 A wo∣man sitting by the side of Nilus, a Crocodile snatched away her child, promising to restore him, if she would answer truly to what he asked; which was, Whether he mean•• to restore him or not. She answered, Not to restore him, and challeng'd his promise, as having said the truth. He replyed, that if he should let her have him, she had not told true.

The reciprocall reasons, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, such was that ofi 1.190 Protago∣ras the Sophist, against Euathlus, a rich young man, his disciple, who promised him a great summe of mony for teaching him,

whereof halfe he paid in hand, the other halfe was to be paid the first that he should plead before the Judges, and carry the cause. Having learned long, and attained a great perfection in Rhetorick, he forbore to pl••ad in publi••k••, that he might de∣fraud Protagoras. Protagoras sues him, and the cause comming to hearing, begins thus: Know, foolish young man, that which way soe∣ver the Cause goes, whether for thee or against thee, thou must pay what I demand. If against thee, it will be given me by judgment; if for thee, thou must pay it according to our agreement. E••athlus answers: I might have been intrapped by your subtlety, if I did not plead my selfe, but had employ'd some other to plead for me. Now I r••ioyce doubly in the victory, that I shall be too hard for you, not only in cause, but in argu∣ment. Know therefore, my most wise Master, that which way soever the cause go, either with me, or against me, I will not pay what you demand. If it go with me, the judgment will acquit me; if against me, you are to have nothing by our agreement. The Judges not able to determine it, dismist them both.

k 1.191 The nullity, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, used by Ulysses, who called himselfe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, no body, when he hurt Polypheme, whence it came to be so named.

The defective reason, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, mentioned by Laertius in Zenone: The mower, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by Lucian: The bald, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by Laertius in Eubulide: The occult, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by La∣ertius in Eubulide: The negative, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, by Laertius in Chry∣sippo, and by Epictetus. But of these enough.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Method.

THere are two kinds of disputation:a 1.192 One, when the truth it selfe is subtlely polished in the dispute: The other, when every expression is accommodated to the vulgar opinion; for, we must use popular and usuall words, when we speak of po∣pular opinions, which Panaetius in the like manner hath done.

b 1.193 The first way was peculiar to the Stoicks, short, acute, and spinous, called likewise Logick, most worthy of Philosophy; for this useth definitions, divisions, and the lights which they af∣ford, as likewise similitudes, dissimilitudes, and the nice acute distinction of them.

The vulgar way of dispute is likewise two-fold: One by con∣tinued oration: The other by question and answer; the first cal∣led c 1.194 Analytick, ord 1.195 Rhetoricall; the othere 1.196 Topick, orf 1.197 Dialecticall. g 1.198 Though the first be delightfull, yet the latter is more commo∣dious, when we insist on particulars, and understand what eve∣ry man granteth, what every man denyeth, what we would have concluded from concessions, and brought to an end. For,

when a 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••n like 〈…〉〈…〉 it beats ma∣ny things along with it; yet we can hold nothing, we cannot stop the ••apid 〈…〉〈…〉h 1.199 The other•• concluding as Zeno used, more shortly and narrowly, 〈…〉〈…〉 re∣prehension. As a River in its course, cannot at all, or very ••••rdly be corrupted, but water shut up, 〈◊〉〈◊〉: So by 〈…〉〈…〉, the faults of the oppo•••• are carried quite away; in 〈…〉〈…〉 speech, they are not easily defend•••• 〈…〉〈…〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪

But each of these methods hath a severall use, the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pro∣per for exposition of A••s and Sci••nces, the oth•••• for 〈◊〉〈◊〉

Notes

• a 1.1

  Plut. de plac. Phil. 1. 1.
• b 1.2

  Laert.
• c 1.3

  Ammonius in Categ.
• d 1.4

  Philop. in lib. 1. Anal. prior.
• e 1.5

  Ammonius in Categor.
• f 1.6

  Sext. Empir. adv. Log. 1.
• g 1.7

  Laert.
• h 1.8

  De plac. Phil.
• i 1.9

  Laert.
• k 1.10

  Laert.
• l 1.11

  Laert.
• m 1.12

  Laert.
• n 1.13

  Laert.
• a 1.14

  Laert.
• b 1.15

  Cic. Acad. 1.
• c 1.16

  Galen. hist. phil.
• d 1.17

  Sen. Empir. adv. log.
• e 1.18

  Laert.
• a 1.19

  St. Aug. Civil. dci. 8. 7.
• b 1.20

  Laert.
• c 1.21

  Origen contra. Cels. lib. 7.
• d 1.22

  Cic. Acad. qu••st. 1.
• e 1.23

  Cic. Acad. qu••st. 4.
• f 1.24

  Sext. Empir. pyrrh. hyp. 2. 8.
• a 1.25

  Laert.
• b 1.26

  Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12.
• c 1.27

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2.
• d 1.28

  Laert.
• e 1.29

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2.
• f 1.30

  Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12.
• a 1.31

  St. Aug. con∣tra Acad. lib. 2.
• b 1.32

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. 2. 8.
• a 1.33

  Cic. Acad. quaest. 1.
• b 1.34

  Cicer. Acad. quaest 4.
• c 1.35

  Galen. Hist. phil.
• d 1.36

  Sext. Empir. adv. Geom. cap. 19.
• e 1.37

  Laert.
• f 1.38

  Laert.
• a 1.39

  Cic. Acad. qu••••st. 4.
• b 1.40

  Cic. lib. d. Fa∣to.
• c 1.41

  Agell. 19. 9. and from him St. August. Ci∣vit. dei. 9. 4.
• a 1.42

  Cic. Acad. 1.
• b 1.43

  Plut. de plac. Phil. 4. 11.
• c 1.44

  Arrian. 1. 22.
• d 1.45

  Simp. in Epict.
• a 1.46

  Cicer. Acad. qu••st. 1.
• b 1.47

  Sext. Emp. adv. Logic. 1.
• c 1.48

  Cicer. Acad. quaest. 1.
• a 1.49

  Sext. Emp. adv. L••g. cap. de vero.
• b 1.50

  Laert.
• c 1.51

  Laert.
• d 1.52

  Laert.
• e 1.53

  Laert.
• f 1.54

  Laert.
• g 1.55

  Laert.
• h 1.56

  Sext. Emp. adv. Leg. cap. de vero.
• i 1.57

  Varro de ling. lat. lib. 5.
• k 1.58

  Cicero.
• l 1.59

  Dionys. Halic.
• m 1.60

  Hieronym.
• n 1.61

  Laert.
• o 1.62

  Laert.
• p 1.63

  Dionys. Halic.
• q 1.64

  S. August•• de Dialect. cap. 6.
• t 1.65

  Galen. de de∣cret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2.
• u 1.66

  Agell. 10. 5.
• x 1.67

  Laert.
• y 1.68

  Laert.
• z 1.69

  Agell. 9. 12.
• y 1.70

  D. August. de dialect.
• z 1.71

  Agell. 2. 25.
• a 1.72

  Varr••. de ling. lat.
• b 1.73

  Dionys. Ha••••∣carn. de compos. verb.
• c 1.74

  Laert.
• d 1.75

  Laert.
• a 1.76

  Laert.
• b 1.77

  Sext. Empi••. adv. Log.
• c 1.78

  Cicer. Topic.
• d 1.79

  Cic. Topic.
• e 1.80

  Cic. Topic.
• f 1.81

  Laert.
• g 1.82

  Sext. Empir. adv. Math. 10. 2.
• h 1.83

  Sext. Empir. adv. Moral. 10.
• i 1.84

  Laert.
• a 1.85

  Laert.
• a 1.86

  Laert.
• b 1.87

  Philop. in A∣nalyt. prior.
• c 1.88

  Sext. Empir. adv. Log.
• d 1.89

  Alexand. A∣phrod. in Top. 4.
• e 1.90

  Senec. Epist. 19.
• f 1.91

  Simplic. in Categ.
• g 1.92

  Simplic. ibid.
• a 1.93

  Simplic. in Categ.
• b 1.94

  Simplic. ibid••
• a 1.95

  Dexipp. in ca∣teg. 2. 22.
• b 1.96

  Simplic. in ca∣teg••
• c 1.97

  Bursius in dia∣lect. Cicer. 4. 3.
• d 1.98

  Simplic. in Categ.
• * 1.99

  Ibid.
• * 1.100

  Ibid.
• * 1.101

  Ibid.
• * 1.102

  Ibid.
• a 1.103

  Plotin. ••. 30.
• b 1.104

  Simplic. in Categ.
• c 1.105

  Simplic. ibid.
• a 1.106

  Simplic, in Cat••g.
• a 1.107

  Laert. vit. Aristoni••.
• b 1.108

  Simplic. in Categ.
• a 1.109

  Laert.
• b 1.110

  Sext. Empir. adv. log.
• c 1.111

  Ammon. in pro•••••• Arist. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉▪
• d 1.112

  Burs. in dial. Cic. 5. 1.
• e 1.113

  Laert.
• f 1.114

  Ammom, in lib. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.115

  Laert.
• a 1.116

  Laert.
• b 1.117

  Ammon. in Arist. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• c 1.118

  Lib. 3.
• d 1.119

  Laert,
• a 1.120

  Laert.
• b 1.121

  Laert.
• c 1.122

  Laert, Sext. Empir adv. Log. cap de ver••.
• d 1.123

  Laert.
• e 1.124

  Laert. ••pul. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• f 1.125

  Boes. in Ci•••• Top.
• g 1.126

  Laert.
• h 1.127

  Laert.
• i 1.128

  Laert.
• k 1.129

  Laert.
• l 1.130

  S••xt. Empi••.
• m 1.131

  Laert. Sext. Empir.
• n 1.132

  Sext. Empit.
• o 1.133

  Sext. Emp.
• a 1.134

  Laert. Sext▪ Emp. adv. Log. de vero.
• b 1.135

  Sext. Emp. adv. Log. cap. de vero.
• c 1.136

  Laert.
• d 1.137

  Laert.
• e 1.138

  Laert.
• f 1.139

  Philop. in A∣nal. prior.
• f 1.140

  Laert.
• g 1.141

  Laert.
• h 1.142

  Laert.
• i 1.143

  Laert.
• * 1.144

  Laert.
• * 1.145

  Agell. 16. 8.
• * 1.146

  Laert.
• * 1.147

  Simplic.
• a 1.148

  Laert.
• b 1.149

  Simplic. in lib. Arist. de opposit.
• c 1.150

  Iohan▪ Gram∣mat. in Arist. de opposit.
• d 1.151

  Cic. de fa••.
• c 1.152

  Alexand. A∣phrod in anal▪ prior.
• d 1.153

  Epictet. 11. 19.
• e 1.154

  Laert.
• f 1.155

  Laert.
• g 1.156

  Cic. Parad.
• h 1.157

  Epictet. 1. 25
• i 1.158

  Laert.
• a 1.159

  Sext. Emp. hypot. 2. 1.
• b 1.160

  Sext. adv. log. c••p. de signo.
• * 1.161

  Sext. Empir. ibid. & Pyr••h. hyp. 2. 10.
• * 1.162

  Galen. Hist. Philos.
• a 1.163

  Laert.
• b 1.164

  Alexand. A∣phrod. in anal. prior.
• c 1.165

  Alex. Aphrod. in anal. pr.
• d 1.166

  Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.
• e 1.167

  Alex. Aphod. in anal prior. & in Topic. 1.
• f 1.168

  Not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as the learned Bursius hath observed, dia••. Cic. 6. 2.
• g 1.169

  Galen. de D••••ctrina Hippo••••. & Plat. lib. 2.
• a 1.170

  Laert. Sext. Empir.
• a 1.171

  Laert.
• b 1.172

  Simplic. in Epictet.
• c 1.173

  Cic. Topic. 1.
• d 1.174

  Cic. ibid.
• e 1.175

  Simpl••c.
• f 1.176

  Sext. Hypotyp. Pyrrh. cap. 14.
• a 1.177

  Laert.
• * 1.178

  Cic Topic. Martian C••p••l.
• a 1.179

  Laert.
• a 1.180

  Laert.
• b 1.181

  Sext. Empir. adv. Logic.
• a 1.182

  Suid.
• b 1.183

  Vlpian. 48. ad Sabin.
• c 1.184

  Laert. though the example be falsely applyed, as Bursius and Casaubon have observed.
• d 1.185

  Laert. in Chrysip.
• e 1.186

  Cic. Acad. qu••st. 4.
• f 1.187

  Agel. 9. 15.
• g 1.188

  Cicer▪ de ••at••,
• h 1.189

  ••oxop••t. in Apthe.
• i 1.190

  Agell. 5. 10.
• k 1.191

  Oay••.
• a 1.192

  Cic. Off••••. 2.
• b 1.193

  Cic. de ••in. 3.
• c 1.194

  Senec. ••pist. 14. 90.
• d 1.195

  Cic. de sin. 2.
• e 1.196

  Senec. Ep. 14. 90.
• f 1.197

  Cic. de sin. 2.
• g 1.198

  Cic. ibid.
• h 1.199

  Cic. de nat. deor. 2.