The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. VII.

Of Assent.

a 1.1 THese things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now speake a little of Assent, and appro∣bation, termed 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, not that is not a large place, but the grounds thereof have been already laid: For when we explai∣ned the power that was in the senses, we likewise declared, that many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses, which cannot be done without Assent. Moreover, seeing that be∣twixt an inanimate and an animate being, the greatest difference is, that the inanimate doth nothing, the animate doth something, we must either take away sense from it, or allow it assent, which is within our power. When we will not have a thing either to

perceive or assent, we in a manner take away the soule from it; for as it is necessary, that the scale of ballance which is laden should tend downwards; so is it that the soule should yeeld to things that are perspicuous.

b 1.2 Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie, yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause, it hath not (according to Chrysippus) this principall reason, not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation (for it is ne∣cessary that assent be moved by phantasie) but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by impulsion, then of their owne nature, the Cylinder seemes to rowle, and the Cone to turne round. As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility; so the objected phantasy imprinteth, and as it were sealeth in the soule its species, yet the assent is in our power, and that (as we said in a Cylinder) extrinsecally impelled, the motion is conti∣nued by its own power and nature.

c 1.3 Phantasies, wherewith the mind of man is presently affected, are not voluntary or in our own power, but inferre themselves by a kind of violence, approbations (〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) by which these phantasies are knowne and judged, are voluntary, and made ac∣cording to our arbitrement. So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven, or by the fall of any thing, or sudden newes of some dan∣ger or the like; it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through op∣nion perceived of any ill, but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions, which praevert the office of the mind and reason. But presently the same wise man approveth not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, those dreadfull phantasies, that is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. but rejects and refuses them, nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull. Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men: The unwise, when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind, thinke them to be tru∣ly such as they appeare, and receiving them as if they were just∣ly to be feared, approve them by their assent, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, (this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion:) But a wise man sudden∣ly changing colour and countenance, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, assents not, but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment, which he al∣waies had of these phantasies, as nothing dreadfull, but terrify∣ing only with a false shew, and vain fear.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Cic. Acad. qu••••st. 4.
• b 1.2

  Cic. lib. d. Fa∣to.
• c 1.3

  Agell. 19. 9. and from him St. August. Ci∣vit. dei. 9. 4.