The history of philosophy, in eight parts by Thomas Stanley.

CHAP. IV.

Of Phantasy.

In the first place (saitha 1.1 Diocles the Magnesian) they put the reason concerning Phantasie and Sense, as a judgment, whereby the truth of things is discerned. It is phantasie as to its genus, and likewise in as much as the reason of assent, comprehension, and intelligence (which is more excellent then the rest) consists not without Phantasy; for phantasy goeth first, then the minde endued with elocution, declareth by words what it suffers from the phantasy.

b 1.2 Phantasy is so called from 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, light; for as light sheweth it selfe, and with it selfe all those things which are contained

within it; so phantasy sheweth it selfe, and that which maketh it.

c 1.3 Phantasy is an impression in the Soul: Cleanthes addes, an im∣pression by depression and eminence, as that impression, which is made in Wax by a Seal.

Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd; for 1. saith he, When the soule first apprehends a triangle and a square, it will follow, that the same body, at the same time, must have in it selfe seve∣rall figures, which is absurd. Again, whereas many phantasies are together consistent in us, the Soul must have divers figures, which is worse then the former: He therefore conceived, that Zeno used the word Impression, for Alteration, meaning thus: Fantasy is an alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer ab∣surd, that the same body (many severall phantasies being at the same time consistent in us) should receive severall alterations. For, as the aire receiving at once innumerable different percus∣sions, hath presently many alterations; so the supream part of the soule, receiving various phantasies, doth something which hath proportion and conformity thereto.

Some object that this exposition is not right; because, though every phantasy is an impression and alteration in the Soul; yet, every impression or alteration of the Soul is not phantasy: as when the finger smarts or itches, and the hand is rubbed, there is then an impression and alteration in the soul; but it is not phantasy, because it is not in the supream part of the soul.

They answer, That in saying, an impression in the Soul, is im∣plyed as in the Soul as fully, as if we should say, phantasy is an impression in the Soul as in the Soul; as when we say, the white in the eye, we imply, as in the eye; that is, the white is in a cer∣tain part of the eye, which all men have so by nature. So when we say, Phantasy is an impression in the Soul, we imply the im∣pression to be made in the supream part thereof.

Others more elegantly answer, that the word Soul is taken two waies, either for the whole, or for the principall part: when we say, man consists of soul and body; or, that death is a separa∣tion of the soul from the body, we mean properly the supream part, wherein properly consists the motion and goods of the Soul. When Ze••o therefore calleth Phantasy an impression in the Soul, he is not to be understood of the whole Soul, but, of part thereof; as if he should say, Phantasy is an alteration of the supream part of the Soul.

To this interpretation, some object thus: Appetition, Assen∣tion, and Comprehension are alterations in the supream part of the soul; but, these differ from phantasy, that being a certain kinde of perswasion and affection, whereas this is more operati∣on then appetition, therefore the definition is not good, being competible to many other things.

They answer by recourse to 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (impliances) that a defi∣nition is understood to be in all. As he who saith, Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendship, im∣plyeth amongst young people; so when we say, that phantasy is an alteration in the supream part of the soul, we imply by per∣swasion; for, alteration is not made by operation.

d 1.4 Of Phantasies there are many kinds, some are sensible, others not-sensible. Sensible are those which are received through one or more of the sences: Not-sensible are those which are received through the minde, as of incorporealls, and other things com∣prehended by reason. The sensible formed from things that are, are made with concession and assent. There are also apparitions of phantasies, proceeding from things which are.

Again, some are rationall, others irrationall; rationall, those of reasonable creatures; irrationall, those of unreasonable. The ra∣tionall are intelligence, the irrationall have no name.

Again, some are artificiall, others in-artificiall; for, an Image is considered by an Artist one way, by him that is not an artist ano∣ther way.

e 1.5 Again, some are probable, some improbable: The probable are those which make an easie motion in the soul; as, It is now day, I discourse, and the like. The Improbable are of a contrary na∣ture, averting us from assent; as, it is day, the Sun is not above the earth; if it is dark, it is day. Both probable and improbable are those, which, by relation to other things, are sometimes such, as in doubtfull speeches, neither probable nor improbable are such, as these, The staires are even, the staires are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantasies, some are true, some are false, some are neither true nor false. True are those, whose predication is true, as, It is day, 'tis light: False, whose predica∣tion is false; Both true and false, as happened to Orestes in his mad∣nesse, meeting Electra; that he met something, it was true, for it was Electra; but, that it was a fury, was false. Neither true nor false are those which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not such as the Species in all respects: as, of men, some are Grecians, some are Barbarous; but, man in generall is not Gre∣cian, for then all men must be Grecians, neither barbarous, for the same reason.

Of true Phantasies, some are comprehensive, others are not-comprehensive. Not-comprehensive are those which happen through sicknesse, or perturbation of minde; many being troubled with frenzie or melancholly, attract a true phantasy which is not comprehensive, even from that which extrinsecally occurrs ca∣sually, for which reason, they neither assert it often, nor assent unto it. Comprehensive phantasie is that which is impressed and signed by that which is, and conformable to that which is, so as it cannot be of that which is not.

To comprehensive phantasie three conditions are requisite▪ 1. That it arise from that which is; for many phantasies arise from that which is not, as in mad men. 2. That it be conforma∣ble to that which is; for some phantasies are from that which is, but represents the similitude of that which is not: as Orestes de∣rived a phantasie from that which was, viz. from Electra, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the furies. Comprehensive phantasie must be conformable to that which is, and so impressed and signed, as that it may im∣print artificially all the properties of the thing phancied, as Gravers touch all the parts of those things which they imitate, and the impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and per∣fectly beareth all its characters. Lastly, that it be without im∣pediment; for sometimes comprehensive phantasie is not credi∣table, by reason of outward circumstances; as when Hercules brought Alcestis taken out of the Earth, to Admetus, Admetus drew from Alcestis a comprehensive phantasie, but did not cre∣dit it; for, he consider'd, that she was dead, and therefore could not rise again, but, that sometimes Spirits appear in the shape of the deceased.

f 1.6 Phantasy, Phantaston, Phantasticon, and Phantasme, according to Chrysippus, differ thus: Phantasy is a passion made in the Soul, which sheweth it selfe, and that which made it; as, when with our eyes we see white, it is a passion engendred by sight in the Soul, and we may call this a passion, because the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us: the like of smelling and touching.

Phantaston is that which maketh phantasie; as the white and the cold, and whatsoever is able to move the Soul, that is phan∣taston.

Phantasticon is a frustaneous attraction, a passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing; as in those who sight with shadowes, or extend their hands in vain: for, to phantasy is objected phan∣taston, but phantasticon hath no object.

Phantasme is that, to which we are attracted by that frustra∣neous attraction, which happens in melancholy, or mad persons; as Orestes in the Tragedy, when he saith,

Bring hither, Mother, I implore, These snakie bloodie Maids no more, Whose very lookes wound me all o're.

This he saith in his madnesse, for he saw nothing: wherefore Electra answers him,

Ah quiet in thy bed (unhappy) lie: Thou seest not what thou thinkst before thy eye.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Laert.
• b 1.2

  Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12.
• c 1.3

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2.
• d 1.4

  Laert.
• e 1.5

  Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2.
• f 1.6

  Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12.